Appendix — Trivette v. New York Life Insurance (No. 103)

Supreme Court brief1961

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APPENDIX I

Action No. 505

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

Mupprep C. TRIVETTE - - - 7 7 ~ Plaintiff

Vs:

New York Lire INSURANCE COMPANY - Defendant

OPINION OF DISTRICT COURT

(Reporter’s Note—After the introduction of all

the evidence of the plaintiff, the defendant, by counsel,

in the absence of the jury, moved the Court for a di-

rected verdict in its favor. The following is the ruling

of the Court on the defendant's motion for a directed

verdict. ) :

The Court: Are you familiar with the case of

Prudential Insurance Company Vs. Tuggle’s Admin-

istrator, 254 Ky. 814, 72 S. W. 2d 440?

Mr. Hinton: Yes, sir.

The Court: How do you distinguish this case from

that one? 7

Mr. Hinton: I don’t remember that case exactly.

The Court: I want to read that case to you. It

was decided by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in 1934.

I cannot distinguish that case from this case. If lam

in error, I want you to point it out to me.

oa

“The appellant seeks to reverse a judgment of

#1,000 recovered against it by the appellee upon an

insurance contract for the alleged accidental death of

his intestate.

“Ivan Tuggle: was an employee of the Louisville

& Nashville Railroad Company at the time of his death.

He was a locomotive fireman having been demoted from

engineer, doubtless due to reduction in forces as a ye-

sult of the depression. The railroad company was car-

rying a group insurance policy for the benefit of its

employees. The decedent was protected by this insur-

ance, which provided for the payment of a death ben-

efit of $3,000.00, which has been paid, and provided

further, in the event the death was a result of an acci-

dent, as defined in the policy, for an additional benefit

of $1,000.00.

‘The decedent died instantly from the effect of

a gunshot wound on the 7th day of September, 1931.

This tragedy occurred under the floor of the house

where the decedent lived about 10:30 o'clock a.m. on

that day. The house was built on a steep hillside, and

the natural surface never had been disturbed. Conse-

quently the lower side of the house was considerably

above the ground, and the surface sloped upward at an

angle of about forty-five degrees. The house was sup-

ported by a concrete foundation, and there was a door

leading under the house at the lower side considerably

toward the rear of the house. Coal and kindling were

kept under there, and it was a dark and uninviting

place, The public school in Hazard opened the morn-

ing of the tragedy, and the children of the community

had gone to school. The appellee claims that the trag-

edy was an accident and that the decedent’s death was

the result of accidental means, as defined by the policy,

which appellant denies, and as an additional defense

it alleges that he zommitted suicide.”’

Su

That is the identical position of the pleadings in

this case.

The poliey is not before us, Aemaster policy No.

(71788 was issued, and that, it is alleged, is in the hands

of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company. Cer-

tifieates were issued to the railroad's various employ-

ees, and to Tuggle there was issued certificate No, 62485

but even that is not here, so we must gather the provi-

sions of this contract from the pleadings. The follow-

ing undenied allegation is copied from appellant’s an-

swer: ‘The defendant says that in and by the terms of

the said group insurance policy it is provided that no

accidental death benefits shall be payable if such death

resulted from suicide—whether the insured should be

sane or insane’.”’

Was that the case here?

Mr. Blackwell: With two of the policies, suicide,

sane or insane. The other two use the words ‘‘self-

destruction.”’

The Court: ‘*That must be taken as the part of the

contract that is determinative of the rights of these

parties, and the issue was whether Tuggle died from

accident as alleged by appellee or committed suicide

as alleged by appellant.

‘There is evidence that the deceased was generally

even tempered and very friendly; that he was a jolly,

friendly fellow, and seldom angry; that ordinarily he

had a smile for everybody; that he had a good position,

and had a family to which he was devoted, and appellee

had much evidence he was happily situated. Even so,

he had been acting queerly. He had lain out some place

all the night before the tragedy. His wife became

alarmed during the night, and about 12:30 or 1 o'clock

made inquiry about him of a neighbor, Mrs. Creola

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Barnett. Mrs. Barnett saw him next morning, a short

time before the tragedy. She asked him, ‘Did you get

your neck broke last night?’ He answered that he had

‘laid out last night’. About ten days before the trag-

edy the witness, Russell Eaton, passed him on the

street, spoke to him and passed the time of day with

him, but he passed on and disregarded the witness.

They were well acquainted, and the deceased seemed

to be ina study or troubled about something. The wit-

ness, Felix Gilbert, operated a restaurant near the

railroad yards. About a week or ten days before the

tragedy the deceased went to the restaurant and or-

dered a dinner. He stated that he was hungry and

stayed at home until dinner was ready and then got

mad and came off without his dinner. These facts are

an indication of the change that had come over the

deceased during a short time before the tragedy. These

facts show a radical change in his disposition. One of

the witnesses who had worked with him stated that he

seldom became angry, but we find him getting so mad

that he left dinner at home and ate at a restaurant.

This was only a week or ten days before the tra -edy.

“The evidence unmistakably shows that the 1 ice

of the tragedy was dark and uninviting. It was so

dark under there that one of the witnesses nearly

stumbled over the body before he discovered it. They

struck matches and used flashlights in finding their

way to where the body was found and in making their

observations. There was in this basement a steel bar-

rel or drum standing on end against the concrete wall

at the lower side and between the door leading under

the house and street. Appellant claims that the de-

ceased became disgusted with things for some reason

and took his gun and went to this basement for the

deliberate purpose of committing suicide. The arms

of the deceased were long enough to permit him to rest

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his gun across this barrel, to place the muzzle of the

gun against the side of his head, and then reach back

and trip off the trigger with his left hand.

“The bullet entered the left side of his head near

his ear and passed through and came out at the top of

his head. There was no powder burn on the side of his

head; the gun was lying across the top of the barrel at

the time it was discharged. A mark on the concrete

wall indicated where, due to the recoil, the gun struck

when it was discharged. The bullet entered the oppo-

site bank in the line with the gun in the position we

have indicated and was recovered in the presence of

several persons. The only explanation we can see of

the fact that the deceased was shot through his head

as we have indicated is that he knelt, squatted, or

hunkered down in front of the gun and deliberately

committed suicide. The evidence shows without con-

tradiction that under such facts there would be uo

powder burns. It seems that where the muzzle of a

gun is held against the flesh and tired, the smoke and

flame follow the ball into the wound. See Epperson v.

Com., 227 Ky. 404, 18 S. W. (2d) 247. There were

blood and brains on the inside of the muzzle of the

barrel due to ‘back suction’ after the gun was (lis-

charged with the muzzle pressed against the side of

the head. This was a Springfield army rifle, a power-

ful gun; a copper-jacketed 30-30 bullet was used. The

gun had a range of over a mile and a half. The effect

of the shot was to completely crush the head and to

cause immediate death. These are most unusual cir-

eumstances to reconcile with the theory of accidental

death. In the first place, there is no apparent reason

why he should have had the gun in such a place. He

did not drop it, for it was carefully placed on ton of the

barrel. He had to be kneeling, squatting, or hunkering

down for the bullet to strike him in the head. If he had

6a

been a little way from the muzzle of the gun, there cer-

tainly would have been no back suction of brains and

blood into the end of the gun barrel, and there prob-

ably would have been powder burn. The most logical

explanation of this strange set of facts is that he took

the gun under there to commit suicide; that, after plae-

ing the gun on the barrel, he placed himself at the

muzzle in a kneeling or squatting position with the end

of the gun barrel against the side of his head. Then,

by stretching in order to reach the trigger, he would

necessarily tilt his head so the bullet would pass

through and out at the top of his head. No other ex-

planation is consistent with the facts.

‘* Appellant insists it was entitled to a directed ver-

dict. In determining that we must take into considera-

tion the presumption against suicide and the fact that

by section 2062a-21 Ky. Stats., the copy of the death

certificate filed is made prima facie evidence of the

facts therein stated, and in this ease it is stated Tug-

gle’s death was the result of an accidental gunshot

wound. Conceding but not deciding that it was com-

petent for this certificate to contain such a statement,

then its prima facie evidence effect is nothing more

than a presumption. In this ease, if no other evidence

has been introduced. either of these presumptions

would have heen enough to require the giving of a di-

rected verdict for the appellee, thus each of them has

some weight, but how much? A fieck of eiderdown has

some weight, yet it is so inconsiderable that, just as

soon as almost any material thing is placed upon the

opposing scale pan, the scale is tipped by the first sub-

stantive evidence for the appellant, though the idea is

very prevalent that, when a litigant by evidence puts

himself in a position where by some statute that posi-

tion is said to be prima facie established, his position is

Val

as secure as if it had a stone wall built about it, vet

such is not the case.

A man concealed by an enshrouding fog is just?

as securely protected from enemies by whom he is be-

leagured as the man who has made no more than a

prima facie case. The one’s protection is destroyed

and he is left exposed and helpless when the rays of the

sun or the winds scatter the fog, and the other finds his

prima facie case destroyed by the first breath of sub-

stantive evidence against him.

**Presumptious are indulged in to supply facts,

and do not arise where the facts are known, 22 C. J.,

p. 83, Section 25. Ordinarily, presumptions must give

place when in conflict with clear, distinct, and cCONVINC=

ing proof. 10 R. C. L., p. 868, Section 10. In Jones

on Evidence, (2nd Ed.), Section 32, it is thus stated:

‘Presumptions are only intended to take the place of

facts and cannot be relied upon where the facts are

shown; or that no presumption can stand in the face of

facts. According to such authorities a presumption is

an artificial thing, a mere house of ecards, which one

moment stands with sufficient force to determine an

ixsue, but at the next, by reason of the slightest rebut-

ting evidence, topples utterly out of consideration of

the trier of facts.’

‘This is taken from Brunswick vs. Standard Acci-

dent Ins. Co., 278 Mo. 154, 213 S. W. 45, 50, 7 A.L.R.,

page 1213 (a suicide case) ; ‘Presumptions are the bats

of the law, which the light of evidence frightens and

causes to fly away. Mockowik v. Kansas City, Bt. J.&

C. B. R. Co., 196 Mo. 550, loc. cit. 571, 94S. W. 256.’

‘¢ As to the contents of the death certificate, the rule

is not different, as will appear from this which is tak-

en from Jones on Evidence, (2nd Ed.), Section 509:

‘Prima facie evidence in legal intendment means evi-

dence which if unrebutted or unexplained is sufficient

>

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to maintain the proposition and warrant the conclusion

to support which it has been introduced, but it does not

shift the general burden of proof, and stands only until

the contrary is shown.’

‘*For example, see Federal Fidelity Co. v. Roval

Mortgage & Finance Co., 252 Ky. 716, 68 S. W. 2d 25.

The Federal Fidelity Company had a prima facie case

established by its note with the name of Hoodenpy]

signed thereto, but the moment Hoodenpy! denied that

signature its prima facie case was destroyed, and a

directed verdict against it was affirmed.

‘‘A good illustration is afforded by Section 890,

Ky. Stats., which makes the killing or injury of stock

by an engine or car of a railroad company prima facie

evidence of negligence, yet, if the evidence of no negli-

gence is otherwise uncontradicted, there is no issue to

submit to the Jury. Crawford v. Southern Ry., 150 Ky.

741, 150 S. W. 990; Kentucky Central R. Co. v. Talbot,

78 Ky. 621; MeGhee v. Guyn, 98 Ky. 210, 32 S. W. 615,

17 Ky. Law Rep. 794.

‘With the presumption against suicide and the

statements of this death certiticate out of the way, let

us look at the evidence.

‘‘We have abundant facts proven from which it

can be inferred Tuggle committed suicide, and a con-

clusion rested on an inference is sound. See Kidd v.

Modern Amusement Co., 252 Ky. 386, 67 S. W. (2d)

466. We have no facts from which we can infer this

was an accident. Of course, one may guess this was an

accident by supposing Tuggle had taken his gun into

this basement to kill a rat and discharged it acciden-

taliy, but a supposition has no legitimate support or

habitation in judicial administration. Louisville &

NR. Co. v. Mann’s Adm’r., 227 Ky. 399,13 S. W. (2d)

257; Kidd v. Modern Amusement Co., 252 Ky. 386,

67S. W. (2d) 466.

“We are persuaded that this whieh is taken from

a svilabus written by the court in the case of Agen v.

Metropolitan Lite Ins. Co.. 105 Wis, 215, 80 hy es

1020, 1021, 76 Am. St. Rep. 905 is correct: ‘Where the

reasonable probabilities from the evidence all point to

suicide as the eause of death, so as to establish it. in

the light of reason and common sense, with such cer-

tainty as to leave no room for a reasonable controversy

on the subject, a jury should not be permitted to tind

to the contrary and have such finding stand asa verity

in the ease, but the question should be decided by the

trial court as one of law."

“We will diseuss briefly some of the authorities

cited hy the appellee. One is the case of Curtis v. Lou-

isville City Railway Co., 14 Ky. Law Rep. 272, in wiach

ease the superior court said: *A peremptory instruction

ix not authorized where the plaintiff has made out a

prima facie case by his own evidence, no matter how

strong and convincing the court may deem the defen-

dant’s evidence to he.’

“That case came to this court. and this court's opin-

ion may be found in 94 Ky. 5738, 28 8. W. 363, 15 Ky.

Law Rep. 351, 21 L. R. A. 649, and with the opinion of

the superior court before it this court did not adopt

that language or approve it. Appellee cites the case of

Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Louisville Trust Co., 207

Ky. 654, 269 S. W. 1014. How that case can have any

application to this one we are unable to see. He cites

the case of Brunswick v. Standard Accident Insurance

Co., 978 Mo. 154, 213 S. W. 45, 7 ALL.R. 1218.) But au

examination of that opinion will disclose that neither

the pleadings. upon either side, nor the instruction,

nor the evidence, except the policy, contained the word

‘snicide’. The defense in that ease was not rested upon a

claim that the deceased had committed suicide. Hence

that case is not applicable here. Appellee cites the case

of American Benevolent Association v. Stough, 83S.

W. 126, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 1093.) That was an action

Upou a life insurance policy, and of course, the plain-

tiff’s case Was made out as soon as the poliey was put

in evidence, and it Was shown that the insurer had been

furnished with proof that the insured was dead. The

insurer rested its defense upon the alleged suicide of

the deceased and the burden was on it to prove that.

In this case the beneficiary of this policy has alleged

that Tuggle’s death was accidental and in order to re-

cover the beneficiary must sustain the burden of prove

ing that. Appellee cites the case of Massachusetts Mu-

tual Life Insurance Co. v. Bush, 236 Ky. 400, 33S. W.

20351, which he says cannot he distinguished from this

one, But we think it ean. Bush was found dead seated

in his automobile. The motor was running, he had his

pistol in his Jap, and it was on a public road. There

were other circumstances tending to indicate his death

was accidental. Thus we need say nothing about

whether or not we would adhere to that opinion if the

facts were not distinguishable from the facts in this

Case,

“So reserving all other questions, we have con-

cluded the Court erred in overruling appellant’s motion

for a directed verdict.

* Judgment reversed."’

Now, in the case at bar, it seems to me that for the

Court to deny this motion, would be flying in the teeth

of that. We have here a stronger case for the defend-

ant than was had in the case I just read. We have an

eyewitness to the fact that this man showed by his atti-

tude at the dinner table, after he had left the table. the

fact that he took two drinks of whiskey in the imme-

diate presence of a witness, he showed a sullen ill-

tempered attitude, he tore up his clothes, which was not

the usual or normal thing to do. He then left the house

and went and got this pistol and was gone for twenty

minutes. He came back inte the reom. and took the

pistol and put it toe lus head and pulled the trigger,

Now, those conditions are terrifwing and heartrendiag,

T.know, but that’s what happened. What bas the jury

got to decide? You cant say that because a man did a

thing like that. that it was an aeeident. Ttoamay have

heen unnatural something that could tot have resasen-

ably been antieipated, but he deliberately went out. get

his gun. eame back, was gone for a period of about

twenty qinutes, drank seme whiskey. a couple of

times. There is no evidenee that anvene struek dis

arm. There is no evidence that lis arm struck any-

thing. T would certaindy. as would the jury, as stated

by counsel for both sides, have every svinpathy for this

family, but it would serve ne purpose te have this case

decided here. and proceed with it further, have it ape

pealed. and have it brought back or reversed and dis-

mnissed. That is not serving ay purpose Whatsoever,

If there was anything at all omwliech the plamitiff

eould hang the possibility of the man having—oef the

pisto) having been exploded by anything other than

the trigger tinger of the mut who was killed. There i-

noteven an imaginary idea that it happened any other

wav. Tn the first place the pistol is a very large pistol,

unusnally so. and to say that it exploded with io rea-

sonat all exeept that the trigger was pulled would be

to ask fora credulity which this court doesn't possess.

Not only that, but we have in this case the further

proposition that this man had. on prior oeeasions.

While ao witness testifies that he ever threatened te kill

himself. he had on oecasion gotten out this gun. flour-

ished it around, and indieated that he would—actually

—right in this very room, nad shot through the ceiling,

and on another occasion, in Indiana, had gotten out

the gun and gone out on the walk and fired it off. and

tc

~

on another occasion had gotten it out and kicked the

furniture around, knocked the lamps off the table and

did considerable damage to the home furnishings. Then

he had gotten the pistol out and directed his wife to

clean up the mess. Then, at this time, coming in and

With no reason at all, except that the steaks were tough,

got ina very surly and black mood. While they don't

use the exact words, it is certainly more than a reason-

able inference to say that his wife and family were

afraid of him. He went through the house and sat

down in front of the television and they could see that

he was not at himself. Then he went out of the

house, stayed for some several minutes and came hack

in the house with, apparently, this large pistol stuck

into his belt. He took it out and put it to his head and

killed himself. What has the jury got to decide? To

say that there is even a suggestion of that bemg an

accident is to call for a basic fact that doesn't exist in

this case when the facts are all to the contrary.

At the time of the case which Mr. Hinton referred

to, which was some twenty-four years before this case

which I read of Prudential Insurance Company v. Tug-

gle’s Administrator, which was decided in 1934, since

that time, in Nugent vs. Nugent's Administrater, 281

Ky. 263, 185 S. W. (2) 877, the scintilla rule has heen

abolished. The scintilla rule was in effect at the time

this Tuggle case was decided, and it has been followed

since that time saying that even though there is A scin-

tilla of evidence that the Court should not decline to

give a directed verdict where the facts show ta the

contrary.

In my opinion, gentlemen, there is no point in pro-

longing something unless there is a basis of law on

which it might rest. In my opinion, in this case it

was conclusively shown that it was not the result of an

accident but it was the result of a deliberate act on the

loa

part of the deceased, under circumstances under which,

by no stretch of the imagination, could the jury cou-

clude that there was an accident. That will be the

judgment of the court.

The Court: Members of the Jury, under the law,

when the plaintiff has introduced its case and offered

all the evidence it proposes to offer, and there is pre-

sented no issue of fact for the jury te decide, it is the

duty of the presiding judge of the court to direct a

verdiet for the defendant.

The case which you have been trying is one in-

volving the single question of whether or not this de-

ceased, Maurice Trivette, committed suicide or whether

he died as the result of an accident. The issue, as TI

say, is narrow, and under the evidence which has been

offered to vou here, there can be but one conclusion that

ean be reached, and that is that he teok the pistol and

put it to his head and killed himself. So, there is no

issue of fact which the court could submit to you for

your determination.

Where one meets a violent death, or an unnatural

death, as we say, it may become a question as to how

that thing oeceurred, whether it was an accident or

whether it was a deliberate act. There can be no doubt

from the evidence shown in this case, or the reasonable

inferences which may be drawn from it, that this man

did commit suicide. There could not possibly be drawn

an inference or deduction that that gun exploded hy

any accidental means. It was a deliberate act of the

decedent, Maurice Trivette.

So, I am going to direct you to find a verdict for

the defendant. I have prepared here, through the:

Clerk, the following verdict: ‘‘Under direction of the

Court, we the jury find for the defendant.” (See Ap-

pendix, pp. 15a-27a).

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‘ APPENDIX II

No. 13910

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Miuprep C. TRIVETTE - - - Plaintiff-Appellant

V.

NEW York Lire INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant-A ppellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Kentucky

Decided October 31, 1960 _

OPINION OF CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

Before MILLER and Pops, Circuit = and

KENT, District Judge.

Kent, District Judge. This action is based upon

tour policies of insurance issued by the defendant com-

pany prior to the death of the insured, Maurice Tri-

vette, of which the plaintiff widow was the beneficiary.

Under the terms of the policies ‘‘double indemnity”’

was to be paid in the event of accidental death. The

principal amount of the four policies was $30,000,

which was paid by the defendant company. The Dis-

trict Court directed a verdict against the plaintiff

(appellant) at the conclusions of the plaintiff’s proofs.

lda

The issue is whether the plaintiff is entitled to double

indemnity for the death of the insured.

During the argument in this Court plaintiff's

counsel conceded that the decedent shot himself. — It

was the theory and claim of the plaintiff that the dece-

dent “might not’ have intended to shoot the gun, that

he “might not’* have intended to kill himself, that he

only intended to ‘scare’ the members of his family.

Admittedly, he put the gun to his forehead in the pres-

ence of the plaintiff and the gun was fired resulting in

the death of the devedent. Plaintiff relies upon Diek v.

New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 427 (and other cases

which need not be discussed), a case decided under the

law of North Dakota in which the Supreme Court of the

United States held that the burden was upon the in-

surer to establish that the death of the insured was due

to suicide. Under Frie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304

U.S. 64, this Court and the District Court are required

to follow the law of the State of Kentucky. The trial

court had before it the decision of the Court of Appeals

of the State of Kentueky in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Tug-

gle’s Admr., 254 Ky. 814, 72 S. W. 2d 440. After that

decision and prior to the argument of the principal

case hefore this Court, the Court of Appeals of Ken-

tucky decided Prudential Ins. Co. v. Hattie Bell Red-

wine, Adm’ of Ewen, 332 8. W. 2d 643 (1959). In

many respects the facts in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Red-

wine, supra, were similar to the facts in the present

ease and as pointed out by the Court at 382 8. W. 2d

643, at page 645—‘It must be remembered that the

plaintiff had the burden on the whole case of proving

death by accident. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.

Bush, 236 Ky. 400, 33 S. W. 2d 351.”

In Prudential Ins. Co. v. Redwine, supra, the

Court of Appeals of Kentucky approved its earlier de-

cision in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Tuggle’s Admr., supra.

Ga

The facts in the instant case are such as to require the

same result as that reached by the Court of Appeals of

Kentucky in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Redwine, supra.

The District Judge could not submit the principal

ease to the jury for speculation or surmise as to some

cause other than suicide for the death of the decedent.

At the conclusion of the argument on the motion for a

directed verdict Judge Swinford stated in part—

“In my opinion, gentlemen, there is no point

in prolonging something unless there is a basis of

law on which it might rest. In my opinion, in this

ease it was conclusively shown that it was not the

result of an accident but it was the result of a

deliberate act. on the part of the deceased, wader

circumstances under which, by no stretch of the

imagination, could the jury conclude that there

was an accident. That will be the judgment of

the court.”’

For the reasons set forth by Judge Swinford as

the basis for directing a verdict for the defendant, and

on authority of Prudential Ins. Co. v. Tuggle’s Admr.,

supra, and Prudential Ins. Co. v. Redwine, supra, the

decision of the District Court must be affirmed.

Pork, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

Since I find myself unable to concur in the major-

ity opinion, I think I should state the reasons for my

disagreement. They are several.

The opinion assumes that the rule of Erie Railroad

Co. v. Tompkins is to be applied here. As I shall indi-

cate later, I think a more complete statement of the

facts would call for a different result even assuming

the propriety of the Erie Railroad Co. approach. But

if, as I am convinced, this case is not ruled by Erie,

then the reasons for a different result are even

stronger.

lia

I realize that in Lovas v. General Motors Corp., 6

eir., 212 F. 2d 805, this court said that in a diversity

‘ase Whether a plaintiff's evidence is sufficient to take

the case to the jury is a question to be decided accord-

ing to state law. But an examination of that case

shows that it was decided, as the court said, upon prin-

ciples that ‘tare well settled under both state and fed-

eral law."’ It cannot be said that any different result

would have been reached no matter which law, state or

federal, Was apphed. In short, it cannot be said that

the expressed view as to the applicability of the Erie

Railroad case Was necessary to the decision. Our case,

however, is one which might well turn on the question

Whether Lam right in my view that, as put by Profes-

sor Moore?" The sufficiency of certain evidence to raise

a question of fact for the jury... shordld not be con-

trolled by state law.*”

As time goes on it becomes increasingly clear that,

as often stated by the Fifth Circuit, ‘*[t]he kind of

jury trial to which the parties are entitled in Federal

Courts under Rules 38 and 39 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, 28 U.S. C. A., is that preserved by

the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution, to which

the doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. vy. Tompkins, .. . is

of course subservient.’” Pogue v. Great Atlantic & Pa-

eifie Tea Company, 242 F.2d 575, 582."

‘The Lovas case was one in which the physical facts were such

that the,e was “no substantial evidence of probative value to sup-

port the appellant’s charge.”

* Moore’s Federal Practice, 2nd Ed., § 38.10, p. 102.

*T am not suggesting a reexamination by this court, as now con-

stituted. In some circuits with which I am familiar, reexamination

under such circumstances is accomplished after reargument before

the court sitting en banc.

* Other cases to the same effect in the Fifth Circuit are: Reuter v.

Eastern Air Lines, 226 F. 2d 443, 445; Revlon v. Buchanan, 271 F. 2d

795, 800.

lSa

This ix exactly the same principle applied by the

Supreme Court in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Cooperative, 356

U. S. 525, 537, where the Court said: ‘“‘An essential

characteristic of that system is the manner in which, in

civil common-law actions, it distributes trial functions

between judge and jury and, under the influence—if

not the command—of the Seventh Amendment, assigns

the decisions of disputed questions of fact to the jury.

... The policy of uniform enforcement of state-created

rights and obligations, . .. eannot in every case exact

compliance with a state rule—not bound up with rights

and obligations—which disrupts the federal system of

allocating functions between judge and jury.”’

I am not suggesting that the Byrd case dealt with

the precise question presented in the case now before

us. It is plain that the Supreme Court has not thus

far directly expressed itself upon the question which I

here discuss.* But the clarity with which the Court

there declares the principle which underlies the deci-

sion of the Fifth Circuit in the Pogue case, to my mind

furnishes clear evidence that when it does find occasion

to speak, the Supreme Court will agree with what was

said in the Pogue ease.

In my opinion there are compelling reasons for

regarding the position of the Fifth Circuit as the only

tenable one. Such is also the view of the Courts of

Appeals for the Fourth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits.

Duvis Frozen Foods v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co..

* Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U. S. 464, sometimes mis-

understood, is discussed by Moore, § 38.10 supra, who suggests it

should be regarded as “a novel application of the doctrine of ‘the law

of the case.’” I agree with Judge Magruder that it “had to do with

the application of the doctrine of res judicata, which certainly is a

matter of substantive law.” Schell v. Ford Motor Co., 270 F. 2d 384,

388 (dissenting opinion, cited infra, note 8). The most conclusive indi-

cation that the Supreme Court considers it has not decided this ques-

tion is the fact that in Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U. S. 437,

445, the Court noted the decisions of the Courts of Appeals without

any reference to any decision of its own.

19a

1953) 4 cir, 204 F. 2d 839, 842; State of Washington v.

United States, (1954) 9 cir, 214 F. 2d 63, 40; Smith v.

Buck, (1957) 245 F. 2d 348, 349, 9 cir.; Allen v. Matson

Navigation Company, (1958) 9 cir., 255 F. 2d 273, 281-

282." Diederich v. American News Co., (1942) 10 cir.,

128 FY. 2d 144; Basham v. City Bus Co., (1955), 10 eir.,

219 F.2d 547; Miller ve Irby, (1955) 10 cir., 227 F. 2d

942.

As noted in Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.

S. 437, 445, not all of the courts of appeals have agreed

upon this proposition. An examination of those cases

which have purportedly followed state decisions as to

What constitutes a sufficient case for the Jury convinces

me that in the main they are distinguishable either on

the ground that the court found it unnecessary in the

particular case to pass upon this point, or because the

‘ase really involved a problem of state substantive law

such as the existence of presumptions and the location

of burden of proof.’

For instance, the ‘atest discussion of a similar

question in the Second Circuit is to be found in Presser

Royalty Company Vv. Chase Manhattan Bank, (1959)

272 F.2d 838, 840. There the court said: ‘‘In this di-

versity action brought in the Southern District of New

York and involving only issues of state law the ques-

tion whether the evidence was sufficient to take the

case to the jury is probably to he determined by New

York law."*) (Emphasis mine.) The use of the word

“In this last case the court cited with approval the rule stated by

Moore, supra, and the Pogue case, supra, and noted that the state

court’s decisions indicated that the state court would reach the same

conclusion. See footnote 11, p. 282. Also in that case, although juris-

diction was predicated upon diversity of citizenship, the action was to

recover for a maritime tort. See footnote 5 and accompanying text

commented upon in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.,

358 U. S. 354, 376 (footnote 44).

7 That these latter are to be regarded as questions of substantive

law was stated in Dick v. New York Life Insurance Co., supra, at p.

446.

20a

‘*probably”’ clearly indicates that the court found it

unnecessary for the purposes of the case to decide the

question, and also that it had some reservations upon

the question.

This is further indicated by the fact that the court

called attention to a dissenting opinion of Judge Ma-

gruder expressing an opposite view. (In Pierce Con-

sulting Eng. Co. v. City of Burlington, Vt., (1955), 221

F. 2d 607, which the court cited, the court showed sim-

ilar doubts as to whether state law controlled. citing

Moore and cases from the Fourth and Tenth circuits. )

Interestingly, although the court cited a number of

other cases from the Second Circuit, it failed to cite its

own decision in Reynolds v. Pegler, 223 F. 2d 429, 433-

434, where it is said that the *‘hetter view’? would seem

to be that expressed by Moorc and by decisions in the

Ninth and Tenth Cireuits. I am of the opinion that

the question is still an open one in the Second Circuit."

~The question has not I think been presented for decision in the

First Circuit although twice Judge Magruder, dissenting, has posed

the question here discussed; on one occasion reserving judgment on

the point, and on another suggesting that the point he sought to make

would have been a better ground for the court’s conclusion. These

cases are Metropolitan Coal Co. v. Johnson, | cir.. 265 F. 2d 173, dissent

at p. 182; and Schell v. Ford Motor Co., 270 F. 2d 384, dissent at 387.

In the Third Circuit, that court purported to follow the local state rule

as to what was required to make a case for the jury. Lennig v. New

York Life Ins. Co., (1941) 122 F. 2d 871; Waldron v. Aetna Casualty

Co., (1944) 141 F. 2d 230. It seems plain they are based upon a mis-

understanding of the Stoner case, cited supra, note 5. In Clay County

Cotton Co. v. Home Life Insurance Co.. 113 F. 2d 856, the Eighth Cir-

cuit appears to recognize the rule stated by Moore that in respect to

the procedural questions a federal court in a diversity case will follow

the federal law. However, in the final paragraph of the court's opin-

ion it held that a motion for a directed verdict raised a question of

substantive law, namely, whether aggravation of a pre-existing dis-

ease through accident constituted accidental injury; accordingly it

followed the state law. In Curry v. Pyramid Life Ins. Co., 8 cir., 271

F. 2d 1, 3, the court quoted with approval from the Byrd case, supra,

the statement of that Court that “It cannot be gainsaid that there is a

strong federal policy against allowing state rules to disrupt the jucge-

jury relationship in the federal courts.”

I am therefore confident that Professor Moore is

hasing his conclusion upon what is the great weight of

authority in the federal courts when he stated in the

section previously referred to that the sufficiency of

certain evidence to raise a question of fact for the jury

should not be controlled by state law but is rather a

question of federal law under the federal system which,

in the language of the Byrd case, supra, ‘distributes

trial function between judge and jury and, under the

influence —if not the command —of the Seventh

Amendment, assigns the decisions of disputed ques-

tion of fact to the jury.’

If l am right in that. then, when the full facts in

this case are considered it seems clear to me that the

Judgment should be reversed.

As I read the majority opinion, the facts of this

not too simple case are recited in a single sentence

where it is said decedent ‘tput the gun to his forehead

in the presence of the plaintiff and the gun was fired

resulting in the death of the decedent.’’ This state-

ment is not only inaccurate but very incomplete.

At the time of his death Trivette was 45 vears of

age. He had two children by a former marriage, and

appellant and he were married in 1945. They had four

children born of their marriage, the eldest of whom was

10 and the youngest, 5. These four children and the

voungest of the children by the former marriage lived

With him and the appellant. He was engaged in the

eoul mining business and as an adjunct to it operated

a garage. The business was prosperous; he drew a

salary as executive vice-president and general manager

of $700 per month. His wife and oldest son each drew

a salary or dividend also. He had no business prob-

lems; he was attentive to and affectionate with his wife

and «hildren and within a week preceding his death he

oan

had made plans to install a children’s playground for

his on and the community children on an adjacent lot.

He had no health problems. In short, the evidence neg-

atives any possible motive or reason for suicide.

The evidence does disclose that Trivette was given

to occasional fits of anger in which his aetions were so

fantastic and bizarre as to indieate a serious mental

instability. During these explosive tantrums Trivette

would engage in violent actions usually accompanied

by shooting of the pistol. Some 10 years previous to

his death when the family lived in Indiana, Trivette

hecame ‘quite angry’? when he had had trouble with

some hired hands and ‘the got the gun out,’’ ‘stomped

out the house,”’ fired his pistol and was found outside

sitting on the sidewalk. Some seven years later he be-

came angry because of an interruption of his Saturday

night dinner plans and ‘‘broke up all the things in the

living room’’; ‘‘just started swiping everything off the

tables and wrecking them off, and there was glass all

over the living room and dining room.” He got his

gun out and ‘slung it around just like he was swing-

ing his hands around before and ordered his wife to

clean up the mess.’’ Approximately two years prior to

his death in another similar tantrum he got his pistol

and shot out the light in the center of the ceiling of his

bedroom, the same room in which he was finally shot.

The testimony indicated that after such demonstrations

of anger he would quickly recover and often when they

occurred he had been drinking whiskey.

On the occasion when he was shot he went into a

similar tantrum. He had eaten dinner with his family

and the steaks served had been selected by his brother-

in-law with whom Trivette was out of sorts on account

of the former’s failure to repay a loan owing to Tri-

vette; the steaks proved to be tough and Trivette re-

fused to finish his dinner and became sullen. He con-

23a

tinued sullen and incommunicative and then went to

the garage to get some money and after about twenty

minutes he returned to the house still in an ugly mood.

He went into his bedroom and motioned to his

wife to come in. His wife had bought him a shirt and

a pair of slacks and he was about to pack a bag in

order to spend a night at a motel to avoid night calls

from the garage. <At the sight of the shirt and slacks

he hecame violent; he found the sleeves of the shirt

about a quarter of an inch too long and tore it and the

slacks saying: ‘‘Don’t buy me any more clothes.’’ He

threw the torn slacks and shirt across the bed toward

his wife; he was then standing in a narrow space be-

tween the bed and the wall with his right side next to

the wall. At this point his wife started to get up to

calm_him when suddenly he pulled a gun from under

his coat and belt with his right hand and with a-single

sudden motion ‘‘like a flash’’ fired the pistol upward.

The-pistol was a 44 Special Smith & Wesson revolver

which measured 1214 inches from muzzle to butt with

a weight without ammunition of 38 ounces. It was

loaded with 5 cartridges each 114 inch in length.

It is a permissible inference from the record that

when Trivette ‘‘like a flash”’ and in a fit of blind anger

suddenly jerked this extraordinarily heavy gun from

his belt, he intended to do precisely what ue had done

before, shoot into the ceiling, and that in attempting to

do so all in one movement, his elbow struck the wall

by which he was standing and the shot was deflected to

hit the sidg of his head and range upwards to the top

of his head.’

® The majority opinion states that he “put the gun to his fore-

head.” This is inaccurate ir two respects. The bullet entered just

above and forward of the right ear. About the hole were powder

marks 34 of an inch in diameter from which it could be inferred that

the muzzle was not against his head. The bullet came out “just to the

left of the center line of the top of the head” and entered the ceiling

of the room, ranging upward at about a 50 degree angle.

2ti

Mrs. Trivette testified that he was standing close

to the wall; as he pulled out his gun and raised it, he

pulled his arm back; and although she did not actually

see his arm strike the wall, **I thought that he had be-

cause he was standing so close to the wall; I stood in

the same position he did and I could not see how he

could get the gun to his head without striking the

wall.”’

I think that a jury would properly infer that the

manifest purpose of Trivette was not to harm himself

but to frighten his wife just as he had done on the

prior similar occasions. The inferences are all against

any purpose of self*destruction and an inference of

a«idental shooting is plainly suggested.

But if I am right in my view that this court ought

to follow the federal rule as to what makes a case for a

jury, then beyond the peradventure of a doubt were

this case in the hands of the Supreme Court it would

ax summarily reverse this judgment as it did in Wil-

liams Vv. Carolina Life Insurance C'o., 348 U.S. 802, re-

versing 210 F. 2d 477; Swaffc. d v. Atlantic Coast Line

RR Co., 350 U.S. 807, reversing 220 F. 2d 901; Union

Trust Co. v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 350 U. S, 907, re-

versing 221 F. 2d 62; and Gibson v. Ph illips Petroleum

Corp., 352 U. 8. 874, reversing 232 F.2d 13. None of

these are F. E. L. A. actions. All but one are diversity

CASES,

I am willing to go further: I feel certain that even

the Kentucky court if presented with the facts which I

have here set forth would Say that this was a case prop-

erly to be submitted to the jury. I can find no resem-

blance hetween the facts here proven and those in the

Kentucky cases the court here relies upon. That a

Jury may properly draw its own inferences from other

a

facts proven was recognized in United Benefit Ins. Co.

v. Schott, 296 Ky. 789, 177 S. W. 2d 581; Kentuchy

Home Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Watts, 298 Ky. 471, 183

Ss. W. 2d 499,

I have another and different objection to the result

here reached. It relates to two of the four policies

sued upon, and is based upon a long line of Kentucky

decisions holding that in an action on a life policy

Which provides that self-destruction while sane or in-

sane, is a risk not assumed by the insurer, recovery may

he had if the insured was so insane that he could not

understand the nature of his acts."

At the oral argument counsel for appellee was

queried about these cases, and asked why they did not

require the submission to the jury of the question of

Trivette’s mental condition. In a supplemental brief,

filed after the argument, appellee replied to this by

stating that since this is a suit to recover double in-

demnity assurance, it is ruled by Equitable Life Assur.

Soe. Vv. Bailey, 203 Ky. 339, 262 S. W. 280, * because

nearly all Double Indemnity provisions ... expressly

exclude from Double Indemnity death resulting from

infirmity of mind or body, or of illness or disease ; and

' Equitable Life Assur. Soc. Etc. v. Bailey, 2i4 Ky. 754. 284 S. W.

403; at 404: “Under a long line of decisions ... it is held that in such

circumstances [where a party is so insane that he does not understand

the nature or the character of the act] there may be a recovery upon

a life policy notwithstanding the provision in the contract attempting

to protect the insurer from death by self-destiuction.” Sovereign

Camp of Woodmen of the World v. Havas. 217 Ky. 846, 290 S. W. 690.

I make no effort to list numerous earlier cases to the same effect.

Appellee’'s brief describes these as “the large group of ‘suicide’ de-

fense cases where under the Kentucky law the company has the bur-

den of proving that at the time of suicide he had sufficient mental

capacity to appreciate the consequences of his act: and there was sub-

stantial evidence that at such time he was such a lunatic or so ‘devoid

of reason’ that he lacked that mental capacity—and of course that

substantial evidence created a jury issue on the mental capacity issue.”

2ba

if the insured’s self-destruction occurs when he has

such infirmity his death is automatically excluded.’””

This would appear to be a good answer so far as

two of the policies are concerned. For those two poli-

cies contained substantially the same language as that

found in the policy described in the case cited by eoun-

sel (which might be termed the first Bailey case). They

provide that the double indemnity shall not be payable

if the insured’s death ‘‘resulted from any one or more

of the following :—self-destruction,,. whether sane or

insane; ... infirmity of mind or body.... ”

But the other two policies are quite different. They

contained the usual suicide clause, ‘‘sane or insane,’’

the same clause found in most of the policies in the

large group of Kentucky cases previously mentioned,

including the second Bailey case (284 S. W. 403), and

the Sovereign Camp Woodmen case cited above. They

contained no clause excluding coverage in case of death

resulting from infirmity of mind.” In contrast to the

11In this case cited by counsel the double indemnity clause pro-

vided: “This agreement to pay an increased amount in the event of

death from bodily injury does not cover self-destruction, sane or in-

sane... or death resulting directly or indirectly from bodily or

mental infirmity.” Said the court: “In other words, she could not, in

order to entitle herself to the $10,000 ordinary life insurance, allege

and prove that the insured was so insane as not to appreciate the

nature and consequence of his act, and at the same time deny that his

death resulted directly or indirectly from bodily or mental infirmity,

in order to entitle her to the double indemnity insurance against

accidental death.”

12 The clauses in these two policies read as follows: “The Com-

pany will pay to the beneficiary, subject to the terms and conditions

of this policy, an additional amount (the double indemnity benefit)

equal to the face amount of this policy upon receipt of due proof that

the insured’s death resulted directly, and independently of all other

causes, from accidental bodily injury and that such death occurred

within 90 days after such injury and before the earliest of the follow-

ing: ... (However, the double indemnity benefit will not be payable

if such death results frorn (a) suicide, whether sane or insane, . . . nor

wiil such benefit be payable if such death is caused or contributed to

by bodily infirmity, or any illness or disease other than a bacterial

infection occurring in consequence of an accidental injury on the

exterior of the body.”

tS

=i

me

other policies these exclude **death caused or contrib-

uted to by bodily intirmity.’’ I need not cite cases to

support the universal rule that such policies must be

construed most strongly against the insurer. And by

no possibility can it be said that a reference such as

this to ‘*bodily infirmity’’ means the same thing as if

it said ‘‘intirmity of mind or body.’

Because the court directed a verdict at the close of

plaintiff’s case, we are not concerned here with the

question of where lay the burden of proof, or in what

form instructions should be cast. But it is plain to

me that the rule of the first Bailey case has no place

here. The issue of mental capacity should have been

submitted to the jury under the rule of the second

‘Bailey case and the many othcis in accord.

The conduct of Trivette at the time here in ques-

tion was not only not normal and irrational, it was

so strange, erratic and wild as to show the character-

isties of a temporarily deranged and unhinged lunatic.

The jury, to whom the issue of mental derangement

should have been submitted in respect to the claim on

these two policies, could well find mental unseandness

sufficient to bring the case within the Kentucky rule

here mentioned.”

12 This is particularly true nere where the same company issued

the policies and issued them at a later date than the others.

14It is not contended that this evidence must be supplemented by

opinion evidence. Mental concition or capacity may be proven by

circumstantial evidence such as the person's outward conduct. Wig-

more on Evidence. 3d Ed., $$ 227-228: Cooley’s Briefs on Insurance.

2nd Ed., page 5472. Inter-southern Life Ins. Co. V. Boyd, 124 S. W.

333, 334: “All that we can do is to inquire into nis surroundings, his

condition, his personal relations, his domestic affairs. his habits, his

traits of character, and from these make up our minds the best we

can whether the suicidal act was intentional or the result of a state

of mind that deprived the person of the power of understanding the

naure and quality of his act.”

28a

APPENDIX III

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Relevant facts and circumstances culminating in

the death of Maurice Trivette, according to undisputed

evidence, are chronologically listed as follows:

On January 14, 1945, Maurice Trivette and the

appellant were married (37a). He had two children,

ages 21 and 13 by a former marriage (39a), and four

children, born of this latter marriage, 10, 9, 7 and 5

years of age, respectively, at the time of his death

(38a). The five youngest of these lived with him and

appellant (39a).

On June 19, 1944, he. procured the two insurance

policies sued on, of the aggregate face amount of

$10,000.00, with double indemnity in case of accidental

death, and excluding suicide, sane or insane (va and

4a).

On February 21, 1956, two more policies were

procured of the aggregate face amount of $20,000.00,

with similar (though not identical), double indemnity

clauses (3a and 5a).

At the time of his death on October 19, 1957, he

was engaged in the coal mining business, and also oper-

ated a garage at Virgie, in Pike County, Kentucky

(41a). He was executive vice-president and general

manager in charge of the coal company operation (New

Virgie Coal Corporation), and he and his wife and son

owned fifty percent of the stock of the corporation,

and his brother, Charlie Trivette, owned the other fifty

percent (41a and 102a).

The coal business was prosperous and Maurice

Trivette drew a salary of $700.00 per month, and his

wife and son drew a salary, or dividend, of $117.00 per

294

month each (42a, 102a-103a). The garage business

Was operated primarily to repair and maintain the

coal mining equipment and was on an even Keel (40a-

46a).

Both of these enterprises continued operation on

a successful basis up until the time of his death (108a-

14a). He was devoted to his wife and children, and

Was attentive to and affectionate with them (80a-838a,

35a, 1494, 159a).

He died on October 19, 1957 (87a). On that day,

and within the preceding week, he had made plans to

gradc and install a ehildren’s playground for his own

and community ehildren on a lot adjoining his home,

which was next to the garage (43a-+Ha).

On the day of the decedent's death. lis wite, the

appellant here, had taken the five children to Bristol,

Tennessee, primarily to have some dental work done

for her step-son (52a) and while there had gotten her

brother-in-law, a Mr. Morrison, who married Maurice

Trivette’s sister, to select some steaks for her to take

home to supper (52a). She returned home to Virgie

about 5:30 p.m. (58a). She and the children were

greeted at the garage by the decedent in a cordial man-

ner (58a). Her husband appeared o> be in a nermal

good humor (53a, 179a, 182%-183a).

Maurice remained at the garage until time for

supper. This was on Saturday. He had made up and

distributed the payroll (110a, 179a and 182a).

He then went home about 6:30 p.m. (54a).

The residence was next door to the garage. His

brother, Warren, saw him at the garage about 5:30,

and wanted some Prestone that Maurice told him he

wa: out of, but would order some for him and it would

be there the following Monday. Warren said he was

ina ‘tvery good mood” at that time (100a ).

30a

His wife had run his bath water (55a) and he

cleaned up and changed his clothes at home, and took

two drinks, or nips, from a pint bottle of whiskey. Mrs.

Trivette testified she saw hin take two drinks, or

‘*nips’’ of whiskey that night while he was dressing

(79a), but he was not drunk (80a). The family went

into the dining room for supper somewhere around

7:30. The ste: xs selected by the brother-in-law in

Bristol proved to be tough (55a).

Maurice Trivette was out of sorts with this broth-

er-in-law beeause he had loaned him $7,500.00 some

years prior thereto, which the brother-in-law had made

no effort to repay (56a, 89a-92a). Maurice then be-

came ill-humored and did not finish his steak and re-

mained silent. The children went into the living room

and he and his wife sat at the table for some time and

drank about two cups of coffee. He then went into the

living room and sat staring into space, and was sullen

and incommuniecative. (d6a, 90a).

After a short time he went to the garage to get the

money out of the cash register, as was his custom (57a).

He habritially kept considerable money on hand to eash

checks for customers and employees of the coal com-

pany (57a). He was gone about 20 minutes (91a).

When he returned he was still in an ugly mood. He

went into the bedroom oceupied by him and his wife

and motioned to his wife to come in. He became vio-

lent and tore up a shirt and a pair of socks which his

wife had bought for him (58a, 92a-93a). He had de-

cided to spend the night at a motel in order to get some

rest and to avoid Saturday night calls from late trav-

elers at the garage, as he had done on previous occa-

sions (58a).

He packed toilet articles in a case for this pur-

pose (58a). He had put the money from the garage,

something over $990.00 (107a), in the pocket of a

sla

sports coat that he was wearing (58a). He had also

put five extra cartridges for his pistol in his pocket

(100a-101a, 1J5a, 164a-165a, and 170a).

This was about 10 p.m. (1386a-137a). He was

standing between the wall and the bed about midway

of this wall, with his right side next to the wall (61a),

and his wife was sitting on a bench, or stool, in front

of a dressing table near the corner of the opposite wall

(60a). (See floor exhibit, 48a).

Mr. Trivette complained that the sleeves of the

shirts were too long, and after tearing the shirt and

the slacks, threw them across the room. At this point

Mrs. Trivette started to get up to calm him down, as

she had done on previous occasions (60a), when he sud-

denly jerked a 44-special, Smith & Wesson revolver

(99a). from under his coat and belt, with his right

hand, and all in one motion fired the pistol (64a). The

bullet entered his right temple and ranged upward at a

Sharp angle, described by the undertaker as about a

90-degree angle (1182).

There was powder burn on his right temple, form-

ing a cirele around the hole made at the point of entry

of the bullet about * ths or “ths of an inch in diameter

(120a, 123a). Some of the brain was missing from

the point of exit in the upper part of his head (122a).

The bullet emerged from the top part of the head and

entered the ceiling at a point about 7 inches from the

connecting wall, near the corner opposite where Mrs.

Trivette was standing (70a). The bullet was never

found (72a).

He fell between the bed and the wall, a space of

about 3 feet (63a), with his head away from where his

wife had been sitting (62a).

Mrs. Trivette rushed to him and had his head in

her arms when some of the neighbors eame in and

found them in this position (134a, 146a, 162a). An

St

ambulance was called, and Mrs. Trivette, Troy Chil-

ders, and Jimmy Ellis aecompanied Maurice to the

hospital in Pikeville (168a), but he was dead upon

arrival (67a, 164a).

Mrs. Trivette deseribed the action of her husband

in jerking the pistol from his belt and firing as ‘‘like a

flash’’ (64a, 66a, 186a), and said she thought he struck

the wall with his right elbow. The court sustained ob-

jection to this and instructed the jury not to consider

it. The witness’ testimony on thispoint was as follows:

‘© A, 203. And so far as I can remember—I am

not positive about all this, but he was standing

about like this (indieating), about like so (indicat.

ing), standing close to the wall, and when he

jerked his arm back—like that (indicating )—

about that fast. He was very angry. It isn’t the

same when you are calm. When you puli a gun

out of your pants and put it up to vour head with

certain details, he didn’t do that, with minute de-

tails. It was all ina flash.

*Q. 204. Do you have any opinion as_ to

whether his arm, or elbow, struck the wall ?

“Mr. Blackwell: Object, Your Honor, she

ean't give an opinion.

“The Court: Objection sustained as to the

opinion. Mrs. Trivette, you may state to the best

of your knowledge, whether or not you saw the arm

strike the wall.

‘*A. I didn’t actually see it strike the wall.

I thought that it had because he was standing so

close to the wall. I stood in the same position he

did, and I didn’t see how he could get the gun up

to his head without striking the wall.”’

Mrs. Trivette was heard to say by one of the neigh-

bors that came running into the house within a few

minutes, while holding her husband’s head in her lap,

Oba

and holding her hands over the wound to stop the

blood, that the did not mean it’ (163a-164a ).

Her brother-in-law, Warren Trivette, who came

into the room shortly after the accident, observed Mil-

dred holding her husband, and testified that she said,

‘he didn’t mean to do it’ (113a).

Some two years prior to this time, Maurice Tri-

vette, ina similar fit of anger, had tired this same pistol

in the same bedroom and had broken the ceiling light

in the middle of the room (76a, 84a). On another occa-

sion in Indiana, he had fired a gun while in an angry

mood (77a-83a-84a), and on another occasion at his

home at Virgie on a Saturday night when he had been

‘alled to pull in a wreeked car which interfered with

plans that they had made to dine out, he came back

home angry and broke up the living room furniture and

furnishings, and flourished his gun about, but did not

fire it at that time (77a, 85a). Mrs. Trivette testified

that he had got over these spells almost immediately,

and would be very sorry (78a).

Maurice Trivette left no wilk He left no suicide

note. He made no threats to kill himself. He did not

do or say one single thing that indicated that he had

- any intention of taking his life.

He was not in any kind of financial difficulty or

trouble of any kind, and he was in good health (96a,

97a, 106a, and I11a).

The coroner, Mr. Call, held an inquest on Novem-

her 19, 1957 (68a. 88a, 123a, 127a, 135a, and 136a). An

effort was made to introduce in evidence the cause of

death as shown by the death certificate (39a-40a), and

by the verdict of the coroner’s jury, which showed acei-

dental death by gunshot wound (127a, 136a). The

lower Court refused to permit any questions about the

coroner's verdict and held there was no issue as to the

‘cause of death’ (40a, 136a).

34a

A distinct issue was made of the cause of death by

the answer. Taragraph IV of the answer is as fol-

lows: |

‘‘New York Life specifically denies that the

insured, Maurice Trivette, died on October 19,

1957, from bodily injury effected solely through

external, violent, and accidental means.’’ (11a).

After proofs of death were filed with the defend-

ant’s insuranee company, it paid the face of the poli-

cies, aggregating $30,000.00 to the appellant (38a), but

declined to pay the double indemnity. It was stipu-

lated that the policies were in full force and effect.

Complaint was filed in the Pike Cireuit Court in

March of 1958 seeking recovery under the double in-

demnity clause of each policy. (See complaint, 3a to

6a). Each of the four policies were filed and exhibited

in evidence, and it was admitted and stipulated that

they were in full force and effect at the time of Maurice

Trivette’s death (48a-49a).

The only portions of the policies that are relevant

to the issues upon this appeal are the double indemnity

clauses.

The clause in the first two policies is copied into

the complaint (4a), and the clause contained in the last

two policies is copied into the complaint (5a).

On April 18, 1958, the action was removed to the

United States District Court for the Eastern District

of Kentucky on the grounds of diversity of citizenship.

wt

35a

APPENDIX IV

DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN THE CASE

AT BAR AND THE (KY.) TUGGLE &

REDWINE CASES

(1) Tuggle went underneath his house to a place

Where coal and kindling was stored, described in the

opinion as a ‘tdark and uninviting place.” Trivette

was in his own, well-lighted bedroom at his home which

he and his wife oceupied daily.

(2) There was no one around or close to Tuggle

at the time he shot himself. Trivette’s wife was in the

room with him. The door between the bedroom and the

living room was open, and his small ehildren were

watching television in the adjoining room.

(3) Tuggle had been morose for at least 10 days

hefore the tragedy occurred. He had passed old friends

on the street without speaking to them. Friends said

that he seemed to be in a study, or troubled about some-

thing, for a period of 10 days before the tragedy. Tri-

vette had pursued his customary routine during the

entire day and was in a normal good mood up to a very

short time before the tragedy occurred, and not more

than 2 and 1% or 3 hours at the most.

(4) Inthe Tuggle case, Tuggle had laid his rifle

across a steel barrel, or drum, bracing the gun so as to

place the muzzle against the side of his head, and then

reached back and tripped the trigger. Trivette pulled

the gun from his helt and fired in one quick motion, or

‘flash’? as deseribed by his wife, and without any

aim, preparation, or deliberation of any kind.

(5) In the Tuggle case there were no powder

burns on the side of the head showing that the gun was

ob

placed directly against the side of the head. In the

Trivette ease there were powder burns showing that the

gun was not placed against the head at the time it was

discharged. It is common knowledge that if a person

holds a gun in his hand, and attempts to point it at the

side of his head without aiming or touching the head,

it is impossible to tell where the gun is aimed in this

position.

(6) In the Tuggle case there was blood and

brains on the inside of the muzzle of the barrel, due to

the hack suction after the gun was discharged with the

muzzle pressed against the side of the head. In the

Trivette case, there was no evidence of any blood,

brains, or tissue of any kind on or in the gun that had

been used.

(7) In the Tuggle case it is stated that there was

no apparent reason why Tuggle should have had a gun

in the first place. In the Trivette case it was shown

that Mr. Trivette kept money at his home taken from

the garage each night, and that for vears, he had kept

a gun under the mattress in his bedroom for the pur-

pose of protection.

(8) In the Trivette case it was shown that Tri-

vette had a high temper, and at various times preced-

ing the tragedy, that he would get his gun and shoot

it, after which he usually became calm. In fact, it was

shown that he had fired his gun into the ceiling in this

same bedroom about two years before. The place where

the bullet went through the ceiling had been patched,

but was still visible, and a photograph was presented

of this in the evidence. On two previous occasions he

had flourished the gun around in a fit of temper. No

such antecedent similar circumstances were in evidence

in the Tuggle ease.

37a

(9) In the Tuggle case there was clear-cut evi-

dence of motive for suicide, Le., demotion, In this case,

no motive Whatever was shown. On the contrary, it

was shown by uncontradicted evidence that the de-

ceased had every reason to want to lve—suecessful

business, good health, a good home, a good income,

and a devoted family consisting of a young wife and

five voung children and one grown son, [It seems more

apparent in this case that Trivette intended to do what

he had done before, whitein a rage, that is, pull his

gun and shoot through the -eiling of the bedroom, and

that he either misjudged the aim by not being able to

see where the gun was pointed, or as his wife surmised,

that his elbow hit the wall, causing the gun to deflect

and fire into his head.

A careful study of the Tuggle ease and the facts

of this case reveals that there is no basis for compari-

son. While the facts of the Tuggle case show conelu-

sively that Tuggle intended to commit suicide, the

facts of the Trivette case show more conclusively that

no such act was intended, and that death was acciden-

tal. At least, it must be admitted that the inferenecs

from all the facts and circumstances point to accident,

and not to intentional suicide.

In the Redwine ease, the Kentucky opinion, after

reviewing all of the evidence concludes ‘‘ Clearly, Ewen

intentionally ended his own life.’ (Emphasis ours.)

(352 S. W. (2) 646.)

38a.

APPENDIX V

No. 13.910

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Miuprep (. TRIVETTE - - - - - = Appellant

VS:

NEW York LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY - = Appellee

ORDER DENYING REHEARING

February 28, 1961

This date this eause came on to be heard on the

petition of the appellant, Mildred C. Trivette, for re-

hearing. On authority of Lovas vy. General Motors

Corp., 212 F. 2d 805, (C. A. 6) 1954, the Court is sat-

istied that the conclusion reached in the original deci-

sion is correct. We do not read Dick v. New York Life

Ins. Co., 358 U.S. 427, 79 S. Ct. 921, as requiring a

different result.

Judge Pope adheres to the same position which be

expressed in his dissenting opinion herein.

It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that

the petition for rehearing be and. it is hereby denied.

/s/ W: WALLACE KENT

District Judge

Sitting by designation

39a

APPENDIX VI

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, O. T. Hinton, one of the attorneys for the Peti-

tioners herein state on oath that [am a member of

tae bar in good standing of all of the State and Fed-

eral Courts within the S'ate of Kentucky, including

the Court of Appeals of Kentucky and of the United

States District Court for the 6th Cireuit, and have been

for more than 40 years; that I am a member in good

standing of the Pike County Bar Association, the

Kentucky State Bar Association, and the American

Bar Association, and do hereby certify that on the

aa day of May, 1961, I served copies of the fore-

going petition for writ of certiorari upon the respond-

eut, New York Life Insurance Company, as follows:

By mailing a copy in a duly addressed envelope with

first-class postage prepaid to its attorneys of record as

follows: Thomas W. Bullitt, Kentucky Home Life

Building, 7th Floor, Louisville 2, Kentucky, and R. Lee

Blackwell, Kentucky Home Life Building, 7th Floor,

Louisville 2, Kentucky.

(QO. PT. Hinton)

STATE OF KENTUCKY

COUNTY OF PIKE |

Subseribed and sworn to before me by O. T. Hin-

day of May, 1961.

My Commission expires

ton this

Witness my signature and seal of office this ——

dav of . 1961.

Notary Public, Pike Co., Ky.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UMITED STATES

ae

; Leagan

MILDRED C. TRIVETTE, . . ‘ Petitioner,

versas

NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE

COMPANY, . - - - Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF.

In Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

R. LEE BLACKWELL,

1700 Ky. Home Life Building,

louisville 2, Ky.

THOMAS W. BULLITT,

1700 Ky. Home Life Building,

Louisville 2, Ky.

Counsel for Respondent.

BULLITT, DAWSON & TARRANT,

Of Couneel.

WESTERFIELD-BONTE CO.. INT ORPORATED. LOUISVILLE. KY.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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