Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Robinson v. Franke (No. 615)
Supreme Court brief1960
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
-
rites
“DEC $0 1980
FILE COPY ; ay Office” Supreme Court, U.S,
JAMES 8. BROWNING Clerk
Saree fs The Pi
Supreme Court of the United-States
Ooo. Thea. logan’
G4.
; dD
Nw. "
° : AMES A 2 homens
Pru tiberrger e
*Winttuas B. Bis ki. Seertrars wl the Nawt, ‘
; I sprouw /, wl ~
>" ane
SCRPOEN TE Poavses
. e Pekidtiwer
¥.
Witiie Bo BRiasis Seeretary of Ahe NUN,
; I, sprevatede wl t
.
PETITION FOR: WRIT OF CERPFIORARE TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
oe Penrose derecas Arenas
C'onpsecl feos Pp, hidacrne r.:
OOS Perpetual Building
Washington ae | ae &
- Rbisons Mason and Albright
Of Covwnsel
W'LSON. EPES PRINTING Co RE 7.6002 WASHINGTON . oo. &.
a
INDEX
OPINIONS BELOW .... poeta, 7 rte :
JURISDICTION ............. OCS. ROMAIN is OREN RE RD
WUESTIONS [PRESENTED a“
CONSTITUTIONAL, PROVISIONS, STATUTES
AND REGULATIONS. INVOLVED ....._’ yea
STATEMENT SEE PEAR re MR on Reds Se
NO See et ae
“APPENDIX A | 7
Opinion of the United States Court_of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in Payson v. Franke.
APPENDIX B )
APPENDIX C
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
' ‘im Payson v. Prenke 0,
APPENDIX D
Excerpts from Sectiyn 8, Art. I, United States
OE scningnsimiiilendininaig athe sit
Excerpt from the Act of Apri. 18, 1946, 60 Stat.
ere Ne SRL a en eR
- sonnel Act of 1947 _...... hinbinigielandnntintcaceteti eat
“10 U.S.C. 6384(a) ow SED SI am
- £
17
33
8
ot tee * INDEX—Continued
APPENDIX D—Continued _ eee PaGE*
10 U.S.C: 6388(a) EE EE cesiecessiningas hinpalcqeniniibieitonslaeass . 35
a a MII ice ciasdsinpcacoicsoincosniiiptneeannschiomantoians siiventaions 36
kf AE RST aN, Oe eee eT” anes 37
Art. 1701(8) (a) and (b), US. inated Regulations,
1948 , saints a 38
| ’ Citations
CASES — | .
Bates & Guild v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106 .................... 10
7 ’ Creary. v. Weeks, 259° U.S. 336 cc ceccccccccccecpesceeee - 13, 23
Crenshaw v. The United States, 134 U.S. 99... 12
Dismuke v. United States, 297 U.S. 167 .............. a ©
Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U. = } Saas “fi -
Etoyd Sabando Societa v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329 .... - 10
Orloff v. Willotighby,-345 U.S. 83 ote 12, 23
Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 ote 1OZ12 ©
' Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 . 26
- Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 SidaaidciasinisianenaitibasScias 10, 12
Schoot of Magnetic ry v. aie ‘187 .
U.S. 94 (ahessaigiasiniierdarttiniianmniatanepaneiiinsaniiciaennaiitlennnitinthesn 10
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS | eS eat
~~~ ~“Aet of “April: 18, SRE. Sa eae aiesacad ... 16, 19, 34
.-Administrative Procedures Act of 19460 oc. 4, 10
, -Art. 1701(8), Navy Regulations .................. weeeee 15.13, 38
~ ’ D.C. Code. (1951), | | anne nen 4
a Office Personnel Act of 1947 t.............. 8, 14, 15, 21, 34
Be ne IIE sCiccaissnccncetsimicinaqibiccesnsiecs 3, 5, 13, 36, 37
10 U.S.C, 6384(a) .......... . 6, 13, 14, 18, 20, 25, 26, 29,.35
i RE SUIT, Ginhinsttendtsocdusasiencaneinnin .- 14, 15, 20, 21, 26, 35
ae ; Miscellaneous
I I i scactectnlet a onnechistismssineinngiacieosensors en ee
SS. _ &. 2p eekSeer ee enn ee 15, 22
Navy Court-Martial Orders, 1-1949 and 2-1949 .......... 15
In Tue
Supreme Court of the United States
_ OcToBer TERM, 1960
James B. Rosinson,
_ Petitioner
¥.
sting Wittum B. FRANKE, Secretary of. the Navy,
Re »spondent
and :
. StepHen H. Payson,
Petitioner
v. a
Wittum B. FRawe, Secretary of the Navy,
Respondent
( »
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE:
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE |
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
a
The Petitioners pray that a writ of certiorari issue to
review the judgments of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit entered in the
above cases on October 28, 1960, and August 4, 1960,
respectively, (am extension of time of sixty days within
which to petition for certiorari having been granted on
October 28, 1960 until January, 2, 196] in the latter case
by.the Chief Justice). :
\ ‘ \
° 2
OPINIONS BELOW - | a
Opinions were not rendered by the United States Dis-
trict Court for-the District of ‘Columbia (Dist. Ct. Record; .
Robinson, CCA Record, Payson, 108) in either case. The -
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co.
lumbia Circuit affirmed in Robinson w. Franke on October -
- 28, 1960, on Government’s motion without rendering an -
_ opinién (CCA Record, Robinson, 8). The opinion of
ithe United States Court of Appeals for the District of
‘- Columbia Circuit in. Payson v. ‘Franke, announced on
' , August 4, 1960, is reported at 282 F.2d 851, and a copy
is appended to this petition as Appendix A.
Pex _ JURISDICTION
The judgments of the Court of Appeals for the District:
of ‘Columbia Circuit were made and entered on October
28, 1960 in Robinson v. Franke, and on August 4, 1960 in *
Payson .v. Franke, and are appended to this petition in -
‘Appendices B* and C, respectively. The jurisdiction of
—this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254/1).
tek: QUESTIONS PRESENTED .
Both petitioners, officers of the regular Navy with over -—
.. 17 years of active duty, were discharged as unsatisfactory ,
pursuant to a Board’s findings based exclusively on peti-
tioners’ fitness reports. The majority of the fitness re-
_ ports were not shown to petitioners, and all of them were
_. expressly graded satisfactory or better. -Neither peti-
* tioner was granted a hearing or opportunity for a hear-
ing, although the Board involved’ was authorized to con-
duct. hearings prescribed by 10 -U.S.0. 5863:
Moreover, despite the fact that the Board’s considera-
* tion of officers for discharge as unsatisfactory was limited-
‘Appendix B also contains the Government’s Motion to Affirm
or Dismiss, Petiticaers: Opposition and the Government’s Reply.
fe)
3
to oficers’ “with less than 20 years “of service,” both
petitioners were, under 10 U.S.C. 6388, deemed to have
constructively the same years of service as certain Naval
Academy graduates once’ junior ‘to then= who had com-
pleted over twenty years” service, .
+ The Government took the position in both -cases that.
it was beyond the scope of the Court's power to review
the Board’s findings. “In Payson vy. Franke, the Court of
Appeals sustained the: Government’s pesition in this re-
spect, holding that it was without power to review the
Board’s findings. Robinson v. Franke was thereafter
decided by the District Court and affirmed on Govern-
ment’s motion by the Court of -Appeals (Circuit Judge
Fahy would have denied the motion) on the basis of the”
opinion in Paydou v. Franke. The questions presented
are; : 7
. ay Is the action of the Board involved judicially _re-
viewable for arbitrariness or abuse of discretion?
(2) If the action is so reviewable, ‘ean sufficient basis.
- for the Board’s action be found in petitioners’ records.
(3) Is the’ pertinent statute (10 U.S.C. 6384(a) ) rea-
-sonably clear as to the Board’s limits of authority to
find an of§cer unsatisfactory so as to sustain its validity?
(4) Was the Board’s failure to give petitioners an
opportunity for a hearing a denial of administrative due
process? . .
(5) w ere petitioners officers with: over “20 years of
service” and therefore statutorily exempt from discharge
_ 4s unsatisfactory? . .
CONSTITUTIONAL PROV ISIONS, STATUTES AND
REGULATIONS INVOLVED
The constitutional provisions, statutes and regulations
‘which are relevant to decision of this case, and the perti-
-
A
4
‘neni text of whieh is set forth in Appendix D hereto, are
Section 8, Article I of the United States Constitution, -
<'the Act of April 18, 1946, 60 Stat. ‘92, Sections 202(a) .
sy
opportunity to be heard on the matter.
and 202(d)(1) of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947, 61
Stat. 816, Sections 6384(aJ, 6388(a) and (b), 5862, and
9863 of Title 10, United States Code, and Article 1701
(8), U.S. Navy Regulations.
. ; STATEMENT
Petitioners originally brought separate suits for de-
claratory "judgments to set aside a Selection Board’s find-
angs of unsatisfactory service which resulted in their dis-
charge from the servicé.. Jurisdiction of. the District
Court for the District. of Columbia ‘was invoked under
the Administrative Procedures Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. 1009,
and under D. C. Code (1951), Section 11-306. (Dist. (Ct. me
Record, Robinson, 2nd Amended Complaint; CCA Record,
‘Payson, 1) i
The facts of Robinson v. Franke serve better to high-
light the issues.
Commander Robinson was initially appointed in the
‘Naval Reserve of the United States Navy, January 19,
"1940, in the*grade of lieutenant (junior grade). In
2 Insofar as applicability of the governing opinion in Payson V.
_ Franke, Appendix A; is concerned; the cases of Commanders
Robinson and Payson would appear legally identical.- Both were
regular commissioned officers in the Civil Engineer Corps, United
States Navy. Both had formerly been Naval Reserve officers.
Both had completed:over 17 years of active duty at the time of
their disposition and were deemed to have the constructive service
of Naval Academy graduates with over 20 years’ active duty.
Neither had any unsatisfactory fitness reports and the Govern- .
ment admits in each case that it cannot sustain the Board's
action on any records outside these reports. Neither were ever
shown the majority of their fitness reports upon which the Board’s
action «is allegedly ‘based. Both were branded as unsatisfactory
by the same Board at the same time. - Neither was given: any
t&
*
) Soa *
e . ® nie? , ; Sd
‘August, 1940, he was ordered. to. active duty. at Pearl
Harbor, but was” subsequently transferred) to Wake
"Island. On December 22, 1941, while,engaged in the de-
fense of that outpost, he was taken a. prisoner-of-war of
the Japanese and remained in such status until Septem-
ber 11, 1945, when freed to Ameriqnn jurisdiction. Upon
returning, he was promoted in. successive steps: through
the grades of lieutenant, lieutenant commander, and final-
ly to commander, and in April, 1947, was released from
active duty. He, however, made application to be ap-
‘pointed to thé Regular Navy and, this application being
accepted, on August 1, 1947, he‘ was permanently ap-
pointed to ‘the Regular’ Navy in the temporary grade of
commander (Civil Engineer Corps). and-returned to active
duty. Subsequently his ‘grade of commander -was ‘made
permanent to.rank from February 16, 1950. (Dist. Ct.
Record, Robinson, 2nd Amended Complaint, Answer)
Commander Robinson became statutorily eligible to be-
considered for discharge as unsatisfactory’ in the fiscal ©.
year 1952 and was presumably -so considered for dis-
tharge by a ‘Board -that year and each successive year
, (Dist. Ct. Record, ‘Robinson, Answer). In fiseal 1958,
however, a Board, which was a combined Selection Board
and Examining Board: (CCA Record. Payson, &7), con-
cluded—without. setting fort’ any basis—that Robinson's |
records indicated his unsatisfactory performance of duty
in his’ present grade (Dist, ('t. Re
of Proceedings of Selection Board and Naval Examining
Board). This, despit® the fact. that Commander Robhin-
son’s records. contained -no unsatisfactory ratings .what~
Soever. After the action of the Board was approved hy:
the President, Commander Robinson was notified thereof
and orders were issued for his discharge which became
effective July 1,.1958 (Dist. Ct. Record, Robinson: 2nd
Amended Complaint, Answer). He was given no Oppor
tunity for a hearing pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 58g3 ( Appen-
‘cord, Robinson, Record .
e*
i
dix D) or otherwise and, in “fact,;was unaware of the
Board’s action’ until “it_had been°approved. At. the time
of his discharge he: had 17% years’ attive duty—2!. short
of eligibility for voluntary retirement.
Under Section 6384(a), Title 10, U.S.C., the Board was
requiréd to make its finding of unsatisfactory perform. .
ance of duty on the basis: of petitioners’ records. The
Government and petitioners. have agreed that if any evi-
dence of: unsatisfactory performance of duty exists, it
cannot be found in any of petitioners’ records. outside of
their fitness reports. (Dist. Ct. Record, Robinson, An-
swer,, CCA Payson, 77) Moreover, since the Board must
find that an officer performed unsatisfactorily in his
present grade, the scope of review ean be ‘narrowed to
petitioners’ fitness reports in the grade of commander--
or in Robinson’s case, those fitness reports issued after
his release as a prisoner-of-war. This is, of course, not
to intimate that adverse material may be found in the
other® records, ‘but rather to narrow the scope of review.
Looking now’ at Robinson's fitness reports, the form
used: for such reports during September 5, 1946 through
July 4, 1951, provided in Space 12 as follows * ;
«
_ Give in this space a clear, concise appraisal of the
officer ‘reported on and his performance of: duty, in-.
cluding afiy worthy of SpecM@il mention. Include rev-
‘ommendations as to promotion, Any statements of
unsatisfactory performance, ability, character, or con-
duct miust be referred to. the officer for statement.
Statgments of a ecenstructive nature which refer to
« Minor. imperféctions: or lack of qualifications do not
— . eonstitute an unsatisfactory report. For example:
“This officer was a little slow in getting started Init
is now making good progress” .or: “This officer vis
well qualified in his present duties: but has had no
experience “at sea” would not. be unsatisfactory in
nature. Check one’ of these boxes—I_ consider this
report to be | | Satisracrory (J Uwsravorant.
[7 Unsatisractory | a,
“3
a tee
For, the above-mentioned period, Commander Robin-
son’s fitness reports were all Parked “Satisfactory”.
(Dist. Ct. Reeord, Robinson, Photostats of Fitness Re-
ports, p. 36-56) “ |
For'‘the period of July 4, 1951 to February 28, 1954, a
different fitness report form was utilized. In tiis. form,
Item 14 provided as follows:
A report containing adverse matter must .be -re-
» ferred to the officer reported on-for statement. pur-
suant to article 1701(8) USNR. His statement should
“be attached to this report. Statements of minor
deficiencies either in character. or performance of
‘duties must be brought to the attention of the officer
reported on _cither orally, or in writing. “Has Tins
Been Done? ....... Rik sehsiddid AIR SL LN Wat
During this period Commander Robinson TECETV EC q no
unsatisfactory marks on his fitness reports and there ‘is
no indication in Item 14 that any of the reports contained.
adverse matter. (Dist. Ct. Record, ‘Robinson, Photostats
of Fitness Reports, p. 21-35) .
Starting March 1, 1954 and continuing for the remain-
der of Commafder Robinson's naval career, a still fur-
ther form was used for: fitness reports. In this form,
performance of duties were rated. Item 16 provided. for’
- an “Unsatisfactory” mark on a comparative basis. Item
21 provides as follows: 2
(a) As a general rule, officers should pot be shawn
their fitness reports by the reporting seniors unless
the report contains adverse matter. An adverse re-
port must be referred for statement. pursuant to
Article 1701-(8) Nayy Regulations. His .statemént
should be attached to this report. i
(b) Has the officer reported on seen -this report?
.Yes [] - No nm
8
In the foregoing reports not. one contained an unsatis.
factory or adverse mark apd not one was checked “Yes”
under Item 21. (Dist. Ct. Record, Robinson Photostats
of Fitness Reports, p. 1-20). :
In summation, none of Robinson's fitness reports con-
tained unsatisfactory ratings or are any indicated as
unfavorable by the rating officer. Of all the reports, it is
indicated that only owe was even ever seen by him or
referred to. him for comment. This is the report for
June 6, 1950 to August 31, 1950, which was referred to
Robinson for comment by the Bureau of Naval Personne!
rather than by his commanding officer. (DRt Ct. Record,
Robinson, -Photostats of Fitness Reports, p. 41, 37-39)
The purpose of referring the. report to Robinson was in
View of: a comment contained in the report whieli reads
in full as follows: |
This officer has performed his duties satisfactorily
since reporting ag Assistant Naval Attache, Cairo,
Egypt. He shouk concentrate upon development of a
more forceful personal presentation and positiveness.
Hy is not recommended for promotion at this time.
[Emphasis supplied |
This report. which unquestionably is petitioner Robin-
-son’s worst report and was rendered almost eight years
prior to his discharge: as unsatisfactory, is onits face no:
e . r + .
an unsatisfactory report. To the contrary, it affirmative-
z . ‘ . . .
ly states that Robinson had performed his duties satis.
factorily. One might easily conelude from Robinson’:
records that the Board -had inadvertently, confused his
records with those of another less. desirable officer,
Counsel for petitioners challenges the Solicitor General
to point out anything in the pertinent records of Robin-
son. which would provide any basis. whatsoever for the
Board's findings. - 7
id
The same vact > which first ‘authorized the discharge
* The Officer Personnel Act of’ 1947.
* 9 ;
of staff corps officers “with less than”20 years of service”
as unsatisfactory, constructively gave to Regulars who
had formerly been in the Reserves the same service “in
respect to separation” of “an officer originally appointed
in the grade or rank of lieutenant (junior grade) or en-
sign in the: -Regular Navy.” There is no’ dispute that.
Commander Payson had constructively the same service
as one Mark Henry Jordan (CCA Record. Payson, 77,
100) (who was appointed to the Regular Navy from -the
Naval Academy June 3, 1937, and served continuously
thereafter without loss’ of precedent to have completed
over 21 years* active duty upon Payson's” disposition)
or that Commander Robinson had constructively the same
service as. one Jolin Joseph Cassidy who, by the same °
token, had completed 20 years’ active duty at the time. of
Commander Robinson's Alischarge. (Dist. Ct. Récord, 2nd
Amended_Complaint, Answer). Nevertheless, both Com-
manders Robinson and: Payson were considered as officers
“with less than’ 20 years of -serview” in respect to estab-
lishing eligibility for their separation. as unsatisfactory.
* #
Not only have petitioners lost a Valuable retirement
equity, but as a result of the arbitrary actjon of the
Board, they will bear for the rest of their lives a brand:
of: “What did they do?” Yet, when put to it, ‘the
Government was unable to answer this simple question in’
the hearing before District Judge Youngdahl ( Dist. Court
Record, Robinson, Transcript)
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
1. The decisions of the court. below have either de-
cided an important question of federal law which has
not been settled by this Court or have decided the ques-
tion in conflict with applicable decisions of this Court.
The Court of Appeals has thus in effect held that it will
not review the record to determine whether action taken
to discharge a regularly commissioned officer of the armed
. f
a
oe
10
_ forees as unsatisfattory met the statutory criteria under
Which the action Was ostensibly authorized even though
it may be arbitrary and ‘an abuse of diseretion.. The
Court of Appeals has thus carved in a critical and im.’
portant area an é@xtensive exception to judicial review-
ability of administrative actions contrary to this Court's
decisions in School of, Magnetic Healing y. McAnnulty,
187 U.S. 94 (1902); Bates & Guild v. Payne, 194 US. 106;
Lloyd Sabaudo Societa vy. Elting, 287 U.S. 329; ana
Dismuke v. United States, 297 U.S. 167; and more recently
in Peters y- Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955); and Service ¥.
Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957). ‘ ay
2. The subsidiary question of. statutory construction
pertaining to petitioners’ years of service is, in itself,
not unimportant. -Thus, the decision -of the Court of
Appeals permits an uncontemplated discriminatory treat-
ment as between line officers and staff corps ‘officers and
as between Naval Academy graduates and ox-Reserve
officers that is clearly inconsistent with both the inteit
and letter of the law. ‘ a
3. The Court of Appeals seems to have completely
overlooked the applicability of the Administrative Proce-
dures Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. 1009, 60 Stat. 243. Seetion
1) of this Act provides: “Exeept so far as (1) statutes
preclude judicial review or (2) agency action jis by law
committed to agency diseretion— : . - (ec) Every agency
_ action made reviewable by statute and every final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in
any court shall be subject to judicial review.” And _ thie
term “agency” includes the President, cabinet: mombers.
and other executive officers. It includes also the military
exeent “courts martial and military commissions” and
“military or natal authority exercised in the field in time
of war or in oceupied territory.”* In the House report
to this Act it. is provided: “To preclude judicial review
*5 U.S.C. 1001(a). ’
under this bill’a statute if not specific in withholding such
review, must upon its face give clear and convincing evi-
dence of an intent to withhold it.’5 Having in peti-
tioners’ case a situation Where, in contrast to the Army
and Air Force, no hearing is given, no basis. for the,
action-is given, and no provision ¢s made for adequate
check bie? a of diseretion, it is indeed remarkable that
there may be no judicial inquiry,as to whether the action
nay not constitute abuse of discretion. ‘There is nothing
in 10 U.S.Code 6384(a) which either specifically provides
or gives. “clear.and' convincing evidence of intent to with-
hold” judicial review. It would thus appear manifest the
action of the Selection Board involved clearly falls within
the ambit of judicial review provided hy Section 10 of the
Administrative Procedures Act of 1946. |
, rs ¥
4. Under the Constitution, while the President is the
commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, the power
‘is given to Congress to provide and maintain a Navy and
to make rules for the government and regulation of the
land and naval forces. The instances in history Wherein
the armed forces have been the instrument of power and
control over a people are too numerous to recount. While
this has fortunately been comparatively thon-existent in
this nation, espevially in peacetime, never before lave we
maintained such a large peacetime Regular Establishment
in the Armed Forces. It is perhaps more truly analogous
of the armed forces than any other agencies that we have
a large beast on a bridle. If this bridle should fray or
hecome loose, ‘should the judiciary he either more of less
prone to repair the same than it jis in the cases of those
smaller beasties also bridled? It is petitioners’ position
that, if anything, more attention should be paid to this
particular bridle than the others. In any event, certainly,
a
5 CF. Heika V. Barber, 345 U.S.) 229, 232.
* Sec. 8, Art. I, U.S. Constitution ( Appendix D); Cf. Federalist
Papers Nos. 13 and 69. ae
- -
12
‘no good reason is pereeived why. the armed forees, or
specifically, why the Navy should be above the law than
any other federal agency. Yet the opinion of the (Court
of Appeals creates just such on distinetion: For while (
Crenshaw vo The United States (1890), 134 U.S. 99, -it was
noted on page 107 that in “respect of official tenure ther:
is no difference in iaw hetween officers in the army and
other officers of the government,” the Court of Appeals
holds petitioners” cases nonreviewable’ by the Judiciary
contrary te the holdings of this Court in connection with
civilian Officers, Peters y. Hobby, 349 US. 331 61955).
Service v. Dulles, 304 US. 368 (1957).
5. The citations by ‘the Court of Appeals of Creary +:—
Weeks, 250 US, 336 449225>+and Orloff v. Willough he,
53 U.S. 83 (9953). for its proposition that petitioners’
Cases are unreviewable, are only casually related to peti-
tioners’ cases. Creary ¥, Weeks involved a post World
War | -Board concerned with reduction in numbers in
Officers. In that case, the relator was given full Oppor-
tunity te be heard and this Court carefully held at 343.
344 that the “hoards which acted on his ease did not
exceed the powers conferred upon them.” Morcover, the
Statute’ involved specilically provided that the adminis.
trative action should be final. Still f¥rther, in Creary v..
Weeks the board's function Was, in effect, to thin out the
oherd”—but- tiving” those tentatively chosen for elimina-
tion opportunity to be heard. In comparison, the purpose
of petitioners’ board was te eliminate the “black sheep"—
based. upon the “sheepherders’ ” records. But the records
of petitioners do not designate them as “black sheep”.
Orloff v. Willoughby held that this Court would not. in-
‘terfere with the President's power to appoint comniis-
sioned officers. The Court in no way indicated that this
non-interfergnee should apply also to an involuntary cut:
ting off-of tenure. In fact, the: contrary Was indicated
(although in a back-Nanded manner) when the Court
stated on pays 90, “Whatever control courts have exerted
over tenure or compensation under an appointment, they
©
?
13 oO
have never assumed any process to conceal the appeinting
power either in civilian or military. positions.”
6. Although in Payson it was argued to the Court of
Appeals that he should have been given a hearing under
10 U.S.C. 5862-5863, (Appendix D) the Court of Appeals |
failed entirely to comment on this issues These provi-
sions of-law, and regulations in implementation “thereof,
give to a “candidate for promotion” notice and oppor-
tunity for a hearing hefore the board when the beard
_entertains doubt as t | .s mental, moral and professional
fitness. There is no qaestion but that the Board consider-
ing petitioners had these powers, but did not. exercise
thent in petitioners’ cases. No explanation has been
offered by the Government for this failure,
F - *,
‘ The criteria set forth ‘for the Board's avtion in 10.
U.S.C. 6384(a) is whether the Officer's record indieates
that “his performance of duty is unsatisfactory in’ his
present grade and that he Would not satisfactorily per.
form the duties of a higher grade. For a long time past,
the Navy has specifically provided a place in an. officer's
fitness reports to mark him unsatisfaetory-if he was so”
considered by his reporting senior. Under Navy Regula-
tions an officer ix -shown all Unsatisfactory reports and
given an opportunity to reply. (Navy Reg. Art. 1701(8),
Appendix D) It -is clear from the legislative histery that
it Was specifically in view of this procedure that 10 UIS.C.
6384(a) was originally enacted into law. Yet the Gov.
* The Government has not contended that petitioners failed to
exhaust their administrative remedies. But siffte in the oral
arguments in Payson, despite the statutory provision fot notice
in 10 USC 5863(c). the Court expressed some curiosity” as to
whether Commander Payson had requested a hearing, it might be
well to relate that Commander ‘Payson did request review and
cancelation of his prospective dischargé but was informed that
no person or board possessed the power -to cancel or hold in
abeyance his prospective discharge. Neither Payson nor Robin-
son knew “that they had been. selected for discharge as unsatis-
factory until after the’ President's action. '
, ff Pg" in .
; mareey .
* ernment has contended that an unsatisfactory ‘perform. °
ance could be determined from purely ex parte reports
Which are all graded satisfactory such as petitioners—
through insight gained by. experienced navat-efficers. bhe=—
yond that of. persons not so favored. And-there is some
hint from the opinion in Payson that the Court’ of Ap-.
peals felt it lacked\such insight and for such reason could
not review petitioners’ records. But if this be so.. it is
submitted that the criteria of 10 U.S.C. 6384(a) is either
no. criteria or not the criteria intended by Congress, and
the proviso itself must fail as being too broad of a déle- ;
gation of legislative authority. . ; s
(‘8 ‘The opinion of the Court of Appeals in Payson
‘Testates ‘petitioners’ position upon the computation ef
years of: service precisely opposite to that taken. It was
and is: petitioners’ position-that the original statute (Sec-
tion 202 of the Officer Personnel Act. of 1947, Appendix
D) is unequivocally clear that Staff Corps officers were
to count their service from the date of original appoiut-
ment ‘in the Regular Navy whether they were originally
appointed in the Staff Corps og in the Line and trans:
- ferred without loss of rank to the Staff Corps concerned.
This way, all the service Was counted gnd the transferee
Was, not, in effeet, “reborn”. when he was transferred.
With such interpretation, Line and: Staff Corps running
mates” becane eligible for separation and. retirement at
the same t.me. Hov ever, despite the unambiguous nature
of the statute, ihe Navy Judge Advocate Genera] in 1949
Ppined that there was a Statutory “rebirth” and Stat? .
Corps transferees lost the time they had previously spent
in the Line. (CC@ Record, Payson, 111-123) Tater, the
Navy Judge Advogate General proposed a modification of
his original opinion in line with that. subsequently sub-
mitted: on behalf of petitioners. But in the meanwhile
-a Codification of laws relating to the military was en-
acted. And wheteas the prier provision was not: am-
biguous, the codified provision was..> (10 U.S.C. 6888,
‘Appendix D) In view of the Codifieation’s changes, the
a
Comptroller General would not accept the Navy Judge
Advocate General's proposal for a different interpretation
onthe grounds that the Codifieation had adopted his prior
opinion (37 CompGen ‘747, CCA Reeord, Payson, 124-128).
However, the Senate artd House Reports to the Codifi-
cation state that where such opinions were adopted with
the: text reworded to express those interpretations, such
changes were explained in the revision. notes: But, th®
changes in the applicable provision (10 U.S.C; 6388) .
Were not so’ explained—there being no mention of the
prior opinion of the: Navy Judge Advocate General in
the Reyision notes at all. ’ ;
. Petitioners and their attorney alike seriously question
whether consideration of the case by the Court of Appeals’
was more than superficial when the Court's statement,
“Appellant seems totally to have overlooked: the effect
Which must be given®o Section 202(a) of the 1947 Act”
is edntrasted rae following from page 14 of the -
Repiy Brief in. Payson:
Counsel for Appellant, however, utterly fails to
discern any Foom for int®rpretation.of the language
in Section 202(d)(1), supra, When “commissioned
officers holding permanent appointments in the Staff
Corps” is:substituted for “officers” in th section (See
Appellee'’s Brief, page 12 [referring to Section 202
(a) of: the 1947 Act]), the meaning would, if any-
thing, seem even more clear that the eléck for-tota!
commissioned service started running for these off.-
cers upon their original Regular Navy appointment, °
Moreover, it is, submitted that this Viewpoint is con-
siderably fortified by the fact that the Judge Advo-
¢ cate General of the Navy indicated in ‘his opinion
submitted to the Comptroller General tht he con-
sidered that the 1949 opinion did not correctly in-
_ terpret Section 202(d). Had the Comptroller Gen-
“eral agreed with the Judge Advocate General, it is
apparent that we would not now be before this Court.
It is a fundamental pule df Statutory construction
that where a statute is clean and unambiguous an
administrative construction thereof. js not material.
“a
Q
16
The foregoing is then followed in the Brief by ofe and
one-half pages of pertinent case citations ‘and quotations.
9. It might ‘at first blush seem that the Court, of
Appeals’ decision as te petitioners’ years of service ‘will |
have the same adverse effects on Line officer transferees
to the Staff Corps fs on ex-Reserve Staff Corps officers
who later integrated into the Regular Navy. . But this
is not.the case. While it -is true that both ‘rémain to-
_ gether for eligibility to be recommended for discharge
as unsatisfactory and for involuntary retirement, the :
Line transferee can count his “lost” time. for voluntary
retirement—something*the ex-Reserye officer can not do.
‘Hence, had either of-the Line transferees, to which peti-
tioners must look. for their years of ,service under 10
U.S.C. 6388 (Appendix D), been recommendéd for dis-
charge as unsatisfactory, they tould haye neatly avoided
same merely by voluntarily retiring before their involun-
tary separation. Thus the Court of Appeals has sue.
ceeded in fostering a discrimination af to officers because
of their, source contrary to the express intent of Congress
‘that-no préference was to be accorded officers becanse
they enteréd the Regular Navy from a particular source.
(Act of April 18, 1946, “Appendix D)
-. CONCLUSION:
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted
that this writ of certiorari should be granted.
. }
PENRose} Lucas ALBRIGHT
Attorney for Petitioners
-° — 708 Perpetual Building
Washington 4, D. ¢.
Mason, Mason and Albright 3
Of Counsel
7“~-
ty
17
APPENDIX A
UNITED. STATES COURT OF APPEALS: FOR THE
: DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 15554
-StErHeN H. PAYSON, APPELLANT
Vv.
Wituim B. Fraxkr, Secretary of the Navy,
> e .
APPRKLLEE .
Appeal from the United States District Court
mf. for the District of Columbia
ge
- Decided August 4, 1960 ©
Mr. Penrose Lucas Albright for appellant. j
-
Mr. Daniel J. McTaque? Assistant United States Attor-
ney, with whom: Messrs. Oliver Gasch, United States
Attorney, and Car! W. Belcher, Assistant United States
Attorney, were 6n the brief, for appellee,
- ? ae We Sy.
Before Puiups, Senior United States Circuit Judge
for the Tenth Cireuit,* and Wiser K, MILLer and Dawa-
NER, Circuit Judges,
Dananer, Circuit Judge: A Navy Department selection:
board was convened September 24, 1957, to consider the
cases of officers of the Civil Engineer Corps of the Navy
* Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 294(d).
+
* 18
on active duty eligible for consideration for temporary
promotion tothe grade of Captain. Three officers: were
selected. By direction of. the Secretary, the’ selection
board also considered the cases of all such officers “with
less than twenty years of service” whose reeords indi-
cated their unsatisfactory performance of duty in their
present grade and that they would not satisfactorily per-
form the duties of a higher grade, The board found this
appellant ineludable among the latter group. The report
of the selection board was concurred in oy the Chief of
Naval Operations, and thereafter was approved -by the
Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of Defense.
Finally,. after the report bad been approved by the
President on October 17, 195 , appellant was given notice
of the action taken and was informed that he would be
separated from the service as of June 30, 1958. After the
Secretary of the Navy had refused appellant’s request”
that his. discharge be suspended, appellant filed suit in
the District Court where a temporary restraining ordér
was issued. A motion-for a preliminary injunction was
denied, and appellant was finally discharged on July 18,
1958. Cross motions for summary. judgment having. been -
filed, .the Secretary's motion Was granted. Appellant's .
motion was denied and his case was dismissed, and this
appeal followed. “T° OS
. Appellant’s ¢omplaint had. asked the District Court. to
adjudge and declare null and void that portion of ‘the
report of the selection board which reflected the board's
opinion that appellant’s record indicated his, unsatisfac-
tory performance of duty in his grade of Commander.
Alternatively, appellant asked the District Court to ad-
judge and declare 10°U.S.C. § 6384 to bea nullity, (a),
for its failure to prescribe with reasonable clarity the
_ limits of the power entrusted to the selection board, or
(b), for prescribing “unreasonable and too broad limits:
of authority which Congress is without power to pre-
scribe,” ; .
19 Eee
! .
The record shows that’ appellant on October I4, 1937
was appointed Lieutenant (j.8.) in the Civil Engineer
Corps of the United States Naval Reserve and*that he
accepted appointment December 29, 1937, He Was not
called to active duty until January 22, 1941. He served
in various grades until, on’ September 7, 1946, he was
appointed an officer in the Regular Navy, Civil Engineer
Corps, achieving the permanent. rank of Commander in
June, 1949. Pursuant ‘to the Act approved April 18,
1946, 60 Srar. 92, 34 U.S.C. $15. (1952), many officers
like appellant who had served in World War II as Re-
serves transferred ‘to the Regular Navy. It is clear from
the Act that Congress contemplated no discrimination .
against officers because of the source from which they
entered the Regular Navy and that no preference was to
be accorded officers because they entered the Regular
Navy from a particular source. Problems arose. never.
theless, and Congress next passed the Officer Personnel
Act of 1947, 61 Srar. 795, 891, 34. U.S.C. § 806d (e) (2) ©
(1952),-(now 10 U.S.C. § 6384(a) (1958)), where provision
was made for certain action by a selection board as to
‘officers “of less than twenty years’ service.” :
Despite appellant’s claims, we perevive no proper basis
upon which to conclude that the sections here applied
Were a “nullity.” Not only does Congress possess specific
constitutional authority to legislate with respect. to the
Navy, U. S. Consr. art. I, § 8, but the President from: the’
same source derives his authority as Commander-in-chief.
_He appointed the Seeretary-of the Navy by whose “pre.
cept” the selection board was convened. To the latter,
expressly detailed duties were assigned by the Secretary.
The carefully outlined agenda, set forth in the record,
discloses a comprehensive plan whereby a recorder was
named and sworn, each member of the hoard was sworn
to the performance of the specific duties devolving upon
source provisions to be found in the Officer Personnel Act
20
the board, at least two-thirds. of the membership were
bound to, and did, coneur in the ultimate individual opin-
ions and conclusiors, and the final findings were read
aloud ‘in the presence of all members who then siigned
the report as did the recorder. We can not agree that
.the administrative plan authorized by statute with the
report of the board proceeding through. channels, and
ultimately approved by the President, was a “nullity.”
_ Apparently the records of some 125 Civil Engineer’
Corps officers of the Navy were under consideration by
the board. Three officers were found eligible for promo-
tion and three others were in. the board’s sworn, collec-
tive judgment not qualified for continued service. Short
of court martial proceedings based upon gross derelic-
tion, or’ retirement for physical or ‘mental disability, the
mechanism may well seem ta reflect. the experience of
long years involving thousands of offivers, Whose qualiti-
cations for continued service may thus become subject to
periodic’ review. Congress has long been aware of the
problem, with severance pay, retirement status and other
personnel factors the subject of extensive legislation.
To decide, as we do, that the statutes and the proceed-
ings ‘under them are not a “nullity” is not to end our :
task. If appellant had achieved “tatal commissioned sery-
ice” of twenty years, he would not have been subject to.”
separation from service. He insists he possessed a ree-
ord of twenty years’ serviee for the purposes of 10 U.S.C. °
§$ 6384(aJ (providing for action by the selection board
looking to separation from the service), and 6288(a) and
(bj(1) and (b)(2} (providing for computation of total
commissioned’ service). He argues that the codifiers in
drafting 10 U.S.C. and particularly § 6388(a) and (b)(1)
and (b)(2), erroneously and substantively altered the
of 1947, particularly Section 202(d)(1). The-latter not
only specified how “total ¢éommissioned service” must be
«
a | ; Yan ; °
computéd for Regular Navy Officers but related his service
fo one of the latter next — to him.
Appellant thus claims that his “total commissioned
service” should be deemed to date back to June 30, 1937,
of the fiscal year from which his Nayal Academy “run-
ning mate” must date his service undef 10 U.S.C. § 6388 °
(@).. On appellant’s ‘theory, his twenty years’ service
would have been concluded by June 30, 1957, and the
selection beard therefore lacked power to recommend
his separation,
We do not agree. The record clearly shows that ap-
pellant’s running’ mate had been appointed Ensign in the
Regular Navy on June 3, 1937, but he did not accept ap-
pointment as Lieutenant (j-g.) in the Navy's Civil. Engi-
neer Corps until August 23, 1940. The onset date of: his
Staff corps Service, under the Act, became June 30, 1941, whe
Appellant seems totally to have overlooked the effect
Which must be given to section 202(a) of the 1947. Act.
There the word “officers” was detined for the purposes of
Title II to mean “commissioned offiéers . . . in the Staff -
Corps of the Regular Navy,” (emphasis supplied) which
ineluded the Civil Engineer Corps: . Thus section 202(d)
(1) in referring to “total commissioned service”. of such
a Regular Navy Officer ‘provided that computation must
date “trom June 30 of the fiscal year in whiclr he accepted —
such appointment,” Lé€.,-as a commissioned officer jn the
Staff Corps. Sections 202(a) and 202(d)(1) must be read
together. The codifiers in drafting 10° U.S.C. § 6388
simply elided the terminology as to “staff corps” service
to avoid the circumlocution and interpolation essential to
& proper reading of the 1947 Act.
The affidavits and administrative records before’ us
demonstrate a consistent application by the Navy: of inter-
pretations with which we agree. The Officer Personnel
Act of 1947, 61 Star. 815. denominates Title IT as con-
b oe 22
; Pag
taining “Permanent Provisions Relating to Officers of the
Staff Corps of the Navy.” The'Judge Advocate Genera.
of the Navy had clearly distinguished section 1U02(d) of
the 1947 Act as ‘applicable to line officers from section. °
202(d) (1) as applicable to staff corps. officers. That his
persuasive opinion, Court-Martial Order 2-1949, p. 40,
since followed, had commended itself to Congress, we do
not doubt. The Comptroller General agrees.- See 37 |
Comp. Gen. 747 (1958).!| When Title%0 of the United
States Code was. enacted: into positive law as of August
10, 1956, Senate Report No, 2484, 84th Cong., 2d Sess, 1)
(1956), to accompany H.R. 7049, explained in pertinent
part: - soe
“The object of the new titles has been to restate
existing law, not to make new lan, . . . Where.
court decisions, Opinions of officials“such as the At-
torney General or the Comptroller General, executive
orders, regulations, or well-established administrative
practice have established authoritative interpretations
clarifying ambiguities in: the law, the text has been
reworded to express those interpretations.” (Emplia-
sis added.) Rian ri
‘We are satisfied that the qriginal statute, the depart-
mental interpretations, thé codification and the Comp-
troller General's decision, supra, demonstrate that. ap-
pellant’s total commissioned service was correctly com.
puted. Calculated as it was, appellant had not achieved
the twenty vears’ service which would have insulated him
from separation from service.
- It is net our function to reassess the appellant’s per-
_ formance record which the selection hoard deemed ‘unsutis-
factory. Varidus references therein may well have ap-
1 Appellant on brief concedes ‘that if these two -administrative
opinions can be sustained, his allegation that he had over 20
years’ service, computed under 10 U.S.C. 6388, “must fail.”
°
23
v °
peared to an expert budy to suggest an adequate basis for
the conclusion which was reached. This may seem espe-"
cially the case where this appellant’s record was to be con-
trasted with-many others. The criteria were for the board
in its sworn judgment to apply for the good of the service, °
Suffice it to say that we are in no position to assess and.
appraise that record by itself even were we free to do so.
Cf. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U:S. 83, 93 (1953) ; Creary
v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 336, 343, affirming Weeks +. United
‘States, 51 App.D.C. 195, 277 Fed. 594 (1922),
We have carefully considered evety aspect of the claims
advanced before us. We ean not say that appellant's
separation from service was improperly accomplished.
>
Affirmed.
24
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS |
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT é
é
Zz
(United States Court of Appeals For the District of
* Columbia Circuit Filed Oct 28 1960 /s/. Joseph W.
; Stewart. Clerk) ~ ;
No. 16,021 September Term, 1960
id
James B. Ropinson, aPPELLANT
| v.
Wittiam B. Franke, Secretary of the Navy,
7% _ APPELLEE
Before: Prettyman, Bazelon and Fahy, Circuit
Judges, in Chambers: .
ORDER .
On consideration of appellee’s motion to affirm or dis-
miss, of appellant’s opposition, and of appellee's reply,
it is
Orverev by the court that the judgment of the District
Court is affirmed on authority of Payson v. Franke. No.
15,554, D.C. Cir., Aug. 4, 1960.
Per Curiam.
Dated: October 28 1960
Circuit Judge Fahy would deny the motion.”
25
e
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
: DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
“No. 16,021
JAMEs B. RoBINsON, APPELLANT
*
¥. = *
st , } .
Wituiam B, FRANKE, Secretary of the Navy,
. APPELLEE
MOTION TO AFFIRM’ OR DISMISS
Appellant was ag Officer in the United States Navy.
A Navy Selection Board compared appellant's service
record with the service records of other officers of the
Navy. It found that appellant’s Navy service record
indicated unsatisfactory performance of duty in-his pres-
ent grade and that he would not satisfactorily perform
the duties of a higher grade. . It recommended he be
separated from the Navy, The Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of Defense and
the President approved this ‘recommendation. Appellant
. Was thus honorably discharged from the Navy. 10 U.S.C.
§ 6384. ‘ :
In the Distriet Court he challenged the Jurisdiction and
findings of the Selection Board. Because tho sane “pre.
cise questions” were invelved, the -District Court withheld
its ruling pending ‘this Court’s de¢ision in Payson vy,
Franke, Secretary of the. Navy, appeal no. 15.554, decided
August 4, 1960. .Thereafter, appellee’s motion for sum.
mary. judgment was granted and appellant's cross motion
for summary judgment was denied.
On appeal appellant argues the evidence before the
Selection Board was insufficient to support the findings
made by the Board. He does net argue a total absence
26 :
of any evidence to support those findings. In addition,
he argues the Seléction Board ‘had no jurisdiction to re.
view his service record because he was not “an officer with .
less than 20 years of service,” a condition required jhy
-10 U.S.C. § 6384(a). He relies upon his own interpreta.
tion of the definition: section: of the statute, 10 U.S
-§ 6388(a) and (b)(1) and (b) (2). :
These same issues were rejected by this Court in an
appeal brought by the same counsel who brings tiv
instant appeal. -Payson v. Franke, Secretary of the Navy,
supra. As to appellant’s first point, this Caurt held in
Payson, it would not review the sufficieney of the evidence
in a service record to support a similar finding hy this
same Selection Board. As to appellant’s remaining point,
this Court in Payson, validated the’ same. application. of
the same statutes as is now challenged by the instant °
appellant. .
Because of the recent decision by this Court in the
Payson case, it is clear there is no merit to either of the
issues raised by the instant appellant. Such appeals ary
to be summarily affirmed, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co..
263 U.S. 413 (1923), or. in the alternative, dismissed.
F.R. Civil P. 75(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2106. ;
Wherefore, it is respectfully submitted the appeal be
‘summarily affirmed or, in the alternative, dismissed.
‘/8/ Ottver Gascu
Oviver Gascu, .
United States Attorney.
/8/ Cart W. Beucuer-
‘Cart W. BeLcHer,’
Assistant United States Attorney.
L
bor .
CERTIFICATE oF SERvIcE.
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Motion
has been personally served on attorney for’ appeNant,
Penrose Lucas Albright, ‘Esquire, 1111 E Street, XN. W.,
Washington, D. C., this 11th Was of October, 160, °°
/s/ Caru’W. BELCHER
Car. W, Bevcuer,
Assistant United States Attorney, .
UNITED STATES COUR? OF APPEALS FoR THE.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT a
No. 16,021
James B. Ropinson, appertayxy’
Vv.
Wittiam B. Frayxe. Secretary of the Navy, °.
APPELLEE .
OPPOSITION TO APPELLEE'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM
Appellant was a regular -officer of the United States
_ Navy. “A Navy Selection Board found pursuant to See.
tion #384(a), Title. 10, United States Code, that appel-
lant’s Navy records indicated his unsatisfactory perform.
ance of duty in his\present grade and that he would not:
satisfactorily perform the duties of. 4 higher grade. The
President approved this ‘recommendation and appellant
Was separated from the Navy. Appellant had no unsatis-
- fagtory fitness reports in his regerd=all sneh reports
being’ graded satisfactory or better—and app lee has ad.
$
A
28
Sibel ee .
..Mitted that Said fitness reports were the only. material
before the board which contained material on which the
board’s report cduld have been based. (See Allegation 6,
Plaintiff's Secon Amend. Complaint and Defendant's
' Answer) —
Before the District Court, appellant asked that the find.
ing of the selection board as pertains to him be declared
a nullity and void on the grounds, inter alia, that the evi-
dence before the selection board was legally insufficient to -
Support the findings made by the board, and such find.
ings*°were therefore arbitrary and capricious: and also
that appellant was not “an officer with less than 20 years
of service”, as required for consideration under Section
6384(a), Title 10, United States Code. Appellant's Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment was denied and. Appette..’s
Motion for Summary Judgment was. granted by the Dis-
trict Judge on authority of the decision. in Payson vy.
Franke, Court of Appeals No. 15554; decided August 4,
1960. - : A
The case of Payson y. Franke, supra, involved an of.
ficer faund unsatisfactory by the same selection board
in the same report despite the faet. that he did not have
any unsatisfactory fitness reports. The contentions ad-
vanced in the Payson case were substantially the same
as advanced. in thé instant ease. This Court held in the’
Payson that it could not review the sufficiency of evidence °
in @ service record to Support the board’s finding, and
sustained the Government’s interpretation of the: statutes
under which appellant's service is to be computed.
oo
Counsel for Appellant agrees that the above holding
in the Payson case appears to govern the instant cast.
It is the decision itself "which is considered erroneous
and, in opinion of counse', warrants reversal.
It is thus’ appeilant’s Position that ‘there must be a2
rational basis in the evidence for the conclusion of. the
29
, Selection board, and if such conclusion is not supported
by evidence, the District Court could and should have set
it aside together with orders based thereon’ as arbitrary.
And it is appellant’s further position -that his “years: of
service” should be considered the same as the Years of
service of one John Joseph Cassidy, Jr. who was origi-
_ nally appointed to the rank of Ensign in the Regular
* Navy on June 2, 1938, and he therefore was not “an -—
officer with less than 20 years of service” within the
meaning of 10 U.S.C, 6384(a) upon disposition of the
Selection Board's action.
While in no way considered controlling upon the legal
‘Aspects of this case, counsel invites to the Court’s atten.
tion that he is authorized to seek review of the Payson
case by the Supreme .Court, and if this Court adheres to
its holding in «the Payson with respect to the instant
case, it is contemplated that this case will besjojned with
Payson in such application to -the Supreme Court.
Wherefore, it is respectfully submitted that, in view of
the above and for reasons submitted in detail in the ap.
pellant -Payson’s briefs in. Payson, this Court should not
follow, but should reverse the precedent of Payson in
this case, and accordingly the appeal should ‘neither be
summarily affirmed nor dismissed,
=
Respectfully submittéd, .
/s/ Pengese Lucas Albright ;
‘ ’ PENkoseE Ltcas ALBRIGHT
Counsel for Appellant
708 Perpetual Building
Washington 4, D. ©
Mason, Mason & ALBRIGHT
Of Counsel
30°
CERTIFICATE’ or SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Opposi-
tion has been personally served on Carl W. ‘Belcher,
Esquire, Attorney for Appellee, at the U.S. Court House,
Constitution Avenue and John Marshall Place, Wash.
ington, D.C., this 12th day of October, 1960.
‘/8/ Penrose Lucas Albright :
Penrose Lucas ALBRIGHT
Counsel for Appellant
.
ae
Copies to: Attorney General '
Secretary of the Navyl J
~
uu
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR TIE °
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 16,021
James B. Robinsoy, aprpeLLant
: 3
P ce v.
Wituiam B. Franke, Secretary of the Navy,
APPELLEE.
REPLY T9) “OPPOSITION TO APPELLEE'S MOTION |
TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM
‘Appellant concedes (Opposition, p. 2) that his Navy
service record is in degal effect in the same posture as. °
the Navy service rend of Payson, the appellant in
Payson v. Franke, appeat-No. 15,554, decided August 4.
1960. In both service records there are no adverse con-
clusions stated in the various fitness reports in the service
31
records. However, in both service records. there are
certain fitness reports which do. contain notations and
comments which make it Possible to reach an evaluation
of the individual in comparison with other individuals
by review of the Service records and fitness reports’ of
such other individuals. This comparison ts the legal
function. of the Navy Selection Board.
This Court held in the Payson case that the Board
hess “reports, looks to the notations and comments con-
tained in the body of. fitness reports, and reach a legal
finding from comparing such notations and comments
with similar material in the service records of other
Navy officers, Thus, appellant presents no issue which
iS not now foreclosed to him by the decision in the
Payson case. ie
Appellant ‘suggests that ne is wrongly decided,
There is no petition for rehearing pending in Payson.
That ease is final, and, therefore, the law of this juris-
diction. :
Whereforé, it. is respectfully submitted this appeal be
summarily affirmed, OB, in the alternative, dismissed,
o ‘ ' a
/8/. OLIVER Gascu
OLIVER Gasca,
‘ United States Attorney,
/s/ Cart W. BELCHER
Cart W. BELcuer, |
‘Assistant United States Attorney,
32
Certiricate or Service -
y of the foregoing Reply has
ttorney for appellant, Penrose
petual Building, Wash
this 12th day of October, 1960,
/s/ Caru/W. Betcuer
Cary W. Betcuer, .
Assistant United States Attorney,
2
APPENDIX G*
.UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR TIE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCULT |
- No. 15,554
September Term, 1959
Civil 1670.58
Srepusy -H. PAYSON, APPELLANT _
. v.
Wiuiam B. F Ranke, Secretary of. the Navy,
: APPELLEE
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the District of Columbia
Before: Phillips,
for the Tenth Circuit, and Wilbur K. Miller a
Circuit Judges, : 1
Senior United States Cirenit Judge
nd Danaher,
; JUDGMENT
This cause came on to be heard on the
from the United States District
of Columbia, and was argued by
On consideration whereof, It ,is
-by this Court that the order—of
pealed from in this cause he,
record on appeal
Court for the District’
counse, .
ordered and adjudged
the Distriet Court ap-
and it is hereby, affirmed.
¥
Per Curiam.
Dated: August 4, 1960
34
, 4
APPENDIX D
Section, 8, Article I of Constitution:
Congress shall have the, Power to . provide for the
common Defense and geperal welfare of the United
States; ... To provide and maintain a Navy; To make .
Rules for the Government and Regulation’ of the land
and naval forces; ... To provide for organizing, arming,
and disciplining, the Militia, and fer governing such Part
of them as may be employed in the Service of the United
States, reserving to the States, respectively, the Appoint-
ment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the
Militia according to the discipline prescribed hy Congress;
. And to make all Laws which shall be nec essary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Pawers,
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in “the
Government of the United States, or any Department or
Offices thereof.
The Act of April 18, 1946, 60 Stat. 92:
... ({]n order to remove any apprehension on the part
of Naval Reserve officers regarding their opportunitiys
for advancement in event of their transfer to the Regular
Navy, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the Con-
gress that in all matters relating to commissioned officers
in the Regular Navy there shall be no discrimination
whatsoever against officers because of the source from
which they entered the Regular Navy, and that no pret:
erences shall be given officers by reason of the fact that
they entered Regular Navy from any particular source.
Officer Perso». Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 816:
Sec, 202(a) As used in this title, the word “officers” shall
be held to mean commissioned officers holding, permanent
appointments as such on the active list in the Staff Corps
of the Regular Navy. »
a
(d)(1)
For the’ purposes of this‘title in -respect to eligibility
for contihuation on the active list and in respect to sep-
aration from the active list, the total commissioned service
of an officer originally appointed in the grade or rank
of lieutenant (junior grade) or ensign in the ‘Regular
Navy, who has served continuously on.the active ‘list shall
be computed from June 30 of the fiseal year in which he
accepted such appointment, except for officers appointed
pursuant to the Act of April 18, 1946 (Publie Law 347,
Seventy-ninth Congress). Each other: officer shall be
deemed to have for these purposes as anuch total com-
missioned service ’as any officer described above in this
subsection who shall not have lost numbers or precedence
and who is, or shall have been, junior to such other offi er
in his corps for the purpose of eligibility for promotion
or selection for promotion since the date of the latter's
first appointment to permanent conimissioned rank in thy
. Regular Navy above the grade-of commissioned warrant
- Offeer, following which he shall have served continuously
on the eative list of the Regular Navy.
10 U.S. Code 6384(a):
Facli: selection board convened’ under chapter 543. of
this title to recommend officers for promotion shall report,
from among those officers eligible for. consideration, the
name of each officer with less than 20 years of service
whose record, in the opinion of the board, indicates his
unsatisfactory performance of duty in his present grade,
and, in the opinion of the board, indicates that he Would
not satisfactorily perform the duties of a higher .grade.
10 U.S. Code 6388:
(a)»For the purpose of the preceding sections of this
chapter, the total commissioned service of each officer
originally appointed. in the grade of lieutenant (junior
yrade) or ensign in any staff corps of the Navy, who has
.
‘
a
36
since that appointment served continuously on the active
- list of the Navy, is computed from June 30 of the fisea!
year in which he accepted that appointment. However,
this subsection does not apply te officers appointed under
the Act of April 18, 1946, ch. 141 (60 Stat. 92)...
(b) Each other commissioned officer on the active list
of the Navy in any staff Corps is considered to have the
same total commissioned service for the purpose of the’
preceding sections of this chapter as the officer ‘in his.
corps -described in subsection (a) having the’ maximum
total commissioned service who—
(1) has not lost numbers or precedence; and
(2) is, or at any tinre has been, junior to the other
officer: for the purposes of eligibility for promotion,
and selection for promotion during that other officer's
_ latest period of continuous service on the active list.-
. . © °
10 U.S. Code 5862:
a) Before an officer on the. active list of the Navy or
the Marine Corps may be permanently promoted to a
higher grade, he must, except as provided in subsection
(ce), be examined by an examining board and certified,
under section 5863 of this title, to be qualified,
(b) Before an officer cn the active list of the Navy
below the grade of rear admiral or an officer on the
active list of the-Marine Cérps below the grade of major
_ general may be temporarily promoted to a higher grade
under section 5769, 5772, 5773, or 5784 of this title, he
must be examined Ky an examining | ‘board and certitied,
under section 5863 of this title, to be qualified.
_ (@) An officer who has successfully passed the mental. .
moral, and professional examination for temporary pro-
motion to a grade under subsection (b) may not again
be examined for permanent appointment in that grade.
Y |
. 37
(d) Each board for the mental. mora}, and professional
examination of officers shall be convened by the Presi-
dent or, when authorized by the Sec retary of the Navy,
by the senior officer present, or other commanding officer,
on a foreign station. A board convened by a senior officer
present, or other commanding officer, on a foreign station
may only examine officers who are under-the command
of the convening authority and who are directed. to ap
pear before the board.
(e) Each examining bonne convened under this séetion
shall be composed of commissioned officers of the naval
service. At least three members must act in’ each’ case.
No member may act in the case of any officer Senior to
hi . ’
10 U.S. Code 5863; ;
(a) Except as provided i in subsection (b), an examining -
hoard convened under section 5862 of: this titlt may take
. testumony and may examine al] matter in the records of
the’executive part of the Department of the Navy relating
to the case of any officer: that. it is considering. The
president of a board shall administer the oath to all wit- |
nesses who testify in person before the board. A record
shall be made of the examination and statement of the
officer and of the testimony of the witnesses.
(b) The report of an examining board convened under
section .5862 of ‘this title, recommending an officer for pro-,
motion, is conclusive, after its approval, as ‘to any fact
concerning that officer that was considered and decided
upon by the examining hoard. Such a fact may not again
he considered by a later examining board unless it is a
continuing one and shows the unfitness 6f the ‘officer to
perform his duties at sea. If a board fails to comply With
this subsection, the President may-direct a reexaniination
of the case of the officer concerned.
.,
38
(c) An officer is. entitled to be present and submit a
statement under oath when an examining board convened
under section 5862 of this title is considering his case.
Before the board may find an officer not qualified, it-
must conduct a public examination of the records of the
executive part of the Department of the Navy concerning
the officer and, unless he fails to appear after due notice,
of the officer himself.
(d) An examining board shall report the recommenda-
tion of-an officer for promotion in the following terms:
WD TN GU TUE peri ee has
the mental, moral, and professional qualifications to per-
furm efficiently all the duties, both at sea and on shore, °
of the grade to. which he is to be promoted, and recom- .
mend him for promotion,”
(e) The record and certification of a bourd in each case,
with any record of the executive part of the Department
of the Navy considered by the board to be necessary in
the determination of that case, shall be submitted to the
President for approval or disapproval: of the finding.
U. S. Navy Regulations, 1948, Article 1701(8) provides:
(a) Adverse matter shall not be placed in an’ officer's
record without his knowledge. It shall be first referred
to the officer reported upon for such official statement as -
he may choose to make in reply. If the officer reported
upon desires to make no statement, he shall so state
officially in writing. "
(b) When a report of fitness containing adverse matter,
or any correspondence relating thereto, is sent to an of-
ficer, it shall be sent direct, addressed in his name. The
officer concerned shall report any communication so re.
ceived, together with his statement in reply to the Chief
of Naval Personnel (Commandant of the Marine Corps)
via, the officer by whom the original report was completed
and via the officer oy officers through whom such report
was forwarded.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.