Appendices to Petition for Certiorari — Miner v. Commerce Oil Refining Corp. (No. 451)

Supreme Court brief1960

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REAIOMRY DF OORT

Map Based on Plaintiff's Exhibit 22, Showing Jamestown and

Adjacent Areas; the Refinery Use. District: the Location of

Petitioners’ Homes; and the Distances Involved.

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Suprenwee Court-af the United Stair:

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On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United Star

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Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

APPENDICES TO PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

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INDEX TO APPENDICES

Page

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CD) O)peimbern wf the Di triet Court... Al

el) (dpimion wl thee Cleuart of Appeals - -

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VT) Oviginal Judgment 2.0.0... > ; rete Ty

2) Order Denving Rehearing... eae ts eee.”

App mndis Co Role of Court, Statutes, seme) Chrelimeners

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bp? State Statutes .....--- ewes a"

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Appendix Demon-frable Factual Errors in the Court

of Appects" Opinion: . aCe ee aa » AR

Apuvenelin EO The Rhode [land duaw of Nui-aness ASY

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APPENDIX A

OPINIONS BELOW

(1) Opinion of the District Court

DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNIPED STATES:

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RITODEE ISLAND

| Civil Action No, 2118

Comareck Oi Rerixine CorponStion, Plaintiff

v,

Winniam W. Miser, ef Ab, Dy pendants

OPINION

January 5, 1909

Day, District Judge. This i+ an action Wherein the plain-

it seeks damages and injunctive relief against the defemd..

ants. Jurisdiction of this Court i~ based on diversity of

citizenship and the existence of awontroversy in the requ

site amount, .

Plaintiff’s complaint contains two counts. In the first

count plaintiff alleges in substance that on or about Sep:

tember 27, 1956. a license to engage in the refinipg, mann-

facturing and processing, of petrolenm prodiets Was issued

to it by the Town Council of the Town of Jamestown in

accordance with the provisions of Chapter 50 of the ordi-

nanees of said Jamestown, and that it paid a fee of £5,000

for said license; that refinery operations are a permis: ive

use"in a refinery use distriet in said town: that under the

onlinanees of said Jamestown, the laws of the ‘State of

Rhode Island and of the United States, plaintiff has a right

to construet and operate a plant for the purpose of; con-

- dueting refinery operations and intends to constfnet and

operate cueh ao refinery forthwith in such a refinery use

d’striet in said Jamestown s that the defendants have un

7

A2

lawfully combined and eonspired to harass, delay an

prevent plaintiff from exereising its right to construe

and operate said refinery in said Jamestown: that pursnant

to said unlawfnl combination and eons piracy to deprive

plaintitf of its said right the defendants have ilacert i and

maliciously resorted to the use of unlawful means, inelued

ing certain overt acts, which are alleged therein; that it is

informed and believes and alleges. on information and

belief that the defendants in furtherance of said unlawful -

combination and conspiracy intend to perform further acts

to harass; delay and prevent it from eonstrueting and Oper

ating said refinery,.and that it has been damaged in the

sum of $500,000. In this count, plaintiff demands that the

defendants be enjoined during + pendeney of this action

and permanently ‘from unlawfully combining and ean.

“pining against the plaintiff! and from taking any action

Lesisenied to harass, delay or prevent plaintiff from exercis

ge its sand rights ete’? and that it have judement agains!

the defendants and each of them-in the sum of & Sp00,009, the

costs of this action and exemplary or punitive d: images.

The second count alleges a cause of action arising under

the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 15 ULS.CLA. v, 1-7, 15. with

Jurisdietion of this ee hased on the provisions of the

Clayton Act, 16 US.CLAL $12 et seq.; repeats the allega-

tions with respect to ae license, ete. contained in the firs:

count? ‘seeks similar injunctive relief as that demanded

therein, and judgment against the defendants and eac hoo!

them int the sum -of $1,500,000, reasonable attorneys’ foes

and costs, a

Oefendants in-their answers asserf that the license upon

Which the plaintit? relies is invalid, that the amendment te

the zoning ordinance of Jaiaestown creating a refinery use

district is invalid, and that the amendment to the building

ordinance whereby plaintiff was exeused from compliance

therewith is invalid. In addition, they filed eounterelainy

wherein the ‘Y allege the invalidity of said license, the invalid

ity of said amendment to said zoning ordinance, and of said

AB

amendment to the building ordinance. They also allege

therein that the value of the real estate owne “by them will

lw substantially reduced and destroyed, and that said real

estate will be rendered unfit and uncomfortable for its

enjoyment by the ereetion and operation of said. refine TY,

aul that said refinery will eo institute a continuing puisanee

to them,

In their countere ‘i tits the le ‘Tendants seek a deel: ratory

judgiment thi at said Neense and said ame ‘mdlments are yoid:

an} temporary and permanent iIMjuNCtions enjoining the:

plaintu® from taking any further action og doing any act

purported to be authorized under said license and said

amendments; and such other or further relief as may he

required by equity and good conscience,

Plaintiff in its reply to the counter claims denies that

said license and amendments are invalid. and further by

way of defense to said éounmterclaims alleges that the de-

fendants have been guilty of such laches as should jn e. quity

har them from maintaining said counterclaims because the

plaintiff ‘tin redianee on the atidity of said ordinances

wiul said Teense’* and og defendants’ failure to br: ng any

leval or equitable proceedings to challenge the’ validity

thereof - has taken certain steps, ineluding the acquisition

of lands, the expenditures ef large sums of mone ¥. ete.

Subsequent to the filing of it. rep dy, the plaintiff? moved

for the entry of a sumim: iry judgment in if< faver dismiss

ine said connterelaimes. This inmotion was denied by me on

Mebruary 7, — See Commerce Oil Refining Corpora

tion v. Miner, 22 F.LR.D. 5. a

When this ease was reached ‘for trial. plaintift an

yoinced in open court-that it did not intend to offer any

tN denee in support of its clan of an illegal conspiracy hy:

the defendants aaainst it. and upon motion by the defend

auts its complaint was dismissed with prejudice. The trial

then proceeded on the defendants’ countere laims,

The trial, which lasted for more than forty days. pro.

duced a ree ord of nearly 6,000 paige and ” great many ex

Ad

hibits. Npart from the presentation of detailed testimony

as to the cireumstances attendant upon the adoption of said

amendments to the zoning and building ordinances and the

adoption of an ordinance and the isswance to the plaintit?

of a lieonse thereunder, many days of the trial were devoted

to the presentation of testimony by expert withesses on the

question of whether the operation of the refinery as planned

will constitute a nuisance to the defendants.

The issues developed by the pleadings and the evidence

are (1) the validity of said amendments to the zonjng and

buildinig ordinances, (2) the validity ef the Heense granted

to the plaintiff amd (3) whether the operation of said

refinery at the location specified and in the manner pro

posed by the plaintiff will constitute a nuisance to the

defendants or any of them. ‘

Plaintit? contends that the defendants have no standing

to attack the validity of amendments to tht zoning and

building ordinances or the validity of the leense «or, the

ordinance pursuant to whieh it,was granted. In my opinien

this contention is without merit, Ptis well settled in Rhode

Island that if a party ean show that an amendment te a

zoning ordinance is ifegal and that the value of his prop

erty is injured or substantially threatened with injury by

its enforeement, he is entitled to relief in equity with respect

to such. iHegal amendment. “In Rhode T<land Home Build

ers’v. Hunt. 1948, T4-R. 1. 255, the Supreme Court said at

page Joo: : 5

0 When hi rights are injured or substantial!

threatened with mgyney by the enforcement of the a!

leved Hlegal amendment to the zoning ordinanee and

be is:dble to establiv’ the illegality of such amendment,

he hos ample remedy through ordinary proceedings

iT eqeety.

That the same rule applies in Rhode !sland to the:amend

ment to the building ordinance and license aspects of thi-

ease is impheit in the decisson of the Supreme Court ot

Ad

Rhode Island in Order of St. Benedict in bag tenn

Town Council of Portsmouth, 1956, R. 1. 12004. 2d 829. In

that case the petitioner applie i for hassles to review and

quash the action of the -respcudents in granting a ‘building

permit to erect and a lieense to operate an oil refinery to

the plaintiff in this action. The Supreme Court in refusing:

to grant the relief sought pointed ont that at common law

the issuance of a writ of certiorari rested im the diseretion

of the Court, and held that in the exereise of that discre-

tron it would not issue the writ becarse of the pendency of

other proceedings in equity instituted by the petitioner to

secure relief from the grievances alleged in the petition for

certiorari. ;

Similarly, the federal courts have long adhered to the

doctrine that private persons may attack the validity of

municipal ordinances in equity proceedings when ordinary:

remedies do not atford full protection against the threat

‘of substantial harm. General Electric Ry. Co. v. Chieago,

L& L. Ry. Co., 1900, 7 Cir. 9S FL 907, aff'd. on rehearing,

17 F. 771; Seattle Gas & KE. -trie Co. y. Citizens Light &

Power Co., 1903, C.C. Washes, 123 F. 58s

In this cas’ the defendants have produced ample evidence:

that their rights are substantially ia d with injury by

the continned enforcement of said amendments to the zon-

ing and building ordinanees, and the ordinance under which

said license Was eranted. Under the laws of Rhode Ish: ined

the defendants thus have sanding presently to attaek the'r

Valndity in this Court. 3

’

I

Vaniprry oF THE, AMENDMENTS To THE ZONING

: ; axp Beanpise Orpi~asxces

The original soning ordinanee of the Town of James:

Town Which the ‘Pown Couneih purported to amend by the

ereation af said refinery se distriet on September 2G. 1906

Was adopted Oni \ugust ro | Mae The ey ilenee establishes

and plaintiff concedes that due nofice af the hearing on its

A6 :

proposed adoption was not viven prior thereto as require:

by the.state enabling act authorizing cities and towns to

adopt zoning ordinances. As a consequence thereof th:

zoning ordinance was invalid and void on September 27,

1956 when the Town Council purported to enact the amend.

ment thereto creating the so-called refinery use district

R. 1. Home Builders, Ine. ve Budlone Rose Co. 4950, 77

R.1.147. Since it was void, the amendment thereto is like

Wise void unless it can be said to be complete and perfee:

in and of itself. Lassiter v. Atlantic ( itv, 1914, 86 NUE.

87, 90 A. 675; City of Chieazo vy. MeKinley, 1981, 3440 11.

297, 170 N. EB. 261: Board of Com'rs. re City of Newark v..

Grodecki, 1943, 21. N. J. Mise. 241, 38 A. 240115: ef. City of -

LaCrosse vy. Elbertson, 1931, 205 Was. 207, 237 NW. 99, It

is obvious that the amendment was not intended as an orig

inal zoning ordinance independtnt of and apart from =

which it purported to amend, and if it were so intended,

must be deemed to be void and of no etfeet beeause as he

record establishes it was not, prior to its enaetment, ap

proved by a financial town meeting of seid Town of James.

town, as required hy See, 1 of Chapter 342 of the General

Laws of Rhode Island, Revision of T9388. Cf. Ro 1. Heme

Builders, Ine. v. Budlony: Rose Co., supra.

Prior to its amendment, the building ordinance of said

Town, Chapter NLTV, contained among other provisions.

the following:

“Section 3. Every person intending to build, eon

struét, reeonstrnet or alter any building strneture or

foundation, including temporary struetures, platform.

‘or stands for assembly purposes, shall before com.

meneing the same, file with the Inspector of Building:

an applieation for a building permit on a form pro:

vided therefor, shall pay a fee therefor at the rate of

£1.00 for each S1O00 of estimate “lLeost of the strneture

and shall at any time, if required by the [nispeetor of >

P idings or Board of Appeal. tiles the plans, speeit!

* sons and details or other full and aceurate deserip

AG

tion of the intended building, construetion or recor

struction or alteration. This shall be in addition to

such permits as may beorequired by the laws of Rhode

Island for specific classes of buildine.”*

Said amendment, adopted September 27, 1950, contains the

following provisions:

“Sertivon 48. The provisions of this ordinance, Chay

ter ALIV, shall not apply to buildings, structures,

foundations, storage tanks, vessels, or any other facility

constructed, to be constructed or altered, designed or

used for the refining of petroleum or the manufaeture,

process or storage in bulk or commercially of gasefine,

gas, crude petroleum, gasoline, kerosene, heating fuels,

lubricating oils and greases, or of allied petroleum:

products or substances derived from the refining of

petroleum.”’

The effect of said amendment is te exempt all buildings,

structures and other facilities used for the cefining of petre-

leumand allied products from tle provisions of the build-

ing ordinanee of said Town. Authority toenaet sad butled

ing ordinance and any amendment thereto was conferred

upen said Town by the provisions of section 52 of Chapter

033 of thegliencral Laws of Rhode Istand. Revision of TIS,

which in gart provided as follows: 2

See. 52. Town and city councils and the representa-

tive eouneil of the City of Newport may feem time to

time make and ordain all ordinanees and regulations

for their respective towns and cities, net repugnant to

law, as they may deem necessary. regulating the man-

ner of constructing and CoM TPP of all buildings and

other structures within sald town er city which may be

ereeted, altered or repaired after the passaste of such

ordinanee ..

AS

Defendants contend that this statute only authorized the *

Town by ordinance to regulate thé manner of constructing

and equipping all buildings and other strictures within

said town, and did not authorize it to regulate the manner

of constructing and equipping some buildings and.to exempt

others from all regulation. Plaintiff. on the other han],

claims that said statute permits but does not require the

regulation of the manner of construeting and equipping of

all buildings and structures‘ in the event a municipality

elects to enact a building ‘ordinance pursuant thereto, and

that reasonable classification and exemption from building

regulations are not prohibited thereby. Assuming but with-

out deciding that plaintiff's interpretation of said statute

is vorrect, the speeifie exemption from said ordinance pro-

vided by said amendment is in itself a regulation within

the meaning of said statute. To be valid the regulations

and ordinances of a municipality ‘‘must find their justifica-

tion in some ‘aspect of the police’ power, asserted for the

public weltare.”’? Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,.

1926, 272 U. S. 365, 387. They must bear a rational and

substantial relation to the health and safety of the eom-

munity. Doherty v. Town Council of South Kingstown,

1938, 61 R. 1. 248; Robinson v. Town Counei!l of Narra-

_gansett, 1938, 60 K. 1. 422; Standard Oil Company of New

Jersey Y. City of Charlottesville, 1930, 4 Cir., 42 F. 2d 8s;

5 MeQuitlin, Municipal Corporations (3rd ed.) § 19.14.

It is'a matter of common knowledge that an oil refinery

is a potential source of danger from fire and explosion

unless properly constructed. And it is similarly a nratter

of common knowlelge that such danger from fire and explo-

ston can be substantially lessened if not entirely eliminated

by the imposition of proper restrictions and safeguards

relating to its construction.

The record in this case is completely devoid of any: evi-

dence which could possibly support a’ finding that said

amendment to the building ordinance is conducive to the

conservation of the public health, safety or welfare of said

AY

Town. In my opinion it cannot be.sustajned as being within

the lawful exercise of the police power of the municipality,

and is accordingly invalid.

II

Vauipiry oF THE LjCENSE

Plaintiff's license was granted pursyant to Chapter 50

of the ordinances of said Town of Jamestown whith was

also enacted on September 27, 1956, at the same meeting of

the Town Council when the amendment to the building

ordinance hereinbefore discuss¢ «dl was adopted by that body.

It was enacted pursuant to ‘the provisions of section 21 of

Chapter 333 of the Generai Laws of Rhode Island, Revision *

of 1938, which provides as follows:

‘See. 21, Town councils and city councils may from

time to time make and ordain all ordinances and regu-

lations for their respective towns, not repaynant to

law, which they deem necessary for the safety of their

inhabitants from the m: inufacture, processing, stor-

age, keeping, having in possession, sale or use of...

crude petroleum, gasoline, kerosene, heating fuels,

lubricating oils and greases,-allied petroleum products,

and any and all other explosives, explosive chemicals’

and inflammable substances, and may prohibit the

manufacture, storage, keeping, having in possession,

transportation, sale or use by any and all person ‘or

persons of any 9r all said substances “and gases in their

respective tow.s, unless a license for the same shall be

first obtained ty rom the town council or board of alder-

men, which license shall he henceforth effective unless

revoked for good and sufficient cause by order of said

town council or board of aldermen .. .”’

Section 1 of said Chapter 50 is. as follows:

‘Section 1. No person, firm or corporation shall, from

and after the passage of this ordinance, engage in the

Al0 :

refining, manufacturing or processing of crude petro-

leum, petroleum products or substances derived there

from in connection with such ‘refining, manufaeturing

or processing of crude petroleum, petroleum products

or substances derived therefrom within the Town un-

less a license for the same shall be first obtained from

the Town ‘Council.’* :

Section 2 thereof sets forth the information which must.

be furnished by an applicant for a license but includes a

provision that the Town Council may at any time upon

such terms and conditions, as it may deem advisable waive

‘the filing of any of the foregoing requirements’’. Section

3 prevides that the Town Council may consider and take

such action on any application for a licénse under said ordi-

nance as it ‘‘may deem proper with due consideration for

the safety of the inhabitants of the Town of Jamestown"

Section 5 of said ordinance provides that no licensee shall!

engage in the refining, ete. of crude pe ‘troleum exeept upon

certain conditions therein set forth in sub-seetions 5(a) ta

d(h) inelusive. Most, if not all, of these sub-stctions incor-

porate by reference standards promulg rated by ‘certain na-

tional organizations. ,

Sub-section 5(a) provides that all faéilities used for refin-

ing, ete, shall be constructed, installed, ete.’so as to conform

at all times with#he ‘Standards of the National Board of

Fire Underwriters for the Storage, Handling and Use of

Flammable Liquids as Recommended by the National Fire

Protection Association’’. Sub-seetion 5(b) provides that

all pressure vessels, ased for refining, ete. shall be con:

structed, installed, ete. so as ‘to conform at all times with

the standards set forth in the American Petrolewm Insti

tute-—American Seciety of Mechanical Eagineers ‘Code for

Unfired Pressure Vessels for Petroleum Liquids and Gases’

(1992) or ‘Rules for Constrnuetion of Untired: Pressure Ves

sels, Section VITT,; ASME Boiler Construction Code’ (1950),

of the American Society of Mechanical Enginers. Sub-sec

All

tion 3(¢) provides that all heat exchangers shall be con-

structed, installed, ete. so as to conform at all times with

the standards set forth in the American Petroleum Institute

—American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code for+Un-

fired Pressure Vessels for Petroleum Liquids and Gases’

(1992) and the standards of the Tubular Exchanger Manu-

facturers Association, Class R. Sub-section d(d) provides

that all piping systems shall he constructed, installed,: ete.

so as to’conform at all times to the applicable portions of

the ‘American Standard Code for Pressure Piping’, (ASA.

*B31.1—1951), and sub-section 5; e) provides that all eleetri-

cal equipment shall be constructed, iustalled, ete. so as te

conform to the standards of the National Electrical Code.

Sub-seetion (f) requires that all premises used in the refin-

ing, ete. of erude pet roleum shall be surrounded by.a fence

of noncombustible materials of a minimum height with "6

suficient number of gates to provide adequate aceess for fire

extinguishing purposes", and sub-sections (a) and (h)

contain requirements for the installation of a foam-fire

protection system and first aid fire control equipment. ae-

cording to certain standards incorporated by reference

therein. .

The parties agree that said ordinance was adopted with-

out a public hearing on the question of its enactment and

without notice of sueh hearing by publication in a news-

patper as provided rn said section a2 of Chapter 333 which

anthorizes town and city councils to make and ordain ordi.

mances regulating the manner of constructing and equip.

ping of all buildings and structures in their respective towns

amd cities, This section provides in part as follows:

6620) -

- . ..*®

No such ordinance shat! he enacted. amended or re

pealed until after a public hearing has been held upen

fhe question of the enactment, amendment or repeal of

such ordinante, before sal town, vite or representa

hive couneil, which conneil shall first give notice of sneh

Neary by. publication in a new spuiper printed in sail

Al2

town or city, if any, and, if none, then in a newspaper

published in the county in which said city or town is

located ...”’

Defendants contend that said Chapter 50 is invalid be-

cause (1) the standards incorporated by reference therein

were not in fact known to the Town Couneil, (2) it is in

reality a building ordinance and was not enacted after a

public hearing of which notice was given by publication in

’ a newspaper as provided in said section 52 of Chapter 333.

ofthe General Laws of Rhode Island, Revision of 1938, (3)

the provisions contained therein for an appeal from actions

of the Town Council thereunder are invalid and (4) it lacks

definite standards for the grant of licenses thereunder.

In my opinion it is unnecessary for me to consider all of

the aforesaid contentions. Although counsel for the parties

hereto during the trial and in their respective briefs have

consistently referred to said Chapter 50 as ‘*the licensing

ordinance’’, it is entitled ‘An Ora.nance Authorized By

Section 21 of Chapter 333 of the General Laws of Rhode

Island (1938) As Amended, Providing For The Safety Of-

The Inhabitants Of The Town Of Jamestown From The Re-

fining, Manufacturing Or Processing Of Crude Petrolewn,

Petroleum Products Or Substances Derived Therefrom, Or

The Storage Or Handling Of Crude Petroleum, Pétroleun

Produets Or Substances Derived Therefrom In Connection

With Such Refining, Manufacturing Or Processing Of Crude

Petroleum, Petroleum Products Or Substances Derived

Therefrom’’. st

» While it is true that legislative intent is to be found pri

‘marily in the language of an ordinance, yet that languae

is to be canstrued in the light of the faets and circum.

stances attendant upon the passage of such ordinance, Cf.

Blais v. Franklin, 1910, 31 R. 1.95. It must be remembered

that said Chapter 50%was enacted at the same meeting at

which said amendment to the building ordinance wa-

adopted, This is an important cireumstanee to be consid

Al3

ered in determining the intent of the Town Council in enact-

ing said Chapter 50. -Doherty v. Town Council of South

Kingstown, supra.

1 am unwilling to believe that the Town Council when it

adopted said amendment to the building ordinance intended

that there would be no regulations or restrictions of any

sort on the manner of constructing ‘and equipping the pro

posed refinery. On the contrary, a study of the provisions

of said Chapter 50 and of the codes incorporated by refer-

ence therein satisfies me that the ‘Town Council intended

thereby to regulate its construction and equipment. In my

judgment those sub-sections are for the’ most part building

regulations within the purview of said seet¥on 52 of Chap-

ter 333. _ .

Tt is the well-settled rule that cities and towns have no

powers to enact, ordinances except those powers from time

to time delegated to them by. the legislature. And it is a

fundamental rule of construction that such powers, being

delegated, should be strictly construed. In re Opinion to

the House of Representatives, 1939, 62 R. I. 347; Heeney

v. Sprague, 1877, 11 R. I. 456.

The only authority vested in the cities and towns of this

state to enact building ordinances is that conferred upon

them by said Section 52. Its provisions clearly preempt the

field; and when such authority is conferred it may only be

exercised in strict conformity with the terms of the grant.

Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. City of Char-

lottesville, supra; ef. R. I. Home Builders, Ine. v. Budlong

Rose Co., supra, Absent such compliance, it foltows that

the provisions of said sub-seetions 5(a) to 5(h), inclusive,

insofar as they are building resulations are null and void.

The question then arises--whaft is the effeet of their in-

validity? Chapter 50 contains a *‘severability clanse’’,-so-

valled, which in essence provides that if any provision or

provisions thereof shall be declared invalid, this determi

nation shall in no wise affect the yalidity of its remaining

provisions. - But such a clause is not decisive of the effect

Alf

of the invalidity of a portion or portions of an ordinance -

upon its remaining portions. The rule is well stated in

Heubeck v. City of Baltimore, 1954, 205 Md. 303, 107°A. 2d

99 at 103-104, where the Court held:

‘*... regardless of such a clause, an act must fail en-

-tirely if the effect of declaring a portion of it invalid

would render the remainder incapable of effecting the

purpose for which the act was enacted.’’

To the same effect, see The Narragansett Indians, 1898,

20 R. 1. 715; State v. Tonks, 1886, 15 R. 1. 385; F.T.B. Cor-

poration v. Goodman, 1949, 300 N. Y. 140, 89 N. E. 2d 865.

It is manifestly clear that the Town Cquneil by the enact-

ment of the sub-sections 5(a) to 5(h), inclusive, intended

to control the manner of constructing and equipping of ©

the refinery as well as its manner of operation. Since the

provisions of said sub-sections which I have found to be

null and void are so interwoven with ‘the remaining provi-

sions thereof that they cannot be separated, it follows that

section 5 must fail in its entirety. The-inv alidity of said

section 5 compels me to conclude that the whole of Chapter

50 must likewise fail, because the intention of the Town

Council will not be served by the remaining portions of said

chapter which, if given effect; would leave the construction,

“equipping and operation of the proposed refinery without

effective control or regulation by the Town Council. It

follows that the lieense issued pursuant therete is also

invalid. .

Ill

Tre Issur or ANTICIPATED NUISANCE

The determination of whether. the erection and opera

tion of the proposed refinery will constitute a continuing

nuisance to the defendants must be determined by resert

to Rhode Island law.

‘In Blomen v. N. Barstow Co., 1913, 35 Bo. 198, 200-210,

the Supreme Court @f Rhode Island quoted with appreval

Alo

the rule laid down in Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568

at page 576:

-***As to what is a reasonable use of one's own prop-

erty cannot be ‘defined by any certain general rules,

but must depend upon the cireunistances of each case.

A use of property in one locality, and under some eir-

stances, may be lawful and reasonable, which, under

other circumstances, would be unlawful, unreasonable,

and a’nuisance. To constitute a nuisance, the use must

be such as to produce a tangible and appreciable

injury to neighboring property, or such as to render

its enjoyment specially uneomfortable or ineonven-

ient’ ’’.

And in determining whether a particular use is a nui-

sance, the location thereof is an important consideration.

In Kennedy v. Frechette, 1924, 45 R. 1. 399, 405-406, the

Supreme Court said:

‘*The location is always an important consideration

in the determination of the existence of a nuisance. It

is clear that the location is not a manufacturing one.

... 1s the use of the property in the particular ation

reasonable or unreasonable, considering not only the

rights of the owner, but also those of his neighbor. If

such-use causes a substantial diminution either in the

value of adjacent property, or in the enjoyment thereof

as measured by the degree of comfort which the aver-

age man living in such a neighborhood has a right to

expect, it may properly be held to be unreasonable and

henee a nuisance.”*

To the same effect, see Aldrich v. Howard, 1865, 8 R. 1. 246:

Strachen v. Beacon Oil Co. 1925, 251 Mass. 479, 146 N. E.

787; Dahl v. Utah Oil Retining Co. 1927, 71 Utah 1, 262

P. 3h. ;

Defendants seek a permanent injunetion against the pro-—

pesed ereetion and operation of said refinery as an antici.

Al6 os

pated nuisance: To entitle them to that relief under the

law of Rhode Island, the evidence must show clearly and

convincingly that substantial diminution in. the values of

their properties or in the enjoyment thereof will be prac-

_tically certain to result, from the erection of the refinery or

from its operation. In Otto Seidner, Inc. v. Ralston Purina

Co., 1942, 67 R. I. 436, where plaintiff, the owner of a busi-

ness, sought an injunction to prevent the defendant from

erecting and operating a coal pocket in an industrial dis-

trict on the ground that the préposed erection and opera-

tion of said coal pocket would constitute a nuisance fo the.

plaintiff, the Supreme Court held at page 452:

‘*We are of the opinion that to justify an injunction,

in a cause of the character of the instant one, the evi-

dence must show clearly and convincingly that substan-

tial damage to the complainant’s property or business

will be practically certain to result from the operation

by the respondent of the business. against which an

injunction is sought.’’

The Town of Jamestown is an island situated in Narra-

gansett Bay within the State of Rhode Island. Its area is

approximately 9.3 square miles. It is primarily a residen-

tial, resort and farming area. At the present time, no

industries of any sort are located thereon and there are

only relatively few business enterprises, such as_ retail

shops, stores, gasoline filling stations and hotels. It enjoys

considerable popularity asa resort area during the summer.

The refinery district, so-called, irregular in shape, extends ,

completely across the northerly portion of the island. The .

area of this district in which plaintiff proposes to ereet its

refinery is 814.72 acres, of which 604.72 are owned by plain-

tiff and the remainder by other persons, including the de-

fendants Florence E. B. Wright, George F. Wright, Louis

F. Wright, Virginia ( Wright. Henry EB. Wright. Rita

Wright, George FE. Wright and Yirginia W. Wright, who

have homes on their lands. At the time of the trial of this

+

Al7

ease there were sixteen (16) dwelling houses in said dis-

trict, one having been destroyed by fire since September 27, °

1956. The remainder of the land therein is vacant. While

a small portion of it is swampy and overgrown with scrub,

most of said land is cleared and dry. Eighty-five per cent

of it was described in the testimony as good farm land, suit-

able for farming or home sites. South of said district and

about two miles therefrom are at least one hundred forty-

three homes in the .Jamestown Shores development, so-

ealled, and to the north and within about one and one-half

‘miles therefrom there are seventy-one “homes, a summer

hotel and a camp comprising eleven or twelve buildings.

The evidence establishes that the prevailing winds on the

island arp from the southwest and from the northwest.

Wind velocities during at least a third of the year range

from calm to fourteen miles per hour and fogs of varying

dluration enveloping the fsland oceur with relative fre-

queney,

The defendant William W. Miner owns and resides on

residential property which abuts upon the easterly end of

said district. The remaining defendants are the owners

and oeeupants of residential properties situated at points

approximately two-thirds of a mile to four. miles away.

from said district. The properties of the defendants Ter-

range MeGaughan and Burgess Lunsford are located to

the north of said district, and the properties of the remain-

ing defendants to the south and southeast of said district.

The homes owned by the defetidants rangé in value from

+4.000 to $50,000). Most of them, if not all, are substan-

tially constructed, well maintained and attractively land-

scaped, A

During the trial the plaintiff produced upof the demand

of the defendants what it termed the design plans of the

proposed refinery. From the testimony presented by the

mlamtiff at the close of the defendants’ evidence, it would

appear that substantial changes in these plans had been

eMected by the plaintiff sinee the opening of the trial, in

Ats

~weder ta meet aome of the vritieism wae rey mide SY Le

defendanta. , [2 these +h, ores parpertel to Seve Owen male

have in fart heen made, ther world serve to eum may or

tigate to aome degreé some of the sonrees of the nuisance

which the defendants claim are «ertain to resait from cay

Operation of the proposed retin ery: For the parpese of tuy

derision, I shall assame phat these changes | have deen made.

anit: de na pite these assumed modifications. the evidence esta>

lixhes that the proposed refinery will comprise, among other

strnetares, at least fifteen stacks ranging from tweltty to

‘tus hundred feet in height which will contain many thou

-and« of feet of piping, countless joints and connections,

nearly one hundred anfired pressure Vessels of varying stZes

-and constructions, approximately four. hundred pumps.’

thousands of seals and compressors, tanks, heat exchang-

ers, and like equipment.

According to the evidence plaintiff will refine forty-three

thousand (45 000) barrels of Kuwait ecrude-oil each day in

its refinery, slightly less than the total daily capacity of

all the oil refineries in New England at the present time.

Kuwait crude oil is : sour crude oil having a sulfur content

of approximately 2.50. The refinery wili be operated

twenty four hours per day, seven days a week throughout

the year, with brief shut-downs once a year, for mainte

nance and repair purposes. The products to be produced

are high oetane gasoline, liquified petroleum gas (1. PQ),

and heating fuel‘oils. By-products to be produced will be

petroleum coke and elemental sulfur.

Three types of processes will be used to convert the crude

oil into gasoline, LPG and heating oils. The first of these

ix distillation, wherein the ernde oii is heated at very high

temperatures and gas, gasoline, and a variety-of oils are

sequrrately boiled off at different temperatures and collected

for further processing. This process, distillation, will occur

inthe erndecand vacuum units of the refinery. A seconel

proeess Wherehy gas, gasoline and heating oils are also

produced will take place in the fluid catalytic cracking uni!

R this ’ Cus'sss the CUP eW REL AT sirinctire wf BS Swe Ciaete vee fs

: ¢

, > rr A < fi - *

OL pp radnuecd PRR ESTATE Rtas tS g Attia te Ben

changed Dv the a

2 M . | °

pplication: of heads, pressure atid a cdtaine!

,

“ae

ay . , P . . .

WN the resial hart the “SATAY Brrewties wl oval are.

. — - bal aug lh? . S, bl nts O0d Panes F . . ri

hares sed UTP Swi y ttholestiiaes of acts, Kaw tet ati

.

heating orl ln the third provess, stttaller: @tralowutles of

aas resulting from earher Processes: are eteeterscally cquens

Vertied by heat te PES atte ealaly sts utttar tevay ret teeaelys

enles of gasoline im the alkyl afoot ata pols gtrotisatoon enn fs

Tn the various stages of the above. processes large pitas

httes of hydrogen sulfide aresproduced. Planer prt arpicrvers

te volleet this hv drogen sultide and to eee of amie ete

ental sulfur, a salable by es eae Uv drogen sultide tha

particularly matodoronus sas deseribed as heavitus an odor

Ike rotten ewes atid us be ime ale ‘Teefable ins ery Low concen

trations. Lt is highly texte amd in sutlierent comeentt ations

injurious to health. Another ones itable preavdinet of the tefin

Ing processes is the produetion of a eroupof cascous hve

cecarbons Known as mercaptans “Those are Dhewise pattie

ularly obnexious and are detectable by smell one Vtretnely

low concentrations Vhevrntit? Prbeoprrsen fare ‘olleet atl bean

them in an incinerator and there ‘by prevent therm gaeape te

the atmosphere An additional waste proctiet similarly

resaadting of nec essity from fhe re Hitt prtewessen os silts

dioxide (SQ). Ht as undisputed that the volume of Se

Which will be discharyed inte the attnosphere from the

stacks of the refinery will depene upon the eMiereney of ats

~ulfur reeovery unit net pom the solfiar coment of the tial

ol burned ins the relinery ter sanpepely Drevet Peet ates v centers

process units. tg.

While the proposed relwmers as se destemed! that fuel oul

having a sulfur content an execs of Pome anid ome dal

(Hh) per eemt aay he heenesd an the heater Wi polinsnetll

clatnis that it does not aitened te nse Paved cols Des atne ae sultans

conten? ime \ereess oh twee rened fete haath art ‘po peen een tt

mists thet ot wall ae only bel corh cob titet Pinmerteed colbers

COnTOHL recapeldes of ther cent laned eds sohianonn > Des cad De-tet copes

A20—

of its witnesses any intention of using the residuals from its

erudé vacuum unit to supply heat, although the design of the

refinery. Would permit of such use. Much testimony of a

conflicting nature as to the economies of such a practice and

the likelihood of its being followed by the plaintiff was

produced at the trial. However, giving full‘eredence to the

plaintiff’s proposed: intention in- this regard and. assuming

that the sulfur recovery unit will operate at all times to its

maximum efficiency, it is clear that the minimal quantity of

SO, to‘lie discharged each day into the atmosphere will be

thirty-seven tons. SO, is a gas having a disagreeable,

suffocating. odor like that of burned sulfur matches. It is

detectable in a concentration of 2.5 parts per million of the

atmosphere, and in concentrations of more than five parts

per million has an irritating effect upon the nose, throat and

eves. The extent of its irritant effect depends upon the

length of one’s exposure thereto. If the exposure be for

only a few seconds, its effect may be only to produce tears.

If exposure be prolonged, engorgement of the blood vessels

of the eyes and irritation of the nose and throat result. In

persons suffering from respiratory ailments or heart dis-

eases its effect is to aggravate such ailments and diseases

and produce added discomfort.

_ When conrbinec with water or moisture i in the atmosphere,

SO. becomes converted inte sulphurous acid which in turn

may be converted into sulphuric acid. These. acids are

highly corrosive to iron and steel and are destructive of

plant life.

The crude oil to be refined will he brought by tankers .

‘from the Middle East to Jamestown. Plaintiff proposes to —

eonstruct a landing deck off the east shore of the island

from which the oil will be pumped through pipes to the

crude storage area and then to the process units. The plans

or the proposed refinery would seem to indicate that the

erude oi] will be kept at all times in an enclosed system from

the time of its arrival throngh the completion of the refinin’

processes. For this reason plaintiff contends that it follow

re ‘ A2l

that none of the offensive and obnoxious odors incident to

and connected with the refining operations will escape into

the atinosphere, with the exception of SO..

The evidence further shows that the plaintiff will draw

large quantities of salt water from Narragansett Bay for

cooling certain refinery. units. The total amount so used

will be at least 100,800,000 gallons each day. After circulat-

--ing through the heat exchangers it will pass through a

cooling pond and will be discharged into the bay. In addi-

tion, process water used in the-refining processes and water

used to wash platforms, walks and other areas in the proc-

pssing units, amounting to more than 2,000,000 gallons

each week, after treatment to ‘remove’ certain hydrocarbon |

compounds with which it has beeome contaminated and after

passing through an oxidation pond will also be discharged

into the bay together With storm water accumulating in the

processing units and in the crude storage area.

Considerable testimony was also presented by the parties

as to the extent of the illumination of the refinery at night.

While the extent of this illumination was sharply disputed,

it fs obvious that the refinery will be illuminated to a degree

sufficient to. permit persons employed therein to perform

their work on the ladders, walks and platforms of the

refinery structures and in the areas surrounding them, with

efictency and safety. Likewise, there was a sharp dispute

is to the amount of smoke that would be discharged by

the refinery. °

Many days were devoted to the presentation of opinion

evidence as to the results that would ae company the opera.

tion of the refinery. For the expert witnesses, this trial

inmust have heen a dream realized.

Defendants contend that the evidence establishes that the

erection and operation of said refinery will constitute a

private nuisance to them against which they are entitled to

injunctive relief. In snpport of their claim they argue that

the evidence shows as certain sources of this nuisance the

following: (1) the flare on the refinery: (2) the elare from

a7

.

A22

the nocturnal illuinination of the refinery. struetures; (3)

dust emitted from the catalytic unit; (4) smoke emitted

from the stacks and process-heatérs; (5) pollution of the

waters of the bay by the discharge of waters used in the

refining processes and of waters from the storm water

system, and by virtue of spills and leaks in the loading and

unloading of tankers; (6) discharge of SQ, into the atmos-

phere; (7) the emission of hydrogen sulfide; (8) the emis-

sion of mereaptans; (9) the emission of general refinery

odors; and (10) injury to health.

Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that the defendants

‘failed to sustain the burden of proof imposed upon them in

order to entitle them to the relief which they seek. In addi-

tion, they argue that the sentiment of the Town of James-

town, as evidenced by the actions of the Town Council,

though invalid, and by the vote of the qualified electors of

said town in-favor of the erection of a modern oil refinery

is persuasive against the grant of any injunctive relief here.

In support of this argument plaintiff quotes certain lan-

zuage from the opinion in Futtle v. Chureh, 1892, C.C. R. 1,

53 F. 422. In my opinion, there is nothing in the holding in

that case which supports such an argument. Moreover, that

ease is obviously distinguishable from the instant. one.

Theré the plaintiff sought to enjoin the operation of a fac-

tory which was engaged in the making of fish oils and, ferti-

lizers, which had been in operation for more than thirty

years. In denying injunctive relief to the plaintiff the court

found that not only had the plaintitf been guilty of laches:

_ but that the defendant's plant caused only oeeasional offen-

sive odors during the summer nionths and that its operation

‘aused no serious damage to anyone. While the sentiment

‘of the Town of Jamestown, as evidenced by the actions of

the Town Council and by the vote of the electorate is a cir-

cumstance to be considerea here, it must be remembered

that they did not have the opportunity to consider and

evaluate the detailed testimony by experts in oil refining

that was presented during the protracted trial of this case.

A +)*)

To attempt to summarize the testimony of the numerous

expert witnesses caYed by the parties would serve no use-

ful purpose and would unduly prolong this opinion. While

defendants have cited many respects in which they claim the

proposed refinery will be a nuisance, entitling them to: in-

junctive relief, I do not believe it necessary to consider or

discuss all of them.

Here it is undisputed that obnoxious gases such as hvdrb-

xen sulfide'and mereaptans will be ‘produced in the retining

process. While the, plaintiff contends that there Will be no

‘escape of these gases and cites the.devices and procedures

it will employ to contain them, neither the record nor the

testimony of their experts sustains this contention. - The

most that can be said for said devices and procedures is

that they will be nearly completely effective under the most

ideal conditions. But having in mind the highly corrosive

qualities of Kuwait crude oit and the volume of erude oil

_to be processed each day, I am Satisfied that varying quanti-

ties of these obnoxious gases will find their way into the

atmosphere at all times when the refinery is in operation.

To assume that they will not be carried by the prevailing

winds beyond the relatively small area upon which a refin-

ery of the size contemplated is to he located would he far

from realistic. On the contrary, the credible testimony in

this ease establishes that said gases will be carried hy the

prevailing winds at all times to the properties af some of

the defendants, and, beeanse of their.extremely disagreeable |

odors in very low concentrations and their cumulative effect,

they will seriously diminish hoth the value of the defend-

ants’ lands as: residential properties and the enjoyment

thereof. The same observation may he made with respect

to the general refinery odor described in the testimony as

being an inevitable incident to refining operations. |

Insofar as SO, is ‘concerned, it is abtindantly-clear that

at least thirty-seven tons thereof will be discharged into

the atmosphere each day. It is undisputed that this mal-

odorous gas is detectable. by smell ina concentration of 2.5

3 Al4

parts per inillion and that in conventrations of more than

five parts per million it has an irritating effect of varying

degrees, depending upon the health of an individual and

the length of his exposure to it. In answer to a hypotheti-

cal question which included no recital of the volume of SO.

to be discharged from the stacks of the proposed refinery,

an expert witness for the phaintilf testified that the ground

concentration of SO, at a point-beyond the nearest property

line of the defendant Froberg would not exceed 0.4 parts

per’ million under the most unfavorable conditions, and

hence its presence would not be Rtectable on his property

or beyond it. Under eross-examination, however, this same

witness admitted that he could not determine sueh ground

concentrations without knowledge of the volume of SO.

that was being emitted by the stacks. His opinion as to

ground concentrations of SO. is in my judgment entitled to

no weight. The credible testimony satisfies me that, depend-

ing upon atmospheric conditions, wind velogities, and the

prevailing winds, as shown by the evidence of past annual

weather conditions on the Island of Jamestown, there will

be frequent concentrations of Les on the property of the

defendant Froberg in excess of 2.5 parts per million} ‘and

that it is reasonable to conclude that the properties of the

other defendants will be frequently visited with similar eon-

centrations carried to their premises by the prevailing

winds, and that these concentrations will serve to effect a

substantial diminution in the values of thei ‘ir properties and

in the enjoyment thereof.

The evidence establishes that the State of Rhode Island

has enacted legislation to prevent the pollution of public

waters and that the Division of Sanitary Engineering of the

Department of Health of said state has, pursuant to said

- legislation, promulgated regulations which prohibit the dis-

charge of effluents from oil refinerivs into the publie waters

of said state except pursuant to a license granted only after

the approval by said Division of the processes and methods

of discharge. The evidence further discloses that the

* AD»

plaintiff has applied for such a li¢ense and that its proposed

processes and methods, or at least some of them, appear to

be under consideration by that Division. Under the cireum-

stances, | am unwilling to assume that said Division will not

perform the duties imposed upon it by said legislation in a

competent. and conscientious manner and believe that |

should not now consider or pass upon that issue. See Inter-

state Milk Handlers v. Hoffman, 1955, 34 N. J. Stiper. 356,

12 A. 2d 574; Kahl v. Consolidated (ias, Electrie Light &

Power Co., D948, 141 Mad. 249, GOAL 2d TOF; ef, Willapoint

Oysters, Ine. v. Ewing, 1949, 9 Cir., 174 F. 2d 676, cert. den.

33% U.S. 360; Ellison v. Rayonier, Ine., 1957, D. C. Wash.,

156 FL Supp. 214.

The evidence in this case also establishes beyond doubt

that the area wherein plaintiff proposes to erect and operate

its refinery is entirely residential and agricultural. Defend.

ants’ homes are substantial, attractive and well maintained.

They afford their owners a degree of comfort and enjoy-

ment not to be found in urban or industrial communities.

The air of the loeality is ideal from the standpoint of the

absence of air pollution. They are not now located in a

manufacturing community where the air is inevitably im.

pregnated with disagreeable odors and impurities, features

that are the coneomitants of life in sueh a community.

Plaintit? now seeks to change the character of the area

Where defendants’ homes are located by the establishment

of its oil refinery therein. a ,

In determining whether the proposed refinery will be a

nuisanee to the. defendants against which they are entitled

to relief, the fact that it may be useful or may eontribute

to the economie welfare of Jamestown, is not determinative.

In Blomen v. N. Barstow Co., supra, the Supreme Court, in

rejecting respondent’s argument that the issuance of an

injunetion against the respondent wonld work a detriment

to the publie, at page 205 quoted with approval from Broad-

-hent v. Imperial Gas Co., 7 De G. M. & G. 436, aff’d. 7

H.L. Cas. 601, where the court stated: -

A226

“If it should turn out that the company had no right

so to manufacture gas as to damage the plaintiff’s

market garden, I have come to the cgnelusion that |

cannot enter into any question of how far it might be

convenient for the public that the gas manufacture

should go on... But unless the company had such a

right, | think the present is not a case in which this

court can go into the question of canvenience or incon-

venience, and say, Where a party is substantially dam-

aged, that he is only to be compensated by bringing an

action toties quoties. That would be a disgraceful

state of the law and T quite agree with the vice-chan-.

cellor in holding that in such a case this court must

issue an injunction, whatever may be the consequences

with regard to the lighting of the parishes and districts

which this company supplies with gas.”’

The plaintiff has not cited and I have been unable to find

any decision of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island which

in any way impairs the rule laid down in Blomen vy. N.

Barstow Co., supra: Certainly there ‘is nothing in the

opinion of Rose v. Socony Vacuum Corp., 1934, 54 R. 1. 411,

cited by the plaintiff, which may fairly be said to do so. The

desirability of improving the economic welfare of the Town

of Jamestown is beyond dispute. But that laudable objec-

tive is not to be attained by the erection and operation of the

proposed refinery on plaintiff’s lands if such use, consider-

ing not only the rights of the plaintiff but also those-of the

defendants, will be unreasonable and hence a nuisance. —

After a careful consideration of all the testimony and the

reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, and recogniz-

ing the right of the plaintiff to make a reasonable use of its

lands, I am satisfied that the operation of said refinery in

the manner and at the location proposed by the plaintiff

-will eause a substantial diminution both in the values of

the defendants’ properties and in their enjoyment thereof

as measured:by the degree of comfort which the average

man living in such a locality has the right to expect. It

AQT:

follows that said use will be unreasonable and hence a

nuisance to the defendants against which they | are entitled

to injunetive relief. .

A judgmeat may be entered declaring that said license, -

said amendment to’said Chapter XXXV and said amend-

ment to said Chapter XLIV are null and void, and perma-

nently enjoining ‘the plaintiff from taking any further

action or doing any ,act purported to be authorized by said

license and said amendments and from operating said pro-

posed refinery in said Town of Jamestown.

(2) Opinion of the Court of Appeals

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE First Circuit .

. No. 5475

CoMMERCE O1L Rerinino Corp., Plaintiff, Appellant

v.

> Wituiam W. Miser, ev a., Defendants, Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the District of Rhode Island

Before Woopsury, Chief Judge, and Hartican and ALpricn,

Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

June 16, 1960

Woopsury, Chief Judge. ‘Commerce Oil Refining Corpo-

ration, Commerce hereinafter, a.Delaware corporation, fied -

a complaint in two counts in the court below against seven-

A2s

-teen named defendants, all citizens of Rhode Island, as

individuals; and nine .of them as officers and directors of

the Jamestown Protective Association. Commerce alleged

_in its first count that it had,a license from the Town of

Jamestown to erect and operate an oil refinery in an area

of the town zoned for such use and that the defendants

‘unlawfully combined and conspired to harass, delay and

prevent plaintiff from exercising its right to construct and

operate’’ its refinery and that to effectuate their ‘‘unlawful

combination and conspiracy’’ the defendants ‘‘formed and -

used an organization designated as Jamestown Protective

Association as part of said unlawful combination and con-

spiracy.’’ On this count the plaintiff asked that the de-

fendants be enjoined from harassing the plaintiff by suit.

in the court below or in any Rhode Island court or by any

other means and for an award of damages against each

defendant in the amount of $500,000 plus costs and exem-

plary or punitive damages. In its second count, repeating

the allegations of count one, the plaintiff asserted a cause

of action under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, as amended,

15 U.S.C. $1 et seq." and asked for injunctive relief and

an award of freble damages against each defendant in the

amount of $1,500,000 plus costs aid a reasonable attorney's

fee.

The defendants, answered denying the basie allegations

of the complaint, including the validity of the plaintiff's

license, and counterclaimed alleging that the plaintiff's

refinery when constructed and put ‘into operation would

constitute a continuing nuisance causing them great. and

irreparable harm. Wherefore they asked that a local safety

ordinance regulating the construction of oil refineries and

the license issued to the plaintiff thereunder be declared

null and void. The counterclaim furfher prayed that the

amendment to the zoning ordinance of the Town of James.

town permitting the construction of oil refineries in a de-

1°26 Stat. 269, as amended.

AD

fined area’ of the town and also an amendment to the local

- building ordinanee. which exempted oil refineries from the

requirements of that ordinance be deelared null and ‘void

and thatthe plaintiff be enjoined tsom taking any action

or doing any act purporting to be authorized by its license

and the amendments. ;

After lengthy preliminary proceedings the éase came on

for trial before the court below sitting without a jury at.

the’ outset. of whieh counsel ‘or the plaintiff announced

that no evidence would be offered in support of its ¢laim

of an illegal conspiracy. On the defendants’ motion the

plaintiff's complaint was thereupon disanissed with preju-

diee and the trial proceeded on the defendants’ counter-

claim. More than forty days of trial produced a record

consisting of thousands of pages of testimony and hun-

dreds of exhibits a great deal of both being highly technical

innature. Asa result the court below concluded (1) that

the amendment of the town: zoning ordinance’ and the

safety ordinance and license issued pursuant thereto, were

invalfd because of the failure of the Town Council to

comply with the statutory procedural requirements for

enacting ordinances of the kind involved. (2) that the

amendment to the loeal building ordinance could not be

sustained as being within the lawful exercise of the police

power of the municipality and was therefore invalid, and

(3) that the plaintiff's proposed refinery when put into

ope ration would constitute a nuisanee. On the latter point —

it saith:

“After a careful consideration of all the testimony

and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom,

and recognizing the right of the plaintiff to make a.

reasonable use of its lands, T am satisfied that the

operation of said refinery in the manner and at the

location proposed by the plaintiff will cause a substan-

tial: diminution both in the values of the defendants’

properties and in their enjoyment thereof as ‘meas-

ured by the degree of comfort which the average man

A30

living in such a locality has the right to expect. It

follows that said use will be unreasonable and hence

a nuisance to the defendants against which they are

entitled to injunctive relief.’’

Commerce has taken this appeal from the judgment en-

tered hy the court below in conformity with its opinion

wherein it declared the Jamestown ordinances and _ the

plaintiff’s license invalid and, with costs to the appellees,

permanently enjoined Commerce from proceeding with the

erection of its refinery. ‘

In our view there was no occasion for the court helow,

and there is no oceasion for us, to pass upon the validity

of the local ordinances and hence of the. plaintiff’s license,

for it is the. generally accepted rule that ‘*. .. the validity.

or constitutionality of an ordinance is hot an issue before

a court, and the court need not pass upon it, ... where

the determination of it is Pe necessary to a proper dispo-

sition of the case...’ 6 MeQuillin, Municipal Corpora-

tions, § 20.10 (3d. ed. 1949)...

The plaintiff’s license was issued pursuant to a local

ordinance enacted by the Town Council under the authority

conferred by Section 21 of Chapter 333 of the General Laws

of Rhode Island, Revision of 1938, upon town and city

councilssto make and ordain all ordinances and regulations

for their towns or cities ‘‘which they deem necessary for

the safety of their inhabitants from the manufacture,

processing, storage, keeping, having in possession, sale.

or use of .. . crude petroleum, gasoline, kerosene, heating!

fuels, lubricating oils and greases, allied petroleum prod.

ucts, and any and all other explosives, explosive chemicals

ant inflammable substanees....’’ Obviously this enabling

act authorizes local regulation of the handling of the cy

sfances named therein in order to provide protection from 4

_ fire or gxplosion. There is nothing in it authorizing local

governments to regulate air pollution. Indeed, authority

for local regulation in that respect was conferred at the

A3l

*

time the local ordinance was adopted by a different enabling

act. Chapter 1760 of the Rhode Island Acts and Resolves,

Jan. Sess. (1946), now General Laws of R. I. (195t)) §§ 23-

25-21 et seq. Nor is there anything in the amendment to

the safety ordinance or the license issued thereunder relat-

ing to air pollution. The local regulation purports to

extend and extends only to risks of fire and explosion. But,

the District Court did not base its finding that the plain-

tiff’s refinery when constructed would constitute a private

nuisance becanse of any such danger. On the contrary, it

found: as a matter of common knowledge that although an

oil refinery was a potential source of danger from fire or

explosion unless properly constructed, such dangers could

‘the substantially lessened if not entirely eliminated by the

imposition of — restrictions and safeguards relating

to its construction.’

~ Clearly the District Court's finding of aaticipatery nui-

sanece rested upon subsidiary findings that the refinery

when in operation would pollute the air with nojsesome

and noxious gases, matters not covered in the amendment

to the local ordinance or the license issued under it. Thus,

even if we should assume arguendo that a license would he

a defense, the present license would not be, for the alleged

nuisance does not arise from the explosive or inflammable

nature of the substances stored or the processes earried

out on the premises, but from the deleterious, unpleasant

and noxious effects of the gases which ure the by-products

of the refinery process. In this situation the license is of

no consequence as pointed out in Commonwealth vy. Kidder,

107 Mass. 188, 193 (1871), wherein, considering an indict-

ment laid against an ail refinery constructed in accordance

with statutory safety requirements as-a common law nnis-

ance.because it polluted the air, the court said:

‘‘These enactments are manifestly intended to pro-

tect the publie against dangers arising from the explo-

sive and inflammable nature of petroleum; and, having

regulated the whole subject:in that aspect, they might

A32

well be deemed to protect any establishment, guarded

as they dfrect, from indictment as a nuisance on ac-

count of such dangers only. But they contain no pro-

visions for preventing the spread of unwholesome and’

offensive odors in the course of the manufacfure; and >

if the defendants’ position were sustained, the result

would be that no limit would be put to such manufac-

. ture in the most crowded and populous portions of any

town or city. The reasonable, if not the necessary;

inference is, that it was‘ not the intention of the legis-

lature to establish a new rule in this regard, but to

leave the question whethér the mantifacture is carried.

on at such places and in such a manner as to be un-

wholesome and offensive to the public, and on that

account indictable as a nuisance, to be determined by

the rules of the common law.’’

Moreover, in spite of the minority view prevailing, appar-

ently, in Massachusetts, see Strachan v. Beacon Oil Co.,

251 Mass. 479 (1925), we would infer from State v. Barnes,

20 R. 1. 525, 529, 530 (1898), that Rhode Island would follow

the majority view and hold that, while a license constitutes

a defense-to a prosecution for maintaining a publie nui-

sance, a governmental ‘*orant of powers and privileges to

do certuin things does not carry with it any immunity for

private Injuries which may result directly from the exer-

cise of those powers and privileges.’* Baltimore & Potomac

R.R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317, 334 (1883).

For citation of eases and discussion see 39 Am. Jur., Nui-

saneces § 205 (1942); note, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 781 (1952

re, Torts § 74 (2nd Ed. 1955).

Little needs to be said with respect to the amendment

of the loeal zoning ordinance creating a refinery use dis-

trict, for it is clearly established that compliance, with a

zoning ordinance does not protect a person from the conse-

quences of making an unreasonable use of his property

whereby he invades the private right of his neighbor. The

_ A33 ‘ c

matter was well stated in Weltsche v. Graf, 823 Mass. 408,

500 (1948), wherein, affirming an injunction against oper-

ating a truck terminal on the edge of a zone permitting

such a use but adjacent to a hotel in the zone owned by

one of the plaintiffs.and at the boundary of a district zoned

for residences where all the plaintiffs had their homes. the

court said:

‘“... The fact that the operation of certain kinds of

commercial enterprises is. permitted under a zoning

ordinance is an important factor in’ determining

whether the use being made of the land in conducting

a particular enterprise goes heyond what is reasonable

in view of the nature and eharacter of the lowality, the

effect of the use upon those who live in the neighbor-

hood and the strength and force appropriately due

to the various conflicting interests usnally involved

‘in the subject matter. But a zoning ordinance affords

no protection to one who uses his land in such a man-

ner as to constitute a private nuisance,” :

’ ’

We think it clear from Dunham vy. Westerly Zoning Board,

6S RT. 88, 97 (1942), that this is also the law in Rhode

Island for in that case, referring to persons objecting to

the erection of a power station in a zone permitting that

use, the court said: **. . . they will not be deprived of a

suitable remedy merely beeause a permit under the zoning

ordinance has been granted, since such a permit would not

vrant any right to operate a private nuisance.’’-

There remains for consideration the amendment to the

local building ordinance. Surely it could not seriously be

contended that compliance by the plaintiff with the local

hnilding ordinance would afford it any protection if it used

its property in such a manner as to constitute an unreason-

able interference with its neighbors in the enjoyment of

their property. |

Since, even if valid, neither the plaintiff’s license nor the

amendmept to the local zoning and building ordinances

A34

would provide the plaintiff with a defense to the charge

of constructing a private nuisance, it follows that there

was no need for the court to pass on the validity of the

ordinances, for decision of that matter was unnecessary

to its disposition of the case.

We now come to grips with the ‘basic problem on this

appeal. The town of Jamestown, Rhode Island, is co-

extensive with the island of Conanicut in lower Narra-

gansett Bay. The island:is a little over 9 miles long and

is only slightly more than a mile wide at its widest point.

Its area.is 9.3 square miles and its permanent population

is about 2,000. A majority of the permanent population,

about 75%, live in a relatively compact residential and

small business district in the southerly third of the town

which has a public water supply and sewer system. Accord-

ing to the District Court's findings: ‘‘It is primarily a

residential, resort and.farming area. At the present time,

no-industries of any sort are located thereon and there are

only relatively few business enterprises, such as_ retail

shops, stores, gasoline filling stations and hotels. It en-

joys considerable popularity as a resort area during the

summer.’

No doubt the island has many advantages in the way of

climate and scenery as a place for country living. . But its

popularity as a place te live does not appear to have

increased very much in the last few years. As a resort ‘it

appears, if anything, to have declined. Only a few new

homes have been built on the island in recent years, fewer

hotels are operating than formerly and a.golf course has

been abandoned. It is fair to say that the island’s economy

‘is relatively static.

The island is well suited for Commerce’s purpose, how-

ever, for not only is it located near the heart of industrial

New England, but it also lies in the sheltered waters of

Narragansett Bay and has a harber deep enough to permit

the docking of deep-draft tankers bringing crude oil from

the Middle East. And it would appear that a majority of

A35_

the permanent residents of the town, no doubt anticipating

a source of substantial tax revenue and employment, wel-.

comed the construction of a refinery within its borders.

This is indicated by the action of the Town Council amend-

ing the local zoning ordinance, although perhaps not strictly

in accordancé with the required statutory procedures, ta,

create a refinery use district. A straw vote of the inhahit-

ants of the town, however, provides more persuasive evi-

(lence of popular sentiment. Strong feeling for and against

the ereetion of a refinery having been expressed by various

meetings held in the town, the Town Council authorized a

vote of the inhabitants qualified to vote at a general elee-

tion on the question: **Are you in favor of a modern oil

refinery in the northern part of the Island of Jamestown?”?

Of the 1020 voters checked off on the check list 777 voted

‘tyex,’’ 233 voted ‘‘no,’? and there were 10 blank or defee-

tive ballots. | fe

The plaintiff proposes to construct’ its refinery on an

approximately 600 acre tract of land it owns in the refinery

use district created by the amendment to the zoning ordi-

nance, That district, consisting of about 815 acres, extends

across the middle of the northerly third of the island. At

the time of the trial ther® were 16 dwellings in‘the clistrict

and the rest of theJand therein was vacant. While a small

portion of the district is swampy and overgrown with

serub, most of it, about 85°C, is suitable for home sites or

farming. It is not, however, being used for. agrieultural

purposes or, indeed, for anything else. About two miles |

sonth of the district is a housing development begun about...

~) years ago in which to date about 143 homes have been

built, and within abont one and one half miles north of

the district there are 71 homes, a summer hotel and a

summer camp. The center of the compact part of the town

is about 214 miles south of the distriet. The prevailing

winds over the island are frem a generally westerly diree-

ton. ‘

A36

There can be no doubt and indeed it is treely conceded

by Commerce that substantial quantities of malodorous,

and in sufficient concentration toxic, gases are generated:

in the process of refining crude oil, particularly ‘*sour

cerudes?’ such as those-from the Sheikdom of Kuwait which

Commeree intends to process in the refinery it proposes to

build in Jamestown. These gases are hydrogen sulfide

(H.S) and a group of. gaseous hydrocarbons called mer-

captans. Furthermore the stacks carrying. the exhaust .

from the various heaters esséntial tu the refinery process —

will discharge substantial quantities of sulfur dioxide (SO:)

into the atmosphere. his gas is not veculiar to the oper-

ation of a refinery but, as a product of combustion, is

present in varying degrees in most smokestacks. + It has

the odor of burned sulfur matches, is detectable by its odor

‘in coucentrations of 2.5 parts per million parts of air by

volume and on constant exposure is deleterious to health

‘n coneentrations of 5 or more parts per million of air

by volume.

We turn our attention first to hydrogen sulfide and mer-

captans. In accordance with general commercial practice

about 1°¢ of the sulfur in the'erude oils Commerce proposes

to refine will be removed in the form-of hydrogen sulfide

prior to shipment from the Middle East by a process known

as stabilization. More of the sulfur will be converted in

the course of the refining process into hydrogen sulfide and

the residue will remain in the final products of the refinery.

The hydrogen sulfide given off by the crude oil durin the

refining process will, according to Commerce’s plan, be

converted into odorless, elemental sulfur by a process

which is about 96% efficient. The remaining hydrogen sul-

fide will be incinerated and discharged into the air as sul-

fur dioxide. :

Mereaptans are produced at various stages of the re-

finery process. In Commerce's operation some will be con-

verted into hydrogen sulfide, which will be treated as de-

seribed above, others will be removed by a eaustic wash

A3T

treatment and*incinerated and some will be converted into

hydrocarbons and form part of the gasoline and heating

oils produced. 3 ; |

Commerce propeses a system which is completely en-

closed from the tanker at the dock to the storage tanks

for the finished products. When functioning properly any

of the above gases not converted into elemental sulfur will

be incinerated and discharged into the atmosphere as sulfur

dioxide. There is no dispute that theoretically the proposed

refinery would be practically 100% effective in preventing

the escape of hydrogen sulfide or mereaptans into. the

atmosphere. In ease of accident, however, there is no

doubt that these gases might eseape into the air and should

that oceur be blown by the wind not only out of the refinery

area but also out of the refinery use district altogether.

The real dispute as to these gases lies in the: probability

of the occurrence of accidents resulting in a discharge of

the‘gases onto the defendants” properties. ;

Accidents in refineries as elsewhere are, of course, in-

evitable. And there ean be no doubt that in fhe event of

a serious accident these malodorous and toxie gases might

eseape and be blown onto the defendants’ properties if at

the-time the wind happened to be blowing in their direction,

But the evidence is undisputed that ina modern, well de-

signed and well bu'it refinery accidents allowing the eseape

of these gases could be minimized, one expert witness indi-

cated practically to the vanishing point, by ‘*good house-

keeping,’? meaning by that, frequent and therough inspec-

tions of the equipment, keeping the premises neat and

clean, and employing skillful and competent supervisory

and operating personnel, No Witness, of course, could say

now frequently accidents permitting the eseape of these

gasés in substantial quantity would be likely to oceur.

The District Court, however, found that the **most that

can be said’? for the ‘devices and procedures” proposed

hy Commerce ‘‘is that they will he nearly completely effee-

tive under the, most ideal conditions.”’ Then, noting the

A3s

highly, corrosive qualities of Kuwait erude oil and the

volume to be processed each day, it said that it was ‘‘satis-

fied that varying quantities of these [referring to hydro-

gen sulfide and mereaptans] obnoxious gases will find their

way into the atmosphere at all times when the refinery

‘is in operation. To assume that they will not be earried

by the prevailing winds beyond the relatively small area

upon which a refinery of the size contemplated is to be

located would be far from realistic. On the contrary, the

credible testimony in this case establishes that said gases

-will be carried by the prevailing winds at all times to the

properties of some of the defendants, and, because of

their extremely disagreeable odors in very low concen-

trations and their cumulative effect, thes will s¢riously

diminish both the value of the defendants’ lands ‘as resi-

dential properties and the enjoyment thereof.”’

The futding that there will be a continuous discharge of

these gases onto the properties of some of the defendants

is not supported by the evidence. For the evidence is un-

disputed that the malodorous gases to which the court was

referring will escape into the atmosphere only in the event

of some accident and there was no testimony, as indeed

there could be none, as to the probable frequency of ‘acei-

dents in the propesed refinery resulting in the escape of

these gases. Furthermore, assuming that accidents result

ing in the discharge of these gases will oceur-in or near

the center of Commerce's. processing area, it is clear that

if the wind at the time were blowing from any direction

between northe.st and south, the gases would not be car.

ried onto the property of any defendant but out over the

waters of the bay.

Sulfur dioxide, and what is referred to as general re-

finery odors, as contaminants of the atmosphere remain

to be considered.

Little needs to be said as to the !atter. It is an odor

produced by a combination of the odors of hydrogen sul-

fide, mercaptans and the general hydrocarbon odor often

encountered at gasoline filling stations. Since there js no

dispute that Commerce’s plans calls for a completely en-

closed system, this odor due to its composition would be

present only in the event of an accident. Having already

pointed out that the frequency of aecidents is conjectural,

it is enough to add that the testimony is convincing that

any general refinery odor remaining after an aceident could

be quickly eliminated by prompt and thoroygh cleaning of

the area affected.” It will suffice to say id our previous

discussion applies equally here and that further comments -

are superfluous.

Sulfur dioxide is another matter, f6r there is no doubt

that this gas will be continuously produced in substantial

quantities and the only means proposed for disposing of it

is to dischargé it into the atmosphere through stacks of

varying heights. We are not concerned, however, with the

amount of this gas in the upper air. Our concern is with

the concentrations of it on the ground likely to Be eneoun-

tered on the properties of the defendants.

There was no expert testimony that, in view of the height

of the proposed stacks and other pertinent factors, there

would ever be a ground concentration of this gas on any

defendant’s property of as much as 5 parts per million

parts of air by volume and henee enough to have an ad-

verse effect on health. The court found, however, that

there would be enough ground concentration of the gas on

the defendants’ properties to be: perceptible. It said:

“The credible testimony satisfies me that, depend

ing upon atmospheric conditions, wind velocities, and

the prevailing winds, as shown by the evidence of pas?

annual weather conditions on the Island of James-

town, there will be frequent concentrations of SO, on

the property of the defendant Froberg in excess of

2.5 parts per million, and that it is reasonable to eon-

elude that the properties of the other defendants will

be frequently visited with similar concentrations ear-

ried te the premises by the prevailing winds and that

A40

*

these concentrations will serve to effect a substantial

diminution in the values of their properties and in the

enjoyment thereof.”’

In reaching this conclusion the court specifically rejected

‘the testimony of one expert witness with impressive quali-

fications by training and experience in problems of air

pollution caused by refineries who had said: that in his

opinion the ground eoncentration of SO, beyond the rearest

boundary line of the defendant nearest to fhe refinery, Fro-

berg, would not exceed 0.4 parts per million even under the

most unfavorable conditions. Sub silentio it also. rejected

testimony in similar vein of several other expert witnesses.

The court’s finding, however, has some foundation in the

testimony of three experts. One of these speaking on the

basis af experience said: ‘From a high sulfur erude and

under atmospheric conditions of steady but not high

velocity wind in the direetion of the wind to leave the

refinery Tam sure that you can deteet SO, by its irritating

effect on the eyes, the nose and the throat at a distance of

two or three miles: That might not happen every, day,

but it will happen some of the time."* Another testified in

somewhat the same vein although he indicated that SO. |

could be detected at a distance only by its odor and not

by its irritating effect. But this witness when employe:

as an expert by the Town Council prior to this litigation

gave as his opinion that: ‘*Pollution by sulfur dioxide

from refinery operation is seldom objectionable if limited

to the concentrations resulting from burning fuel oil and

the’ malodorous mereaptans separated in refining opera:

tions... . Many law suits have resulted from the dis

charge of sulfur dioxide into the air by smelters on account

of the damage to vegetation but not from oil refinery prav-

tiee.”’ The other witness on whom the court must: have

relied for its fining testified on.the basis of a formula,

at basis other experts, including some of the appellees’.

rejected. as wholly inadequate, one went so far as to char

Ad4l

acterize it as *tcockeyed,"* for the reason that no formula

could take matters of topography into account. Moreover,

‘the formula used by this witness was not one generally

“accepted in the art but the witness’ own simplification of

sucha formula. Whatever the value of the witness’ formula

may be, however, according to it Commerce's refinery

would produce concentrations of SO, on the property of

the defendant nearest to it of over 2.5 parts per*million

only when the wind was blowing in that direction at 1 mile

per hour. At zero wind velocity the result produced by

the formula is admittedly absurd. At a wind velocity of

2 miles per hour the concentrations of the gas on the prop-

erty nearest the refinery would drop below 2 parts per

migiion and as the wind velocity increased the concentra-

tions Would deerease. Moreover, there is no specitie evi-

denee of the frequency of 1 mile per hour winds over

Jamestown in any direction, since the data used by the

expert Witness who testified.on this phase of the ease listed

all winds of less than 3 miles per hour as calm. However,

computations based on this witness’ testimony show that

winds blow from the refinery toward the Froberg property

about one twelfth of the time, and, assiming that the wind

was blowing at 1 mile per hour one third‘of the time the

-wind was listed as calm, calculations show that accepting

the results of the formula there would be detectable con-

coutrations of SQ. on the Froberg property only for about

one hour in every 720 hours, or for somewhat less than one

hour in every period of four weeks.? :

With the evidence as summarized above and the findings

* The court below. mentioned but did pot pass upon the defend-

‘ants’.econtentions that the proposed refinery world. be a nuisance

in other respeets, such as by the glow from its flare, its iiamination

at night, dust from its eatalytie cracking unit. smoke from. its

Sacks and its pollution of the waters of the bay. We see no reason

ty consider these eontentions either, for the evidenee is quite inade-

fate to show that the refinery wonld eonstitute a nuisance in any

r4

hese respeets.

A42

of the District Court in mind, we now turn to the appli-

cable law, which, of course, is the law o¢ Rhode Island.

We may take it for granted that a home owner does not

- enjoy the absolute right to keep his neighborhood forever

residential in character. Lord Justice James in Salvin v.

North Brancepeth Coal Co., L.R. 9 Ch. App. 705, 709 (1874),

colorfully expressed this general rule in the statement:

‘‘If some picturesque haven opens its arms to invite the

commerce of the world, it is not for this court to forbid

the embrace, although the fruit of it should be the sights,

and sounds, and smells of a common seaport and _ ship-

building town, which would drive the Dryads and their

masters from their ancient solitudes.’’ See also Pennsyl-

vania Co. v. Sun Co., 290 Pa. 404; 409 (1927), a leading

case cited and relied upon on another point in Seidner, Inc.

- v. Ralston Purina Co., 67 R.L. 436 (1942), to be considered

in detail presently, whereia the Supreme Court of Pennsy!-

vania said:

‘‘In this age, persons living in a community or

neighborhood ‘must subject their persona] comfort to

the commercial necessities of earrying on trade and

business. Where the individual is affeeted only in his

‘tastes, his personal comfort, or pleasure, or prefer-

ences, these he must surrender for the comfort and

preferences of the many.’’

No 6ne, however, is required to submit to his neighbor's

unreasonable use of his property. The Supreme Court of

Rhode Island in Blomen v. N. Barstow Co., 35 R.T. 198, 211

(1913), in considering a bill in equity by residence owners

to enjoin the operation of a drop hammer in their neighbor-

hood which made a loud thumping noise and jarred their

premises, summed up its conclusion drawn from an analysis

of many cases from ofher jurisdictions in the statement:

‘The rule of law is well settled that every person

ix bound to.use his property so as not t6é injure that

of another, or interfere with the reasonable and proper

A4ts :

enjoyment ‘the ‘reof and that the carrying on of a busi.

ness Which creates nvisesome smells, or noxious vapors,

or eauses great and disturbing noises, jarrings’ or

vibrations, which affect injurieusly property in the

vieinity or render the occupation thereof inconvenient

and uncomfortable, is a nuisance for which a person

- whose property is damaged or whose health is injured

or Whose reasonable enjoyment of his estate as a place

of residence is impaired or destroyed thereby, may

-maintain an action to recover compensation for the

injury, and that in such case a court of equity’ will

restrain the continuance of the.nuisance by injanetion.”’

But, to secure an injunetion against a néighber's pre-

spective use of his property, more must be shown than the

mere possibility or even probability of harm = resulting

-from that-use. Unless a proposed use will be a nuisance

per se, Which is not suggested here for it is generally held

that refineries are not in that category, see Purcell vy. Davis,

10) Mont. 480 (1935), courts of equity do not readily grant

injunctions to restrain anti@ipatory nuisanees, The rule in

Rhode Island is to be found in the Semduer easé cited above

Wherein the court at page 451 quoted City of Lynchbur WN.

Peters, 145 Va. 1 (1926), as follows:

“Tt is a well established principle of equity juris.

prudence that when a proposed strueture or the use

of it, is met a nuisance per se, a court of equity will

not grant an injunction against the erection of the

structure or the use, merely beeanse it may become a

nuisance. The alleged nuisance must be the necessary

result or the court will await the actual results."”

The Rhode Island court then went on to say in its own

words:

‘*We are of the gpinion that to justify an injune-

tion, in a eanse of the character of the instant one:

Ad

i.e. a suit to enjoin a prospective nuisance], the evi-

dence must show clearly and convincingly that sub-

stantial damage to the complainant's property or busi-

ness will be practically certain to result from the oper-

ation by the respondent of the business against which

an injunction is sought.’’ :

To give the words of comparison used by the Supreme

Court of Rhode Island (‘‘clearly,’’ ‘‘eonvineingly’’ and

‘*practically certain’’), the meaning the court intended

them to convey we must look to the application of the

Rhode Island rule‘in the case in which the words were used

We turn therefore to consideration of the Seidner case’ in

some detail. | .

The plaintitf Otto Seidner, Inc., at the time of suit and

for many years before had operated a mayonnaise factory

in a predominantly industrial section of the town of West-

erly, Rhode Island. The defendant, as the lessee of adjoin-

ing land, propesed to const uct a coal yard-into which

coal would be dumped from railroad ears standing on a

siding. The plaintiff's bill in equity sought to enjoin the

construction of the coal yard on the ground that coal dust .

would necessarily be carried by the wind into its mayon-

naise factory contaminating its product thereby and pre-

venting it from carrying on its business to its irreparable

injury. It was not disputed that the proposed location of

the ¢oal bins was only 75 feet from the nearest corner of

the plaintiff's building and certainly there can be no doubt

that coal dust in mayonnaise would, to Say the least,

adversely affect its saléability. . |

At the trial an expert witness with many years’ experi-

enee in the coal business, called by the .plaintiff, testified

that he did not see how coal dust could possibly be pre-

vented under certain conditions of wind. from getting into

the plaintiff's factory even with the precautions-in the way

of canvas covers during the unloading process which the

defendant proposed to take. An expert galled by the

A45

defendant testified that although there would be dust from

the defendant’s yard there would be no appreciable amount

in view of the covers the defendant proposed to use and

that in any event unless there was a high wind the dust

would not travel over 100 feet. ‘

On the basis of this testimony the trial court eaaibe

the injunction prayed for, saying:

“Considering the testimony of both experts together

with the other convincing. evidence in the case, it

appears to us to be clearly: and convineiigly proved

that the operation of the proposed coal bins without

some dust escaping is absolutely impossible.”

Expressing doubt as to the efficacy of the precautionary

measures the defendant, proposed to take to prevent the

escape of coal dust, the court then went on to say: —

“We are satisfied that even with the canvas cover-

inv, coal dist of appreciable density and quantity

will escape, W hich, carried hy a westerly wind, will be

blown into complainant’s. plant and especially into

the mixing room, working great havoc to the food

products, both completed and in process. The coal

dust will also settle into and onto the wlassware, making

necessary a. hand-washing, the cost of which, as opposed

to machine washing, would put the complainant in the

dilemma where it could not hope successfully to cope

with competition, Irreparable injury to complainant

must certainly follow.’

-

-

Nevertheless, in spite of those findings the Supreme

Court of Rhode Island reversed. Applying the appheable

rule as quoted herein above the court said at page 4o1:

“We have carefully considered the relevant evidence

"in this cause, being almost entirely opinion evidence,

on the question whether substantial damage te the

complainant will be practically certain to result from

A46

the operation by the respondent of its proposed busi-

ness, in the place and in the manner in which the

respondent intends to operate it and we are of the

opinion that it has not been proved by clear and con-

vineing evidence that such damage will be practically

certain to result.’’

It is true that in Seidner the court was concerned with an

attempt to enjoin a dusty business in an industria? area

wheréas here we are concerned with an attempt to enjoin

a stack industry, so-called,-in a residential, resort and

agricultural area. Nevertheless, in, the exercise of our

appellate duty * to examine the defendants’ evidence to see

whether it meets the high standard of proof required by

the Rhode Island law as stated and applied in the Seidner

case, we feel constrained to hold that the court below erred

in enjoining erection of the plaintiff’s refinery as a pro-

spective nuisanee. Standing in the shoes of the Supreme

Court of Rhode Island, that is to stay, applying the Rhode

Island rule to the evidence and the findings in this case as

we believe the Rhode Island court would apply its rule, it

seems to us from the Seidner case that the Supreme Court

of Rhede Island would: not sanetion enjoining the erection

of the plaintiff's refinery in Jamestown. Instead, on the

relatively even balance of the sharply conflicting expert

testimony in the record before us, we think the Supreme

Court of Rhode Island would-wait to see whether the refin-

ery constituted a nuisanée when put into operaticn.

. The judqment of the District Court is set aside and the

case is remanded to that Court for the entry of a judqment

dismissing the defendants’ counterclaims, but without costs

in this Court.

'See Bre ne ’ V Unite d Nhat is 45 9%] 90, qv (¢ A. t. 194))

; A47

APPENDIX B

JUDGMENTS BELOW

(1) Original Judgment

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

_ FOR THE First Circuit

No. o479

Commerce O1w Rerixine Core., Plainteff, Appellant, |

| | a i

Wituiam W. Miner et AL, Defendants, Appellees.

| JUDGMENT

| June 16; 1960

This cause came gn to be heard on appeal from the United

States Distriet Court for the District of Rhode Island, and

was argued by counsel.

~ Upon consideration whereof, It is now here ordered, ad-

judged and ‘deereed as follows: The judgment of the Dis-

triet Court is set aside and the ease is remanded to that

Court for the entry of a judgment dismissing the defend-

ants’ counterelaims, but without eosts in this Court.

By the Court:

Rocer A. STINCHFIELD

Clerk.

(2) Order Denying Rehearing

{Caption Omitted |

ORDER OF COURT

July 6, 1960 |

It is ordered that appellees’ petition for rehearing filed

July 1, 1960, be, and the same hereby is, denied.

By the Court:

Rower A. STINCHFIFLD

Clerk.

A48

APPENDIX C

RULE OF COURT. STATUTES. AND ORDINANCES

sia INVOLVED

l. Rule of Court

tnle S2(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil) Procedure

péovides in pertinent part:

** Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly

erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the oppor

tunity of the trial court to judge of the eredibility of

the witnesses."’

2. State Statutes

(a) Sections 4524-1, 45-24-2, and 45-24-83 of the Genera!

Laws of Rhode Island, 1956, formerly Chapter 342, Seetion

1, of the General Laws of Rhode Island, 1938, provide as

follows:

“45-24-1. Power of councils—Scope of ordinances.—-

Kor the purpose of promoting the public health, safety,

morals or general welfare, the city council of any city,

and the town council of any town, upon the approval

of the financial town meeting of such town, shall have

power in accordance with the provisions of this chapter

within. the limits of such city or town by ordinance to

regulate and restrict the height, number of stories and!

size of buildings and other structures, the percentace

of lot-that may be occupied, the size of vards, court-

and other open spaces, the density of population, and

the location and use of buildings, struetures and land

for trade, industry, residence or other purposes,

“45-24-2. Division into districts—Uniformity within

‘districts.-—For any anc vll of said purposes said city

or town council may divi'> the municipality into dis

triets of such namber, shape and area as it may deen

best suited to carry out the purposes of this chapter:

and within such districts it may regulate and restrict

the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration,

repair or use of buildings, structures or land. Al!

such regulations shall be uniform for each elass or kind

Ad

of buildings throughout each distriet but the regula

tions in- one district may differ from those in other

districts. yee ,

“45-24-3. General purposes of ordinances.—Such

regulations: shall be made in accordance with a com-

prehensive plan-and designed to lessen congestion in

the streets; to secure safety from fire, panie and other

dangers; to promote the publie health and the general.

welfare; to provide adequate light and air; to prevent

the overerqwding of land; to. avoid undue concentra-

’ tien of population; to facilitate the adequate provision

of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks and

other public requirements. Such regulations shall be

made with reasonable consideration, among other

things, to the character of the district and its peculiar

suitability for particular uses, and with a view to con-

serving the value of buildings and encouraging the

most appropriate use of land throughout such tewn or

municipality.’’

(h) Sections 45-24-4 and 45-24-5 of the General Laws of

Rhode Island, 1956, formerly Chapter $42, Seetion 2). of

the General Laws of Rhode Island, 1938, provide as follows:

“45-24-4. Hearings on ordinances.—No sxneh ordi.

nance shall be enacted, amended of repealed until’

after a public hearing has been held upon the question

of the enactment, amendment or repeal of sueh ordi-

nanee, befare the city or town council, as the case

may be, or a committee or commission authorized by

such city or tewn council to investigate and make ree-

ommendations concerning such proposed ordinance,

who shall give first notice of such“ publie hearing

specifying the time and place of sueh hearing by pub

lication of such notice in a newspaper of general ciren-

lation within such city or town at least onee each week

for three (3) suecessive weeks prior to the date of

such hearing, ‘at whieh hearing opportunity shall be

civen all persons interested to be heard upon. the

Inatter of the proposed ordinance.

“45-24-5. Amendment and repeal of ordinances—

Landowners’ protests.—The city or town council, as the

ASU

case may be, shall have power, after a public hearing

as herein provided, from time to time to amend or

repeal any such ,ordinance and thereby change said

regulations gr distriets; provided, that, if there shatl

he filed in the office of the city or town elerk of such

city or town on or before the day of such hearing or

within three (3) days thereafter a written protest

against such proposed amendment or repent signed

and acknowledged by the owners of twenty per cent

(20°) or more of the street frontage of the property

proposed to be affected, or by the owners of twenty

per cent (20°7) or more of the street frontage directly

_opposite.the property proposed to be affeeted, or by

the owners of the property abutting on twenty per

~eent (20%) or more of the boundary line between the

property proposed to be affeeted and the property

immediately in the rearthereof when there is no street

hetween said properties, no such amendment or repeal

shall be passed except by a three-fifths vote of such

eity or town council and the approval ofthe mayor of

such town or city, or if disapproved by such Maver,

by a like vote.as may be required by law to enact an

ordinance in the ease of disapproval by the mayor of

such town or city. Fhe word ‘owner’ as used in this

section shall not be construed to include’ attaching

erediters or lien holders other than mortgaees.”’

(eo) Seerions 23-27-1 to 28-27-4 of the General Laws of

Rhode Island, 956, formerly Chapter 333, * Section 02,

of the General Laws of Rhode [stand, 1938, as added by

Publie Laws of Rhode Tsland, 1950, Chapter 2525, Section

1. provide as follows: ;

“93.97-1. Ordinances regulating construction and

equipment of buildings. —Town af@ city councils may

from time to time make and ordain all ordinances and

regulations for their respective towns and cities, not

repnygnant to law, as they may deem necessary, regi:

lating the manner of constructing and equipping of

all buildings and other structures, within said town or

eitv which may be ereeted, altered or repaired after

the passage of such ordinance, ;

“23.27-2. Hearings on building ordinances.-No suc!

-ordinanee shall be enacted, amended or repealed until

,

Aol

after a public hearing bas been held upon the question

cof the enactment, amendment or repeal of such ordi-

nance, before said town or city couneil, which council

shall tirst give notice of such hearing by publieation in

a newspaper printed in said town or city, if any, and,

if none, then in a newspaper published in the county

in Which said city or town is located. .

*23.27-3. Inspector-of buildings—Appointment and

duties.—Said town or city council shall have the power

to appoint an inspector of biitdings and define his -

duties in the issdance of building permits and in the

administration and enforcement of such ordinance.

“23-27-4. Penalties for ordinance violations—Prose-

eution.—Said town or city couneil shall have power

to provide a penalty for the violation of any ordinance

enactodainder the authority herein given by a fine not

exceeding one hundred dollars ($100). for each offense,

such fine te inure te said town or eity, and may also

cause suit, to be brought in-the supreme or superior

tourt in the name of said town or .city: to restrain

the violation of or te compel compliance with the pro

visions of any such ordinance,”’

(1) Section 23-36-1 of the General Laws of Rhode Tsland,

WAG, formerly Chapter cy Section 21, of the General Laws

f Rhode Island, 1938, a. amended by Publie Laws 1955

Ist special session), Chapter 3233. Seetion 1, provides

< follows.:

. “23-36-1. Ordinances regulating manufacture and

handling of explosives and infammables—License.

‘Town councils and city councils may from time to time

makeoand ordain all ordinances and, regulations for

their respective towns, .not repugnant to law, which

they may deem necessary for the safety of their in-

habitants from the manufacture, processigg, storae,

keeping, having in possession, transportation, sale or

use of ginpowder, euneotton, dynamite, nit rogiveerme,

nitrogelatine, Iwddite, chlorate of potash. pierie acid,

sodinm. ealeium earbide, acetvlene gas, gasétine- gas,

eride petroleum, gasoline, kerosene, heating fiels. lub

rieating oils and greases, allied petroleum produets,

.

-

A o2 7

and any and all other explosives, explosive chemicals

and inflammable substances; and may prohibit the

manutacture, storage, keeping, having in possession,

transportation, sale or use by any and all person or

persons of any or all said substances and gases in their

respective towns, unless a license for the same shall be

first obtained from the town: council ar city council,

which license shall be henceforth effective unless re.

yoked for good and sufficient cause by order of said

town council or city council. Any person violating any

provision of any ordinance, regulation or prohibition,

authorized by this section shall be fined not less than

twenty dollars ($20.00) nor more than one hundred!

dollars ($100) for each such offense.”’

3. Municipal Ordinances

(a) The basie Jamestown zoning ordinance, ech, NNXY,

ix x. BB at 3 R. 284-293. (The zoning map is Ex. LL at

OR. 317-329.)

(b) The amendment to the Jamestown zoning ordinance,

Which purported to authorize the creation of*a refiners

use district, is Ex. S at 3. R. 267-269,

(c) The basic Jamestown building ordinance, ch. XLIV.

is Ex. CC at 3 R. 294-314,

(d) The amendment to the Jamestown building ordi

nance, whieh purported to” exempt oil retineries trom Its

provisions, is kx. Tat 3 R. 269-270,

(©): The Jamestown licensing ordinance, ch. JO, is bx

U'-} at 3 R. 270-279,

In the present. posture of the case. which complains that

he court below dismissed the allegations of petitioners’

‘ounter@aims regarding these ordinances Without consid

‘ration of their merits, see the first Question Presented

ind ** First*’, Ppp. 2 and 32-33 of the Petition, supre,

tis not deemed necessary to repeat the detailed provi

ions of the ordinanees in question.

ADd3

APPENDIX D

DEMONSTRABLE FACTUAL ERRORS IN THE

" COURT OF APPEALS’ OPINION

We list here the most significant errors committed by

he court below in the course of its reappraisal of the’ testi-

jony in’the present ease. Some of these involve demon-

trable misstatements; ea, item 1, the geography of James.

own, and item 3, the loeation of certain of the petitioners’

mes in relation to the*site of the corporation's proposed

efinery., Another, item 5, the validity of Dro Schutt’s

ormula, involves a question of credibility and a denigration

f that expert’s testimony unsupported by the record.

thers, such as items 6 and 7, summarizing the probable

Teets of the corporation’s refinery operations, invelve

reevaluation of the testimony contrary to the weight of

hat testimony and at variance with the district court's

ndings. Finally, item &, exposure to sulfur dioxide,

rhores testimony of record, and fails in addition to Uuive

dequate weight to the ‘Rhode Island law, which holds that

iscomfort rather than uninhabitability is the Ineasure of

private nuisance,

The geography of Jamestown. The eourt of appeais

tid (p. ASS), SA majority of the permanent population,

lout 757, live in a relatively compact residential and

wall business distriet in the southerly third of the town

hich has a publie water supply and sewer svsten.””

The fact is that the southerly third of the istand has

niy a single year-round resident, and that the compact

ssidential area is in the middle third of the town. See

Ro ST4t-S75t, GOStOT0t, 9704 (te ‘stimony of the ecorporn

on’s Witnesses); see also pp. 6-7, supra, and the map fol-

wing p. 41, also- supra.

The district judge, who took a view (5 Ro 1092-1055),

: course made no such mistike.

77

A ot

2. The prevailing winds. The court. of Appeals said

(p. ASO), The prevailing winds over the island are fros

a generatly westerly direction.”’

Tie fact is.(1 R. Ut-11t) that the prevailing wind i.

westerly in only one month, December, and that in no

month ix a westerly wind the second highest prevailing

wind. [Th seven months of the vear, winds from the south~

West prevail. In one month, February, west-north-wes!

winds prevail, and that direction is second in two other

months. (1 R. 9t.11t.) :

The district court found (3. R. 3: p. ALT) that “The

evidence establishes that the prevailing winds on the island

are from the southwest and from the northwest."

3. Effect of south wind on some of petitioners. The eourt

of appeals said (p. ASS) that ‘if the wind at the time were

blowing from any direction between northeast and south,

the gases would not be carried onto the property oftany .

defendant but out over the waters of the bay.”*

The fact is that the houses of both the petitioners

MeGaughan and Lunsford are directIt north of the refiners

use district (4 Ro 542: and see map following p. 41 supres.

Consequently with a south wind, whieh prevguls ino two

menths and is secondary in four months more (1 R. 9t-1it),

the gases and odors from the proposed refinery, would be

carried direetly to those petitioners’ homes,

4.°° Whe tier corporation's re finery was completely in

closed, The court of appeals said (py. AST). Commerce

proposes a svstemr whieh is completely enclosed frome the

tanker at the dock to the storage tanks for the finished

products,"

The fact is that the corporation's plans contemplated: an

oxidation pond, whieh must. be open (LR. 246t-247t),

as Well as a coke storage area. likewise open (Det bey,

what chy SUR. ISC)). Both of these eXude odors (LR, Pat:

2 OR, 1027t, LOS6t). |

ASS

The distriet court considered the oxidation pond in its

findings (3 R. 77; p. A21). : : ;

0 Dr. Schutt’s qualifications. “The court ef appeals said

(p. A4L) with respeet to Dr. Schutt, a consulting engineer

(1 R. 195t-198t) called by petitioners as an expert, ‘*the

formula used by this witness was not one generally accepted

inthe art but the witness’ own simplifieation of such’ a

formula,.**

The fact is (2 R.-1174t) that the formula used by Dr.

Schutt “is eommon practice in oil refineries solving: such

problems,"* testimony that was not contradicted ly uri

Witness,

The reliability of Dr. Schatt's computations is under.

scored by his use of the materials balance, viz. a determina.

tion made of the products and by-products whieh are

emitted by a refinery on the basis of the nature and amount

of the raw materials which go there:to be refined (2. Ro

W1l6ts & Re 1307-1308),

Dr. Schutt prepared a materials balanee for the corpo:

ration’s proposed refinery on the basis of its processing

Kuwait sour crude, and determined that the resultant output

of sulfur dioxide (St 2) would be on the arder of 35 to 40

short tons per day (2. R. 1063t). :

Mr. Sutherland, the corporation's engineer witness who

supervised the design of the proposed refinery (LOR. OT3t

V1t), was asked, and promised to, to produce a materials

balance (5 R. 1308-1311), Although the witness testified

that such a balance was in existence (5 R. 1808), he later

refused to produce it (4 Ri 1391),

Thereafter, the corporation’s engineer witness Hatrtwis

did produce such a balance (2 RL 122 1t ef seq.), and aceord.*

Ye to his estimate the total SN » eNhausted to the air trom

he eorporation's proposed refinery would be OF tons per

lay (2. R. 1245t; soe Ex. BBBB, 6 R. 1901).

Consequently, quote apart fram the legal Hpropriety en

he part of the court of appeals in reevaluating the credi-

AS6

bility of the expert witnesses whom it did not and could no

see (opinion, pp. A4O-A41, and see discussion in Petition

at pp. 3o-37), quite apart frem the inappropriateness of

its exercise in advocacy, viz., rehabilitating the corpora.

tion’s expert who had been disbelieved by the distriet cour:

for cause (3 R. SO-S1; p. A24: compare p. ALO: see diseu-

sion in Petition at pp. 23-24 and 36), and minimizing

the testimony of Dr. Schutt, who very obviously was. be

lieved by the district court, the fact is that on the basis 6

the corporation’s witness Hartwig's testjmony (2 Ro bar,

one of Dr. Schutt’s essential conclusions was fully cor:

roborated,

6. Cantimuous discharge. The court. of appeals sail

(p. ASS), “The finding that there will be a continuous «is

charge of these kases onto the properties of some of the

defendants is not supported by the evidence.”’

If **gases’’ include odors, then the fact is otherwise, for

there was ‘considerable evidence that a refinery always lias |

a smell, that the escape of odors therefrom is inevitable

(1 R. 67t, S6t-S8t, 113t, 11M, 138t), and that the odor js

cumulative (1 R. 145t). See pp. 22, 25-26 of the Petition.

where the evidence is set out in detail,

Moreover, and this was a cireumstance ignored hy thie

court of appeals, the island has frequent fogs (1 R. 12t-1s!

n & conattion Which one of the corporation's experts acdinvittes

‘means that vour air pollution conditions would increase’

(1 R. 628).

The distriet court found (ft Re : op. AIT) that Bin

of varying duration enveloping ibe sh Loceur with rm!

tive Frequeney’* and its conclusion as. te the diffusion « a

SO. was niger in part upon “atmospherie conditions”

SRST: ps A24).

¢. Odor as caused only by accidents. The court below

said (p. ASS) that “the evidence is undisputed that the

Hinlodoraus cases to whieh the idistriet court was y@fe

ring will eseape into the atmosphere only in the event o!

some accident and there was no te stimony, as indeed ther:

ADT :

could be none, as to the probable frequeney of accidents in

the proposed refinery resulting in the escape of these

gases."’

The fact is*that odors are not caused only by major mal-

‘ funetionings, such as the court of appeals seems to have

had in mind, but result from the multitude of minor leaks

vind spiils (1 Re 117t), which are inevitable in a retinery

such as the corporation proposes, which (3 R. 74: p. ATS)

“will comprise among other structures at least fifteen stacks

ranging from twenty to twe hundred feet in height which

will contain many thousands of fet of piping, countess

joints and connections, nearly one handred untired pressure

Vessels of varying sizes and canstruetion, approximately

four hundred pumps, thousands of seals and COMPLressors,

‘tanks, heat exchangers, and like-equipment."’

Consequently, since accidents and particularly minor ae-

cidents are admittedly jinevitable— the corporation's own

designer admitted (1 Ro 590t) that “I don't think vou ean

ever leave out the possibility that leaks will oeenr’ (see

alo Petition at pp. 21-22, eapra, for the testinfony Jin

detail), there is created a general refinery odor —whieh has’

a cumulative effeet (1 Ro 145t).

Or, as expressed by another witness (1 Ro 210, 2201 ‘:

"A. The general odor ¢reated in a refinery, that is

sometimes characterized as oil smell, ix ereated his

minor or more serious leaks in the process units, sueh

as through lines, stuffing boxes of pumps, through a

loose flange which-can happen when one considers the

wultitude of pipe connections which are contained in

a process unit. Those leaks, when released in. the

atthosphere, are, to my way of thinking, generally

responsible for the oily smell or odor. .

“Also, T make’ 1 add one more thing: Open waste

~emarators-—in an oil refinery they are open where

Water is settled also creates a typical refiners oder

ie, ° Are these odors perceptible outside of three pee

finery itself?

ASS

“Mr. Duggan [counse!] for the corporation]: Are we

referring to any particular— :

‘*Mr. Moore [counsel for the residents]: No, this

retinery, this refinery.

* * s oe e

“A. Yes. -

* . © & ae

“*Q. Would you answer with respect to r ‘finery odors

being perceptible outside of the refinery—ld

an opinion whether that would apply to this refinery?

“A. In a magnified form because processing of sour

erude creates stronger odors than, processing a sweet

erude.”’ |

The result is that, by ignoring the testimony on both

sides as to the inevitability af accidents (Petition, p. 21),

,and by similarly ignoring the testimony that ** A. refinery

always smells’? (1 R. 113t; and. Petition, pp. 25-26), the

court of appeals bas not only committed a procedural ir-

regularity (Petition, pp. 33-37), it has made » grave and

‘indeed critical factual error. Indeed, its conclusion lends

substance to Jeremy Bentham's taunt that jurisprudence

ix thé science of being methodically ignorant of what every.

one else knows,

8. Effect on comfort. The court of appeals «said. with

respect to SO (p. AS6), that ‘ton constant eXpesure [i

is deleterions to health in coneentrations af 5 or more parts

per mullion of air by volume,’ and further that (p. A9),

- There was no expert testimony that" ** there would eve

he a ground concentration of as much as 2 parts per miflo

parts of air by volume and henee enough to have an advers:

effect en health."

>

Phere was, however, testimony that the greund eonee

fration of SOQ at he Petitioner Proberg’s hore would bs

as high as O88 parts per inition, which greatly exeneds t!

imate bevel of detectability and discomfort ar 2.5 part:

- t

eroamiiiion «2 RoJO6e8r 1OG8e).

lo you have

ASY

There was also testimony that, in respeet of sick in.

dividuals, or with those suffering from bronchitis or heart

disease, the effect of the SO. would be, aggravated (ARS

056-957). |

Here the error of the court of appeals is essentially a

legal one, for under Rhode Island law it is not necessary

that, to eonstitute a nuisance, a complainant’s home be

rendered uninhabitable; it is sufficient that what is done

by the defendant ‘causes a substantial diminution either

in the value of adjacent property, or in the enjovinent

thereof as measured by the degree of comfort whieh the

average man living in such a neighborhood has a right to

expect’ Kennedy ve Brechette, 45 RL 899, 406, 123 Atl.

146, 148; and see Appendix E, immediately: following.

APPENDIX E

THE RHODE ISLAND LAW OF NUISANCES

1. Generally. “Phere are four leading Rhode Island de

cisions on the law of nuisances,

(i) Aldrich ve Howard, & RLV. 246° C865). Tere: the

plaintul, the owner ofoa dwelling house. recovered dam

ages for the nftisanee. caused by the defendant's nearby

very stable, whieh adinittedly was property butt and kept,

ane the verdict was sustained on appeat.

In answer %, the defendant's contention that the jury

had heen misdireeted. the Supreme Court of Rhode [stand

“aid (SR. DL at 24s 24):

as Pe

instriefions are, that the motses and the smells,

order to become a nuisance, must create an annovanes

Toostch an-extent as te render life tneom™ortakle, or te

ter the house unesinfortable as a dwelling house and

mitted for the proper purposes for whieh it was designed.

t odes thous referred teow Tn led, that itcis Theol Ppererees sca \

the house should: be rendered useless in order. te

e

Ab60

Inaintain an action, but that it is quite sufficient that the

injury should be such as to render the enjoyment of life

there uncomfortable, We think, therefore, that for all the

purposes of this case, the charge is not open to the objec.

tion that it does not -sufficiently or correctly define a

nuisance at common law.”’

(ii) Blomen, Frederickson vy. N. Barstow Co.. 35 Ro 1.

INS, SO Ath 924 (1913). Here the owners of dwelling

Houses sought an injunction against the respondent's Ops

eration of drop hammers. Pending appeal, the ope ration

of the 500 Ib, hammer was restricted to 4 hours a day, On

appeal, the court held that complainants were entitled to an

injunction against any further operation ef the hammers

At pp. 203-204 of 35 R. 1, p. 926 of 85 Ath, the ee

Court of Rhode Island quoted with approval the statement

of the New York court in Fish ve Dodge, 4 Den. 311, 316.

“Tt is not necessary to a right of action that the owner

should have been driven from. his dwelling: it is enough

that the enjoyment of life and property has been rendered

uncomfortable,"

At p. 211 of 35: R. 1. p. 928 of 85 Atl, the Supreme Court

of Rhode Island ‘said ;

“The rule of law is well settled that every person. is

hound to use his property so as not to injure that of

another, or interfere with the reasonable and proper en-

joyment thereof and that the carrying on of a business

Which creates noisome smells, or NOXIOUS Vapors, or causes

great and disturbing noises, jarring or vibrations, whicti

affect injuriously property in the vicinity or render the

oveupation thereof inconvenient and uneomfortable, is a

nuisance for which a person whose property is damaged or

Whose health is injured er whose reasonable enjoyment of

his estate as a place of residence is impaired er destroyed

thereby, may maintain an action to recover compensation

for injury, and that in suchi a case a court of equity. will

restrain the contiruance of the nuisance by injumetion. °

.

Aol

(iti) Kennedy vo Frechette, 45 Ro 1 899, 128 Ath 146

(1924). In this ease the owner of residential property

sought an injunction against the operation of a factory in

Which saws and woodworking machinery were used to man-

ufacture tennis racquets. One trial judge issued a prelim

inary injunction, On further hearing, another trial judge

entered & permanent injunction whieh limited the respond

ent te 2 hours a day for the use ef his circular saws,

‘limited the thickness of the wood that could be eut on them,

restrained him from operafing after 5 P.M. and on Sun

dats, and required him te Kevep his factory windows closed.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held thet

the complainant was entitled to an unlimited) injunetion

against the operation of the saws and the woodworking

machinery.

The court said (45 R. 1. at 405-406, 125 Ath at 148),

“The location is always an important consideration in

the determination of the existences of a nuisanee, 1 is

clear that the location in gguestion is wof a omanufaeturing

one, ® * * Respondent now seeks to change the character of

this seetion west of Broadway fin the City of Pawtueket |

by the establishment of a factory therein, Anyone living

inacity must put up with the usual and ordinary noises

of city life; in this vieinity also with any of the usual

results incidental to the use of. the shops on Broadway,

Certain additional annoyance and inconvenience often is

Inevitable as the city grows and changes, but the’ amount

thereof which may be caused by any individual without

there hy CTC iting ao nitisance is ta be decided pon cons ic:

eration of all the facts in any given ease. ds the use of the

property in this partiewlar location reasonable or unres

sonable, considering not only the rights of the owner, but

also those of his neighbor. [Tf such use causes a substan-

hal diminution either in the value of adjacent property, or

in the enjovinent thereof as meds sured by the degree of

comfort which the average man living in Sueh oa ne dihber-

A 62

hood has a right to expect, it may properly be held to be

unreasenable and hence a nuisance.

**The operation of this factory has diminished the value

of complainant's land. The operation of the cireular saws

two hours daily deprives complainant for that length of

time of the comfortable and reasonable enjoyment of her

home and results in an unwarranted and illegal disturbance

of her rights. That the tine of operation is limited, affect.

“the extent of the injury but does not change the. nature

thereof.”’ ‘ ;

(iv) Serdner, Inc. ve Ralston Purina Co.. 67 R. (3 436, 24

A. td 902 (1942). Complainant, owner of a mayonnaise

factory ina part of Westerly, Ro 1b. zoned for heavy in

dustry, sought an injunction against respondent's proposvil

operation of a coalyard, on the ground that the anticipated

coal dust would seep ito complainant's mayannoise prod:

ucts. On the basis of sharply conflicting opinion evidences,

the trial judge granted an injunction. This was reversed

on appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Eshind saving’ (47

R. Tat 451, 24 As 2d at 909),

‘to justify an injunction, * ** the evidence must show

cleatly and convincingly that substantial damage to the

complainant's property or business will be practicalls

certain to result from the operation by the respondent

of the business against which an injunction is sought.”’

2. Residential versus Business. The guideline here, see

Kennedy vy. Frechette, 45 R. 1. 399,405, 123 Ath 146. 14s.

ix that ‘The. location is always an important eonsideration

in the determination of the exisistence of a nuisance.”

Significantly enough, the plaintiff? or complainant whos:

property Was in a residential section won im the Aldrich,

Blomen, and’ Kernedy cases, The respondent prevailed

only in Seidver, where the complainant's property was

located ino ao predominantly industrial) seetion of the

community.

A63

3. Vountervailing Public Benefit, In Blomen, Prederick-

‘son VN. Barstow Co. 35 R.A, 198, 209-210, 85 Ath. 924, O28,

the Rhode Island court squarely rejected the notion that

economie or other benefit to the community wéuld assist in

justifving what would otherwise be a nuisance; it said:

“Respondent's counsel argue that the granting gf an in-

junction in such cases is within the diseretion of the court;

and that it will not be granted where it will be inequitable

between the parties of will work detriment to the public

or Will involve damage to the defendants engaged in a

lawful business disproportionate’ to the damage to the con:

plainant from the continuance of the alleged nuisance.

‘Such ‘an argument was nlade in Broadbent y. Imperial

Gas Co, 7 De GoM. & G. 4386. The complaint’ was,, that

vegetables growing in the market-garden. of the ecomplain-

ant were injured by the gas of that company, and the argu-

nent was pressed that this injury was slight in compari-

son with the benefits conferred: by the company on the pub-

lit, and that on that account the court would not exercise

‘its power to restrain the manufacture of the gas. Lord

Cranworth, at p. 462, savs: ‘Tf it should turn ont that the

company had no right so to Inanufacture gas as to damage

the plaintiff's market-garden, [ have eome to the conclu.

sion that T cannot enter into any question of how far it

might be convenient for-the publie that the gas manufae-

ture’ should go on?) He further remarks, ‘but unless the

company had sue ha right, | think the present is not a case

in which this court ean go into the question of convenience

or inconvenience, and say, where a partyeis substantially

damaged, that he is only to be compensated by bringing an

action toties quoties. That would be a disgraceful state

of the law, and T quite agree with the viee-chancellor in

holding that in such a ease this court must issue an. in-

Junction, whatever may be the consequences with regard

to the fighting of the parishes and distriets which this com.

pany supplied with gas’. This ease was affirmed on ip

y peal, (7 HEL. Cas. 600).""

Di mre i f) foe Prig } essary hy ppt fists Nuais.

rm See Aldrich vo Toward; Blomen; Frederickson v. N:

irstow Coy and Kennedy vo Frechette, all supra; dis-

fort rather than eviction is the measure of nuisanee.

I the Aldrich case, the court said (Ssh. 1. at 249),

The question still‘is, does it tm faet render life uneom-

fortable?"’) Or, as phrased in the Kennedy case, 45 R. EL

at 406, 125 Ath at 148, Tf such use causes a substantial

dinunution * * * in the etijoyment thereof as measured by

the degree of comfort which the average aman living in such’

a neighborhood hae a right to expect, if TAN percep rly be

held to be unreasonable and henee a nuisanee.*’

» Confinuous versus Tntermittent Disturbance.. That

Intermittent discomfort, as distinguished from continuous:

annoyance, does net render the condition. in question any

less a nuisance, is established by Aennedy v. Frechette,

supra, Where the Supreme Court of Rhode Island set aside

an injunction which permitted partial operation of noisy

etory taachines, Tt said (45 R. bo at 408. 128 Ag. at 14S),

:

, : , in =

, AT ena { ‘ ‘ ‘> :

eration is tinted, atfeets the’ extent

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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