Appendices to Petition for Certiorari — Miner v. Commerce Oil Refining Corp. (No. 451)
Supreme Court brief1960
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REAIOMRY DF OORT
Map Based on Plaintiff's Exhibit 22, Showing Jamestown and
Adjacent Areas; the Refinery Use. District: the Location of
Petitioners’ Homes; and the Distances Involved.
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Suprenwee Court-af the United Stair:
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On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United Star
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Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
APPENDICES TO PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
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INDEX TO APPENDICES
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Appendix Demon-frable Factual Errors in the Court
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Apuvenelin EO The Rhode [land duaw of Nui-aness ASY
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APPENDIX A
OPINIONS BELOW
(1) Opinion of the District Court
DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNIPED STATES:
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RITODEE ISLAND
| Civil Action No, 2118
Comareck Oi Rerixine CorponStion, Plaintiff
v,
Winniam W. Miser, ef Ab, Dy pendants
OPINION
January 5, 1909
Day, District Judge. This i+ an action Wherein the plain-
it seeks damages and injunctive relief against the defemd..
ants. Jurisdiction of this Court i~ based on diversity of
citizenship and the existence of awontroversy in the requ
site amount, .
Plaintiff’s complaint contains two counts. In the first
count plaintiff alleges in substance that on or about Sep:
tember 27, 1956. a license to engage in the refinipg, mann-
facturing and processing, of petrolenm prodiets Was issued
to it by the Town Council of the Town of Jamestown in
accordance with the provisions of Chapter 50 of the ordi-
nanees of said Jamestown, and that it paid a fee of £5,000
for said license; that refinery operations are a permis: ive
use"in a refinery use distriet in said town: that under the
onlinanees of said Jamestown, the laws of the ‘State of
Rhode Island and of the United States, plaintiff has a right
to construet and operate a plant for the purpose of; con-
- dueting refinery operations and intends to constfnet and
operate cueh ao refinery forthwith in such a refinery use
d’striet in said Jamestown s that the defendants have un
7
A2
lawfully combined and eonspired to harass, delay an
prevent plaintiff from exereising its right to construe
and operate said refinery in said Jamestown: that pursnant
to said unlawfnl combination and eons piracy to deprive
plaintitf of its said right the defendants have ilacert i and
maliciously resorted to the use of unlawful means, inelued
ing certain overt acts, which are alleged therein; that it is
informed and believes and alleges. on information and
belief that the defendants in furtherance of said unlawful -
combination and conspiracy intend to perform further acts
to harass; delay and prevent it from eonstrueting and Oper
ating said refinery,.and that it has been damaged in the
sum of $500,000. In this count, plaintiff demands that the
defendants be enjoined during + pendeney of this action
and permanently ‘from unlawfully combining and ean.
“pining against the plaintiff! and from taking any action
Lesisenied to harass, delay or prevent plaintiff from exercis
ge its sand rights ete’? and that it have judement agains!
the defendants and each of them-in the sum of & Sp00,009, the
costs of this action and exemplary or punitive d: images.
The second count alleges a cause of action arising under
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 15 ULS.CLA. v, 1-7, 15. with
Jurisdietion of this ee hased on the provisions of the
Clayton Act, 16 US.CLAL $12 et seq.; repeats the allega-
tions with respect to ae license, ete. contained in the firs:
count? ‘seeks similar injunctive relief as that demanded
therein, and judgment against the defendants and eac hoo!
them int the sum -of $1,500,000, reasonable attorneys’ foes
and costs, a
Oefendants in-their answers asserf that the license upon
Which the plaintit? relies is invalid, that the amendment te
the zoning ordinance of Jaiaestown creating a refinery use
district is invalid, and that the amendment to the building
ordinance whereby plaintiff was exeused from compliance
therewith is invalid. In addition, they filed eounterelainy
wherein the ‘Y allege the invalidity of said license, the invalid
ity of said amendment to said zoning ordinance, and of said
AB
amendment to the building ordinance. They also allege
therein that the value of the real estate owne “by them will
lw substantially reduced and destroyed, and that said real
estate will be rendered unfit and uncomfortable for its
enjoyment by the ereetion and operation of said. refine TY,
aul that said refinery will eo institute a continuing puisanee
to them,
In their countere ‘i tits the le ‘Tendants seek a deel: ratory
judgiment thi at said Neense and said ame ‘mdlments are yoid:
an} temporary and permanent iIMjuNCtions enjoining the:
plaintu® from taking any further action og doing any act
purported to be authorized under said license and said
amendments; and such other or further relief as may he
required by equity and good conscience,
Plaintiff in its reply to the counter claims denies that
said license and amendments are invalid. and further by
way of defense to said éounmterclaims alleges that the de-
fendants have been guilty of such laches as should jn e. quity
har them from maintaining said counterclaims because the
plaintiff ‘tin redianee on the atidity of said ordinances
wiul said Teense’* and og defendants’ failure to br: ng any
leval or equitable proceedings to challenge the’ validity
thereof - has taken certain steps, ineluding the acquisition
of lands, the expenditures ef large sums of mone ¥. ete.
Subsequent to the filing of it. rep dy, the plaintiff? moved
for the entry of a sumim: iry judgment in if< faver dismiss
ine said connterelaimes. This inmotion was denied by me on
Mebruary 7, — See Commerce Oil Refining Corpora
tion v. Miner, 22 F.LR.D. 5. a
When this ease was reached ‘for trial. plaintift an
yoinced in open court-that it did not intend to offer any
tN denee in support of its clan of an illegal conspiracy hy:
the defendants aaainst it. and upon motion by the defend
auts its complaint was dismissed with prejudice. The trial
then proceeded on the defendants’ countere laims,
The trial, which lasted for more than forty days. pro.
duced a ree ord of nearly 6,000 paige and ” great many ex
Ad
hibits. Npart from the presentation of detailed testimony
as to the cireumstances attendant upon the adoption of said
amendments to the zoning and building ordinances and the
adoption of an ordinance and the isswance to the plaintit?
of a lieonse thereunder, many days of the trial were devoted
to the presentation of testimony by expert withesses on the
question of whether the operation of the refinery as planned
will constitute a nuisance to the defendants.
The issues developed by the pleadings and the evidence
are (1) the validity of said amendments to the zonjng and
buildinig ordinances, (2) the validity ef the Heense granted
to the plaintiff amd (3) whether the operation of said
refinery at the location specified and in the manner pro
posed by the plaintiff will constitute a nuisance to the
defendants or any of them. ‘
Plaintit? contends that the defendants have no standing
to attack the validity of amendments to tht zoning and
building ordinances or the validity of the leense «or, the
ordinance pursuant to whieh it,was granted. In my opinien
this contention is without merit, Ptis well settled in Rhode
Island that if a party ean show that an amendment te a
zoning ordinance is ifegal and that the value of his prop
erty is injured or substantially threatened with injury by
its enforeement, he is entitled to relief in equity with respect
to such. iHegal amendment. “In Rhode T<land Home Build
ers’v. Hunt. 1948, T4-R. 1. 255, the Supreme Court said at
page Joo: : 5
0 When hi rights are injured or substantial!
threatened with mgyney by the enforcement of the a!
leved Hlegal amendment to the zoning ordinanee and
be is:dble to establiv’ the illegality of such amendment,
he hos ample remedy through ordinary proceedings
iT eqeety.
That the same rule applies in Rhode !sland to the:amend
ment to the building ordinance and license aspects of thi-
ease is impheit in the decisson of the Supreme Court ot
Ad
Rhode Island in Order of St. Benedict in bag tenn
Town Council of Portsmouth, 1956, R. 1. 12004. 2d 829. In
that case the petitioner applie i for hassles to review and
quash the action of the -respcudents in granting a ‘building
permit to erect and a lieense to operate an oil refinery to
the plaintiff in this action. The Supreme Court in refusing:
to grant the relief sought pointed ont that at common law
the issuance of a writ of certiorari rested im the diseretion
of the Court, and held that in the exereise of that discre-
tron it would not issue the writ becarse of the pendency of
other proceedings in equity instituted by the petitioner to
secure relief from the grievances alleged in the petition for
certiorari. ;
Similarly, the federal courts have long adhered to the
doctrine that private persons may attack the validity of
municipal ordinances in equity proceedings when ordinary:
remedies do not atford full protection against the threat
‘of substantial harm. General Electric Ry. Co. v. Chieago,
L& L. Ry. Co., 1900, 7 Cir. 9S FL 907, aff'd. on rehearing,
17 F. 771; Seattle Gas & KE. -trie Co. y. Citizens Light &
Power Co., 1903, C.C. Washes, 123 F. 58s
In this cas’ the defendants have produced ample evidence:
that their rights are substantially ia d with injury by
the continned enforcement of said amendments to the zon-
ing and building ordinanees, and the ordinance under which
said license Was eranted. Under the laws of Rhode Ish: ined
the defendants thus have sanding presently to attaek the'r
Valndity in this Court. 3
’
I
Vaniprry oF THE, AMENDMENTS To THE ZONING
: ; axp Beanpise Orpi~asxces
The original soning ordinanee of the Town of James:
Town Which the ‘Pown Couneih purported to amend by the
ereation af said refinery se distriet on September 2G. 1906
Was adopted Oni \ugust ro | Mae The ey ilenee establishes
and plaintiff concedes that due nofice af the hearing on its
A6 :
proposed adoption was not viven prior thereto as require:
by the.state enabling act authorizing cities and towns to
adopt zoning ordinances. As a consequence thereof th:
zoning ordinance was invalid and void on September 27,
1956 when the Town Council purported to enact the amend.
ment thereto creating the so-called refinery use district
R. 1. Home Builders, Ine. ve Budlone Rose Co. 4950, 77
R.1.147. Since it was void, the amendment thereto is like
Wise void unless it can be said to be complete and perfee:
in and of itself. Lassiter v. Atlantic ( itv, 1914, 86 NUE.
87, 90 A. 675; City of Chieazo vy. MeKinley, 1981, 3440 11.
297, 170 N. EB. 261: Board of Com'rs. re City of Newark v..
Grodecki, 1943, 21. N. J. Mise. 241, 38 A. 240115: ef. City of -
LaCrosse vy. Elbertson, 1931, 205 Was. 207, 237 NW. 99, It
is obvious that the amendment was not intended as an orig
inal zoning ordinance independtnt of and apart from =
which it purported to amend, and if it were so intended,
must be deemed to be void and of no etfeet beeause as he
record establishes it was not, prior to its enaetment, ap
proved by a financial town meeting of seid Town of James.
town, as required hy See, 1 of Chapter 342 of the General
Laws of Rhode Island, Revision of T9388. Cf. Ro 1. Heme
Builders, Ine. v. Budlony: Rose Co., supra.
Prior to its amendment, the building ordinance of said
Town, Chapter NLTV, contained among other provisions.
the following:
“Section 3. Every person intending to build, eon
struét, reeonstrnet or alter any building strneture or
foundation, including temporary struetures, platform.
‘or stands for assembly purposes, shall before com.
meneing the same, file with the Inspector of Building:
an applieation for a building permit on a form pro:
vided therefor, shall pay a fee therefor at the rate of
£1.00 for each S1O00 of estimate “lLeost of the strneture
and shall at any time, if required by the [nispeetor of >
P idings or Board of Appeal. tiles the plans, speeit!
* sons and details or other full and aceurate deserip
AG
tion of the intended building, construetion or recor
struction or alteration. This shall be in addition to
such permits as may beorequired by the laws of Rhode
Island for specific classes of buildine.”*
Said amendment, adopted September 27, 1950, contains the
following provisions:
“Sertivon 48. The provisions of this ordinance, Chay
ter ALIV, shall not apply to buildings, structures,
foundations, storage tanks, vessels, or any other facility
constructed, to be constructed or altered, designed or
used for the refining of petroleum or the manufaeture,
process or storage in bulk or commercially of gasefine,
gas, crude petroleum, gasoline, kerosene, heating fuels,
lubricating oils and greases, or of allied petroleum:
products or substances derived from the refining of
petroleum.”’
The effect of said amendment is te exempt all buildings,
structures and other facilities used for the cefining of petre-
leumand allied products from tle provisions of the build-
ing ordinanee of said Town. Authority toenaet sad butled
ing ordinance and any amendment thereto was conferred
upen said Town by the provisions of section 52 of Chapter
033 of thegliencral Laws of Rhode Istand. Revision of TIS,
which in gart provided as follows: 2
See. 52. Town and city councils and the representa-
tive eouneil of the City of Newport may feem time to
time make and ordain all ordinanees and regulations
for their respective towns and cities, net repugnant to
law, as they may deem necessary. regulating the man-
ner of constructing and CoM TPP of all buildings and
other structures within sald town er city which may be
ereeted, altered or repaired after the passaste of such
ordinanee ..
AS
Defendants contend that this statute only authorized the *
Town by ordinance to regulate thé manner of constructing
and equipping all buildings and other strictures within
said town, and did not authorize it to regulate the manner
of constructing and equipping some buildings and.to exempt
others from all regulation. Plaintiff. on the other han],
claims that said statute permits but does not require the
regulation of the manner of construeting and equipping of
all buildings and structures‘ in the event a municipality
elects to enact a building ‘ordinance pursuant thereto, and
that reasonable classification and exemption from building
regulations are not prohibited thereby. Assuming but with-
out deciding that plaintiff's interpretation of said statute
is vorrect, the speeifie exemption from said ordinance pro-
vided by said amendment is in itself a regulation within
the meaning of said statute. To be valid the regulations
and ordinances of a municipality ‘‘must find their justifica-
tion in some ‘aspect of the police’ power, asserted for the
public weltare.”’? Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,.
1926, 272 U. S. 365, 387. They must bear a rational and
substantial relation to the health and safety of the eom-
munity. Doherty v. Town Council of South Kingstown,
1938, 61 R. 1. 248; Robinson v. Town Counei!l of Narra-
_gansett, 1938, 60 K. 1. 422; Standard Oil Company of New
Jersey Y. City of Charlottesville, 1930, 4 Cir., 42 F. 2d 8s;
5 MeQuitlin, Municipal Corporations (3rd ed.) § 19.14.
It is'a matter of common knowledge that an oil refinery
is a potential source of danger from fire and explosion
unless properly constructed. And it is similarly a nratter
of common knowlelge that such danger from fire and explo-
ston can be substantially lessened if not entirely eliminated
by the imposition of proper restrictions and safeguards
relating to its construction.
The record in this case is completely devoid of any: evi-
dence which could possibly support a’ finding that said
amendment to the building ordinance is conducive to the
conservation of the public health, safety or welfare of said
AY
Town. In my opinion it cannot be.sustajned as being within
the lawful exercise of the police power of the municipality,
and is accordingly invalid.
II
Vauipiry oF THE LjCENSE
Plaintiff's license was granted pursyant to Chapter 50
of the ordinances of said Town of Jamestown whith was
also enacted on September 27, 1956, at the same meeting of
the Town Council when the amendment to the building
ordinance hereinbefore discuss¢ «dl was adopted by that body.
It was enacted pursuant to ‘the provisions of section 21 of
Chapter 333 of the Generai Laws of Rhode Island, Revision *
of 1938, which provides as follows:
‘See. 21, Town councils and city councils may from
time to time make and ordain all ordinances and regu-
lations for their respective towns, not repaynant to
law, which they deem necessary for the safety of their
inhabitants from the m: inufacture, processing, stor-
age, keeping, having in possession, sale or use of...
crude petroleum, gasoline, kerosene, heating fuels,
lubricating oils and greases,-allied petroleum products,
and any and all other explosives, explosive chemicals’
and inflammable substances, and may prohibit the
manufacture, storage, keeping, having in possession,
transportation, sale or use by any and all person ‘or
persons of any 9r all said substances “and gases in their
respective tow.s, unless a license for the same shall be
first obtained ty rom the town council or board of alder-
men, which license shall he henceforth effective unless
revoked for good and sufficient cause by order of said
town council or board of aldermen .. .”’
Section 1 of said Chapter 50 is. as follows:
‘Section 1. No person, firm or corporation shall, from
and after the passage of this ordinance, engage in the
Al0 :
refining, manufacturing or processing of crude petro-
leum, petroleum products or substances derived there
from in connection with such ‘refining, manufaeturing
or processing of crude petroleum, petroleum products
or substances derived therefrom within the Town un-
less a license for the same shall be first obtained from
the Town ‘Council.’* :
Section 2 thereof sets forth the information which must.
be furnished by an applicant for a license but includes a
provision that the Town Council may at any time upon
such terms and conditions, as it may deem advisable waive
‘the filing of any of the foregoing requirements’’. Section
3 prevides that the Town Council may consider and take
such action on any application for a licénse under said ordi-
nance as it ‘‘may deem proper with due consideration for
the safety of the inhabitants of the Town of Jamestown"
Section 5 of said ordinance provides that no licensee shall!
engage in the refining, ete. of crude pe ‘troleum exeept upon
certain conditions therein set forth in sub-seetions 5(a) ta
d(h) inelusive. Most, if not all, of these sub-stctions incor-
porate by reference standards promulg rated by ‘certain na-
tional organizations. ,
Sub-section 5(a) provides that all faéilities used for refin-
ing, ete, shall be constructed, installed, ete.’so as to conform
at all times with#he ‘Standards of the National Board of
Fire Underwriters for the Storage, Handling and Use of
Flammable Liquids as Recommended by the National Fire
Protection Association’’. Sub-seetion 5(b) provides that
all pressure vessels, ased for refining, ete. shall be con:
structed, installed, ete. so as ‘to conform at all times with
the standards set forth in the American Petrolewm Insti
tute-—American Seciety of Mechanical Eagineers ‘Code for
Unfired Pressure Vessels for Petroleum Liquids and Gases’
(1992) or ‘Rules for Constrnuetion of Untired: Pressure Ves
sels, Section VITT,; ASME Boiler Construction Code’ (1950),
of the American Society of Mechanical Enginers. Sub-sec
All
tion 3(¢) provides that all heat exchangers shall be con-
structed, installed, ete. so as to conform at all times with
the standards set forth in the American Petroleum Institute
—American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code for+Un-
fired Pressure Vessels for Petroleum Liquids and Gases’
(1992) and the standards of the Tubular Exchanger Manu-
facturers Association, Class R. Sub-section d(d) provides
that all piping systems shall he constructed, installed,: ete.
so as to’conform at all times to the applicable portions of
the ‘American Standard Code for Pressure Piping’, (ASA.
*B31.1—1951), and sub-section 5; e) provides that all eleetri-
cal equipment shall be constructed, iustalled, ete. so as te
conform to the standards of the National Electrical Code.
Sub-seetion (f) requires that all premises used in the refin-
ing, ete. of erude pet roleum shall be surrounded by.a fence
of noncombustible materials of a minimum height with "6
suficient number of gates to provide adequate aceess for fire
extinguishing purposes", and sub-sections (a) and (h)
contain requirements for the installation of a foam-fire
protection system and first aid fire control equipment. ae-
cording to certain standards incorporated by reference
therein. .
The parties agree that said ordinance was adopted with-
out a public hearing on the question of its enactment and
without notice of sueh hearing by publication in a news-
patper as provided rn said section a2 of Chapter 333 which
anthorizes town and city councils to make and ordain ordi.
mances regulating the manner of constructing and equip.
ping of all buildings and structures in their respective towns
amd cities, This section provides in part as follows:
6620) -
- . ..*®
No such ordinance shat! he enacted. amended or re
pealed until after a public hearing has been held upen
fhe question of the enactment, amendment or repeal of
such ordinante, before sal town, vite or representa
hive couneil, which conneil shall first give notice of sneh
Neary by. publication in a new spuiper printed in sail
Al2
town or city, if any, and, if none, then in a newspaper
published in the county in which said city or town is
located ...”’
Defendants contend that said Chapter 50 is invalid be-
cause (1) the standards incorporated by reference therein
were not in fact known to the Town Couneil, (2) it is in
reality a building ordinance and was not enacted after a
public hearing of which notice was given by publication in
’ a newspaper as provided in said section 52 of Chapter 333.
ofthe General Laws of Rhode Island, Revision of 1938, (3)
the provisions contained therein for an appeal from actions
of the Town Council thereunder are invalid and (4) it lacks
definite standards for the grant of licenses thereunder.
In my opinion it is unnecessary for me to consider all of
the aforesaid contentions. Although counsel for the parties
hereto during the trial and in their respective briefs have
consistently referred to said Chapter 50 as ‘*the licensing
ordinance’’, it is entitled ‘An Ora.nance Authorized By
Section 21 of Chapter 333 of the General Laws of Rhode
Island (1938) As Amended, Providing For The Safety Of-
The Inhabitants Of The Town Of Jamestown From The Re-
fining, Manufacturing Or Processing Of Crude Petrolewn,
Petroleum Products Or Substances Derived Therefrom, Or
The Storage Or Handling Of Crude Petroleum, Pétroleun
Produets Or Substances Derived Therefrom In Connection
With Such Refining, Manufacturing Or Processing Of Crude
Petroleum, Petroleum Products Or Substances Derived
Therefrom’’. st
» While it is true that legislative intent is to be found pri
‘marily in the language of an ordinance, yet that languae
is to be canstrued in the light of the faets and circum.
stances attendant upon the passage of such ordinance, Cf.
Blais v. Franklin, 1910, 31 R. 1.95. It must be remembered
that said Chapter 50%was enacted at the same meeting at
which said amendment to the building ordinance wa-
adopted, This is an important cireumstanee to be consid
Al3
ered in determining the intent of the Town Council in enact-
ing said Chapter 50. -Doherty v. Town Council of South
Kingstown, supra.
1 am unwilling to believe that the Town Council when it
adopted said amendment to the building ordinance intended
that there would be no regulations or restrictions of any
sort on the manner of constructing ‘and equipping the pro
posed refinery. On the contrary, a study of the provisions
of said Chapter 50 and of the codes incorporated by refer-
ence therein satisfies me that the ‘Town Council intended
thereby to regulate its construction and equipment. In my
judgment those sub-sections are for the’ most part building
regulations within the purview of said seet¥on 52 of Chap-
ter 333. _ .
Tt is the well-settled rule that cities and towns have no
powers to enact, ordinances except those powers from time
to time delegated to them by. the legislature. And it is a
fundamental rule of construction that such powers, being
delegated, should be strictly construed. In re Opinion to
the House of Representatives, 1939, 62 R. I. 347; Heeney
v. Sprague, 1877, 11 R. I. 456.
The only authority vested in the cities and towns of this
state to enact building ordinances is that conferred upon
them by said Section 52. Its provisions clearly preempt the
field; and when such authority is conferred it may only be
exercised in strict conformity with the terms of the grant.
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. City of Char-
lottesville, supra; ef. R. I. Home Builders, Ine. v. Budlong
Rose Co., supra, Absent such compliance, it foltows that
the provisions of said sub-seetions 5(a) to 5(h), inclusive,
insofar as they are building resulations are null and void.
The question then arises--whaft is the effeet of their in-
validity? Chapter 50 contains a *‘severability clanse’’,-so-
valled, which in essence provides that if any provision or
provisions thereof shall be declared invalid, this determi
nation shall in no wise affect the yalidity of its remaining
provisions. - But such a clause is not decisive of the effect
Alf
of the invalidity of a portion or portions of an ordinance -
upon its remaining portions. The rule is well stated in
Heubeck v. City of Baltimore, 1954, 205 Md. 303, 107°A. 2d
99 at 103-104, where the Court held:
‘*... regardless of such a clause, an act must fail en-
-tirely if the effect of declaring a portion of it invalid
would render the remainder incapable of effecting the
purpose for which the act was enacted.’’
To the same effect, see The Narragansett Indians, 1898,
20 R. 1. 715; State v. Tonks, 1886, 15 R. 1. 385; F.T.B. Cor-
poration v. Goodman, 1949, 300 N. Y. 140, 89 N. E. 2d 865.
It is manifestly clear that the Town Cquneil by the enact-
ment of the sub-sections 5(a) to 5(h), inclusive, intended
to control the manner of constructing and equipping of ©
the refinery as well as its manner of operation. Since the
provisions of said sub-sections which I have found to be
null and void are so interwoven with ‘the remaining provi-
sions thereof that they cannot be separated, it follows that
section 5 must fail in its entirety. The-inv alidity of said
section 5 compels me to conclude that the whole of Chapter
50 must likewise fail, because the intention of the Town
Council will not be served by the remaining portions of said
chapter which, if given effect; would leave the construction,
“equipping and operation of the proposed refinery without
effective control or regulation by the Town Council. It
follows that the lieense issued pursuant therete is also
invalid. .
Ill
Tre Issur or ANTICIPATED NUISANCE
The determination of whether. the erection and opera
tion of the proposed refinery will constitute a continuing
nuisance to the defendants must be determined by resert
to Rhode Island law.
‘In Blomen v. N. Barstow Co., 1913, 35 Bo. 198, 200-210,
the Supreme Court @f Rhode Island quoted with appreval
Alo
the rule laid down in Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568
at page 576:
-***As to what is a reasonable use of one's own prop-
erty cannot be ‘defined by any certain general rules,
but must depend upon the cireunistances of each case.
A use of property in one locality, and under some eir-
stances, may be lawful and reasonable, which, under
other circumstances, would be unlawful, unreasonable,
and a’nuisance. To constitute a nuisance, the use must
be such as to produce a tangible and appreciable
injury to neighboring property, or such as to render
its enjoyment specially uneomfortable or ineonven-
ient’ ’’.
And in determining whether a particular use is a nui-
sance, the location thereof is an important consideration.
In Kennedy v. Frechette, 1924, 45 R. 1. 399, 405-406, the
Supreme Court said:
‘*The location is always an important consideration
in the determination of the existence of a nuisance. It
is clear that the location is not a manufacturing one.
... 1s the use of the property in the particular ation
reasonable or unreasonable, considering not only the
rights of the owner, but also those of his neighbor. If
such-use causes a substantial diminution either in the
value of adjacent property, or in the enjoyment thereof
as measured by the degree of comfort which the aver-
age man living in such a neighborhood has a right to
expect, it may properly be held to be unreasonable and
henee a nuisance.”*
To the same effect, see Aldrich v. Howard, 1865, 8 R. 1. 246:
Strachen v. Beacon Oil Co. 1925, 251 Mass. 479, 146 N. E.
787; Dahl v. Utah Oil Retining Co. 1927, 71 Utah 1, 262
P. 3h. ;
Defendants seek a permanent injunetion against the pro-—
pesed ereetion and operation of said refinery as an antici.
Al6 os
pated nuisance: To entitle them to that relief under the
law of Rhode Island, the evidence must show clearly and
convincingly that substantial diminution in. the values of
their properties or in the enjoyment thereof will be prac-
_tically certain to result, from the erection of the refinery or
from its operation. In Otto Seidner, Inc. v. Ralston Purina
Co., 1942, 67 R. I. 436, where plaintiff, the owner of a busi-
ness, sought an injunction to prevent the defendant from
erecting and operating a coal pocket in an industrial dis-
trict on the ground that the préposed erection and opera-
tion of said coal pocket would constitute a nuisance fo the.
plaintiff, the Supreme Court held at page 452:
‘*We are of the opinion that to justify an injunction,
in a cause of the character of the instant one, the evi-
dence must show clearly and convincingly that substan-
tial damage to the complainant’s property or business
will be practically certain to result from the operation
by the respondent of the business. against which an
injunction is sought.’’
The Town of Jamestown is an island situated in Narra-
gansett Bay within the State of Rhode Island. Its area is
approximately 9.3 square miles. It is primarily a residen-
tial, resort and farming area. At the present time, no
industries of any sort are located thereon and there are
only relatively few business enterprises, such as_ retail
shops, stores, gasoline filling stations and hotels. It enjoys
considerable popularity asa resort area during the summer.
The refinery district, so-called, irregular in shape, extends ,
completely across the northerly portion of the island. The .
area of this district in which plaintiff proposes to ereet its
refinery is 814.72 acres, of which 604.72 are owned by plain-
tiff and the remainder by other persons, including the de-
fendants Florence E. B. Wright, George F. Wright, Louis
F. Wright, Virginia ( Wright. Henry EB. Wright. Rita
Wright, George FE. Wright and Yirginia W. Wright, who
have homes on their lands. At the time of the trial of this
+
Al7
ease there were sixteen (16) dwelling houses in said dis-
trict, one having been destroyed by fire since September 27, °
1956. The remainder of the land therein is vacant. While
a small portion of it is swampy and overgrown with scrub,
most of said land is cleared and dry. Eighty-five per cent
of it was described in the testimony as good farm land, suit-
able for farming or home sites. South of said district and
about two miles therefrom are at least one hundred forty-
three homes in the .Jamestown Shores development, so-
ealled, and to the north and within about one and one-half
‘miles therefrom there are seventy-one “homes, a summer
hotel and a camp comprising eleven or twelve buildings.
The evidence establishes that the prevailing winds on the
island arp from the southwest and from the northwest.
Wind velocities during at least a third of the year range
from calm to fourteen miles per hour and fogs of varying
dluration enveloping the fsland oceur with relative fre-
queney,
The defendant William W. Miner owns and resides on
residential property which abuts upon the easterly end of
said district. The remaining defendants are the owners
and oeeupants of residential properties situated at points
approximately two-thirds of a mile to four. miles away.
from said district. The properties of the defendants Ter-
range MeGaughan and Burgess Lunsford are located to
the north of said district, and the properties of the remain-
ing defendants to the south and southeast of said district.
The homes owned by the defetidants rangé in value from
+4.000 to $50,000). Most of them, if not all, are substan-
tially constructed, well maintained and attractively land-
scaped, A
During the trial the plaintiff produced upof the demand
of the defendants what it termed the design plans of the
proposed refinery. From the testimony presented by the
mlamtiff at the close of the defendants’ evidence, it would
appear that substantial changes in these plans had been
eMected by the plaintiff sinee the opening of the trial, in
Ats
~weder ta meet aome of the vritieism wae rey mide SY Le
defendanta. , [2 these +h, ores parpertel to Seve Owen male
have in fart heen made, ther world serve to eum may or
tigate to aome degreé some of the sonrees of the nuisance
which the defendants claim are «ertain to resait from cay
Operation of the proposed retin ery: For the parpese of tuy
derision, I shall assame phat these changes | have deen made.
anit: de na pite these assumed modifications. the evidence esta>
lixhes that the proposed refinery will comprise, among other
strnetares, at least fifteen stacks ranging from tweltty to
‘tus hundred feet in height which will contain many thou
-and« of feet of piping, countless joints and connections,
nearly one hundred anfired pressure Vessels of varying stZes
-and constructions, approximately four. hundred pumps.’
thousands of seals and compressors, tanks, heat exchang-
ers, and like equipment.
According to the evidence plaintiff will refine forty-three
thousand (45 000) barrels of Kuwait ecrude-oil each day in
its refinery, slightly less than the total daily capacity of
all the oil refineries in New England at the present time.
Kuwait crude oil is : sour crude oil having a sulfur content
of approximately 2.50. The refinery wili be operated
twenty four hours per day, seven days a week throughout
the year, with brief shut-downs once a year, for mainte
nance and repair purposes. The products to be produced
are high oetane gasoline, liquified petroleum gas (1. PQ),
and heating fuel‘oils. By-products to be produced will be
petroleum coke and elemental sulfur.
Three types of processes will be used to convert the crude
oil into gasoline, LPG and heating oils. The first of these
ix distillation, wherein the ernde oii is heated at very high
temperatures and gas, gasoline, and a variety-of oils are
sequrrately boiled off at different temperatures and collected
for further processing. This process, distillation, will occur
inthe erndecand vacuum units of the refinery. A seconel
proeess Wherehy gas, gasoline and heating oils are also
produced will take place in the fluid catalytic cracking uni!
R this ’ Cus'sss the CUP eW REL AT sirinctire wf BS Swe Ciaete vee fs
: ¢
, > rr A < fi - *
OL pp radnuecd PRR ESTATE Rtas tS g Attia te Ben
changed Dv the a
2 M . | °
pplication: of heads, pressure atid a cdtaine!
,
“ae
ay . , P . . .
WN the resial hart the “SATAY Brrewties wl oval are.
. — - bal aug lh? . S, bl nts O0d Panes F . . ri
hares sed UTP Swi y ttholestiiaes of acts, Kaw tet ati
.
heating orl ln the third provess, stttaller: @tralowutles of
aas resulting from earher Processes: are eteeterscally cquens
Vertied by heat te PES atte ealaly sts utttar tevay ret teeaelys
enles of gasoline im the alkyl afoot ata pols gtrotisatoon enn fs
Tn the various stages of the above. processes large pitas
httes of hydrogen sulfide aresproduced. Planer prt arpicrvers
te volleet this hv drogen sultide and to eee of amie ete
ental sulfur, a salable by es eae Uv drogen sultide tha
particularly matodoronus sas deseribed as heavitus an odor
Ike rotten ewes atid us be ime ale ‘Teefable ins ery Low concen
trations. Lt is highly texte amd in sutlierent comeentt ations
injurious to health. Another ones itable preavdinet of the tefin
Ing processes is the produetion of a eroupof cascous hve
cecarbons Known as mercaptans “Those are Dhewise pattie
ularly obnexious and are detectable by smell one Vtretnely
low concentrations Vhevrntit? Prbeoprrsen fare ‘olleet atl bean
them in an incinerator and there ‘by prevent therm gaeape te
the atmosphere An additional waste proctiet similarly
resaadting of nec essity from fhe re Hitt prtewessen os silts
dioxide (SQ). Ht as undisputed that the volume of Se
Which will be discharyed inte the attnosphere from the
stacks of the refinery will depene upon the eMiereney of ats
~ulfur reeovery unit net pom the solfiar coment of the tial
ol burned ins the relinery ter sanpepely Drevet Peet ates v centers
process units. tg.
While the proposed relwmers as se destemed! that fuel oul
having a sulfur content an execs of Pome anid ome dal
(Hh) per eemt aay he heenesd an the heater Wi polinsnetll
clatnis that it does not aitened te nse Paved cols Des atne ae sultans
conten? ime \ereess oh twee rened fete haath art ‘po peen een tt
mists thet ot wall ae only bel corh cob titet Pinmerteed colbers
COnTOHL recapeldes of ther cent laned eds sohianonn > Des cad De-tet copes
A20—
of its witnesses any intention of using the residuals from its
erudé vacuum unit to supply heat, although the design of the
refinery. Would permit of such use. Much testimony of a
conflicting nature as to the economies of such a practice and
the likelihood of its being followed by the plaintiff was
produced at the trial. However, giving full‘eredence to the
plaintiff’s proposed: intention in- this regard and. assuming
that the sulfur recovery unit will operate at all times to its
maximum efficiency, it is clear that the minimal quantity of
SO, to‘lie discharged each day into the atmosphere will be
thirty-seven tons. SO, is a gas having a disagreeable,
suffocating. odor like that of burned sulfur matches. It is
detectable in a concentration of 2.5 parts per million of the
atmosphere, and in concentrations of more than five parts
per million has an irritating effect upon the nose, throat and
eves. The extent of its irritant effect depends upon the
length of one’s exposure thereto. If the exposure be for
only a few seconds, its effect may be only to produce tears.
If exposure be prolonged, engorgement of the blood vessels
of the eyes and irritation of the nose and throat result. In
persons suffering from respiratory ailments or heart dis-
eases its effect is to aggravate such ailments and diseases
and produce added discomfort.
_ When conrbinec with water or moisture i in the atmosphere,
SO. becomes converted inte sulphurous acid which in turn
may be converted into sulphuric acid. These. acids are
highly corrosive to iron and steel and are destructive of
plant life.
The crude oil to be refined will he brought by tankers .
‘from the Middle East to Jamestown. Plaintiff proposes to —
eonstruct a landing deck off the east shore of the island
from which the oil will be pumped through pipes to the
crude storage area and then to the process units. The plans
or the proposed refinery would seem to indicate that the
erude oi] will be kept at all times in an enclosed system from
the time of its arrival throngh the completion of the refinin’
processes. For this reason plaintiff contends that it follow
re ‘ A2l
that none of the offensive and obnoxious odors incident to
and connected with the refining operations will escape into
the atinosphere, with the exception of SO..
The evidence further shows that the plaintiff will draw
large quantities of salt water from Narragansett Bay for
cooling certain refinery. units. The total amount so used
will be at least 100,800,000 gallons each day. After circulat-
--ing through the heat exchangers it will pass through a
cooling pond and will be discharged into the bay. In addi-
tion, process water used in the-refining processes and water
used to wash platforms, walks and other areas in the proc-
pssing units, amounting to more than 2,000,000 gallons
each week, after treatment to ‘remove’ certain hydrocarbon |
compounds with which it has beeome contaminated and after
passing through an oxidation pond will also be discharged
into the bay together With storm water accumulating in the
processing units and in the crude storage area.
Considerable testimony was also presented by the parties
as to the extent of the illumination of the refinery at night.
While the extent of this illumination was sharply disputed,
it fs obvious that the refinery will be illuminated to a degree
sufficient to. permit persons employed therein to perform
their work on the ladders, walks and platforms of the
refinery structures and in the areas surrounding them, with
efictency and safety. Likewise, there was a sharp dispute
is to the amount of smoke that would be discharged by
the refinery. °
Many days were devoted to the presentation of opinion
evidence as to the results that would ae company the opera.
tion of the refinery. For the expert witnesses, this trial
inmust have heen a dream realized.
Defendants contend that the evidence establishes that the
erection and operation of said refinery will constitute a
private nuisance to them against which they are entitled to
injunctive relief. In snpport of their claim they argue that
the evidence shows as certain sources of this nuisance the
following: (1) the flare on the refinery: (2) the elare from
a7
.
A22
the nocturnal illuinination of the refinery. struetures; (3)
dust emitted from the catalytic unit; (4) smoke emitted
from the stacks and process-heatérs; (5) pollution of the
waters of the bay by the discharge of waters used in the
refining processes and of waters from the storm water
system, and by virtue of spills and leaks in the loading and
unloading of tankers; (6) discharge of SQ, into the atmos-
phere; (7) the emission of hydrogen sulfide; (8) the emis-
sion of mereaptans; (9) the emission of general refinery
odors; and (10) injury to health.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that the defendants
‘failed to sustain the burden of proof imposed upon them in
order to entitle them to the relief which they seek. In addi-
tion, they argue that the sentiment of the Town of James-
town, as evidenced by the actions of the Town Council,
though invalid, and by the vote of the qualified electors of
said town in-favor of the erection of a modern oil refinery
is persuasive against the grant of any injunctive relief here.
In support of this argument plaintiff quotes certain lan-
zuage from the opinion in Futtle v. Chureh, 1892, C.C. R. 1,
53 F. 422. In my opinion, there is nothing in the holding in
that case which supports such an argument. Moreover, that
ease is obviously distinguishable from the instant. one.
Theré the plaintiff sought to enjoin the operation of a fac-
tory which was engaged in the making of fish oils and, ferti-
lizers, which had been in operation for more than thirty
years. In denying injunctive relief to the plaintiff the court
found that not only had the plaintitf been guilty of laches:
_ but that the defendant's plant caused only oeeasional offen-
sive odors during the summer nionths and that its operation
‘aused no serious damage to anyone. While the sentiment
‘of the Town of Jamestown, as evidenced by the actions of
the Town Council and by the vote of the electorate is a cir-
cumstance to be considerea here, it must be remembered
that they did not have the opportunity to consider and
evaluate the detailed testimony by experts in oil refining
that was presented during the protracted trial of this case.
A +)*)
To attempt to summarize the testimony of the numerous
expert witnesses caYed by the parties would serve no use-
ful purpose and would unduly prolong this opinion. While
defendants have cited many respects in which they claim the
proposed refinery will be a nuisance, entitling them to: in-
junctive relief, I do not believe it necessary to consider or
discuss all of them.
Here it is undisputed that obnoxious gases such as hvdrb-
xen sulfide'and mereaptans will be ‘produced in the retining
process. While the, plaintiff contends that there Will be no
‘escape of these gases and cites the.devices and procedures
it will employ to contain them, neither the record nor the
testimony of their experts sustains this contention. - The
most that can be said for said devices and procedures is
that they will be nearly completely effective under the most
ideal conditions. But having in mind the highly corrosive
qualities of Kuwait crude oit and the volume of erude oil
_to be processed each day, I am Satisfied that varying quanti-
ties of these obnoxious gases will find their way into the
atmosphere at all times when the refinery is in operation.
To assume that they will not be carried by the prevailing
winds beyond the relatively small area upon which a refin-
ery of the size contemplated is to he located would he far
from realistic. On the contrary, the credible testimony in
this ease establishes that said gases will be carried hy the
prevailing winds at all times to the properties af some of
the defendants, and, beeanse of their.extremely disagreeable |
odors in very low concentrations and their cumulative effect,
they will seriously diminish hoth the value of the defend-
ants’ lands as: residential properties and the enjoyment
thereof. The same observation may he made with respect
to the general refinery odor described in the testimony as
being an inevitable incident to refining operations. |
Insofar as SO, is ‘concerned, it is abtindantly-clear that
at least thirty-seven tons thereof will be discharged into
the atmosphere each day. It is undisputed that this mal-
odorous gas is detectable. by smell ina concentration of 2.5
3 Al4
parts per inillion and that in conventrations of more than
five parts per million it has an irritating effect of varying
degrees, depending upon the health of an individual and
the length of his exposure to it. In answer to a hypotheti-
cal question which included no recital of the volume of SO.
to be discharged from the stacks of the proposed refinery,
an expert witness for the phaintilf testified that the ground
concentration of SO, at a point-beyond the nearest property
line of the defendant Froberg would not exceed 0.4 parts
per’ million under the most unfavorable conditions, and
hence its presence would not be Rtectable on his property
or beyond it. Under eross-examination, however, this same
witness admitted that he could not determine sueh ground
concentrations without knowledge of the volume of SO.
that was being emitted by the stacks. His opinion as to
ground concentrations of SO. is in my judgment entitled to
no weight. The credible testimony satisfies me that, depend-
ing upon atmospheric conditions, wind velogities, and the
prevailing winds, as shown by the evidence of past annual
weather conditions on the Island of Jamestown, there will
be frequent concentrations of Les on the property of the
defendant Froberg in excess of 2.5 parts per million} ‘and
that it is reasonable to conclude that the properties of the
other defendants will be frequently visited with similar eon-
centrations carried to their premises by the prevailing
winds, and that these concentrations will serve to effect a
substantial diminution in the values of thei ‘ir properties and
in the enjoyment thereof.
The evidence establishes that the State of Rhode Island
has enacted legislation to prevent the pollution of public
waters and that the Division of Sanitary Engineering of the
Department of Health of said state has, pursuant to said
- legislation, promulgated regulations which prohibit the dis-
charge of effluents from oil refinerivs into the publie waters
of said state except pursuant to a license granted only after
the approval by said Division of the processes and methods
of discharge. The evidence further discloses that the
* AD»
plaintiff has applied for such a li¢ense and that its proposed
processes and methods, or at least some of them, appear to
be under consideration by that Division. Under the cireum-
stances, | am unwilling to assume that said Division will not
perform the duties imposed upon it by said legislation in a
competent. and conscientious manner and believe that |
should not now consider or pass upon that issue. See Inter-
state Milk Handlers v. Hoffman, 1955, 34 N. J. Stiper. 356,
12 A. 2d 574; Kahl v. Consolidated (ias, Electrie Light &
Power Co., D948, 141 Mad. 249, GOAL 2d TOF; ef, Willapoint
Oysters, Ine. v. Ewing, 1949, 9 Cir., 174 F. 2d 676, cert. den.
33% U.S. 360; Ellison v. Rayonier, Ine., 1957, D. C. Wash.,
156 FL Supp. 214.
The evidence in this case also establishes beyond doubt
that the area wherein plaintiff proposes to erect and operate
its refinery is entirely residential and agricultural. Defend.
ants’ homes are substantial, attractive and well maintained.
They afford their owners a degree of comfort and enjoy-
ment not to be found in urban or industrial communities.
The air of the loeality is ideal from the standpoint of the
absence of air pollution. They are not now located in a
manufacturing community where the air is inevitably im.
pregnated with disagreeable odors and impurities, features
that are the coneomitants of life in sueh a community.
Plaintit? now seeks to change the character of the area
Where defendants’ homes are located by the establishment
of its oil refinery therein. a ,
In determining whether the proposed refinery will be a
nuisanee to the. defendants against which they are entitled
to relief, the fact that it may be useful or may eontribute
to the economie welfare of Jamestown, is not determinative.
In Blomen v. N. Barstow Co., supra, the Supreme Court, in
rejecting respondent’s argument that the issuance of an
injunetion against the respondent wonld work a detriment
to the publie, at page 205 quoted with approval from Broad-
-hent v. Imperial Gas Co., 7 De G. M. & G. 436, aff’d. 7
H.L. Cas. 601, where the court stated: -
A226
“If it should turn out that the company had no right
so to manufacture gas as to damage the plaintiff’s
market garden, I have come to the cgnelusion that |
cannot enter into any question of how far it might be
convenient for the public that the gas manufacture
should go on... But unless the company had such a
right, | think the present is not a case in which this
court can go into the question of canvenience or incon-
venience, and say, Where a party is substantially dam-
aged, that he is only to be compensated by bringing an
action toties quoties. That would be a disgraceful
state of the law and T quite agree with the vice-chan-.
cellor in holding that in such a case this court must
issue an injunction, whatever may be the consequences
with regard to the lighting of the parishes and districts
which this company supplies with gas.”’
The plaintiff has not cited and I have been unable to find
any decision of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island which
in any way impairs the rule laid down in Blomen vy. N.
Barstow Co., supra: Certainly there ‘is nothing in the
opinion of Rose v. Socony Vacuum Corp., 1934, 54 R. 1. 411,
cited by the plaintiff, which may fairly be said to do so. The
desirability of improving the economic welfare of the Town
of Jamestown is beyond dispute. But that laudable objec-
tive is not to be attained by the erection and operation of the
proposed refinery on plaintiff’s lands if such use, consider-
ing not only the rights of the plaintiff but also those-of the
defendants, will be unreasonable and hence a nuisance. —
After a careful consideration of all the testimony and the
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, and recogniz-
ing the right of the plaintiff to make a reasonable use of its
lands, I am satisfied that the operation of said refinery in
the manner and at the location proposed by the plaintiff
-will eause a substantial diminution both in the values of
the defendants’ properties and in their enjoyment thereof
as measured:by the degree of comfort which the average
man living in such a locality has the right to expect. It
AQT:
follows that said use will be unreasonable and hence a
nuisance to the defendants against which they | are entitled
to injunetive relief. .
A judgmeat may be entered declaring that said license, -
said amendment to’said Chapter XXXV and said amend-
ment to said Chapter XLIV are null and void, and perma-
nently enjoining ‘the plaintiff from taking any further
action or doing any ,act purported to be authorized by said
license and said amendments and from operating said pro-
posed refinery in said Town of Jamestown.
(2) Opinion of the Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE First Circuit .
. No. 5475
CoMMERCE O1L Rerinino Corp., Plaintiff, Appellant
v.
> Wituiam W. Miser, ev a., Defendants, Appellees
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the District of Rhode Island
Before Woopsury, Chief Judge, and Hartican and ALpricn,
Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
June 16, 1960
Woopsury, Chief Judge. ‘Commerce Oil Refining Corpo-
ration, Commerce hereinafter, a.Delaware corporation, fied -
a complaint in two counts in the court below against seven-
A2s
-teen named defendants, all citizens of Rhode Island, as
individuals; and nine .of them as officers and directors of
the Jamestown Protective Association. Commerce alleged
_in its first count that it had,a license from the Town of
Jamestown to erect and operate an oil refinery in an area
of the town zoned for such use and that the defendants
‘unlawfully combined and conspired to harass, delay and
prevent plaintiff from exercising its right to construct and
operate’’ its refinery and that to effectuate their ‘‘unlawful
combination and conspiracy’’ the defendants ‘‘formed and -
used an organization designated as Jamestown Protective
Association as part of said unlawful combination and con-
spiracy.’’ On this count the plaintiff asked that the de-
fendants be enjoined from harassing the plaintiff by suit.
in the court below or in any Rhode Island court or by any
other means and for an award of damages against each
defendant in the amount of $500,000 plus costs and exem-
plary or punitive damages. In its second count, repeating
the allegations of count one, the plaintiff asserted a cause
of action under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, as amended,
15 U.S.C. $1 et seq." and asked for injunctive relief and
an award of freble damages against each defendant in the
amount of $1,500,000 plus costs aid a reasonable attorney's
fee.
The defendants, answered denying the basie allegations
of the complaint, including the validity of the plaintiff's
license, and counterclaimed alleging that the plaintiff's
refinery when constructed and put ‘into operation would
constitute a continuing nuisance causing them great. and
irreparable harm. Wherefore they asked that a local safety
ordinance regulating the construction of oil refineries and
the license issued to the plaintiff thereunder be declared
null and void. The counterclaim furfher prayed that the
amendment to the zoning ordinance of the Town of James.
town permitting the construction of oil refineries in a de-
1°26 Stat. 269, as amended.
AD
fined area’ of the town and also an amendment to the local
- building ordinanee. which exempted oil refineries from the
requirements of that ordinance be deelared null and ‘void
and thatthe plaintiff be enjoined tsom taking any action
or doing any act purporting to be authorized by its license
and the amendments. ;
After lengthy preliminary proceedings the éase came on
for trial before the court below sitting without a jury at.
the’ outset. of whieh counsel ‘or the plaintiff announced
that no evidence would be offered in support of its ¢laim
of an illegal conspiracy. On the defendants’ motion the
plaintiff's complaint was thereupon disanissed with preju-
diee and the trial proceeded on the defendants’ counter-
claim. More than forty days of trial produced a record
consisting of thousands of pages of testimony and hun-
dreds of exhibits a great deal of both being highly technical
innature. Asa result the court below concluded (1) that
the amendment of the town: zoning ordinance’ and the
safety ordinance and license issued pursuant thereto, were
invalfd because of the failure of the Town Council to
comply with the statutory procedural requirements for
enacting ordinances of the kind involved. (2) that the
amendment to the loeal building ordinance could not be
sustained as being within the lawful exercise of the police
power of the municipality and was therefore invalid, and
(3) that the plaintiff's proposed refinery when put into
ope ration would constitute a nuisanee. On the latter point —
it saith:
“After a careful consideration of all the testimony
and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom,
and recognizing the right of the plaintiff to make a.
reasonable use of its lands, T am satisfied that the
operation of said refinery in the manner and at the
location proposed by the plaintiff will cause a substan-
tial: diminution both in the values of the defendants’
properties and in their enjoyment thereof as ‘meas-
ured by the degree of comfort which the average man
A30
living in such a locality has the right to expect. It
follows that said use will be unreasonable and hence
a nuisance to the defendants against which they are
entitled to injunctive relief.’’
Commerce has taken this appeal from the judgment en-
tered hy the court below in conformity with its opinion
wherein it declared the Jamestown ordinances and _ the
plaintiff’s license invalid and, with costs to the appellees,
permanently enjoined Commerce from proceeding with the
erection of its refinery. ‘
In our view there was no occasion for the court helow,
and there is no oceasion for us, to pass upon the validity
of the local ordinances and hence of the. plaintiff’s license,
for it is the. generally accepted rule that ‘*. .. the validity.
or constitutionality of an ordinance is hot an issue before
a court, and the court need not pass upon it, ... where
the determination of it is Pe necessary to a proper dispo-
sition of the case...’ 6 MeQuillin, Municipal Corpora-
tions, § 20.10 (3d. ed. 1949)...
The plaintiff’s license was issued pursuant to a local
ordinance enacted by the Town Council under the authority
conferred by Section 21 of Chapter 333 of the General Laws
of Rhode Island, Revision of 1938, upon town and city
councilssto make and ordain all ordinances and regulations
for their towns or cities ‘‘which they deem necessary for
the safety of their inhabitants from the manufacture,
processing, storage, keeping, having in possession, sale.
or use of .. . crude petroleum, gasoline, kerosene, heating!
fuels, lubricating oils and greases, allied petroleum prod.
ucts, and any and all other explosives, explosive chemicals
ant inflammable substanees....’’ Obviously this enabling
act authorizes local regulation of the handling of the cy
sfances named therein in order to provide protection from 4
_ fire or gxplosion. There is nothing in it authorizing local
governments to regulate air pollution. Indeed, authority
for local regulation in that respect was conferred at the
A3l
*
time the local ordinance was adopted by a different enabling
act. Chapter 1760 of the Rhode Island Acts and Resolves,
Jan. Sess. (1946), now General Laws of R. I. (195t)) §§ 23-
25-21 et seq. Nor is there anything in the amendment to
the safety ordinance or the license issued thereunder relat-
ing to air pollution. The local regulation purports to
extend and extends only to risks of fire and explosion. But,
the District Court did not base its finding that the plain-
tiff’s refinery when constructed would constitute a private
nuisance becanse of any such danger. On the contrary, it
found: as a matter of common knowledge that although an
oil refinery was a potential source of danger from fire or
explosion unless properly constructed, such dangers could
‘the substantially lessened if not entirely eliminated by the
imposition of — restrictions and safeguards relating
to its construction.’
~ Clearly the District Court's finding of aaticipatery nui-
sanece rested upon subsidiary findings that the refinery
when in operation would pollute the air with nojsesome
and noxious gases, matters not covered in the amendment
to the local ordinance or the license issued under it. Thus,
even if we should assume arguendo that a license would he
a defense, the present license would not be, for the alleged
nuisance does not arise from the explosive or inflammable
nature of the substances stored or the processes earried
out on the premises, but from the deleterious, unpleasant
and noxious effects of the gases which ure the by-products
of the refinery process. In this situation the license is of
no consequence as pointed out in Commonwealth vy. Kidder,
107 Mass. 188, 193 (1871), wherein, considering an indict-
ment laid against an ail refinery constructed in accordance
with statutory safety requirements as-a common law nnis-
ance.because it polluted the air, the court said:
‘‘These enactments are manifestly intended to pro-
tect the publie against dangers arising from the explo-
sive and inflammable nature of petroleum; and, having
regulated the whole subject:in that aspect, they might
A32
well be deemed to protect any establishment, guarded
as they dfrect, from indictment as a nuisance on ac-
count of such dangers only. But they contain no pro-
visions for preventing the spread of unwholesome and’
offensive odors in the course of the manufacfure; and >
if the defendants’ position were sustained, the result
would be that no limit would be put to such manufac-
. ture in the most crowded and populous portions of any
town or city. The reasonable, if not the necessary;
inference is, that it was‘ not the intention of the legis-
lature to establish a new rule in this regard, but to
leave the question whethér the mantifacture is carried.
on at such places and in such a manner as to be un-
wholesome and offensive to the public, and on that
account indictable as a nuisance, to be determined by
the rules of the common law.’’
Moreover, in spite of the minority view prevailing, appar-
ently, in Massachusetts, see Strachan v. Beacon Oil Co.,
251 Mass. 479 (1925), we would infer from State v. Barnes,
20 R. 1. 525, 529, 530 (1898), that Rhode Island would follow
the majority view and hold that, while a license constitutes
a defense-to a prosecution for maintaining a publie nui-
sance, a governmental ‘*orant of powers and privileges to
do certuin things does not carry with it any immunity for
private Injuries which may result directly from the exer-
cise of those powers and privileges.’* Baltimore & Potomac
R.R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317, 334 (1883).
For citation of eases and discussion see 39 Am. Jur., Nui-
saneces § 205 (1942); note, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 781 (1952
re, Torts § 74 (2nd Ed. 1955).
Little needs to be said with respect to the amendment
of the loeal zoning ordinance creating a refinery use dis-
trict, for it is clearly established that compliance, with a
zoning ordinance does not protect a person from the conse-
quences of making an unreasonable use of his property
whereby he invades the private right of his neighbor. The
_ A33 ‘ c
matter was well stated in Weltsche v. Graf, 823 Mass. 408,
500 (1948), wherein, affirming an injunction against oper-
ating a truck terminal on the edge of a zone permitting
such a use but adjacent to a hotel in the zone owned by
one of the plaintiffs.and at the boundary of a district zoned
for residences where all the plaintiffs had their homes. the
court said:
‘“... The fact that the operation of certain kinds of
commercial enterprises is. permitted under a zoning
ordinance is an important factor in’ determining
whether the use being made of the land in conducting
a particular enterprise goes heyond what is reasonable
in view of the nature and eharacter of the lowality, the
effect of the use upon those who live in the neighbor-
hood and the strength and force appropriately due
to the various conflicting interests usnally involved
‘in the subject matter. But a zoning ordinance affords
no protection to one who uses his land in such a man-
ner as to constitute a private nuisance,” :
’ ’
We think it clear from Dunham vy. Westerly Zoning Board,
6S RT. 88, 97 (1942), that this is also the law in Rhode
Island for in that case, referring to persons objecting to
the erection of a power station in a zone permitting that
use, the court said: **. . . they will not be deprived of a
suitable remedy merely beeause a permit under the zoning
ordinance has been granted, since such a permit would not
vrant any right to operate a private nuisance.’’-
There remains for consideration the amendment to the
local building ordinance. Surely it could not seriously be
contended that compliance by the plaintiff with the local
hnilding ordinance would afford it any protection if it used
its property in such a manner as to constitute an unreason-
able interference with its neighbors in the enjoyment of
their property. |
Since, even if valid, neither the plaintiff’s license nor the
amendmept to the local zoning and building ordinances
A34
would provide the plaintiff with a defense to the charge
of constructing a private nuisance, it follows that there
was no need for the court to pass on the validity of the
ordinances, for decision of that matter was unnecessary
to its disposition of the case.
We now come to grips with the ‘basic problem on this
appeal. The town of Jamestown, Rhode Island, is co-
extensive with the island of Conanicut in lower Narra-
gansett Bay. The island:is a little over 9 miles long and
is only slightly more than a mile wide at its widest point.
Its area.is 9.3 square miles and its permanent population
is about 2,000. A majority of the permanent population,
about 75%, live in a relatively compact residential and
small business district in the southerly third of the town
which has a public water supply and sewer system. Accord-
ing to the District Court's findings: ‘‘It is primarily a
residential, resort and.farming area. At the present time,
no-industries of any sort are located thereon and there are
only relatively few business enterprises, such as_ retail
shops, stores, gasoline filling stations and hotels. It en-
joys considerable popularity as a resort area during the
summer.’
No doubt the island has many advantages in the way of
climate and scenery as a place for country living. . But its
popularity as a place te live does not appear to have
increased very much in the last few years. As a resort ‘it
appears, if anything, to have declined. Only a few new
homes have been built on the island in recent years, fewer
hotels are operating than formerly and a.golf course has
been abandoned. It is fair to say that the island’s economy
‘is relatively static.
The island is well suited for Commerce’s purpose, how-
ever, for not only is it located near the heart of industrial
New England, but it also lies in the sheltered waters of
Narragansett Bay and has a harber deep enough to permit
the docking of deep-draft tankers bringing crude oil from
the Middle East. And it would appear that a majority of
A35_
the permanent residents of the town, no doubt anticipating
a source of substantial tax revenue and employment, wel-.
comed the construction of a refinery within its borders.
This is indicated by the action of the Town Council amend-
ing the local zoning ordinance, although perhaps not strictly
in accordancé with the required statutory procedures, ta,
create a refinery use district. A straw vote of the inhahit-
ants of the town, however, provides more persuasive evi-
(lence of popular sentiment. Strong feeling for and against
the ereetion of a refinery having been expressed by various
meetings held in the town, the Town Council authorized a
vote of the inhabitants qualified to vote at a general elee-
tion on the question: **Are you in favor of a modern oil
refinery in the northern part of the Island of Jamestown?”?
Of the 1020 voters checked off on the check list 777 voted
‘tyex,’’ 233 voted ‘‘no,’? and there were 10 blank or defee-
tive ballots. | fe
The plaintiff proposes to construct’ its refinery on an
approximately 600 acre tract of land it owns in the refinery
use district created by the amendment to the zoning ordi-
nance, That district, consisting of about 815 acres, extends
across the middle of the northerly third of the island. At
the time of the trial ther® were 16 dwellings in‘the clistrict
and the rest of theJand therein was vacant. While a small
portion of the district is swampy and overgrown with
serub, most of it, about 85°C, is suitable for home sites or
farming. It is not, however, being used for. agrieultural
purposes or, indeed, for anything else. About two miles |
sonth of the district is a housing development begun about...
~) years ago in which to date about 143 homes have been
built, and within abont one and one half miles north of
the district there are 71 homes, a summer hotel and a
summer camp. The center of the compact part of the town
is about 214 miles south of the distriet. The prevailing
winds over the island are frem a generally westerly diree-
ton. ‘
A36
There can be no doubt and indeed it is treely conceded
by Commerce that substantial quantities of malodorous,
and in sufficient concentration toxic, gases are generated:
in the process of refining crude oil, particularly ‘*sour
cerudes?’ such as those-from the Sheikdom of Kuwait which
Commeree intends to process in the refinery it proposes to
build in Jamestown. These gases are hydrogen sulfide
(H.S) and a group of. gaseous hydrocarbons called mer-
captans. Furthermore the stacks carrying. the exhaust .
from the various heaters esséntial tu the refinery process —
will discharge substantial quantities of sulfur dioxide (SO:)
into the atmosphere. his gas is not veculiar to the oper-
ation of a refinery but, as a product of combustion, is
present in varying degrees in most smokestacks. + It has
the odor of burned sulfur matches, is detectable by its odor
‘in coucentrations of 2.5 parts per million parts of air by
volume and on constant exposure is deleterious to health
‘n coneentrations of 5 or more parts per million of air
by volume.
We turn our attention first to hydrogen sulfide and mer-
captans. In accordance with general commercial practice
about 1°¢ of the sulfur in the'erude oils Commerce proposes
to refine will be removed in the form-of hydrogen sulfide
prior to shipment from the Middle East by a process known
as stabilization. More of the sulfur will be converted in
the course of the refining process into hydrogen sulfide and
the residue will remain in the final products of the refinery.
The hydrogen sulfide given off by the crude oil durin the
refining process will, according to Commerce’s plan, be
converted into odorless, elemental sulfur by a process
which is about 96% efficient. The remaining hydrogen sul-
fide will be incinerated and discharged into the air as sul-
fur dioxide. :
Mereaptans are produced at various stages of the re-
finery process. In Commerce's operation some will be con-
verted into hydrogen sulfide, which will be treated as de-
seribed above, others will be removed by a eaustic wash
A3T
treatment and*incinerated and some will be converted into
hydrocarbons and form part of the gasoline and heating
oils produced. 3 ; |
Commerce propeses a system which is completely en-
closed from the tanker at the dock to the storage tanks
for the finished products. When functioning properly any
of the above gases not converted into elemental sulfur will
be incinerated and discharged into the atmosphere as sulfur
dioxide. There is no dispute that theoretically the proposed
refinery would be practically 100% effective in preventing
the escape of hydrogen sulfide or mereaptans into. the
atmosphere. In ease of accident, however, there is no
doubt that these gases might eseape into the air and should
that oceur be blown by the wind not only out of the refinery
area but also out of the refinery use district altogether.
The real dispute as to these gases lies in the: probability
of the occurrence of accidents resulting in a discharge of
the‘gases onto the defendants” properties. ;
Accidents in refineries as elsewhere are, of course, in-
evitable. And there ean be no doubt that in fhe event of
a serious accident these malodorous and toxie gases might
eseape and be blown onto the defendants’ properties if at
the-time the wind happened to be blowing in their direction,
But the evidence is undisputed that ina modern, well de-
signed and well bu'it refinery accidents allowing the eseape
of these gases could be minimized, one expert witness indi-
cated practically to the vanishing point, by ‘*good house-
keeping,’? meaning by that, frequent and therough inspec-
tions of the equipment, keeping the premises neat and
clean, and employing skillful and competent supervisory
and operating personnel, No Witness, of course, could say
now frequently accidents permitting the eseape of these
gasés in substantial quantity would be likely to oceur.
The District Court, however, found that the **most that
can be said’? for the ‘devices and procedures” proposed
hy Commerce ‘‘is that they will he nearly completely effee-
tive under the, most ideal conditions.”’ Then, noting the
A3s
highly, corrosive qualities of Kuwait erude oil and the
volume to be processed each day, it said that it was ‘‘satis-
fied that varying quantities of these [referring to hydro-
gen sulfide and mereaptans] obnoxious gases will find their
way into the atmosphere at all times when the refinery
‘is in operation. To assume that they will not be earried
by the prevailing winds beyond the relatively small area
upon which a refinery of the size contemplated is to be
located would be far from realistic. On the contrary, the
credible testimony in this case establishes that said gases
-will be carried by the prevailing winds at all times to the
properties of some of the defendants, and, because of
their extremely disagreeable odors in very low concen-
trations and their cumulative effect, thes will s¢riously
diminish both the value of the defendants’ lands ‘as resi-
dential properties and the enjoyment thereof.”’
The futding that there will be a continuous discharge of
these gases onto the properties of some of the defendants
is not supported by the evidence. For the evidence is un-
disputed that the malodorous gases to which the court was
referring will escape into the atmosphere only in the event
of some accident and there was no testimony, as indeed
there could be none, as to the probable frequency of ‘acei-
dents in the propesed refinery resulting in the escape of
these gases. Furthermore, assuming that accidents result
ing in the discharge of these gases will oceur-in or near
the center of Commerce's. processing area, it is clear that
if the wind at the time were blowing from any direction
between northe.st and south, the gases would not be car.
ried onto the property of any defendant but out over the
waters of the bay.
Sulfur dioxide, and what is referred to as general re-
finery odors, as contaminants of the atmosphere remain
to be considered.
Little needs to be said as to the !atter. It is an odor
produced by a combination of the odors of hydrogen sul-
fide, mercaptans and the general hydrocarbon odor often
encountered at gasoline filling stations. Since there js no
dispute that Commerce’s plans calls for a completely en-
closed system, this odor due to its composition would be
present only in the event of an accident. Having already
pointed out that the frequency of aecidents is conjectural,
it is enough to add that the testimony is convincing that
any general refinery odor remaining after an aceident could
be quickly eliminated by prompt and thoroygh cleaning of
the area affected.” It will suffice to say id our previous
discussion applies equally here and that further comments -
are superfluous.
Sulfur dioxide is another matter, f6r there is no doubt
that this gas will be continuously produced in substantial
quantities and the only means proposed for disposing of it
is to dischargé it into the atmosphere through stacks of
varying heights. We are not concerned, however, with the
amount of this gas in the upper air. Our concern is with
the concentrations of it on the ground likely to Be eneoun-
tered on the properties of the defendants.
There was no expert testimony that, in view of the height
of the proposed stacks and other pertinent factors, there
would ever be a ground concentration of this gas on any
defendant’s property of as much as 5 parts per million
parts of air by volume and henee enough to have an ad-
verse effect on health. The court found, however, that
there would be enough ground concentration of the gas on
the defendants’ properties to be: perceptible. It said:
“The credible testimony satisfies me that, depend
ing upon atmospheric conditions, wind velocities, and
the prevailing winds, as shown by the evidence of pas?
annual weather conditions on the Island of James-
town, there will be frequent concentrations of SO, on
the property of the defendant Froberg in excess of
2.5 parts per million, and that it is reasonable to eon-
elude that the properties of the other defendants will
be frequently visited with similar concentrations ear-
ried te the premises by the prevailing winds and that
A40
*
these concentrations will serve to effect a substantial
diminution in the values of their properties and in the
enjoyment thereof.”’
In reaching this conclusion the court specifically rejected
‘the testimony of one expert witness with impressive quali-
fications by training and experience in problems of air
pollution caused by refineries who had said: that in his
opinion the ground eoncentration of SO, beyond the rearest
boundary line of the defendant nearest to fhe refinery, Fro-
berg, would not exceed 0.4 parts per million even under the
most unfavorable conditions. Sub silentio it also. rejected
testimony in similar vein of several other expert witnesses.
The court’s finding, however, has some foundation in the
testimony of three experts. One of these speaking on the
basis af experience said: ‘From a high sulfur erude and
under atmospheric conditions of steady but not high
velocity wind in the direetion of the wind to leave the
refinery Tam sure that you can deteet SO, by its irritating
effect on the eyes, the nose and the throat at a distance of
two or three miles: That might not happen every, day,
but it will happen some of the time."* Another testified in
somewhat the same vein although he indicated that SO. |
could be detected at a distance only by its odor and not
by its irritating effect. But this witness when employe:
as an expert by the Town Council prior to this litigation
gave as his opinion that: ‘*Pollution by sulfur dioxide
from refinery operation is seldom objectionable if limited
to the concentrations resulting from burning fuel oil and
the’ malodorous mereaptans separated in refining opera:
tions... . Many law suits have resulted from the dis
charge of sulfur dioxide into the air by smelters on account
of the damage to vegetation but not from oil refinery prav-
tiee.”’ The other witness on whom the court must: have
relied for its fining testified on.the basis of a formula,
at basis other experts, including some of the appellees’.
rejected. as wholly inadequate, one went so far as to char
Ad4l
acterize it as *tcockeyed,"* for the reason that no formula
could take matters of topography into account. Moreover,
‘the formula used by this witness was not one generally
“accepted in the art but the witness’ own simplification of
sucha formula. Whatever the value of the witness’ formula
may be, however, according to it Commerce's refinery
would produce concentrations of SO, on the property of
the defendant nearest to it of over 2.5 parts per*million
only when the wind was blowing in that direction at 1 mile
per hour. At zero wind velocity the result produced by
the formula is admittedly absurd. At a wind velocity of
2 miles per hour the concentrations of the gas on the prop-
erty nearest the refinery would drop below 2 parts per
migiion and as the wind velocity increased the concentra-
tions Would deerease. Moreover, there is no specitie evi-
denee of the frequency of 1 mile per hour winds over
Jamestown in any direction, since the data used by the
expert Witness who testified.on this phase of the ease listed
all winds of less than 3 miles per hour as calm. However,
computations based on this witness’ testimony show that
winds blow from the refinery toward the Froberg property
about one twelfth of the time, and, assiming that the wind
was blowing at 1 mile per hour one third‘of the time the
-wind was listed as calm, calculations show that accepting
the results of the formula there would be detectable con-
coutrations of SQ. on the Froberg property only for about
one hour in every 720 hours, or for somewhat less than one
hour in every period of four weeks.? :
With the evidence as summarized above and the findings
* The court below. mentioned but did pot pass upon the defend-
‘ants’.econtentions that the proposed refinery world. be a nuisance
in other respeets, such as by the glow from its flare, its iiamination
at night, dust from its eatalytie cracking unit. smoke from. its
Sacks and its pollution of the waters of the bay. We see no reason
ty consider these eontentions either, for the evidenee is quite inade-
fate to show that the refinery wonld eonstitute a nuisance in any
r4
hese respeets.
A42
of the District Court in mind, we now turn to the appli-
cable law, which, of course, is the law o¢ Rhode Island.
We may take it for granted that a home owner does not
- enjoy the absolute right to keep his neighborhood forever
residential in character. Lord Justice James in Salvin v.
North Brancepeth Coal Co., L.R. 9 Ch. App. 705, 709 (1874),
colorfully expressed this general rule in the statement:
‘‘If some picturesque haven opens its arms to invite the
commerce of the world, it is not for this court to forbid
the embrace, although the fruit of it should be the sights,
and sounds, and smells of a common seaport and _ ship-
building town, which would drive the Dryads and their
masters from their ancient solitudes.’’ See also Pennsyl-
vania Co. v. Sun Co., 290 Pa. 404; 409 (1927), a leading
case cited and relied upon on another point in Seidner, Inc.
- v. Ralston Purina Co., 67 R.L. 436 (1942), to be considered
in detail presently, whereia the Supreme Court of Pennsy!-
vania said:
‘‘In this age, persons living in a community or
neighborhood ‘must subject their persona] comfort to
the commercial necessities of earrying on trade and
business. Where the individual is affeeted only in his
‘tastes, his personal comfort, or pleasure, or prefer-
ences, these he must surrender for the comfort and
preferences of the many.’’
No 6ne, however, is required to submit to his neighbor's
unreasonable use of his property. The Supreme Court of
Rhode Island in Blomen v. N. Barstow Co., 35 R.T. 198, 211
(1913), in considering a bill in equity by residence owners
to enjoin the operation of a drop hammer in their neighbor-
hood which made a loud thumping noise and jarred their
premises, summed up its conclusion drawn from an analysis
of many cases from ofher jurisdictions in the statement:
‘The rule of law is well settled that every person
ix bound to.use his property so as not t6é injure that
of another, or interfere with the reasonable and proper
A4ts :
enjoyment ‘the ‘reof and that the carrying on of a busi.
ness Which creates nvisesome smells, or noxious vapors,
or eauses great and disturbing noises, jarrings’ or
vibrations, which affect injurieusly property in the
vieinity or render the occupation thereof inconvenient
and uncomfortable, is a nuisance for which a person
- whose property is damaged or whose health is injured
or Whose reasonable enjoyment of his estate as a place
of residence is impaired or destroyed thereby, may
-maintain an action to recover compensation for the
injury, and that in such case a court of equity’ will
restrain the continuance of the.nuisance by injanetion.”’
But, to secure an injunetion against a néighber's pre-
spective use of his property, more must be shown than the
mere possibility or even probability of harm = resulting
-from that-use. Unless a proposed use will be a nuisance
per se, Which is not suggested here for it is generally held
that refineries are not in that category, see Purcell vy. Davis,
10) Mont. 480 (1935), courts of equity do not readily grant
injunctions to restrain anti@ipatory nuisanees, The rule in
Rhode Island is to be found in the Semduer easé cited above
Wherein the court at page 451 quoted City of Lynchbur WN.
Peters, 145 Va. 1 (1926), as follows:
“Tt is a well established principle of equity juris.
prudence that when a proposed strueture or the use
of it, is met a nuisance per se, a court of equity will
not grant an injunction against the erection of the
structure or the use, merely beeanse it may become a
nuisance. The alleged nuisance must be the necessary
result or the court will await the actual results."”
The Rhode Island court then went on to say in its own
words:
‘*We are of the gpinion that to justify an injune-
tion, in a eanse of the character of the instant one:
Ad
i.e. a suit to enjoin a prospective nuisance], the evi-
dence must show clearly and convincingly that sub-
stantial damage to the complainant's property or busi-
ness will be practically certain to result from the oper-
ation by the respondent of the business against which
an injunction is sought.’’ :
To give the words of comparison used by the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island (‘‘clearly,’’ ‘‘eonvineingly’’ and
‘*practically certain’’), the meaning the court intended
them to convey we must look to the application of the
Rhode Island rule‘in the case in which the words were used
We turn therefore to consideration of the Seidner case’ in
some detail. | .
The plaintitf Otto Seidner, Inc., at the time of suit and
for many years before had operated a mayonnaise factory
in a predominantly industrial section of the town of West-
erly, Rhode Island. The defendant, as the lessee of adjoin-
ing land, propesed to const uct a coal yard-into which
coal would be dumped from railroad ears standing on a
siding. The plaintiff's bill in equity sought to enjoin the
construction of the coal yard on the ground that coal dust .
would necessarily be carried by the wind into its mayon-
naise factory contaminating its product thereby and pre-
venting it from carrying on its business to its irreparable
injury. It was not disputed that the proposed location of
the ¢oal bins was only 75 feet from the nearest corner of
the plaintiff's building and certainly there can be no doubt
that coal dust in mayonnaise would, to Say the least,
adversely affect its saléability. . |
At the trial an expert witness with many years’ experi-
enee in the coal business, called by the .plaintiff, testified
that he did not see how coal dust could possibly be pre-
vented under certain conditions of wind. from getting into
the plaintiff's factory even with the precautions-in the way
of canvas covers during the unloading process which the
defendant proposed to take. An expert galled by the
A45
defendant testified that although there would be dust from
the defendant’s yard there would be no appreciable amount
in view of the covers the defendant proposed to use and
that in any event unless there was a high wind the dust
would not travel over 100 feet. ‘
On the basis of this testimony the trial court eaaibe
the injunction prayed for, saying:
“Considering the testimony of both experts together
with the other convincing. evidence in the case, it
appears to us to be clearly: and convineiigly proved
that the operation of the proposed coal bins without
some dust escaping is absolutely impossible.”
Expressing doubt as to the efficacy of the precautionary
measures the defendant, proposed to take to prevent the
escape of coal dust, the court then went on to say: —
“We are satisfied that even with the canvas cover-
inv, coal dist of appreciable density and quantity
will escape, W hich, carried hy a westerly wind, will be
blown into complainant’s. plant and especially into
the mixing room, working great havoc to the food
products, both completed and in process. The coal
dust will also settle into and onto the wlassware, making
necessary a. hand-washing, the cost of which, as opposed
to machine washing, would put the complainant in the
dilemma where it could not hope successfully to cope
with competition, Irreparable injury to complainant
must certainly follow.’
-
-
Nevertheless, in spite of those findings the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island reversed. Applying the appheable
rule as quoted herein above the court said at page 4o1:
“We have carefully considered the relevant evidence
"in this cause, being almost entirely opinion evidence,
on the question whether substantial damage te the
complainant will be practically certain to result from
A46
the operation by the respondent of its proposed busi-
ness, in the place and in the manner in which the
respondent intends to operate it and we are of the
opinion that it has not been proved by clear and con-
vineing evidence that such damage will be practically
certain to result.’’
It is true that in Seidner the court was concerned with an
attempt to enjoin a dusty business in an industria? area
wheréas here we are concerned with an attempt to enjoin
a stack industry, so-called,-in a residential, resort and
agricultural area. Nevertheless, in, the exercise of our
appellate duty * to examine the defendants’ evidence to see
whether it meets the high standard of proof required by
the Rhode Island law as stated and applied in the Seidner
case, we feel constrained to hold that the court below erred
in enjoining erection of the plaintiff’s refinery as a pro-
spective nuisanee. Standing in the shoes of the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, that is to stay, applying the Rhode
Island rule to the evidence and the findings in this case as
we believe the Rhode Island court would apply its rule, it
seems to us from the Seidner case that the Supreme Court
of Rhede Island would: not sanetion enjoining the erection
of the plaintiff's refinery in Jamestown. Instead, on the
relatively even balance of the sharply conflicting expert
testimony in the record before us, we think the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island would-wait to see whether the refin-
ery constituted a nuisanée when put into operaticn.
. The judqment of the District Court is set aside and the
case is remanded to that Court for the entry of a judqment
dismissing the defendants’ counterclaims, but without costs
in this Court.
'See Bre ne ’ V Unite d Nhat is 45 9%] 90, qv (¢ A. t. 194))
; A47
APPENDIX B
JUDGMENTS BELOW
(1) Original Judgment
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
_ FOR THE First Circuit
No. o479
Commerce O1w Rerixine Core., Plainteff, Appellant, |
| | a i
Wituiam W. Miner et AL, Defendants, Appellees.
| JUDGMENT
| June 16; 1960
This cause came gn to be heard on appeal from the United
States Distriet Court for the District of Rhode Island, and
was argued by counsel.
~ Upon consideration whereof, It is now here ordered, ad-
judged and ‘deereed as follows: The judgment of the Dis-
triet Court is set aside and the ease is remanded to that
Court for the entry of a judgment dismissing the defend-
ants’ counterelaims, but without eosts in this Court.
By the Court:
Rocer A. STINCHFIELD
Clerk.
(2) Order Denying Rehearing
{Caption Omitted |
ORDER OF COURT
July 6, 1960 |
It is ordered that appellees’ petition for rehearing filed
July 1, 1960, be, and the same hereby is, denied.
By the Court:
Rower A. STINCHFIFLD
Clerk.
A48
APPENDIX C
RULE OF COURT. STATUTES. AND ORDINANCES
sia INVOLVED
l. Rule of Court
tnle S2(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil) Procedure
péovides in pertinent part:
** Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the oppor
tunity of the trial court to judge of the eredibility of
the witnesses."’
2. State Statutes
(a) Sections 4524-1, 45-24-2, and 45-24-83 of the Genera!
Laws of Rhode Island, 1956, formerly Chapter 342, Seetion
1, of the General Laws of Rhode Island, 1938, provide as
follows:
“45-24-1. Power of councils—Scope of ordinances.—-
Kor the purpose of promoting the public health, safety,
morals or general welfare, the city council of any city,
and the town council of any town, upon the approval
of the financial town meeting of such town, shall have
power in accordance with the provisions of this chapter
within. the limits of such city or town by ordinance to
regulate and restrict the height, number of stories and!
size of buildings and other structures, the percentace
of lot-that may be occupied, the size of vards, court-
and other open spaces, the density of population, and
the location and use of buildings, struetures and land
for trade, industry, residence or other purposes,
“45-24-2. Division into districts—Uniformity within
‘districts.-—For any anc vll of said purposes said city
or town council may divi'> the municipality into dis
triets of such namber, shape and area as it may deen
best suited to carry out the purposes of this chapter:
and within such districts it may regulate and restrict
the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration,
repair or use of buildings, structures or land. Al!
such regulations shall be uniform for each elass or kind
Ad
of buildings throughout each distriet but the regula
tions in- one district may differ from those in other
districts. yee ,
“45-24-3. General purposes of ordinances.—Such
regulations: shall be made in accordance with a com-
prehensive plan-and designed to lessen congestion in
the streets; to secure safety from fire, panie and other
dangers; to promote the publie health and the general.
welfare; to provide adequate light and air; to prevent
the overerqwding of land; to. avoid undue concentra-
’ tien of population; to facilitate the adequate provision
of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks and
other public requirements. Such regulations shall be
made with reasonable consideration, among other
things, to the character of the district and its peculiar
suitability for particular uses, and with a view to con-
serving the value of buildings and encouraging the
most appropriate use of land throughout such tewn or
municipality.’’
(h) Sections 45-24-4 and 45-24-5 of the General Laws of
Rhode Island, 1956, formerly Chapter $42, Seetion 2). of
the General Laws of Rhode Island, 1938, provide as follows:
“45-24-4. Hearings on ordinances.—No sxneh ordi.
nance shall be enacted, amended of repealed until’
after a public hearing has been held upon the question
of the enactment, amendment or repeal of sueh ordi-
nanee, befare the city or town council, as the case
may be, or a committee or commission authorized by
such city or tewn council to investigate and make ree-
ommendations concerning such proposed ordinance,
who shall give first notice of such“ publie hearing
specifying the time and place of sueh hearing by pub
lication of such notice in a newspaper of general ciren-
lation within such city or town at least onee each week
for three (3) suecessive weeks prior to the date of
such hearing, ‘at whieh hearing opportunity shall be
civen all persons interested to be heard upon. the
Inatter of the proposed ordinance.
“45-24-5. Amendment and repeal of ordinances—
Landowners’ protests.—The city or town council, as the
ASU
case may be, shall have power, after a public hearing
as herein provided, from time to time to amend or
repeal any such ,ordinance and thereby change said
regulations gr distriets; provided, that, if there shatl
he filed in the office of the city or town elerk of such
city or town on or before the day of such hearing or
within three (3) days thereafter a written protest
against such proposed amendment or repent signed
and acknowledged by the owners of twenty per cent
(20°) or more of the street frontage of the property
proposed to be affected, or by the owners of twenty
per cent (20°7) or more of the street frontage directly
_opposite.the property proposed to be affeeted, or by
the owners of the property abutting on twenty per
~eent (20%) or more of the boundary line between the
property proposed to be affeeted and the property
immediately in the rearthereof when there is no street
hetween said properties, no such amendment or repeal
shall be passed except by a three-fifths vote of such
eity or town council and the approval ofthe mayor of
such town or city, or if disapproved by such Maver,
by a like vote.as may be required by law to enact an
ordinance in the ease of disapproval by the mayor of
such town or city. Fhe word ‘owner’ as used in this
section shall not be construed to include’ attaching
erediters or lien holders other than mortgaees.”’
(eo) Seerions 23-27-1 to 28-27-4 of the General Laws of
Rhode Island, 956, formerly Chapter 333, * Section 02,
of the General Laws of Rhode [stand, 1938, as added by
Publie Laws of Rhode Tsland, 1950, Chapter 2525, Section
1. provide as follows: ;
“93.97-1. Ordinances regulating construction and
equipment of buildings. —Town af@ city councils may
from time to time make and ordain all ordinances and
regulations for their respective towns and cities, not
repnygnant to law, as they may deem necessary, regi:
lating the manner of constructing and equipping of
all buildings and other structures, within said town or
eitv which may be ereeted, altered or repaired after
the passage of such ordinance, ;
“23.27-2. Hearings on building ordinances.-No suc!
-ordinanee shall be enacted, amended or repealed until
,
Aol
after a public hearing bas been held upon the question
cof the enactment, amendment or repeal of such ordi-
nance, before said town or city couneil, which council
shall tirst give notice of such hearing by publieation in
a newspaper printed in said town or city, if any, and,
if none, then in a newspaper published in the county
in Which said city or town is located. .
*23.27-3. Inspector-of buildings—Appointment and
duties.—Said town or city council shall have the power
to appoint an inspector of biitdings and define his -
duties in the issdance of building permits and in the
administration and enforcement of such ordinance.
“23-27-4. Penalties for ordinance violations—Prose-
eution.—Said town or city couneil shall have power
to provide a penalty for the violation of any ordinance
enactodainder the authority herein given by a fine not
exceeding one hundred dollars ($100). for each offense,
such fine te inure te said town or eity, and may also
cause suit, to be brought in-the supreme or superior
tourt in the name of said town or .city: to restrain
the violation of or te compel compliance with the pro
visions of any such ordinance,”’
(1) Section 23-36-1 of the General Laws of Rhode Tsland,
WAG, formerly Chapter cy Section 21, of the General Laws
f Rhode Island, 1938, a. amended by Publie Laws 1955
Ist special session), Chapter 3233. Seetion 1, provides
< follows.:
. “23-36-1. Ordinances regulating manufacture and
handling of explosives and infammables—License.
‘Town councils and city councils may from time to time
makeoand ordain all ordinances and, regulations for
their respective towns, .not repugnant to law, which
they may deem necessary for the safety of their in-
habitants from the manufacture, processigg, storae,
keeping, having in possession, transportation, sale or
use of ginpowder, euneotton, dynamite, nit rogiveerme,
nitrogelatine, Iwddite, chlorate of potash. pierie acid,
sodinm. ealeium earbide, acetvlene gas, gasétine- gas,
eride petroleum, gasoline, kerosene, heating fiels. lub
rieating oils and greases, allied petroleum produets,
.
-
A o2 7
and any and all other explosives, explosive chemicals
and inflammable substances; and may prohibit the
manutacture, storage, keeping, having in possession,
transportation, sale or use by any and all person or
persons of any or all said substances and gases in their
respective towns, unless a license for the same shall be
first obtained from the town: council ar city council,
which license shall be henceforth effective unless re.
yoked for good and sufficient cause by order of said
town council or city council. Any person violating any
provision of any ordinance, regulation or prohibition,
authorized by this section shall be fined not less than
twenty dollars ($20.00) nor more than one hundred!
dollars ($100) for each such offense.”’
3. Municipal Ordinances
(a) The basie Jamestown zoning ordinance, ech, NNXY,
ix x. BB at 3 R. 284-293. (The zoning map is Ex. LL at
OR. 317-329.)
(b) The amendment to the Jamestown zoning ordinance,
Which purported to authorize the creation of*a refiners
use district, is Ex. S at 3. R. 267-269,
(c) The basic Jamestown building ordinance, ch. XLIV.
is Ex. CC at 3 R. 294-314,
(d) The amendment to the Jamestown building ordi
nance, whieh purported to” exempt oil retineries trom Its
provisions, is kx. Tat 3 R. 269-270,
(©): The Jamestown licensing ordinance, ch. JO, is bx
U'-} at 3 R. 270-279,
In the present. posture of the case. which complains that
he court below dismissed the allegations of petitioners’
‘ounter@aims regarding these ordinances Without consid
‘ration of their merits, see the first Question Presented
ind ** First*’, Ppp. 2 and 32-33 of the Petition, supre,
tis not deemed necessary to repeat the detailed provi
ions of the ordinanees in question.
ADd3
APPENDIX D
DEMONSTRABLE FACTUAL ERRORS IN THE
" COURT OF APPEALS’ OPINION
We list here the most significant errors committed by
he court below in the course of its reappraisal of the’ testi-
jony in’the present ease. Some of these involve demon-
trable misstatements; ea, item 1, the geography of James.
own, and item 3, the loeation of certain of the petitioners’
mes in relation to the*site of the corporation's proposed
efinery., Another, item 5, the validity of Dro Schutt’s
ormula, involves a question of credibility and a denigration
f that expert’s testimony unsupported by the record.
thers, such as items 6 and 7, summarizing the probable
Teets of the corporation’s refinery operations, invelve
reevaluation of the testimony contrary to the weight of
hat testimony and at variance with the district court's
ndings. Finally, item &, exposure to sulfur dioxide,
rhores testimony of record, and fails in addition to Uuive
dequate weight to the ‘Rhode Island law, which holds that
iscomfort rather than uninhabitability is the Ineasure of
private nuisance,
The geography of Jamestown. The eourt of appeais
tid (p. ASS), SA majority of the permanent population,
lout 757, live in a relatively compact residential and
wall business distriet in the southerly third of the town
hich has a publie water supply and sewer svsten.””
The fact is that the southerly third of the istand has
niy a single year-round resident, and that the compact
ssidential area is in the middle third of the town. See
Ro ST4t-S75t, GOStOT0t, 9704 (te ‘stimony of the ecorporn
on’s Witnesses); see also pp. 6-7, supra, and the map fol-
wing p. 41, also- supra.
The district judge, who took a view (5 Ro 1092-1055),
: course made no such mistike.
77
A ot
2. The prevailing winds. The court. of Appeals said
(p. ASO), The prevailing winds over the island are fros
a generatly westerly direction.”’
Tie fact is.(1 R. Ut-11t) that the prevailing wind i.
westerly in only one month, December, and that in no
month ix a westerly wind the second highest prevailing
wind. [Th seven months of the vear, winds from the south~
West prevail. In one month, February, west-north-wes!
winds prevail, and that direction is second in two other
months. (1 R. 9t.11t.) :
The district court found (3. R. 3: p. ALT) that “The
evidence establishes that the prevailing winds on the island
are from the southwest and from the northwest."
3. Effect of south wind on some of petitioners. The eourt
of appeals said (p. ASS) that ‘if the wind at the time were
blowing from any direction between northeast and south,
the gases would not be carried onto the property oftany .
defendant but out over the waters of the bay.”*
The fact is that the houses of both the petitioners
MeGaughan and Lunsford are directIt north of the refiners
use district (4 Ro 542: and see map following p. 41 supres.
Consequently with a south wind, whieh prevguls ino two
menths and is secondary in four months more (1 R. 9t-1it),
the gases and odors from the proposed refinery, would be
carried direetly to those petitioners’ homes,
4.°° Whe tier corporation's re finery was completely in
closed, The court of appeals said (py. AST). Commerce
proposes a svstemr whieh is completely enclosed frome the
tanker at the dock to the storage tanks for the finished
products,"
The fact is that the corporation's plans contemplated: an
oxidation pond, whieh must. be open (LR. 246t-247t),
as Well as a coke storage area. likewise open (Det bey,
what chy SUR. ISC)). Both of these eXude odors (LR, Pat:
2 OR, 1027t, LOS6t). |
ASS
The distriet court considered the oxidation pond in its
findings (3 R. 77; p. A21). : : ;
0 Dr. Schutt’s qualifications. “The court ef appeals said
(p. A4L) with respeet to Dr. Schutt, a consulting engineer
(1 R. 195t-198t) called by petitioners as an expert, ‘*the
formula used by this witness was not one generally accepted
inthe art but the witness’ own simplifieation of such’ a
formula,.**
The fact is (2 R.-1174t) that the formula used by Dr.
Schutt “is eommon practice in oil refineries solving: such
problems,"* testimony that was not contradicted ly uri
Witness,
The reliability of Dr. Schatt's computations is under.
scored by his use of the materials balance, viz. a determina.
tion made of the products and by-products whieh are
emitted by a refinery on the basis of the nature and amount
of the raw materials which go there:to be refined (2. Ro
W1l6ts & Re 1307-1308),
Dr. Schutt prepared a materials balanee for the corpo:
ration’s proposed refinery on the basis of its processing
Kuwait sour crude, and determined that the resultant output
of sulfur dioxide (St 2) would be on the arder of 35 to 40
short tons per day (2. R. 1063t). :
Mr. Sutherland, the corporation's engineer witness who
supervised the design of the proposed refinery (LOR. OT3t
V1t), was asked, and promised to, to produce a materials
balance (5 R. 1308-1311), Although the witness testified
that such a balance was in existence (5 R. 1808), he later
refused to produce it (4 Ri 1391),
Thereafter, the corporation’s engineer witness Hatrtwis
did produce such a balance (2 RL 122 1t ef seq.), and aceord.*
Ye to his estimate the total SN » eNhausted to the air trom
he eorporation's proposed refinery would be OF tons per
lay (2. R. 1245t; soe Ex. BBBB, 6 R. 1901).
Consequently, quote apart fram the legal Hpropriety en
he part of the court of appeals in reevaluating the credi-
AS6
bility of the expert witnesses whom it did not and could no
see (opinion, pp. A4O-A41, and see discussion in Petition
at pp. 3o-37), quite apart frem the inappropriateness of
its exercise in advocacy, viz., rehabilitating the corpora.
tion’s expert who had been disbelieved by the distriet cour:
for cause (3 R. SO-S1; p. A24: compare p. ALO: see diseu-
sion in Petition at pp. 23-24 and 36), and minimizing
the testimony of Dr. Schutt, who very obviously was. be
lieved by the district court, the fact is that on the basis 6
the corporation’s witness Hartwig's testjmony (2 Ro bar,
one of Dr. Schutt’s essential conclusions was fully cor:
roborated,
6. Cantimuous discharge. The court. of appeals sail
(p. ASS), “The finding that there will be a continuous «is
charge of these kases onto the properties of some of the
defendants is not supported by the evidence.”’
If **gases’’ include odors, then the fact is otherwise, for
there was ‘considerable evidence that a refinery always lias |
a smell, that the escape of odors therefrom is inevitable
(1 R. 67t, S6t-S8t, 113t, 11M, 138t), and that the odor js
cumulative (1 R. 145t). See pp. 22, 25-26 of the Petition.
where the evidence is set out in detail,
Moreover, and this was a cireumstance ignored hy thie
court of appeals, the island has frequent fogs (1 R. 12t-1s!
n & conattion Which one of the corporation's experts acdinvittes
‘means that vour air pollution conditions would increase’
(1 R. 628).
The distriet court found (ft Re : op. AIT) that Bin
of varying duration enveloping ibe sh Loceur with rm!
tive Frequeney’* and its conclusion as. te the diffusion « a
SO. was niger in part upon “atmospherie conditions”
SRST: ps A24).
¢. Odor as caused only by accidents. The court below
said (p. ASS) that “the evidence is undisputed that the
Hinlodoraus cases to whieh the idistriet court was y@fe
ring will eseape into the atmosphere only in the event o!
some accident and there was no te stimony, as indeed ther:
ADT :
could be none, as to the probable frequeney of accidents in
the proposed refinery resulting in the escape of these
gases."’
The fact is*that odors are not caused only by major mal-
‘ funetionings, such as the court of appeals seems to have
had in mind, but result from the multitude of minor leaks
vind spiils (1 Re 117t), which are inevitable in a retinery
such as the corporation proposes, which (3 R. 74: p. ATS)
“will comprise among other structures at least fifteen stacks
ranging from twenty to twe hundred feet in height which
will contain many thousands of fet of piping, countess
joints and connections, nearly one handred untired pressure
Vessels of varying sizes and canstruetion, approximately
four hundred pumps, thousands of seals and COMPLressors,
‘tanks, heat exchangers, and like-equipment."’
Consequently, since accidents and particularly minor ae-
cidents are admittedly jinevitable— the corporation's own
designer admitted (1 Ro 590t) that “I don't think vou ean
ever leave out the possibility that leaks will oeenr’ (see
alo Petition at pp. 21-22, eapra, for the testinfony Jin
detail), there is created a general refinery odor —whieh has’
a cumulative effeet (1 Ro 145t).
Or, as expressed by another witness (1 Ro 210, 2201 ‘:
"A. The general odor ¢reated in a refinery, that is
sometimes characterized as oil smell, ix ereated his
minor or more serious leaks in the process units, sueh
as through lines, stuffing boxes of pumps, through a
loose flange which-can happen when one considers the
wultitude of pipe connections which are contained in
a process unit. Those leaks, when released in. the
atthosphere, are, to my way of thinking, generally
responsible for the oily smell or odor. .
“Also, T make’ 1 add one more thing: Open waste
~emarators-—in an oil refinery they are open where
Water is settled also creates a typical refiners oder
ie, ° Are these odors perceptible outside of three pee
finery itself?
ASS
“Mr. Duggan [counse!] for the corporation]: Are we
referring to any particular— :
‘*Mr. Moore [counsel for the residents]: No, this
retinery, this refinery.
* * s oe e
“A. Yes. -
* . © & ae
“*Q. Would you answer with respect to r ‘finery odors
being perceptible outside of the refinery—ld
an opinion whether that would apply to this refinery?
“A. In a magnified form because processing of sour
erude creates stronger odors than, processing a sweet
erude.”’ |
The result is that, by ignoring the testimony on both
sides as to the inevitability af accidents (Petition, p. 21),
,and by similarly ignoring the testimony that ** A. refinery
always smells’? (1 R. 113t; and. Petition, pp. 25-26), the
court of appeals bas not only committed a procedural ir-
regularity (Petition, pp. 33-37), it has made » grave and
‘indeed critical factual error. Indeed, its conclusion lends
substance to Jeremy Bentham's taunt that jurisprudence
ix thé science of being methodically ignorant of what every.
one else knows,
8. Effect on comfort. The court of appeals «said. with
respect to SO (p. AS6), that ‘ton constant eXpesure [i
is deleterions to health in coneentrations af 5 or more parts
per mullion of air by volume,’ and further that (p. A9),
- There was no expert testimony that" ** there would eve
he a ground concentration of as much as 2 parts per miflo
parts of air by volume and henee enough to have an advers:
effect en health."
>
Phere was, however, testimony that the greund eonee
fration of SOQ at he Petitioner Proberg’s hore would bs
as high as O88 parts per inition, which greatly exeneds t!
imate bevel of detectability and discomfort ar 2.5 part:
- t
eroamiiiion «2 RoJO6e8r 1OG8e).
lo you have
ASY
There was also testimony that, in respeet of sick in.
dividuals, or with those suffering from bronchitis or heart
disease, the effect of the SO. would be, aggravated (ARS
056-957). |
Here the error of the court of appeals is essentially a
legal one, for under Rhode Island law it is not necessary
that, to eonstitute a nuisance, a complainant’s home be
rendered uninhabitable; it is sufficient that what is done
by the defendant ‘causes a substantial diminution either
in the value of adjacent property, or in the enjovinent
thereof as measured by the degree of comfort whieh the
average man living in such a neighborhood has a right to
expect’ Kennedy ve Brechette, 45 RL 899, 406, 123 Atl.
146, 148; and see Appendix E, immediately: following.
APPENDIX E
THE RHODE ISLAND LAW OF NUISANCES
1. Generally. “Phere are four leading Rhode Island de
cisions on the law of nuisances,
(i) Aldrich ve Howard, & RLV. 246° C865). Tere: the
plaintul, the owner ofoa dwelling house. recovered dam
ages for the nftisanee. caused by the defendant's nearby
very stable, whieh adinittedly was property butt and kept,
ane the verdict was sustained on appeat.
In answer %, the defendant's contention that the jury
had heen misdireeted. the Supreme Court of Rhode [stand
“aid (SR. DL at 24s 24):
as Pe
instriefions are, that the motses and the smells,
order to become a nuisance, must create an annovanes
Toostch an-extent as te render life tneom™ortakle, or te
ter the house unesinfortable as a dwelling house and
mitted for the proper purposes for whieh it was designed.
t odes thous referred teow Tn led, that itcis Theol Ppererees sca \
the house should: be rendered useless in order. te
e
Ab60
Inaintain an action, but that it is quite sufficient that the
injury should be such as to render the enjoyment of life
there uncomfortable, We think, therefore, that for all the
purposes of this case, the charge is not open to the objec.
tion that it does not -sufficiently or correctly define a
nuisance at common law.”’
(ii) Blomen, Frederickson vy. N. Barstow Co.. 35 Ro 1.
INS, SO Ath 924 (1913). Here the owners of dwelling
Houses sought an injunction against the respondent's Ops
eration of drop hammers. Pending appeal, the ope ration
of the 500 Ib, hammer was restricted to 4 hours a day, On
appeal, the court held that complainants were entitled to an
injunction against any further operation ef the hammers
At pp. 203-204 of 35 R. 1, p. 926 of 85 Ath, the ee
Court of Rhode Island quoted with approval the statement
of the New York court in Fish ve Dodge, 4 Den. 311, 316.
“Tt is not necessary to a right of action that the owner
should have been driven from. his dwelling: it is enough
that the enjoyment of life and property has been rendered
uncomfortable,"
At p. 211 of 35: R. 1. p. 928 of 85 Atl, the Supreme Court
of Rhode Island ‘said ;
“The rule of law is well settled that every person. is
hound to use his property so as not to injure that of
another, or interfere with the reasonable and proper en-
joyment thereof and that the carrying on of a business
Which creates noisome smells, or NOXIOUS Vapors, or causes
great and disturbing noises, jarring or vibrations, whicti
affect injuriously property in the vicinity or render the
oveupation thereof inconvenient and uneomfortable, is a
nuisance for which a person whose property is damaged or
Whose health is injured er whose reasonable enjoyment of
his estate as a place of residence is impaired er destroyed
thereby, may maintain an action to recover compensation
for injury, and that in suchi a case a court of equity. will
restrain the contiruance of the nuisance by injumetion. °
.
Aol
(iti) Kennedy vo Frechette, 45 Ro 1 899, 128 Ath 146
(1924). In this ease the owner of residential property
sought an injunction against the operation of a factory in
Which saws and woodworking machinery were used to man-
ufacture tennis racquets. One trial judge issued a prelim
inary injunction, On further hearing, another trial judge
entered & permanent injunction whieh limited the respond
ent te 2 hours a day for the use ef his circular saws,
‘limited the thickness of the wood that could be eut on them,
restrained him from operafing after 5 P.M. and on Sun
dats, and required him te Kevep his factory windows closed.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held thet
the complainant was entitled to an unlimited) injunetion
against the operation of the saws and the woodworking
machinery.
The court said (45 R. 1. at 405-406, 125 Ath at 148),
“The location is always an important consideration in
the determination of the existences of a nuisanee, 1 is
clear that the location in gguestion is wof a omanufaeturing
one, ® * * Respondent now seeks to change the character of
this seetion west of Broadway fin the City of Pawtueket |
by the establishment of a factory therein, Anyone living
inacity must put up with the usual and ordinary noises
of city life; in this vieinity also with any of the usual
results incidental to the use of. the shops on Broadway,
Certain additional annoyance and inconvenience often is
Inevitable as the city grows and changes, but the’ amount
thereof which may be caused by any individual without
there hy CTC iting ao nitisance is ta be decided pon cons ic:
eration of all the facts in any given ease. ds the use of the
property in this partiewlar location reasonable or unres
sonable, considering not only the rights of the owner, but
also those of his neighbor. [Tf such use causes a substan-
hal diminution either in the value of adjacent property, or
in the enjovinent thereof as meds sured by the degree of
comfort which the average man living in Sueh oa ne dihber-
A 62
hood has a right to expect, it may properly be held to be
unreasenable and hence a nuisance.
**The operation of this factory has diminished the value
of complainant's land. The operation of the cireular saws
two hours daily deprives complainant for that length of
time of the comfortable and reasonable enjoyment of her
home and results in an unwarranted and illegal disturbance
of her rights. That the tine of operation is limited, affect.
“the extent of the injury but does not change the. nature
thereof.”’ ‘ ;
(iv) Serdner, Inc. ve Ralston Purina Co.. 67 R. (3 436, 24
A. td 902 (1942). Complainant, owner of a mayonnaise
factory ina part of Westerly, Ro 1b. zoned for heavy in
dustry, sought an injunction against respondent's proposvil
operation of a coalyard, on the ground that the anticipated
coal dust would seep ito complainant's mayannoise prod:
ucts. On the basis of sharply conflicting opinion evidences,
the trial judge granted an injunction. This was reversed
on appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Eshind saving’ (47
R. Tat 451, 24 As 2d at 909),
‘to justify an injunction, * ** the evidence must show
cleatly and convincingly that substantial damage to the
complainant's property or business will be practicalls
certain to result from the operation by the respondent
of the business against which an injunction is sought.”’
2. Residential versus Business. The guideline here, see
Kennedy vy. Frechette, 45 R. 1. 399,405, 123 Ath 146. 14s.
ix that ‘The. location is always an important eonsideration
in the determination of the exisistence of a nuisance.”
Significantly enough, the plaintiff? or complainant whos:
property Was in a residential section won im the Aldrich,
Blomen, and’ Kernedy cases, The respondent prevailed
only in Seidver, where the complainant's property was
located ino ao predominantly industrial) seetion of the
community.
A63
3. Vountervailing Public Benefit, In Blomen, Prederick-
‘son VN. Barstow Co. 35 R.A, 198, 209-210, 85 Ath. 924, O28,
the Rhode Island court squarely rejected the notion that
economie or other benefit to the community wéuld assist in
justifving what would otherwise be a nuisance; it said:
“Respondent's counsel argue that the granting gf an in-
junction in such cases is within the diseretion of the court;
and that it will not be granted where it will be inequitable
between the parties of will work detriment to the public
or Will involve damage to the defendants engaged in a
lawful business disproportionate’ to the damage to the con:
plainant from the continuance of the alleged nuisance.
‘Such ‘an argument was nlade in Broadbent y. Imperial
Gas Co, 7 De GoM. & G. 4386. The complaint’ was,, that
vegetables growing in the market-garden. of the ecomplain-
ant were injured by the gas of that company, and the argu-
nent was pressed that this injury was slight in compari-
son with the benefits conferred: by the company on the pub-
lit, and that on that account the court would not exercise
‘its power to restrain the manufacture of the gas. Lord
Cranworth, at p. 462, savs: ‘Tf it should turn ont that the
company had no right so to Inanufacture gas as to damage
the plaintiff's market-garden, [ have eome to the conclu.
sion that T cannot enter into any question of how far it
might be convenient for-the publie that the gas manufae-
ture’ should go on?) He further remarks, ‘but unless the
company had sue ha right, | think the present is not a case
in which this court ean go into the question of convenience
or inconvenience, and say, where a partyeis substantially
damaged, that he is only to be compensated by bringing an
action toties quoties. That would be a disgraceful state
of the law, and T quite agree with the viee-chancellor in
holding that in such a ease this court must issue an. in-
Junction, whatever may be the consequences with regard
to the fighting of the parishes and distriets which this com.
pany supplied with gas’. This ease was affirmed on ip
y peal, (7 HEL. Cas. 600).""
Di mre i f) foe Prig } essary hy ppt fists Nuais.
rm See Aldrich vo Toward; Blomen; Frederickson v. N:
irstow Coy and Kennedy vo Frechette, all supra; dis-
fort rather than eviction is the measure of nuisanee.
I the Aldrich case, the court said (Ssh. 1. at 249),
The question still‘is, does it tm faet render life uneom-
fortable?"’) Or, as phrased in the Kennedy case, 45 R. EL
at 406, 125 Ath at 148, Tf such use causes a substantial
dinunution * * * in the etijoyment thereof as measured by
the degree of comfort which the average aman living in such’
a neighborhood hae a right to expect, if TAN percep rly be
held to be unreasonable and henee a nuisanee.*’
» Confinuous versus Tntermittent Disturbance.. That
Intermittent discomfort, as distinguished from continuous:
annoyance, does net render the condition. in question any
less a nuisance, is established by Aennedy v. Frechette,
supra, Where the Supreme Court of Rhode Island set aside
an injunction which permitted partial operation of noisy
etory taachines, Tt said (45 R. bo at 408. 128 Ag. at 14S),
:
, : , in =
, AT ena { ‘ ‘ ‘> :
eration is tinted, atfeets the’ extent
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.