Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ — Crest Finance Co. v. United States (No. 325)

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1900

JAMES BR. BRUWNING Chere

Uf

IN THE

Supreme Court.of the United States

Ocranies Term, A. D. 1960

No. 825

_ ELI FRIEDLANDER, BERTHA 4A. ‘LLOYD, CARL F. LLOYD,

JAMES J. PRINCE and BERNARD F. VAN HARREN, d b a

LLOYD'S PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION OF CHI.

CAGO and LLOYD REALTY COMPANY,

eons rs,

VS.

THE CHICAGO BAR ASSOCIATION, an Illinois Corporation,

not foy profit, STUART C. ABBEY, MANDEL L. ANIXTER,

DAVIS 'P. BUZANE, RICHARD L. KAHN JOHN LIGTEN.

‘BERG, JOHN T. LOVE, JOHN CADWALADER MENE,

JAMES T. MULLANEY, CURTIS F. PRANGLEY, and JOHN

A. WATSON,

Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A WRIT

OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME — OF

ILLINOIS.

JOHN Lit: TENBERG

134 North LaSalle Street

Chicago 2, Illinois

J. RUSSELL CHRISTIANSON

11] W. Washington Street

“Chicago 2, Minois

Attorne us for Re spond nits

CHICAGO LAW PRINTING CORP., 189 W. MADISON, CHICAGO FR anklin 2-8521

e

t

EN YEN

PAGE

l. The Proeeedings Below oe .

2. * Activities of Petitioners |... !

3 Scope of Petition for Writ of Certiorari ..... 6

4. Question of Jurisdiction Pte eee ort caer ‘

3. Questions: Presented

(1) Has petitioner raised any right, title, privilege

or immunity under the Federal Constitution? = 7

(2) Has thé Federal question (if any) been raised

_in a timely manner in such a way that it will

be considered by this coart 22.0.0. inns 7

(3) Will-the Supreme Court take jurisdiction of a ,

decree involving a question. solely of state

RA Te sere eet eee tee aes Saree te ee 7

6. Argument :

I. The petitioner has not set up-any right, title,

privilege or immunity under the Federal Con-

stitution ..... eye neo pec Rh Rian 8 beer ae Dt s

1]. Even if there is a Federal question in. the case

it has not been raised in a timely manner or in

such a way that it will be considered by this

COnrt oo. ae pina icesosenteussoanastassFezatasen sie duo sd dees ee it

Tif. The Supreme Court of the United States will.

not take jurisdiction of a State Decree involv. @

ing a question solely and peculiarly of State Law 13

GIR BLOT ree rr eee re ee ee ee

il

LIST OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Brinkerhoff vy. Hill, 281 U.S. 675, 680 000...

Central Land Company -v. Laidley, 109 U.S. 103.

Chicago Bar Assn. v. yen Taxpayers of America,

et al., 312 [ll App. 24

Durley v."“Mayo, Fla. 1956. 76S. Ct. 806, 391 ae eae (3

100 L. Ed. 1178, rehearing denied T7 S. Ct. 22, S02

U.S. 859 1 L. Ed. 2nd 69 .......... Pee eee

Hulbert v. Chicago, 202 U.S. 275, 00 i. ed. 1026

In re Isserman, 345 U.S. 286 ......... fee ieee

Konigsburg v. State Bar of ( ‘alifornia, 303 U.S. 202 ..10, 15

MeC are v. Board of Managers of Chicago Bar .\>-

sociation, 326 U.S. 689 :

Midland Credit Adjustment Co. et al. v. Donnelley, 210

BH, AOR ZT bess

Mitenall.v. Greenough, 100 F. 2d 184 00000.

In-Re Paus’ Estate, 385 IIL. 550

People v. Chicago Motor Club, 362 TIL 5000002. 0 Wa 15

People v. People’s Stockyards Bank, °44 Ill. 462° 1.05

People v. Securities Discount Corp., 279 All. App. 70

People ex rel, Chicago Bar .Assn. v. Goodman, 366 TI,

346 3

"People ex rel. Chicago Bar Assan. v. The Motorist-

Assen: OF lil. soe 4: ORO) 342.4. 0a

—— ta te

————

lil

PAGE

People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Tinkotf, 399

i Ely Aa la 2 eS SE sem _Aeeere antes: P

People ex rel. Hlinois State Bar Assn. and Chicago

Bar: Assn: v..Schafer, 404 Ill. 45 00. eee

‘chware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 ...10, 13°

Selline s. Madford, 243 U.S. 46. ...................-.................. li

Smith v. Illinois Adjustment’ Finance Co., 326 Il. App.

bot eee cede eenes Dresses pe iBssoeoenenencseddencenseeaih:- lo

Suuray Oii Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,

147 Fed. 2d 962 .............. Deedee ete eet aria mieaks, ane

- Tinkoff v. United States, 212 LOY es 1]

Ex Parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 00 eee M

é

P ee

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Octoper Term, A. D. 1960

No. 325

ELI FRIEDLANDER, BERTHA A. LLOYD, CARL F. LLOYD,

JAMES J. PRINCE and BERNARD F. VAN HARREN, db a

LLOYD'S PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION OF CHI.

CAGO and LLOYD REALTY COMPANY, —

Petitioners,

; VS.

THE CHICAGO BAR ASSOCIATION, an Illinois Corporation,

not for profit, STUART C. ABBEY, MANDEL L. ANIXTER,

DAVIS P. BUZANE, RICHARD L. KAHN, JOHN LIGTEN.-

BERG, JOHN T. LOVE, JOHN CADWALADER MENK,

JAMES T. MULLANEY, CURTIS F. PRANGLEY, and JOHN

A. WATSON,

Llespondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A WRIT

OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF

ILLINOIS.

To thie Honorable, The Chief Justis and th. Associate

Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States:

Comes now John Ligteuberg, as attorney and solicitor

lor the respondents (himself included) and says that a

writ of certiorari should net-be granted for the following

reasons:

.

)

1. There is no special or important reason therefore,

as required by Rule 19 of this Covrt.

2. The petitioners in the Court below raised no ques-

tion under the Federal Constitution and the matters there

presented were not within the contemplation of Rule 1!

It shall be our pyrpose to support these two prepositions

as concisely as possible.-

1. The Proceedings Below.

, This case originated in the Superior Court of Cook Comn-

ty, Illinois, a court of ‘general original jurisdiction, The

plaintiffs, the Chicago Bar Assqeiation, and certain met-

bers of the Committee on Unauthorized Practice of thiit

association commenced a chancery action seeking to enjoin

the defendants (who are the petitioners here) from doing

certain acts alleged to be the unauthorized practice of law.

These acts were essentially the representation of property

owners in four kinds ef proceedings:

(1) Condemnation proceedings,

(2) Special Assessment, proceedings,

(3) Tax Rate proceedings, and

(4) Proceedings relating to the valuation of real estate

for tax purposes.

4

‘The swere actively engaged in these matters

though they were not licensed to practice law. They solic-

ited property owners to employ them in such matters mos’

ly on a contingent fee basis, claiming long and success! ul

experience (Abst. 1-32), and that they employed a staff of

real estate experts, appraisers and attorneys to assist them

where necessary.

The amended answer denied that the defendants did any-

thing that amounted to the practice of law but described

their activities in considerable detail. They also pleaded

that they were protected by an unreported 1934 decision

: aigienmetiaeaneceranares

of the Illinois Supreme Court, which is described in detail

in the petition for writ of certiorari, pp. 6-8.

However, the amended answer raises no state or federal

constitutional question and no ,Federal question in any

form (Abst. 33-59).

The cause was heard and determined on the motion of

plaintiffs to strike the amended answer and a decree for a

permanent injunction was entered.

An appeal was then taken to the Illinois Appellate Court,

a tribunal which has no jurisdiction of constitutional ques-

tions. lad the petitioners. raised a question under the

State or Federa! Constitution their appeal would have lain.

direct to the Supreme Court of Hlinois. Mlinois Civil Prac-

tice Act, Seetion 75.’ IIL Rev. St. (State Bar Ed.) 1959,

Chapter 110, Section 75, which in part follows:

‘*(1) Appeals shall be taken directly to the Supreme

Court (a) in all cases in which * * *

tion of the constitution is involved.

a construe-

39

The opinion of the [linois Appellate Court, 24 Ill. App.

2nd 130, affirmed the deeree below and.mentioned no Fed-

eral question. 3

The petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of |

[ilinois was denied May 23, 1960, without opinion. The

petition its-If raised only state questions. These were:

1. That the decree conflicts with. earlier de¢isions of

the Hlinois Supreme Court, including the so-called

first Llovd’s case.

2. -The defendants were not guilty of the unauthorized

practice of law.

o. The opinion and decree below allow discrimination

hetween adversaries,

' 4. The Appellate Court ignored the principles of Res

} Judicata, Estoppel by Judgment and Stare Decisis.

4

“An inspection of the entire proceedings in the courts of

Ilifnois does not disclose that any Federal question owas -

“raised at any time. The entire case was ébyiously con

ducted on the theory that ‘no cons titutional question, state

r fede ral, was involved.

2. The hokivitios of Petitioners.

Since the above may not disclose adequately the

nature of the activities enjoined by the decree we quot

here a summary statement adopted by the Appetlatc Court

of Illinois. The statement is changed oily by paragraphing

it for easier reading. Its source is the qpinion of the trial

court chaticellor (Abst. 68-65). “Chicago Bar Association

et al vy. Friedlander, 24 Ul. App. 2nd, 130:

‘Defendants conduct their operations as ‘Lloyd"s

Property Owners Association of Chicago’ and ‘Lloyd’

Realty Company’. The acts complained of relate to.

their representation of property owners in (1) condetm-

nation proceedings, (2) special assessment proeecditigs,

(3) tax rate proceedings, and (4) proceedings relating

to the valuation of real estate for tax purposes. —

“Defendants solicit property owners to employ then,

to represent s@ch owners in condenmation proceedings.

In the course of this solicitation, defendants claim lone

and successful experience in the handling of such miat-

ters-and stale that ‘We have a staff of real estate:

experts and appraisers who know this type of work

and also attorneys with long experience in eondemna-

tion cases.’ When the solicitation is sueeessful, de

fendants contract to. represent the property owners

for 20 of any sum obtained over and above the initia!

offer. In-this contract. the property owner autherize-

defendants to select an attorney for him (at an addi-

tional expense ); ‘Tf it is necessary to have an attor-

ney’s services and [do not select an attorney.’ De-

fondants eugage real estate experts, efieiipers rend

construction expert. at their own expesse to assist

them in their efforts. + Where only questions of valu

et es eunteninem

4

ation were involved’, defendants proceed to negotiate

for condemnation awards without the services of an

attorney. If their own negotiations are satisfactory,

an attorney is employed merely for the purpose of

filing the owner’s appearance; otherwise the attorney

. works with defendants in fartlier negotiations and pro-

ceeds to try the case if necessary. Through attorneys

retained and employed by them, defendants cause ap-

pearanees, answers and obje ctions to be filed 1 in courts

of record. While jit is claimed that Suck attorneys:

are ‘acting as attorney or attorneys for property own-

ers and not as attorney or attorne ys, employee or

employees, of these defendants’, it appears. that only

one licensed attorney has been emploved by defendants

in reeent years to represeft all eae owners In-

volved] n condenmation Inatters, b

‘The practices followed by defendants in assessiuent.

matters parallel their operations with respeet to con-

demnation cases: solicitation based on a claim of long

and suecessful-experionce: a contingent fee contract

authorizing defendants to select an attorney for the

property owners: the employment of engineers or reai

estate experts by defendants at their own expense;

the employment ef an attorney- (at an added expense

to the property owner) to file and pr@ecute objections

to the assessinent. Again it appears that in recent

years only two licensed attorneys have been employed

by defendants to re present all property owners in

special assessment matters,

“With respect to the contesting of tax rates, defend-

ants cirenlarize and = solieit) substantially all of the

property owners whose names they have accumulated

over the vears and entér into contingent ‘fee contracts

of employment to arrange for the payment of taxes

under protest and to file and present objections to the

‘fax rate. They file a letter of protest prepared by their

attorney, on behalf of such property owners, and em-

plovan attorney to file and prosecute objections to the

rates on behalf of sueh owners.

6

*Detgndants’ operations with refOronce to valuation

- of a A for tax purposes are substantially the

same as in the other three fields. ;

“Defendants have emphasized that their services

relate*to questions of valuation only, are confined to

preparatory work, and that they do not appear in court.

Certainly the practice of law is not confined to the

courtroom, ‘Nor can defendants take refuge in the

fact that their work may be said to be preparatory in

nature. The fact is that all of their operations were |

in connection with matters that ultimately lead to court.

proceedings or proceedings before an administrative

hody. Their letters of solicitation make it. perfectly

clear that their services include those te ‘be performed

by an attorney. The preparation of cases for trial

and negotiation directed to out-of-court settlements

are an integral part of the typical lawyer’s work."

3. Scope of the Petition For Writ of Certiorari.

Of the four types of activities enjoined by the deere«

below this petition relates only io the last:

Proceedings relating to the Valuation of real estate

for tax purposes. :

oe. uth yond . :

I hefespondents have apparently acquiesced as to the other

three, or have now consented that these activities amounted

to the practice of law. The basis of their contention seems

to be that tax valuation matters are handled in non-judicial

proceedings and that the courts of Illinois erred in finding

that appearance in real estate valuation eases constitute

the practice of law. This seems to the respondents pal-

pably and solely a state juestion.

The petition for certiorari (page 7) states that the issues

in the first Liloyd’s case ‘twere in all pertinent respects s

vlentieal with the charges made in the present case.’’ {The

emphasis is theirs). It seems inconsistent for them to

7

admit now that the 1934 decision of the Illinois Supreme

Court does not protect them with respect to condemnation,

special assessment and tax rate matters but may still shield

-them in valuation cases. Do they admit by this that the

Hlinois courts are competent to decide that some things

ure the practice ef law but that they are incompétent as

to others?

4. The Question of Jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction. of this Court is claimed on the basis of

Title 28, USCA Section 1257 (3).

5. Questions Presented.

(1) Has the petitioner raised any right, title, privilege

or immunity under the United States Constitution?

(2) If a federal question is involved, has it been raised

in a timely manner, if presented in this ecirt

for the first time?

(3) Witi the Supreme Court of the United States take

jurisdiction of a decree inve!ving a question solely

and peculiarly of state law?

.

ARGUMENT.

I.

The petitioner has not set up any right, title, privilege or

immunity under the Federal Constitution.

Newhere in the proeeedings in any of the Illinois State

BS ;

courts did the petitioners contend that any part of the

Federal Constitution had be en violated.

The ‘Judicial Code, USCA, Title 28, Seetion 1257 (5),

provides that it shall be competent for the Supreme Court

of the United States by certiorari to certify for review any

final judgment or decree of the Highest court of a state

court, where “any title, right, privilege or er is

specially set up or claimed under the constitution * * *"'-

Since. no such right is set up or claimed, there 1 is nothing

for this Court to review.

It is ‘significant that the petitioners do not argue specif.

ically in their petition for certiorari that their activities

are not the practice of law. While they sometimes call

their activities a ‘business’? (Petition p. 12) they find

themselves unable to describe their activities without using

words and phrases peculiar to the practice of law.

On page 11 they speak of their right to practice. On

page 12 they mention *'351 separate hearings conducted by

‘them’’, ‘‘rules of procedure

9

.elients’’, and ‘trepresenta-

On page 13 they expand upon their ‘*knowledge otf

state taxation’’, surely an extremely complicated legal!

subject. These are merely a few examples plucked from

their argument.

tion

They rely solely on the 1934 opinion of the Hlinois Sv.

preme Court that their ‘business’ in tax valuation cases

9

isnot the practice of law. Inconsistently, they apparently

coneede that the earlier opinion Was Wrong about the other

phases of their business. ‘The ‘y have not venfured.to &x-

plaue why the decree enjoining then: from practicing in

condemnation, special assessment and lag orate matters

presented only a state question while the in jagetion against

their tax valnationswork did. present a Federal question.

As aamatter of law, the entire decree, including the por-

tion here attacked is based on adequate state grounds.

This Court has refused jurisdietion where the decision of

the state court is referable to readily available and ade-

quate state grounds. Durli yy. Mayo, Fla. 1956. 76S. Ct.

806, 351 U.S. 277,100 L. Ed. 1178, re-hearimg denied 77

St. Ct: 22, 352_U. S. 859, 1 L. Ed. 2nd 69.

It has always been conceded that ‘the practice .of law

and what coustitutes such practice is peculiarly a state

question. In Mitchell vi Greenough, 100 FL 2d Is4, the

Court said {pt 185):

“We pause here to observethat the right to practice

law ta the state court has Deon held by the Supreme

Court not. tg be a privilete granted by the Federal

Constitution or laws. Bradicell v.cState of MMlinois,

16 Wall. 130, 21 1 Ed. 2: Bor parte Lockwood, 154

U.S. 116, 14S. Ct. 1082, 36 1, Bad. S20. tn Greeny.

Elbert, 8 Cir. 68-F. 30s, the Cirenit Court of Appeals

held that the COUSPITAC) y to deprive a lawser of his

fight to practice law ino the state courts was not a

‘conspiracy to interfere with any right oro privilege

‘eranted, secured or protected by the Constitution of

the United States.’

In Central’ Land Company ve Letudley, 14 . S. tos

this Court said (p. 112):

“When the parties have tee fully heard in the

ee course of judicial proceedings, ai erroneous

deetsion of a state court does mot deprive the unsue-

cessful party of his property without due process of

a

‘ Ww

law, within the Fourteenth Amendment of the Const-

tution of the United States."’

‘It is apparent from the opinion of the Illinois Appellate

Court in this case, 24 Ill. App. 2nd 150, Appendix’ A of

Petition, that the deeree for injunction, as applied to prac-

tice before the board of tax appeals in valfiation eases, is

“well within the frame work of Tllinois case law on the sub-

ject. The many cases cited by. the Appellate Court con-

stitute the léading body of law in-the United States on-

the subject of unauthorized practice.

There can he no property right in the practice of law.

No layman ean gain a vested right to practice, This state-

inent is not contradicted by Schware v. Board of Bar

Eraminers, 353 U. S. 232, or Hénigsburg v. State Bar of

Califorma, 333 C. S. 252.

At any rate these cases’do not apply here beeause peti-

tioners do ret claim the right to practice law, but on the

contrary claim their,work is not such practice.

The fallaey of petitioners is simply this: The practice

of law is not a business. A license to practive law is not

a property right; it is a privilege. Even if it be said that

the privilege was cxtended to the respondents in the first

Lloyd's case in 1934, the, Illinois Supreme Court has never

viven any such privilege to the petitioners, The right to

practice Jaw cannot be inherited or assigned. There is, by

definition, no property right in a privilege. People v.

Chicago Motor Club, 562 I. 50; People ve Pe ople ’s Stock-

yards Bank, 544 Tl. 462.

—

These Lhinois holdings are fully sustained by the pre-

nouncements of this (‘ourt. In In re Txserman, O40 ie s.

Ys6, this court said:

There is no vested right inoan individual te pura

tice law. Rather there is a right in the Court toy.

~~ or

tect itself. aud henee society, as can instrument ‘of

justice.’

Even in disbarment cases, this court has found no issue

of Federal due process, apparently on the basis that state

procedures were adequate. Selltna ve Radford, 243 U.S

4h: Mi Callin 1 ‘Board of Manage rs of Chicagy Rar sisso-

ciation, 226 UES. 6802 Ee Parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265; Peo-

ple a rel. Chie ada Bar Asso iation 2 ee Tinkoff, Bug) Hi. YQ

‘cortioranl denied 354 0. $e: soo. Tinkoff v. United States,

212 Fed. 2nd 18,

It would seem to be beyond dispute’ that no real sub-

stantial Federal question has been presented by the peti

tioners,

Il.

Even if there is a Federal question in the case it has not.

been raised in a timely manner or in such a way that

it will be considered by this Court.

An inspection of the record shows that the petitioner in

the court below raised no question under the federal con-

stitution. The amended answer to the complaint in the

trial court is completely devoid of any tender of an issue

invelving the federal constitution. No tederal question

Was raised or even hinted at in the Appellate and Supremi

Court of Iflinois. Had any constitutional question been

‘present, petitioner could have appealed direct to the Su

preme Court of Illinois, henee it is obvious that the raising

of a federal question here is an after-thought,

In order to meet the. jurisdictional requirement of this

Court, petitioners in therr argument (Page 14 of the Pet

tion) sUguest that Res Judieata is a prime dpele of Jaw wie

is part of due process, rnd litiwanits ithe entitled) to lave

it recognized, Whatever that statement means. Pt is not el

- 42

whether petitioners are suggesting that Res Judicata is «

different kind of defense to that of any other kind, such a-

the Statute of Limitations or payment, which would mak:

this defense so privileged under the Constitution of the

United States, that an erroneous réfusal to recognize 1

would tpso facto; give this court jurisdiction. Petitioner-

cite no authority to support this unusual legal proposition,

nor, in our opinion, can they. They then proceed to argu:

that if this defense, as oppdsed to any other kind of defenss,

is interposed in a trial court and is overruled, which action

is subsequently sustained by the Appellate and Supreme

Courts in the State of Illinois, this, for the first time, raise-

a constitutional question. There is nothing unique or

different about the plea or defense of Res’ Judicata which

permits of this construciion. The statement of the Supreme

Court of Illinois in In Re Paus’ Estate, 385 Ul. 550, seems

particularly appropriate:

- We have repeatedly stated that the Constitution

does not guarantee that the courts shall net Gomi!

error in the trial of eauses, and is not-a guaranty

against erroneous or unjust decisions by courts whict

have jurisdiction of the parties and the subjeet mat-

ter. Tf errors are committed, or erroneous decision-

rendered, they may be correeted in the manner pro

vided by law for the correction of such errors, It

mere errors ina Judgment or decree do not deprive the

losing party of due process of law. Mellvaine v. City

Nat. Bank & Trust Co. 371 MM. 563, 21 N.E.. 2d 737;

Foreman-State Nat. Bank ¥. Sistek, 338 Til, apa, 1%

N.E. 5138. A constitutional question is not involved, so

as*to give this court jurisdiction of a direet appeal.

Where the judgment or deeree is assailed on th:

sround that its enforcement will.deprive the person

agatnst whom enforeement is sought, of his property

without due process of law. The anestion in such cas

is the validity of the judgement or decree and not t

constitutional question, * * *

13

“dts the duty of this court to determine whether

thas jurisdiction, but the crowing practice of bring-

ing eases direetiv to’ tas court upon the pretense that

a constitutional question is involved, when the only

niiter in controversy is that the trial court has ren-

dered an unjust-or erroneous decision, ix net ap-

proved.”

The petitioner cannot raise federal questidns here when

he did net raise them in the Supreme Court of Illinois.

Hulbert v. Chicago, 202 U.S. 275, 50 L. ed. 1026. Tt may

be suggested that Schware vy. Board of Bar Exramiters, 305

U.S: 232 ts a ease where the federal question was raised

for the first time in this court. However, in this case the

Supreme Court of New Mexico was the court of original

jurisdiction and its judgment denying a license to practice

law was the point at which a federal question arose.

In Konigsburg v. State Bar of California, 353 US. 252,

the federal question was raised in the Supreme Court of

California which was the case of original jurisdiction.

There is no reason in law for permitting the petitioners

to come into this court on a federal question which is

purely an afterthought and in addition has no substantial

foundation.

ta

The Supreme Court of the United States will not take juris-

diction of a State Decree involving a question solely and

peculiarly of State Law.

The. decisions of the courts of review, of the State or

Jiiinois on the unauthorized practice of law have been cor

sistent, unequivocal and firm. They comprise the leading

bedy of law in this country on this subject. “Phey indicat:

_that the courts of Hlinois have taken a stand in the interest

of the publie as well as the profession.

14 :

; eS ; : , :

The s seek'to take refuge in the fact that th

practice in tax valuation cases is before ‘an administratiy:

tribunal and that such practice does not amount to the prac’

tice of law. However, the Supreme Court of Hlinois ha-

long ago taken a position on this question and this stan

has been consistently followed since.

In People ex rei. Chicago Bar Assn. . Goodman, tit

Ill: 346, the Illinois Supreme Court held = 352):

“It is urged that the practice by the respondent

before the Industrial Commission is before an admin. °

istrative body, and that the respondent, therefore, os

not practicing law because he is not before a court.

* * * It is elementary that a great portion of the

present day practice of law is conducted outside the

court room. The respandent urges that, because the

legislative act relating to the Industrial Commission

grants to that body the right to promulgate rules gov-

erning the procedure before it, and the commission

has adopted a rule permitting a party to appear before

it by his attorney or ‘agent,’ that he, as agent of the

claimant, may lawfully appear before the commission

as the representative of the client and try his claim

there. Even though the Industrial Commission i>

merely an administrative body, yet, if, what the re-

‘spondent did for a fee, in the presentation of .and

hearing of a petitioner's claim) before that» body,

‘ amounted to the practice of law, a rule of the com-

mission purporting to grant him that privilege is: ot

no avail to him. The General Assembly has no author.

itv to grant a layman the right to practice law. (Li

re Day, supra.) It follows that any rule adopted bs

the commission, purporting to bestow such priviles:

upon one not a duly licensed attorney at law, is void.

Nor ean the General Assembly lawfully declare not

to be the praetice of law, those activities the perform:

ance of Which the judicial department may determin

-is the practice of law." :

1)

The case ‘of Chicago Bar Assn. v. United Tarpayers of

America, et al., 312 HL App. 243, also covers practice

before an administrafive body, te.. the Department of

Finance.

Illinois courts of review have condenmed the practice of

law by collection.agenvies (Aludland Credit Adjustment Co.,

et al. v. Donnelley, 219 IL. App. 271, People v. Securities

Discount Corp., 279 UL App. 70, affirmed, $61 TIL ool;

Smith v. Illinois Adjustment Finance Co... 326 TL App.

64), practices by individuals covering real estate and al-

lied transactions (People ex rel. dllinois State Bar Assn.

and Chicago Bar Assn. v. Schafer, 404 Hl. 45; People ¢2

rel, Chicago Bar Assn., et al. v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 382), the

practice of law by a patent agent (Clocago Bar Assn, cf

al. y. Kellogg, 338 Ill App. 618), as well as that of banks

(People ex rel, inois State Bar Assn. ct al. v. People’s

Stock Yards Bank, 344 Hl. 462), and motor clubs (Peopl:

ex rel. Chicago Bar Assn. v. Chicago Motor Club, 362 YU.

50: People ex rel. Chicago Bar ifssn. ve The Motorist»

Assn. of Illinois, 354 TL. 599):

The principles as laid down in those cases permit of no

exception here.

The mere fact that a state court has renderéd an ei-

roneous decision on a question of state law, moreover, or

has overruled principles or doctrines established by prevt-

ous decisions on which a party relied does not give rise to

a Gaim under the. Fourteenth Amendment or otherwise

confer jurisdiction on this court because of the presence

of a federal question. Brikerhoff vo Mil 28) USs 603,

680,

In the case of Sunray Oul Co, Vv. Comousstoner of Lite rics

Revenue, 147 Fed. 2d 962, it was held that there i. ne

‘Vested right in the decisions af a court and a change ot

16

decision does not deprive a litigant of the equal protection

of laws_or take his property without due process of law.

A federal question is not raised because a court overruled

a prior decision. Certiorari was denied by this court Sur

ray v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 325 U.S. Sol.

From these authorities it is apparent that the deerce be-

low was well, within the established body of Illinois case

law, making the activities of the respondents clearly anid

palpably the unauthorized practice of law. The permanent

injunction decreed by the state court was easily predicta-

ble. The respondents were accorded a full and extended

hearing and ‘‘due process’

them.

was abundantly accorded to

CONCLUSION.

We accordingly submit that this case presents no federal

question of which this court will take notice, and that

certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Joun LIGTEN BERG

Attorney for Respondents

J. RusseELL CHRISTIANSON

Greneral Counsel,

Chicago Bar Asxor iation,

also appearing for

Respondents.

ENGST

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