Petition for A Writ of Certiorari — Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corp.
Supreme Court brief1958
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In THE
| Supreme Court of the Hnited States
OCTOBER TERM,
=” , No - 476
GOLDIE B. PRASHKER,
INC.,
1958
Executrix of the
Vi
4
f
8
Estate of Nathan
Prashker, deceased, and CHC IC E EMBROIDERY & LACE S.
—-——_
Petitioners,
<
‘BEECH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION and ATL ARTIC
AVIAHON CORPORATION, ,
—~
Respondents
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF: CERTIORARI TO THE. -
" UNITED SJATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Of Counsel:
Lee S..KREINDLER,
Mine ON 'SINCOFF,
Jay R. HANDWERGER
+
V HAROLD
LESHEM,
218 North American Bul ding,
Wilmington, Delaware,
“ Ler S. KReINDLER,
Le, POS
oi A natlier
Street:
ets CCl,
New York 7N , we
Counse!
for
Petitioners
en.
OR.
| .
( INDEX
ce _ : * PAGE
_ Opinions Ex cto inkew kaa scanse cues eeer ae cao we
GOTIOTICHION occ ic checcecdes ea hacnsscaukees owes 2
Questions Presented..." . err Pere ee oP 2
** Constitutional Provision Involved .:..........-.... 3
i Statement of ‘the Case ....... Pere TIT TTT eeevere é 3:
Reasons for Granting the Writ ......... Spee ye res re 10
; 1. Holding the prior Bonanza disintegratién acci-
; dents and the Bonanza’s disparate rate of fail-
Se - ure ‘‘irrelevant’’ was gross and shocking error,
a violation of local law, in conflict with other —
ee decisions of the court below, and a deprivation
~ |. °- - ofjhry trial ....... Bena Aegis Sires 10
+ 2. The direction of a.verdict on the *‘alternative”’
grounds of contributory negligence as a matter
of law and failure @» prove negligence was a
_shocking’ invasion of the jury’s function, a
* ‘denial of petitioners’ right to jury trial, and.
in conflict. with standards well settled by this
RAE Oc cneabncedadans conaresacqatanusesens 15
3. The decision below adve.sely affects the rights
" of many other litigants, present and future.
It is improperly, though implicitly, based upon
the findings of an administrative agency .... 20
®-. ConcLusion ....... denseededseceuasece ee -
SARUM nics cc ccccdbeccccnccceasqusssesseanees la
Opinion of the Cou OF DPOB «0 5665 sas casas gee
_. Judgment .:-:.. ere: ‘Pere ee GbN i ocudWebsn cee l4a
Opinion Sur Petition for reer ts ee N.S dda
ii INDEX
‘ . TABLE OF Cases Es -Citep-——-
° PAGE
Antonelli v., Tumolo, 390) Pa. 68, 73, 132 A. 2d 285
I sg eae ac oe Ok Wun eee Ces xan 18,22. -
Baker v. Hagey, 177 Pa. 128, 139, 140, 35 A. 705
I Bee ee ace US be hae ss li
Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Felgenhauer, i68 F. 24 12,
RN os egy a i
De a. v. Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Co, ae
F. 2d 409 (C. A. 3, 1954) 26 ae gO 11
Dimengo- vy. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 19 F: R.D. sad
(DE-Del., 1956) Savin each ea huss ah tis haa ue Ne tee 13
Fisher v. Pomeroy’s Ine, 322 Pa. 389, 185 A. 296
ASH OGRA ae a ate ee ne ae 11
Gibson v. Phillips Petroleum Compania, 352 U.S. S74, is
77S. Ct. 16 (1956) ......... ey Cerrar 24
Hadley v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 120 F, 2d 993,995 (C. A.
G3 ES PEC rere wees ks US ee ee - 13°
__Jackson, 13 CAB Rep. 103 (1945) ...........000,..00 17
Jacob v. City of New York, 315 U. S..752, 86 L. Ed.
i hel cede ved. 18
Jungersen, 13 CAB Rep. 544 (1952) ee MicPuyavcea Vi
Lavender v.: Kurn, - 327 U. S. 645, 66 S. Ct. 740
eh OM a ea ine ay ad oe og 1822
Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co., do2 Pa. ol, 41 A. 2d.
‘ S50 (1945) O.2.0 6 6. 6's. pales os oS +9 “Lane r £ oy ey ae a oe ee . 19
Mules v. A. B. Kirschbaum Co., 298 Pa. .s 148 A.
Noe ahh os bn bo os Fak Gal vn oe 2 11
Patton v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 1% e 2d 732, 739 (C. A. 3,
NN ee Sh phe eo bane tb eho e e bvsdaden sox 12
Vokora v. Wabash Railway Co., 290 U.S. 624 (1933)
(cert. granted), 292 U.S, 98 PE bh ceikduseds 24
Pope, 13 CAB Rep. 514 (1950) eo ae
Potter v. Natural Gas Company, 183 Pa., 575; 590,
39 A. 7 (1898)
© 2 "
INDEX , —
t “* ;
i mked : os PAGI
Reid v. Linck, 206 Pa. 109, 55 A. 849 (1903) ........ <a
Rennekamp v. Blair, 375 Pa. 620, 101A. 2d 669 ree 17
Sehilz v. Pennsy Ivania Railroad C pmpeny, 350 U. ;
3 (1956) terrors r 13
Sebok v. Pennsylvania Edison Co. 331. Pa. 2 2
ee OR eren ea eer 11
~ Swofford Vv. Atlantic Coast. kine R..R., 350 U. S. 807
bse rere rer rT Ter TT Teer ee 24 -°
Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So. 2d 603 (Fla., 1958) 22
’ Tenant v. Peoria & Pekin Union R. Co., 321 U.S. 29,
85, 88 L. Ed. 525. 943) . 2.26.55. RIE Pe ee 24°
Union Trust Company v. Eastern Airlines, |
_- U.S. 907, 76 S. Ct. 192 (1955). ....... OP Pry rer 2d.
Wright v. Carter Products, Inc., 544 F. 2d 53, 56,57
. ALS 2, 1957) atu Oa: hrs PP rr -
TaBLeE oF AUTHORITIES. CITED
14 CFR:
SS, RR eet Ane ee ar eras ere ee +
© SRG PSE are AO pear aete srr e rye eee RR CAE a Ee 8
ee ae sa g
RESP nee cee mince aman Snmererey Amer ergrr tt" &
Constitution of the United States.) Seventh Amend-
ee Sore e Pere ree Cee Crrre wala sean 3
28 U.S.C. 1254(1) Se a 2 Chee oes ey a eer 2
”
7
\e -
\
; ~
re
‘ | ian OCTOBER TERM, 1958
_ Gotpie B. PrasHKeEr, Executrix of the
Ix THe |
Supreme Court of the United crud
\ Oe
No.
_
’
‘+
-
tate ‘of NaTrHan \ ad
PRASHKER, aaa ie and CHOICE Empp DERY & LACES, 5 Oy 4
Inc., © a
Petitione rs, ¢ as .
% ® V.. ; . ( e yf , af » a
a la
. ¢ ‘ \
Beecu ArrcrArt Corporation and ATLANTIC , te
= AVIATION CORPORATION,
zee Respondents.
+ : ¢
° ; , e
_ PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
‘To tHE Honorable, THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND ASSOCIATE °’
. dl ® 4 ‘
| Justices or THE SupREME Court oF THE UNITED States:
< ; ‘ :
* Petitioners, Goldie B. Prashker, Exeeutrix of the Estate
of Nathan Prashker, deceased, and Choice Embroidery
& Laces, Inc., respectfully petition that a-Writ of Certiorari
issue ‘to review the judgment of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third’ Circuit enfered.on July 21, 1958,
and the order of said court denying rehearing entered on
August § 4 958. | Cpa ere ‘
2
Opinions Below
| 3
adits
o- .
‘ :
, «e
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e
The*opinion of the District Court-for the District of
Delaware is not reported. It is printed in the appendix
to appellants” brief, below, at pages 295a-299a. The opinion
of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has not yet
been reported. It is printed in the appendix hereto, infra;
pages la-l3a. : sa
a Jurisdiction ce ae
The judgment of the Court ‘of Appeals was entered July
21, 1958 (imfra, p. 14a). The order denying rehearing
was entered on August 8, 1958 {infra, p. 14a). The juris--
diction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
te ~~ Questions Presented
‘1. Forty-five. Beechcraft Bonanza airplanes disinte-
grated in the air in the same manner and for the same
réasons as the Prashker airplane, killing. all occupants in
each instance. The Bonahza’s ef structural failure,
as compared with all other single-ehine civil airplanes,
was a startling 15 to 1. a“ fags
A. Was it not strange and alarming error for the
court below to affirm the exclusion 'of -this evi-
dence? And was it not a mystifying failure-te
apply local law? ate
—
B. Are the estates and dependents of pilots’ kille? *
these accidents to be denied theiraright to jury
trial by .the device of holding other accidents
‘irrelevant’? = > CF? | |
C. Can the opinion of a leading aerodynamicist that
the accidents demonstrate the improper design
-and dangerous characteristics of th® airplane. be
3
be
{
a
i
5
i
4
Satie
disregarded, asa matter of law, by the ‘court ”
below?
“eo
it ~
Ss ee en
FESS eC NI
_
:
. 2. Was not the direction. of -a verdict on the “‘alter-
‘native’? grounds of, contributory negligence as a matter
_ of law and faflure to prove negligence a. shocking denial
of petitioners’ ‘constitutional right to trial’ by jury that~
warrants the exercise of this court’s supervisory powers? _
3. Is the ‘manufacturer of an airplane insulated from
liability for its,failure to give necessary: warnings and for
its negligent ign by approval and ‘certification of that
airplane by a federal agency? ;
Constitutional Provision Involved
Constitution of the United States, Amendment VII:
‘‘In suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy ‘shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial -
by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the .
United States than according to the rules of the com-
mon law.’’ } : —: ot
Statement of the Cuan. 7
There are approximately 5,000 Beechcraft Bonanza air-
_ planes registered. About one out of every sixty manu-
factured has come apart in the air, killing all- occupants
“(one to four people in ‘each case).’ » According to peti-
tioners’ proof, which was largely confined to the Prashker
accident and the forty-five instances that preceded it, these
accidents were caused by the airplane’s unique and danger- —
ous combination of flying characteristics (or ‘‘handling
qualities’) which, under , certain conditions, disorient a
- pilot, make him sick, lead him to lose control of his, air-
plane, and through. the. force that he exerts on his ‘‘stick "
or rudder control, lead him to impose huge loads on the
1As ‘of December 31, 1957. seventy-nine -Bonanzas had come
apart in flight. a : ——
“6
4
wings which cause structural faure. The accidents have .
inwalved pilots of all degrees of experience. : .
Statistically, petitioners discovered and tried to ‘prove
that the Bonanza suffersstructural: failure in flight at a:
. rate fifteen times*the rate. of afl other single-engine civil
aircraft? A comparison between the number of Bonanza
_ Structural failure accidents and the number of all others
indicates that for all practical purposes the Bonanza, which .
is the only airplane certificated to make use of the unique
_ “*V?* tail,.is the only’ type @r model airplane that has come:
; apart with anything more ins isolated ‘frequency. .
Despite the obvious and frightening danger in the air-
plane, the Bonanza, at least through the time of the Prash- |
ker aceident, continued to be manufactured with the same _
design defects and without significant corrective changes.
Tle Bonanza conforms-to the standards of the Civil Air _
Regulations, promulgdted by the Civil Aeronautics Board ©
(14 C.F.R. Part 3). It has been and is ‘certificated and
approved by the Civil Aeronautics Administration, largely. |
because it conforms ‘with the standards of the Regulations |
(23e-26¢ )e?
Despite Civil Aeronautics Administration, approval, the .
respondent Beech, saw fit, in 1947 and 1948, to warn
* Bonanza users of the structural failure in flight possibility
in Bonanzas. Detailed accident reports, sometimes in hair-
raising language were sert out to all Bonanza users (PX
64-65, 341a-364a, 320a-323a). This policy, althorgh itself
igadequate to meet the danger, was discontinued in Oc-
tober, 1948, largely because of the pressure from dis-
* This rate is based on a simple comparison of the number of .
structural failure accidents with the- number of aircraf¢ registered
for a six-year petiod through the year of the Prashker accident, and
year by year through that period. The court below, while ruling <
this evidence inadmissible, admitted it was “startling.” er £
* References are to the appendices to the briefs below, unless
otherwise indicated. , ge cs.
°
_
*
ereenres tees @ar' ae (
tributors. and salesmen (3208, 32la, 323a). hiainan
Prashker. the deceased pilot in this case, had not been
given these warning letters, and had: not been tokd about
any of-the forty-five accidents that preceded hig (17a).
This action ariseg out of the 46th- almost identical in-
stance of structural failure in flight of a Bonanza. It in- |
volved Bonanza N-2168D, which was being flown by Nathan
Prashker and was owned by Choice Embroidery & Laces,
Ine, This action wasxbrought by Prashker’s estate and
Choice, for wrongful death, suryival, punitive, and prop-
erty damages against: the respondents, the manufacturer
and distributor of the airplane. It is based both on negli-
gence and breach of warranty. 4 aes
Petitioners’ Claims | be
2 ifjoners sought to prove that the Bonanza had an os- |
cillation characteristic (sometimes called ¢ ‘*fishtailing’’ -
or ‘“‘weaving’’) in air with any degree of turbulence. The
oscillation was of a unique type—creating accelerations
(rates of changes of speed) which would’ disorient a pilot
- and make him physically ill. | Coupled with this oscillation-
4,
acceleration characteristic was the second major factor—
an extremély rapid rate of speed build-up in a nose-down
attitude. Thus if the nose, or front of the airplane, yips i
down (itself a result of the oscillations) the airplane picks -
up speed very rapidly. Finally, at the high speeds wHich,
this plane would attain, a light touch 6n the stick would
create huge loads on the structure, tearing it apart. As
indicated, ifwas-the combination of these characteristics
which, ‘in their interaction, made the Bonanza peculiariy
~ subject to disintegration in flight. a
') . Petitioners claimed that respondents had failed to rive
warning of the great danger .in the airplane; indeed that
they had failed to give warning, required by the cireum-
stances of the large number and high raté of prior acci- Pa
..9
.
oe
6
dents. . They claimed dissemination of false information
abdut, the airplame—that it was safe from a structural
standpbvint, when, in fact, it was known -by respondents to
be especially dangerous. In addigon they: claimed negii-
gent design, as indicated aliove, ané
_failure to correct the bad design, -or add safety devices
-$uch as dive brakes, when the airplane was known to be
unsafe,
The priffipal basis for petitioners’ Gains was evidence.
of the prior accidents and statistical comparison of fail.
ure. mentioned above. Aside from being the most im-
_ portant proof .of notice to Beech, it was the basis for
. @xpert testimony that the cause of the Prashker accident
lay in the characteristics of the Bonanza. Petitioners’
expert witness, Dommasceh,* in testimony later stricken be.
cause it was based in part on prior a@idents which had
. been excluded, testified that the explanation of these ‘ac-
cidents lies ‘tin the characteristics of the airplane which
can induce it to, let-us. sav, disorient a pilot, and also to
bring its nose down rather rapidly without his awarencss -
of this situation’’ (235a). Again, ‘‘that the peculiar han-
; |
more important, a—
dling qualities of this airplaine * * *'? . would, cause .
“eo * * the nose to drop out ang the pilot to become
disoriented. And under these copditions there’ is very
little else he could do at dow altitude but pul] the wings
off when he .recognized By aeaall (236a, 287a).
rg ee ae ad ; . e
a ene . . - “
~* Daniel‘O. Dommasch is “ of the world’s leading aerodynam-
"fests. He is chief of three authors: of “Airplane Aerodynamics,”
which ts the standard- work on aerodynamics*in aeronautical Shoo!s
today, and he is the author of three oth¢r books in the field of acro-
nautics. He set-up the flight test program for the N.A.T.O; natiofs.
He organized and establishéd-the curriculum of the Nayy’s test pilot
trainin division at Patuxent. He is former engineering coordinator
(On-a level with chicf engineerd of Bell Aircraft: Company, former °
project engineer Of the Civil Aeronautics Administration, former
professor at Pripceton University in aeronavtical eygiMeering, and
hé has*been a consul€ant to many. leading aeronautical companies
. (137a-143a, 145a-1d6a, 233a). “
ra) : & ’ , . @
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7
‘ Sos)
~The District Court refused to admit any accident
reports or statistics, on tif issue of causation, and ad-
mitted. only seven reports on the limited issue of notice.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the exclusion of this ,evi-
dence on the unbelievable ground that it was ‘‘irrelevant.’’
The Accident.” ae
The accident herein occurred on October 5, 1953, only
seventeen minutes after ‘Prashker took off from Allegheny -
County Airport (south. of Pittsburgh) on a 4 minute -
flight, northwest, to Cleveland (62a, 76a, 30la, 308a).
Although the takeoff was in a northwest, dirgetion, the
erash was eight miles southeast (62a, 76a).
The takeoff was normal. Prashker. was seen flying abont
. three miles nerthwest (310a). He was not seen nor heard -
- frony until eleven minutes later, at which.time he called-
the Allegheny tower to say “‘he was over the city at-
2300 feet, unable to maintain VFR, and was going to
climb’’“¢208a). It was conceded by the court below tp be
inferrable that prior to making this radio call Prashker
had turned around from his course to Cleveland to avoid
worsening weather condition ahead (opinion, infra, p. 6a),
and that he wa¥ trying to return tu Allegheny County Air-.
port (310a, 3lla). |
Within four minutes, ground witnesses at tle scene of
the crash ‘‘saw a wing fall off an airplane’’ and saw tied?
plane crash to the ground (63a, 76a, 312a). There is no
; ee 4 S P a °
; * The “City” referred to Pittsburgh. and “2300 feet” referred to *
the height above sea Jevel, shown on Prashker's altimeter, as dis-
tinguished from height above the grougd” The Civil Air Regulations
(PX 25) prevent flight at less than one thousand feet over a City
‘or populated area. “VFR” reters to Visual Flight Rules, specified
in those regulations, said flight to be ‘conducted by visual reference
to the ground, objects or clouds (42a, 44a) as distinguished irom,
reference to instruments. e
ee Wii
:
€
8
. question but that in that four minute period Prashker be-
came anxious and‘ excited, that he was disoriented and
lost, that he lost control ofsthe airplane and imposed loads
on its structure that.it could not withstand. This was as-
serted by petitioners as the result of the unique and
‘dangerous flying characteristics of the plane. . Petitioners
— to prove that_on the 45 prior occasions pilots with:
ail degrees of experience, ranging from novices in experi-
“enced instr@ment pilots with a perfect right and all the
necessary qualifications to fly in instrument weather, had -
lost control, and, like Prashker, had pulled their “eee
—_ in p ecisely the same way he had.°
|
The Civil: Air Regulations said certain conditions
*~ of ceiling and visibility without which a -non-instrument.
pilot may not fly (14°C.F.R. 60.30, 60.31, PX 25), They ,
also provide that i in emergency situations the pilot is free
to disregard regulations and act in the interest of im-
mediate safety (14 C.F.R. 60.2, PX 25).
“When Prashker took off from Allegheny the weather
‘there was indisputably well »bove VFR requirements (414,
304a). Furthermore, the reported weather at Greater
Pittsburgh Airport, along the way. and at Cleveland, his
destination, which was the only weather information avaik}
able to Prashker, showed substantial and increasing im-
provement along the route. (63a, 64a, 294a, 304a. 3144)’
There was no ‘specific evidence as to whether Prashker
had actually checked ‘the weather prior to his departure,
but this was inferrable from the.fact that he filed a VFR
light plan, demonstrating his belief that the weather along
>
ee. »
cs
* Eleven of the 45 pilots were qualified instrument pilots (See
accident reports, 260a-261a, PX 32).
” The District Court refused to admit evidence of the omperied-
Cleveland weather. The court below recites this seviderice, however,
as though it were admitted (Opinion; yifra, p. 2a).
a
. ]
the route VER requirements (301a, 307a-30Sa ), There
was als evidence that™it was Prasiiker's regular practree
to chegk the weather (lla).
‘
. Prashker concedédly had no instrument rating (Sa). He
did have considerable ihstrument training, however -(9a, _
lla, PX. 3). He. was described by ‘his brother, also a
pilot, as. ‘ta very apable pilot, a yery safe pilot’? (Sa).
‘He knew the dangers of flying in bad weather (17a) and
his training was such aS would help him avoid bad
weather if that were possible (18a). ° .
.
Rulings of the Courts Below
At the close of the plaintiffs’ case, the. District Court
directed a verdict for the respondents (aj in the ‘claims
_based on negligence, on the ground that the deceased, pilot
was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law,
(b) in the elaim for breach of warranty against the’ dis-
-tributor, on the ground that decedert’s negligence bars a.
recovery, (¢) in the claim fer breachtof warranty against
the manufacturer; on the basis of lack of privity under
- Kansas law, and (¢@} in the claim against the manufacturer
for’ pupitive damages on the ground that there was in-
sufficient evidence. |
On appeal by the petitioners to the Court of Appeals;
-tha® Court ‘affirmed, but on somewhat different grounds. ,
While stating that the petitioners’ position: on tlie ques-
tion of contributory negligence, wes starguable’’, it reiied
‘also. on. an alternative ground #@r decision’, that. the
plaintiffs, failed to prove negligence and breach ‘of war-,
rantv. As indicated, the. court affirmed the exclusion of
evidence of other accidents and the coniparative rate of.
failure on the ground of ‘‘irrelevancy *. & :
~
~y
10
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
ies ee ee
1. Holding the prigr Bonanza disintegration acci-
dents and the Bonanza’s disparate rate of failure
“irrelevant” was gross and shocking error, a vio-
lation of- local law, in conflict with other decisions
of the court below, and a deprivation of . jury
* trial. ‘
As to Prior Accidents °
The court below has decided, as a matter of law, that
the prior accidents were caused by pilot fault, and that.
therefore, they were “‘irrelevant’’ to:the issue of whether
the Bonanza was unsafe, and whethef its characteristics
caused (the Prashker accident (Opinionpsinira, p. Ta)
“This finding is in direct contradiction ty the petinoners’
expert proof that the accidents avere not erused by pilot
fault, but rather by the characteristics of the airplane.
tSee Dominaseh testimons, quoted supra, p. 6). The
court below has, in e ‘ffect, set itself up as a super-e ngineer
who can. read aircraft accident reports With eves “more
_ skilled than those of a jeading expert in the field.
The cour; has conclided that no inferences whatever,
may be drawn from the facet that an airplane comes apart
an the-air. **hecguse of the compromise required with
structural strength in designing an aireraft which will get
off the ‘ground’ (Opinion, imfra, p: lla). It has not
only ignered common sense, but has ignored ‘the direct
testimony -to,the contrary of a man Whose life's work has
heen devoted to aireraft design (See DommaschAestimony,
YT2as and transcript, pp. A887 and 1952). 7 ,
The finding. of the avert be low that the ace ‘denis were
urrebe ‘vant’’ defies understanding. - Instances ‘of struc-
tural failute in flight in Bonanzas are obviousl’ relevant
to the Prashker Instance of structural failure in flight in
a Bonanza, partic ularly when an expert specifiedlly sive
we
eae
eee wh
)
a : :
so, (235a, Zola, OfJa).. True, respondents may attempt
“to explain these instances and. distinguish them from the
Prashker accident. But a court may ari hold that they
are “‘irrelevant’’ as a matter of law.’
. Indeed, these reports of other accidents, were more
than relevant to the issue of causation. They were neces:
sary! “Asked ‘what material do vou as an engineer re-
quire to analyze the Prashker accident and come to a
conclusion om the cause of the Prashker accident,’ Mr.
Dommasch’ rephed ‘a study of similar’ circumstances of °
si@iar occurrences if they exist’’ (170a).. He added, ** thir
“is an essential ingredient, to my analysis —_or
accident’” (17la). a) a
The District Court refused to admit anf of the aceident
reports on the issue of dangerous cofMition and Cuuse-
tion, Since this was éssential evidence its exclusrom ¢ftee
tively prevented petitioners from introdueing specifi ex
pert proof on causation. This determination by the Dis
Os triet Court, along with the exclusion of all other related
evidence on the ground of Srrelevancy, was ‘affirmed 4)
the court below. It was in stark Violation of ‘the law of-
Pennsylvania where pie actident happened, the, law of
Delaware, where the case Was tried, and other deoision=
of the Court of Appeals.
a
*
: ee ° , e ° :
In Fisher v. Pomerows, Ine.. 322 Pa. 38, 185 A. 2h
(1936), and Baker v. Haaeu. 177 Pa. 128, 189, 140, 60
A. 705 (1806), fhe Stuprenw Court of Petnevivania clearly
”
aye
‘The court below, wenteeven furthest and impliedly held te
ever) the admisstor Of evidetice of sever ac idemi-, om the amute
issue of motice, Was Not M arranted. This was in direct conta Tretaent
_ tg the Court's holding. in Defugenw AMlis:Chaimers A/ta ¢
210 F.2d 404, 414 «C. A. 3, 1954,;,°crting Baltimore OF ie WB
v- Felgenhauer, 168 *. 2d 12,17 (C. A. 8, 1948), a twas conefars
to cleer Pennevivania Law. Aladicr \ Kirschbuvm Co., 208 ¥: att)
148 A. 851 (1930). Sehok V Pennsyivania bdison Co. 331 Va. 524
1A. 2yi GBO ¢1938); and Reid v Lintk, 200. Pa. 10 55 AL MY
(1903). : 5
held that evidence of prior occurrences was relevant. and
admissible on the issues of the existence’ of a dangerous
‘condition, and causation. ,
Potter v. Natural.Gas Company, 183 Pa: 575, 590, 39
A. 7 (1898), to the same effect, has striking significance
to the question at bar. One pricr instance, in which a pipe
laid by defendant at.the side of a highway had, through
a seraping sound made by the wheel of a_cart passing
over it, frightened a horse and caused him te jump, Was _
> held admissible. The court said it was reievant to deter-
mine whether - the pipe, in its position. on the road, was
dangerous to travelers by horse and vehicle: that if ©
excited fear in an ordinarily gentle horse, it-was:- part of
plaintiff’s case to preve it; that if the plaintiff's horse in
the ease then at bar: had jumped only becanse it was
exceptionally excitable, the defendant was not ‘bound to
foresee the danger. and guard against ‘it.
os
© In the instant case petitioners were ‘obliged to show
that the accident was caused by the dangerous character-
istics of the Bonanza airplane, rather than by any ~
proper conduct on the part of Prashker. The proof o
the prior accidents, which involved pilots of all rac
of experience, including pilots with air transport ratings.
instrument ratings, and commercial licenses,- was Clear.
demonstraticn that the Prashker accident, as well as, the
others, was caused by the airplane rather than the a
_dn Patton vy. B. dO. RR. Co., 197 F. 2d 732, 739 (C.
. 1952), the plaintiff's decedent had ton killed by ee
runaway gondola ears. The case was based upon negli.
gence in maintenance of brakes ‘on’ the defendant’s cars.
Emplovees of the railroad vard where the accident had
taken plaée testified to prior incidents where handbrake
‘on B. & O. ears proved inadequate, and wouldn’t hold.-
The court, which was the same court, though a different
pane! of judges as the court below, held that this was
not erros despite the fact-that the particular four ears
involyed in the accident were not singled out.
re, Gea.
13
In Hadley v. B. € 0. R. Co., 120 F. 2d 993, 995 (C.. A.
3, 1941), cited ‘in the Patton case, the Court said, at
page 995:
3 »
‘‘Furthermore the testimony qualified as relevant and
material under the general rule, that ‘the fact that
a given result recurs continually and frequently while
but one cause remains constant, is’ strong proof that.
such’ cause produces the result in question * * °’.
Henry Pennsylvania Trial Evidence, 3rd Ed. 33.”’
In Dimenco v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 19 F.R.D.
499
(D. Del., 1956), Chief Judge Leahy stated (p. 501):
‘A survey of authority indicates evidence of other
accidents and near accidents admissible to show dan-
werous character,and notice provided the nature of
‘che subject matter as in issue and provided substan-
tially similar‘conditions dstablish its probative value.”
e
At page 503, ‘he said: °
.
°
““T therefore find evidence of prior’ accidents and .
near accidents relevant and material ‘and ‘therefore -
admissjble under proper instructions, not as direct
evidence of the. fact of negligence, but to show the °
dangerous character of the crossing, notice to the
defendant, and failure thereafter to take proper: pre-
-eautions; evidence of subsequent accidents and near —
accidents, though not logically determinative of not-ce
of a prior condition, may be admissible to show exist- .
enee of dangerous character anc failure to take prover
precautions.”’ { ,
* As to Statistics ‘\
The court below affirmed the exclusion of the statistical
p. 1
proof in'very sweeping terms. It stated (Opinion, m/ra,.
Za): | ;
“As to the, issue of causation by a design defect,
the statistic tends to prove nothing more than the
a
: . It
individual accident reports. It is extremely dubious’
in fact, whether statistics involving probabilities as
to causation hive ‘any significane e at all w hen applied
toa particular incident.’ at 4
If the court is correetone-wonders how such ek
accepted ‘statistical’? evidence’as expectancy of life tables
are admitted. Actually, petitioners’ “‘statisties’* were
véry simple. .They consisted of CAA and CAB informa.
tion on the number of airplanes registered and the num-
her of strueturat fadure accidents. The Bonanza’s rate
of failure was 15 times the rate for all other airplanes,
by a siinple comparison, -
-nW right v. Carier Products Inc., O44 F. 9d-53, 56,
oF (GC. AL 2, 1957), a recent manufacturer’s liability
case involving the duty to warn, the defendant souglit
to establish the safety of its product, by a-statistical analy-
sis of the inéidence of injury. The Disiriet Court relied
very heavily upon -the small incidence in finding’ in favor
of the defendant. The Court of “Appeals, in reversing the.’
District Court inferentially ac knowledged that the sta-
‘ tistic had probative foree, altuough not the force given to
it by pe lower court.
In affirming the exclusion of thé statistieal proof, the
court below applied an incomprehensibie logic. The court
has said that since the statisties are based in part upon
Bonanza accidents whieh are irrelevant (Sinee, as a mat-
ter of law, the accidénts were caused bw pilot fallibility)
’ ‘
Sed eee
the statistics are also irre ‘levant. The court ptself admits .
the statistic is startling’ (infra, p. La).
“The statistics show that for any and all reasons the
Jonanza comes apart more than fifteen times as often as
all other aircraft. They consider all instances of struc-
tural failure in flight in single-engine civil airplanes. Theie
effeet is to eliminate extraneous and contributing factors
of causation, such as’ pilot fault, and to evaluate the rela-
15
tive safety of the Bonanza. The statistics demonstrate
the falsity of the assumption made by the court below—
that the Bonanza*accidents were ‘caused by pilot fault.
Inca sense, the statistics provide further proof that the
particular aceident reports were admissible on the issue
‘of dangerous condition, and causation,
This evidence was probative of the questions of nevli-
gence, ‘causation, and contributory negligence, since it
demonstrated that it was the airplane and not the pilots
that cased these accidents; and since it furnished the basis -
for expert proof to te same effect. The @ffect of its shock’
ing exelusion was to deny petitioners their constitutional
right to trial by jury.
cy
\
| 2. The direction of a verdict on the “alternative”
grounds of contributory negligence as a matter
of law and failure to prove negligence was a
shocking ‘invasion of the jury’s function, @ denial
of petitioners’ right to juty trial, and in conflict
‘ .. with standards well settled by this Court.
|
Even without the important evidence of the other acei-
dents, petitioners were clearly entitled toe go tor the jury
in their claims of negligence sand breach of warranty. This
right bas ‘been. denied them on the “‘altérnative* ground=
that (1) the decedent was cuilty of contributory negligence
‘asa matter ‘of Taw, and (2) ‘*no negligence can be imputed
to the defendants (Opinionsampra, p. 1a). oe
a. Contributory Negligence as a Matter of Law
It is net entirely clear whether the court below did or
did not base its deeision on contributory negligence. The
court said, infra, p. 72:
“A decision based on Prashker’s contributory negli-
rence alone would depend on a presmunary holdime
that the evidenee would not support an inference that
— .
16.
bad weather may have dined in on him even though
-he Was exercising .due care for his-own safety. We.
‘incline to the view that no such inference is available,
but concede that the question may be arguable. There-
fore * * * we prefer to rely also on an alternative
ground far, decision. We think that no negligence
can be imputed to the defendants. ?
How can the ‘question of ‘contributory negligence he
Rig soe , and still not be left for the jury? - Schulz
.. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 350 U. S. 52% , 16 8.
Ct 608 (1956), this court, citing the Seventh Amendment's
guarantee of the right to trial by jury, and having ‘granted
certiorari to consider the failure of the District Court to
let this case go to the jury, 350 U. S. 882,’’ stated (p. 526):
‘*The very essence of its function is to select from
among conflicting inferences’ and ee: that,
which it considers most reasonable.’
The ‘charge that Prashker was guilty of: contributory
negligence rests entirely on the. proposition | that he wil-
fully flew in instrument conditions while not possessing an
instrument rating.. The only. specifie indication of what
he did, however, is set forth in his own words. on the con-
trel tower radio—that he found himself ‘unable to main-
tain VFR,” and that he was ‘‘going to climb’? (30S8a).
The court below admits that it is ‘“‘inferrable from the
time intervals involved’’ that before giving this message,
-and shortly’ after taking off from Allegheny ‘County Air-
port, Prashker encountered worsening esnditions, and
turned back (Opinion, infra, p. 6a). “This, of course, is
the conduct of a reasonable, safe, pilot, who, &fter taking
off in-weather that is well above VER requirements, and .
headed in a direction where all av ailable weather reports
show substantially bettter conditions, finds that thie weather
_ ahead of him is worse than he hada right to expect. He
_furns, in an attempt to return to the airport of his de-
mi mig *
it
parture, but finds himself. trying to return through an
‘area Where the weather has deteriorated, and over a city,
where Regulations forbid him from flying at less” than
1,000 feet, He cannot -go down.. On his own ‘statement
he cannot maintain VFR at his level of flight., He does”
what, indeed, is the safest thing for him to do. He indi-*
cates to the tower controller (the aviation equivalent of
a policeman onthe ground) that he is going to climb so
that the tower may warn other aircraft of his presences
and he‘does climb, to get as much space between himselt |
and the ground as possible, and in the hope. that he will
find clear weather above. are :
‘Even if Prashker’s conduct was not aidea by a very
strong presumption of due care og the part.of a decedent,
its every move (from his turning from his course to Cleve-
land to his message to the tower) smacks of due care.
But, decisive of the question, is the very strong ‘presump-
-tion that the pilot exercised due care fer his own safety’.
Rennekamp v. Blair, 375, Pa, 620,101 A. 2d 669 (1954).
applying Pennsylvania law, applicable herein, inva strik-
ingly similar situation.” ee
;
The finding: of contributory negligence, if indeed there
was such a finding below, is in clear vioiation of the well
settled principle, to which the’ court below pays lip service,
that on a motion for a directed verdict at the close of plain-
tiff’s: case all evidence and inferences to be drawn there-
¢
* Respondents advanced the argurfent below. that the mere fact
that a VFR pilot flies in instrument weather constitutes a violation -
| ;
of Regulations. ‘This is rekutted by holdings of the: Civit Aero-
nautics Board in proceedings to remove or suspend. pilots’ licenses,
‘brought by the CAA. The CAB held that mere fact not-to be a
Violation, Rather, the determinative question is whether the pilot
knew, in advance, thit he would encounter instrument conditions,
and continued to:fly through those conditions nevertheless, or whether
he was confronted witht an emergency situation. See Pope, 33 CAB:
Rep. 514 (1950), Jungersen, 13 CAP. Rep. 544, 553, 554 (1952),
anil Jackson, 13 CAB Rep. 103 (1945).
ay
So 2
ls eee
from weet be read in ,the light most tavereble to the
piaintiffs, It is also a violation of the: principle. voiced in
Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U. Sv 645, 66 S.:Ct. 740 (1945); and,
followed in Pennsylvania in’ Antonelli v. Tumolo, 390 Pa.
6S, 73, 102 A. 2d 285 (1957) that it is error to take a case
froma the jury on the basis of inferences*in favor of a de-'
fendant, _— there are contrary inferences in favor of a
plaintiff,--
The decision below, if itis based on a finding of eon-
tributory, negligence as a matter, of.law, demands exercise
. of this Court’s supervisory powers, for. it is a transpareiit
invasion of the jury’s province which h should’ be checked
here before it gets out of bounds. * +.
b. Failuré to Prove Negligence ond Breach of Warranty
This Court has no more soleynn duty than the protection
~ of the Constitution and the rights and liberties guaranteed
by it.
“The right of jury trial in civil cases at common law
is a basic and fundamental feature of our system of
Iederal jurisprudence which is protected by the
Seventh Amendment, a right, so fundamental and
szered to the citizen * * * should be jealously guarded
by the court.” ;
These are the opening lines of this Court’s opinion in
Jacob v. City of New York,.315'U. S. 752, 86 L. Ed. 1166, -
' 1168 (1942), reversing the affirmance of a District -Court’s
dismissal of an action at the close of plaintiff’s ease upon
the ground that plaintiff-had failed: to prove faets sufficient
to justify submitting to the jury the issue of defendant’s-
negligence. Aceord Schulz v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.,
300 U. S. 523, 76 8. Ct. 608 (1956) which similarly,
reversed a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff’ S$ case.
There can be no doubt that even without the important
evidence of the 45 prior accidents, on the issues of danger-
ous condition-and causation, petitioners far exceeded the
minimum ‘Tequirements of proof of negligence.
“
<
a qa ) Failure to Warn
¥; ,
. The ovlusiaia allegation ‘PRtitioners made was that iiicl
failed to give necessary warnings of a danger and propen-
sity for structural failure in the Bonanza. The District
Court admitted proof of, seven prior Bonanza structural
failure accidents on the limited issue of notice. It further
admitted expert testimony that, they reports gave notice
of a danger, or accident propensity in the Bonanza
(24Sa-251a, 271a, 272a).: 5 ti i
_ Petitioners* expert, Dommasch, testified, on the basis
of material admitted into evidence and within the knowl-
edge of Beech, that the seven accident -reports ‘‘con-
stituted a notice’’ of the dangerous character of the Beech
Bonanza’ (249a). He ‘said it was ‘‘an. indication#st a
_ pattern of characteristics: which induced a certain type:
of response * * * notice that a group of characteristics .
of the airplane was such as to make the airplane accident
prone under certain types of operating conditions * * °
notice that the specific characteristics of this lateral
directional oscillation behavior in turbulent air, its ability
to drop its nose or,.rather to accelerate very rapidly if
the nose goes down under these conditions ean as a
“combination produce a set of circumstances w thich can get
A pilot into very serious trouble” (251a. See also 27la,
272a). - ; : zs
There is ample evidence, and ‘it is “undisputed, that
respondents gave no- warnings at all of a particnlar danger
or propensity for failure in the Bonanza, to say nothing
of a specific warning of the occurrence of the prior acci-
dents (17a, 21a, 22a, 25a, 29a, 39a, 40a). Thus, evga if
there were no other<evidence of notice in the récord than
the seven’ aecident reports and Dommasch’s testimony,
ahove; petitioners would have established a prima facie
case of negligence based upon: respondents’ failure to
warn. Pennsylvania law provides that the nature and
degree of the ‘warning. given must be proportionate to
the nature and degree of the danger ,itselfy Maize v.
20
8 »
“Atlantic Refixing Co... 352° Pa. 51, 410A. 2d 850 (1945).
Involved in these seven accidents was the danger of death,
for no one survived any of the accidents. it was obviously
for the jury to say if the failure to warn, under the
circumstances, was negligence.
In. addition, however, there Was admitted an. aetndy,
. namie report that. Beech itself had prepared years before
the Prashker ‘accident, which demonstrated know ledge by
Beech of the unusual danger in the airplane. The report
(PX 72, 368a) considered the rapid rate of acceleration of
a airplane in a nose down attitude and the use of dive
brakes as a safety device. It states, in part: Sa
« “The model 35 is considered a very high perform.
ance airplane for this class of -plane yet may be oper-
ated hy an@inexperienéed pilot. It has heen considered, -
therefore, that dive brakes mitht be used as a safety
feature and- als® for the: psychological effect on the
* pilot. For example: if an inexperienced pilot enters
a cloud and becomes confused, he might be endangered
by the fact that the airplane, if flying 166 m.p.h. and in
a slightly nose down condition, can in a few seconds
. build up to 190 or 200 m.p.h. At this point, 200 m.p.h.,
the airplane attained a speed of 220 m.p.h. in a few
seconds the airplane. could still be decelerated to a
normal speed without great. discomfort or difficulty
bythe pilot.’’
Similarity, a second report prepared by Beech (PX 42,
p. C-4, 340a) proeier Beech’s concern with the rate of ac-
celeration in a nose down attitute of the Bonanza, particu-
larly with respect to the possibility’ of its being flown by
inexperienced pilgts. It set forth a rate of, acceleration
which Beech’s own Chief of Aerodynamies, Gordon, éalled
.to testify by the petitioners, reluctantly admitted was so
fast, it whs impossible’? | (218a-221a).
the flaps would be automatically extendedg Even if
]
,.@
21 -
4
A :eport of the National Advisory Committee of \ero-
. pauties received by Beech (PX 22, 340a), stated: **the ease
with which the Bonanza ‘airplane cag exceed its maximum
allowable air speed could make it diffieult for an inexperi-
enced pilot to maintain a safe speed.’’ In another plage
(p. 14) it referred to ‘*the ease with which the airplane
- ean exceed its maximum allowable airspeed in relatively
gradual dives.’’ (italics supplied). And in still another
section it reported that ‘tas a result ef thé low damping
of the lateral oscillations the Bonqnza was subject to con-
tinuous oscillations in rough air. * * * The pilot stated
that it was impossible to stop these rough air excited. os-
cillations.’’ (118a). Sef |
There was also evidence that, in addition to the seven
‘instances of structural failure in flight, there were other
instances, known and inyestifated by Beech, of+structural
deformation short of complete failure, also caused by the.
development of excessive loads in flight (316a-317a). With
’ the adimitted fact that po warnings of a danger or propen-
sity for failure in the airplane were given Prashker, the
finding by the court below that the petitioners had failed
to prove negligence, even on the sole basis of failure to
warn, is axcounding. The court below says (Opinion,
infra, pp. Sa-Ya) :
“Even if it can be said that there is a duty to warn
of the. dangers in exceeding the inherent restrictions
in any aireraft, that duty. was adequately discharged
by the warnings to avoid instrument flicht conditions
which ‘would be the only anticipated way the restric-
tions could be unintentionally exceeded by a pilot.”’
This finding is a shocking deprival to the petitioners of
_ their constitutional right to have a jury make that deter-
‘mination. ft was elearly for the jury to.say if the nature
of the information given by respondents, none of Which
pointed ‘to an unusual danger or propensity in the Bonanza,
satisfied their duty to warn under the circuzustances. See
:
"22
the striking recent case of 7 ampa Drug Co. v. Wait, 103
So. 2d 603 (Fla.,-1958) where the fourt held it was for the’
jury to decide whether a manufacturer of a floor cleaning
. ° a a be . . v
fluid containing dangerous carbon tetrachloride, which, had
in fact included a warning on the product’s label, had given
sufficient warning... \
. \ ,
° (2) Negligent Design
The court below virtually ignores petitioners’ principal
claim of failure to warn and confines its: consideration to
the claim of negligent design. And, even in doing that, it
careens blithely through the evidence, accepting only that
view and those inferences that supportgts conclusion. In
this respect also, it is in direct conflict with the principle
-of Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U. S. 645, 66 S. Ct. 740 (1945),
and Antonelli v..Tumulo, 390 Pa. 68 (1957), 182 A. 2d 285,
that a verdict may not be directed, on the basis of infer-°_
ences against a party, when there are contrary inferences
in his favor. .
% . ; . . 7 ce
First, the court below examines the three’principal de-
sign defécts alleged by petitioners seriatim despite peti-
tioners’ assertion that it was the unique combination of
’ these characteristics that made the airplane exceedingly
dangerous. The court thus disposes of petitioners’ charge
that the stick loads were. dangerously light, by pointing
out that they exceeded military requirements for planes
designed to perform even more violent maneuvers than the
Bonanza. That military planes generally have much
rreater structural strength (ability to withstand loads),
thot they do not have the Bonanza’s unique ‘V’ tail which
cuts down drag and allows the airplane to pick up speed
so rapidly, and that they do not have the Bonanza’s tinique
Fs sgh
oscillation-indueed accelerations — these things are not
mentioned by.the court below. ° Yet it-is the existence of
these characteristics in the Bonanza’ that requires high
stick forces. In short, it is the combination of characteris-
ties that make the Bénanza unsafe.
3
$
: : é 23.
The court below ignores the fact that the Bonanza’s
oscillations are of a most extraordinary kind. They pro-
duce accelerations (rates of changes of speed) that induce
peri and disorientation on the part of a pilot (229a- °
Wa, 28la, 285a). Furthermore, even the highly skilled
; test pilots of the National Advisory Committee on Aero-
nauties found it ‘‘impossible to stop — 7 air. eX- .
cited oscillations’’ ip the’ Bonanza (PX 22, 118a). The
proof was that all aircraft do not have the same oscillation
ns and all do- not pitch to the same degree .
o76a, 134¢). eee :
The:court below states (Opinion, infra, p. 7a) ‘‘but
the testimony was that the nose of the Bonanza does not
drop of its own accord.*’ This was the testimony “of
Beech’s Chief of Aerodynamics, which itself was full of
qualifications (51¢c).. It was contradicted by Dommasch
who stated that in view of the design of the: Bonanza’s .
unique ‘*V’’ tail; it was possible that a pitching motion
could be inadvertently induced‘ by the pilot (232a-233a).
It was:also contradicted by his testimony that the NACA
report showed a rapid nose down pitch and build up of
speed associated with it (Transcript, p. 1762).
The court: below then states (Opinion, infra, p: Sa) “the /
acceleration once the plane was in a nose down attitude
was not extreme for.an aireraft of clean design.’’ Plain-
tiff’s Exhibits 22, 42 and 72, discussed ‘at pages 20-21,
supra, were strikingly to the contrary.
The court below has ‘read. the evidence in the light most:
unfavorable to petitioners, contrary to the well established
principle set forth in its own opinion (infra, p. 4a). Even
on the claim of negligent design, petitioners proved a prima
facie case.
More is at stake ‘here than the interests of the parties
to this controversy. , The right to jury trial itself has been
impaired. In the past this court has exercised its super-
visory powers to preverft infringement of jury trial far
\
gy ea | ; fist.
%4 ae
less sweeping and far lesg dangerous than occurred below.
In Union Trust Company vy. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 350
U.S: 907, 76.8. Ct. 192 (1955), this court sranted certiorari
and summarily reversed an order of the’Court of Appeais
for the District of Columbia Circuit which set aside a jury
verdict and ordered a new trial‘in a div ersify action brouglit
by the estates of deceased passengers against, an airline.
In Swofford vy. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 350 U.S. 807
(195 ), a diversity of citizenship negligence action, laa
Court granted certiorari and summarily reversed the
Court of Appeals forthe Fifth Circuit which had reversed
“a jury verdict for plaintiff on the ground that the -evi-
dence required a finding that the aecident had been gue
solely to tf negligence of plaintiff’ 's decedent.
‘In Gibson Vv. Phillips Petroleum Company, 3 302 U.S. S74,
7S. Ct. i6.(1956), this court again granted certiorari
a summarily reversed the reversal of a jury verdiet and |
direction of a verdict for defendant hy the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Cireuit in a diversity neghigence suit.
In Pokora v. Wabash Railway Co., 292 U.S. 98 (1934),
cert. granted 290 U.S. 624 m2 this. court) granted
certiorari and reversed the affirmaiee of 2 directed ver
dict for the defendant, in a WBAde-crossing diversity e ase,
on the ground that the plaintiff was guilty of ‘contributory
negligence, --
i. Penant Peoria Pekin Union Rt. Co:, 321-U.
29, 35, SS L.Ed. 625 (1943), an action brought under i
Podoral Employers Liability Act, this Court, finding **no.
reason * * * why we should abdicate our duty to protect
and guard that rig’. [jury ‘trial],"* granted certiorari and
reversed a Cirenit Court reversal of a‘jury verdict. In
. the exercise of its supervisory powers, this Court should
correct the excesses below. :
3. The decision wn adversely aifects the rights
of many other litigants, present and future. It is
improperly, though implicitly, based upon the_
findings of an administrative agency. -
The Beechcraft Bonanza was manufactured and certifi-
eated under Part 3 of the Civil Air Regulations—the see-
tion of- the Civil Air Regulations, promulgated by the
Civil Aeronauties Board, applicable to most private air-
planes and all private single-engine airplanes. The air-
plane gheets all the standards of Part 3 and, largely for
that reason, has. been approved as ‘*safe’™ by the Civil
Aeronautics Administration (28e-26c). It meets all the
specific tests that a bal 3 airplane ix subjected to. Yet,
even before the first’ Bonanza was sold, in U7, Beéeh
knew that it Wis unusnall¥ Subject to structural failure
in flight, particularly when being flown by an inexperienced
pilot (PX 72, 36Sa, quoted, supra, p. 20).
From the time of its initial sale Bonanzas have come
apart with alarming frequency, The accidents did not
stop with, the Prashker aceident, which was number 46,
but have continued at about the same rate. At the time
the trial herein started (September, 1957) there had been
74 such accidents aceordiag to CAA and. CAB reports in
petitioners” possession, Qne Bonanza came apart in the
air while the trial was on, and from October 9th, 1957,
wheh the District Court directed a verdict threuch the
end of 1957, four more disintegrated, making a total of
7% through the end of 1957, with no survivors of any of the
accidents. Petitioners do net know how many have oe-
curred since 1957. ° ®
These accidents have been investigated, some by the
CAB, which is the agency tat promulgated the standards,
and some by the CAA, which granted the approval. They
have been considered separately, one at a time.” When
thus viewed they have often appeared to be instances of
pilot’ error—in flying into bad weathe r.
S)
26
The petitioners herein were the first, so far as is known,
te pinpoint the design of the airplane as the cause of these’
accidents. They were the first to discover that the Bon-
anza’s rate of structural failure was 15 times the rate
for all other comparable airplanes, despite the fact that
the statistical material which demonstrated this fact was
official CAA and CAB information, which obviously had
been available to these agencies, and which they had
ignored. ’
Seven tent actions arising out of Bonanza disintegra-
tion arcidents are now pending.”’. If the evidence of other. |
aceidents is irrelevant.in the ‘Prashker case, it is presum-
abla irrelevant in the other eases. Some of the other
actions involve pilots who had instrument ratings and a.
perfect right to {lv in instrument weather. Some jnvolve
the application of the law of comparative negligence. Yet,
if the deeision below. stands, and sparticularly if the acci-
dent reports and. statistical comparison are, held to be
‘‘irrelevant’’, it is AP that any one of the plaintiffs
in those cases can prov eagase, + oa
And, since there have be ‘en many other accigle nts, wherein
suit has not heen instituted, and accidents. ‘that have not
Vet happened but that will happen until the negligent situa-— |
tion is corrected, many other potential litigants will be
denied just redress by virtue of the decision helow.
in the briefs and arguinents below: respondents took_the
pesition that CAA apprWal of the airplane _ established,
de cate on the part of respondents as a matter of law.
(See. for example, beech’s brief below, pp. 3-5, 27.) The
court expressed great interest inthis proposition in. Ms
questions to counsel on the argument below. Yet in its
In the United States District Court for the District ef Dela-
ware: Cleminshaw v. Beech, Civil No. 1067, Mitchell vo Beech.
Ciwil No. 1783, Day v. Beech, Civil No. 1828, Johnstone v. Beéec!:
and Adlantic, Civil No, 1881, and Van sllphen v. Beech, Civil-No.
2028. In the Delaware State Court: Weissman vo Beech and Atlantic.
Civil No. S65 (also arising ,out of the Prashker accident), and
Weeson v. Beech, Civil No. 1278.: ‘
ae, ‘OT oe
e
“opinion the court helow carefully refrains from basing
iis decigion on CAA approval. The court does say, in
part (Qpinion, w/ra, p. 7a) ‘tany airplane certificated
by the CAA as) was the Bonanza. must be statically
stable."” Petitioners would agree with this statement
only with the qualifieation that the term, ‘statically -
stable.” is used “as defined in the Civil: Air Regulations,
and aceording to the. very limited eriteria used by the
CAA in itaking the determination. Mr.. Domumasch. tes-
tified that the Civil Air Regulations, insofar as they apply
to stability characteristics, were so general as to lose
-aneaning completely. He said {transeript p. ISS): °
°
“© * * this eannot be in my opinion considered de-
tailed. If you say a maximum should be 40 pounds,
"and there is no minimum, it is ‘saying that the Inaxi-
muni weight of every human being will not exceed a
thousand pounds and calling this descriptive of a
human being or specifie information. iE he
‘T do not criticize the regulations in any way, but I
do hold that there is a great deal of room for pro-.
tied downspecitically ; * 7 *"’
e F .
To have recited in its pinion the. patently erroneous
doctrine advanced by_r &pondents, that government ap-
proval establishes due care as a matter of law, would have
“heen to have invited quick reversal by his Court. Bat we
suggest that it-is there just the same, éven in addition to
the specific reliance, indicated above, on the’ CAA‘s find-
ing of statie stability. There is no other reasonable way
‘to explain the ainazingly wrong decision of the court below
(1) on the. admission of evidence, (2) on contributory negli- -
gence as a matter of law, and (3) on the legal sufficiency
of the evidence presented. The court below has arrogated
-to itself the, power to decide that petitioners are not en-
titled to-recover. — It has done so, with one ere on CAA
approval and another eye on the practical consequences of
28
. a verdict fer the petitioners herein. It has usurped that
power from the jury, guaranteed to petitioners by tlie
Constitution. And it has taken the precious right of jury
trial from other victims of these needless accidents, as
well.. ‘
. . $ & . - . . ‘ E .
If this right can be impaired in the instant case because
governmental agencies with presumed competente in the
field have decided that an airplané is ‘safe, or because the ba
consequences of -a-plaintiffs* verdict are far reaching, then
the structure of the jury system itself is threateneds. The
decision below represents a gross and alarming: departure
from our constitutional tradition of jury trial, which this -
Court should check here.
CONCLUSION
The“decision below i is grounded upon an apparent
indifference to the jury’s exclusive function and right
to decide contested questions of fact. ‘It is a gross and’
alarming departure from our ‘constitutional jury tradi-
tion which should be checked here. If the many
families affected are:to be protected, if more, than lip
service'to the jury system is to be compelled, and if the
right of jury trial is to be guarded against the errosive
effect of labelling obviously admissible evidence “‘ir-
relevant”—then the decision of the court below must
be reviewed and reversed here. . In the exercise of its
‘supervisory jurisdiction, this Court should grant the
petition for a writ of certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
Harotp LEsHEM,
Lee S. Krernpvuer,
q - Counsel for Petitioner.
Of Counsel> Reteie
Lee S. Krernpier,
Musrox G. Sincorr, -
P Jay R. HANpWERGER:
“
APPENDIX
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For tHe Tuirp Circuit }
No. 12,445.
GoLDIE B. PRASHKER, EXECUTRIX OF THE EstTaTE OF NATHAN.
Prasuker, Deceasgp, anp CHoice EMBROIDERY & Laces,
Inc.,
Appellants, | * -
. . v.
\ ‘
oe Beecu AIRCRAFT CoRPORATION AND ‘ATLANTIC AVIATION
CoRPORATION. A ers
7 .
. ’
AppeaL From THe Uniren States Districr Court For THE
io District of DELAWARE.
Argued April 18, 1958
Before Goopricn, McLavGHLin and STALey, Circuit Judges.
Opinion of the Court
(Filed July 21, 1958) ;
By “McLaveutin: Circuit Judge.
Nathan Prashker was a young man, twenty-seven years
old, unmarried, president of a family corporation, and the
holder of a private pilot’s lieense with some 215 hours
flying time to his credit. Or October 5,°1953 he undertook .
to fly from Allegheny County Airport near Pfttsbt rgh to
. Cleveland, about 150 iniles-distant, With his cousin, f young
“man who. was the father of several children. Thé visual
flight plan filed with the Allegheny tower by Prashker called
for a flight of approximately 42 minutes at 3,000 feet in a
ae
-
. | 2a
Appendix,
Beechcraft Bonanza, N 2168 D, recently acquired by the
_ family corporation and in which Pr: ashker had logged some
‘forty hours of flying time. — . ek
At the take-off point the-ceiling was estimated as S00
feet, visibility four miles with ¢ight rain band himae.—AT the |
Greater Pittsbursh—tirport conditions were better with
broken clouds at 5,000 feet, overcast at 9 O00 feet, visibility
12 miles with light rain. At Cleve land the ceiling was
15,000 feet with broken ciouds below t'.at, visibility 12 miles.
There is no indication other than that he was in the habit
of doing so that the weather conditions actually were
checked by Nathan Prashker, | so a
. N 2168 D with Nathan —— at. beh yuan de-
parted Allesheny County Airport at 12:09 P.M. he aded in
a northwest by west direction With instructions to Use cau-
tion.in passing through the Greater P ittsburgh area which
had a lot of instrument traffic. At 1222 the’ pilot called
Allegheny tower by radio, advising that he was’ over the
City of Pittsburgh at 2.500 feet, was unable to maintain
visual references, and that he was into and climbing up
through the overcast. immediately after the towér had:
advised that their last re pert for the tops-of the overcast
had heen 3.800 feet. Pittsbarch tower, who apparently had
heard P rashker report, called Alleghe ‘ty tower to advise
that a jet reported the cloud tops at 33,600 feet. This in- ‘
Jormation was relayed to N 2168 D and the pilot was then
asked sfor his approximate position. r rashker replied
terselt that he didn’? know. He was axked if he wepted to
return to the airport and he nervously said that he did hut
that ke didn’t know his position and that he was incapable
of fiving on instruments. : a
Immediately Allegheny tower: ‘cin Pittshart tower
to take a direction-finding reading on N 2168 D’s transinis-
sions and thie pilot was told to give a short count. The tower
heard him give the count and his identification. Pittsburgh
tower then told them to have the pilot steer 325 degrees
magnetic ;.this was immediately relayed to the pilot with the
3
iinet bi te
‘
a z “a
va 2 ee
; Appe ndi. r. \ :
information that it would take him to Conair Pittsburgh
Airport and that he should break out **in the vicinity of the
]
‘river’’. The acknowledgement came as a-broken and poor
transmission, Allegheny tower repeated the steerand-ad-
vised that the plane switch radio frequencies to work the
Greater Pittsburgh Airport, but there was ny ac -knowledge-
went. Repeated calls in the next minute were not answered. |
They at 12:27 an outside telephone call was received
from a woman reporting that she and a neighbor had’ just
seen an aircraft go behind a hill and that they thought it
had crashed. Eight minutes later a man ¢allea to report:
that he and his co-werkers had seen a’ wing fall off a plane
and that the plane had crashed in Pangburn Hollow, near
Elizabeth, Pennsvivania. Wiccan :
_ The crash scene was in a hilly, heavily wooded area
near but out of sight of the Monongahela River, about §
miles: south-southeast of the .Allegheny County Airport...
The left wing was detached from the main‘body of wreckage
and lav about 250 yards back along the flight path. The
left stabilizer and part of the rudder were Missing.
_These actions were brought in Delaware’ against Beech,
Aireraft Corporation as the manufacturer of the Bonanza.
and against Atlantic Aviation Corporation as the seller of
the aircraft, both of them-Delaware corporations, by the
executrix of ‘the estate of Nathan -Prashker and by Choice
Embroidery and Lace Company, the Prashker family cor-
poration, incorporated: in New: York, which owned the air-
eraft. Jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship.
The claims against Atlantic are-for breach of the im-
plied warrantly of merchantability and for negligent failure
to warn of known dangerous propensities of the aircraft.
Four allegations of negligence are made against Beech:
(1} that the airplane was improperly designed; (2) that
after receiving notice of the improper design it failed to
make changes; (9) ‘that there was a failure to include
: The. execitrix herself is a new je rsey resident ; the decedent
was a resident of Pe mnsylvania.
|
4a .
Appendix. oe
necessary safety devices; and (4) that there was a failure .
to warn of the prospective dangers. Additionally there is
ar allegation sounding in deceit that it was a CONSCIOUS
, Poliey of Beech to disseminate false information as to the
strength and safety of the Bonanza. ‘There was further a
claim against Beech for breach ‘of warranty. ;
At the conclusion of a three week. presentation of the
- plaintiffs’ evidence, the trial court directed’ a verdict in
favor of the.defendanis on the grounds that Nathan Prash-
ker had. ineontrovertibly been eontributorily negligent,
thereby barring recovery on any claims of negligence, that
there was no privicy between Beech and the plaintiffs to
sustain recovery on breach of warranty under the applica-
ble law of Kansas, and that though there was an implied
‘warranty ‘of merehantability between‘ Atlantic and the
plaintiffs there eSuld be no recovery thereon when the
damage to the plaintiffs. had beén proximately taused by
their own representative’s contributory negligence.
It is a truism that on a motion by the defendant for
a directed verdict -at the close @® the } ointiff’s case, the
evidence ‘and all the inferences reason oly ta be drawn
therefrom,must be viewed, in the light P ist favorable tu
the plaintiff:
We consider first thie hiatter of Nathan Prashker’s coun-
tributory negligence. Because the harm occurred im Penn-
sylvania, tnat is the place of the alleged tort. The United
States Distriet Court of Delaware. in vu diversity action *
posing a conflict of laws question looks to the conflicts rule
of Del aware to determine \the law .to be applied. ._Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 314 U.S: 487 (1941). Dela-
vare follows the usual course of focking to the law of the
place of -the alleged tort to determine the substantive rights
‘of the parties arising thereform. . Pack v. Beech. Aireraft
Co., 132-A.2d 54 (Del.S.Ct. 1957); Restatment, Confiet of
Laws, 4384. Thus, the’ law of Pennsylvania was applied
by the Distriet Court and wil! be looked to by us.
Appendix.
‘The Civil Air Regulations, which were put into evidence
>in this case, prohibit flying under instrument conditions
hia. pilot without an instrument rating and without recent
practive.?, A pilot. without instrument qualifications must
- adhere to “the, visual flight - ‘rules., These prohibit fiving
when visibility is less than three miles’ or when the ceiling
is less than 1,000 feet. Additionally they require that a
visibility of three miles be maintained at, all times while in
flight and that the plane approach clouds no cleser than*’
2,000 feet horizontally, 500 vertically under, and 1,000 feet |
vertically over.’ The regulations do contain a provision,
_ however, which permits’ departure fromthe other Regula- |
tions in event of emergency.* We-mention the regulations:
of the Civil Aeronautics Board in order to establish iim-,
partial and authoritative criteria: for judging theSquestion
presented to us! ;
The evidence shows that the necessity of prohibitions
on flight under instrument conditions by unqualified pilots
is dictated by the extreme likelihood of loss of control over,
the aireraft once visual points of refererice bgcome unavail-
able. This likelihood arises out of a vertigo induced by
the movements of the aircraft in which the pilot becomes
disoriented in Space to the point where he has difficulty
in distinguishing between right and left and up and viewn.
Normal sense perceptions ure vnréliable to the point of
being actively misleading. The plane can quickly go out of
control in. such eiregmestances. Even if the pilot can
recognize what maneuver the out-of-control plane is per-
forming his tendency is to. over-correct. The consequence
is for the plane again to go out of control, or if the cor-
rection § too violent resulting in an attempted maneuver
for which the plane is not designed, to tear the plane apary .
in mid-air by reason of the extreme forees exerted on it.
¥C. F R. = 65 dnd 43.68. Ee be .
C.F.R. s and 60.31. ! o
C.F.R 602 ett,
: ae
Appendix.
°'y
_ Nathan Prashker knew, or certainly should have known,
about and understood these and other factors involved in
flight safety. Much of the literature put into his hands by
‘the defendants at the time the Bonanza was purchased and
afterwards emphasized the necessity for maintaining posi-
_tive contro] over the aircraft at @ll times; it emphasized,
too, the extreme danger of losing that contrél when instru-
ment flight conditions were encountered by a pilot insuffi-_
. Nathan Prashk
>
. -
ciently skilled in coping with the difficulties peculiar to in-
‘struinent flying. Nathan Prashker knew, too, that his craft
was a faster, aerodynamically ‘*eleaner’’ airplane than had
- been the three” he had owged previously at varions times,
and that such an airplane could rapidly get into serious
trouble if not skillfully operated. A fast, ‘‘clean” airplate
is more difficult to fy, both on visual flight rules and on in-
struments because it respo&ds to contro) quickly and easily.
The contro] exe arises must, therefore, be skilled. In fact,
doubtless had the skill | requisite to handle
the Bonanza so long as he remained within the limitations
imposed by the visual flight rules and stayed out of instru-
* ment conditions.
The facts, however, diniaatiiin that Nathan Prash-
ker, w ittingly or not, madea number ofadecisions involving
bad judgment which set the stage for the ensuing tragedy.
To begin with he elected to takeoff from the Allegheny
County Airport in marginal weather conditions, judged
by the visual flight rules. -He thus assumed the risk of
getting into poorer flight conditions, even though he un-
doubtedly -hoped and may even have assumed that they
would inmprove. It is inferable from the time-intervals
involved that he shortly did encounter worsening condi-
tions and that he turned bagk toward Pittsburgh. Over the
city he made the grievous mistake of electing to go into the
overcast in an attempt to climb through it’
There was elicited on cress-examination from a part-.
time employee of Atlantic's, who was.also an airlines pilot
- of some 10,000 hours experience, testunony that he ‘had
.
‘ .
=
>
7a | : 2
Appendix.
never encountered a wedther condition which he could nat
have avoided either by going around, by turning back, or
presumably by staying on.the ground in the first place. It
is apparent, then, that what are alleged to be defects in
the Bonanza only become significant because Prashker had —
» gotten himself ipio a situation in which causes beyond his
ability to control inexorably commenced to operate: —
~ A decision based on Prashker’s, contributory ‘negligence
alone would depend on a preliminary holding that the
evidence would not support an inference that bad weather
may have closed in on him even thongh he was exercising
due care for his owfi safety. ° We incline to the view that
no such inference is available, but concede that the question
may be arguable. Therefore, and because the case has been
so thoroughly and well presented to us, we prefer to rely
also on an alternative ground for decision. We think that
no negligence can be imputed to the defendants.
Plaintiffs asserted that the Bonanza had been necli-
gently designed; they have attempted to spell out three
specific defects. The first of these alleged defects is that the
* Bonanza model involved’is subject to a lateral oscillation
of some two or three degrees, on either side.of a norm in
rough-air flight, and that this oscillation induees vertigo
whenever visua} references hecome unavaiiable. But there
was undispyted_evidence that any airc raft under similar
flight conditions is subject to some lateral oscillation. The
_ conclusion is that, although the existence of oscijlations
may explain how vertigo is induced, vertigo cannot be
avoided except by avoiding ‘the loss ‘of a visual reference:
in instrument flight the reference is supplied by the instru-
atents which in their use require a dgrree of skill amount-
ing to an art. *.
‘Another alleged defect was that the plane tended to
assume a nose-down attitude and once in that position
accelerated,dangerously. But the testimony was that the
nose of the Bonanza doef not drop of its own accord. Any
airplane certificated by the C.A.A. as was the Bonanza must
. e ; - re 8a
Appendiz.
be statically stable. The acceleration once the plane was
in a nose-down attitude was not extreme for an aircraft of
clean design; again this partict} ar aircraft required .a
measure of skill in flying it, and Nathan Prashker ap-
parently had that skill so long as he remained within the
limitations of the visual flight rules as. he was required to
do. Plaintiffs allege that the Bonanza would have been a
safer plane had it been equipped with dive brakes.” Beech
had in fact considered the use of dive-brakes but had
abandoned the idea largely because much the same result.
could be achieved by extending the landing gear. It is
doubtful in the extreme that Nathan Prasnker would have
thought to use the dive brakes even had they been installed
because the landing gear was still-retracted after the plane
had crashed.
The third alleged defect of which plaintiffs complain
is that stick-loads were dangérously light. They are im-
portant in preventing the pilot, when under stress, from
violently moving the controls, thereby imposing such stress
on the plane structure in its attempt to respond that it dis-
integrates. It appeared, however, that the Bonanza’s stick-
loads exceeded those imposed by the military’ for their air-
craft designed to perform more violent maneuvers’ than is «
the Bonanza.
In short -all these alleged defects were. either . non. ;
_ existent or present to an unavoidable -extent known to
Nathan’ Prashker. .Heeding the fundamental warning
- against an unqualified pilot's getting into instrument con-
ditions is the surest means to avoid unintentionally ex-
ceeding the inherent restrictions in the design of any air-
eraft. That Nathan Prashker could have violated that
tenet without negligerice on his part: does not, of course,
make the defendants liable absent negligence on their part.
Even if it can be said that there is a duty to warn of the
dangers in exceeding the inherent restriction in any air-
craft, that duty was adequately discharged by the warnings
to avoid instrument flight conditions which would be the
9a
: Appe nd ir. ;
only aniticipaiable way the restrictions. could be. uninten-
tionally exceeded by a pilot.
We turn now fo a consideration of the clatns for breach
_of warranty. Again the conflicts rule of Delaware is looked
_ to in order to deterniine what law shall be applied to judg-
ing these claims arising out of contract. No reason is per-
ceived why Delaware would refuse to apply the law that
the. parties have stipulated. to be the governing law by
-reason of the contract of sale of the airplane having, been |
entered there by Beech as seller and Atlantic as buyer.
’ Cf. Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust do., 24 A.
94 309 (Del; Ch. 1942). The law of Kansas will, therefore,
be applied: to determining the breach of wHlatever war-
ranties accompanied the sale.
We think on the basis of the foregoing discussion
dealing with the physical limitations on airplane design.
- that the plaintiffs’ evidence concerning breach of warranty
“was insufficient to go to the jury. The eyide; fails to
demonstrate any breach Of either an express}or implied
warranty by Beech. We therefore pass without deciding,
the question of whether the law of Kansas w ould require
- privity between Beech and the plaintiffs.
As for the claimed breach of. the implied warranty of
merchantability between Choice ‘and Atlantic, we app,
through the Delaware rule of conflicts, the law: of, Néw.,
Jersey where the sale occurred, both for construing the
contract, Harris v..N.Y. Life Instirance. Co., 33 A.2d 1o+4
(Del. Ch. 1943). Lams v. F. H. Smith Co., 178 ‘A. 651 (Del.
‘Super. 1935), and for ascertaining damages arising. from
any breach, Canadian Industrial Aleohol Co. v. Nelson, 188 ”
A. 39 (Del.S.Ct. 1936).
The méasure of damages which Choice asserts is the
value of the airplane, and ngt simply the difference in value
between the aircraft at-the time it was sold and ‘the value’
of a similar plane free from the ed defects making the
plane unmerchantable. The of damages for a
breach of. warranty is, und ersey law, the ‘loss
- 10a
: é
Appendix,
directly and naturally resulting in am ordinary course af
; 4 ents from such breach. DeRose v, Hunter Lindsay Corp.
N.J. Super. 178 (App. Div. 1956); Somerville Container
hikes v. General Metal Corp., 38 N.J. Supier. 348, amended
39 NJ. Super. S62 (App. Div. 1956). The inescapable in-
ference: is that the damage complained of must stem from
the breach of warranty and not from some other cause,
Thus, it is clear that if the damage to the plane was proxi-
mately caused by the negligence of *Choice’s pilot, Choice
cannot recover. Cf. Heath v. Channel Lumber Co., Ine.,
25 N,J. Super. 6, (App. Div. 1953). But since we have not
rested our decision as to the negligence issues solely on
Nathan Prashker'’s contributory neglicence, neither do
- we do so on this point; again, the plaintiff’S.evidence fails
to. prove that the plane was not reasonably fit for flying.
- One point remains for discussion and AMecision. Piain-
tiffs complain of the trial court's ruling which prevented
them from putting into evidence the reports of forty-five
fatal accidents involving structural failure in flight of
Bonanzas both on the issue of.cause and on the issue of
notice. The court permitted the introduction of only seven |
of the accident reports limited solely to the issue of notice
of the alleged defects. The plaintiffs also offered evidence,
which was rejected on both issues, of government. satistics
known to Beech that over a six year period prior to the
accident iri question the Bonanza had a rate of@tructural
failure in flight approximately fifteen times the rate for all
other single engine civil aircraft.
The first issue confronting the trial court upon the
ofier of the reports was whether evidence of accidents to
one model of the Bonanza could be relevant as to the cause
of accidents in other models. The court was justified in
putting the plaintiffs to'their proof. that the five different
Bonanza models involved in the series of accidents were
similar. The court ultimately decided that-the models were
more like each other thari like any other airplane.
‘ *
.
lla
Appendix,
‘At the same ‘time the court was justified in excluding
* evidence as to.accidents to the first model. The sum of the
changes made in the design of the first model through four
subsequent models permitted the trial court to regard the
first-and fifth planes as dissimilar aircraft. Evidence of
accidents in the first model would not have heen sufficiently
material to the cause of accidents in the fifth model to re-
quire its admission, The two most significant changes from
the preceding models occurred between the first and the
second and between the third and fourth. The first of these
changes involved increasing’ the limit design load factor
from 3.8 G's to 44 G's which moved the plane. from the
C.A.A.’s normal category to the utility category for certi-
fication purposes. At the same time gross- weight was in-
creased. These changes improved the structural stréngth
‘of the airplane. Tic second significant change was to the
ditedral and area of the ta.) which affected ‘the plane's
handling characteristics.
The second issue confronting the, frial court. once it .
had initially determined what models for puropses of the
case were identical and which reports could therefore be
relevant and material, was to decide whether the accident
reports were indeed relevant on the issues for which they -
were offered. The court found that on the issue of notice
of possible defects the reports were relevant, ut that as
to the cause of this accident they were irrelevant. Simi
larly the statistics were ruled irrelevant. a
The determinations of irrelevancy were proper. Each
accident report involved an instance of structural failure in
flight. where the airplane was, as plaintiffs assert, **palled
apart by loads in excess cf its stress Limitations. ** And
yet the stress limitations exceeded those which the Civil
Aeronautics Administration required as sufficient to assure
flight safety. Showing that the planes came apart is not
enough because of the compromise required with structural
strength in designing an aircraft which will get off the ~
ground. To be relevant on the issue of. causation attribyt-
s 4
‘12a
A ppendix.
able to a design defect the ego reports would have had
to show at least that the plahes involved had not gone out
of control prior to their coming apart, or if they had gone
out of control, that it had beep without fault by the pilot.
The seven reports in evidence—and they may be assumed |
best to present the plaintiffs’ .case—invariably involve
pilots unqualified to fly under instrument conditions who
nonetheless were in such conditions or, in a few instances
involving the unadmitted reports, pilots qualified for in-
strument flight who were in turbulent weather when the
accidents occurred. To hold the aircraft responsible on
such evidence would -be utterly to disrgard the factor of
human fallibility known inevitably to occur in such circum-
stances’ and would be patently unjustified. The reports,
: therefore, do not tend to prove the existence of a defect in
design of the Bonanza. The cases cited by plaintiffs on
the admissibility of prior occurrences as evidencing exist-'
ence of a dangerous condition are consequently inapposite.
_ . The statistic as to rate of ‘structural failure of the
Bonanza is, on its face, startling. But it involves the same .
accidents which were the subjects of the reports above a,
eussed. In view of what amounts to an explanation of eaclic
accident: which contributed to the ultimate statistic; that
statistic itself has no relevance as notice to Beech of the
existence. of a defect. As to the issue of causation by a
design defect, the statistic tends - ‘to prove na&hing more
than the individual accident reports. It is extremely du-
*bious, in fact, whether statistic: inv olving probabilities as
to causation have any significance at alk when applied to
a particular incident. : :
Even were it assumed that the accident reports and
statistics prove the Bonanza to We accident-prone under
conditions of turbulence in instryinent flight, probably th:
warning-t9 stay out of such conditions and emphasizing the
— of i ignoring it wo d be enough. By ‘‘accident-
prone’’ js meant that the-p ne has. some characteristics
which may, when a pilot loses\yisua! reference, call upon
a
. 13a
Appendiz.
*
him for a much greater degree of skill than. theretofore
he had ‘been required to exercise in controlling the air-
plane. If he has: the skill and can make the adjustment
quickly, he is safe. If the characteristics of the plane take
it out of control before he adjusts, he is in serious trouble. °
If it is possible to get into turbulent instrument flight con-
ditions despite the exercise of due care, then the pilot can
be said, in view of the warning, to have assumed the risk .
of the accident proneness every time he flies subject to the
possibility, that he may encounter turbulent instrument
conditions. ; : ” |
The limitation on introducing the evidence offered of
other accidents for the purpose of showing notice of de-
fects to Beech was, at the least, a proper exercise of “the
trial judge’s discretion in conducting the course of the trial.
The judgment is affirmed.
A True Copy :,
Teste: ° »
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit.
- l4a
o
Judgment.
Present: Goopricu, McLavontin and STa.ey,,
Cireuit Judges,
This cause came on to be heard on the record from the
United States District Court: for the District of
Delaware and was argued by counsel — ;
On consideration’ whereof,.it is now here ordered and |
adjudged by this Court that the ‘judgment of the said.
District. Court in this case ‘be, and the same is hereby
affirmed, with costs.
Attest:
aan | _ Harrrer G. Humpnrys,
| _* Chief Deputy Clerk.
July 21, 1958. .
Opinion Sur Petition for Rehearing.
‘Present: Goopricn, McLavcHuw and Sra.ey,
Circuit Judges.
After due consideration the petition for rehearing i in the
above-entitled case is hereby denied.
nay J
By the Court
JAireuit Judge
vA McLaveuun.
Dated: August 7, 1958.
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