Respondent Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari — In re Teitelbaum
Supreme Court brief1958
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
Qhetonen Trernuy AL DP. 195s.
No. 376.
¢
itt \LATTER. OF
ABRATLAM TEITELBAUM, ax Arrorses.
: } Prehatroney
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR’ WRIT |
OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
ILLINOIS.
CianbES Leviton, prise,
| YO South duaSalle Street,
(hicaye 3, Tilinois,
Heretofore appearing as amieus curiae
in the Supreme Court of [hinois for
the Board of Managers and the Com
Inittee on Girtevaneces of The ©hieave
Bar Assoctation, Sitti as Comins
Seners of the Supreme Court oof
Pdineis under Rule Oo
"hE OUR HORF @eekee Fe arse COmMPeRY, be Caeeo
i
INDEX.
s PAGE
Oe ee a er en ee 2
» The Basis for Jurisdiction ........ Se ae see
. Questions Presented: °
(1) Has the petitioner set up any right, title, privi-
lege or immunity under the Federal Constitu-
SE Naa R AUK RA Reece eu reed c cana aca r ka es 3
(2) Will the Supreme Court of the United States
take jurisdietion over a judgment involving a
question peeulidrly of state law? ... 000 4..5.. a
Argument : . .
1 The Petitioner Has Not Set Up Any Right, .
Title, Privilege or Immunity Under the Federal
POI ok bs cadets Vixdaeeee ea Pere ee a
Il. The Question Below Is One Peculiarly Involv-
NY crak Auadc ci vekcan che cenccus. 6
lll. Petitioner’s Petition ‘Is Frivolous and Vexa-
OWS ...... ‘Seasce RENCE TTT wea atgas e's terme. Tt
vuelusion : ee TT eCres Te ee ae ; , a ee a peaccas be
\
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Supreme Court of the United States
-Octoser Term, A. D. 1958.
No. 376
Ix THE MATTER OF -
ABRAHAM TEITELB AU M, an ATTORNEY,
Petitioner.
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT.
OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME °' en OF
ILLINOIS.
(omes now Charles Leviton, heretofore ‘appearing as
vicus curiae in-the matter of Abraham Teitelbaum, an
attorney, petitioner, the opinion of which. is reported in
‘Ill? 2d 586, and says that a rev iew on writ of certiorari
‘ould-not be granted for the followi ing reasons:
1. There is no special or important reason therefor, as
‘quired by Rule 19 of this Court.
‘ The petitioner in the: Court below raised no question
wer the Federal Constitution and the matters and things
‘wre presented were not within the contemplation of
Rule 19, ‘
in view of the fact that the petition. for certiorari does
‘comply with the requisites of Rule 19 of this Court, and.
an effort to bring order out of chaos, the undersigned
tes the following suggestions, in as informal a manner |
a 2 _
as possible, so that it wy be sanity apparent that the pe
tion is frivolous in it# nature and the questions praise
require no formal or extensive ‘briefing.
“1. THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW.
The proceedings below were brought’ under the y
visions of Rule 59 of the Rules of the Supreme Court
Ilinois, which provides for the appointment of Coma
| “wioners of the Court to make investigations concern
practices of attorneys at law whielt tend to defeat *)
administration of justice or to bring the courts and
legal profession: <uto disrepute. This rule in most respec’
is ‘not materially different from the Rules of’ Court te
Disciplinary Proceedings adopted by the House of Delegars
of the American Bar Association on February 21 1
The Rule provides, among other things, thidt the Cor
missioners, if action: by the Supreme Court of Illinois
recommended, shall make report. to the Court of cone
sions of fact and law concerning a complaint, answer av
proof; that if after the report is filed the respon dent’
exceptions; a member of«the bar shall be .design rated *
file such certificates of proof, additional abstracts an
briefs. as may be necessary fully to advise the Court-
support of the report of the Commissioners. An amc
curiae has’ been ‘designated in each instance in these cas
since 1933 when the system of reports by Commissions
was first adopted, andthe undersigned has so, gneve :
in proceedings originating before the Conunittee on, Gre
ances of The, Chiecayo. Bar Association as Commissin
of the Supreme Court of. Illinois, sinee 1935, mel i
The undersigned has filed with the Clerk the follow:
portions of the reeord before the Supreme Court of Illi
properly certified by the Clerk of that Court:
(1) The report of the C ommissioners.
a ro
(2) ‘The objections filed by the. respondent to the-report.:
(3) The.exceptions to the report, filed by the respond-
ent in the — Court of Illinois, ~
(4) Brief, ‘and Argument of ‘Respondent. |
* 49) Additionat Abstract of Record, filed -by the under-
signed, Kare ‘
An inspection of the objections of the respondent in the
Supreme Court of Illinois, his brief and argument; and
his petition for rehearing, fails to disclose the bringing
lefore the State Court of any Federal question.
. 2. THE BASIS FOR 2 JURIEDIOTION, .
The jurisdiction, if any, of this Court may -be invoked
under Title 28 of. the Judicial Code, Section 1257.
The petitioner has mentioned that jurisdiction is also
invoked ‘funder the Due Process Clause and Equal Protee-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment td the Constitu-
. tion of the United States,’’ and has also claimed that ‘the
Applicability of théiF'ull Faith and Credit Clause $s also of.
tliajor importance.’?
No contentions based upon these constitutional gr ounds:
were ev er presented to the Supreme Court of Illinois.
é
3. QUESTIONS PRESENTED. a
(1) Has the petitioner set up any ‘right, title, —
_ vr immunity under the Federal Constitution?
An inspection, of tlie record shows that the petitioner in
‘he coart below raised no question under the Federal Con-
‘itution, -His answer to.the complaint (Report, pp: 3-5;
_ Abstract of Record, pp. 5-38), is: completely devoid of any
“‘ider of an issue involving the Federal Constitution. His
‘jections (Abstract, pp. 39-43) and. his exceptions (Ab-
“raet, pp. 69-75), his brief and argument and his petition
°°
’
4
.
for.rehearing, likewise have failed to raise any quitiion
under the Federal Constitution. .
The petitioner cannot raise Federal questions here whe
he did not raise them in the Supreme Court of Hlinois,
Hulbert v. Chicago, 202 U. S. 275, 50 L: Ed. ley
(2) Will the Supreme Court of the United States tak
instalation over a judgnient involving a question peculiar)
of state law? . : ,
The mere. fact that the decision below may have bee
erroneous does not confer juriadiction upon the Court. Th.
proposition is elementary. The fact that a Federal Cour
may have decided that respondent's conviction of 4 Fevlgra’
crime did not involve moral turpitude, does not preci
the Supreme Court of Illinois from passing upon the effec
of such a conviction. Even where practice before the
Court is concerned, this Court has held that it will ne
hesitate to uphold the diseipliné of an attorney, wher —
character requisite for membershtp in the bar®is lackinz.
in the absenée of some grave reason to the contrary.
In re Isserman, 345 U.S. 286, pp. 288, 28!
*Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, pp. 50, 51.
McCallum ?- Board of Managers and Gruvar
Committee of Chicago Bar Association, 326U.>
689.
Bute v. People of the State. of Minors, 423 '.8
640, p. 659, 68 S. Ct.*763. .
Er Parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, pp. 271, 20.
Tinkoff v United States, 212 F. 2d 1s, pp. Vee
- Phipps v. Wilson, 186 F. 2d 748, p. 752.
Mitchell v. Greenough, 100 F. 2d 184, pp. Ts.
Central Lanil Company v. Laidley, 0 US.)
p. 112. ia |
The Petitioner Has Not Set Up Any Right, Title, Privilege
or Immunity Under the Federal Constitution.
Nowhere in the record can any’ contention be. found
‘hal any part of the Federal Constitation was violated.
The Judicial Code, Title 28, Section 1257, elearly pro- —
vides that it shall be competent for the Supreme Court of
the United States by certiorari to certify for review and
deterntination any cause wherein a final judgment or decree
a> heen rendered by the highest court of a state in which
4 cision could be had, where *‘any title, right, privilege ;
rT immunity “is specially set up or claimed under: the
Vonstitufion, treatios or statuten of, or commission held i
#.: authority exercised under, the United States.’ here
wing no such right set up or Gaimed, there ix nothing for
‘his Court to review. r
+ In Hulbert ¥. Chicago, 202 US. 275, 50 L. Ed. 1026, the
‘ourt held that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the
“alutory provision in setting up a right under the Con-
‘titution of the U nited States; that there was no evidence
6 the record to-show that the decision of either the trial
“art or the Supreme Court of Illinois, whose judgment Was °
wstioned, was invoked by plaintiff in error upon a right
aimed under the Constitution of the U nited States: The
nt of error was therefore dismissed. Thix rule is so
‘mentary and of such long standing shat, no further
<ussion of the issues involved would ‘seem necessary.
@
” ae nn ;
II.
The Question Below Is One Peculiarly Involving State Law
As the Court said in In re Isserman, 345 U.S. 286 \y
288) : . F .
**Disbarment* by a state does not automatics!
disbar members of our bar, but this Court will,
the absence of some grave reason. to the contran
follow the finding of the state that the charac’
erequisite for membership in the bar is laéking, S+/))
Radford, 248 U.S. 46 (1917).""
And (p. 289): ‘
“There is no vested right in an individual to pra
tice law. Rather there isa. right’ in’ the Court.’
protect itself, and. hence society, as an instrument |
justice.’ :
In Selling v. eblaad, 243 UL S. 46, Radford, whe ks
been originally a member of ‘the bar of the State of Mie
gan and then had been adnytted to the Supreme Cour
"of the United States, was respondent i in an action to dist:
him: from the Supreme Court of the United: States on*
basis of an opinion and order of disbarment entered |
the Supreme Court of Michigan. The Court held that
had no, authority to-re-examine or reverse as. acreview:
court the action of the Supreme Court of Michigan jnd-
barring Radford. As to whether or not Radford she
continue as a member of the Supreme Court of the (' nite.
States, the Court held that it would recognize the: cond
created by the judgment of the state court unless, fr
an intrinsic consideration of the state record, one or «
of the following conditions should appear (p. ol):
“1. That the state procedure from wait of h"
or opportunity to be heard was wanting in die
cess; 2, that there was sueh an infirmity of preot
to’ facts found,to have established the want of
ir
a
7
" private and professional character as to give rise toa
_ ¢lear conviction on our part that we could hot consist-
- ently with our-duty accept as final the conclusion on that
‘ subject; or 3,’that some other grave reason existed
which should convince us that to allow the natural con-
sequences of the judgment to have their effect would
conflict with the duty which tests upon us not to dishar
\exvept upon the conyfetion that, under the principles
of-right-and* justice, we were constrained: so lo dow”.
¥
Similar questions were raised by William Wallace Me-
Callum, who was disbarred by the Supreme Court of [linois
in tere McCallum, 391 Tl. 400, ane whose appeal was
dismissed for want of a substantial Federal question, in
MeCallum'y., Board of Managers and Grievance Committee
t Chicago Bar Association, 326°. 8. 689,
In Bute v. People of the State of Tlinois, 333 U.S. G40,
ihe Court held .(p. 659), that even in a criminal case ‘the’
» procedure followed:by Hlinois should not be held to Violate
the standard of permissible process of JaW broadly. recog:
uized by the Fourteenth Amendmént, unless the [linois
procedure violates ‘the very essence lof a seheme of ordered
liberty’ and that to continue it would ‘vidlate a“ pringiple’
of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental." °°
In Ex Parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, there Was brought into
uestion in’a petition for mandamus filed in the Supreme .
Vourt of the United States, the validity of an order of a
Federal District Judge prohibiting Wall from practicing
it the bar of the District Court. The Court upheld the’
validity of. the order of the District. Court, and held that
‘he attorney had had due process, in that’ (p. 200) “due
wotice was given to the petitioner, and a trial and hearing
vas had before the court, in the manner in which proceed-
—iigsragainst attorneys, when the question iS whether they
‘tould be struck off the roll, are always conducted."!
oe?
In Tinkof’ ve United States, 212 F.2d 18, the Cour
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had before it an efor hy
‘Tinkoff to tile a petition to vacate an order de uving hb
leave to fileca petition for reinstateme ‘nt to the bar: af thy
Federal Diatriet Court. Tinkot® had been distarred
the Supreme Court of Hlinois and had been SUbseopuens
held guilty of contempt of‘ court for the aeaittonte
practice of kaw in o% ople ea rel. Chicago Bar Asoo wt
‘a. Tinkoff, 399 TIL 282, certiorari denied, 34 : SS
The Court stated (pp, 19-20) ;
‘*Secking to annnal these Orders, apprethart ons.
le PPOssessts ile ‘right’, to petition, eof san) preter?
status that the district judge Mast reeeive and.
tain his petition. Titis ix the framework on whic
hangs argument raising constitutional emestions. Ab
Justice. Vinson, when delivering the order of thet nit’
reported as Ji re Isserigai, W538, B45 VS. ost es
738. Ct. 676, 677, 97 LBA WOT, aptly Sav
8 98 There is ne rested riahe ib one ime
to practice law. Rather there isca right in the Com
& fo protect itself, and hence sociefy, as an in-trame:
of justices. That to the imlividual thisharred
ix a loss of status is incidental to the pourtiose cot *
( Court and cannot deter the Court) from jt- duty
strike from its rolls one who hats engaged in
inconsistent with the gay expected tf offiecrs
the Court.” (Italics ours.)
“Certainly that quotation goes far toward en
crowned from under appellant’. thet. | Nev
a recent concept of the license to prneties law So.
| a oY W all, 1SSZ, 107 U.S. 2 BS OO, Swi 2
Mal. 552 Pe ate
. of . - . .
“Long ago Mr. Justice Cardozo, speaking for"
Court reviewing jn ore Rouss, 1917, 221 N.Y!
N. BA. 782, 783, said: .
*Membership in the bar is a sit Se vl
‘with conditions. A fair private amd pre
character ix ome of them. Compliance with’
' Wan Cincama
*
condition is essential at the moment of admission:
but it is equally essential afterwards * * * “When.
ever the condition js broken the privilege is lost,
To refuse admistion te wh unwerthy applicant
is not to punish hin for Mist offenses. The ex:
amination inte character, like the eNamunation inte ;
learning, is merely atest of fitness. To strike
the unworthy Tawyer from the voll is Hot te ele
to the pains and pemiltioes of erime
o
In Phipps v. Wilson, ise. 2d 748, the Court said ip.
“2): . :
“The real basis for plas tials complaint seems te
be that it was the Chieree Bar Association whieh in
Vestivated the charges aszainst him and recommended
disbartvent. Plaintift Claims that the Bar Assowin
‘tion's committees were prejudiced against him. A
similar objection Wits Pisnede- amd overrated jn | an
Wi Callum, BO. IL, 400, G4 Ne pe. 24 OO, a disharmens
proceeding, The. court there peinted ont that ~ink..
103 conumnittows of the Chicago Bar Association Wave
acted as Commissioners of the Hingis Supreme Court
‘ip disciplinary proceedings brought against ittorney.
at law in Chicago, See: Rule 30 Supreme Court
Rules of Practices and Procedure, Ch. 119”. Smith Hurd i
Hl, Anno, Stat, 5 20.50 The court emphasized that
such commissioners are merely the court's agents
for the purpose of vatherintc amd reporting the evi
dence and that their recommendations are purely
advisory, The conrt said 399 Hl. at pace 418, 64 NOE
ad at page SIT: * The recommendations made are i
pirely wlvisory and this court aet~ only after an ex
amination of the evidence In thie cise, eXcept where
Wo answer is tide by respondent, and in these cases
the charges and “Upporting evidenes are eXamined
fore action is takes by this court.’
“It is signifieant that MeCallum did not file a peti-
tion for certiorari, but songlit access to the United
Mates Supreme Court hy direet appeal, attacking the
colstitutionality of Rule 39. However, the Supretive
‘ourt dismissed the appeal, holding that it did net
10 -
- ¢
raise any substantial federal question, MeCallun
Board of Managers and Grievance Committey of Che
cago Bar Assoc tation, 326 U.S. 689, 66S: Ct. 12, ‘
L. Md. 405.
“In considering w hether the procedure herein befor
the Supreme Court of Hlinois and the commission«
‘was a denial of due process, the applicable principles
authoritatively stated in Bute v. Mlinois 333 U.S. 640,
659; 68'S. Ct. 763, 773, 92 L. Ed. 986, are: ‘°° “R
here the procedure followed by THlinois should not |
held to violate the standard of permissible process o:
law broadly recognized by the Fourteenth Pad edtniens
unless the IHlinois procedur e Violates ‘the very essen
of a scheme of ordered diberty’’ and its continua:
would ‘* violate a ‘principle of justice so rooted iri.
traditions and conscivnee of our pe ople as to be rankes
as fundamental.’ ** * * *
As the amended complaint: shows that plaint.”
was apprized of the charges tiled against him, and the
“he had a redsonable @pportunity to “defend thes
against, the procedure complained against did not \
late a scheme of ordered: liberty ora deep rooted prin.
ciple of justice, In other words, we find that plain?
was not denied federal due process of Sanna
The: case of Th re.Summers, 825 US. 5610 hi as ne spplie
tion, the issue there being one which brought inte ques!
whether or not the principles of religious freedom wh
the i gg ndment ‘to the, Constitution of *
United States »Ceures against state action had been wih
lated by the denial to Sammers of the right. to pprae Hew, bi
_ In Tinois. .
In Mitchell v. ianawes 100 FY. 2d 184, the Court =3
(p. 185): ’ ,
‘*We pause here to oheerv e'that the eae te pract
law in the state court has heen held by the Supret r
Court not to be a privilege granted - by the Fede:
Constitution or laws. Bradwell v. State of Lilies.
* Wall. 130, 21 L. Ed. 442; Er parte Lockwood V4
I 16, 14 S.Ct. 1082, 38 L. Ed. 929. In Green X. Klher’
>
x
a
‘
:
: ll
8 Cir, 63 F. 308, the Cireiit Court of Appeals held
‘that the « conspiracy to deprive a lawyer of his right to
‘practice law in the-state courts Was not a —
to interfere with any right or privilege ‘granted,
cured or protected by the Constitution of the U nited
States."""° wae
In Central Land Company v. Laidley, 159 U.S. 403, this
Curt said (p. 112): .
“When the parties have been fully heard i in the regu-
lar course of judicial proceedings, - an erroneous deci-
sion of a state court does not deprive the unsuccessful
party of his property without dae process of law,
witliin the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution
“of the United States.”*
f
ee
Petitioner’s Petition Is Frivolous and Vexatious.
The undersigned does hot intend at this stage of the pro-
dings to discuss the merits of the case at length or those
vcisions “of the Supreme Court of the United States and
ther Federal Courts which indicate that what respondent
vas convieted of involved moral turpitude, No ground
pears for are wersal of the decision of the Supreme Court
Illinois constitutional’or otherwise, ,
Conclusion.
It is submitted that Teitelbaum's petition for writ o
certiorari should be denied,:and that the writ should nor ss
‘ granted.
~ Respectfully submitted,
Cuartes Leviron, pro se,
29 South La Salle Street,
Chicago 3, Ilineis,
a Heretofore appearing as amicus cur
in the’ Supreme Court of Tlinsis
the Board of Managers and the Cow
mittee on Grievances of The Chicw
Bar Association, Sitting as Comms
4° aye sionefs of the Supreme Court
Illinois under Rule 59. :
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