Petition for A Writ of Certiorari — Raidy v. United States (No. 931)
Supreme Court brief1957
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
APR 13s i948
SOHN T. FEY, Clerk }
=
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1957
N 0. PBI
JAMES S. RAIDY
Petitioner,
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
Bernarp M. Go.pster,
1716 Court Square Building
Baltimore 2, Maryland
Marvin I. Srvacer,
Counsel for Petitioner.
King Bros., Inc., Printers, 208 N. Calvert St., Baltimore, Md. (4-9-58—50)
INDEX
~
Page
CERI Te COI TI aia sesisckccnssteceesecsntndenmisasotcctans 1
PN cepidosactcmetlecancatenncdccediniadinnschactesissasesésieuacnds alae 2
NI Fr I © ccccoraa sea cal ateunrpeneaeoranecinonnrs 2
NINE a cccidscchensncaeeatincncakcneencintnccacccutdcasebeleesesnarabeniahes 2
Reasons For Granting The Writ
I. Conflict Among Decisions of
Circuit Courts of Appeals—Unseaworthiness.... 5
II. Conffict In Principle with Decisions
of This Court—Unseaworthiness.......000.....ccc.ccc 8
IiI. Conflict In Application of
Pe Fa iicctcncinneemaes 11
IONE ria esac atch csc at ee 15
Appendix A—Opinion and Decree of the
IIS es ARIE speed noccinctinaoaccone 16
CITATIONS
Cases:
Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 205 F. 2d 478, 347 U.S.
SN RD: a tkcdeecenniateassae ti esecna des déhenie caieacekécsemoancns: 10
Berge v. National Bulk Carriers Corp., 251 F. 2d 717
CRIN siniseseuisdcaecapenck naan aut ekee cstetiochabiseigicceaenies specie! 6, 7,9
Berryhill v. Pacifie Far East Line, 238 F. 2d 385
ERE “i cahcsstacskonecpcecdeelsnptiinie sip anced cactcegiiadsaabcoeaaantiascaiees 7
Chriziiansen v. U.S., 192 F. 2d 199 (1951) ow. 5
Feinman v. A. H. Bull S.S. Co., 216 F. 2d 393 (1954) 13
Guerrini v. U.S., 167 F. 2d 352 (1948) ............................ §
Halecki v. United N.Y. & N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots
fo Se OR ee 8 Re Eaemreae 7,9, 12
Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F. 2d 4 (1956) ............ 6
Jefferson, The, 215 U.S. 130 (1909) oo... 11
Lester v. U.S., 234 F. 2d 625 (1956) .................. coachinas 11
Pioneer Steamship Co. v. Hill, 227 F. 2d 262 (1955)... 6
Pope & Talbot, Ine. v. Hawn, 198 F. 2d 800, 346 U.S.
LY. RA Ramen eet ne nee ee ree sid bisigdesantensita 5, 8, 14
Raidy v. U.S., 153 F. Supp. 777 (1957) ............cssscssseee 10
Read v. U.8., 201 F’. 2d 756 (UGGS) ccsecscsissesccraressesees vo
Rogers v. U.S. Lines, 347 U.S. 984 (1954) 0. 10
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946) ...... 5, 8
Tarkington v. U.S. Lines, 222 F. 2d 358 (1955) 0.0.0.0... 10
Statutes:
ing Me a Rs, IE LEY sisiecstctnrapcomnecinadionas 2
U.S.C.A., Title 33, See. 901 et seq., Longshoremen and
SOR WRONNNO TAO elec cccasesnitanieannn 4,12, 14
U.S.C.A., Title 46, See. 741 et seq., Suits in
PETA DARR sosccinincicodeaaeen ened 2
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1957
JAMES 8S. RAIDY
Petitioner,
VS.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
JAMES S. RAIDY, your Petitioner, prays that a writ of
certiorari issue to review the decree of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, entered in thie
above-entitled ease on February 11, 1958.
CITATIONS TQ OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the District Court, printed in Record la,
p. 61, is reported in 1538 F. Supp. 777. The opinion of
the Cireuit Court of Appeals, printed in Appendix A hereo!,
p. 16, is unreported as vet.
»)
~
JURISDICTION
The decree of the Cireuit Court of Appeals was entered
on February 11, 1958; Appendix A, p. 16, infra.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Title 28,
United States Code Annotated, Section 1254 (1).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Is the seaworthy cause of action aveilable to a ship-
fitter working on a vessel in a floating drydock who was in-
jured at night under poor lighting conditions by falling
through an unguarded hole in the operating walkway of the
vessel?
II. Is a negligence cause of action made out where the
uncontradicted facts established that a shipfitter working
on a vessel in floating drydock was injured at night under
poor lighting conditions by falling through an unguarded
hole in the walkway after the shipowner’s representatives
knew the working conditions were unsafe but gave no
warning and took no precautionary measures?
STATEMENT
The libel was brought under the Svits in Admiralty Acts
(U.S.C.A. Tit. 46 see. 741 et seq) against the United States
as owner of the dredge, S.S. Goethals and claimed recovery
for unseaworthiness, and in negligence, for failure to
furnish a safe place to work. The Government impleaded
Bethlehem and the case was tried by the District Judge
without a jury.
The Petitioner, a ship fitter employed by Bethlehem
sustained crippling injuries on the evening of October 27,
1954, when he fell some 30 feet through an unguarded hole
in one of the operating walkways of the vessel.
It was uncontradicted +):at at the time of the acciden’ he
was working on one of the operating walkways of the
vessel; that there was a hole in the walkway due to a miss-
3
ing plate; that the accident occurred at night and the light-
ing was poor. The District Court denied recovery as to
each count, holding that the seaworthy warranty was not
available and that the Government was not negligent. On
appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed the Judgment of the
District Court in a per curiam opinion.
Before the accident the Goethals was actively engaged in
her duties as a navigable and seaworthy vessel. She came
to the Bethlehem shipyard in Baltimore for the usual 12-18
month overhaul and the conversion of her unloading system:
certain repairs and renovations were also to be made.
Under the contract for the work, Bethlehem agreed to pro-
vide a safe place to work for its employees and to indemnify
the Government against any liability for injuries resulting
from the fault, negligence, wrongful acts or omissions of
Bethlehem. The vessel was placed in a floating drydock for
13 days, although the over-all work lasted for a longer
period. While in the dock some of the crew, including the
chief electrician, maintained their quarters aboard the
vesvel and the Government had several inspectors aboard.
(R. la, p. 19, 52; 2a, p. 3) After the work was completed
the vessel resumed her service in navigation.
The accident occurred after night had falien. The Gov-
ernment inspectors knew that work would be done at night
requiring the use of the walkway and that sufficient lighting
would be necessary. (R. la, p. 19, 51) However, al-
though the customary lighting for the walkway had been
removed before the accident, no substitute lighting was
furnished and no warning of the hole was given. (R. la,
p. 26, 46, 51-55) At the point where the Petitioner was
working ( the starboard side), there was no light at all.
(R. la, p. 53, 55) The lighting there wa: described by
the chief electrician as ‘‘very poor’’ and the District Court
found this as a fact. (R. Ja, p. 52, 55, 64)
4
The Petitioner was working on one of the operating walk-
ways of the vessel when he was hurt. The walkway con-
sisted of removable steel plates 3x3 feet. One of the walk-
way plates located behind a work bench was missing, leaving
a hole. here was a sheer drop of 30 feet from the hole
to the bottom of the mixing well. The chief Government
inspector had seen the hole earlier in the day but no pre-
cautions were taken and no warning was given. (R. la,
p. 40)
The petitioner had been working below deck when he was
instructed to go to the upper area to help lay a ‘‘chalk
line,’’—a guide line for the installation of a hopper. (R.
la, p. 24, 25) He did not know there was a hole in the
walkway. (R. la, p. 26) He complained about the lack
of light but was told it was a ‘‘small job’’ which would only
take a short time. (R. la, p. 25, 26) As he proceeded
along the walkway with the line in the customary manner,
he came into contact with the work bench and was feeling
his way around it in the darkness when he plunged through
the hole to the bottom of the mixing well. (R. 1a, p. 21,
26) After the accident a light was placed at the hole and
the Government inspectors required a report of the acci-
dent. (R. la, p. 13-14)
The Petitioner suffered permanently crippling injuries
including many fractures, internal injuries and disabling
injuries to the spine, pelvis and brain. He has received a
total of $895.00 in compensation payments. (R. 2a, p. 3)
Under the terms of the Longshoremen and Harbor
Workers’ Act, he cannot claim any substantial additional
benefits.
v0
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I. CONFLICT AMONG DECISIONS OF CIRCUIT COURTS
OF APPEALS—UNSEAWORTHINESS.
Conflict and uncertainty mark the decisions in the circu'ts
as to the applicability of the seaworthy rule to shipyard
workers. The District Court expressed the prevailing un-
certainty at the close of the trial:
‘« . . Now, the question here is whether the Sieracki
ease is to be limited or to be extended. Now, is it not
probably the situation, here, that ... nobody will ever
know until the Supreme Court decides it? ... We do
not have any pro forma orders in this Court. But it is
the kind of ease, after I have heard the respective argu-
ments, in which, apparently, there is no flat decision of
the Supreme Court, itself. Each side feels that its side
of the case is consistent with the Supreme Court cases ;
but it looks to me as if the question were not definitely
settled at the present time.’’ (R. la, p. 61)
The 3rd Cireuit Court of Appeals holds that unsea-
worthiness may be asserted by a repairman who was in-
jured because of inadequate lighting while working on a
vessel undergoing major conversion in the shipyard. Read
vy. UU. S., 201 F. 2d 758 (CA 3, 1953). The Court ruled that
no distinction could be made between the repairman and the
carpenter who was grantea recovery in Hawn v. Pope &
Talbot, Inc., 3 Cir., 1952, 198 F. 2d 800, affirmed, 346 U. S.
406 (1953).
The Ist and 6tu Cireuits evince support for the 3rd
Cireuit’s ruling. In Christiansen v. U. S., 192 F. 2d 199
(1951) the Ist Civeuit indicated that employees of a tank
cleaning company were among the workers who could
invoke unseaworthiness. The 6th Circuit in the case of a
shipfitter who fell into an unguarded hole while the vessel
was under repair during its winter lay-up, declared that
recovery could have heen based on unseaworthiness, al-
6
though the actual decision was grounded in negligence since
the unseaworthiness claim had been withdrawn at the trial.
Pioneer Steamship Co. v. Hill, 227 F. 2d 262 (CA 6, 1955).
See also the language of the 6th Circuit in Jmperial Ou Ltd.
v. Drlik, 234 F. 2d 4 (1956) where a dock-worker was
injured:
‘* |. The rule (unseaworthiness) has lately been ex-
tended to stevedores and others doing a seaman’s work
and incurring a seaman’s hazards, although not in the
employ of the owner of the vessel. [Citing Sterackt,
Hawn and Petterson cases.] Appellee would fall with-
in the protection of the rule so extended. .. .”’
In the cireuits that deny the applicability of the sea-
worthy warranty in like settings, there is disagreement as
to the basis for the denial, thus foreshadowing ever-increas-
ing conflicts. In the present case, the 4th Cireuit denied
a ship fitter working on a vessel undergoing major conver-
sion in a shipyard the benefit of the unseaworthy rule,
stressing the vessel’s withdrawal from navigation and its
surrender to the shipyard.
The conflict with the 3rd Circuit’s decision in Read is
plain although it was not openly stated. However, the 2nd
Circuit in Berge v. National Bulk Carriers Corp. 251 ¥. 2d
717 (1958) conceded the conflict in denying the seaworthy
warranty to a rigger working on a vessel in the shipyard
who was injured when a shackle pin broke and the tackle
fell upon him. The Court flatly said:
‘*... We disagree with Read v. United States, 201 Fed.
2d 758 (CA 3).”’
In Berge, the Court said that the test in determining
whether the seaworthy doctrine would be applied was
whether the workman was engaged in work of a kind that
the crew of the vessel was accustomed to perform. But the
nice line separating the cases became immediately apparent
in Halecki v. United N.Y. and N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots
Ass'n, 251 F. 2d 708 (1958), a companion case, where a re-
covery was allowed a shoreside electrician engaged in clean-
ing the ship’s generators by sprayiag them with a danger-
ous chemical. In Halecki, as in the instart case, the vessel
was undergoing an annual overhaul and inspection at the
repair yard and it was neccessary to use electric current
from shore as the vessel was without her own. The Court
acknowledged the unsatisfactory nature of its differentia-
tion between Berge and Halecki by remarking:
‘‘ As might be expected, so shadowy a line of demarea-
tion will in application produce inconsistent re-
sults....’’
The decision in the present case increases the confusion
by emphasizing the concept that a vesse! undergoing major
repairs is removed from navigation, hence the seaworthy
warranty is unavailable. Under this view it is submitted
that Halecki would not have gotten a recovery in the 4th
Circuit. It also raises more problems than it solves because
the crucial question becomes when are the repairs major
enough to deprive the injared workman of the benefit of
the seaworthy warranty? The aaritime worker's right to
invoke seaworthiness will come to be determined not by the
work he is performing but by the natnre of his employer's
contract for repairs to the vessel. It is evident that serious
injustice, many times on a hair-splitting basis, will cer-
tainly result.
The 9th Cireuit Court of Appeals in Berryhill v. Pacific
Far East Line, 238 F. 2d 385 (1956) emphasized that the
unseaworthiness rule should be restricted to workmen
engaged in loading and unloading operations, in refusing
a machinist recovery for injuries caused by the explosion of
a grinding wheel brought on board by his employer; thus
again raising the question whether Halecki, the electrician,
would have been awarded recovery in the 9th Circuit.
8
i. CONFLICT IN PRINCIPLE WITH DECISIONS OF
THIS COURT—UNSEAWORTHINESS
The views of the Court below are inconsistent with, and
it is believed, disregard the true meaning of this Court’s
opinions. In Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85,
(1946), it was held that unseaworthiness gives rise to
absolute liability, regardless of fault and that a longshore-
man could claim the warranty against the shipowner. For
some time Sieracki received a narrow interpretation in the
lower courts, as illustrated by the 2nd Cireuit’s decision in
Guerrint ve U, S., 167 BF. 2d 352 (1948) whieh refused to
extend the rule to cover harbor workers other than
stevedores.
This approach was again evideneed below, although the
position had been made untenable as far back as 1953 with
the decision in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406,
where the majority clearly gave Sieracki the broadest read-
ing. Hawn was a carpenter whose employer was engaged
to repair the grain feeders on @ ship and was injured when
he slipped on some loose grain. Although the Court was
urged to reverse Sieracki or at least limit its application to
longshoremen, it chose to ‘‘adhere to Steracki’’ and ex-
tended the doctrine to cover workers like Hawn. The
opinion emphasized that Hawn’s need for protection from
unseaworthiness was the same as that of the stevedores
working with him; that ail were subjected to the same
danger and all were entitled to like treatment under the
law. Since then the 2nd Circuit has acknowledged that it
was wrong in Guerrint.
In this ease the Courts below have completely ignored
the underlying consideration in Haw» to grant the remedy
to maritime workers exposed to the same dangers and have
emphasized only the ‘‘traditional work of seamen’’ passage
as the criterion for the application of the seaworthiness
9
rule. This has led to discriminations without solid basis
as the 2nd Cireuit recognized in Halecki. The attempt to
categorize workers who perform essentially similar tasks,
into those who may obtain the protection of the rule and
those who cannot, is impractical and unworkable.
The repairman is as closely connected with maritime
service as the longshoreman, the cleaner, the carpenter or
the painter. He is equally exposed to the hazards of ship’s
work. Despite this, the unseaworthiness rule is denied him
hut granted to other workers. Indeed, the dissenting
opinion in Halecki insisted forcefully that the work of the
rigger who was refused recovery in Berge was as close
to traditional seamen’s activity (even more so the Judge
thought) as the work of the electrician engaged in the
specialized work of spraying the ship’s generators with
a chemical, who was granted a recovery in Halecki. More-
over, Halecki, unlike Berge or Petitioner, was employed
principally ashore, not on ships.
It is respectfully submitted that discriminations of this
sort are unfair and were not intended by this Court. Let
us suppose that Raidy, the injured workman in the present
case, instead of a ship fitter, was a carpenter or cleaner
working on the vessel. In the supposed case, it seems the
2nd Cirenit would apply the seaworthy rule because the
work could be assimilated to the customary work of sea-
men; but the ship fitter ~ould be denied its protection.
A fortior?, in the 4th Circuit, even the carpenter or cleaner
econld not claim recovery because under its ruling unsea-
worthiness is not available where a vessel is undergoing
major work.
Surrender of control.
In reaching the present decision, the Courts below relied
heavily on the rejected ‘‘surrender of control’’ doctrine. Jn
10
Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 205 F. 2d 478 (CA 9, 1953),
347 U.S. 390 (1954), this Court upheld a recovery based on
unseaworthiness due to faulty equipment brought on board
by the injured stevedore’s employer, although control of
the vessel had been surrendered. See also Rogers v. U.S.
Lines, 347 U.S. 984 (1954). After these decisions, the 2nd
Circuit which had evolved the Control Doctrine openly
repudiated it. See Tarkington v. U.S. Lines Co. 222 F. 2d
358 (1955).
Despite this, in the present case the District Court relied
strongly upon surrender of control as did the Court of
Appeals which, during the argument and in its opinion,
stressed that the lighting for the work was controlled and
was to be supplied by the shipyard:
‘«’,. He complains of the hole in the catwalk and con-
tends that the lighting was insufficient, although the
lighting for the re: air job was furnished by the ship-
yard and not hy the vessel... .’’
And again,
ee
... The owner maintained no control over the work
by the independent contractor other than the right to
inspect to determine whether the str actural changes
were being performed in accordance with the elaborate
specifications. ...’’’ (Emphasis supplied) Raidy vr.
United States. (Appendix A, p. 16.)
This represents an attempt to revive the discarded doc-
trine and re-intreduce the fault concept as the basis for
liability in unseaworthiness cases, contrary to this Court’s
decisions. It also raises doubts which, unless dispelled,
will increase the confusion in the lower courts and serve to
arrest the development of the law as intended by this Court.
Also, the theory that a vessel undergoing major repairs
is removed from navigation and is therefore not subject to
11
the Admiralty rules, seems directly contrary to this Court’s
holding in The Jefferson, 215 U.S. 130 (1909), where it was
said that a vessel in drydock for major repairs remains an
object of the Admiralty law.
Court’s interest in questions.
This Court evinced its intention to resolve the questions
when it granted certiorari in Lester v. U. S., 234 F. 2d 625
(CA 2, 1956, cert. granted, 352 U.S. 889, 1956), a claim based
upon unseaworthiness by an electrician working on a vessel
in drydock. However, the case was settled before consider-
ation of the merits and was therefore dismissed from the
docket. It is interesting to observe that in the Govern-
ment’s brief opposing certiorari it was conceded that un-
seaworthiness could be invoked:
‘‘Under the decisions of this Court, petitioner, a
shore based electrician, is, of course, entitled to a sea-
worthy ship which means that the ship must be ‘reason-
ably fit’ but not that it can ‘weather all storms’.”’
(Gov. Br. p.8)
But the Government has reversed its position and now
asserts that the seaworthy warranty is inapplicable.
In the interval since Lester, the conflicts and uncertainty
in the circuits have increased to the point where a review
and authoritative ruling is urgently required. It is sub-
mitted that the present bewildering state should not be per-
mitted to continue where fortuitous circumstances as to
the extent of the work done on a ship or the locale of an
accident will determine whether an injured maritime worker
will be accorded the protection ef the seaworthy warranty.
Ill. CONFLICT IN APPLICATION OF NEGLIGENCE
PRINCIPLES.
The decision in this ease has for practical purposes denied
the right of a dockyard worker to maintain an action in
12
negligence. Customarily the shipowner relinquishes con-
trol of the vessel when it is turned over to the dockyard for
repairs. If a dockvard employee is injured due to failure to
supply a safe place to work, he cannot sue his employer,
undey*the sete of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor
Workers’ Act*; and, under the rule now laid down in the
4th Circuit, he cannot recover against the shipowner even
though its representatives knew that the working condv
tions were unsafe and took no precautionary measures. So
that, except for the extraordinary case where the ship-
owner’s representatives remain in active control after the
vessel is turned over to the yard the shipyard worker is left
without a negligence action.
The 4th Cireuit’s position is that transfer of the vessel
to the shipyard immunizes the shipowner from a negligence
claim. This is contrary to the decisions in the other circuits
which 1-cognize that the fundamental duty to supply a safe
place to work persists whether actual control of the vessel
is retained by the owner or transferred to a contractor.
In Halecki, supra, the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals state.
the correct rule: (per vudge Hand)
«|. The deceased was certainly an ‘invited person,’
or ‘business guest,’ and the shipowner was table, not
only for the negligence of the master, but, although the
work was let out to a subcontractor, also for any lack of
‘reasonable care to ascertain the methods and manner
in which the concessionaire or independent contractor
carries on his activities, not only at the time when the
concession is let, or the contractor employed, but also
during the entire period in which the concessionaire or
contractor carries on his activities’... .’’
*33 U. S. C. A., Sec. 901 et seq.
13
And the 3rd Cireuit Court of Appeals said in Fetmman v.
A. H. Bull S.S. Co., 216 F. 2d 393 (1954): (per Judge
Biggs)
‘Obviously in a diversity suit brought by a longshore
worker against a shipowner, based on negligence, as in
the case at bar, the shipowrcr cannot be relieved of
liability when the ship's appliances have become de-
fective or broken simply because he has relinquished
control of the vessel to a stevedoring company... .”’
This is not a case where the important facts were dis-
puted and we are not asking the Court to reexamine fact
findings of the lower Courts. We do insist that the Courts
below were incorrect in deciding that the shipowner could
not be held in negligence simply because the vessel was in
the shipyard’s control when the accident occurred. It is
dificult to imagine a more dangerous situation for a ship-
worker than a hole in a walkway on which he is working at
night without sufficient light. These were the working
conditions supplied Petitioner. Yet, the Courts below dis-
regarded uncontradicted evidence that the shipowner’s
representatives knew of the unsafe conditions and failed
to take any precautions, to wit:
That at the time of the accident part of the crew was
living aboard, including the chief electrician who was pres-
ent when the accident occured and testified the lighting was
“very poor’’. (R. la, p. 52) That the chief government
inspector saw the hole in the walkway before the accident.
(Roda, p. 45) The government inspectors knew that work
would be done after dark requiring the use of the walk-
way. (R. la, p. 19) They knew that the customary ight-
ing had been removed. (R. la, p. 51) They knew that
adequate light was required for the work. Despite this, no
warning Was given and no precautions were taken, although
the customary safeguard was to place a light at a hole. (R.
la, p. 26, 46,51-55) That Petitioner did not know the hole
was there. (R. la, p. 26) That after the accident a light
14
was placed at the hole and the Government inspectors re-
quired a report. (R. la, p. 13, 14)
It is submitted that these undisputed facts would un-
doubtedly have been sufficient for a finding of negligence in
any circuit but the 4th, which alone among the circuits,
regards the vessel’s transfer to the shipyard as foreclosing
the need for further inquiry. Also the decision below is a
step towards the obliteration of the negligence cause of
action, contrary to this Court’s opinion in Pope & Talbot,
Inc. v. Hawn, supra, which carefully preserved the harbor-
worker’s negligence cause of action:
‘*The fact that Sieracki upheld the right of workers
like Hawn to reeover for unseaworthiness does not
justify an argument that the Court thereby blotted out
their long recognized right to recover in admiralty for
negligence.”’
Importance of third party action.
The decision below and similar decisions which curtail
and restrict 3rd party actions usually assume the sufficiency
of the remedies provided by the Longshoremen and Harbor
Workers Act. This comforting assumption is rudely shaken
when we consider the meager remedy afforded by the Act in
this case.
The Petitioner has received only $895.00 in compensation
payments and has little prespect of any additional payment.
The Act does not provide compensation for pain and s . -
fering; for loss of sexual power, for internal injuries and
brain injuries; for inability to enjoy life as before the acci.
dent. It ducs not provide compensation for the permanent
impairment of his vital bodily functions since they are not
among the scheduled injuries; nor partial compensation in a
case such as this, where Petitioner has returned to light work
at the same wages; it does not take into account the uncer-
tainty of continued light employment and the tragic con-
15
sequences to Petitioner if he is terminated. And even if
he could be put back on compensation, the Act provides only
a fraction of the present day cost of living and reduces him
from a full provider for his family to a compensation
pauper. These factors car receive recognition only in a
3rd party action.
CONCLUSION
The importance of the questions involved and the conflict
and uncertainty in the lower courts present a compelling
case for review to resolve the conflicts, as well as to reverse
the incorrect decision below.
Respectfully abmitted,
Bernarp MM. GoupsteErn,
Marvin I. Srncer,
Counsel for Petitioner.
16
APPENDIX A
OPINION OF COURT OF APPEALS
Before Parker, Chief Judge, and Soper and Sosevorr,
Cireuit Judges.
Per CuRIAM:
This is an appeal in a suit in admiralty brought to re-
cover damages sustained by a shipyard worker while work-
ing on a government vessel which had been turned over to
the shipyard for major repairs and which was then in dry
dock in the course of being repaired. The worker was in-
jured when he fell through a hole in a catwalk on the vessel
which was caused by the removal of a plate in tke course
of the repairs being made by the shipyard. He complains
of the hole in the catwalk and contends that the light ing
was insufficient, although the lighting for the repair job
was furnished by the shipyard and not by the vessel. The
trial judge exonerated the United States, as owner of the
vessel, from the charges of negligence and unseaworthiness,
correctly stating as to the latter
‘In the instant case the libelant shipyard worker was
performing duties not within the competence or the
traditional or customary activities of the crew. His
status therefore was very different from that of a sea-
man. The ship was in drydock for structural changes
which could not have been performed by the crew. In
fact the crew Lad heen discharged long before the aeci-
dent occurred. The ship at the time was not subjected
to any perils of navigation. In fact it had necessarily
been withdrawn from navigation for a long period.
The owner maintained no control over the work by the
independent contractor other than the right to Inspect
to determine whether the structural changes were being
performed in accordance with the elaborate speeifica-
tions. It seems to me a misnomer to speak of the re-
movable and absent footplate as ‘unseaworthiness of
the ship’. The removal of the absent piate, for the
ee eee
a
17
substitution of others, was a part of the work required
to be performed by the contract specifications.”
We agree with the trial judge that there was no liability
on the part of the United States as owner, for reasons
adequately stated in the opinion below, which is adopted as
the opinion of this court. See Raidy v. United States 153
F. Supp. 777. See also Berryhill v. Pacific Far East Line 9
Cir. 238 F. 2d 385, cert. den. 354 U.S. 938.
Affirmed.
DECREE
Filed and Entered February 11, 1958.
Unrrep States Court oF APPEALS FOR THE FourTH Circuit
Appra.ts From the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland.
Tus Cause came on to be heard on the record from the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland,
and was argued by counsel.
Ox ConsiperaTION Wuereor, It is now here ordered,
adjudged and decreed by this Court that the decree of the
said District Court appealed from, in this cause, be, and
the same is hereby, affirmed.
Joun J. Parker
Chief Judge, Fourth Circuit.
Morris A. Soper
United States Circuit Judge.
Sruow E. Sopetorr
United States Circuit Judge.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.