Petition for A Writ of Certiorari — Raidy v. United States (No. 931)

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APR 13s i948

SOHN T. FEY, Clerk }

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1957

N 0. PBI

JAMES S. RAIDY

Petitioner,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Bernarp M. Go.pster,

1716 Court Square Building

Baltimore 2, Maryland

Marvin I. Srvacer,

Counsel for Petitioner.

King Bros., Inc., Printers, 208 N. Calvert St., Baltimore, Md. (4-9-58—50)

INDEX

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Page

CERI Te COI TI aia sesisckccnssteceesecsntndenmisasotcctans 1

PN cepidosactcmetlecancatenncdccediniadinnschactesissasesésieuacnds alae 2

NI Fr I © ccccoraa sea cal ateunrpeneaeoranecinonnrs 2

NINE a cccidscchensncaeeatincncakcneencintnccacccutdcasebeleesesnarabeniahes 2

Reasons For Granting The Writ

I. Conflict Among Decisions of

Circuit Courts of Appeals—Unseaworthiness.... 5

II. Conffict In Principle with Decisions

of This Court—Unseaworthiness.......000.....ccc.ccc 8

IiI. Conflict In Application of

Pe Fa iicctcncinneemaes 11

IONE ria esac atch csc at ee 15

Appendix A—Opinion and Decree of the

IIS es ARIE speed noccinctinaoaccone 16

CITATIONS

Cases:

Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 205 F. 2d 478, 347 U.S.

SN RD: a tkcdeecenniateassae ti esecna des déhenie caieacekécsemoancns: 10

Berge v. National Bulk Carriers Corp., 251 F. 2d 717

CRIN siniseseuisdcaecapenck naan aut ekee cstetiochabiseigicceaenies specie! 6, 7,9

Berryhill v. Pacifie Far East Line, 238 F. 2d 385

ERE “i cahcsstacskonecpcecdeelsnptiinie sip anced cactcegiiadsaabcoeaaantiascaiees 7

Chriziiansen v. U.S., 192 F. 2d 199 (1951) ow. 5

Feinman v. A. H. Bull S.S. Co., 216 F. 2d 393 (1954) 13

Guerrini v. U.S., 167 F. 2d 352 (1948) ............................ §

Halecki v. United N.Y. & N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots

fo Se OR ee 8 Re Eaemreae 7,9, 12

Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F. 2d 4 (1956) ............ 6

Jefferson, The, 215 U.S. 130 (1909) oo... 11

Lester v. U.S., 234 F. 2d 625 (1956) .................. coachinas 11

Pioneer Steamship Co. v. Hill, 227 F. 2d 262 (1955)... 6

Pope & Talbot, Ine. v. Hawn, 198 F. 2d 800, 346 U.S.

LY. RA Ramen eet ne nee ee ree sid bisigdesantensita 5, 8, 14

Raidy v. U.S., 153 F. Supp. 777 (1957) ............cssscssseee 10

Read v. U.8., 201 F’. 2d 756 (UGGS) ccsecscsissesccraressesees vo

Rogers v. U.S. Lines, 347 U.S. 984 (1954) 0. 10

Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946) ...... 5, 8

Tarkington v. U.S. Lines, 222 F. 2d 358 (1955) 0.0.0.0... 10

Statutes:

ing Me a Rs, IE LEY sisiecstctnrapcomnecinadionas 2

U.S.C.A., Title 33, See. 901 et seq., Longshoremen and

SOR WRONNNO TAO elec cccasesnitanieannn 4,12, 14

U.S.C.A., Title 46, See. 741 et seq., Suits in

PETA DARR sosccinincicodeaaeen ened 2

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1957

JAMES 8S. RAIDY

Petitioner,

VS.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

JAMES S. RAIDY, your Petitioner, prays that a writ of

certiorari issue to review the decree of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, entered in thie

above-entitled ease on February 11, 1958.

CITATIONS TQ OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the District Court, printed in Record la,

p. 61, is reported in 1538 F. Supp. 777. The opinion of

the Cireuit Court of Appeals, printed in Appendix A hereo!,

p. 16, is unreported as vet.

»)

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JURISDICTION

The decree of the Cireuit Court of Appeals was entered

on February 11, 1958; Appendix A, p. 16, infra.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Title 28,

United States Code Annotated, Section 1254 (1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I. Is the seaworthy cause of action aveilable to a ship-

fitter working on a vessel in a floating drydock who was in-

jured at night under poor lighting conditions by falling

through an unguarded hole in the operating walkway of the

vessel?

II. Is a negligence cause of action made out where the

uncontradicted facts established that a shipfitter working

on a vessel in floating drydock was injured at night under

poor lighting conditions by falling through an unguarded

hole in the walkway after the shipowner’s representatives

knew the working conditions were unsafe but gave no

warning and took no precautionary measures?

STATEMENT

The libel was brought under the Svits in Admiralty Acts

(U.S.C.A. Tit. 46 see. 741 et seq) against the United States

as owner of the dredge, S.S. Goethals and claimed recovery

for unseaworthiness, and in negligence, for failure to

furnish a safe place to work. The Government impleaded

Bethlehem and the case was tried by the District Judge

without a jury.

The Petitioner, a ship fitter employed by Bethlehem

sustained crippling injuries on the evening of October 27,

1954, when he fell some 30 feet through an unguarded hole

in one of the operating walkways of the vessel.

It was uncontradicted +):at at the time of the acciden’ he

was working on one of the operating walkways of the

vessel; that there was a hole in the walkway due to a miss-

3

ing plate; that the accident occurred at night and the light-

ing was poor. The District Court denied recovery as to

each count, holding that the seaworthy warranty was not

available and that the Government was not negligent. On

appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed the Judgment of the

District Court in a per curiam opinion.

Before the accident the Goethals was actively engaged in

her duties as a navigable and seaworthy vessel. She came

to the Bethlehem shipyard in Baltimore for the usual 12-18

month overhaul and the conversion of her unloading system:

certain repairs and renovations were also to be made.

Under the contract for the work, Bethlehem agreed to pro-

vide a safe place to work for its employees and to indemnify

the Government against any liability for injuries resulting

from the fault, negligence, wrongful acts or omissions of

Bethlehem. The vessel was placed in a floating drydock for

13 days, although the over-all work lasted for a longer

period. While in the dock some of the crew, including the

chief electrician, maintained their quarters aboard the

vesvel and the Government had several inspectors aboard.

(R. la, p. 19, 52; 2a, p. 3) After the work was completed

the vessel resumed her service in navigation.

The accident occurred after night had falien. The Gov-

ernment inspectors knew that work would be done at night

requiring the use of the walkway and that sufficient lighting

would be necessary. (R. la, p. 19, 51) However, al-

though the customary lighting for the walkway had been

removed before the accident, no substitute lighting was

furnished and no warning of the hole was given. (R. la,

p. 26, 46, 51-55) At the point where the Petitioner was

working ( the starboard side), there was no light at all.

(R. la, p. 53, 55) The lighting there wa: described by

the chief electrician as ‘‘very poor’’ and the District Court

found this as a fact. (R. Ja, p. 52, 55, 64)

4

The Petitioner was working on one of the operating walk-

ways of the vessel when he was hurt. The walkway con-

sisted of removable steel plates 3x3 feet. One of the walk-

way plates located behind a work bench was missing, leaving

a hole. here was a sheer drop of 30 feet from the hole

to the bottom of the mixing well. The chief Government

inspector had seen the hole earlier in the day but no pre-

cautions were taken and no warning was given. (R. la,

p. 40)

The petitioner had been working below deck when he was

instructed to go to the upper area to help lay a ‘‘chalk

line,’’—a guide line for the installation of a hopper. (R.

la, p. 24, 25) He did not know there was a hole in the

walkway. (R. la, p. 26) He complained about the lack

of light but was told it was a ‘‘small job’’ which would only

take a short time. (R. la, p. 25, 26) As he proceeded

along the walkway with the line in the customary manner,

he came into contact with the work bench and was feeling

his way around it in the darkness when he plunged through

the hole to the bottom of the mixing well. (R. 1a, p. 21,

26) After the accident a light was placed at the hole and

the Government inspectors required a report of the acci-

dent. (R. la, p. 13-14)

The Petitioner suffered permanently crippling injuries

including many fractures, internal injuries and disabling

injuries to the spine, pelvis and brain. He has received a

total of $895.00 in compensation payments. (R. 2a, p. 3)

Under the terms of the Longshoremen and Harbor

Workers’ Act, he cannot claim any substantial additional

benefits.

v0

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. CONFLICT AMONG DECISIONS OF CIRCUIT COURTS

OF APPEALS—UNSEAWORTHINESS.

Conflict and uncertainty mark the decisions in the circu'ts

as to the applicability of the seaworthy rule to shipyard

workers. The District Court expressed the prevailing un-

certainty at the close of the trial:

‘« . . Now, the question here is whether the Sieracki

ease is to be limited or to be extended. Now, is it not

probably the situation, here, that ... nobody will ever

know until the Supreme Court decides it? ... We do

not have any pro forma orders in this Court. But it is

the kind of ease, after I have heard the respective argu-

ments, in which, apparently, there is no flat decision of

the Supreme Court, itself. Each side feels that its side

of the case is consistent with the Supreme Court cases ;

but it looks to me as if the question were not definitely

settled at the present time.’’ (R. la, p. 61)

The 3rd Cireuit Court of Appeals holds that unsea-

worthiness may be asserted by a repairman who was in-

jured because of inadequate lighting while working on a

vessel undergoing major conversion in the shipyard. Read

vy. UU. S., 201 F. 2d 758 (CA 3, 1953). The Court ruled that

no distinction could be made between the repairman and the

carpenter who was grantea recovery in Hawn v. Pope &

Talbot, Inc., 3 Cir., 1952, 198 F. 2d 800, affirmed, 346 U. S.

406 (1953).

The Ist and 6tu Cireuits evince support for the 3rd

Cireuit’s ruling. In Christiansen v. U. S., 192 F. 2d 199

(1951) the Ist Civeuit indicated that employees of a tank

cleaning company were among the workers who could

invoke unseaworthiness. The 6th Circuit in the case of a

shipfitter who fell into an unguarded hole while the vessel

was under repair during its winter lay-up, declared that

recovery could have heen based on unseaworthiness, al-

6

though the actual decision was grounded in negligence since

the unseaworthiness claim had been withdrawn at the trial.

Pioneer Steamship Co. v. Hill, 227 F. 2d 262 (CA 6, 1955).

See also the language of the 6th Circuit in Jmperial Ou Ltd.

v. Drlik, 234 F. 2d 4 (1956) where a dock-worker was

injured:

‘* |. The rule (unseaworthiness) has lately been ex-

tended to stevedores and others doing a seaman’s work

and incurring a seaman’s hazards, although not in the

employ of the owner of the vessel. [Citing Sterackt,

Hawn and Petterson cases.] Appellee would fall with-

in the protection of the rule so extended. .. .”’

In the cireuits that deny the applicability of the sea-

worthy warranty in like settings, there is disagreement as

to the basis for the denial, thus foreshadowing ever-increas-

ing conflicts. In the present case, the 4th Cireuit denied

a ship fitter working on a vessel undergoing major conver-

sion in a shipyard the benefit of the unseaworthy rule,

stressing the vessel’s withdrawal from navigation and its

surrender to the shipyard.

The conflict with the 3rd Circuit’s decision in Read is

plain although it was not openly stated. However, the 2nd

Circuit in Berge v. National Bulk Carriers Corp. 251 ¥. 2d

717 (1958) conceded the conflict in denying the seaworthy

warranty to a rigger working on a vessel in the shipyard

who was injured when a shackle pin broke and the tackle

fell upon him. The Court flatly said:

‘*... We disagree with Read v. United States, 201 Fed.

2d 758 (CA 3).”’

In Berge, the Court said that the test in determining

whether the seaworthy doctrine would be applied was

whether the workman was engaged in work of a kind that

the crew of the vessel was accustomed to perform. But the

nice line separating the cases became immediately apparent

in Halecki v. United N.Y. and N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots

Ass'n, 251 F. 2d 708 (1958), a companion case, where a re-

covery was allowed a shoreside electrician engaged in clean-

ing the ship’s generators by sprayiag them with a danger-

ous chemical. In Halecki, as in the instart case, the vessel

was undergoing an annual overhaul and inspection at the

repair yard and it was neccessary to use electric current

from shore as the vessel was without her own. The Court

acknowledged the unsatisfactory nature of its differentia-

tion between Berge and Halecki by remarking:

‘‘ As might be expected, so shadowy a line of demarea-

tion will in application produce inconsistent re-

sults....’’

The decision in the present case increases the confusion

by emphasizing the concept that a vesse! undergoing major

repairs is removed from navigation, hence the seaworthy

warranty is unavailable. Under this view it is submitted

that Halecki would not have gotten a recovery in the 4th

Circuit. It also raises more problems than it solves because

the crucial question becomes when are the repairs major

enough to deprive the injared workman of the benefit of

the seaworthy warranty? The aaritime worker's right to

invoke seaworthiness will come to be determined not by the

work he is performing but by the natnre of his employer's

contract for repairs to the vessel. It is evident that serious

injustice, many times on a hair-splitting basis, will cer-

tainly result.

The 9th Cireuit Court of Appeals in Berryhill v. Pacific

Far East Line, 238 F. 2d 385 (1956) emphasized that the

unseaworthiness rule should be restricted to workmen

engaged in loading and unloading operations, in refusing

a machinist recovery for injuries caused by the explosion of

a grinding wheel brought on board by his employer; thus

again raising the question whether Halecki, the electrician,

would have been awarded recovery in the 9th Circuit.

8

i. CONFLICT IN PRINCIPLE WITH DECISIONS OF

THIS COURT—UNSEAWORTHINESS

The views of the Court below are inconsistent with, and

it is believed, disregard the true meaning of this Court’s

opinions. In Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85,

(1946), it was held that unseaworthiness gives rise to

absolute liability, regardless of fault and that a longshore-

man could claim the warranty against the shipowner. For

some time Sieracki received a narrow interpretation in the

lower courts, as illustrated by the 2nd Cireuit’s decision in

Guerrint ve U, S., 167 BF. 2d 352 (1948) whieh refused to

extend the rule to cover harbor workers other than

stevedores.

This approach was again evideneed below, although the

position had been made untenable as far back as 1953 with

the decision in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406,

where the majority clearly gave Sieracki the broadest read-

ing. Hawn was a carpenter whose employer was engaged

to repair the grain feeders on @ ship and was injured when

he slipped on some loose grain. Although the Court was

urged to reverse Sieracki or at least limit its application to

longshoremen, it chose to ‘‘adhere to Steracki’’ and ex-

tended the doctrine to cover workers like Hawn. The

opinion emphasized that Hawn’s need for protection from

unseaworthiness was the same as that of the stevedores

working with him; that ail were subjected to the same

danger and all were entitled to like treatment under the

law. Since then the 2nd Circuit has acknowledged that it

was wrong in Guerrint.

In this ease the Courts below have completely ignored

the underlying consideration in Haw» to grant the remedy

to maritime workers exposed to the same dangers and have

emphasized only the ‘‘traditional work of seamen’’ passage

as the criterion for the application of the seaworthiness

9

rule. This has led to discriminations without solid basis

as the 2nd Cireuit recognized in Halecki. The attempt to

categorize workers who perform essentially similar tasks,

into those who may obtain the protection of the rule and

those who cannot, is impractical and unworkable.

The repairman is as closely connected with maritime

service as the longshoreman, the cleaner, the carpenter or

the painter. He is equally exposed to the hazards of ship’s

work. Despite this, the unseaworthiness rule is denied him

hut granted to other workers. Indeed, the dissenting

opinion in Halecki insisted forcefully that the work of the

rigger who was refused recovery in Berge was as close

to traditional seamen’s activity (even more so the Judge

thought) as the work of the electrician engaged in the

specialized work of spraying the ship’s generators with

a chemical, who was granted a recovery in Halecki. More-

over, Halecki, unlike Berge or Petitioner, was employed

principally ashore, not on ships.

It is respectfully submitted that discriminations of this

sort are unfair and were not intended by this Court. Let

us suppose that Raidy, the injured workman in the present

case, instead of a ship fitter, was a carpenter or cleaner

working on the vessel. In the supposed case, it seems the

2nd Cirenit would apply the seaworthy rule because the

work could be assimilated to the customary work of sea-

men; but the ship fitter ~ould be denied its protection.

A fortior?, in the 4th Circuit, even the carpenter or cleaner

econld not claim recovery because under its ruling unsea-

worthiness is not available where a vessel is undergoing

major work.

Surrender of control.

In reaching the present decision, the Courts below relied

heavily on the rejected ‘‘surrender of control’’ doctrine. Jn

10

Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 205 F. 2d 478 (CA 9, 1953),

347 U.S. 390 (1954), this Court upheld a recovery based on

unseaworthiness due to faulty equipment brought on board

by the injured stevedore’s employer, although control of

the vessel had been surrendered. See also Rogers v. U.S.

Lines, 347 U.S. 984 (1954). After these decisions, the 2nd

Circuit which had evolved the Control Doctrine openly

repudiated it. See Tarkington v. U.S. Lines Co. 222 F. 2d

358 (1955).

Despite this, in the present case the District Court relied

strongly upon surrender of control as did the Court of

Appeals which, during the argument and in its opinion,

stressed that the lighting for the work was controlled and

was to be supplied by the shipyard:

‘«’,. He complains of the hole in the catwalk and con-

tends that the lighting was insufficient, although the

lighting for the re: air job was furnished by the ship-

yard and not hy the vessel... .’’

And again,

ee

... The owner maintained no control over the work

by the independent contractor other than the right to

inspect to determine whether the str actural changes

were being performed in accordance with the elaborate

specifications. ...’’’ (Emphasis supplied) Raidy vr.

United States. (Appendix A, p. 16.)

This represents an attempt to revive the discarded doc-

trine and re-intreduce the fault concept as the basis for

liability in unseaworthiness cases, contrary to this Court’s

decisions. It also raises doubts which, unless dispelled,

will increase the confusion in the lower courts and serve to

arrest the development of the law as intended by this Court.

Also, the theory that a vessel undergoing major repairs

is removed from navigation and is therefore not subject to

11

the Admiralty rules, seems directly contrary to this Court’s

holding in The Jefferson, 215 U.S. 130 (1909), where it was

said that a vessel in drydock for major repairs remains an

object of the Admiralty law.

Court’s interest in questions.

This Court evinced its intention to resolve the questions

when it granted certiorari in Lester v. U. S., 234 F. 2d 625

(CA 2, 1956, cert. granted, 352 U.S. 889, 1956), a claim based

upon unseaworthiness by an electrician working on a vessel

in drydock. However, the case was settled before consider-

ation of the merits and was therefore dismissed from the

docket. It is interesting to observe that in the Govern-

ment’s brief opposing certiorari it was conceded that un-

seaworthiness could be invoked:

‘‘Under the decisions of this Court, petitioner, a

shore based electrician, is, of course, entitled to a sea-

worthy ship which means that the ship must be ‘reason-

ably fit’ but not that it can ‘weather all storms’.”’

(Gov. Br. p.8)

But the Government has reversed its position and now

asserts that the seaworthy warranty is inapplicable.

In the interval since Lester, the conflicts and uncertainty

in the circuits have increased to the point where a review

and authoritative ruling is urgently required. It is sub-

mitted that the present bewildering state should not be per-

mitted to continue where fortuitous circumstances as to

the extent of the work done on a ship or the locale of an

accident will determine whether an injured maritime worker

will be accorded the protection ef the seaworthy warranty.

Ill. CONFLICT IN APPLICATION OF NEGLIGENCE

PRINCIPLES.

The decision in this ease has for practical purposes denied

the right of a dockyard worker to maintain an action in

12

negligence. Customarily the shipowner relinquishes con-

trol of the vessel when it is turned over to the dockyard for

repairs. If a dockvard employee is injured due to failure to

supply a safe place to work, he cannot sue his employer,

undey*the sete of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor

Workers’ Act*; and, under the rule now laid down in the

4th Circuit, he cannot recover against the shipowner even

though its representatives knew that the working condv

tions were unsafe and took no precautionary measures. So

that, except for the extraordinary case where the ship-

owner’s representatives remain in active control after the

vessel is turned over to the yard the shipyard worker is left

without a negligence action.

The 4th Cireuit’s position is that transfer of the vessel

to the shipyard immunizes the shipowner from a negligence

claim. This is contrary to the decisions in the other circuits

which 1-cognize that the fundamental duty to supply a safe

place to work persists whether actual control of the vessel

is retained by the owner or transferred to a contractor.

In Halecki, supra, the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals state.

the correct rule: (per vudge Hand)

«|. The deceased was certainly an ‘invited person,’

or ‘business guest,’ and the shipowner was table, not

only for the negligence of the master, but, although the

work was let out to a subcontractor, also for any lack of

‘reasonable care to ascertain the methods and manner

in which the concessionaire or independent contractor

carries on his activities, not only at the time when the

concession is let, or the contractor employed, but also

during the entire period in which the concessionaire or

contractor carries on his activities’... .’’

*33 U. S. C. A., Sec. 901 et seq.

13

And the 3rd Cireuit Court of Appeals said in Fetmman v.

A. H. Bull S.S. Co., 216 F. 2d 393 (1954): (per Judge

Biggs)

‘Obviously in a diversity suit brought by a longshore

worker against a shipowner, based on negligence, as in

the case at bar, the shipowrcr cannot be relieved of

liability when the ship's appliances have become de-

fective or broken simply because he has relinquished

control of the vessel to a stevedoring company... .”’

This is not a case where the important facts were dis-

puted and we are not asking the Court to reexamine fact

findings of the lower Courts. We do insist that the Courts

below were incorrect in deciding that the shipowner could

not be held in negligence simply because the vessel was in

the shipyard’s control when the accident occurred. It is

dificult to imagine a more dangerous situation for a ship-

worker than a hole in a walkway on which he is working at

night without sufficient light. These were the working

conditions supplied Petitioner. Yet, the Courts below dis-

regarded uncontradicted evidence that the shipowner’s

representatives knew of the unsafe conditions and failed

to take any precautions, to wit:

That at the time of the accident part of the crew was

living aboard, including the chief electrician who was pres-

ent when the accident occured and testified the lighting was

“very poor’’. (R. la, p. 52) That the chief government

inspector saw the hole in the walkway before the accident.

(Roda, p. 45) The government inspectors knew that work

would be done after dark requiring the use of the walk-

way. (R. la, p. 19) They knew that the customary ight-

ing had been removed. (R. la, p. 51) They knew that

adequate light was required for the work. Despite this, no

warning Was given and no precautions were taken, although

the customary safeguard was to place a light at a hole. (R.

la, p. 26, 46,51-55) That Petitioner did not know the hole

was there. (R. la, p. 26) That after the accident a light

14

was placed at the hole and the Government inspectors re-

quired a report. (R. la, p. 13, 14)

It is submitted that these undisputed facts would un-

doubtedly have been sufficient for a finding of negligence in

any circuit but the 4th, which alone among the circuits,

regards the vessel’s transfer to the shipyard as foreclosing

the need for further inquiry. Also the decision below is a

step towards the obliteration of the negligence cause of

action, contrary to this Court’s opinion in Pope & Talbot,

Inc. v. Hawn, supra, which carefully preserved the harbor-

worker’s negligence cause of action:

‘*The fact that Sieracki upheld the right of workers

like Hawn to reeover for unseaworthiness does not

justify an argument that the Court thereby blotted out

their long recognized right to recover in admiralty for

negligence.”’

Importance of third party action.

The decision below and similar decisions which curtail

and restrict 3rd party actions usually assume the sufficiency

of the remedies provided by the Longshoremen and Harbor

Workers Act. This comforting assumption is rudely shaken

when we consider the meager remedy afforded by the Act in

this case.

The Petitioner has received only $895.00 in compensation

payments and has little prespect of any additional payment.

The Act does not provide compensation for pain and s . -

fering; for loss of sexual power, for internal injuries and

brain injuries; for inability to enjoy life as before the acci.

dent. It ducs not provide compensation for the permanent

impairment of his vital bodily functions since they are not

among the scheduled injuries; nor partial compensation in a

case such as this, where Petitioner has returned to light work

at the same wages; it does not take into account the uncer-

tainty of continued light employment and the tragic con-

15

sequences to Petitioner if he is terminated. And even if

he could be put back on compensation, the Act provides only

a fraction of the present day cost of living and reduces him

from a full provider for his family to a compensation

pauper. These factors car receive recognition only in a

3rd party action.

CONCLUSION

The importance of the questions involved and the conflict

and uncertainty in the lower courts present a compelling

case for review to resolve the conflicts, as well as to reverse

the incorrect decision below.

Respectfully abmitted,

Bernarp MM. GoupsteErn,

Marvin I. Srncer,

Counsel for Petitioner.

16

APPENDIX A

OPINION OF COURT OF APPEALS

Before Parker, Chief Judge, and Soper and Sosevorr,

Cireuit Judges.

Per CuRIAM:

This is an appeal in a suit in admiralty brought to re-

cover damages sustained by a shipyard worker while work-

ing on a government vessel which had been turned over to

the shipyard for major repairs and which was then in dry

dock in the course of being repaired. The worker was in-

jured when he fell through a hole in a catwalk on the vessel

which was caused by the removal of a plate in tke course

of the repairs being made by the shipyard. He complains

of the hole in the catwalk and contends that the light ing

was insufficient, although the lighting for the repair job

was furnished by the shipyard and not by the vessel. The

trial judge exonerated the United States, as owner of the

vessel, from the charges of negligence and unseaworthiness,

correctly stating as to the latter

‘In the instant case the libelant shipyard worker was

performing duties not within the competence or the

traditional or customary activities of the crew. His

status therefore was very different from that of a sea-

man. The ship was in drydock for structural changes

which could not have been performed by the crew. In

fact the crew Lad heen discharged long before the aeci-

dent occurred. The ship at the time was not subjected

to any perils of navigation. In fact it had necessarily

been withdrawn from navigation for a long period.

The owner maintained no control over the work by the

independent contractor other than the right to Inspect

to determine whether the structural changes were being

performed in accordance with the elaborate speeifica-

tions. It seems to me a misnomer to speak of the re-

movable and absent footplate as ‘unseaworthiness of

the ship’. The removal of the absent piate, for the

ee eee

a

17

substitution of others, was a part of the work required

to be performed by the contract specifications.”

We agree with the trial judge that there was no liability

on the part of the United States as owner, for reasons

adequately stated in the opinion below, which is adopted as

the opinion of this court. See Raidy v. United States 153

F. Supp. 777. See also Berryhill v. Pacific Far East Line 9

Cir. 238 F. 2d 385, cert. den. 354 U.S. 938.

Affirmed.

DECREE

Filed and Entered February 11, 1958.

Unrrep States Court oF APPEALS FOR THE FourTH Circuit

Appra.ts From the United States District Court for the

District of Maryland.

Tus Cause came on to be heard on the record from the

United States District Court for the District of Maryland,

and was argued by counsel.

Ox ConsiperaTION Wuereor, It is now here ordered,

adjudged and decreed by this Court that the decree of the

said District Court appealed from, in this cause, be, and

the same is hereby, affirmed.

Joun J. Parker

Chief Judge, Fourth Circuit.

Morris A. Soper

United States Circuit Judge.

Sruow E. Sopetorr

United States Circuit Judge.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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