Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari — North American Aviation, Inc. v. Hughes (No. 601)

Supreme Court brief1957

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SUBJECT INDEX

PAGE

I,

Every one of the questions presented to the Supreme Court by

petitioner in its petition for certfiprari has a false premise........

IT, Ee

- Petitioner's statement which® purpotts to be a statement of

fact, is very substantially” erfoneous. .............ccecccececcccesecseeeeenees

be

2 oe

Writ of certiorari should be ref ed because the case does not

>

involve questions of public importance... ete

IV.

Petitioner's arguments in support of reasons for granting writ

of certiorari are without sound legal foundation........00...0....2....

A. The doctrine of manufacturer's lability as recognized by

California law has neither been disregarded nor extended

by the decision of the Court of Appeals... 0...

B. There is no conflict between the opinion of the United

States Courts of Appeals and the California decision§ in-

volving the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur..00000..... (as eae

1 It is for the jury to determine whether each of the

conditions necessdry to bring into play the doctrine

of res ipsa foquitur ts~presemt.............. cs.

|

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be relied upon

tS

’

to support a judgment although no jury instruction

0 CEI: oscar ictinninincinininmbiamntace gp ancnssamnpeninvansnsesetven

3. The accident was of a kind which does not occur in

the absence of someone's, negligence...

4.) The condition requirtig exclusive control ino deten-

dant is satished.... dein

x

10

10

11

12

13

13

PAGE

5. The accident could not have been due to any volun-

tary action or contribution on the part of the de-.,

co EERE EE SS SSNS es ER RESET SR 15

6. There was no evidence of iliac iets

: pilot error. ........... atecnnlaiietinlseyseiniedbiagacebtheninem sensative = 16

C. The decision of the Court of Appeals does not conflict

with the decisions of other circuits on the application of

res ipsa VOqUitur..........o..eeccssessccsnesesssonseegeecaneecs iskmeneenantioisese i 19.

)

D. The verdict was fair and just and supported by sub-

RNIN IIIIINE isc eps cdcosendatinistsshadesaia toagconthedlaiendain-aitdsuiteaaisuben. UD

*

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

CasEs PAGE

Baker v. Goodrich Co., 115 Cal. App. 2d 221, 252 P. 2d 24........ 14

Bauer v. Otis, 133 Cal. App. 2d 443, 284 P. 2d 133.................... 13

Boise Payette Lumber Co. v. Larsen, 214 F. 2d 373.................... 19

Burr v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P. 2d 1041.... 14

Cohn v. United Air Lines Trans. Co., 17 Fed. Supp. 685 mee pa 20

Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P. 2d

ewer ee ears nearehestvesnensabsnesessinenesl SussTavsenatsnansaeesnseseonacaenetenees T4, 16

Fields v. Oakland, 137 Cal. App. 2d 602; 291 P. 2d 145................ 14

{General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 304

CFB. UPd, GE Sa. TO Bre FO BR iiss sccm 9

Hoffing v. Coca-Cotffottling Co., 87 Cal. App. 2d 371, 197

BE I cea Spelt eh caictnoasicccisclnowkcpacd sieaisalessoubecaninadiianabeaoheisecarceltaea 14

Jaffke +. Dunham, 352 U. S. 285, 1 L. Ed. 2d 314...........02..... 13

La Porte v. Houston, 33 Cal. 2d 167, 199 P. 2d 665........0..0........ 14

Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U. S. 645, 56 S. Ct. 740, 90 L. Ed. 916. 22

Layne and Bowler Corp. v. Western Well Works, Inc., 261 —

Rr ee RR ee ree ae! 10

Liggett and Myers Tobacco Co. v. De Lape, 109 F. 2d. 598... 15

Magnum Import Co. v. DeSpoturne Coty, 262 .U. S, 159, 163

iat RET hema eal, Rc neti ee ace Ra RACE 10

McPherson vy. Buick Motor Company, 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. EB.

| UREA RR ee rites tmutien rer Sil lclsinsork ipl Rlaoocied 10, 20

Michener v. Hutton, 203 Cal. 604, 265 Pac. 2380000000000. ooo... 15

Morrison y. LeTourneau Co. of Georgia, 138 F. 2d 339... .... 19

National Labor Relatigns Board v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co.,

A A eB RN iachcinccneokcctonnns: @

ined v. — Valley etc. Assn., 142 Cal. App. 2d 653,

300 P. 2d 283... Seis la cegeattpidiease lnc a. danicarietssdeiaghhGRa nie 14

Rourke v. Day and Night Water Heater Co.. 31 Cal. App.

2d 364 PO Ui Do ee OR ies ee SRSA Soe CD ea: | 21

ae ge RRC Sect OPUS CEO he ec EE 13

Rohar ¢. Osborne, 133 Cal. App. 2d 345, 284 P. 2d 125.............. 14

Rose v. Melody Lane, 39 Cal. 2d 481, 247 P. 2d 335... 13

Rui v. Sioux City Cemetery, 349 U. S. 70, 99 L. Ed. A 10

Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P. 2d 915.................12, 15

Sloboden v. Times Oil Co., 145 Cal. App. 2d 197, 302 P. 2d 34.. 11

Smith v. Alaska Airways, 89 F.2d 253....0.....cccccccceccccccccecceceescesccseee 19

Smith v. O'Donnell, 215 Cal. 714, 12 P. 2d 933... sasledies 19

Spencer v. Beatty Safway Scaffold Co., 4] Cal. App. 2d 875,

Ae es kssinctna ar ndagt acd teaici gc cr oe ia 15

Sullivan v. Shell Oil ae a4 F. 28 738.............: Siadahcaiapbdians 7

Tennant v. Peoria and P. U. Ry. Co., 321 U. S. 29, 64 S. Ct.

TO. Miata oe ors eet ee dare 8

United States v. Johnson, 268 U. S. 222, 69 L. Ed. a 9

Williams v. United States, 218 F. 2d 473... ee he 19

Zentz v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal. 2d 436, 247 P. 2d 344

vs sara incase bata ase dbp tees ical editakaduslaicicicleauens Sine cactus 12, 14

STATUTES

Calitornia Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 19610000. — iF

California Code of Civil Procedure, | SE a eee 15

TEXTBOOKS

37 Califorma Law Review, pp. 183, 194-198, Prosser, Res Ispsa

Ca cB Mig cee EE estes CE RO DSR RE 12

65 Corpus Juris Secundum, p. 620 0... Sane NYRR ENO Oe 10, 20

ie

SEI Lee

be de Clot es abe ©.

a

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1957 —

No. 601

NortH AMERICAN AVIATION, INc., a Corporation,

Petitioner,

vs.

Waxpa Lee Huoues axnp Raxpart LL. HvuGHers, a,

Minor, by His Guardian, ad Litem, Harry Sutton.

Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR

WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

—_— ——

; eee

Every One of the Questions Presented to the Supreme

Court by Petitioner in Its Petition for Certiorari

Has a False Premise.

It has been Petitioner's consistent policy to ignore all

of the evidence which conflicts with Petitioner's interests.

Although the evidence of negligence in manufacture has

been specifically pointed out by Respondents twice in briefs

and also in oral argument, Petitionef prefers to pretend

that it is not there, as in question ‘number 1. Since the

jury tould and did conclude from this evidence that Peti-

tioner was negligent, Petitioner's hope is that some appel-

late court will reweigh the evidence and come to a con-

trary conclusion, as suggested in question number 3.

=

ails :

As tar as the law is concerned, the United States

Court of Appeals simply decided that the evidence on all

questions was conflicting, but sufficient. to sustain the

verdict. This is not an innovation in any field of the law,

as assumed in question number 2. At does not conflict

with the decisions of the Courts of Calitornia or with those

of other Courts of the United States. It will be of little

or no value as a precedent,“

In order to pose legal issues on appeal, Petitioner has

erected a straw man in question number 5 by supposing

that the judgmem has been sustained by# application of

the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. There is no room for

speculation as to the law applied because the Court of

Appeals held that there was substantial evidence’ to sup-

port Respondents’ theory that the crash was due to “a de-

fect in the manufacture of the airplane, for which Peti-

troner was responsible.” (Emphasis added.)

The Court of Appeals held that there was substantial

evidence that mechanical defect caused/ the crash. This

does not leave the uncertainty which is! the false premise

of question number 4. There is nothing to indicate that

the Court af Appeals did not give full consideration to

every authority cited and every argument made before it,

as assumed in question number 6, The guarantee of due

process of law does not require the Court of Appeals to

discuss arguments of counsel in an opinion or even to write

an opinion,

The Court of Appeals noted in its decision (page 7

ot the Appendix to Petition for Certiorari) that the four —

questions presented to that Court by Petitioner boiled

down te-one which was whether the evidence sustained the

verdict ot the jury. The Court of Appeals held that it

did. The questions now presented to the Supreme Court

oem

are subject to the same analysis and, therefore, fall into

a categorwof cases which the Supreme Court has long since

refused to review. .

IT.

Petitioner's Statement Which Purports to Be a State-

ment of Fact, Is Very Substantially Erroneous.

Until First Lieutenant Hughes stepped into the cockpit

of the plane, it had ‘been under the exclusive control of

the manufacturer. Petitioner manufactured the airplane.

tested it for the Air Force accepted it for the Air Force

[R. 313. 314, 320. 508]. The Army Air Force had inspec-

tors on the premises, but on a surveillance basis down

in the detail and major assembly departments, but not in

the final assembly | R. 366-367]. This is important because

an electrical fire occurred in the fuselage of the airplane

in final assembly where there were no Air Force Mspec-:

tors [R. 367]. Further reterence to this incident appears

below.

Petitioner's assertion that First: Lieutenant Hughes had

only 38 hours of instrument: flying time is contrary to

fact. In the Court of Appeals Petitioner stated that

Lieutenant Hughes had 137 hours of instrument flying

time (App. Op. Brop. 49. Restgndents agrggd that this

was correct and were then aes attacked in the Reply

Brief of Petitioner. The 3& hour figure tails to take into ac-

count approximately LOO hours ot instrument fiving time

credited to Lieutenant Hughes while he was in training.

Exhibit 1 is a record of his flight experience and this

shows a total of 132 hours and 25 minutes of istrument

fight experience. The Court of Appeals correctly notes

in its decision that) Petitioner claimed that) Lieutenant

Hughes had 137 howrs or instrument Ming (see Ap-

~ . t

<?

ills

pendix to Petition tor Writ, p. 3). By way of compari-..

son, it appears that test pilot Kinkella, a man of unques- |

tioned competency, had 150 hours of instrument time [R.

540]. This attack on decedent's instrument flight experi-

ence is unconvincing.

The opinion of the Court of Appeals summarizes the

conflict on the question of the pilot's experience ( Appendix

‘to Petition for Certiorari, p. 5). He flew 100 combat mis-

sions in jet aircraft in a foreign theatre [R, 103, 108, 132,

140] and had 144 hours of combat time [R. 143] and

received decorations including the Distinguished Flying

Cross and Oak Leaf Clusters [R. 108, 112]. Decedent

acted under \orders: from the Army Air Force which

would seem ty be best qualified to judge his competency

to do as he was ordered. .

The debate on the pilot's experience is reduced to in-

significance by Petitioner’s concession that decedent. was

entitled to the presumption of due care (See Petitioner's

Opening Briet in the Court of Appeals, pp. 35-37; and”

Petition tor Certiorari, p. 16). Suffice it to say that

the jury obviously did not find that inexperience caused

the pilot’ death and that the Court of Appeals found sub-

stantial evidence that the cause was mechanical failure.

idicted” that the weather

Appendix to Petition for

The evidence is net “unecont

Was instrument weather (see

Certiorari, p. 6). Nine pages} of text and Appendix in

Respondents’ briet in the Cougt of Appeals were devoted

to discussion of the conditionfof the weather which Re-

-pondents pointed out was good at the time of the accident

and normal for the Los Angeles Airport. The conflict in

the evidence on this point was there pointed out with de-

tailed reterence to the record. The condition of the

weather \Wwas a question for the jury. The deceased pilot

2

a

did have an instrument clearance for take-off, but it was

pointed out by witnesses that instrument clearance would

be required if instrument weather was expected at any

point between the place of take-off and destination. Again,

this conflict was for the jury to resolve and obviously the

jury did not consider that the weather was responsible for

the pilot's death.

Petitioner states the case most favorably to itself in

saying that there was some conflict as to whether the

plane exploded before or after it erashed. The evidence

established a flame-out.’ followed by an explosion in_ the

air? and that’ the plane was afire in the air? It is, there-

fore, net true that the evidence is “uncontradicted” that

IThe incident report which was admitted without ejection |.

reads : . Lit |

“Subsequent reports from the City Operations peryonnel, ‘

from Nerth American Aviation supervisors and fram the .

City Fire Department personnel indicate the knee g a jet,

had an apparent flame-out at approximately . 100 feet alti- .

tude 4s

Test Pilot Frank C. Smith testified:

J dost sight of it in the fog, and we, were returning

back into the lounge area, and we heard the pluine stop with

an explosion immediately, aid we looked out to the area

and saw. the. black smoke coming up through the fog”

[R. $24]

?Patrick H. Rogers testined : ‘ =

“Tt was air-horne at the tmme [ scen it, it was air-borne

ahout 25 to 40> feet. and just awell. at hadn't even got to

the end oof the runway when there was a loud explosion and

a big burst of flame. 26 to 40 feet off the runway” [R. 180].

*Patrick H. Rogers” testified :

~aee a . * - .

“The Court: When vou first saw this airplane, vou saw a

flash °

The Witness: Just a great big hall at tire

The Court: It was in the fog then, was it?

The Witness: He was ar-berne in the fog” jR Isl]

Robert } (allay te-triied that when bie first

saw the plane it

was airborne amd oon tire PR. 18-187]

AX

\ / —6—

the plane caught fire after it crashed or that the pilot was

then killed. The time of death of the pilot was not estab-

lished and it is equally as possible that he was killed by

the explosion in the air as by the crash to the ground.

The evidence was not “uncontradicted” that decedent

did not operate the jet engine long enough to stabilize his

instruments. The gyro horizon was the only instrument

which needed to be stabilized and this required five min-

utes. Analysis of the testimony of the witnesses shows

that not less than four minutes and forty seconds expired

after the jet engine was turned on and before the plane

started down the runway [R. 400, 406, 411, 414, 415,

425, 428]. The time necessary for the take-off supplies the

balance of the required five minutes. | |

Furthermore, it was established that the gyro horizon

was an electrical instrument which is not,in any way de-

pendent upon the running of the jet engine [R. 456]. On

pages 10 and 11 of Respondents’ brief in the Court of

Appeals, Respondents pointed to the evidence in the

-record which showed that. this instrument had time to

stabilize. |

Why doesn’t Petitioner point out that there was. an

electrical tire in the fuselage of the plane in the course

of manufacture? The evidence of this fact was as follows:

“Q. . . . Would you go back to L-4? I over-

looked a couple of items. Would fou read No. 3 on

that, 89, item 89 on that L-4? “A. Due to use of

foamite cleaner, it looks like, or due to use of foamite,

clean all relay boxes and terminal connectors, such

as reverse current relay, field current relay, arma-

ment relay, and so on.

(J. What does that mean, Mr. Clayton? A. The

only reason there would be any foamite in there would

be it we had an electrical fire in the assembly. |

anil

©. That means they had a fire there and put

it out, isn’t that right? A. It reads that way.

(). Isn't that the final check-out sheet, squawk

sheet,’ for the electrical system? A. No, This is

down in the final assembly. . This isn’t the final

squawk sheets of the airplane.

Q. This is the final assembly? A. That's right.”

[R. 810-811].

From the unexplained presence of this electrical fire and

the callous indifference of the manufacturer's inspector

(who did not require a check of the cause of the fire or

a check of the wiring, but only that evidence of the. fire

be erased) and the fact of the accident itself." the jury was

warranted in concluding that Petitioner was careless in

manufacturing the plane. 6

It is net true, as asserted by Petitioner, that Respon-

dents were unable to point to negligence of Petitioner

which was in any manner a proximate cause of the crash,

or that there was no evidence pointing to a flaw in its

manufacture. . Again, on the contrary, the evidence does

show a fault of inspection and manufacture and in a

potent potential souree of trouble. The wiring, if faulty,

is likely to be responsible for malrunction of electrically

operated fuel pumps causing a flame-out, and also tor

an electrical fire while the plane is in the air, igniting:

fuel or fumes to cause both explosion and fire in the air.

Such substantial evidence, even if it is circumstantial... 1s

evidence of negligence sufficient to support a jury verdict.

The trial court’s instruction on the duty of a manufac-

turer of a potentially dangereus instrumentality was proper

and the jury had the duty of weighing the circumstantial

scl

evidence submitted to it. The jury did determine that the

manufacturer breached its duty. The Court of Appeals

found that there was “substantial evidence” to support the

verdict.

Whether the trial judge would have reached the same

conclusion from the same evidence is of no consequence.

Suffice it to say that regardless of his personnal appraisal

of the evidence, he was steadfast in his judgment that

there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury. Of all of .

Petitioner's quotations from comments of the trial judge,

only one line is of real importance:

“{ don’t feel justified in substituting my opinion

for the opinion of the jury.”” [R. 878].

As this Court has said of the duty of both trial and

appellate courts: —

“Courts are not free to set aside-the jury verdict

merely because the jury could have drawn different

inferences or conclusions or because judges feel that

other results are more reasonable.”

Tennant v. Peoria and P. U. Ry. Co. (1944),

321 U. S. 29, 64S. Ct. 409, 88 L. Ed. 520.

The opinion of the Court of Appeals follows the law that

the facts are for the jury to determine. The jury, having

done so on substantial evidence, the result is not to be up-

set by the trial or appellate courts. The jury's conclu-

sion is sound, reasonable and just. To ascertain the nature

and character of the substantial evidence which supports

the verdict, Petitianer has but to read the whole record, not

just the testimony favorable to Petitioner.

oe

IIl.

Writ of Certiorari Should Be Refused Because the *

Case Does Not Involve Questions of Public Im-

portance. _

As noted above, Petitioner is&ygimarily interested in a

review of conflicting evidence and all of the questions

presented are predicated upon an assumption or assertion

that there ts no evidence to sustain the jury verdict. It

has long been the declared policy of the Supreme Court to

refuse to review a conflict or the sufficiency of the evi-

dence. / |

INR. v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co. (1951), 340

“UL S. 498,/95 L. Ed. 479,-4827-483 ;

General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec-

tric Co. (1937), 304 U. S. 175, 178, 82 L. Ed.

1273, 1275, 58S. Ct. 849;

United States v/ Johnson (1925), 268 U. S. 222,

227, 69 L. Ed. 925, 926.

The questions ¢ ‘law which Petitioner asserts are in-

volved do not appear trom the decision itself, but are as-

sumed by the Petitioner to underlie the decision. If such

were the case, further review by the Supreme Court is

only of importance to the parties to the litigation. The

decision :plainly states that the only question involved is

the sufficiency of the evidence. No question of conflicting

precedent is presented; so the case is entirely lacking in

public interest or importance. The .policy of the Supreme

‘

—I0—

Court not to grant certiorari in such cases is well stated

in the following decisions: | i

Ruvv. Sioux City Cemetery (1954), 349 U. S. 70.

99 L.. Ed. 897, 901: ~~ \ |

Magnum Import Co. v. DeSpoturno Coty (1923), |

262 U. S. 159, 163 L. Ed. 922, 924;

Layne and Bowler Corp. v. Ww estern Well Works,

Inc. (1922). 261 U.S. 387, 7393, 67 -L. Ed. .

712, 714. ae. ao”

., Aaa .

Petitioncr’s Arguments in Support of Reasons for

Granting Writ of Certiorari Are Without Sound

gal Foundation.

A.» The Doctrine of Manufacturer's Liability as Recognized

by California Law Has Neither Been Disregarded Nor

_Extendea by the Decision of the Court of. Appeals. ~~

Contrary to the contention of Petitioner, the Court of .

Appeals based its deciston upon three factors: (1) There

was substantsal evidence that the accident which caused

the pilot's death was caused by mechanical defect; (2)

There was substantial evidence that this resulted from

“a defect in the manufacture of the airplane’ and (3) There

was substantial evidence that Petitioner was responsible

for this defect, avhich is to say that it was negligently

responsible,

The law of manutacturer’s responsibility in California

isosubstantially the same as established in AlcePherson wv.

Buick Motor Company (1916), 217 N. V. 382, 11

Nob 1080-68 CC. JS. 629) The principle is that if a

manntactured arty le ix the kind of article which will cause

more thon. trivial h arm { carelessly manutactured — the

nanutactirer dist muse ressopable care in manufacturing

‘ \

oni Jone

t

it. The Court said that there must be knowledge of dan-

ger, not merely possible, buf probable.

_ This means that there must be knowledge that the

article is the kind of thing which will be harmful if not

carefully manufactured. Everyone knows that an air-

plane of any kind is such an article. Even Petitioner knows

this.

Applying the law to this case, the question is whether

Petitioner did exercise reasonable care in manufacturing

the aircraft in question. This is & question of fact which

the jury resolved against the Petitioner upon the evidence

already noted.

”

Fairly appraised, the opinion’ of the Court of Appeals

is not susceptible to any inference that the Court sanc-

tiened holding Petitioner lable upon any ground except

Petitioner's own negligence in the manufacture of the

airplane.

B. There Is No Conflict Between the Opinion of the

United States Court of ‘Appeals and the California

Decisions Involving the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur.

In some states it has been held that it is a question:

of law as to whether the circumstances do or do not war-

rant application of the doctrine of ves thsa_ loguitur.

This is not the law of Calitornia,

The law of this State IS AN ell expressed in Sloboden 7.

Times Oil Co. (1980), 145 Cal. App. 24'197, 302 P. 2d 34.

“Res rpsa logmitur is based in’ great degree on

probabilities: at as ao simple. understandable rule of

circurstantial evidence with sound background of

commen sense and human experiences rather than,

rivid Tegal rormula designed Aargely for exclusionary

purype wes.

=;

1. It Is FoR THE Jay To DETERMINE WHETHER EACH

OF THE CONDITIONS NECESSARY TO BRING INTO PLAy

THE DoctRINE oF Res Ipsa Logurtur Is PRESENT.

As stated by the California Supreme Court in the recent

case of Seneris v. Haas (1955), 45 Cal. 2d &11, 291 P.

2d 915,

The existence of the conditions upon

which the operation of the doctrine is to be predi-

cated is a question of fact and the right of the jury

to find those facts must be carefully preserved. (cit-

ing cases. )”” |

The doctrine is applicable tf it can be said that in the

light of common experience or trom evidence in the case,

the accident was more probably than not the result of de-

fendant’s negligence. ¢Zents v7. Coca-Cola Bottling Ce.

(1982), 39°Cal.- 2d 436.247 P. 2d 344.) However:

The cenclusion that negligence is the

most hikely explanation of the accident. or injury,

is not for the trial qgurt t& draw, or to refuse to draw

- so long as: plaintiff has produced -sutticient evidence ,

-to permit the jury te draw the inference of negli-

genceseven though the court itself, would not draw

that inference; the court must still leave the question

to the jury where reasonable men may differ as to

the balances of probabilities.

“In order that a plaintitt be cptitled to the bene-

fit ot the doctrine et res rpsa loqieter, he need not

exclude every other possibnity that the injury was

caused other than by detendant’s negligence.” ¢ Pros

ser, Res fpsa Loquitur in) California, 37° Cal 1.

Rev. 183. 14-198.) A

—

mie |

In Bauer v. Qtis (19553, 133 Cal. App. 2d 439, 443,

e ..

284 P. 2d 133, the Court pointed out:

’

“The inference of negligence is not required to be

an exclusive or compelling one. it is enough that the

court cannot sav that reasonable men could not draw

a

2.0 Tue Doctrine or Res [psa Loon ituk May Be Re-

LIED Upon to Sv PrORT A JU R. MENT ALTHOUGH No

Jury [Nstrec Tox, Is (GIVEN,

Jaffke & Dunham (1957), 382 U.S. 285.1 1. Ed.

2d 314; .

Rogers v Los Angeles Transit Lines (1985). 45

Cal. 2d 414, 289 PB. 2d 226;

Rose =. Melody Lane (1952), 39 Cal. 2d 481,

247 P. 2d 3335.

4

3. THe Accinest Was or a Kip Witten Dors Not

OCCUR IN THE ABSENCE OF SOMEONE'S NEGLIGENCE,

The FSocet plane delivered to Lt. Hughes was not an

cexperimental model [Ro 400, 479 This partic ular type

of plane had been magut: actured., by Petitioner for four

vears [R. 4600]. Thousands had’ been delivered to the

Army j{R. 330]. A jet plane is no more dangerous than

a prop plane | R. 325-326].

It is an extraordinary event fora jet te hive a flame

out, to explode or te burn upon take-ot [R. 328. 49.470.

479, 626.627 |.

Test pilot Annis had flown three te four thousand tlichts

in F&e'e without experiencing’ fame out oon takwooth oor

fre or explosion [Ro 47910 He had never heard ef plane

eXplodyne daring take ot R 4 470] aii

re

a

The case of La Porte v. Houston (1948), 33 Cal. 2d

1607, 199 PB. 2d 665, is distinguished from the instant case

by the fact that there was nothing that the defendant

could have done to cause the accident.

4.

7

Tre Conpition REQUIRING EXCLUSIVE CONTROL IN

DEFENDANT IS SATISFIED.

The requirement of control is not an absolute one. The

fact that the accident occurred sometime. after Petitioner

relinquished physical control of the instrumentality which

caused the accident does not preclude application of the

doctrine provided there is evidence that the instrumentality

had not been improperly handled by Respondents’ dece-

dent

or. some

third

person “Or

its

condition

otherwise

changed after control was relinquished by Petitioner.

Zeuts v Coca-Cola Bottling Co., oupra;:

the time of the nethiyvent

Voergar \

142 Cal

Rurr i:

Pieasant

Dalley

\pp. 2d 633, 300 PL 2d 2X5:

<n Issn.

(1986),

Vherrcoin Ulan, Co. (1954). 42 Cal. 2d

O&82*2o8 PL 2d 1041.

It isthe comtrolot the mstrumentalitv by defendant at

element.

cet

tod .

Rohar ve, Osborne (1955), 133 Calo Apy

284 P. 2d 123:

Piehis o. Oakland (V93558 1, Y37 Calo Apy

201 BP. 2d 145:

Baker 2 Goedrich Ca. ce§983). 118 Cal

>, 252 Pd 4:

Ai ey g?. Caa-¢ ola Rottlorg Co. i {O48

Arm. 2d 371, 197 P. 2d Sn: ‘

; i ( rCola Bottling Co. (V4a

; rsa P* Sh 483

> . ad e . ‘

Which satisties the control

.

—15—

Liggett and M yers Tobacco Co. v. De Lape (C.

C. A. 9th, 1940), 109. F. 2d 598;

Michener v. Hutton (1928), 203 Cal. 604, 265

Pac, 238. .

2

The evidence in this case is clear and without. con-

tradiction that the Petitioner had full physical control

over. che jet plane until the moment) when Lt. Hughes

climbed into the cockpit. He had physical control of the

instrumentality only for a few minutes before the acci-

dent. After Lt. ERighes climbed into the cocRpit and

until the moment when the aircraft entered the obscuration

at the far end of the airstrip there was no change in the

condition of the aircraft. '

+ There is no evidence that the pilot ipfproperly handled

| the instrumentality. — There is fa presumption which is

evidence in the case that he exercised all due care (Code

~ Civ, Proc... Ses. 1963). ‘

> THe Accbenr Ceétrpo Nor Have Bee~w Dre ro ANY

VoLtuntary Action o# Conrrinetio€® ox THE Part

oF THE DrcEASED Pitot - .

Respondents agree that an element of the doctrine of res

ipsa logiatur is Jack ot contribution. Hlowever, contribu-

titn is a question of fact to be resolved by the jury.

(Seneris v. Haas sutvay. p &230 “We are of the opin-

Gem that the qurvo under appropriate instructions, should

have heen permitted. te determine whether each of the

conditions necessary te bring into play the rule of res

thsa lometur were present.” )- oh

The Cash aq } ros Met Weve rriec! Pe\ the case on Spencer

Roatte Vor I\ ' ant ‘if t JOS, 5. i3] cae. \pp. 2d

Mg ee A OY ig Ae Die distinction Tf that there was

a See

affirmative evidence thet Spencer contributed to the acci-

dent. The Court said: é

“As proof that negligence of respondents did not

cause appellant to fall, it is recalled that he had for

eight months been familiar with the, method of op-

erating the bleacher, and Ahad been the chief actor in

its operation. He had never discovered anything out |

of order. On the contrary, he had abused the ply-

board by standing on the ld which was not desfgned

to support a man's weight. Such practice may have

caused a warping of the plyboard and thus have added

to the friction of the cable and caused it to be im-

mobilized.” ( P. &82.) |

‘

The record together with the disputable presumption -

of due care whieh Petitioner does not contend was rebutted

permits “a reasonable inference that it (the aircraft) was

not accessible to extraneous harmtul forces and that it

was earetully handled by plaintitt. “(Escola v.

Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (1944), 24 Cal. 2d 453, 458, 150

P. 2d 436.) )

6. Tuere Was No Evivexce or Possinte NoN-NEGLI-.

’ ios — GENT Pitot ERRor.

ince there was substantial.evidence that the accident

was caused by mechanical failure. the jury could nave

so decermined. To the extent that such a determination

supports the verdict, it must be assumed on appeal that

the jury did so-decide.

In tact the Respondents’ case insofar as it relates to

evidence of mechanical Yailure cant weil rest right there.

Sut Petitioner has listed supposed possthilities of pilot

error, ‘They are characterized as non-negligent because

in the ciremmatanees there is ne evidence of pilot negli-

a

rs

gence. Moreover, there is a presumpticn with the weight

of affirmative evidence against negligence of the pilot and

evidence te the contrary. merely raises a question of fact

which has been adversely resolved against Petitioner. Just

to clear the atmosphere on this: subject the contentions

of Petitioner commencing at page 14 of its petitien are

treated seriatim.

(a) A pilot induced throttle burst is absolutely pre-

cluded because this never happens on take-offs [R. 471-

472]. N\

(b) The testimony is overwhelmingly to the effect that

the pilot could not accidently cut the fuel supply and

that to do so intentionally would be suicide |R. 474, 47%

478]. No such speculatio#® can be indulged because of

the presumption that the pilot acted with due respect for

his own satety (Code Civ. Proc., Sc 1961)

(c) The hypothesis that the pilot might “hit” the stick

and move it in the wrong direction is preposterous. His

life depends upon his hold on the stickoand his experience

was such as to eliminate anv danger “f a deliberate turn

toward the ground. He was lasy seen with flaps and

wheels up in proper attitude of climb {Ro S504].

(d) Nothing more need be said about the experience

of this pilot. There is no reason to suppose that. the

pilot took off on visuel fight and switched to instruments.

nor is it established bevond a jury question of fact that

he dost visteal contact with the ground at any pomt. At

the same time atts equally cons:cent with the evidence

too suppese that he wos an instruments from: start to finish

and that his tstruments were warmed up and. pertfecth

Minetionime

= =

(e) As before pointed out the idea that the uncontra-

dicted evidence establishes that the plane or the instru-

ments were not properly warmed up is a mistaken notion.

(f) The evidence of the actuator setting is the theo-

reticaVresult of laboratory paperwork and there is no testi-

mony to the effect that the angle of impact compares

with the supposed setting. No such compar‘son was at-

tempted.

‘¢) The only bad thing about the weather was a fog

bank at the far end of the runway and th pilot was

airborne long before he reached the fog. The jet engine

does not need a warm-up. j

(h) There is no evidence that the pilot attempted to

Ay on visual contact or on instruments or of any switch

from one to another. His clearance authorized either at

his own election. Kinkella did got know or testify as to

what this opilot did.

(i) The throttle is net a delicate instrument [R. 520]

ner can it be accidentally cut [RL 476).

Cenerall) speaking, the attempt of Petitioner to point

“to contributing cases df the accident has resulted in the

rankest speculations ghd tmaprohable suppositions. Cali-

rormia bas requires the question st contribution to) the

cause of an accident te he submitted to othe jury in the

| came manner ao oany other question at fact. The jury's

detertninatien of this issue is as binding upon the triat

court anedoon appeal as anv other tury decision.

}

= we

C. The Decision of the Court of Appes!s Does Not Conflict

With the Decisions of Other Circuits on the Application

of Res Ipsa Loquitur.

In each of the cases from other circuits cited by Peti-

‘tioner, the distinction lies in the fact that the Court is

applying the law of another State which differs from

the law of Californiac.-

In the case of. Woerrtson v LeTourneau Co. «f Georgia

(1943), 138 F. 2d 339, the Fitth Circuit, applying the

law of Georgia, refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsa

loguitur to an airline accident involving the crash-death

of a pil t and his passenger. This case is contrary to the

doctrine of res ipsa leguitur as applied in the State of

Calitornta and the Ninth Circuit.

Parker w./ Granger (1935). 4 Cal. 2d 668, 52

P. 2d 226; |

Smith o O'Donnel! (1932), 215 Cal. 714; 12

PY. 26 Fas:

Boise Patette Lumber Co. v. Larsen (1954), 214

I. 2d 373 (Sustained jury verdict for plaintiff

without any actual evidence of negligence and

without reference to the doctrine) ;

Snvth ow, dlaska Airways OC. C. A. Oth, 1937),

89 F. 2d 253.

In the case of Williams +. United States (1955), 218

F. 24 473. the Firth Circuit: said that under the law of

Florida cne deetrine was only applicadle to cases invelying

eiremmstanees which are within the common ordinary

experience et most people “The case serves to exemplify

that the law of Fhortda ditvers from the law of California.

but tas or me curther stenttieance

—20-—

The difference between the law of California and the

law of Wyoming appears in Cohn v. United Air Lines

Trans. Co. (1937), 17 Fed. Supp. 685, wherein the

District Court states:

ee

the law tells us that the doctrine of

res ipsa loquitur shall not be applied.if there is any —

other reasonable or probable cause from which it ’

might be inferred that there was no negligence at

all.”

D. The Verdict Was Fair and Just and Supported by

Substantial Evidence.

This is in answer to Petitioner's Point IV. page 20 6f

the petition which is mainly a hodgepodge of other argu-

ments. which have already been answered above.

Petitioner reverts again to the case of McPherson v.

Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 383, 11 Nv E. 1050, and

repeats a completely unsound argument made in the Court

below by misconstruing this case. Petitioner seems to think

that to recover against a manutacturer for negligence in

producing an articie which is inherently dangerous if care-

lessly made. it must be proved that the manufacturer knew

Unt THis defective. :

Obviously negligence is carelessness in not taking rea-

sonable precautions to prevent defects, when reasonable

care would have disclosed them. The uncontradicted evi-

dence is that there was an “elecirical fire in the assembly.”

Nothing was done about it except to put out the fire and

clean off the roamite, leaving no evidence of fire. — But»

the tact that it lett the very detect which originally caused

the tire and which caused another when Lieutenant Hughes

took the pline into the air is a fair .aference,

a

/Any possibility of negligence of General Electric in

manufacturing the jet engine is precluded. Petitioner

/put on experts to testify with convincing certainty that

there was nothing wrong with the engine and this was

uncontradicted. Such testimony was necessary as a part

of Petitioner’s defense because the engine was not a sealed

unit which could not be disassembled for inspection with-

out destroying it. Hence, the rule of O’Rourke v. Day

and Night Water Heater Co. (1939), 31 Cal. App. 2d

364, is not in point.

Respondents offered the Court of Appeals a reasonable

explanation of the accident which was supported~by. the

evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.

Respondents_did not indulge in speculation nor did the

Court of Appeals in its decision. -The only element of

speculation involved is whether the jury reconstructed

the event of the accident in the same way as Respondents

did or came to some other equaly tenable conclusion

from the evidence. The Court of Appeals clearly enough

adopted the same approach.

It is well to bear in mind that the evidence on some

important issues of fact was substantially conflicting. In

such circumstances the Stuyreme Court kas said:

“It is nw answer to say that the jurv’s verdict

involved speculation and conjecture.” (that accident

was impossible and must have been murder). ‘“When-

ever facts are in dispute or the evidence is such that

fairminded men. may draw different inferences, a

measure oJ Speculation an? conjecture is required

on the part of those whose duty it is to settle the

dispute by choosing what seems to them to be the

most reasonable inferences. Only when there is a

complete absence of probative fact to support: tne

=

concluston reached does a reviewable error appear.

But when, as here, there is an evidentiary basis for

the jury’s verdict, the jury is free to discard as dis-

belief whatever facts are inconsistent with its con-

clusion, and the appellate court’s function is ex-

hausted when that evidentiary basis becomes appar-

ent, it being immaterial that the court might draw a

contrary inference or feel that another conclusion is

more reasonable.” {Emphasis added. )

Lavender v7. Kurn (1945), 327 U. S. 645, 66

é S. Ct. 740, 90 L. Ed. 916, 923.

Conclusion.

The object and purpose of the petition is to gain a

aD

review ofthe sufficiency of conflicting evidence to sus-

: . oie © 2 Ni ‘ . O . . : .

tain the verdict No~qrestion_of public interest and im

portance is presented. “The petition for Writ-of Certiorari

should not be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

ALBERT LEE STEPHENS, JR.,

(;LENDON TREMAINE,

Attorneys for Respondents.

Associate Counsel Not a

Member of This Court:

James V. BREWER, .

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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