Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari — North American Aviation, Inc. v. Hughes (No. 601)
Supreme Court brief1957
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SUBJECT INDEX
PAGE
I,
Every one of the questions presented to the Supreme Court by
petitioner in its petition for certfiprari has a false premise........
IT, Ee
- Petitioner's statement which® purpotts to be a statement of
fact, is very substantially” erfoneous. .............ccecccececcccesecseeeeenees
be
2 oe
Writ of certiorari should be ref ed because the case does not
>
involve questions of public importance... ete
IV.
Petitioner's arguments in support of reasons for granting writ
of certiorari are without sound legal foundation........00...0....2....
A. The doctrine of manufacturer's lability as recognized by
California law has neither been disregarded nor extended
by the decision of the Court of Appeals... 0...
B. There is no conflict between the opinion of the United
States Courts of Appeals and the California decision§ in-
volving the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur..00000..... (as eae
1 It is for the jury to determine whether each of the
conditions necessdry to bring into play the doctrine
of res ipsa foquitur ts~presemt.............. cs.
|
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be relied upon
tS
’
to support a judgment although no jury instruction
0 CEI: oscar ictinninincinininmbiamntace gp ancnssamnpeninvansnsesetven
3. The accident was of a kind which does not occur in
the absence of someone's, negligence...
4.) The condition requirtig exclusive control ino deten-
dant is satished.... dein
x
10
10
11
12
13
13
PAGE
5. The accident could not have been due to any volun-
tary action or contribution on the part of the de-.,
co EERE EE SS SSNS es ER RESET SR 15
6. There was no evidence of iliac iets
: pilot error. ........... atecnnlaiietinlseyseiniedbiagacebtheninem sensative = 16
C. The decision of the Court of Appeals does not conflict
with the decisions of other circuits on the application of
res ipsa VOqUitur..........o..eeccssessccsnesesssonseegeecaneecs iskmeneenantioisese i 19.
)
D. The verdict was fair and just and supported by sub-
RNIN IIIIINE isc eps cdcosendatinistsshadesaia toagconthedlaiendain-aitdsuiteaaisuben. UD
*
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
CasEs PAGE
Baker v. Goodrich Co., 115 Cal. App. 2d 221, 252 P. 2d 24........ 14
Bauer v. Otis, 133 Cal. App. 2d 443, 284 P. 2d 133.................... 13
Boise Payette Lumber Co. v. Larsen, 214 F. 2d 373.................... 19
Burr v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P. 2d 1041.... 14
Cohn v. United Air Lines Trans. Co., 17 Fed. Supp. 685 mee pa 20
Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P. 2d
ewer ee ears nearehestvesnensabsnesessinenesl SussTavsenatsnansaeesnseseonacaenetenees T4, 16
Fields v. Oakland, 137 Cal. App. 2d 602; 291 P. 2d 145................ 14
{General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 304
CFB. UPd, GE Sa. TO Bre FO BR iiss sccm 9
Hoffing v. Coca-Cotffottling Co., 87 Cal. App. 2d 371, 197
BE I cea Spelt eh caictnoasicccisclnowkcpacd sieaisalessoubecaninadiianabeaoheisecarceltaea 14
Jaffke +. Dunham, 352 U. S. 285, 1 L. Ed. 2d 314...........02..... 13
La Porte v. Houston, 33 Cal. 2d 167, 199 P. 2d 665........0..0........ 14
Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U. S. 645, 56 S. Ct. 740, 90 L. Ed. 916. 22
Layne and Bowler Corp. v. Western Well Works, Inc., 261 —
Rr ee RR ee ree ae! 10
Liggett and Myers Tobacco Co. v. De Lape, 109 F. 2d. 598... 15
Magnum Import Co. v. DeSpoturne Coty, 262 .U. S, 159, 163
iat RET hema eal, Rc neti ee ace Ra RACE 10
McPherson vy. Buick Motor Company, 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. EB.
| UREA RR ee rites tmutien rer Sil lclsinsork ipl Rlaoocied 10, 20
Michener v. Hutton, 203 Cal. 604, 265 Pac. 2380000000000. ooo... 15
Morrison y. LeTourneau Co. of Georgia, 138 F. 2d 339... .... 19
National Labor Relatigns Board v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co.,
A A eB RN iachcinccneokcctonnns: @
ined v. — Valley etc. Assn., 142 Cal. App. 2d 653,
300 P. 2d 283... Seis la cegeattpidiease lnc a. danicarietssdeiaghhGRa nie 14
Rourke v. Day and Night Water Heater Co.. 31 Cal. App.
2d 364 PO Ui Do ee OR ies ee SRSA Soe CD ea: | 21
ae ge RRC Sect OPUS CEO he ec EE 13
Rohar ¢. Osborne, 133 Cal. App. 2d 345, 284 P. 2d 125.............. 14
Rose v. Melody Lane, 39 Cal. 2d 481, 247 P. 2d 335... 13
Rui v. Sioux City Cemetery, 349 U. S. 70, 99 L. Ed. A 10
Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P. 2d 915.................12, 15
Sloboden v. Times Oil Co., 145 Cal. App. 2d 197, 302 P. 2d 34.. 11
Smith v. Alaska Airways, 89 F.2d 253....0.....cccccccceccccccccecceceescesccseee 19
Smith v. O'Donnell, 215 Cal. 714, 12 P. 2d 933... sasledies 19
Spencer v. Beatty Safway Scaffold Co., 4] Cal. App. 2d 875,
Ae es kssinctna ar ndagt acd teaici gc cr oe ia 15
Sullivan v. Shell Oil ae a4 F. 28 738.............: Siadahcaiapbdians 7
Tennant v. Peoria and P. U. Ry. Co., 321 U. S. 29, 64 S. Ct.
TO. Miata oe ors eet ee dare 8
United States v. Johnson, 268 U. S. 222, 69 L. Ed. a 9
Williams v. United States, 218 F. 2d 473... ee he 19
Zentz v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal. 2d 436, 247 P. 2d 344
vs sara incase bata ase dbp tees ical editakaduslaicicicleauens Sine cactus 12, 14
STATUTES
Calitornia Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 19610000. — iF
California Code of Civil Procedure, | SE a eee 15
TEXTBOOKS
37 Califorma Law Review, pp. 183, 194-198, Prosser, Res Ispsa
Ca cB Mig cee EE estes CE RO DSR RE 12
65 Corpus Juris Secundum, p. 620 0... Sane NYRR ENO Oe 10, 20
ie
SEI Lee
be de Clot es abe ©.
a
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1957 —
No. 601
NortH AMERICAN AVIATION, INc., a Corporation,
Petitioner,
vs.
Waxpa Lee Huoues axnp Raxpart LL. HvuGHers, a,
Minor, by His Guardian, ad Litem, Harry Sutton.
Respondents.
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI.
—_— ——
; eee
Every One of the Questions Presented to the Supreme
Court by Petitioner in Its Petition for Certiorari
Has a False Premise.
It has been Petitioner's consistent policy to ignore all
of the evidence which conflicts with Petitioner's interests.
Although the evidence of negligence in manufacture has
been specifically pointed out by Respondents twice in briefs
and also in oral argument, Petitionef prefers to pretend
that it is not there, as in question ‘number 1. Since the
jury tould and did conclude from this evidence that Peti-
tioner was negligent, Petitioner's hope is that some appel-
late court will reweigh the evidence and come to a con-
trary conclusion, as suggested in question number 3.
=
ails :
As tar as the law is concerned, the United States
Court of Appeals simply decided that the evidence on all
questions was conflicting, but sufficient. to sustain the
verdict. This is not an innovation in any field of the law,
as assumed in question number 2. At does not conflict
with the decisions of the Courts of Calitornia or with those
of other Courts of the United States. It will be of little
or no value as a precedent,“
In order to pose legal issues on appeal, Petitioner has
erected a straw man in question number 5 by supposing
that the judgmem has been sustained by# application of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. There is no room for
speculation as to the law applied because the Court of
Appeals held that there was substantial evidence’ to sup-
port Respondents’ theory that the crash was due to “a de-
fect in the manufacture of the airplane, for which Peti-
troner was responsible.” (Emphasis added.)
The Court of Appeals held that there was substantial
evidence that mechanical defect caused/ the crash. This
does not leave the uncertainty which is! the false premise
of question number 4. There is nothing to indicate that
the Court af Appeals did not give full consideration to
every authority cited and every argument made before it,
as assumed in question number 6, The guarantee of due
process of law does not require the Court of Appeals to
discuss arguments of counsel in an opinion or even to write
an opinion,
The Court of Appeals noted in its decision (page 7
ot the Appendix to Petition for Certiorari) that the four —
questions presented to that Court by Petitioner boiled
down te-one which was whether the evidence sustained the
verdict ot the jury. The Court of Appeals held that it
did. The questions now presented to the Supreme Court
oem
are subject to the same analysis and, therefore, fall into
a categorwof cases which the Supreme Court has long since
refused to review. .
IT.
Petitioner's Statement Which Purports to Be a State-
ment of Fact, Is Very Substantially Erroneous.
Until First Lieutenant Hughes stepped into the cockpit
of the plane, it had ‘been under the exclusive control of
the manufacturer. Petitioner manufactured the airplane.
tested it for the Air Force accepted it for the Air Force
[R. 313. 314, 320. 508]. The Army Air Force had inspec-
tors on the premises, but on a surveillance basis down
in the detail and major assembly departments, but not in
the final assembly | R. 366-367]. This is important because
an electrical fire occurred in the fuselage of the airplane
in final assembly where there were no Air Force Mspec-:
tors [R. 367]. Further reterence to this incident appears
below.
Petitioner's assertion that First: Lieutenant Hughes had
only 38 hours of instrument: flying time is contrary to
fact. In the Court of Appeals Petitioner stated that
Lieutenant Hughes had 137 hours of instrument flying
time (App. Op. Brop. 49. Restgndents agrggd that this
was correct and were then aes attacked in the Reply
Brief of Petitioner. The 3& hour figure tails to take into ac-
count approximately LOO hours ot instrument fiving time
credited to Lieutenant Hughes while he was in training.
Exhibit 1 is a record of his flight experience and this
shows a total of 132 hours and 25 minutes of istrument
fight experience. The Court of Appeals correctly notes
in its decision that) Petitioner claimed that) Lieutenant
Hughes had 137 howrs or instrument Ming (see Ap-
~ . t
<?
ills
pendix to Petition tor Writ, p. 3). By way of compari-..
son, it appears that test pilot Kinkella, a man of unques- |
tioned competency, had 150 hours of instrument time [R.
540]. This attack on decedent's instrument flight experi-
ence is unconvincing.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals summarizes the
conflict on the question of the pilot's experience ( Appendix
‘to Petition for Certiorari, p. 5). He flew 100 combat mis-
sions in jet aircraft in a foreign theatre [R, 103, 108, 132,
140] and had 144 hours of combat time [R. 143] and
received decorations including the Distinguished Flying
Cross and Oak Leaf Clusters [R. 108, 112]. Decedent
acted under \orders: from the Army Air Force which
would seem ty be best qualified to judge his competency
to do as he was ordered. .
The debate on the pilot's experience is reduced to in-
significance by Petitioner’s concession that decedent. was
entitled to the presumption of due care (See Petitioner's
Opening Briet in the Court of Appeals, pp. 35-37; and”
Petition tor Certiorari, p. 16). Suffice it to say that
the jury obviously did not find that inexperience caused
the pilot’ death and that the Court of Appeals found sub-
stantial evidence that the cause was mechanical failure.
idicted” that the weather
Appendix to Petition for
The evidence is net “unecont
Was instrument weather (see
Certiorari, p. 6). Nine pages} of text and Appendix in
Respondents’ briet in the Cougt of Appeals were devoted
to discussion of the conditionfof the weather which Re-
-pondents pointed out was good at the time of the accident
and normal for the Los Angeles Airport. The conflict in
the evidence on this point was there pointed out with de-
tailed reterence to the record. The condition of the
weather \Wwas a question for the jury. The deceased pilot
2
a
did have an instrument clearance for take-off, but it was
pointed out by witnesses that instrument clearance would
be required if instrument weather was expected at any
point between the place of take-off and destination. Again,
this conflict was for the jury to resolve and obviously the
jury did not consider that the weather was responsible for
the pilot's death.
Petitioner states the case most favorably to itself in
saying that there was some conflict as to whether the
plane exploded before or after it erashed. The evidence
established a flame-out.’ followed by an explosion in_ the
air? and that’ the plane was afire in the air? It is, there-
fore, net true that the evidence is “uncontradicted” that
IThe incident report which was admitted without ejection |.
reads : . Lit |
“Subsequent reports from the City Operations peryonnel, ‘
from Nerth American Aviation supervisors and fram the .
City Fire Department personnel indicate the knee g a jet,
had an apparent flame-out at approximately . 100 feet alti- .
tude 4s
Test Pilot Frank C. Smith testified:
J dost sight of it in the fog, and we, were returning
back into the lounge area, and we heard the pluine stop with
an explosion immediately, aid we looked out to the area
and saw. the. black smoke coming up through the fog”
[R. $24]
?Patrick H. Rogers testined : ‘ =
“Tt was air-horne at the tmme [ scen it, it was air-borne
ahout 25 to 40> feet. and just awell. at hadn't even got to
the end oof the runway when there was a loud explosion and
a big burst of flame. 26 to 40 feet off the runway” [R. 180].
*Patrick H. Rogers” testified :
~aee a . * - .
“The Court: When vou first saw this airplane, vou saw a
flash °
The Witness: Just a great big hall at tire
The Court: It was in the fog then, was it?
The Witness: He was ar-berne in the fog” jR Isl]
Robert } (allay te-triied that when bie first
saw the plane it
was airborne amd oon tire PR. 18-187]
AX
\ / —6—
the plane caught fire after it crashed or that the pilot was
then killed. The time of death of the pilot was not estab-
lished and it is equally as possible that he was killed by
the explosion in the air as by the crash to the ground.
The evidence was not “uncontradicted” that decedent
did not operate the jet engine long enough to stabilize his
instruments. The gyro horizon was the only instrument
which needed to be stabilized and this required five min-
utes. Analysis of the testimony of the witnesses shows
that not less than four minutes and forty seconds expired
after the jet engine was turned on and before the plane
started down the runway [R. 400, 406, 411, 414, 415,
425, 428]. The time necessary for the take-off supplies the
balance of the required five minutes. | |
Furthermore, it was established that the gyro horizon
was an electrical instrument which is not,in any way de-
pendent upon the running of the jet engine [R. 456]. On
pages 10 and 11 of Respondents’ brief in the Court of
Appeals, Respondents pointed to the evidence in the
-record which showed that. this instrument had time to
stabilize. |
Why doesn’t Petitioner point out that there was. an
electrical tire in the fuselage of the plane in the course
of manufacture? The evidence of this fact was as follows:
“Q. . . . Would you go back to L-4? I over-
looked a couple of items. Would fou read No. 3 on
that, 89, item 89 on that L-4? “A. Due to use of
foamite cleaner, it looks like, or due to use of foamite,
clean all relay boxes and terminal connectors, such
as reverse current relay, field current relay, arma-
ment relay, and so on.
(J. What does that mean, Mr. Clayton? A. The
only reason there would be any foamite in there would
be it we had an electrical fire in the assembly. |
anil
©. That means they had a fire there and put
it out, isn’t that right? A. It reads that way.
(). Isn't that the final check-out sheet, squawk
sheet,’ for the electrical system? A. No, This is
down in the final assembly. . This isn’t the final
squawk sheets of the airplane.
Q. This is the final assembly? A. That's right.”
[R. 810-811].
From the unexplained presence of this electrical fire and
the callous indifference of the manufacturer's inspector
(who did not require a check of the cause of the fire or
a check of the wiring, but only that evidence of the. fire
be erased) and the fact of the accident itself." the jury was
warranted in concluding that Petitioner was careless in
manufacturing the plane. 6
It is net true, as asserted by Petitioner, that Respon-
dents were unable to point to negligence of Petitioner
which was in any manner a proximate cause of the crash,
or that there was no evidence pointing to a flaw in its
manufacture. . Again, on the contrary, the evidence does
show a fault of inspection and manufacture and in a
potent potential souree of trouble. The wiring, if faulty,
is likely to be responsible for malrunction of electrically
operated fuel pumps causing a flame-out, and also tor
an electrical fire while the plane is in the air, igniting:
fuel or fumes to cause both explosion and fire in the air.
Such substantial evidence, even if it is circumstantial... 1s
evidence of negligence sufficient to support a jury verdict.
The trial court’s instruction on the duty of a manufac-
turer of a potentially dangereus instrumentality was proper
and the jury had the duty of weighing the circumstantial
scl
evidence submitted to it. The jury did determine that the
manufacturer breached its duty. The Court of Appeals
found that there was “substantial evidence” to support the
verdict.
Whether the trial judge would have reached the same
conclusion from the same evidence is of no consequence.
Suffice it to say that regardless of his personnal appraisal
of the evidence, he was steadfast in his judgment that
there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury. Of all of .
Petitioner's quotations from comments of the trial judge,
only one line is of real importance:
“{ don’t feel justified in substituting my opinion
for the opinion of the jury.”” [R. 878].
As this Court has said of the duty of both trial and
appellate courts: —
“Courts are not free to set aside-the jury verdict
merely because the jury could have drawn different
inferences or conclusions or because judges feel that
other results are more reasonable.”
Tennant v. Peoria and P. U. Ry. Co. (1944),
321 U. S. 29, 64S. Ct. 409, 88 L. Ed. 520.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals follows the law that
the facts are for the jury to determine. The jury, having
done so on substantial evidence, the result is not to be up-
set by the trial or appellate courts. The jury's conclu-
sion is sound, reasonable and just. To ascertain the nature
and character of the substantial evidence which supports
the verdict, Petitianer has but to read the whole record, not
just the testimony favorable to Petitioner.
oe
IIl.
Writ of Certiorari Should Be Refused Because the *
Case Does Not Involve Questions of Public Im-
portance. _
As noted above, Petitioner is&ygimarily interested in a
review of conflicting evidence and all of the questions
presented are predicated upon an assumption or assertion
that there ts no evidence to sustain the jury verdict. It
has long been the declared policy of the Supreme Court to
refuse to review a conflict or the sufficiency of the evi-
dence. / |
INR. v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co. (1951), 340
“UL S. 498,/95 L. Ed. 479,-4827-483 ;
General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec-
tric Co. (1937), 304 U. S. 175, 178, 82 L. Ed.
1273, 1275, 58S. Ct. 849;
United States v/ Johnson (1925), 268 U. S. 222,
227, 69 L. Ed. 925, 926.
The questions ¢ ‘law which Petitioner asserts are in-
volved do not appear trom the decision itself, but are as-
sumed by the Petitioner to underlie the decision. If such
were the case, further review by the Supreme Court is
only of importance to the parties to the litigation. The
decision :plainly states that the only question involved is
the sufficiency of the evidence. No question of conflicting
precedent is presented; so the case is entirely lacking in
public interest or importance. The .policy of the Supreme
‘
—I0—
Court not to grant certiorari in such cases is well stated
in the following decisions: | i
Ruvv. Sioux City Cemetery (1954), 349 U. S. 70.
99 L.. Ed. 897, 901: ~~ \ |
Magnum Import Co. v. DeSpoturno Coty (1923), |
262 U. S. 159, 163 L. Ed. 922, 924;
Layne and Bowler Corp. v. Ww estern Well Works,
Inc. (1922). 261 U.S. 387, 7393, 67 -L. Ed. .
712, 714. ae. ao”
., Aaa .
Petitioncr’s Arguments in Support of Reasons for
Granting Writ of Certiorari Are Without Sound
gal Foundation.
A.» The Doctrine of Manufacturer's Liability as Recognized
by California Law Has Neither Been Disregarded Nor
_Extendea by the Decision of the Court of. Appeals. ~~
Contrary to the contention of Petitioner, the Court of .
Appeals based its deciston upon three factors: (1) There
was substantsal evidence that the accident which caused
the pilot's death was caused by mechanical defect; (2)
There was substantial evidence that this resulted from
“a defect in the manufacture of the airplane’ and (3) There
was substantial evidence that Petitioner was responsible
for this defect, avhich is to say that it was negligently
responsible,
The law of manutacturer’s responsibility in California
isosubstantially the same as established in AlcePherson wv.
Buick Motor Company (1916), 217 N. V. 382, 11
Nob 1080-68 CC. JS. 629) The principle is that if a
manntactured arty le ix the kind of article which will cause
more thon. trivial h arm { carelessly manutactured — the
nanutactirer dist muse ressopable care in manufacturing
‘ \
oni Jone
t
it. The Court said that there must be knowledge of dan-
ger, not merely possible, buf probable.
_ This means that there must be knowledge that the
article is the kind of thing which will be harmful if not
carefully manufactured. Everyone knows that an air-
plane of any kind is such an article. Even Petitioner knows
this.
Applying the law to this case, the question is whether
Petitioner did exercise reasonable care in manufacturing
the aircraft in question. This is & question of fact which
the jury resolved against the Petitioner upon the evidence
already noted.
”
Fairly appraised, the opinion’ of the Court of Appeals
is not susceptible to any inference that the Court sanc-
tiened holding Petitioner lable upon any ground except
Petitioner's own negligence in the manufacture of the
airplane.
B. There Is No Conflict Between the Opinion of the
United States Court of ‘Appeals and the California
Decisions Involving the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur.
In some states it has been held that it is a question:
of law as to whether the circumstances do or do not war-
rant application of the doctrine of ves thsa_ loguitur.
This is not the law of Calitornia,
The law of this State IS AN ell expressed in Sloboden 7.
Times Oil Co. (1980), 145 Cal. App. 24'197, 302 P. 2d 34.
“Res rpsa logmitur is based in’ great degree on
probabilities: at as ao simple. understandable rule of
circurstantial evidence with sound background of
commen sense and human experiences rather than,
rivid Tegal rormula designed Aargely for exclusionary
purype wes.
=;
1. It Is FoR THE Jay To DETERMINE WHETHER EACH
OF THE CONDITIONS NECESSARY TO BRING INTO PLAy
THE DoctRINE oF Res Ipsa Logurtur Is PRESENT.
As stated by the California Supreme Court in the recent
case of Seneris v. Haas (1955), 45 Cal. 2d &11, 291 P.
2d 915,
The existence of the conditions upon
which the operation of the doctrine is to be predi-
cated is a question of fact and the right of the jury
to find those facts must be carefully preserved. (cit-
ing cases. )”” |
The doctrine is applicable tf it can be said that in the
light of common experience or trom evidence in the case,
the accident was more probably than not the result of de-
fendant’s negligence. ¢Zents v7. Coca-Cola Bottling Ce.
(1982), 39°Cal.- 2d 436.247 P. 2d 344.) However:
The cenclusion that negligence is the
most hikely explanation of the accident. or injury,
is not for the trial qgurt t& draw, or to refuse to draw
- so long as: plaintiff has produced -sutticient evidence ,
-to permit the jury te draw the inference of negli-
genceseven though the court itself, would not draw
that inference; the court must still leave the question
to the jury where reasonable men may differ as to
the balances of probabilities.
“In order that a plaintitt be cptitled to the bene-
fit ot the doctrine et res rpsa loqieter, he need not
exclude every other possibnity that the injury was
caused other than by detendant’s negligence.” ¢ Pros
ser, Res fpsa Loquitur in) California, 37° Cal 1.
Rev. 183. 14-198.) A
—
mie |
In Bauer v. Qtis (19553, 133 Cal. App. 2d 439, 443,
e ..
284 P. 2d 133, the Court pointed out:
’
“The inference of negligence is not required to be
an exclusive or compelling one. it is enough that the
court cannot sav that reasonable men could not draw
a
2.0 Tue Doctrine or Res [psa Loon ituk May Be Re-
LIED Upon to Sv PrORT A JU R. MENT ALTHOUGH No
Jury [Nstrec Tox, Is (GIVEN,
Jaffke & Dunham (1957), 382 U.S. 285.1 1. Ed.
2d 314; .
Rogers v Los Angeles Transit Lines (1985). 45
Cal. 2d 414, 289 PB. 2d 226;
Rose =. Melody Lane (1952), 39 Cal. 2d 481,
247 P. 2d 3335.
4
3. THe Accinest Was or a Kip Witten Dors Not
OCCUR IN THE ABSENCE OF SOMEONE'S NEGLIGENCE,
The FSocet plane delivered to Lt. Hughes was not an
cexperimental model [Ro 400, 479 This partic ular type
of plane had been magut: actured., by Petitioner for four
vears [R. 4600]. Thousands had’ been delivered to the
Army j{R. 330]. A jet plane is no more dangerous than
a prop plane | R. 325-326].
It is an extraordinary event fora jet te hive a flame
out, to explode or te burn upon take-ot [R. 328. 49.470.
479, 626.627 |.
Test pilot Annis had flown three te four thousand tlichts
in F&e'e without experiencing’ fame out oon takwooth oor
fre or explosion [Ro 47910 He had never heard ef plane
eXplodyne daring take ot R 4 470] aii
re
a
The case of La Porte v. Houston (1948), 33 Cal. 2d
1607, 199 PB. 2d 665, is distinguished from the instant case
by the fact that there was nothing that the defendant
could have done to cause the accident.
4.
7
Tre Conpition REQUIRING EXCLUSIVE CONTROL IN
DEFENDANT IS SATISFIED.
The requirement of control is not an absolute one. The
fact that the accident occurred sometime. after Petitioner
relinquished physical control of the instrumentality which
caused the accident does not preclude application of the
doctrine provided there is evidence that the instrumentality
had not been improperly handled by Respondents’ dece-
dent
or. some
third
person “Or
its
condition
otherwise
changed after control was relinquished by Petitioner.
Zeuts v Coca-Cola Bottling Co., oupra;:
the time of the nethiyvent
Voergar \
142 Cal
Rurr i:
Pieasant
Dalley
\pp. 2d 633, 300 PL 2d 2X5:
<n Issn.
(1986),
Vherrcoin Ulan, Co. (1954). 42 Cal. 2d
O&82*2o8 PL 2d 1041.
It isthe comtrolot the mstrumentalitv by defendant at
element.
cet
tod .
Rohar ve, Osborne (1955), 133 Calo Apy
284 P. 2d 123:
Piehis o. Oakland (V93558 1, Y37 Calo Apy
201 BP. 2d 145:
Baker 2 Goedrich Ca. ce§983). 118 Cal
>, 252 Pd 4:
Ai ey g?. Caa-¢ ola Rottlorg Co. i {O48
Arm. 2d 371, 197 P. 2d Sn: ‘
; i ( rCola Bottling Co. (V4a
; rsa P* Sh 483
> . ad e . ‘
Which satisties the control
.
—15—
Liggett and M yers Tobacco Co. v. De Lape (C.
C. A. 9th, 1940), 109. F. 2d 598;
Michener v. Hutton (1928), 203 Cal. 604, 265
Pac, 238. .
2
The evidence in this case is clear and without. con-
tradiction that the Petitioner had full physical control
over. che jet plane until the moment) when Lt. Hughes
climbed into the cockpit. He had physical control of the
instrumentality only for a few minutes before the acci-
dent. After Lt. ERighes climbed into the cocRpit and
until the moment when the aircraft entered the obscuration
at the far end of the airstrip there was no change in the
condition of the aircraft. '
+ There is no evidence that the pilot ipfproperly handled
| the instrumentality. — There is fa presumption which is
evidence in the case that he exercised all due care (Code
~ Civ, Proc... Ses. 1963). ‘
> THe Accbenr Ceétrpo Nor Have Bee~w Dre ro ANY
VoLtuntary Action o# Conrrinetio€® ox THE Part
oF THE DrcEASED Pitot - .
Respondents agree that an element of the doctrine of res
ipsa logiatur is Jack ot contribution. Hlowever, contribu-
titn is a question of fact to be resolved by the jury.
(Seneris v. Haas sutvay. p &230 “We are of the opin-
Gem that the qurvo under appropriate instructions, should
have heen permitted. te determine whether each of the
conditions necessary te bring into play the rule of res
thsa lometur were present.” )- oh
The Cash aq } ros Met Weve rriec! Pe\ the case on Spencer
Roatte Vor I\ ' ant ‘if t JOS, 5. i3] cae. \pp. 2d
Mg ee A OY ig Ae Die distinction Tf that there was
a See
affirmative evidence thet Spencer contributed to the acci-
dent. The Court said: é
“As proof that negligence of respondents did not
cause appellant to fall, it is recalled that he had for
eight months been familiar with the, method of op-
erating the bleacher, and Ahad been the chief actor in
its operation. He had never discovered anything out |
of order. On the contrary, he had abused the ply-
board by standing on the ld which was not desfgned
to support a man's weight. Such practice may have
caused a warping of the plyboard and thus have added
to the friction of the cable and caused it to be im-
mobilized.” ( P. &82.) |
‘
The record together with the disputable presumption -
of due care whieh Petitioner does not contend was rebutted
permits “a reasonable inference that it (the aircraft) was
not accessible to extraneous harmtul forces and that it
was earetully handled by plaintitt. “(Escola v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (1944), 24 Cal. 2d 453, 458, 150
P. 2d 436.) )
6. Tuere Was No Evivexce or Possinte NoN-NEGLI-.
’ ios — GENT Pitot ERRor.
ince there was substantial.evidence that the accident
was caused by mechanical failure. the jury could nave
so decermined. To the extent that such a determination
supports the verdict, it must be assumed on appeal that
the jury did so-decide.
In tact the Respondents’ case insofar as it relates to
evidence of mechanical Yailure cant weil rest right there.
Sut Petitioner has listed supposed possthilities of pilot
error, ‘They are characterized as non-negligent because
in the ciremmatanees there is ne evidence of pilot negli-
a
rs
gence. Moreover, there is a presumpticn with the weight
of affirmative evidence against negligence of the pilot and
evidence te the contrary. merely raises a question of fact
which has been adversely resolved against Petitioner. Just
to clear the atmosphere on this: subject the contentions
of Petitioner commencing at page 14 of its petitien are
treated seriatim.
(a) A pilot induced throttle burst is absolutely pre-
cluded because this never happens on take-offs [R. 471-
472]. N\
(b) The testimony is overwhelmingly to the effect that
the pilot could not accidently cut the fuel supply and
that to do so intentionally would be suicide |R. 474, 47%
478]. No such speculatio#® can be indulged because of
the presumption that the pilot acted with due respect for
his own satety (Code Civ. Proc., Sc 1961)
(c) The hypothesis that the pilot might “hit” the stick
and move it in the wrong direction is preposterous. His
life depends upon his hold on the stickoand his experience
was such as to eliminate anv danger “f a deliberate turn
toward the ground. He was lasy seen with flaps and
wheels up in proper attitude of climb {Ro S504].
(d) Nothing more need be said about the experience
of this pilot. There is no reason to suppose that. the
pilot took off on visuel fight and switched to instruments.
nor is it established bevond a jury question of fact that
he dost visteal contact with the ground at any pomt. At
the same time atts equally cons:cent with the evidence
too suppese that he wos an instruments from: start to finish
and that his tstruments were warmed up and. pertfecth
Minetionime
= =
(e) As before pointed out the idea that the uncontra-
dicted evidence establishes that the plane or the instru-
ments were not properly warmed up is a mistaken notion.
(f) The evidence of the actuator setting is the theo-
reticaVresult of laboratory paperwork and there is no testi-
mony to the effect that the angle of impact compares
with the supposed setting. No such compar‘son was at-
tempted.
‘¢) The only bad thing about the weather was a fog
bank at the far end of the runway and th pilot was
airborne long before he reached the fog. The jet engine
does not need a warm-up. j
(h) There is no evidence that the pilot attempted to
Ay on visual contact or on instruments or of any switch
from one to another. His clearance authorized either at
his own election. Kinkella did got know or testify as to
what this opilot did.
(i) The throttle is net a delicate instrument [R. 520]
ner can it be accidentally cut [RL 476).
Cenerall) speaking, the attempt of Petitioner to point
“to contributing cases df the accident has resulted in the
rankest speculations ghd tmaprohable suppositions. Cali-
rormia bas requires the question st contribution to) the
cause of an accident te he submitted to othe jury in the
| came manner ao oany other question at fact. The jury's
detertninatien of this issue is as binding upon the triat
court anedoon appeal as anv other tury decision.
}
= we
C. The Decision of the Court of Appes!s Does Not Conflict
With the Decisions of Other Circuits on the Application
of Res Ipsa Loquitur.
In each of the cases from other circuits cited by Peti-
‘tioner, the distinction lies in the fact that the Court is
applying the law of another State which differs from
the law of Californiac.-
In the case of. Woerrtson v LeTourneau Co. «f Georgia
(1943), 138 F. 2d 339, the Fitth Circuit, applying the
law of Georgia, refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsa
loguitur to an airline accident involving the crash-death
of a pil t and his passenger. This case is contrary to the
doctrine of res ipsa leguitur as applied in the State of
Calitornta and the Ninth Circuit.
Parker w./ Granger (1935). 4 Cal. 2d 668, 52
P. 2d 226; |
Smith o O'Donnel! (1932), 215 Cal. 714; 12
PY. 26 Fas:
Boise Patette Lumber Co. v. Larsen (1954), 214
I. 2d 373 (Sustained jury verdict for plaintiff
without any actual evidence of negligence and
without reference to the doctrine) ;
Snvth ow, dlaska Airways OC. C. A. Oth, 1937),
89 F. 2d 253.
In the case of Williams +. United States (1955), 218
F. 24 473. the Firth Circuit: said that under the law of
Florida cne deetrine was only applicadle to cases invelying
eiremmstanees which are within the common ordinary
experience et most people “The case serves to exemplify
that the law of Fhortda ditvers from the law of California.
but tas or me curther stenttieance
—20-—
The difference between the law of California and the
law of Wyoming appears in Cohn v. United Air Lines
Trans. Co. (1937), 17 Fed. Supp. 685, wherein the
District Court states:
ee
the law tells us that the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur shall not be applied.if there is any —
other reasonable or probable cause from which it ’
might be inferred that there was no negligence at
all.”
D. The Verdict Was Fair and Just and Supported by
Substantial Evidence.
This is in answer to Petitioner's Point IV. page 20 6f
the petition which is mainly a hodgepodge of other argu-
ments. which have already been answered above.
Petitioner reverts again to the case of McPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 383, 11 Nv E. 1050, and
repeats a completely unsound argument made in the Court
below by misconstruing this case. Petitioner seems to think
that to recover against a manutacturer for negligence in
producing an articie which is inherently dangerous if care-
lessly made. it must be proved that the manufacturer knew
Unt THis defective. :
Obviously negligence is carelessness in not taking rea-
sonable precautions to prevent defects, when reasonable
care would have disclosed them. The uncontradicted evi-
dence is that there was an “elecirical fire in the assembly.”
Nothing was done about it except to put out the fire and
clean off the roamite, leaving no evidence of fire. — But»
the tact that it lett the very detect which originally caused
the tire and which caused another when Lieutenant Hughes
took the pline into the air is a fair .aference,
a
/Any possibility of negligence of General Electric in
manufacturing the jet engine is precluded. Petitioner
/put on experts to testify with convincing certainty that
there was nothing wrong with the engine and this was
uncontradicted. Such testimony was necessary as a part
of Petitioner’s defense because the engine was not a sealed
unit which could not be disassembled for inspection with-
out destroying it. Hence, the rule of O’Rourke v. Day
and Night Water Heater Co. (1939), 31 Cal. App. 2d
364, is not in point.
Respondents offered the Court of Appeals a reasonable
explanation of the accident which was supported~by. the
evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.
Respondents_did not indulge in speculation nor did the
Court of Appeals in its decision. -The only element of
speculation involved is whether the jury reconstructed
the event of the accident in the same way as Respondents
did or came to some other equaly tenable conclusion
from the evidence. The Court of Appeals clearly enough
adopted the same approach.
It is well to bear in mind that the evidence on some
important issues of fact was substantially conflicting. In
such circumstances the Stuyreme Court kas said:
“It is nw answer to say that the jurv’s verdict
involved speculation and conjecture.” (that accident
was impossible and must have been murder). ‘“When-
ever facts are in dispute or the evidence is such that
fairminded men. may draw different inferences, a
measure oJ Speculation an? conjecture is required
on the part of those whose duty it is to settle the
dispute by choosing what seems to them to be the
most reasonable inferences. Only when there is a
complete absence of probative fact to support: tne
=
concluston reached does a reviewable error appear.
But when, as here, there is an evidentiary basis for
the jury’s verdict, the jury is free to discard as dis-
belief whatever facts are inconsistent with its con-
clusion, and the appellate court’s function is ex-
hausted when that evidentiary basis becomes appar-
ent, it being immaterial that the court might draw a
contrary inference or feel that another conclusion is
more reasonable.” {Emphasis added. )
Lavender v7. Kurn (1945), 327 U. S. 645, 66
é S. Ct. 740, 90 L. Ed. 916, 923.
Conclusion.
The object and purpose of the petition is to gain a
aD
review ofthe sufficiency of conflicting evidence to sus-
: . oie © 2 Ni ‘ . O . . : .
tain the verdict No~qrestion_of public interest and im
portance is presented. “The petition for Writ-of Certiorari
should not be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
ALBERT LEE STEPHENS, JR.,
(;LENDON TREMAINE,
Attorneys for Respondents.
Associate Counsel Not a
Member of This Court:
James V. BREWER, .
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