Brief for the Federal Trade Commission in Opposition — Chain Institute, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission (No. 554)
Supreme Court brief1957
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CITATIONS
Cases:
Allied Paper Mills v. Federal Trade Commission, 168
F. 2d 600, certiorari denied, 336 U.S. 918______-- 9
Bond Crown & Cork Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,
Se cs Coun had wide d «Wud e 9,11
Ethy! Gasoline € ‘orporation v. v. Fr ‘nited States, 309 U.
ES hs sens na ee sii each vilae de eaae ie endal Aah sk 0 11
Federal Trade C ommission Vv. C ement Institute, 333
Ose Meee oer ares . 9,10
Federal Trade Commission v. National Lead Co 0.,
act id vice week daca ce 6,7, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16
Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,
156 F. 2d 899, certiorari denied, 329 U.S. 795__- -- 9
General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co.,
Te en a cn cecbhenaeenes g
Afilk and Ice Cream Can Institute v. Federal Trade
(omn ixsston, 152 F. 2d 478- eee con ee
National Lead Company v. Fede ral Trade Commission,
227 F. 2d 825, cross petition for certiorari denied,
ee | Sa Se a re aad aS 9
Salt Producers Ass'n v. Fede oat Trade Commission, 134
F. 2d 354- a agit ene ea et 8)
Trianale ( rer a Cable Co. v. Federal Trade Com-
miseon, 16S Fo 2d 175, affirmed sub nom. Clayton
Mark & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 336 U.S.
TR RG eee eye Reap on een ee a NE ap 9
United States Maltsters Ass'n. v. Federal Trade Come
ts SE Ue San a ona ks cna nadtnens siete 9
440255 o1-—-1 (1)
r
Statutes:
Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended, 15 U.S. C. 12
et seq.: Page
Section 2 (a)... ~.--~~---=--=-+---52-8+--5"" 4
Section 3 (bh)... ...--- ------ << as esensesee 14
Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719, as
amended, 15 U. S. C. 45, Section 5--------------- 2,3,4
sey ores
Gu the Supreme Court of the Bnited States
OcTOBER TERM, 1957
No. 554
CHAIN INSTITUTE, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
. STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals (Pet. 29-44)
is reported at 246 F. 2d 231. The Commission’s find-
ings, conclusion and order and the dissenting opinion
of Commissioner Mason (R. 592-622) are reported at
49 F. T. C. 1041, 1069-1110.
JURISDICTION .
The judgment of the Court of Appeals (Pet. 45-46)
was entered on July 19, 1957. The petition for a writ
of certiorari was filed on October 16, 1957. The juris-
dictien—ef_this Court is invoked under 28 U.S. C.
1254 (1).
(1)
2
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the Commission, having found that
petitioners have long been parties to a conspiracy to
fix delivered prices, properly directed _petitioners to
cease and desist from continuing thease, pursuant to
agreement, of the delivered price: systems without
which the purposes of the conspifacy could not have
been accomplished. ra
2. Whether the Commission acted within its allow-
able discretion in directing the petitioners individually
to cease and desist. a selling any type of chain pur-
suant to a single basing point system. a freight equali-
zation system or a zone price system, having the pur-
pose or effect of systematically matching the delivered
prices of other sellers. :
STATUTE INVOLVED
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38
Stat. 719, as amended, 15 U. S.C. 45, provides in
pertinent part as follows:
(a) (1) Unfair methods of competition in
commeree, and unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices in) commerce, are hereby declared un-
lawful.
* * * * *
(6) The commission is hereby empowered
and directed to prevent persons, partnerships,
or corporations, * * * from using unfair meth-
ods of competition in commerce and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices In commerce,
(hb) Whenever the Commission shall have
reason to believe that any stich persen, partner-
ship. or corporation has been or is using any
unfair method of competition " * * at) shall
eT ree
3
issue and serve upon such person, partner-
ship, or corporation a complaint. stating its
charges in that respect, and containing a notice
of a hearing * * * * * * Tf upon such hear-
ing the Commission shall be of the opinion
that the method of competition or the act. or
practice in question is prohibited by this Act,
it shall make a report in writing in which it
shall state its findings as te the facts, and shall
issue and cause to be served on such person,
partnerhip, or corporation an order requiring
such person, partnership, or corporation to
cease and desist from using such method of
competition or such aet or practice, * * *
{e) Any person, partnership, or corporation
required by an grder of the Commission to
cease and desist from using any method of
competition or act or practice may obtain a
review of such order in the circuit court of
appeals of the United States, within any circuit
Where the method of competition or the act or
practice in question was used or where such
person, partnership, or corporation resides or
carries on business * * *,) The findings of the
Commission as to the facts, if supported by evt-
denee, shall be conclusive, * * *
STATEMENT
The Commission's amended complaint (R. 41-79)
Was issued in 1945 (R. 79). It charged in Count I
(R. 41-71), under whieh the order Wasgissued, that
petitioners had violated Section 5 of. the Federal
Trade Commission Act by combining and conspiring
to restrain and suppress competition in the sale of
three types of chain, and that this was accomplished
4
primarily by agreeing upon published mill prices and
by charging the same delivered price to buyers at any
given location through the use as to ‘‘welded chain’”’
of a single basing point delivered price system, as to
“‘weldless chain’”’ of a freight equalization delivered
price system, and as to ‘‘tire chain’’ of a zone deliv-
ered price system (R. 52-55, 64-71). It charged that
petitioners had ‘tagreed to fix and maintain, and have
fixed, maintained and made effective identical deliv-
ered price quotations’’ to buyers at any given location
in the United States (R. 52), and that the use by each
petitioner of the three delivered price systems had -
‘**prevented the principles and forces of competition
from making and determining their respective price
quotations” (R. 53). It charged that each seller of
chain had emploved the three delivered price systems
with knowledge that each other seller “simultaneously
does likewise’? (R. 64), and that this was done ‘for
the purpose and with the effect’? of “matching” de-
livered prices on all types of chain (CR. 65-69).
Count IL of the amended complaint (RR. 72-78), dis-
missed by the Commission (R. 652), charged that peti-
tioners had sold theur chain at discriminatory prices
in Violation of Section 2 (a) of the Clayton Aet (15
U.S.C. 13 (a)).
After an extensive hearing, the Commission made
detailed findings of fact (R. 592-652), and concluded
that petitioners’ agreements and understandings, and
their acts pursuant thereto, violated Section 5 (R.
652), and issued its order to cease and desist (R.
653-657). mR
-#
7)
The Commission found that the petitioners. sell
“substantially all the welded chain, weldless chain
’ ?
including sash and kindred chain, and tire chain
produced in the United States’? (R. 603)." They
agreed with each other to sell chain at uniform de-
livered prices (R. 649-650). Each manufacturer, for
the purpose and with the effect of matching delivered
prices with other manufacturers at all destinations
and thus eliminating competition, determined its de-
livered prices as to welded chain by the use of the
Pittsburgh’ plus delivered price system, as to weldless
chain by the use of a freight equalization delivered
price system under which every point of manufacture
is a basing point, and as to tire chain by the use of
a one-zone delivered price system: (R. 604-9),
Petitioners do not contest the evidentiary support
for the Commission's finding of an agreement to fix
basie prices. They do contend, though the court below
held to the contrary (Pet. 38), that there was no sup-
port for the Commission’s finding (R. 650-651) that
the delivered price systems, without which the pur-
Poses of the -CONSplracy could not have heen accom-
plished, were used pursuant to agreement (Pet. 7).
Petitioners contest the validity only of Subpara-
vraph (6) of the first ordering paragraph and the
‘While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals Re-
public Steel Corporation, not a party to the Commission pro-
ceeding, purchased the assets of five affiliated corporate manu-
facturers of chain which were parties, and the Court. pursuant
to motion and with the Commission's consent (Pet. 47-52),
dismissed the petition to review as to these five corporations
(Pet, 53-34).
* The Commission found that since the commencement of the
proceeding two petitioners had ceased using this system (R.
605).
6
third ordering paragraph of the Commission’s cease
and desist order (R. 653-657), both of which deal with
the three delivered price systems. Subparagraph (6)
of the first ordering paragraph prohibits petitioners -
from entering into or carrying out any planned com-
mon course of action, agreement or conspiracy to
(R. 655)—
Quote or sell chain or chain products at
prices calculated or determined pursuant to or
in accordance with the single basing point de-
livered-price system, the freight equalization
delivered-price system, or the zone delivered-
price system; or quote or sell chain or
chain products at prices calculated or deter-
mined pursuant to or in accordance with any
other plan or system which results in identical
price quotations or prices for chain or chain
products at points of quotation or sale or to
particular purchasers by any two or more sell-
ers of chain or chain products using such plan
or system or which prevents purchasers from
finding any advantage in price in dealing with
one or more as against another seller.
The third ordering paragraph is identical in plan with
the order reviewed by this court in Federal Trade
Commission Vv. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 423.
It requires each manufacturer petitioner to cease and
desist from (R. 656-657) —
quoting or selling chain or chain products at
prices calculated or determined pursuant to or
in accordance with a single basing point deliv-
ered-price system, a freight equalization deliv-
ered-price system, or a zone delivered-price
system, for the purpose or with the effect of sys-
tematically matching the delivered-price quota-
tions or the delivered prices of other sellers of
chain or chain products and thereby preventing
purchasers from finding any advantage im. price
in dealing with one or more sellers as against
another. :
The majority of the Commission did not issue a
separate opinion to accompany its findings. In the
National Lead case, which was decided by the Com-
mission a little more than a month before the decision
in this case, the Commission ‘filed a lengthy opinion,
prepared by Commissioner Mead, setting forth im de-
tail the necessity for the provision in order to break
up the conspiracy (49 F. TT. C. 875-889). Comunis-
sioner Mason filed a dissenting opinion in that case
(id., S89-907). Commissioner Mason also filed a dis-
senting opinion in this case (R. 658-059), incorpor-
ating a portion of his opinion in the National Lead
case (R. 659-662). He said that it was his belief that
the third ordering paragraph was improperly included
for the reasons he had objected to with respect to the
Inclusion of the comparable provision in the Nationa!
Lead order.
A Motion for rehearing Was filed with the Commis:
sion and was denied (R. 663-065). The motion did not
allege any change in fact or law, and the Commission
denied it on the ground that it was largely predicated
upon a change in membership of the Commission fol-
lowing the decision (R. 665-667). At the time of the
order denying the motion Commissioner Mead was the
only remaining member of the Commission who had
voted with the majority in issuing the order to cease
and desist (R. 665). He filed a concurring opinion on
447255 St——w2
s
the motion, stating in detail the reasons the third
ordering paragraph had been ineluded in the order
(R. 668-674). His opinion stated that the prohibition
Was “necessary for effective relief from the conspiracy
in whieh the respondents [petitioners | have engaged.”
and that the Conmnnission “had the duty to determine
the remedy necessary to suppress and instire against
a revival of the trade-restraining conspiracy” CR.
HOO): that “we considered a number of factors” in de-
tenmining the remedy: that “A majority of the Com-
inission Was of the opinion that an effective order”
R. 669-670) must prohibit not only the future
use oof the delivered-price systems pursuant to con-
spiracy, “but mast alse prohibit the individual use of
a particular delivered pricing system or method’ for
the purpose or with the effect of svstematically mateh-
ine delivered prices of other selleas (R. 870);
that “Such a prohibition was necessary * * * to make
the order fully effective against the trade-restraimins
couspirey. OR. 670) and that ‘tan order merely pre-
hibitine the combination may well be a useless
vesture’” CR. O71). ; '
The Conrt oof Appeals unanimously affirmed the
Commission's findings, conclusion and order in every
respect,
ARGUMENT
1. The Commission, having found that) petitioners
for many vears had been parties te a price-fixing
conspiracy, the existence of which is not contested,
‘Some of the exhibits upon whieh the Commission relied in
part in finding the existence of a conspiracy were dated ii L987
(Ro 612 613, 628-630). antedating the Conunission’s. order, ts
sued in 1953 OR. 657). by sixteen vears.
9
had the duty to prohibit the further use pursuant te
agreement of the methods by which identity of deliv:
ered prices is accomplished. Delivered price systems.
Where used as a part of a seheme to fix prices ane
restrain trade, have many times been prohibited by
the Commission in conspiracy orders which regularly
have been affirmed by this Court and by courts of
appeals.” Hence, the petition fails in this respect te
present a question of federal law which has not been
decided by this Court. And to the extent petitioners
request further review of the evidence and inferences
to be drawn therefrom, certiorari: clearly is not war-
‘ranted. General Talking Pictures Corp. \. Westeri
Flectrice Co,, 304 U.S. 175, 178.
Moreover petitioners misconceive the basis for the
Commission's finding that the three delivered price
svstems were emploved pursuant to agreement ¢ Pet.
23-25). The findings of conspiracy were not based on
?
hSonele bsisinie pron delivered price <Vstelmn: Vontted Ntittes
Malesters desnw ve Federal Trade Cammission. loz FL 2d dei
(CON. Ty: freight equalization basing potit delivered price
svstern: Mh aid Lee Cream Can lustitute vo Federal Qrond.
Commission, U2 FL 2d 498 (CL ALT): Bond Crown & Cork Cn
Ve Bedeia Trade Commission, VW F.2d 974 (CL NL 4d zone
delivered price >Vsteni: Nalt Producers Assn. vv. Federal Typical
Commission, ISA FL 2d Sob OC. ALT) Bort Howard, Paper Co.
f Fedeval Trine CO MINsion, 15 F. 2d Soo { Be A. Gis opr
torart denied, 329 UL S. T9532 Aid Paper Milly vo Federal
Prade Commission, 16S F.2d 6000 (CL OAL 7). certiorari denied
336 ae, S. O1s: National Lead Com pany Be Fy te ral Tr q/. Coan
mission, 220 BL 2d 825 (CL ALT). cross: petition for certiorar
denied, 551 U.S. 964: multiple basing point delivered price
system: Federal Trade Conumission vo Cement Fnxtrteut.. AI
. S&S. 6R3> Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. ve Federal Trad
Comission, WS F.2d 105 (CL ALT). affirmed sub nom. Clhiyton
Vark del ov. Federal Trade Con mission, X36 VS. O56.
10
!
conscious parallel action but on voluminous evidence
of agreement. The Commission found that there wes
substantial evidence that “‘present and future prices
* * * were discussed antl agreed upon”? on the
occasion of meetings of petitioner Chain Institute,
Ine, the trade association (CR. 609-617); that
pursuant to agreement published mill prices were
identical at all times (R. 639-641) 7 that a evstem of
cheeking on the maintenance of delivered prices wes
fostered and earvied out by the Postitute CR. 61s
HYS): that correspondence between petitioners showed
the existence of an agreement to fix delivered prices
OR. 628-632): that successful efforts to standardize
anid simplify: products, which aided pree fixing, were
continuously carried on through the Tnstionte OR,
H32-O37): that freight rates on welded cham from
Pittsburgh te destinations througheut the United
States were cooperatively compiled and used by peti
tioners and that the compilation Was “het intended to
serve any need for feeight rate. for shippime pur-
poses but was designed for use un computing ile-
livered prices * * "OR. 687-639): that delivered
prices on all types of chain have been. “'wenerally un
form OR. 4D) ds a result of “'the use of idéntieal
pricitig sVstenis or Jnethods * * "°° CR. 641-042).
The Commissiott plainly Was entitled to find on this
record, where the delivered price systems maifitain
Hnifermity of price, that the svstems were used pur-
‘siant te agreement. As the Court of Appeals held,
eiting Federal Trade Commission vo Cement Tnsti-
fate, SOQ TLS. O83, the evidence supports the Com-
Hiission’s finding “that the delivered pricing methous
11
used by petitioners in connection with and in further-
ance of their cooperative and collusive efforts to fix
or stabilize prices for chain were necessarily an in-
herent and indispensable part of the conspiracy”’
(Pet. 38).- And the fact that the systems had been
used historically in the industry since its inception
is inconclusive because it is clear that they were used
by agreement and understanding for the purpose and
with the effect of eliminating price competition. As
the Commission found, the purpose of arriving at
identical delivered prices sould not have been accom-
plished without the use of these systems (R. 650) .°
The Commission did not exceed its authority, there-
fore, by ordering petitioners to discontinue the use
pursuant to conspiracy of the methods of pricing and
selling chain that in the past have been the means by
which the unlawful restraints upon trade were
accomplished.”
2. The Commission's authority in a conspiracy case
to limit the individual use of a delivered price
system, Where necessary to destroy the impetus of
the conspiracy, was settled by the Court's decision i
Fv eral Toade Commission vo National Lead Co., 352
Two Courts of Appesls have said that “it. taxes our
credulity. to bebewe. as argued. that) petitioners employed this
[freight equalizaty a] svsten: without any agreement or plan
among themselves.” Wik and Lee Cream Can Institute vy. Fed-
eral Trade Commission, We F. vd 47s, 481-482 (CL ALT):
Bond Crown & Cork Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 176 F.
vd OTH WNO CCL AL A), |
*The Court held in Fithy? Gasoline Corporation vy. United
States, 300 TLS. 436, 461. that the lower cenrt: “properly
suppressed the means by which the unlawful restraint was
“achieved.” See also Federal Trade Conmission vy. National
Lead Ca. 392 US. 419, 450.
v
12
U. S. 419. Petitioners acknowledge this, but argue
that for various reasons the decision in National
Lead is not controlling here."
It is asserted that since the third ordering para-
graph here limits the use of three delivered price
systems, as opposed to the limitation of the use of
one such system in National Lead, it is too broad
(Pet. 12-15). It is apparent that the National Lead
order related only to the zone delivered price system
because that was the only system used pursuant to
conspiracy in the sale of lead pigments. The order
here appHes to the three systems because in the sale
of chain petitioners pursuant to conspiracy have used
ail three systems. The Court of Appeals, in holding
that the Commission made an allowable judgment in
its choice of the remedy necessary in order effectively
to bring to an end the past unlawful practices, reeog-
nized that the order properly guarded against inter-
changing, as among the three types of chain, the
systems previously used, thus perpetuating the re-
straints of trade at which the order is directed (Pet.
_¢
39)."
* Petitioners’ argument that) the pricing systems anteceded
the conspiracy and agreement and therefore have an inde-
pendent legitimate economic basis (Pet. 1 12) Is discussed at
page TL. sapere,
“The posstble interchange of preoimy systems used / may
already have occurred as to welded chain. Petitioners say
they believe that “the normal and lawful purpose and ‘eétlect
of any delivered pricing method” is systematically to mateh
delivered prices of competitors (Pet. 13). They advise that
the Pittsburgh plus system “is generally regarded as out-
moded,” and that “counsel are informed that the Pittsburgh
Plus method is no longer used by any of the petitioners” (Pet.
11, n. 36). They do not inform the Court as te the method
. : . : : : ;
by which welded chain is currently priced, ;
f
{
| ad
i"
13
Contrary to petitioners’ contention (Pet. 19-21),
the Commission did consider the necessity for the
remedy selected.” Commissioner Mead, in’ his con-
curring opinion on the motion for rehearing, said
that the Commission had fully considered the neces-
sity for the third ordering paragraph (R. 668-674).
He said that “we considered a number of factors” in
determining the necessity of providing a remedy
“to suppress and insure against a revival of the trade-
restraining conspiracy” CR. 669). He also said that
“A majority of the Commission was of the opinion
that an effeetive order” must prohibit the individual
use of the three delivered price systetus “for the
purpose or with the effect of svstematically jiateh-
ing”’ delivered prices of other sellers of chain CR.
669-670). There is no basis, therefore, for petitianers’
contention that the Conmimission gave no consideration
to the necessity of the remedy.
*The petitions ss specifically argue against the order as it
applies to the sone m\steta used oan the sale of tire claon ¢Pet.
1 160. Under this svstem: the petitioners” published mulb prices
are, pursiiant to agreement, identieal and the cham i sold at ail
delivery Point: rao the Uonated States at these published prices,
the seller paying the frerht. Clon. uidike chewing: gum and
erarettes (Pret, IQyoiss heavs commodity, The uVerige cost of
delivery of tire chain te all destinations in the United States
Isabout Ste porcent of the published price (Pet. dey fn ary. As
in tho eases erted in footnote de page Yo sion the Federal
Trade Cosmisston found that this system was part of the un-
lawfal practice. The court below: found that the Commission
had a basis intthe record for such a finding and had not abused
its discretion in forbidding future use of the system. Under
these cireumestanees there is no ground for review by thi: Court,
' Petitioners also argue that the Conmunission gave no con-
sideration to the economic effects of the order, having contended
throughout this proceeding that the order requires them to sell
14
Except that it applies to more than one delivered
price system, the order here is to be interpreted in
exactly the manner this Court interpreted the Na-
tional Lead order. The order does not require fo. b.
mill selling and “delivered pricing per se is not banned
by the order” (352 U.S. at 425)." 0 As the Court said
in National Lead, “delivered zone pricing violates the
order only when two conditions: are present: (1)
identical prices with competitors (2) resulting from
zone delivered pricing’? (352 U.S. at 426). So, here,
the order will be violated only if) “systematically
matching’ prices result) from oa single basing point,
freight equalization, or zone delivered) price system.
Petitioners can comply with the order by competing
instead of agreeing upon base prices, Tt will remain
lawful to meet in good faith the lower prices of a
competitor, no matter what system of delivered pric-
Ing is used. Here. as in National Tead, 3 Section 2 Cb)
of the Clayton Aet is fully applicable. As this Court
foo. bo milk In this connection the record shows that under
the conspiraey eons of the comphunt they requested the Tlear-
ing Evniiiner to tind that an order requiring foo. bo mall selling
would be economically disastrous Qpar. Tac} ) af petitioners’
proposed tinedings, RooOods. waned excepted to the examiner's re-
fusal to tauke the finding cexeeption TS. Ro Soe). “Phe Com-
Hiission ~pecitionlly ruled pon ane denied the eXception (PR
ST4STS. je | :
The Court of Appeals-eecognized that the order «oes not
pers ergy the use of any delivered: price svstent saving
(Pet, 38: “Tf this paragr: aph of the order of the € omimils-
sion were to ro given the effect of depriving each of the peti.
tioners of every luwfnl and practical method of independently
and honestly selling its products at delivered prices, and thus
preventing it) from engaging in nationwide competition, we
would consider the paragraph invalid.”
15
stated (352 U.S. 419, at 426-427, 431), it is read into
every Commission order and the particular type of
order, like the order here in question, ‘“‘was not in-
tended to and does not: proliibit or interfere with
independent delivered * * * pricing per se. Nor does
it prohibit the practice of the absorption of actual
freight as such in order to foster competition.”
As to the duration of the third ordering paragraph,
the order here is temporary in the same sense the
order in National Lead was temporary. There the
Court said: “When and if competition is restored and
the individual prohibition is no longer necessary, the
Commission expressed its intention, upon application,
to vacate the * * * provision of its erder’ (225 U.S.
at 424-425). So, here, Commissioner Mead said in his
opinion on the motien for rehearing (R. 671-672) :
If, after competition Is restored in the indius-
try, any of the respondents can make a proper
showing that this prohibition or anycother pro-
hibition in the ‘order is no longer necessary or
desirable, the Commission, of Mrse, will at
that time take such action as may be, appro-
priate in the light of the tacts and the law.
Petitioners also eontend, as was contended in Na-
tional Lead, that due process Was denied beeause they
had te opportunity. to argue before the Commission
the validity. of the third ordering paragraph (Pet.
22-25). Heres as there, the insertion of the paragraph
“was nothing more than a mode of implementation,
selected by the Commission, to enforce its findings of
Vielatrons of the Net (352 UL S. at-427). The Com-
Srnisston ds charged by the Federal Trade Comunission
16
Act with fashioning the remedy. Since the reason-
ableness of the remedy depends upon the nature of
the violation and the means adopted to accomplish it,
the entire proceeding with respect to the violation is
in substance a hearing on the remedy. Due process
does not require a compartmentalization of the pro-
ceedings.
The Court of Appeals heid that the Commission did
not act arbitrarily or abuse its discretion by including
the third ordering paragraph in the order (Pet. 40-
41). Since this Court held in National Lead that the
Commission’s selection of an identical remedy had a
‘*reasonable relation to the unlawful practices found
to exist”? (352 U. S. at 428), the petition presents no
question of importance that has not been settled by
the Court.
| CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
denied.
Respectfully submitted,
J. LEE RANKIN,
Solicitor General.
Victor R. HANSEN,
Assistant Attorney General.
CHarLes H. Weston,”
Attorney.
EarL W. KINTNER,
General Counsel,
JAMES E. CorkKFy,
Assistant General Counsel,
J. B. TRuiy,
Attorney,
Federal Trade Commission.
NOVEMBER 1957.
U S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFic Eg. 1987
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.