Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — White v. Commissioner (No. 841)

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FILED

‘No. 841 MAR 15 1957

i"

IN THE LJOHN T. FEY, Clerk

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1956

Nos. and

= La

EASTERN AIR LINES, INC

-

Petitioner,

v.

UNION TRUST COMPANY, et al.,

Respondents.

eee

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIO.

RARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CIRCUIT

——————————

JosePpH W. HENpeRSoN

1910 Packard Building

Philadelphia 2, Pa.

Ricuarp W. Gainer

820 Woodward Building

Washington, D. C.

Joun M. AHERNE

99 John Street

New York 38, N. Y.

Attorneys for Petitioner

Paneer era

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955 .......... la

Per Curiam Decision of United States Supreme Court

Dated December 5, 1955, United States v. Union

De OR ea Khd Gh ec eacaebbhsn wo schxese< 38a

Per Curiam Decision of United States Supreme Court

Dated December 5, 1955, Union Trust Co. et al. v.

fe Se a ee 39a

Per Curiam Decision of United States Supreme Court

Dated February 27, 1956, Union Trust Co. et al. v.

GE: ST TONGA, BOR. io ia5 05 his ews Saeed sedis 39a

Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the Dis-

trict of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956 .... 40a

Opinion of United States District Court for the

District of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953 ........ 55a

Statutes :

Administrative Procedure Act—5 U. S. C. 1001

ER kc adeaneudas Stas saa seeisndewkndackawas 66a

Federal Register Act—44 U.S. C. 301 et seq. .... 68a

United States Statutes at Large, Vol. 59, Part 1,

Chapter 443, Public Law 208, October 31, 1945 72a

District of Columbia Code—Washington National

SEG TENE SNE Wa naek canis cedeenansedt 74a

Air Traffic Rules—14 CFR, Part 60 (as of Nov. 1,

SE EN 4a weka nes kwaceueey aw basncapieabnan ce 75a

+

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

United States Court of Appeals,

District of Columbia Circuit.

»s

>

Eastern Air Lives, Inc.,

Appellant,

Vv.

Union Trust Company et al.,

Appellees.

Unitep States or AMERICA,

Appellant,

V.

Union Trust Company et al.,

Appellees.

Nos. 11991, 11992, 12017, 12018.

Argued June 22, 1954.

Decided Feb. 8, 1955.

Petition for Rehearing In Bane Denied in all Cases on

April 15, 1955.

Petition for Rehearing Denied by the Division which

Heard the Case in Nos. 11991-2 on May 4, 1955.

Petition for Rehearing Denied by the Division which

Heard the Cases in Nos. 12017-8 on May 11, 1955.

As Amended June 24, 1955.

Mr. Joseph W. Henderson, Philadelphia, Pa., with whom

Mr. Richard W. Galiher, Washington, D. C., and Mr. John

2a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

M. Aherne, of the bar of the Supreme Court of New York,

were on the brief, for appellant in Nos. 11,991 and 11,992.

Mr. Lester S. Jayson, Atty., Dept. of Justice, of the

bar of the Court of Appeals of New York, pro hac vice,

by special leave of Court, with whom Messrs. Leo A.

Rover, U. S. Atty., Paul A. Sweeney, Atty., Dept. of

Justice and D. G. Galotta, Atty., Civil Aeronautics Ad-

ministration, were on the brief, for appellants in Nos.

12,017 and 12,018. Mr. Lewis A. Carroll, Asst. U. S.

Atty., entered an appearance for appellants in Nos. 12,017

and 12,018.

Mr. David G. Bress, with whom Messrs. Sheldon E.

Bernstein, Alvin L. Newmyer and Jo V. Morgan, Jr.,

Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellees in all

cases.

Before Epcerton, Witsur K. Mixer and Fany, Circuit

Judges.

Wisur K. Miter, Circuit Judge.

On the morning of November 1, 1949, an Eastern Air

Lines DC-4 plane was flying from New York to Washing-

ton, carrying fifty-one passengers and a crew of four.

When it was on final approach for landing on runway 3

at the Washington National Airport and at an altitude of

about 300 feet, the airliner was struck from above and

behind by a P-38 military-type aircraft just purchased

by the Bolivian Government, which was being tested by

a Bolivian military pilot, Eric Bridoux, who was its only

occupant. The DC-4 was cut in two. The forward part

fell in the Potomac River, the after portion on the Vir-

ginia shore. All fifty-five persons aboard were killed.

The P-38, badly damaged, of course, plunged into the

3a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

river but somehow Bridoux escaped from the cockpit.

He was rescued and, despite serious injuries, survived.

These suits were brought in the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia by the Union Trust

Company and Melville W. Stuart as the executors of

Ralph F. Miller and Mildred E. Miller, his wife, who were

passengers on the DC-4. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., and

Eric Bridoux were named as defendants in two of the

actions and the United States was the defendant in the

other two.! Many similar suits filed on behalf of the

estates of others who died in the fatal crash are pending

under an agreement that the determination of liability in

these cases shall govern their disposition.”

Although the two captioned cases against Bridoux and

Eastern were tried to a jury, and the two against the

Government to the Court, by agreement of the parties all

four actions were tried simultaneously. The jury found

Bridoux not “liable,” but found against Eastern Air Lines

in the sum of $50,000 for the estate of Ralph F. Miller

and in thé sum of $15,000 for the estate of his wife. In

the Federal Tort Claims actions against the United States,

the trial judge held the Government liable to the estates

and fixed the damages at $50,000 and $15,000 respectively.

D. C. 113 F. Supp. 80. Eastern Air Lines and the United

States appeal.

1 Aubin & Lyons, t/a Universal Marine and Supply Company,

were also named as defendants on the theory they owned or had

some interest in the P-38. They were dismissed when it appeared

that title to the plane had passed to the Bolivian Government.

2It was also agreed that the determination of the situs of the

accident (whether it occurred over the Potomae River, which is

in the District of Columbia, or over land in Virginia), made in

these eases, shall be binding in all the others. The situs is im-

portant because a Virginia statute limits recovery for wrongful

death to $15,000. In the District of Columbia there is no statu-

tory limit.

Ser nen nee

4a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

I

We first summarize the factual background which is

essential to an understanding of the reasons for reversal

advanced by the appellants. The Washington National

is a controlled airport; that is to say, from a glass-

enclosed observation platform in a control tower standing

above and west of runway 3, employees of the Civil Aero-

nautics Administration observe arriving and departing

planes and direct their movements by radio. An incoming

plane may not land and a departing plane may not take

off until it receives tower permission to do so.

The Administrator of Civil Aeronautics adopted, and

published in the Federal Register October 14, 1949 [14

Fed. Reg. 6247-6250], a regulation for the administration

of the Washington National, which is a civilian airport

owned by the United States. Section 570.55(c) of the

regulation is as follows:

“(e) Aircraft landing or taking off shall conform to

the air traffic pattern as published jointly in the

Airman’s Guide by the Anacostia Naval Air Station,

Bolling Field and the Washington National Airport.”

The air traffic pattern referred to is a map of the air-

port and vicinity, with lines drawn over it intended to

show the general flight patterns for taking off from and

landing on the various runways. For landing on runway

3, it shows a southward pattern to a point south of

Alexandria (the downwind leg), then an east turn until

over the Potomac River (the base leg), then northwardly

over the river to a point a short distance northeast of

Alexandria, where it curves to the left over the Potomac

Yards, and then a curve to the right in a line for a

straight approach to runway 3. The drawing itself was

5a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

published in the Airman’s Guide March 1, 1949, but was

not published in the Federal Register until August 7,

1952, long after the accident here involved. The regu-

lation published October 14, 1949, referred to but did not

include the traffic pattern.

Over Eastern Air Lines’ vehement objection, the trial

court admitted the traffic pattern when it was offered in

evidence by the *rnellees, and charged the jury that it

was a binding Federal regulation, and that an unauthor-

ized deviation therefrom would be negligence per se.

Eastern admittedly had knowledge of the pattern.

On the morning of the accident Glenn D. Tigner, one

of the seven traffic control operators who were working

in the tower, was advised by the Eastern DC-4 at about

11:38 a. m. that it was over Beltsville, Maryland, 15

miles northeast of the airport, and was asked for landing

instructions. Tigner authorized it to enter a left traffic

pattern for landing on runway 3 and advised the pilot

to contact the tower again from a point closer to the

airport. Tigner testified that in a second communication,

when the Eastern plane was still north of the airport, he

cleared it to land on runway 3.3 He fixed the time of the

3The Administrator of Civil Aeronautics was called by the

court as a witness on the meaning of the phrase ‘‘cleared to land.’’

He testified that when a plane in the traffic pattern of an airport

is ‘‘cleared to land,’’ the pilot of the plane is thereby authorized

to commence his landing approach operation immediately; in

other words, when a pilot receives that clearance, wherever he may

be in the traffic pattern, there is no plane ahead of him and he

may make his turn at his discretion and consistently with the safe

management of his plane, and may come in and land at once on

the runway which has been designated by the tower. That this

is the only meaning of the phrase ‘‘cleared to land’’ was the

unanimous testimony of all the certified air traffie controllers who

testified on the subject. The trial judge instructed the jury as

a cory of law that such was the meaning of the phrase ‘‘cleared

to land.’

6a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

clearance as approximately 11:44 a. m. The DC-4 con

tinued its flight and entered the traffic pattern as it hac

been directed to do. It had circled from the patter

and was on final approach for runway 3 when it wa

struck by the Bolivian plane.

The Bolivian P-38 had taken off from runway 3 at 11:3

a. m. and therefere had been in the air only between nin

and ten minutes when the collision occurred. Shortly afte

he had cleared the DC-4 to land, Tigner observed the P-3

at a high altitude, circling Alexandria about seven mile

south of the airport, heading toward the east and startin,

a turn to its left. Tigner was then talking to anothe

plane. He was informed by a tower colleague the P-38 wa

requesting landing instructions. He saw it continuing it

left turn and said by radio, “Bolivian 927, did you reques

landing instructions?” Bridoux replied he had done s

whereupon Tigner told him he was cleared to enter th

left traffic pattern for runwaj 3 and asked him to repo!

on his downwind leg west of the airport.

Tigner said when he next saw the P-38 it was abot

five miles southwest of the airport at about 4,000 fe«

heading northeastwardly with its gear down and in

steep and rapid descent. At 11:45 a. m. he warned tl

DC-4 that the P-38 was in traffic. He said to the P-3

“Bolivian 927, make a 360 to your left. You are No.

to land. Traffic is an Eastern DC-4, turning final ahea

and below you.” Bridoux did not acknowledge the messag

and did not turn as directed. Tigner then called, “Bolivia

927, turn left, turn left. You are No. 2 to land, followir

an Eastern DC-4 turning final ahead and below you

Bridoux did not ack.owledge or comply.

During these transmissions the DC-4 was on its ba:

leg turning into final approach. When Tigner saw tl

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

7a

P-38 was not complying with his instructions, he called

the DC-4 and said, “Eastern 527, make an immediate

left turn. Traffic is P-38 above and behind you.” The

DC-4, which had gone only about a quarter of a mile on

final approach, responded with a surge of power into

a left turn. As it did so, the Bolivian plaue struck i:

Bridoux testified that a minute after his take-off le

began to have engine trouble. He reported that fact to

the tower and requested landing instructions. Receiving

no answer, he repeated his request and the tower said,

“Land 2 on Runway 3,” which he understood to mean there

was another plane ahead of him behind which he was

to land. He testified he also understood this message to

constitute a clearance to land rather than merely clear-

ance to enter the traffic pattern.

When he was about two miles west of the airport

descending at a rate of 500 to 600 feet a minute, F vidoux

said he saw a plane making a final approach for a landing

either on runway 36 or 3, which was either a Beechcraft

C-45 or a Lockheed C-60. He said, “* * * I realized

that that was the reason I was No. 2 to land.” He con-

tinued flying south until he was about five or six miles

south of the field and then made a 90-degree left turn.

As he did so, he observed the Lockheed or Beecheraft on

the ground taxiing toward the buildings. He had not

seen it actually land.

Having been told by the tower he was No. 2 to land on

runway 3 and having seen, as he thought, that the plane

which was No. 1 to land on that runway had already done

so and had taxied away, Bridoux concluded it was unneces-

sary for him to check with the tower to learn wheth.

the plane ahead of him had landed. We reproduce in the

7

8a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

margin‘ his testimony that he regarded the tower’s state-

ment, “You are No. 2 to land on runway 3,” as absolute

clearance to land after he had decided for himself, without

further communication with or from the tower, that the

No. 1 plane was out of the way.

After seeing the Lockheed or Beechcraft taxiing from

runway 3, Bridoux flew on for about one and one-quarter

miles and made another 90-degree left turn to proceed

on final approach, after which he headed north flying

at 150 m. p. h. and at an altitude of about 1,200 feet. He

said he then called the tower, advising he was on final

approach and that the tower responded, saying, “Bolivian

P-38, prepare to land on runway 3,” and gave him the

wind direction; and that he acknowledged the instruction.

He then put his flaps down, reduced his speed to about

130 m. p. h., and began an § turn to line up with runway 3.

As he did so he heard over the radio, “Clear to the left,

clear to the left,’ but thought the instruction was for

somebody on the ground. He did not turn to the left or

4‘*Q. As a matter of fact, at that point you not only accepted

that clearance which you told us was given, but you made another |

complete 360-degree turn around the airport; and then after you ©

had done that, you started downwind leg five or six miles. A.

Because I was No. 2 to land, sir.

‘““Q. You at no time, Captain, asked the identity of the plane

that was ahead of you, did you, Captain? A. No, sir.

‘*Q. And you had no way of knowing, based upon information

from the tower, that that plane was ahead of you, did you,

Captain? A. Unless I see.

‘“*Q. And you didn’t see it. A. I saw it on final approach, the

C-45 or C-60.

‘“Q. What you are telling us is after getting that clearance,

you assumed the plane you saw was the one they meant was ahead

of you? A. Yes, sir.

‘*Q. But you didn’t check with the tower to see if that was the

plane? A. Why have I got to check, if I am seeing?

‘‘Q. I am not asking you why. I am simply asking you if it

isn’t a fact that you didn’t check back with the tower to see if

9a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

take any other action, but continued on his course and

the collision occurred two or three seconds later.

The visibility from the P-38 was structurally limited so

that Bridoux could not see ahead of him except at a

considerable distance. He was flying entirely by time,

computing the distance covered by multiplying his speed

per minute by the number of minutes traveled. He said

that at an altitude of 1,200 feet and four and a half miles

from the airport he could see nothing ahead and below

for a distance of two and one-half miles. It is also ob-

served that Bridoux said that as he descended the nose

of his plane was not more than ten degrees under hori-

zontal, and that he was accomplishing the descent by

reducing his speed. Thus there was not enough nose

declination to increase appreciably the extent of visibility

immediately in front of and below the P-38. Bridoux did

not see the Eastern DC-4 at any time.

that plane you saw was the one ahead of you. A. It isn’t neces-

sary, because I was seeing the airplane.

‘**Q. Would you please answer yes or no to my question? You

didn’t check back with the tower to see if that plane you told us

you noticed on final approach was the one ahead of you, did you?

A. When I was on final approach, I called the tower.

“*Q. Captain, I am asking you, sir, if after you saw that plane,

which you said seemed to be lined up for landing, which seemed

to be on approach for landing on runway 38, did you at any time

thereafter ask the tower if that was the plane that had been ahead

of you? A. No, I didn’t ask. It wasn’t necessary to.

“*Q. You did not ask the tower— A. Because it wasn’t neces-

sary. I was seeing the airplane. I was watching it.

““Q. What you mean is you saw a plane. A. Yes, sir.

**Q. You have no way of knowing whether that one was the

one the tower was referring to, or some other plane, have you,

Captain? A. There was a way, because he was on final approach.

If he didn’t land yet, I understand he is No. 1.

““Q. Isn't it a fact that from that point on there was a lapse

of four or five minutes before you came in, on your own final

approach? <A. More or less.

“*Q. And you never contacted the tower to find out where the

7

be]

10a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

II

With the foregoing background, we turn to Eastern’s

contention that the court erred in admitting as evidence

the approach and landing pattern offered as an exhibit

by the appellees; and in instructing the jury it was a

binding Federal regulation, a breach of which would con-

stitute negligence per se.

With respect to the traffic pattern, the court charged

the jury as follows:

«* * * [T]his pattern in a general sense provided

that an aircraft arriving from the north and desiring

to land at the Washington National Airport on Run-

way 3 would proceed from north to west, in the gen-

eral vicinity of the Pentagon, and then proceed from

that direction south, on * * * its downwind leg, and

continue in that southerly direction south in the di-

rection of the George Washington Memorial Temple

and south of the city of Alexandria; then turning due

plane that was No. 1 was, did you? A. I called on final approach,

advising them I was on final, and they could tell me anything

at that time, in order to realize that.

‘*Q. That was after you had lined up for runway 3, wasn’t it?

A. No, sir.

**Q. You said you were on final approach. A. On final; but

the final is not just the straight line. The final is after the turn

from base leg.

**Q. Did you ask the tower for any permission before you lined

up for final approach? A. No.

“Mr. Bress: He hadn’t said he lined up for final approach.

‘The Witness: I called to the tower, after the turn from

base and I began the final approach.

“*By Mr. Galiher:

**Q. And you didn’t ask the tower for permission before you

began the final approach, did you? A. I didn’t have to ask the

tower for permission, after I had been cleared for landing, sir.

“*Q. You hadn’t been cleared to land at that point, had you,

lla

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1995

east on what is called the base leg, and ultimately

what is called the final approach, a north or northeast

heading.

“* * * This is the prescribed pattern. But you are

instructed as a matter of law that there is nothing

rigid about it. It must be conformed to in a general

way. In other words, the pattern is not a line drawn

over the ground which must be followed by the air-

plane in question. It is just exactly as the word

itself indicates, a pattern which must be followed, but

not with the rigidity and the inflexibility of a line

from one point to another. Indeed, the very purpose

of flight traffic patterns is to control traffic, and at

an uncontrolled airport it must be followed; but at

a controlled airport, such as Washington, the con-

troller has the final say; and you are so instructed.

“However, the unauthorized stepping out of the

Captain? A. I had been cleared for landing, and the first call

from the tower cleared me for landing.

‘**Q. You mean when you were told you were No. 2 to land

on runway 3? A. Yes.

**Q. And that is the only clearance you have had up to this

point? A. I know I was the second.

**Q. And that was issued upon the final approach? A. No; it

was before the final approach.

**Q. Whether it was after or before you had begun the final

approach, you had begun the final approach before you got any

landing clearance from the tower. A. No, sir. The first call from

the tower was when I was cleared for landing.

““Q. For what? A. They cleared me for landing.

““Q. For landing No. 2% A. Yes, sir.

**Q. Did you tell us that being cleared for landing No. 2 is a

landing clearance, a final landing clearance? A. If they mention

that word, it is.

“*Q. You say it was a final landing clearance, the clearance that

told you you were cleared to land on runway 3, behind another

plane, or No. 2, as I think you used it? A. No. 2. That was all.

*“*Q. No. 2. You have no way of knowing whether that plane

you told us you saw when you were on downwind leg was the

12a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

pattern, leaving the pattern, departing from it—and

note my language—the unauthorized stepping out of

the pattern, leaving the pattern, departing from it,

would be a violation of law, because the pattern is

prescribed by rule which has the force and effect of

law. And so, therefore, unauthorized action of the

character I have just referred to would be negligence,

as I have defined that term to you, and would be,

as we lawyers say, negligence per se, in other words,

would be negligence as a result of the very act itself

and no further proof would be necessary. This is

the negligence, in this aspect of the case, which the

plaintiff alleges against Eastern. * * *”

plane you later saw on the landing strip or not, do you? A. I

saw the craft, and I assumed it was the No. 1, sir.

**Q. That plane you told us you saw as you were on downwind

leg, west of the tower— A. Before.

‘*Q. Then you told us when you got down south, when you

were turning on base leg, you noticed a plane that was landing

or had landed—I think you used the expression— A. Yes.

‘*Q. —on the landing strip. <A. Yes.

**Q. It was actually on the ground? A. Yes, sir.

‘*@. You had no way of knowing from that distance of five

or six miles away, did you, whether that was the same plane you

had previously seen, or some other plane, did you? A. I don’t

know exactly. But I saw more or less the same airplane.

“*Q. And you never tried to contact the tower to inquire

whether or not the plane you had seen on final approach, as you

call it, when you were on downwind leg, was the plane that was

No. 1, did you? A. But how am I going to ask the tower that?

Am I going to say ‘Is the plane I am seeing No. 1%’ How is the

tower going to know what plane I am seeing? There was no

reason of calling back to the tower.

**Q. It would have prevented this accident, wouldn’t it, if you

had called the tower and inquired as to the identity of the plane

ahead of you? A. Except that I happened to observe this plane

on final approach, not any other plane. Therefore I assumed

this was the No. 1. This was the only one on final approach.

‘“*Q. And that is where the trouble came in, because you as-

sumed that was the plane that was ahead of you, isn’t it, Captain?

A. Probably, sir.’’

13a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

In insisting the court erred in admitting the traffic pat-

tern as an exhibit and in instructing the jury that it was

a binding regulation and that an unauthorized deviation

from the pattern would be negligence per se, Eastern

relied on the fact that the traffic pattern had not been

published in the Federal Register and cited Hotch v.

United States, 9 Cir., 1953, 208 F. 2d 244, 250, as authority

that it was therefore not a binding regulation. The pat-

tern had been officially prescribed, however, and Eastern

had actual knowledge of it. In those circumstances we

think the pilots of the DC-4 were required to follow the

pattern and, since it is obviously a safety measure to

some extent, the court correctly charged the jury that an

unauthorized departure from it was negligence per se.

It is undisputed that the Eastern plane did leave the

traffic pattern and circled into it again on final approach

to the runway. Its departure from the pattern was not

negligence if the tower had cleared the plane to land.

Conceiving that an issue of fact had been developed as

to whether the DC-4 had been cleared to land, the trial

judge submitted that question to the jury and authorized

it to return a verdict against Eastern if it should deter-

mine landing clearance had not been given,—that the

Eastern plane had not been authorized by the tower to

leave the traffic pattern as it did.

Whether this was error, as Eastern contends, depends

on whether there was substantial evidence showing the

DC+4 had not been cleared to land. On this charge of

negligence against Eastern, as on all others, the burden

of proof lay on the appellees. As substantial evidence

sustaining the burden and showing the DC-4 had not been

cleared to land when it deviated from the pattern, they

rely upon (a) their contention that the Eastern plane was

late and, in order to make up time, short-cut the pattern

Without authority; (b) the testimony of Captain Ator;

l4a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

and (c) the testimony of Lt. Shaw. We consider those

points in the order named.

(a) Even if it be conceded that the Eastern plane was

late, it by no means follows that its pilots attempted an

unauthorized landing to make up time. The point is with-

out substantial weight as evidence of lack of landing clear-

ance to the DC-4.

(b) Appellees further argue that, if Eastern was given

any clearance, it was to land after the P-38; and in sup-

port of the suggestion they point to the testimony of

Captain M. D. Ator, the check pilot of American Flight

No. 1, which at the time of the crash was at the south

end of runway 3 waiting to take off. Ator said his plane

was informed by the tower ground control that it could

take off after an eastern DC-4 had landed. On the basis

of this evidence, appellees argue as follows:

«“* * * According to Tigner, he cleared Eastern to

land first and the P-38 to follow Eastern. But if

Ator was to take off after Eastern landed, he would

have conflicted with the P-38. Thus the Ator testi-

mony indicates that if Eastern was cleared, it was to

land after the P-38.”

The argument rests on a false premise. Tigner did

not testify that he cleared the P-38 to land. He testified

that he told the P-38 it was “No. 2 to land on runway 3.”

This did not authorize it to leave the traffic pattern

and descend. That it was No. 2 to land does not mean

that Ator could not take off before it was cleared to land

and after Eastern landed. In any event this testimony

of Ator is insufficient to furnish a basis for a finding that

if Eastern was cleared to land it was to be after the

P-38.

—

15a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

(c) Lt. Meredith D. Shaw, co-pilot, was flying a Na-

tional Airlines DC-4 en route from New York to Wash-

ington on the morning of November 1, 1949. The pilot,

Captain Porter, was handling the radio. Shaw testified

that when he was over Beltsville, Maryland, he heard the

Eastern plane report by radio to the tower, giving its

position and trip number; and heard the tower clear

it to enter the left traflic pattern for runway 3. Immedi-

ately afterward, at approximately 11:42 or 11:43 a. m., he

said his own plane was also cleared to enter the left

traffic pattern for runway 3, but was told to check again

with the tower when over Hains Point. He reached Hains

Point at 11:45 or 11:46, and at that time heard another

radio communication which said, “Eastern, traffic, a P-38,”

with a direction added which he did not remember. Shaw

testified he did not at any time hear any clearance to

Eastern to land, although he had earphones on continu-

ously> and was on tower frequency, just as Eastern was.

To the contrary, Tigner testified positively that he

cleared the DC-4 to land, after which it swung from the

pattern in a wide turn to approach runway 3. He ad-

hered to that statement despite vigorous cross-examina-

tion. Tigner further said the Eastern DC—4 followed his

instructions throughout the entire flight. The first notice

to Eastern that the P-38 was in the air was a few seconds

before the impact when the tower said, “Eastern 537,

make an immediate left turn. Traffic is P-38 above and

behind you.” Instantly responding to this direction, the

engines of the DC-4 roared and the plane began a left

turn but was struck before it could escape.

Thus the question is whether Shaw's negative testimony

that he heard no landing clearance given Eastern had

5 He qualified this statement somewhat by saving that, from the

time he was over Beltsville until his plane landed, ‘‘to the best

of my recollection I never took off the headset.’’

l6a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

-enough probative value, as against Tigner’s affirmative

statement that he gave the clearance, to form an issue of

fact for the jury.

It is generally held in railroad crossing cases that nega-

tive testimony of a witness that he did not hear a warning

signal from a locomotive is sufficient to form an issue of

fact, in the face of affirmative evidence that the warning

was sounded, provided the witness was in a position to

hear, and provided his attention was not distracted. A

different situation is presented, however, when the wit-

ness is shown not to have been in a position to hear

or appears to have been inattentive. The testimony of

such a witness that he did not hear the warning signal

has little or no probative force. Small v. Pennsylvania

R. Co., 1935, 65 App. D. C. 112, 80 F. 2d 704; Strider v.

Pennsylvania R. Co., 6 Cir., 1932, 60 F. 2d 2387; V enchik

v. Pennsylvainia R. Co., 1941, 143 Pa. Super. 465, 18 A.

94 118; Lanier v. Missouri P. R. Co., 1929, 9 La. App.

586, 119 So. 710; Zotter v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 1924,

280 Pa. 14, 124 A. 284; Jensen v. Oregon Short Line R.

Co., 1922, 59 Utah 367, 204 P. 101; Rickert v. Union fe A

Co., 1916, 100 Neb. 304, 160 N. W. 86; Young v. Erie R.

Co., 1913, 158 App. Div. 14, 143 N Y. S. 176; Jordan v.

Osborne, 1911, 147 Wis. 623, 133 N. W. 32; Hubbard v.

Boston & A. R. Co., 1893, 159 Mass. 320, 34 N. E. 459.

Under the rule just stated Shaw’s negative testimony was

insufficient to form an issue if he either (a) was not in a

position during all the crucial nine-minute period to hear

messages sent from the tower to the Eastern plane 36 or

(b) appears not to have been attentive to all tower broad-

casts during that period.

It is an unquestioned and unquestionable fact that Shaw

was not in a position to hear messages from the tower

6 The period from 11:38 a. m., when Eastern was cleared into

the pattern, until 11 :46-11:47 a. m., when the crashed occurred.

;

17a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

during all the critical nine-minute period. He testified

that, when the radio switch button was depressed for

transmission from his plane, incoming messages on that

frequency could not be heard by him or Captain Porter.

Consequently, whenever the latter called the tower during

the nine-minute period, or depressed the switch button

for that purpose, it was impossibe for him or Shaw to

hear a message broadcast from the tower to Eastern.

Captain Porter did not turn his radio selector to the

tower until approximately 11:42 or 11:43. It follows that

Shaw’s plane was on tower frequency only during the last

four or five minutes of the critical nine-minute period.

The evidence is not clear as to when and how often during

that brief period Porter depressed the switch button to

call the tower and so shut off Shaw’s ability to hear a

message from the tower to Eastern.

In this connection it is to be noted that Shaw could

not have heard the tower clearing Eastern to enter the

left traffic pattern, which he said he heard at approxi-

mately 11:42 or 11:43 while he was over Beltsville. This

is so because the parties agreed and stipulated that

Kastern received traffic pattern clearance at 11:38 a. m.—

the exact time at which Shaw unequivocally said he was

over the Baltimore relay about 15 miles northwardly from

Beltsville,?7 with his radio not yet tuned to the tower. It

is therefore clear that Shaw did not hear—as he said and

7 He was positive of that time and said the times of all other

incidents thereafter to which he testified were fixed by him through

arithmetical computations based on his presence at the Baltimore

relay at 11:38 a. m.

He described the Baltimore relay as ‘‘a radio fixing where two

beams meet * * * when you get a solid hum.”’ which is approxi-

mately 15 miles northwardly from the Beltsville fan marker. The

latter is a 75-megacycle transmitter just slightly northeast of

Beltsville, Maryland. It makes a fan-shaped transmission into

the air, by which planes are informed ihey are at Beltsville.

Se ew ®

18a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

no doubt thought he did—the tower clear Eastern to enter

the traffic pattern.

What, then, cid Shaw hear at approximately 11:42 or

11:43 a. m.? Tigner testified that at approximately 11:44

a. m. he cleared Eastern to land. Since both Shaw and

Tigner were approximating the time, it may well have

been that Shaw heard the landing clearance given at

that time and inadvertently mistook it for traffic pattern

clearance.8 As we have said, it is certain he did not hear

Fastern’s clearance for the pattern. It follows that Shaw’s

statement that he heard no landing clearance to Eastern

is unconvincing.

Moreover, Shaw’s general situation was not conducive

to careful attention, as he was operating the controls of

his plane as it came over Beltsville to Hains Point and

to the airport. The pilot, Captain Porter, was therefore

primarily responsible for radio communications during

that time. Shaw was handling the controls of a huge

airplane and knew his colleague was charged with the

duty of sending and receiving radio messages. We cannot

attribute to him undivided attention to tower broadcasts

to other planes, although he may have had earphones

on. This is not to say he could not hear the communica-

tions he said he heard; but that he was not in the favorable

attitude of one whose negative testimony is for that

reason held to make an issue of fact.®

8 We observe that in a statement given March 4, 1950, to an

investigator of the CAB in Miami, Florida, Shaw said he ‘*heard

the tower giving Eastern landing clearance.’’ To be sure, he

testified that in making the statement he had misused the term

‘landing clearance.’’ But whether he in fact misused the term

‘landing clearance’ in describing the clearance he heard, is

open to serious question because, as we have shown, he could not

have heard the actual traffic pattern clearance which was given

earlier to Eastern.

9 Captain Porter did not testify.

19a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

As to whether his testimony shows he listened carefully

to the messages sent to Eastern by the tower—an illus-

tration will be indicative: After testifying that at 11:45

or 11:46 he heard the tower say, “Eastern, traffic, a P-38,”

Shaw said, “And at that point he gave them a direction;

but the direction didn’t register.” (By “direction” he

said he meant the position of the P-38.) The direction of

the Bolivian plane given to Eastern by the tower “doesn’t

stick in my mind,” he said, although he remembered that a

direction was given. The full message was stated thus

by Tigner, who sent it: “Eastern 537, make an immediate

left turn. Traffic is P-38 above and behind you.” (Tigner

is corroborated by other tower operators and also by

undisputed evidence that thereupon Eastern began an

immediate left turn.) So, Shaw’s possible inattention is

shown by the fact he heard only part of the message, and

remembered only part of what he heard.

All these considerations show the inadequacy of Shaw’s

negative testimony ; that his claimed failure to hear Tigner

clear Eastern to land was due to the depression of the

switch which cut off radio reception, or due either to

inattention or misinterpretation, and was not enough to

raise an issue of fact for the jury as to whether the DC-4

had left the traffie pattern without tower authority to

do so.

The negative testimony is weakened further by the

fact that, because of the human instinct of self-preserva-

tion and the disposition of men to avoid personal harm,

Kastern’s dead pilots are presumed to have acted with

diligence and due care. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v.

Toops, 1930, 281 U. 8. 351, 356, 50 S. Ct. 281, 74 L. Bad.

896; Looney v. Metropolitan R. Co., 1906, 200 U. S. 480,

488, 26 S. Ct. 3038, 50 L. Ed. 564; Campbell v. District of

Columbia, 1935, 64 App. D. C. 375, 78 F. 2d 725; Baltimore

€ P. R. Co, v. Carrington, 1894, 3 App. D. C. 101; Bratt

20a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

v. Western Air Lines, 10 Cir., 1948, 169 F. 2d 214, 216;

Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Spike, 8 Cir., 1903, 121 F. 44, 47.

It has been said the presumption “rises to the dignity of

evidence.” United States v. Fotopulos, 9 Cir., 1950, 180

F.. 2d 631, 637.

As we said in Universal Airline, Inc. v. Eastern Air

Lines, Inc., 1951, 88 U. S. App. D. C. 219, 188 F. 2d 993,

it is not for us to substitute our views for those of the

trier of fact in the District Court when there is conflicting

evidence. But here, as in that case, the evidence con-

cerning the crucial fact is without substantial conflict.

Affirmative testiruony that the Eastern plane was cleared

to land was not countered by evidence sufficient to form

a factual issue; hence the appellees failed to carry their

burden of showing the contrary by a preponderance of the

proof. The intervention of the jury is required only

where some question of fact is actually in controversy.

Oscanyan v. Arms Ce., 1880, 103 U. S. 261, 266, 26 L. Ed.

539.

While there were other charges of negligence against

Eastern which were submitted to the jury, certainly the

principal accusation was that it attempted to land with-

out having been cleared by the tower to do so. Since the

trial court simply asked the jury, “Is Eastern Air Lines

liable?” and the jury simply answered, “Yes,” we do not

know in what way its members considered Eastern had

been negligent; but we do know the jury was authorized

by the court to find against the Air Lines if it should con-

clude the DC-4 had not received landing clearance. We

are therefore forced to hold the trial court erred in sub-

mitting to the jury the question whether the Eastern

plane unauthorizedly deviated from the traffic pattern.

Having so held, we think it unnecessary to discuss the

other grounds for reversal advanced by Eastern Air

Lines. The judgments against it will be reversed, and

the cases will be remanded for a new trial.

2la

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

Ill

The principal question presented by the Government’s

appeal is whether the United States has consented to be

sued for negligence of its control tower employees in

regulating air traffic at a public airport. In answering

the question, we must construe the Federal Tort Claims

Act which limits the liability of the United States to

that which a “private individual” would have “under like

circumstances,” and excludes claims arising from the

performance of a discretionary function or duty.1!

1028 U. S. C. §1346(b) and § 2674 are as follows:

§1346(b). ‘Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of

this title, the district courts * * * shall have exclusive jurisdic-

tion of civil actions on claims against the United States, for

money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for

injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused

by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee

of the Government while acting within the scope of his office

or employment, under circumstances where the United States,

if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accord-

ance with the law of the place where the act or omission

occurred.”’

§ 2674. ‘The United States shall be liable, respecting the

provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same

manner and to the same extent as a private individual under

like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior

to judgment or for punitive damages.

“If, however, in any case wherein death was caused, the

law of the place where the act or omission complained of

occurred provides, or has been construed to provide, for

damages only punitive in nature, the United States shall be

liable for actual or compensatory damages, measured by the

pecuniary injuries resulting from such death to the persons

respectively, for whose benefit the action was brought, in lieu

thereof. June 25, 1948, ¢. 646, §1, 62 Stat. 983.”

11The pertinent portion of 28 U. S. C. § 2680 is as follows:

‘“‘The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of

this title shall not apply to—

““(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an em-

ployee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execu-

22a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

The Government insists that its tower operators per-

form governmental functions of a regulatory nature; that

no private individual has such power of regulation; that

therefore the Act does not permit suit based on negligent

performance of their duties. The situation involved here,

says the Government, when viewed in all the circum-

stances, “cannot be equated to one which would predicate

analogous private liability,” and so it is said the claims

are excluded from the coverage of the Tort Claims Act.

The history of the development of the control tower

is helpful in considering whether there is or may be

private liability analogous to that sought to be imposed

upon the United States in this case. What is said to

be the forerunner of the present control tower was con-

structed in 1931 at an airport in Cleveland, Ohio. During

the following five years 20 other cities erected and operated

towers, and by 1939 there were 52 towers being operated

by municipalities.

Regulations promulgated under the Civil Aeronautics

Act of 1938 provided for the issuance of certificates of

competence to tower operators; and standard procedures,

equipment, installations and tower operating techniques

were suggested, but were not required to be adopted.

November 1, 1941, the CAA issued a Manual of Opera-

tions setting forth Standard Airport Traffic Control Pro-

cedures, and shortly thereafter all certificated tower

operators were required to apply them.

In August, 1941, Congress appropriated funds to enable

CAA to maintain and operate a number of towers.

Through gradual increase in funds available, the CAA

tion of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or

regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or perform-

ance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary

function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an

employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion

involved be abused.’’

23a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

was operating 165 of the country’s 200 towers on Novem-

ber 1, 1949, the date of the accident involved here. As

late as April, 1954, there were stil! a number of towers

in operation which had not been taken over by CAA

personnel. The operators in those non-Government towers

must be certificated by CAA before they may control

civil aircraft in air commerce.!2, Such towers are subject

to CAA inspection;!#3 and the Administrator of Civil

Aeronautics has prescribed procedures and techniques

which must be followed by the towermen. Nevertheless,

these non-CAA controllers are not government employees,

and perform no governmental function.

Airports are usually constructed, maintained and oper-

ated by municipalities, probably because the cost of con-

struction is great and the prospect of financial reward

does not attract private capital. But, as far as we know,

as of November 1, 1949, there was no reason why a private

individual or a private corporation could not construct an

airport and operate a control tower manned by its own

operators certificated by the CAA. Such an individual or

corporation would of course be liable for the negligence

1249 U. S. C. A. §401(6) includes within its definition of an

airman ‘‘any individual who serves in the capacity of * * * ai--

traffic control-tower operator.’’ And 49 U. S. C. A. §560(a) (2)

prohibits any person from serving as an airman in any capacity

without an appropriate certificate to so serve. To be eligible for

a control tower operator certificate an applicant must meet physi-

eal, experience and other qualifications and must pass an examina-

~e on the subject of air traffic control. 14 Code Fed. Regs.

art 26.

1349 U. S. C. A. § 556 is as follows:

‘“‘The Administrator of Civil Aeronautics is empowered to

inspect, classify, and rate any air navigation facility available

for the use of civil aircraft of the United States, as to its

suitability for such use. The Administrator of Civil Aero-

nautics is empowered to issue a certificate for any such air

navigation facility.’’

24a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

of privately employed tower operators. It follows that,

when the United States entered the business of operating

a civil airport and an air traffic control tower in connec-

tion therewith, it assumed a role which might be and was

assumed by private interests. Hence, under 28 U. S. C.

§§ 1346(b) and 2674, the Government is liable for the

negligent acts or omissions of its control tower operators

in the performance of their functions and duties, unless

those Code provisions do not apply because the operators’

activities are of the sort described in the exceptions sub-

section, § 2680(a).

The United States insists that the subsection applies,

and shields it from liability here. It argues that

§ 2680(a)

«“* * * incorporates into the Act the historic prin-

ciple that the courts will not, in a private action,

revise or review executive conduct involving the

exercise of judgment or discretion of a public char-

acter”;

that the tower operators’ duties are public in nature and

involve the exercise of discretion and judgment, with the

result that neither the operators nor the United States can

be held liable for their negligent performance.

The principle referred to is indeed historic, as it was

stated in Marbury v. Madison, 1803, 1 Cranch 137, 169-

170, 5 U. S. 137, 169-170, 2 L. Ed. 60, and has since been

consistently adhered to. We have no doubt that the

principle was consciously restated by Congress when it

declared in § 2680(a) that the United States should not

be liable on

“Any claim * * * based upon the exercise or per-

formance or the failure to exercise or perform a dis-

cretionary function or duty on the part of a federal

—

:

25a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

agency or an employee of the Government, whether

or not the discretion involved be abused.”

The heart of the question, however, is whether this case

falls within the historic principle; whether the Govern-

ment is correct in saying, as the second step in its argu-

ment, “that the tower operators’ duties are public in

nature and involve the exercise of discretion and judg-

ment.” We think the statement is incorrect, for the rea-

sons hereinafter given. We hold that the tower operators

merely handle operational details which are outside the

area of the discretionary functions and duties referred

to in 4 2680(a); and that, consequently, the Tort Claims

Act permits the Government to be sued for damages sus-

tained because of their negligence.

Applicable authority is available to sustain our view,

as comparable questions have been considered by other

courts. Costley v. United States, 5 Cir., 1950, 181 F. 2d

723, involved the question whether the Tort Claims Act

permitted the Government to be sued for the negligence

of its employees in an army hospital. A master sergeant’s

wife was admitted to the maternity section. As an inci-

dent to delivering her child, employees of the United

States prepared and injected into her body a drug which

yas intended to be a spinal anaesthetic but in fact was

a very harmful substance which caused the woman to be

permanently paralyzed from the waist down.

The question on appeal from the District Court’s dis-

missal was whether the employees were under a duty to

use due skill and reasonable care in attending Mrs. Cost-

ley after having admitted her to the hospital under an

army regulation authorizing her admission, or whether

they were performing a discretionary duty or function

which, under § 2680(a), cannot be made the basis of a

tort claim against the Government. The Court of Ap-

26a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

peals quoted the army regulation that wives of soldiers

may be admitted to army hospitals when suitable facilities

for hospitalization are available, and then said, 181 F. 2d

at page 725:

“With facilities available for her care, Mrs. Costley

was admitted to the hospital pursuant to the above

regulation. Having decided that there were facilities

available, and having admitted her for treatment, the

hospital authorities no longer had any discretion to

exercise with regard to whether she was to receive

careful or negligent treatment. A duty arose at this

point to treat her with the same care, skill, diligence,

and ability, that would be owing by a private person

or corporation under the same or similar circum-

stances.”

In accord are Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 4

Cir., 1951, 193 F. 2d 631, and United States v. Gray, 10

Cir., 1952, 199 F. 2d 239. Judge Dobie’s Somerset opinion

sufficiently distinguishes Feres v. United States, 1950, 340

U. S. 135, 71 S. Ct. 153, 95 L. Ed. 152, by saying, 193 F. 2d

at page 634:

«* * * All that case really decided was the ‘Govern-

ment is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act

for injuries to servicemen where the injuries (arose)

out of or are in the course of activity incident to

service.’ ”

The holding of the Costley, Somerset and Gray cases

was neither overruled nor impaired by the later decision

of the Supreme Court in Dalehite v. United States, 1953,

346 U. S. 15, 73 S. Ct. 956, 97 L. Ed. 1427.14 That was a

14 The Government says the Somerset Seafood Co. case was over-

ruled by the Dalehite opinion. We think not; our analysis of that

opinion convinces us to the contrary.

—

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

27a

test case representing some 300 separate personal and

property claims aggregating $200,000,000 which were based

on explosions of fertilizer with an ammonium nitrate base,

at Texas City, Texas, in 1947. Suing under the Tort

Claims Act, the plaintiffs claimed negligence substantially

on the part of the entire body of federal officials and em-

ployees involved in a program of production of the mate-

rial—Fertilizer Grade Ammonium Nitrate (FGAN)—in

which the original fire occured and which exploded. This

fertilizer had been produced and distributed at the in-

stance, according to the specifications, and under the con-

trol of the United States.

The question before the Court was whether the acts

and omissions alleged as negligence were done or omitted

in th performance of or failure to perform a discretion-

ary function or duty within the meaning of § 2680(a).

The Court said, 346 U. S. at page 34, 73 S. Ct. at page

697 :

«“* * * The ‘discretion’ protected by the section

* * * is the discretion of the executive or the admin-

istrator to act according to one’s judgment of the

best course, a concept of substantial historical an-

cestry in American law.”

The statement just quoted was supported in 73 S. Ct. at

page 967, by footnote 30, which is as follows:

“It seems sufficient to cite Marbury v. Madison, 1

Cranch 137, 170, 2 L. Ed. 60; Spalding v. Vilas, 161

U. S. 483, 498, 16 S. Ct. 631, 637, 40 L. Ed. 780; Alzna

v. Johnson, 231 U. S. 106, 34 S. Ct. 27, 58 L. Ed. 142;

15 This is the ‘‘historie principle,’’ referred to in the Govern-

ment’s brief, about which there can be no dispute. But, as we

have said, the real question here is whether tower activities fall

within the principle.

¥y

6

:

28a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

State of Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U. 8. 627, 663, 34

S. Ct. 938, 940, 58 L. Ed. 1506; Perkins v. Lukens

Steel Co., 310 U. S. 113, 131, 60 S. Ct. 869, 878, 84

L. Ed. 1108.”

The Court went on to say, 346 U. S. at pages 35 and 36,

73 S. Ct. at page 968:

“It is unnecessary to define, apart from this case,

precisely where discretion ends. It is enough to

hold, as we do, that the ‘discretionary function or

duty’ that cannot form a basis for suit under the

Tort Claims Act includes more than the initiation of

programs and activities. It also includes determina-

tions made by executives or administrators in estab-

lishing plans, specifications or schedules of opera-

tions. Where there is room for policy judgment and

decision there is discretion. * * *”

It was then pointed out that the Cabinet-level decision to

institute the fertilizer export program was a discretionary —

act; that the basic “Plan” for the production of FGAN |

was drafted by the Office of the Field Director of Am-

munition Plants in June 1946, prior to beginning pro-

duction. It was further stated that each of the specific

acts of negligence charged in the manufacture of FGAN

was in accordance with and done under specifications and

directions set forth in the basic Plan for the production

of fertilizer. Each of the acts looked upon as negligence

was directed by this Plan. The Court concluded as fol-

lows, 346 U. S. at page 42, 73'S. Ct. at page 971:

“In short, the alleged ‘negligence’ does not sub-

ject the Government to liability. The decisions held

culpable were all responsibly made at a planning

rather than operational level and involved considera-

29a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

tions more or less important to the practicability of

the Government’s fertilizer program.”

We may fairly infer from the statement just quoted

that the United States is liable for the negligence of its

employees at the operational level, where there is no

“room for policy judgment and decision.” This leads us

to the Government’s argument that the negligence charged

against the tower operators is the same as that charged

against th Coast Guard in the Dalehite case, which the

Supreme Court held was not actionable because of the

discretionary exception. We quote in the margin the

Supreme Court’s disposition of the alleged negligence of

the Coast Guard.!6

16 346 U. S. at pages 42-43 and 44, 73 S. Ct. at pages 971-972:

‘*The findings of negligence on the part of the Coast Guard

in failing to supervise the storage of the FGAN, and in fight-

ing the fire after it started, were rejected by a majority of

the Court of Appeals. [Dalehite v. United States, 5 Cir.]

197 F. 2d at 777, 780, 781. We do not enter into an examina-

tion of these factual findings. We prefer, again, to rest

our decision on the Act.

*‘The District Court’s holding that the Coast Guard and

other agencies were negligent in failing to prevent the fire by

regulating storage or loading of the fertilizer in some different

fashion is like his specifie citations of negligence discussed

above. They are classically within the exception. ‘The power

to adopt regulations or by-laws * * * for the preservation

of the public health, or to pass ordinances preseribing and

regulating the duties of policemen and firemen * * * are

generally regarded as discretionary, because, in their nature,

they are legislative.’ Weightman v. Corporation of Washing-

ton, 1 Black 39, 49, 17 L. Ed. 52. The courts have tradi-

tionally refused to question the judgments on which they are

based. Zywicki v. Jos. R. Foard Co., D. C., 206 F. 975;

Gutowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 127 Md. 502, 96 A. 630;

State of Maryland to use of Goralski v. General Stevedoring

Co., D. C., 213 F. 51.

‘* As to the alleged failure in fighting the fire, we think this

a

30a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

The Court made it clear that, as far as the alleged

official dereliction of duty in failing to police the ship-

board loading was concerned, the decision not to do so

had been made at a policy-forming level and was not the

decision of the individual members of the Coast Guard

whose duty it would have been to do the policing had

they been instructed to do it. The Court said:

«“* * © To impose liability for the alleged nonfeas-

ance of the Coast Guard would be like holding the

United States liable in tort for failure to impose a

quarantine for, let us say, an outbreak of foot-and-

mouth disease.”

We may paraphrase the quoted sentence thus:

“To impose liability for the alleged nonfeasance of

the Coast Guard would be like holding the United

States liable in tort for the failure of the CAA to

take over for maintenance and operation a certain air

traffic control tower.”

Had the Coast Guard authorities decided to supervise the

storage, we have no doubt the United States would have

too without the Act. The Act did not create new causes

of action where none existed before.

‘««@ # ® the liability assumed by the Government here is

that created by ‘‘all the circumstances,’’ not that which a

few of the circumstances might create. We find no parallel

liability before, and we think no new one has been created

by, this Act. Its effect is to waive immunity from recognized

causes of action and was not to visit the Government with

novel and unprecedented liabilities.’ Feres v. United States,

340 U. S. 135, 142, 71 S. Ct. 153, 157, 95 L. Ed. 152.

‘*It did not change the normal rule that an alleged failure

or carelessness of public firemen does not create private ac-

tionable rights. * * * To impose liability for the alleged non-

feasance of the Coast Guard would be like holding the United

States liable in tort for failure to impose a quarantine for,

let us say, an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease.’’

3la

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

been liable in tort for any causal negligence of its per-

sonnel acting at the operational level. So it is here:

discretion was exercised when it was decided to operate

the tower, but the tower personnel had no discretion to

operate it negligently.

The distinction between non-actionable planning and

actionable negligence in carrying out the plan, was clearly

stated by the Supreme Court in Johnston v. District of

Columbia, 1886, 118 U. S. 19, 6 S. Ct. 923, 30 L. Ed. 75.

Johnston’s property was damaged when a sewer over-

flowed. He sued the District of Columbia, alleging that it

“knowing!y coustructed and continued upon an unreason-

able and defective plan, and of inadequate capacity for its

purpose, and wrongfully permitted [it] to become clogged

up.” The Court said, 118 U. S. at pages 20-21, 6 S. Ct.

at page 924:

“The duties of the municipal authorities, in adopt-

ing a general plan of drainage, and determining

when and where sewers shall be built, of what size

and at what level, are of a quasi judicial nature,

involving the exercise of deliberate judgment and

large discretion, and depending upon considerations

affecting the public health and general convenience

throughout an extensive territory; and the exercise

of such judgment and discretion, in the selection and

adoption of the general plan or system of drainage,

is not subject to revision by a court or jury in a

private action for not sufficiently draining a par-

ticular lot of land. But the construction and repair

of sewers, according to the general plan so adopted,

are simply ministerial duties; and for any negligence

in so constructing a sewer, or keeping it in repair,

the municipality which has constructed and owns

the sewer may be sued by a person whose property

is thereby injured.”

i. en et oo ee i ec So oS a

32a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

With this distinction in mind, we turn to the trial

court’s opinion and find the following statement as to the

nature of the acts and omissions of the tower operators

which were held to constitute negligence :

“* * * As to negligence, I find that there was

failure of the control tower personnel to issue a

timely warning to the Eastern plane as to the P-38

being on final approach; in the failure, also, to warn

the P-38 that Eastern was on final approach; in

clearing both planes for the same runway at ap-

proximately the same time, having in mind their

respective positions in relation to each other and

the speed of both their approach and descent; and

the failure to keep both planes advised as to the

activities of the other; I find this to be negligence

and concurrent both in character and in relation

to that found by the jury with respect to the defend-

ant Eastern. I find, further, that such negligence

contributed proximately to the injury complained of.”

The three negligent omissions and the one affirmative

negligent act found by the court were not “decisions

responsibly made at a planning level” and did not in-

volve any consideration important to the practicability of

the Governnent’s program of controlling air traffic at

public airports. The tower operators acted, and failed

to act, at an operational level. While they were in a

sense exercising discretion as to what they should and

should not do, they were not performing the sort of

discretionary functions contemplated by § 2680(a) and

clearly described in the Dalehite decision.

It is therefore our opinion that, if a Government tower-

man negligently clears two planes to land on the same

runway at the same time, or is guilty of some other

negligent act or omission in doing his work, the Govern-

33a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

ment is liable for resulting injury in the same manner

and for the same reason that it is liable for injury done

by the driver of a mail truck who, in exercising discretion

as to how to drive, negligently runs through a red traffic

light. ,

The Government contends, however, that even though

its theory of non-liability under § 2680(a) be rejected,

the judgments against it should be reversed because the

trial court’s findings do not provide sufficient factual bases

for its ultimate conclusion of negligence. We deem it

unnecessary to do more than quote the pertinent findings

of fact, which expanded the above quotation from the

trial court’s opinion:

“3. At all times in question, there was available

in good operating condition in the control tower at

said airport and in each plane voice radio equipment

for two-way contact between said tower and either

plane or between the tower and both planes simul-

taneously.

“4. For an adequate period of time before the

collision, both planes were visible to the control

tower personnel who observed said planes and knew

that said planes were on converging approaches for

landing on runway 3, and said personnel had an

adequate opportunity to give timely warnings and

instructions to each plane.

“>. At all times in question, weather conditions

at and near the airport were excellent and visibility

unimpeded.

“6. At pll times in question, the Washington Na-

tional Airport and the control tower facilities thereat

were owned by the defendant, United States of Amer-

ica, and were being operated by it through its agents

34a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

and employees (the tower personnel) assigned there-

to by the Civil Aeronautics Administration, an agency

of the United States.

“7. The said agents and employees of the United

States in their operation of the control tower at said

airport failed to exercise reasonable care and were

guilty of negligence in the circumstances in question

in that, having in mind the respective positions of

said planes in relation to each other and their speed

of approach and descent:

“a) they failed to issue a timely warning to the

Eastern plane concerning the P-38 on final approach;

“b) they failed to warn the P-38 that the Eastern

plane was on final approach;

“e) they cleared both planes for the same runway

at approximately the same time; and

“d) they failed to keep both planes advised of the

activities of the other.

“8. The negligence of United States through its

agents and employees, as set out in finding No. 7

above, was a proximate cause of the fatal collision

resulting in the deaths of plaintiffs’ decedents, and

such negligence of the United States also concurred

with the negligence of Eastern as the proximate

cause of said collision.

“9. The collision occurred over the Potomac River

within the boundary of the District of Columbia.”

These findings seem to us to be sufficiently in detail to

justify the conclusion of negligence.

It is observed that the Government does not directly

charge that the evidence is insufficient to support the find-

ings of fact which were made by the trial judge. We have

35a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

considered the question, however, and have concluded

there was proof adequate to support the findings, although

it is meager with respect to the finding that the tower

cleared both planes for the same runway at approximately

the same time—which is probably the most important of

the findings. For, although the trial court was amply

justified in finding (contrary to the jury’s apparent con-

clusion) that the Eastern plane was cleared to land—and

indeed could hardly have found otherwise,—there is only

slight evidence tending to show the Bolivian plane was

ever cleared to land.

Bridoux himself practically conceded his own negligence

of which the jury rather unaccountably exonerated him)

n mistaking the message “You are No. 2 to land” for

ictual and absolute landing clearance. But he did say:

‘I said ‘Washington Tower, Bolivian P-38 on final ap-

roach.” They responded to me immediately, * * * ‘Boli-

‘lan P-38, prepare to land on runway 3” Consequently,

f the trial judge believed, as apparently he did, that

sridoux actually sent such a message and received such

in answer from the tower, there was some evidence that

he tower gave landing clearance to the Bolivian as well

s to the DC-+4. We cannot substitute our judgment on a

actual issue for that of the trial judge simply because

re might have reached a different conclusion.

As to all the foregoing, the court is unanimous. We

re divided, however, as to another contention of the

‘nited States which remains to be considered: that it

‘as error to measure the Government's liability under the

iw of the District of Columbia,!7 which does not limit the

mount of damages for wrongful death, instead of under-

ne law of Virginia, which limits recovery to $15,000 for

17 The trial judge found from conflicting evidence that the

cident oceurred over the Potomae River, which is in the District

f Columbia.

36a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

the death of one person. The contention is based on the

fact, that although the planes collided in the District of

Columbia, the negligent acts and omissions of the tower

operators occurred in the tower, which is in Virginia.

The general conflicts rule disregards the law of the place

of the negligent act or omission and, instead, uses the law

of the place where the injury was sustained. My brothers

Edgerton and Fahy are of the view that the trial court

erred in applying the general rule here because the Tort

Claims Act provides in § 1346(b) that

«“* * * the district courts * * * shall have exclusive

jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the

United States, for money damages, * * * for * * *

death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omis-

sion of any employee of the government * * * under

circumstances where the United States, if a private

person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance

with the law of the place where the act or omission

occurred.” (Emphasis supplied.)

They hold that Congress thus provided in explicit terms

for the Government's liability to be measured under the

law of the place where its negligent employee’s act or

omission occurred, and that therefore the Act requires

Virginia law to be applied in this case.

I do not agree that the language of § 1346(b) compels

us to conclude that Congress had in mind the general

conflicts rule to which reference has been made and in-

tended to make it inapplicable in situations such as this.

I think the legislative expression “in accordance with the

law of the place where the act or omission occurred” was

intended to mean, and therefore should be construed as

meaning, “in accordance with the law of the place where

the tort occurred.” An act, in legal as well as in popular

use; is not merely a voluntary muscular contraction, but

~

-

37a

Oriqimal Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

something more. The word commonly includes the con-

sequences of the muscular contraction. If the defendant

pulls the trigger and the bullet kills a man, in legal as

in popular usage the killing is said to be the defendant’s

act.

In accordance with this usage, I interpret the statutory

words “act or omission” as including not only the mes-

sages negligently sent or omitted by the tower operators,

but also their immediate consequences. This is consistent

with § 377 of Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934), which

reads: “The place of wrong is in the state where the

last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged

tort takes place.” .

My interpretation also accords with that indicated by

Assistant Attorney General Shea in his testimony before

the House Committee on the Judiciary concerning the

Tort Claims bill,!8 as being the then interpretation of the

Department of Justice. Ie said, when asked where a

claimant brings suit,.“Either where the claimant resides,

or in the locale of the injury or damage.” (Italics sup-

plied.) The witness was referring to the venue provision

of the then pending legislation which is now 28 U.S. C.

§ 1402(b):

“(b) Any civil action on a tort claim against the

United States under subsection (b) of section 1346 of

this title may be prosecuted only in the judicial district

where the plaintiff resides or wherein the act or omis-

sion complained of occurred. June 25, 1948, ch. 646,

§1, 62 Stat. 937.”

The words of § 1402(b) which he was construing are not

only the same words which oceur in § 1346(b), with which

18 Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 77th

Cong., 2nd Sess.. on H. R. 5373 and H. R. 6463 (Jan. 29, 1942),

p. 9.

38a

Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955

we are concerned, but also were used with a direct refer-

ence to that section.

The judgments against the United States will be af-

firmed, except that the judgment for $150,000 in No, 12,017

will be reduced to $15,000 to meet the limitation imposed

by the law of Virginia on the amount of recovery.

The judgments in Nos. 11,991 and 11,992 are reversed

and the cases are remanded for a new trial restricted to

the issue of liability. The judgment in No. 12,017 is

affirmed as modified and the judgment in No. 12,018 is

affirmed.

Per Curiam Decision of United States Supreme Court

Dated December 5, 1955, United States v. Union

Trust Co. et all.

Octroser TERM 1955

Per Curtam Deciston—December 5, 1955

(350 U. S$. 907)

No. 296. United States v. Union Trust Co. et al. On

petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court

of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Perr

Curtam: The petition for writ of certiorari is granted

and the judgment is affirmed. Indian Towing Co. v. United

States, 350 U. S. 61. Solicitor General Sobeloff, Assistant

Attorney General Burger, Paul A. Sweeney and Lester S.

Jayson for the United States. David G. Bress, Sheldon

E. Bernstein, Alvin L. Newmyer and Jo V. Morgan, Jr.

for respondents. Reported below: 95 U. S. App. D. C.

189, 221 F. 2d 62.

eee

39a

Per Curiam Decision of United States Supreme Court

Dated December 5, 1955, Union Trust Co. et al. v.

Eastern Air Lines, Inc.

OctToser Term 1955

Per Curtam Deciston—December 5, 1955

(350 U. S. 907)

No. 298. Union Trust Co. et al. v. Eastern Air Lines,

Inc. On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

Per Curiam: The petition for writ of certiorari is granted

and the judgment is reversed. Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER

and Mr. Justice Harian would not grant certiorari. David

G. Bress, Sheldon E. Bernstein, Alvin L. Newmyer and

Jo V. Morgan, Jr. for petitioners. Joseph W. Henderson,

Richard W. Galiher and John M. Aherne for respondent.

Reported below: 95 U.S. App. D. C. 189, 221 F, 2d 62.

—___.

Per Curiam Decision of United States Supreme Court

Dated February 27, 1956, Union Trust Co. et al. v.

Eastern Air Lines, Inc.

Per Curiam Deciston—February 27, 1956

(350 U. S. 962)

No. 298. Union Trust Co. et al. v. Eastern Air Lines,

Inc. On consideration of the petition for rehearing, the

order of December 5, 1955, is reopened and is modified by

directing that the case be remanded to the Court of Ap-

peals to permit that court to pass upon the several issues

left undecided by our reversal of its judgment.

40a

Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For tur District or CotumBia Crrcvit

Nos. 11,991 and 11,992

>

—_

Eastern Air Lives, Ivc.,

Appellant,

Vv.

Uxiox Trust Co., et al.,

Appellees.

Argued June 6, 1996

Decided Sept. 20, 1956

Petition for Rehearing In Bane Denied Jan. 9, 1957

Messrs. Joseph W. Henderson, Philadelphia, Pa., and

Richard W. Galiher, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr.

John M. Aherne, New York City, of the bar of the Su-

preme Court of New York, was on the brief, for appel-

lant.

Mr. David G. Bress, Washington, D. C., with whom

Messrs. Sheldon E. Bernstein, Alvin L, Newmyer and Jo

V. Morgan, Jr., Washington, D, C., were on the brief, for

appellees.

Before Epcertox, Chief Judge, and WILBcR KK. MiIcuer

and Fauy, Cireuit Judges.

Wiscr K. Mutter, Circuit Judge: When these cases

were first before us, we reversed the judgments against

r

Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956

4la

Eastern Air Lines in an opinion to which reference is

made for a statement of the factual situation. 1955, 95

U. S. App. D. C. 189, 221 F. 2d 62. We held that,

since the pilot of a National airliner flying in the general

vicinity was admittedly not in a position during all of

the critical period to hear radio messages sent by the

contro] tower to the Eastern plane, and since he appeared

not to have been fully attentive to such tower broadcasts

as he actually did hear during that period, the National

pilot’s negative testimony that he heard no landing clear-

ance given the Eastern plane did not have enough proba-

tive value, as against the tower operator’s affirmative

statement that he gave such clearance, to form an issue

of fact for the jury.

Having so held, we concluded the trial court erred in

submitting to the jury the question whether the Eastern

plane had negligently deviated from the traffic pattern

without tower clearance to do so, when it was struck from

above and behind by the Bolivian plane. Because of that

conclusion, we reversed the judgments without reaching

other grounds for reversal advanced by Eastern Air

Lines.

There followed a petition for a writ of certiorari, with

respect to which the Supreme Court said December 5,

1955, “The petition for writ of certiorari is granted and

the judgment is reversed.” 350 U.S. 907, 76 S. Ct. 192.

On petition for rehearing by Eastern Air Lines, the

Supreme Court ordered on February 27, 1956:

“On consideration of the petition for rehearing,

the order of December 5, 1955, ante, p. 907, is re-

opened and is modified by directing that the case be

remanded to the Court of Appeals to permit that

court to pass upon the several issues left undecided

by our reversal of its judgment.” 350 U. S. 962. 76

S. Ct. 429.

a

42a

Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956

Thus the cases are again before us. Supplemental briefs

have been filed and further oral argument has been heard.

Eastern Air Lines urges it was deprived of a fair trial

by the plaintiff's “clear design to destroy the character,

integrity and credibility of the tower witnesses by base-

less charges of fabrication and concoction.” The trial

judge told the jury such charges had first been made and

then withdrawn, and then charged in regard thereto:

“So, therefore, 1 want to immediately have you dispel

that from your minds, because counsel have said there

is no charge of fabrication or concoction or subornation

of perjury, if you will, in this case.” While the record

furnishes some basis for supposing the plaintiffs had the

design attributed to them by Eastern, we think the court's

admonition was adequate to remove any possible prejudice

from the minds of the jurors if they were otherwise un-

prejudiced, and that reversal on this ground alone is not

warranted,

Kastern says it was gravely prejudiced by the fact that

the jury heard all the evidence in the non-jury case; that

alleged fault on the part of the tower operators was im-

puted to it by the jury. Even though we assume that

Eastern was disadvantaged because the cases against it

and the non-jury cases against the Government were tried

at the same time, Eastern for reasons then deemed pru-

dent consented to consolidation of the cases for simul-

taneous trial. It cannot now complain because this was

done.

In our first opinion we rejected Eastern’s contention

that the trial court erred in receiving in evidence the

approach and landing pattern offered as an exhibit by

the appellees because it had not properly been officially

prescribed; and held the Eastern pilots were required to

follow the pattern unless landing clearance, which au-

thorizes deviation from it, had been given by the tower.

43a

Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956

Eastern urges that we reconsider the ruling and hold the

pattern inadmissible. We adhere to our original holding

in this regard.

Finally, Eastern urges that the trial judge erred in

denying its alternative motions for judgment non obstante

veredicto or for a new trial, filed under Rule 50(b), Fed-

eral Rules of Civil Procedure.1| The motion asked the

court to set aside the verdicts in favor of Bridoux, the

Bolivian pilot, as well as those against Eastern. The

appellees moved for a new trial of their cases against

Bridoux if a new trial were awarded to Eastern Air

Lines.

The new trial issue includes the inquiry whether the

verdicts were against the clear weight of the evidence,

whether they were induced by passion, sympathy and

prejudice, and whether a miscarriage of justice will re-

sult therefrom, These included inquires, particularly the

latter, contain a combination of questions. One phase of

1The pertinent portion of the Rule is as follows:

“*(b) Reservation of Decision on Motion. Whenever a

motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the

evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the

court is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury

subject to later determination of the legal questions raised

by the motion. Within 10 days after the reception of a

verdict, a party who has moved for a directed verdict may

move to have the verdict and any judgment entered thereon

set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with

his motion for a directed verdict * * ® A motion for a

new trial may be joined with this motion, or a new trial

may be prayed for in the alternative. If a verdict. was

returned the court may allow the judgment to stand or may

reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct

the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been

directed. °° *" 980.8.C. A.

44a

Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956

resulting injustice is asserted by the appellant in this

quotation from its supplemmental brief, at pages 2 and 3:

«* * * The District Court, in the Tort Claims

Act cases, found that Eastern had been cleared

to land, and this Court ruled that such finding

was ‘amply justified’ (Op. p. 38; [95 U. S. App.

D. C. 189], 221 F. 2d 62, 79). Under the trial court’s

charge to the jury, Eastern could have been found

liable only if it had not been cleared to land.

Having found against Eastern the jury necessarily

found that Eastern was not cleared to land, thus

placing it in direct conflict with the fact finding

of the Trial Judge. The result is an extraordinary

and unusual situation in which, having heard the

same evidence from the same witnesses, at the same

time, and on the same record, the court (as a trier

of the facts) and jury reach precisely contradictory

conclusions. Based upon the court’s fact finding, final

judgments have been entered against the United

States and duly affirmed by this Court and by the

United States Supreme Court. The jury finding

against Eastern is now before this Court for exam-

ination to determine if a new trial should be had.

“It is a self-evident truth that the same proposition

é cannot be true and false at the same time, and under

3 the same aspect. Therefore either the jury was wrong

3 in finding that Eastern was not cleared to land, or

; the Trial Judge was wrong in finding that Eastern

was cleared to land. The existence of this extraordi-

nary and unseemly conflict of findings speaks most

eloquently to the necessity for a new trial.”

Before considering the new trial issue, we must decide

whether the phase of it suggested in the foregoing quota-

s.. ee Age ered te te

eal

45a

Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956

tion remains open after remand, in view of the Supreme

Court’s decision that the District Court did not err in

submitting the clearance question to the jury. We think it

is still open. In submitting the clearance question t» the

jury, the trial judge simply held that, viewing the evi-

dence in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, an issue

of fact had been raised, and in this he has been upheld

by the Supreme Court; but he did not weigh or evaluate

‘ae evidence pro and con until he ruled on the motion

for a new trial and this ruling has not been passed on

by the Supreme Court.

A holding that a verdict for the defendant should not

be directed does not necessarily mean that a verdict

against him should not be set aside on a motion for a

new trial. There is a clear distinction between a trial

judge’s duty in ruling on a motion for a directed verdict

and his duty in ruling on a motion for a new trial. The

distinction is reflected in Rule 50(b) and is shown in the

cases. For example, in Garrison vy. United States, 4 Cir.,

1932, 62 F. 2d 41, Judge Parker said, at page 42:

“e * * Where there is substantia! evidence in sup-

port of plaintiff’s case, the judge may not direct a

verdict against him, even though he may not believe

his evidence or may think that the weight of the

evidence is on the other side: for, under the consti-

tutional guaranty of trial by jury, it is for the jury

to weigh the evidence and pass upon its credibility.

He may, however, set aside a verdict supported by

substantial evidence where in his opinion it is con-

trary to the clear weight of the evidence, or is based

upon evidence which is false; for, even though the

evidence be sufficien preclude the direction of a

verdict, it is still his to exercise his power over

the proceedings before him to prevent a miscarriage

of justice. * * *”

Ge eT eal Aelita Fit Be 4

2 SRF ee,

oa

Buiswe ‘-

46a

Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956

In Aetna Casualty &€ Surety Co. v. Yeatts, 1941, 122 F.

2d 350, the Fourth Circuit again discussed the subject,

and said at pages 352-53:

“* * * On such a motion {for a new trial] it is the

duty of the judge to set aside the verdict and grant

a new trial, if he is of opinion that the verdict is

against the clear weight of the evidence, or is based

upon evidence which is false, or will result in a mis-

carriage of justice, even though there may be sub-

stantial evidence which would prevent the direction

of a verdict. The exercise of this power is not in

derogation of the right of trial by jury but is one

of the historic safeguards of that right. Smith v.

Times Pub. Co., 178 Pa. 481, 36 A. 296, 35 L.R.A.

$19; Bright v. Eynon 1 Burr. 390; Mellin v. Taylor

3 B.N.C. 109, 132 Eng. Reports 351. The matter was

well put by Mr. Justice Mitchell, speaking for the

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Smith v. Times

Publishing Co., supra * * * as follows: “The authority

of the common pleas in the control and revision of

excessive verdicts through the means of new trials

was firmly settled in England before the foundation

of this colony, and has always existed here without

challenge under any of our constitutions. It is a

power to examine the whole case on the law and the

evidence, with a view to securing a result, not merely

legal, but also not manifestly against justice,—a

power exercised in pursuance of a sound judicial

discretion, without which the jury system would be a

capricious and intolerable tyranny, which no people

could long endure, This court has had occasion mere

than once recently to say that it was @ power the

courts ought to exercise unflinchingly.’ (Italics sup-

plied).”

47a

Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956

And at page 354, the court said:

“To the federal trial judge, the law gives ample

power to see that justice is done in causes pending

before him; and the responsibility attendant upon

such power is his in full measure. While according

due respect to the findings of the jury, he should not

hesitate to set aside their verdict and grant a new

trial in any case where the ends of justice so re-

quire.”

The foregoing paragraph was repeated in Virginian Ry.

Co. v. Armentrout, 4 Cir., 1948, 166 F. 2d 400, 408, 4 A. L.

R. 2d 1064, with this addition:

“The power of this court to reverse the trial court

for failure to exercise the power, where such failure,

as here, amounts to an abuse of discretion, is like-

wise clear. * * *”

Other cases setting forth these principles include the

following: Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 1940, 311

U. S. 243, 251, 61 S. Ct. 189, 85 L. Ed. 147; Mt. Adams &

E. P. Inclined Ry. Co. v. Lowery, 6 Cir., 1896, 74 Fed.

463; Felton v. Spiro, 6 Cir., 1897, 78 Fed. 576: Adams v.

United States, 7 Cir., 1940, 116 F. 2d 199; General Ameri-

can Life Ins. Co. v. Central Nat. Bank, 6 Cir., 1948, 136 F.

2d 821; Marsh vy. Illinois Central R. R., 5 Cir. 1949, 175

F. 2d 498; Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 9 Cir., 1951, 186

F. 2d 926, 932 note 10; Snead v. New York Central R. R.,

4 Cir., 1954, 216 F. 2d 169.

We conclude, on the authorities and on reason as well,

that the trial judge had the power and duty to grant a

new trie! if the verdicts were against the clear weight of

the evidence, or if for any reason or combination of rea-

sons justice would miscarry if they were allowed to

stand; and that this court has the power and duty to

48a

Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956

reverse and order a new trial if the trial judge abused

his diseretion in denying the metion therefor.

As to what has been said so far in this opinion, the

court is unanimous, We are not in agreement, however,

as to the disposition of the new trial issue. My brothers

Kdgerton and Fahy take the view that the verdicts were

not so clearly against the weight of the evidence or so

plainly the result of passion, prejudice and sympathy, or

otherwise so unjust that the trial judge can be said to

have abused his discretion in refusing to grant a new

trial. It follows that this final point urged by Eastern is

rejected by a majority of the court and the judgn..#‘s

against the appellant will be affirmed.

I think Eastern Air Lines is entitled to a new trial and

that the trial judge abused the judicial discretion com-

mitted to him when he denied the motion. Although the

discretion is broad and appellate review thereof is limited

in scope, I suggest that the denial of a aew trial must

he held an abuse of discretion when it is demonstrable

bevond peradventure that the verdict was flagrantly

against the great weight of the evidence and that grave

injustice will flow from it. Such is the situation here,

in my opinion.

In the first place, a simple statement of what happened

on the fatal morning is sufficient to arouse misgivings as

to the validity of the jury’s verdict. Shortly before noon

on a clear, bright day, the Eastern airliner with two

experienced pilots and 53 other persons aboar@ was

swinging into final approach for landing. The Bolivian

pilot, in a warplane so constructed that he could not see

before and below him, was hurrying to land because of

an ailing engine. He mistakenly thought, without asking

the tower, that the plane authorized to land ahead of him

on the runway he was approaching had already landed

and was out of the way. So he came hurtling downward

pina

49a

Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956

and, without ever seeing the Eastern plane, struck it

from above and behind, cut it in two, and killed the 55

persons who were aboard. Yet the jury said the Bolivian

pilet was not negligent, and that the collision was caused

by negligence on the part of the airliner’s pilot.

There is no basis whatever for exonerating the Bolivian

of negligence, as 1 shall show. The only substanaal basis

for attributing negligence to the stricken airliner is the

charge that it had not been cleared to land and so had

unauthorizedly deviated from the pattern when it swung

into final approach, and had negligently placed itself in

the path of danger. Undoub‘edly the jury decided to con-

clude that the tower had not cleared the Eastern plane

for landing, so the weight of the evidence on that subject

must be examined.

The tower operator unqualifiedly said he had given

clearance to Eastern. He said the liner responded imme-

diately to all his instructions from the time of its first

appearance, including his direction to turn, unfortunately

given too late, when he saw Bridoux was coming on re-

gardless. The dead pilots are presumed to have done

their duty. They were experienced men entrusted with

the lives of a large number of people, and were of course

imbued with the universal instinct of self-preservation.

Moreover, the tower operator was confirmed by Bridoux

himself, perhaps unwittingly, when he said the tower told

him, “You are No. 2 to land on runway 3.” The evidence

shows no plane but Eastern which could have been No. 1

to land on that runway.

There was no affirmative evidence tending to show that

landing clearance had not been given to the airliner.

2 The appellees urge, unconvincingly I think, that the jury may

have thought Eastern was cleared to land and may have found

it negligent for some other reason. The other negligence attrib-

uted to Eastern was too slight, and too much dependent upon

lack of clearance, to give credence to the argument.

. > ner eae

_ aie

py SS BOI LOSE Cte ADB EL LD ch aM

TOR RAS An

Benicia wire

50a

Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956

Lt. Shaw, the National pilot flying near Hains Point,

merely said se heard none. His negative testimony is

the on'y basis for the jury’s conclusion. Shaw admitted,

however, that he could not hear tower messages when his

colleague depressed the transmitting key. He was en-

gaged at the controls of a large airplane and did not

remember all the tower communications which he did

hear.

The jury’s finding that Eastern had not been cleared

to land, based on such flimsy evidence, when considered

in connection with its astonishing verdict in favor of Bri-

doux, impresses me as having been the product of emo-

tion rather than of evidence. I think the trial judge

abused his discretion in not setting aside the verdicts as

arbitrarily arrived at, contrary to the overwhelming

weight of the evidence.

This brings me to a consideration of the jury’s exon-

eration of Bridoux and the part it probably played in

producing the verdicts against Eastern Air Lines. There

may be some question as to whether the verdict in favor

of the Bolivian pilot, who was of course a defendant in

the jury trial along with Eastern, is before us for review,

since there was no appeal from the judgment thereon.

The propriety of the verdict was before the district

judge, however, on the motion for a new trial; it was

expressly drawn to his attention and he had the power

sua sponte to grant a new trial of the cases against

Bridoux. Sulzbacher v. Continental Casualty Co., 8 Cir.

1937, 88 F. 2d 122. Regardless of that, the fact that

the jury found for Bridoux is pertinent for consider-

ation; for, if the verdict in his favor was contrary to the

weight of the evidence and was dictated by sympathy, as

I think it clearly was, the jury’s willingness to depart

from the evidence and to be swayed by emotion is

demonstrated.

5la

Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956

The source of the jury’s sympathy for Bridoux is

easily seen in his testimony. His story was a moving

one, even in cold print. It must have been even more

dramatic and appealing when he told from the witness

stand in faulty English how he had never seen the

Eastern craft, how he plui.ged into the Potomac, and

how he escaped from bis plane as it lay on the bottom

of the river, although he was grievously injured.

But the fact is that, to all intents and purposes, he

admitted guilt of the grossest sort of negligence, except

for which the collision would not have occurred. He was

flying over the busy National Airport a plane which

probably should not have been permitted to ascend into

such crowded air because its structural design limited

visibility and because it had a defective engine which

developed trouble when he had been aloft only a few

minutes. He was in a hurry to land.

In this situation, when the tower said in response to

his request for landing instructions, “You are No. 2 to

land on runway 3,” Bridoux said he regarded the state-

ment as actual and absolute landing clearance as soon

as he should decide for himself, without further commu-

nication from or with the tower, that the No. 1 plane to

land on runway 3 was out of the way. Not only did he

testify that he so regarded the tower statement when it

was made to him, but he also argumentatively insisted

from the witness stand that he had correctly interpreted

the tower message.

This misinterpretation, due either to stupidity or un-

familiarity with the English language, was the primary

cause of the collision, for Bridoux acted in accordance

with his misunderstanding. He said he saw a plane on

the ground ahead of him which he concluded was the

No. 1 plane already landed, and so he thought it unneces-

sary to check with the tower to learn whether the plane

- ve areing

52a

Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956

cleared to land before him had actually landed. Instead

he proceeded to descend blindly at the rate of 500 feet

per minute and at a forward speed of 150 miles per hour.

As a consequence he struck the Eastern plane, which he

never saw and which was vainly trying to escape from

him in response to frantic warning given by the tower

operator when he saw Bridoux was not turning to the

left as he had been told to do. Bridoux said he heard

this instruction but thought it was directed to a plane on

the ground. The fact that the Bolivian pilot’s mistaken

idea that he had been authorized to land without further

clearance was the primary cause of the collision is also

reflected in these questions to Bridoux and his answers

to them:

“Q. It would have prevented this accident, wouldn't

it, if you had called the tower and inquired as to the

identity of the plane abhead of you? A. Except that

I happened to observe this plane on final approach,

not any other plane. Therefore I assumed this was |

the No. 1. This was the only one on final approach.

“Q@. And that is where the trouble came in, be-

cause you assumed that was the plane that was ahead

of you, isn’t it, Captain’ A. Probably, sir.”

In view of the foregoing, it is unthinkable that the jury

had any reason except sympathy for finding that the

probably judgment-proof Bridoux was not negligent. It

was an easy step for such an impressionable jury, through

sympathy for the more than 50 dead and their bereaved

dependents, to find against the luckless appellant, whose

witnesses were killed in the crash.

Other factors, insufficient sta’. ng alone to require re-

versal, may have contributed to the totality of unfairness.

For example, the appellees’ attempt to show “that the

tower statements and testimony did in fact result from |

53a

Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956

mutual consultations between the tower men and their

superiors”? may have been regarded by the jury as a

charge of fabrication and concoction and therefore as an

attack on the veracity and integrity of the tower oper-

ators. To be sure, the appellees disclaimed any intention

of charging them with corruption, and the court conse-

quently admonished the jury to put out of their minds

the idea there was any charge of concocted or fabricated

testimony by the tower witnesses. But a jury willing to

depart from the evidence so far as to find a verdict for

the Bolivian pilot might well have been willing to ignore

the court’s admonition, and to seize upon the idea of

fabrication as a reason for rejecting the tower testimony.

We have seen that it is the duty of a trial judge to

grant a new trial when it is clearly necessary to do so

in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice. He ought

to perform the duty by exercising the power “unflinch-

ingly,” as the Pennsylvania court said. It is equally our

duty to see that a miscarriage of justice does not result

from a jury’s verdict. From the same evidence which

the jury heard, the trial judge found the tower operators

had negligently cleared both Eastern and Bolivian to land

on the same runway at approximately the same time, and

awarded judgment against the Government principally

because of that negligence. Thus he did not agree with

the jury on the fundamental issue as to whether Eastern

was negligent, but found that its plane had been cleared

to land. His finding has in effect been affirmed by the

Supreme Court, and I think is conclusively correct. Cer-

tainly it was amply justified by the evidence. Had the

jury reached the same sound conclusion, it would have

been bound to absolve Eastern.

3 Appellee’s brief on remand, p. 3.

DAE ie Sangha Beit 4

» tes

dat Lin

Beecarniscsaniaxc:

54a

Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956

This court’s affirmance of the judgments against the

appellant produces this anomalous situation: Eastern

Air Lines and the United States have both been mulcted

in damages because of contrary findings on a single fun-

damental factual issue. The judgments against both de-

fendants cannot possibly be correct; justice has miscar-

ried either as to Eastern or as to the Government.

Since the Supreme Court has affirmed the judgments

against the latter, and so has stamped approval on the

finding that the Eastern plane was cleared to land, I see

no escape from the conclusion that Eastern Air Lines is

the victim of injustice.

I would resolve the anomaly by reversing the judg-

ments and remanding the cases for a new trial with direc-

tions that, if the evidence on the subject is substantially

the same as before, the landing clearance question should

not be submitted to the jury, since the question has now,

as it had not when the first jury was instructed, been

authoritatively answered; other acts of negligence alleged

against Eastern, if supported sufficiently by evidence,

should be submitted for the jury’s consideration. I am

unwilling to believe the court is powerless to right the

wrong which has been done in these cases.

Affirmed.

4United States v. Union Trust Co., 1955, 350 U. S. 907, 76

S. Ct. 192.

J Sohal eons

55a

Opinion of United States District Court for the

District of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

For tHe District or CoLUMBIA

>

>

Civ. Nos. 4691-50, 4692-50

Union Trust Co. or District or CoLtumsia et al.,

Plaintiffs,

V.

Unitep Srates,

Defendants.

(Two cases)

>

—< >

Galiher & Stewart, Washington, D. C., and Bigham,

Englar, Jones & Houston, New York City, for defendant

Eastern Air Lines, Ine.

David G. Bress and Sheldon Bernstein, Washington,

D. C., for Union Trust Co.

Ross O’Donoghue and Vincent Burke, Jr., Asst. U S.

Attys., Washington, D. C., for U. S.

McGume, District Judge.

These are wrongful death actions by the executor of

the estates of Ralph E. Miller and Mildred Miller, hus-

band and wife, who died in an air collision of November 1,

1949, in the vicinity of Washington National Airport while

they were passengers in an Eastern Airlines plane.

Before trial the parties had stipulated and agreed on

the following facts:

At approximately 11:46-11:47 A. M., E. S. T. on Novem-

ber 1, 1949, an Eastern Airlines DC-4 No. N88727, de-

| | Pee ged ae

56a

Opinion of United States District Court for the District

of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953

nominated as Eastern flight 537, and a P-38 military type

aircraft No. NX-26927 collided in mid-air while the East-

ern DC-4 plane was approximately 300 feet in the air on

final approach for landing on runway number 3 at the

Washington National Airport, Washington, D. C. Eastern

flight 537 was carrying a crew of 4 persons (pilot, copilot,

steward and stewardess) and 51 passengers, all of whom,

including plaintiffs’ decedents, were killed in and as a

direct and proximate result of said accident. The P-38

was carrying only the pilot, Eric Rios Bridoux, a citizen

of Bolivia and an officer in the Bolivan Air Force who was

then operating the P-38. Bridoux was seriously injured

in said collision but survived. Both aircraft were com-

pletely wrecked and such debris or components of the

planes as were thereafter found in or near the scene of

the collision are indicated on a stipulated chart.

Kastern’s flight 537 was enroute from Boston, Massa-

chusetts, via intermediate points to Washington, D. C.

Over Beltsville, Maryland, 15 miles northeast of the

Washington National Airport, flight 537 contacted the

Washington control tower on 119.1 megacycles voice radio

communications and the flight was cleared by the tower

to enter a left traffic pattern for landing on runway num-

ber 3. One minute before that clearance, that is, at 11:37

A. M., E. S. T., the P-38 had taken off from runway num-

ber 3 at Washington National Airport on a test flight.

From the time the P-38 departed until after the accident,

visibility in the vicinity of the airport remained at 15

miles, ceiling was 6,500 feet with scattered clouds at 3,500

and surface wind was from the northeast 20-25 miles

per hour.

As to the defendant Eastern Airlines, there was a jury

verdict against it, while the defendant Bridoux was

exonerated.

The case of the defendant United States was tried to

———— tae

57a

Opinion of United States District Court for the District

of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953

the Court at the same time, the plaintiff alleging negli-

gence of a concurring character specifically set forth in a

pretrial stipulation:

a. The failure of the control tower personnel to issue

a timely warning to the Eastern plane as to the P-38 being

on final approach;

b. The failure of the tower personnel to take appro-

priate steps to warn the P-38 that the Eastern plane was

on final approach and to deter him from flight actions in-

consistent with or dangerous thereto;

ce. The failure of the tower personnel to take appro-

priate action to separate the two planes involved so as to

avoid collision;

d. The failure of the tower personnel to employ simul-

taneous radio transmissions to both planes to assure each

being advised as to the actions of and the directions to

the other;

e. The failure of the tower personnel to require the

Eastern plane to follow the prescribed landing pattern

and toleration of a shortcut thereof;

f. The failure of the tower to warn the P-38 that the

Eastern plane was not following the prescribed landing

pattern but was shortcutting same;

g. Violation of air regulations then and there in full

force and effect, as follows: Civil Air Regulations, Part

26, § 26.26, Aeronautical Rules for the Washington Na-

tional Airport, § 571.3.

I conclude under the statute, the Federal Tort Claims

Act, 28 U. S. C. A. §§ 1346, 2671 et seq., so-called relied

upon by the plaintiff in its suit against the Government,

that the United States has waived immunity, and the

Court has jurisdiction.

Ae ee Fe EN

58a

Opinion of United States District Court for the District

of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953 |

The case of Feres, Exrecutrix v. United States, 340 U.S.

135, 71 S. Ct. 153, 95 L. Ed. 152, relied on heavily by the

Government in support of its motion for a directed judg-

ment in its favor, can be distinguished.

True, Mr. Justice Jackson, who spoke for the Court and

interpreting the statute said: “* * * It will be seen that

this is not the creation of new causes of action but accep-

tance of liability under circumstances that would bring

private [emphasis supplied] liability into existence.” 340

U. S. at page 141, 71 S. Ct. at page 157.

And it is on this language that the Government seizes

with avidity. It contends that since the United States,

through the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Administra-

tor of Civil Aeronautics, in discharge of a congressional

mandate, has promulgated exhaustive and complete air

traffic rules governing all phases of air traffic operation

and control, which have nationwide force and application

—that this is a function sovereign in character and con-

stitutional in genesis:

“Congress has recognized the natural responsibility

for regulating air commerce. Federal control is inten-

sive and exclusive. Planes do not wander about in

the sky like vagrant clouds. They move only by

federal permission, subject to federal inspection, in

the hands of federally certified personnel and under

an intricate system of federal commands. The moment

a ship taxis onto a runway it is caught up in an

elaborate and detailed system of controls. Jt takes off

only by instruction from the control tower, té travels

on prescribed beams, it may be diverted from its in-

tended landing, and it obeys signals and orders.

{Emphasis supplied] Its privileges, rights, and pro-

tection, so far as transit is concerned, it owes to the

Federal Government alone and not to any state gov-

—— “ ~e wu tate cure — OSE AEE RL AR SS

59a

Opinion of United States District Court for the District

of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953

ernment.” Northwest Air Lines v. State of Minnesota,

1944, 322 U. S. 292, 303, 64 S. Ct. 990, 956, 88 L. Ed.

1283.

With the duty thus imposed of the “regulation of air

commerce in such manner as to best promote its develop-

ment and safety * * *”, Title 49 U. S. C. A. § 402(e),

there follows as a matter of course the corollary re-

sponsibility to promote safety of flight, by the prescrip-

tion of air traffic rules, and their revision from time to

time as circumstances and conditions warrant and dictate,

«* * * for the prevention of collisions between aircraft,

and between aircraft and land or water vehicles.” 49

U.S. C. A. § 551(a) (7).

Thus the Government concludes since this function is

purely governmental—that is, sovereign—there is no lia-

bility since the only allowable claims are those which “* * °

in the same manner and to the same extent a private indi-

vidual under like circumstances * * *” would be liable

for, with certain exceptions not material here, and since

there is no liability of a private individual “even re-

motely analogous to that * * *” now asserted against the

Unted States, the claim falls.

For it is argued no private individual has power to

assume the prerogatives of sovereignty, for no private

person, individual or corporate could possibly act in the

capacity in which the United States acts in its regulation

of air commerce, citing Feres, supra.

But the Feres case as has been said can be distinguished

for it went off on the matter of status. And the distine-

tion is one of substance. Feres was a soldier who per-

ished in a barracks fire while on active duty; the negli-

gence alleged being the quartering him in barracks which

were known or should have been known to have been un-

60a

Opinion of United States District Court for the District

of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953

safe because of a defective heating plant—the Court con-

cluding : .

“We know of no American law which ever has per-

mitted a soldier to recover for negligence, against

either his superior officers or the Government he is

serving. [Italics supplied.] Nor is there any liability

‘under like circumstances,’ for no private individual

has power to conscript or mobilize a private army

with such authorities over persons as the Govern.

ment vests in echelons of command.” 340 U. S. supra,

at page 141, 71 S. Ct. at page 157.

It is upon this language which the Government strongly

relies, but in support of the distinction made, it is sug-

gested that the concluding paragraph of the upinion, 340

U. S. supra, at page 146, 71 S. Ct. 153, clearly and con-

clusively shows that the Government’s argument is actu-

ally what it purports to be—analogous only, and remotely

so. That paragraph as is germane reads as follows:

“We conclude that the Government is not liable

under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to

servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in

the course of activity incident to service. * * * We do

not think that Congress, in drafting this Act, created

a new cause of action dependent on local law for

service-connected injuries or death due to negligence.”

(Emphasis supplied.) 340 U. S. supra, at page 146,

71S. Ct. at page 159.

Thus it appears emphasizing the distinction made.

In this connection it is interesting to note the case of

United States v. Spelar, 338 U. S. 217, 70 S. Ct. 10, 94

L. Ed. 3, decided in October Term 1949 and just about

eleven months before the decision in Feres. There, the

= PRE ERNE ARE OE RN A CAE, CMR Oy ee MR ESSER PR

6la

Opinion of United States District Court for the District

of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953

District Court of the United States for the Eastern

District of New York dismissed an action brought against

the United States under the Act to recover for the wrong-

ful death of a flight engineer at an airfield in Newfound-

land leased by the United States from Great Britain,

alleging, it appears, negligence upon the part of the

United States in the operation of the field. Spelar v. U.S.,

D. C., 75 F. Supp. 967. The Court of Appeals, 2 Cir.,

reversed, 171 F. 2d 208.

The decedent Spelar was an employee of American

Overseas Airlines and was killed in a take-off crash. The

plane involved was that of the decedent. The District

Court as has been said dismissed the action,—not, how-

ever, on the ground of governmental immunity but pre-

dicated its action on the fact of the incident occurring in

a “foreign country” and thus within a specific exception

set forth in the statute! The Supreme Court reversed

the Court of Appeals, holding with the Court of first

instance.

Now this is of interest solely as an indication that

apparently the government in the Spelar case was not

quite so certain of the point it argues here with such

urgency, and it must have had some doubt about it, be-

cause it preferred to take its position on the more certain

ground of a statutory exception. Nor was an appeal taken

in Cerri v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 831 at page 833,

in which Judge Roche met the issue head on and decided

it adversely to the government, and in an opinion that

has since been liberally quoted and relied on.

Certainly if the regulation of air commerce is a sov-

ereign function that of the Coast Guard is sovereign also,

being as it is “a military service and a branch of the

armed forces of the United States at all times * * *”,

128 U.S. C. § 2680(k).

62a

Opinion of United States District Court for the District

of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953

Title 14, U. S. C. A. ¢1, and an essential part of its

function is aids to navigation. 14 U. S. C. A. § 81.

And further, part of its function in this respect is to

maintain Loran stations “(b) required to serve the needs

of the maritime commerce of the United States; or (ce)

required to serve the needs of the air commerce of the

United States as determined by the Administrator of

Civil Aeronautics.” (Italies supplied.) Id.; ef. also 14

U.S. C. A. § 82. |

Yet it has been held that a case was stated against the |

United States under the Federal Tort Claims <Act, the

negligence alleged being that of creating and marking the

wreck of an old battleship. The Court, citing and adopting

the distinction herein made of the reach and effect of the

Feres case, supra.

Somerset Seafood Co, v. United States, 4 Cir., 1951, 193

F. 2d 631, 633, 634, 635, citing Cerri v. U.S. supra, with

approval.

The conclusions thus reached, it seems to me, are

indicative of the fact that the technical niceties hitherto

drawn between what are governmental and other fune.

tions are rapidly being done away with in an age in which

the activities of the Government impinge so manifoldly

upon the individual citizen in nearly all of his. The pres-

ent climate of public opinion, of which the Federal Tort

Claims Act is the most conspicuous example, is to the

effect that the fiction of sovereign immunity is for the

most part outmoded and as far as it relates to the 2~ in

question, preserved only in those specific exceptions which

Congress has specifically indicated and of which the ae-

tivity with which we are here concerned is not one. See

generally, Federal Crop Ins. Co. v. Merrill, 1947, 332 U.S.

380, 383, 68 S. Ct. 1, 92 L. Ed. 10.

As the Supreme Court has further said, in United States

v. Fellow Cab Co., 1950, 340 U. S. 543, at page 547, 548,

ae oo ——e

63a

pinion of United States District Court for the District

of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953

49 and 550, 71 S. Ct. 399, 402, 95 L. Ed. 523, in relation

» the Federal Tort Claims Act:

“Tie Federal Tort Claims Act waives the Govern-

ment’s immunity from suit in sweeping language. It

unquestionably waives it in favor of an injured per-

adidas

“This Act does not subject the Government to a

previously unrecognized type of obligation. Through

hundreds of private relief acts, each Congress for

many years has recognized the Government’s obliga-

tion to pay claims on account of damage to or loss of

property or on account of personal injury or death

caused by negligent or wrongful acts of employees

of the Government. This Act merely substitutes the

District Courts for Congress as the agency to de-

termine the validity and amount of the claims. It

suggests no reason for reading into it fine distinctions

between various types of such claims. * * *

«* * * The proceedings emphasized the benefits to

be derived from relieving Congress of the pressure

of private claims. Recognizing such a clearly defined

breadth of purpose for the bill as a whole, and the

general trend toward increasing the scope of the

waiver by the United States of its sovereign immunity

from suit, it is inconsistent to whittle it down by

refinements.”

New York State has had a similar statute for some

vears. See: Jackson v. State of New York, 1933, 261 N. Y.

134, 184 N. FE. 735; Bloom v. Jewish Board of Guardians,

1941, 286 N. Y. 349, 36 N. E. 2d 617; Foley v. State of

New York, 1945, 294 N. Y. 275, 62 N. E. 2d 69, citing

Jackson v. State of New York and Bloom vy. Jewish Board

of Guardians, supra. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co.,

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64a

Opinion of United States District Court for the District

of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953

247 N. Y. 160, 159 N. E. 896, 62 A. L. R. 1199 ean be

distinguished.

All of which leads to this: When the Government, as

here, takes upon itself the function—as it claims it

must—of the regulation of air commerce and the respon-

sibility, among other things, of regulating the flow of

traffic at a public airport, the assumption of such a re-

sponsibility involves something further, namely, not only

an activity designed to be protective of the interest of

that a morphous group known as the publie as & whole,

but that of individuals as well, against potential hazards

incident to such performance and implicit in its under-

taking. And if injury or death results as a consequence

of the negligence of its servants or agents so engaged,

Congress has decreed that the mantle of sovereignty

which heretofore has protected it, falls from its shoulders

and thus what was formerly at best an unenforceable

moral obligation is thus transmuted into an actionable

legal right. And whatever exceptions there are, this is

not one of them.

Such | find to be the situation here and so hold.

So much for liability. As to negligence, I find that

there was failure of the control tower personnel to issue

a timely warning to the Eastern plane as to the P-38

being on final approach; in the failure, also, to warn the

P-38 that Eastern was on final approach; in clearing both

planes for the same runway at approximately the same

time, having in mind their respective positions in relation

to each other and the speed of both their approach and

descent, and the failure to keep both planes advised as

to the activities of the other; I find this to be negligence

and concurrent both in character and in relation to that

found by the jury with respect to the defendant Eastern.

I find, further, that such negligence contributed proxi-

mately to the injury complained of.

nl nest CRATE DISET IIE

65a

Opinion of United States District Court for the District

of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953

With respect to the locale, the Court concurs in the

finding ef the jury that the accident occurred in the Dis-

trict of Columbia. This particular question was not easy

of resolution. The presentation of evidence with respect

to it took many trial days and it was a very long trial.

But a careful evaluation of it, having in mind such perti-

nent and persuasive factors as the narrowness, so to speak,

of the geographical area involved in relation to the line

of demarcation between the District of Columbia and the

Commonwealth of Virginia; the allowing for the widening

angle of vision from the position of an observer on the

ground in relation to an object in the air unless directly

overhead; and the grave possibility of error resulting

therefrom; the very suddenness of the business, so to

speak; the nature and character of the terrain, ete., all

lead to this conclusion. In addition, by way of corollary

and in support of this finding, the testimony of an ex-

pert, skilled in the science of aerodynamics and predicated

basically on admitted facts as to where the major wreckage

of the carrrier was found, and his mathematical recon-

struction as a consequence of the episode, allowing as

he did for such factors as speed, wind velocity, weight,

altitude, position, direction; the type of aircraft involved;

the character of the collision, and result to the passenger

plane and where, in relation to its fuselage; the aero-

dynamic characteristics involved from the time its tail

fell off; the horizontal advance of the forward section;

the character and nature of falling bodies generally and

those specifically involved here; conclusively resolves the

question as far as the Court is concerned, indicating as

it did in relation to all of the evidence that it prepon-

derated decisively in favor of the factual resolution

reached.

With reference to damages, I also concur in the

verdict of the jury and find accordingly, i. e., $50,000 for

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66a

Opinion of United States District Court for the District

of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953

the estate of the male decedent and $15,000 for that of the

female. Nor do I in the present state of the economic

worth of the dollar and the evidence adduced herein con-

clude in either case such sums to be in any way excessive.

Counsel will prepare tentative findings of fact and judg.

ment. Order accordingly.

Statutes

ADMINISTRATIVE ProcepurE Act—d U.S. C. 1001 et seq,

See. 1001. Definitions.

As used in this chapter

(c) Rule and rule making.

“Rule” means the whole or any part of any agency |

statement of general or particular applicability and future —

effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law

or policy * * *. “Rule making” means agency process for

the formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule.

* * *

(g) Agency proceeding and action.

“Agency proceeding” means any agency process as de-

fined in subsections (c), (d), and (e) of this section.

“Agency action” includes the whole or part of every |

agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equiva- :

lent or denial thereof, or failure to act. (June 11, 1946,

ch. 324, see. 2, 60 Stat. 237)

——_— saa AIR NEC BENE ABD LAD Ret ECE LE LTO E LIS DEI EIIE A

67a

Statutes

See. 1002. Publication of information, rules, opinions

orders and public records.

(a) Every agency shall separately state and currently

publish in the Federal Register * * * (3) substantive rules

adopted as authorized by law and statements of general

policy or interpretations formulated and adopted by the

agency for the guidance of the public, but not rules ad-

dressed to and served upon named persons in accordance

with law. No person shall in any manner be required to

resort to organization or procedure not so published.

See. 1003. Rule making.

Except to the extent that there is involved (1) any

military, naval, or foreign affairs function of the United

States or (2) any matter relating to agency management

or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits,

or contracts——

(a) Notice; publication and contents.

General notice of proposed rule making shall be pub-

lished in the Federal Register (unless all persons subject

thereto are named and either personally served or other-

wise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law)

and shall include (1) a statement of the time, place, and

nature of public rule making proceedings; (2) reference

to the authority under which the rule is proposed; and

(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule

or a description of the subjects and issues involved. Ex-

cept where notice or hearing is required by statute, this

subsection shall not apply to interpretative rules, general

statements of policy, rules of agency organization, pro-

cedure, or practice, or in any situation in which the agency

for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a

brief statement of the reasons therefor in the rules issued)

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68a

Statutes

that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable,

unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.

(b) Procedures.

After notice required by this section, the agency shall

afford interested persons an opportunity to participate

in the rule making through submission of written data,

views, or arguments with or without opportunity to pre-

sent the same orally in any manner; and, after considera-

tion of all relevant matter presented, the agency shall

incorporate in any rules adopted a concise general state-

ment of their basis and purpose. Where rules are re-

quired by statute to be made on the record after oppor-

tunity for an agency hearing, the requirements of sections

1006 and 1007 of this title shall apply in place of the

provisions of this subsection.

(c) Time of publication or service of rules.

The required publication or service of any substantive

rule (other than one granting or recognizing exemption

or relieving restriction or interpretative rules and state-

ments of policy) shall be made not less than thirty days

prior to the effective date thereof except as otherwise pro-

vided by the agency upon good cause found and published

with the rule.

FeperaL Recister Act—44 U.S. C. 301 et seq.

Sec. 301. Custody and printing of Federal documents;

“Division” created in Archives Establishment;

Director, appointment and compensation.

The Administrator of General Services, acting through

a division established by him-in the National Archives

Kstablshment, hereinafter referred to as the “Division”,

is charged with the custody and, together with the Public

EIR ReA ss Manes 2 een NORE NA IA AABN AT eR YP AEG ARLES WPAN LINCO SIRS OU RETR

69a

Statutes

Printer, with the prompt and uniform printing and dis-

tribution of the documents required or authorized to be

published under section 305 of this title.

See. 302. Filing documents with “Division”; notation of

time; public inspection; transmission for

printing.

The original and two duplicate originals or certified

copies of any document required or authorized to be pub-

lished under section 305 of this title shall be filed with the

Division, which shall be open for that purpose during all

hours of the working days when the Archives Building

shall be open for official business. The Administrator

of General Services shall cause to be noted on the ori-

ginal and duplicate originals or certified copies of each

document the day and hour of filing thereof: Provided,

That when the original is issued, prescribed, or promul-

gated outside of the District of Columbia and certified

copies are filed before the filing of the original, the nota-

tion shall be of the day and hour of filing of the certi-

fied copies. Upon such filing, at least one copy shall

be immediately available for public inspection in the office

of the Administrator of General Services. The original

shall be retained in the archives of the National Archives

Establishment and shall be available for inspection under

regulations to be prescribed by the Administrator of Gen-

eral Services. The Division shall transmit immediately

to the Government Printing Office for printing, as pro-

vided in this chapter, one duplicate original or certified

copy of each document required or authorized to be pub-

lished under section 305 of this title. Every Federal

agency shall cause to be transmitted for filing as herein

required the original and the duplicate originals or certi-

fied copies of all such documents issued, prescribed, or

promulgated by the agency. (July 26, 1935, ch. 417, see.

Bie i

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70a

Statutes

2, 49 Stat. 500; June 30, 1949, ch. 288 title I, see. 104 (a),

63 Stat. 381.)

See. 303. “Federal Register”; printing; contents; dis-

tribution; price.

All documents required or authorized to be published

under section 305 of this title shall be printed and dis-

tributed forthwith by the Government Printing Office in a

serial publication designated the “Federal Register.”

See. 304. Definitions.

As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise

requires, the term “document” means any Presidential

proclamation or Executive order and any order, regula-

tion, rule, certificate, code of fair competition, license,

notice, or similar instrument issued, prescribed, or promul-

gated by a Federal agency; the terms “Federal agency”

or “agency” mean the President of the United States, or

any executive department, independent board, establish-

ment, bureau, agency, institution, commission, or separate

office of the administrative branch of the Government of

the United States but not the legislative or judicial

branches of the Government; and the term “person” means

any individual, partnership, association, or corporation.

(July 26, 1935, ch. 417, sec. 4, 49 Stat. 501.)

See. 305. Documents to be published in Federal Regis-

ter; comments and news items excluded.

(a) There shall be published in the Federal Register

* * * (2) such documents or classes of documents as the

President shall determine from time to time have general

applicability and legal effect; and (3) such documents

or classes of documents as may be required so to be pub-

lished by Act of the Congress: Provided, That for the

purposes of this chapter every document or order which

— DERI ER 6 AND EE TOE. RENE

7la

Statutes

shall prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have general

applicability and legal effect.

(b) In addition to the foregoing there shall also be pub-

lished in the Federal Register such other documents or

classes of documents as may be authorized to be published

pursuant hereto by regulations prescribed hereunder with’

the approval of the President, but in no case shall com-

ments or news items of any character whatsoever be

authorized to be published in the Federal Register.

(July 26, 1935, ch. 417, see. 5, 49 Stat. 501.)

Sec. 307. Filing document as constructive notice; publi-

cation in Register as presumption of validity;

judicial notice; citation.

No document required under section 305 (a) of this

title to be published in the Federal Register shall be valid

as against any person who has not had actual knowledge

thereof until the duplicate originals or certified copies of

the document shall have been filed with the Division and

a copy made available for public inspection as provided

in section 02 of this ‘itle; and, unless otherwise spe-

cifically provided by statute, such filing of any document,

required or authorized to be published under section 305

of this title, shall, except in cases where notice by publi-

cation is insufficient in law, be sufficient to give notice of

the contents of such document to any person subject

thereto or affected thereby. The publication in the Fed-

eral Register of any document shall create a rebuttable

presumption (a) that it was duly issued, prescribed, or

promulgated; (b) that it was duly filed with the Division

and made available for public inspection at the day and

hour stated in the printed notation; (c) that the copy

contained in the Federal Register is a true copy of the

original; and, (d) that all requirements of this chapter and

the regulations prescribed hereunder relative to such

a, Se ei. eo ee ee

72a

Statutes

document have been complied with. The contents of the

Federal Register shall be judicially noticed and, without

prejudice to any other mode of citation, may be cited by

volume and page number. (July 26, 1935, ch. 417, see. 7,

49 Stat. 502.)

See. 308. Publication in Register as notice of hearing.

Whenever notice of hearing or of opportunity to be

heard is required or authorized to be given by or under an

Act of the Congress, or may otherwise properly be given,

the notice shall be deemed to have been duly given to all

persons residing within the continental United States

(not including Alaska), except in cases where notice by

publication is insufficient in law, if said notice shall be

published in the Federal Register at such time that the

period between the publication and the date fixed in such

notice fur the hearing or for the termination of the oppor-

tunity to be heard shall be (a) not less than the time

specifically prescribed for the publication of the notice by

the appropriate Act of the Congress; or (b) not less than

fifteen days when no time for publication is specifically

prescribed by the Act, without prejudice, however, to the

effectiveness of any notice of less than fifteen days where

such shorter period is reasonable. (July 26, 1935, ch. 417,

sec. 8, 49 Stat. 502.)

Unrrep States Statutes at Larer, Vor. 59, Part 1,

Chapter 443, Public Law 208, October 31, 1945

“See. 101. The boundary line between the District of

Columbia and the Commonwealth of Virginia is hereby

established as follows:

Said boundary line shall begin at a point where the

northwest boundary of the District of Columbia intercepts

73a

Statutes

the high-water mark on the Virginia shore of the Potomac

River and following the present mean high-water mark;

thence in a southeasterly direction along the Virginia

shore of the Potomac River to Little River, along the

Virginia shore of Little River to Boundary Channel, along

the Virginia side of Boundary Channel to the main body

of the Potomac River, along the Virginia side of the

Potomac River across the mouths of all tributaries af-

fected by the tides of the river to Second Street, Alexan-

dria, Virginia, from Second Street to the present estab-

lished pierhead line, and following said pierhead line to

its connection with the District of Columbia-Maryland

boundary line; that whenever said mean high-water mark

on the Virginia shore is altered by artificial fills and

excavations made by the United States, or by alluvion or

erosion, then the boundary shall follow the new mean

high-water mark on the Virginia shore as altered, or

whenever the location of the pierhead line along the

Alexandria water front is altered, then the boundary

shall follow the new location of the pierhead line.

See. 102. All that part of the territory situated on

the Virginia side of the Potomac River lying between

the boundary line as described in section 101 and the

mean high-water mark as it existed January 24, 1791, is

hereby ceded to and declared to be henceforth within the

territorial boundaries, jurisdiction, and the sovereignty

of the State of Virginia: Provided, however, That con-

current jurisdiction over the said area is hereby reserved

to the United States.”

74a

Statutes

District or Cotumpra Cope—Washington

National Airport (Chapter 13)

Sec. 7-1301. Administration of airport—Definitions.

(a) “Administrator” means the Administrator of the

Civil Aeronautics Authority.

(b) “Airport” means the Washington National Airport,

which shall consist of, and include, the tract of land,

together with all structures, improvements, and other

facilities located thereon, lying partly in the District of

Columbia, and partly in the state of Virginia, * * *.

Sec. 7-1302. Powers and duties of Administrator—Rules

and regulations.

The Administrator shall have control over, and responsi-

bility for, the care, operation, maintenance, and protection

of the airport, together with the power to make and

amend such rules and regulations as he may deem neces-

sary to the proper exercise thereof. (June 29, 1940, o4

Stat. 687, ch. 444, sec. 2.)

See. 7-1305. Penalty for violations.

Any person who knowingly and willfully violates any

rule or regulation prescribed under this chapter shall be

guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof,

shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more

than six months, or both. (June 29, 1940, ch. 444, sec. 5,

as added May 15, 1947, 61 Stat. 94, ch. 62.)

75a

Statutes

Arm Trarric Rutes—14 CFR, Part 60

(as of Nov. 1, 1949)

§60.1. Scope. The air traffic rules in this part shall

apply to aircraft operated anywhere in the United

States, including the several States, the District of Colum-

bia, and the several Territories and possessions of the

United States, including the territorial waters and the

overlying airspace thereof, except:

(a) Military aircraft of the United States armed forces

when appropriate military authority determines that

non-compliance with this part is required and prior notice

thereof is given to the Administrator, and

(b) Aircraft engaged in special flight operations, re-

quiring deviation from this part, which are conducted in

accordance with the terms and conditions of a certificate

of waiver issued by the Administrator.

Note: Specific operations which cannot be conducted

within the provisions of the regulations in this part, such

as air races, air meets, acrobatic flights, or certain pest

control or seeding operations require, prior to commence-

ment of the operation, a certificate of waiver which may

be obtained from the nearest office of CAA.

_ §60.14. Right-of-way. An aircraft which is obliged by

A the following rules to keep out of the way of an-

other shall avoid passing over or under the other, or

crossing ahead of it, unless passing well clear;

Nore. Right-of-way rules do not apply when, for rea-

sons beyond the pilot’s control, aircraft cannot be seen

due to restrictions of visibility. The aircraft which has

the right-of-way will normally maintain its course and

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76a

Statutes

speed, but nothing in this part relieves the pilot from the

responsibility for taking such action as will best aid to

avert collision.

§60.18. Operation on and in the vicinity of an airport.

Aircraft shall be operated on and in the vicinity

of an airport in accordance with the following rules:

(b) If air traffic control is in operation at the airport,

contact shall be maintained with such control, either

visually or by radio, to receive any air traffic control in-

structions which may be issued;

(c) Aircraft operating from an airport shall conform to

the traffic patterns prescribed for that airport;

(d) The Administrator may, when necessary in the in-

terest of safety, prescribe traffic patterns for an airport

which shall supersede any other traffic patterns previously

prescribed ;

§60.19. Air traffic control instructions.

No person shall operate an aircraft contrary to

air traffic control instructions in areas where air traffic

control is exercised.

:. soe steed cobs tebakeckkbebudiancadeas 1

I. Eastern’s First Reason ror GRANTING THE WRIT *

—THE ALLEGED ADMINISTRATIVE PrRocepURE ACT

Issup—Was Not an Issue By REASON OF THE

MANNER IN WHICH THE Case Was SUBMITTED TO

THE JuRY; It Has Aureapy Been Finatriy Dts-

POSED OF HERE AND BELOW; AND IN ANY EVENT

Is WHotty Wirnovut Merit .................. 2

A. The Admissibility or Violation of the Traffic

Pattern Is Wholly Academic in the Context

of the Case as Submitted to the Jury ...... 2

. Even Assuming the Traffic Pattern Issue Is

Not Academic in This Case, It Has Already

Been Finally Adjudicated Here and Below.. 6

. In Any Event, There Is No Merit to the Con-

tention That the Traffic Pattern Was Inad-

CEE os Sin xvcncadsanvecebabsssecantates 9

1. There Was Sufficient Compliance With

Statute in the Manner of Publication .... 9

2. Any Question as to the Propriety of the

Manner of Publication Was Cured by

Eastern’s Actual Notice ............... 12

. Eastern’s Seconp Reason For GRANTING THE

Writ Is Essentiatty an Attack Upon Tuis

Court’s Eartier ReversaL, AND, IN ANY Event,

Presents No ReEvIEWABLE QUESTION ........... 14

NE. on aun oe ue Ribas kackeek dakenks bins 21

TABLE OF CASES

Borak v. Biddle, 78 U.S. App. D.C. 374, 376 (1944) ... 13

Helvering v. Lerner Stores Corp. (Md.), 314 U.S. 463

SUED a dc vanhdbecneieeenshuste AbeeeeeeCe

Hotch v. United States, 208 F.2d 244, reh. 208 F.2d 249,

2d reh. 212 F.2d 280 (C.A. 9, 1953-4) ........... 11,12

ii Index Continued

Page

Illinois ex rel. Hunt v. Illinois C. R. Co., 184 U.S. 77

SE SRR aN etree hen See

Insurance Group Committee v. Denver & R. G. RR.

oe Be 8s err 9

Interstate Consolidated Street Ry. Co. v. Mass., 207

oe ee Er eee cee eee 10

Jaffke v. Dunham, 1 L. Ed. 2d 314 (1957) ........... 6

Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 (1931) .............. 6

United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36 (1951) ....... 6

United States v. Esnault-Pelterie, 303 U.S. 26 (1938).. 8

United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,

EE UNS och 05.5 Unc pa ha ous bad nhoedbs ones 19

United States Trust Co. v. New Mexico, 183 U.S. 536

SEE NaGibinceiahekeudek caw nates 6s bie bis ss 6

Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 196 (1949) .......... 6

Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928) ............. 12

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

Se So as CALS ctidGceWude dave nwanueseasheraaas 9

§ 7, Federal Register Act (44 U.S.C. 307) ........... 12

MISCELLANEOUS

po RO eer errs per rt te reer 13

92 Cong. Record, Part XIV, p. A2987 (May 25, 1946).. 13

S. Doe. No. 248, 79th Cong., 54 een. p. 415 ... 2.005. 13

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OctToBer Term, 1956

No. 841

Eastern AIRLINES, INc., Petitioner,

v.

Union Trust CoMPANY, ET AL.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF FOR UNION TRUST COMPANY, ET AL.

IN OPPOSITION

INTRODUCTION

On November 1, 1949, fifty-five families were be-

reaved by a tragic mid-air crash on the approaches to

the Washington National Airport which, on March 13,

1953, a jury found to have been negligently caused by

petitioner, Eastern Air Lines, Inc. The sufficiency of

the evidence of Eastern’s negligence was impressively

sustained by this Court’s order of December 5, 1955,

granting certiorari in No. 298, O. T. 1955 (Union

Trust Company, et al. v. Eastern Air Tines, Inc.) and

reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

LESLIE LEOPOLDO, ELIE EARLE AEA IEE A FG a i a

2

Yet almost seven and one-half years after their

tragic loss, after bereaved minors have already kecome

adults, the families of the decedents are still awaiting

relief which cannot come until final termination of

this seemingly interminable litigation — litigation

again being extended by a petition for a writ of certio-

rari which by a combination of sophistry, legerdemain

and distortion of the record attempts to manufacture

issues for certiorari consideration.

EASTERN’S FIRST REASON FOR GRANTING THE WRIT—

THE ALLEGED ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT

ISSUE—WAS NOT AN ISSUE BY REASON OF THE

MANNER IN WHICH THE CASE WAS SUBMITTED TO

THE JURY: IT HAS ALREADY BEEN FINALLY DIS-

POSED OF HERE AND BELOW; AND IN ANY EVENT

IS WHOLLY WITHOUT MERIT

A. THE ADMISSIBILITY OR VIOLATION OF THE TRAFFIC

PATTERN IS WHOLLY ACADEMIC IN THE CONTEXT OF THE

CASE AS SUBMITTED TO THE JURY

The traffic pattern for Washington National Air-

port was admitted in evidence at a point in plaintiffs’

case in chief when plaintiffs sought to prove, inter alia,

that when the Eastern plane ‘‘shortcut’’ the estab-

lished pattern for landing (i.e., started its landing

from west or southwest of the airport rather than

continuing around south of Alexandria and then north

to the airport) that shortcut was in and of itself an

act of negligence. The defense then offered evidence

in its case which tended to show that if Eastern re-

ceived a clearance to land it had a right then and there

to leave the pattern, regardless of its then position,

and proceed to land from that point without com-

pleting the entire course of the pattern. Eastern never

contended that there was no pattern nor that there was

PREM eve ew

3

any pattern different from the one received in evi-

dence. It simply contended that it was in the pattern

and had the right to depart therefrom when it received

clearance to land. The trial judge then adopted East-

ern’s contention and stated that he would charge the

jury that, if it found Eastern was cleared to land, then

it was authorized to leave the pattern at that point

and Eastern could not be held liable by reason of

anything connected with the pattern (X J.A. 2090).

In this connection, the trial court charged the jury

as follows:

“This is the prescribed pattern. But you are in-

structed as a matter of law that there is nothing

rigid about it... It... must be followed but not

with the rigidity and the inflexibility of a line

from one point to another. Indeed, the very pur-

pose of flight traffic patterns is to control traffic

. . . but at a controlled airport, such as Washing-

ton, the controller has the final say; and you are

so instructed.

**However, the unauthorized stepping out of the

pattern, leaving the pattern, departing from it—

and note my language—the unauthorized stepping

out of the pattern, leaving the pattern, departing

from it, would be a violation of law, because the

pattern is prescribed by rule which has the force

and effect of law. And so, therefore, unauthor-

ized action of the character I have just referred

to would be negligence ...’? (X J.A. 2108-2109).

x * *

‘“‘And therefore, by virtue of the fact of his [the

air traffic control officer’s] control of operations

in and around the zone in question, and the air-

port in particular, he may authorize, upon request

or without such request, a departure or a leaving

or a stepping out from the so-called traffic pattern.

It is asserted by the defendant Eastern Air Lines

Bere

——. eal

4

that they were given such authority, in the form

of an instruction ‘cleared to land’, and if you find

that to be a fact upon all of the evidence in this

case, then the plaintiff’s allegation of negligence

in this respect falls, because authority to leave

the pattern—or to depart from the pattern, if you

will—was granted, and the Eastern airliner would

be in the place where it was permitted to be at the

time in question. If you should find there was

an authorized departure, either by request or

order, your finding would be for the defendant

Kastern, because the allegation of negligence in

this respect, as I have said, would not have been

established.’’ (X J.A. 2111-2112).

The entirety of the charge on the pattern and clear-

ance pvuint is set out as Appendix A hereto (pp. la-5a).

In order to present an ostensible issue for consider-

ation on petition for a writ of certiorari, Eastern has

now distorted the issue submitted to the jury. East-

ern’s first reason for granting the writ (questions pre-

sented 1 and 2) is bottomed upon the assumption that

the jury was permitted to decide that Eastern’s negli-

gence lay in not following the detailed prescriptions

of the traffic pattern. But the charge quoted above

makes it self-evident that the only issue submitted to

the jury (with respect to pattern or clearance—as

distinguished from lookout’) was whether Eastern had

been cleared to land.

1 Eastern also implies that the clearance issue was the only one

in the case. For example, Eastern asserts (Pet. 9), that because

the trial court instructed the jury that a plane cleared to land is

entitled to assume no other aircraft is a hazard ‘‘the other minor

and trifling allegations of fault, such as lookout, right of way,

ete., were expressly removed from jury consideration if the DC-4

had been cleared to land’’ (Emphasis supplied; see also Pet. 30).

Only desperation could father such bald distortion. Early in

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Under the charge, if the jury found Eastern had

been cleared to land, then ipso facto its subsequent

actions could not—said the court—be considered any

violation or negligence (See also IV J. A. 860, 861).

On the other hand, if the jury found that Eastern was

not cleared, its unauthorized departure from the pat-

tern—that is, attempting to land without clearance—

became the act of negligence. In either event, the

detailed specifications and requirements of the traffic

pattern itself were not a permissible predicate for

decision. In short (apart from the lookout and other

his charge, the trial judge listed the several acts of negligence

claimed against Eastern and enumerated as the first ‘‘The failure

to maintain a proper lookout and to take appropriate steps to

avoid collision, when its pilot or its pilots saw or should have seen

... the imminence of collision’’ (X J.A. 2107; note also third act

of negligence there enumerated). Thereafter, the trial court gave

further detailed instructions as to the jury’s evaluation of these

other acts of negligence upon which its verdict might be based

apart from the clearance issue (X J.A. 2107-8, 2109, 2110-11, 2112,

2113).

Aside from the pertinent violation of miscellaneous air regu-

lations referred to in the trial court’s charge, from the record it

was unquestionable that the Eastern pilots could and should have

seen the P-38 at all times while they were on their so-called down-

wind (headed south) leg of the pattern and while they were turn-

ng into their final turn to land. During this several minute period

intil the very last seconds before the crash, the Eastern pilots

hould have realized the P-38 was a hazard, or vice versa, and

hould have taken action to avoid it. Indeed the supporting evi-

lence was so strong that in its candid brief on the facts in the

ourt below, the Government stated (p. 9) ‘‘There is no testimony

0 show that Eastern’s pilots took any action to avoid the collision

intil the last moment although from the description of the paths

f flight it seems clear that the P-38 could have been seen by the

C-4 pilots.’’

That there was substantial evidence of negligence apart from the

learance issue is also apparent from the Court of Appeals orig-

ial judgment remanding for a new trial on the issue of liability

ut extracting from that new trial any issue with respect to

learance.

Biagmescamones PEERS OMAIE Vas BINT EE RN TPE IF: PELE ROT IM TONNE A Nt, SOR aRRER RENE

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6

issues), the verdict was required to turn upon whether

or not Eastern was cleared to land without regard to

the specifications of the traffic pattern or any traffic

pattern. Therefore, whether or not the pattern was

admissible or a valid and binding fedéral regulation

played no part whatsoever in the verdict and cannot

now, therefore, be any basis upon which to attack that

verdict.

In these circumstances, petitioner’s first ‘‘reason”’

for granting the writ raises an academic issue insofar

as this case is concerned and is, as the trial judge him-

self stated (IV J.A. 860; see also 861) ‘‘much ado

about nothing.’’ Accordingly, the supposed irrecon-

cilable conflict between Courts of Appeals postured

as the first reason for granting the writ is a concocted

effort to have this Court decide a question not in issue

on the record.

B. EVEN ASSUMING THE TRAFFIC PATTERN ISSUE IS NOT

ACADEMIC IN THIS CASE, IT HAS ALREADY BEEN FINALLY

ADJUDICATED HERE AND BELOW

When this case was first before this Court on

respondent’s petition for certiorari, the Court of

Appeals had entered judgment in Eastern’s favor re-

versing the trial court and remanding the case for a

new trial. In opposing respondent’s petition, Eastern

had the right, without filing a cross-petition, to raise

any ground which, although rejected by the Court of

Appeals, would support that court’s determination.

Jaffke v. Dunham, 1 L. Ed. 2d 314 (1957); United

States v. Carignan, 342 U. 8. 36 (1951); Helvering v.

Lerner Stores Corp. (Md.), 314 U. S. 463 (1941);

Langnes v. Green, 282 U. 8S. 531 (1931). Since the

admission of the traffic pattern, if error as claimed by

Eastern, would have supported the earlier judgment of

PBS NERO ARR OAR APT

7

the Court of Appeals in reversing the trial court’s

judgment and remanding, and since the Court of

Appeals had, in its first opinion, rejected Eastern’s

argument and sustained the admissibility of the

pattern (App. to Pet. 13a), that point was plainly

available to Eastern when these cases were first before

this Court in No. 298, O. T. 1955. By not having

raised the traffic pattern issue in its opposition to

certiorari as an alternative basis for affirmance,

Eastern waived that issue. Urie v. Thompson, 337

U.S. 163, 196 (1949) ; United States Trust Co. v. New

Mexico, 183 U. 8S. 536 (1901).

This Court’s order of December 5, 1955, reversing

the judgment of the Court of Appeals, caused Eastern

to sense that its own failure to seasonably raise the

traffic pattern issue had cut-off review thereof by this

Court.’ By its Petition for Rehearing in No. 298, O.T.

1955, addressed to this Court’s order of December 5,

Kastern’s silence was broken, and a hue and ery was

raised on the traffic pattern issue—tacitly urged as an

alternative ground for affirmance. That argument

was captioned (Point V, p. 48): ‘‘The per curiam

order should be vacated for the further reason that

the Court of Appeals erroneously decided, and this

Court did not review, a major issue of law under the

Federal Administrative Procedure Act; and because

its decision in this regard is in conflict with a decision

of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.’

Bottomed on the traffic pattern issue was Eastern’s

alternative plea in its rehearing petition (p. 50) that

2**. . . if the per curiam of December 5th was not intended to

reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals as to the validity of

the purported regulation, then [Eastern] has been deprived of the

opportunity to seek review in this Court ...’’ Eastern’s Petition

Fer Rehearing in No. 298, O. T. 1955, at 49.

—_ SO PRUNE ONSET ar BEER

8

‘“so much of the order as reversed the judgment below

should be vacated, and the case should be placed on

the calendar of this Court for briefs and oral argument

on the merits of all issues’? (emphasis supplied)—

including the traffic pattern issue.

But this Court, by its order of February 27, 1956,

refused to grant such relief. Instead, it left intact its

reve~sal of December 5, 1955 with only the modification

that ‘‘the case be remanded to the Court of Appeals

to permit that court to pass upon the several issues

left undecided by [this Court’s] reversal of its judg-

ment.’’? And whether or not this Court’s refusal to

grant such relief to Eastern amounted to an approval

of the Court of Appeal’s disposition of the traffic

pattern issue—which we think it did (compare United

States v. Esnault-Pelterie, 303 U. S. 26 (1938) )—the

modification of this Court’s previous order was in all

respects consistent with, and in response to, the final

alternative prayer for relief in Eastern’s Petition for

Rehearing. That prayer (p. 50) sought further con-

sideration below only in respect to ‘‘undecided issues’’;

it did not request remand on the traffic pattern issue.

Accordingly, at Eastern’s own request the traffic

pattern issue was then effectively eliminated from the

case, and it

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Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — White v. Commissioner (No. 841) | Frix