Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — White v. Commissioner (No. 841)
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FILED
‘No. 841 MAR 15 1957
i"
IN THE LJOHN T. FEY, Clerk
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1956
Nos. and
= La
EASTERN AIR LINES, INC
-
Petitioner,
v.
UNION TRUST COMPANY, et al.,
Respondents.
eee
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIO.
RARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIRCUIT
——————————
JosePpH W. HENpeRSoN
1910 Packard Building
Philadelphia 2, Pa.
Ricuarp W. Gainer
820 Woodward Building
Washington, D. C.
Joun M. AHERNE
99 John Street
New York 38, N. Y.
Attorneys for Petitioner
Paneer era
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955 .......... la
Per Curiam Decision of United States Supreme Court
Dated December 5, 1955, United States v. Union
De OR ea Khd Gh ec eacaebbhsn wo schxese< 38a
Per Curiam Decision of United States Supreme Court
Dated December 5, 1955, Union Trust Co. et al. v.
fe Se a ee 39a
Per Curiam Decision of United States Supreme Court
Dated February 27, 1956, Union Trust Co. et al. v.
GE: ST TONGA, BOR. io ia5 05 his ews Saeed sedis 39a
Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956 .... 40a
Opinion of United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953 ........ 55a
Statutes :
Administrative Procedure Act—5 U. S. C. 1001
ER kc adeaneudas Stas saa seeisndewkndackawas 66a
Federal Register Act—44 U.S. C. 301 et seq. .... 68a
United States Statutes at Large, Vol. 59, Part 1,
Chapter 443, Public Law 208, October 31, 1945 72a
District of Columbia Code—Washington National
SEG TENE SNE Wa naek canis cedeenansedt 74a
Air Traffic Rules—14 CFR, Part 60 (as of Nov. 1,
SE EN 4a weka nes kwaceueey aw basncapieabnan ce 75a
+
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit.
»s
>
Eastern Air Lives, Inc.,
Appellant,
Vv.
Union Trust Company et al.,
Appellees.
Unitep States or AMERICA,
Appellant,
V.
Union Trust Company et al.,
Appellees.
Nos. 11991, 11992, 12017, 12018.
Argued June 22, 1954.
Decided Feb. 8, 1955.
Petition for Rehearing In Bane Denied in all Cases on
April 15, 1955.
Petition for Rehearing Denied by the Division which
Heard the Case in Nos. 11991-2 on May 4, 1955.
Petition for Rehearing Denied by the Division which
Heard the Cases in Nos. 12017-8 on May 11, 1955.
As Amended June 24, 1955.
Mr. Joseph W. Henderson, Philadelphia, Pa., with whom
Mr. Richard W. Galiher, Washington, D. C., and Mr. John
2a
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
M. Aherne, of the bar of the Supreme Court of New York,
were on the brief, for appellant in Nos. 11,991 and 11,992.
Mr. Lester S. Jayson, Atty., Dept. of Justice, of the
bar of the Court of Appeals of New York, pro hac vice,
by special leave of Court, with whom Messrs. Leo A.
Rover, U. S. Atty., Paul A. Sweeney, Atty., Dept. of
Justice and D. G. Galotta, Atty., Civil Aeronautics Ad-
ministration, were on the brief, for appellants in Nos.
12,017 and 12,018. Mr. Lewis A. Carroll, Asst. U. S.
Atty., entered an appearance for appellants in Nos. 12,017
and 12,018.
Mr. David G. Bress, with whom Messrs. Sheldon E.
Bernstein, Alvin L. Newmyer and Jo V. Morgan, Jr.,
Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellees in all
cases.
Before Epcerton, Witsur K. Mixer and Fany, Circuit
Judges.
Wisur K. Miter, Circuit Judge.
On the morning of November 1, 1949, an Eastern Air
Lines DC-4 plane was flying from New York to Washing-
ton, carrying fifty-one passengers and a crew of four.
When it was on final approach for landing on runway 3
at the Washington National Airport and at an altitude of
about 300 feet, the airliner was struck from above and
behind by a P-38 military-type aircraft just purchased
by the Bolivian Government, which was being tested by
a Bolivian military pilot, Eric Bridoux, who was its only
occupant. The DC-4 was cut in two. The forward part
fell in the Potomac River, the after portion on the Vir-
ginia shore. All fifty-five persons aboard were killed.
The P-38, badly damaged, of course, plunged into the
3a
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
river but somehow Bridoux escaped from the cockpit.
He was rescued and, despite serious injuries, survived.
These suits were brought in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia by the Union Trust
Company and Melville W. Stuart as the executors of
Ralph F. Miller and Mildred E. Miller, his wife, who were
passengers on the DC-4. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., and
Eric Bridoux were named as defendants in two of the
actions and the United States was the defendant in the
other two.! Many similar suits filed on behalf of the
estates of others who died in the fatal crash are pending
under an agreement that the determination of liability in
these cases shall govern their disposition.”
Although the two captioned cases against Bridoux and
Eastern were tried to a jury, and the two against the
Government to the Court, by agreement of the parties all
four actions were tried simultaneously. The jury found
Bridoux not “liable,” but found against Eastern Air Lines
in the sum of $50,000 for the estate of Ralph F. Miller
and in thé sum of $15,000 for the estate of his wife. In
the Federal Tort Claims actions against the United States,
the trial judge held the Government liable to the estates
and fixed the damages at $50,000 and $15,000 respectively.
D. C. 113 F. Supp. 80. Eastern Air Lines and the United
States appeal.
1 Aubin & Lyons, t/a Universal Marine and Supply Company,
were also named as defendants on the theory they owned or had
some interest in the P-38. They were dismissed when it appeared
that title to the plane had passed to the Bolivian Government.
2It was also agreed that the determination of the situs of the
accident (whether it occurred over the Potomae River, which is
in the District of Columbia, or over land in Virginia), made in
these eases, shall be binding in all the others. The situs is im-
portant because a Virginia statute limits recovery for wrongful
death to $15,000. In the District of Columbia there is no statu-
tory limit.
Ser nen nee
4a
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
I
We first summarize the factual background which is
essential to an understanding of the reasons for reversal
advanced by the appellants. The Washington National
is a controlled airport; that is to say, from a glass-
enclosed observation platform in a control tower standing
above and west of runway 3, employees of the Civil Aero-
nautics Administration observe arriving and departing
planes and direct their movements by radio. An incoming
plane may not land and a departing plane may not take
off until it receives tower permission to do so.
The Administrator of Civil Aeronautics adopted, and
published in the Federal Register October 14, 1949 [14
Fed. Reg. 6247-6250], a regulation for the administration
of the Washington National, which is a civilian airport
owned by the United States. Section 570.55(c) of the
regulation is as follows:
“(e) Aircraft landing or taking off shall conform to
the air traffic pattern as published jointly in the
Airman’s Guide by the Anacostia Naval Air Station,
Bolling Field and the Washington National Airport.”
The air traffic pattern referred to is a map of the air-
port and vicinity, with lines drawn over it intended to
show the general flight patterns for taking off from and
landing on the various runways. For landing on runway
3, it shows a southward pattern to a point south of
Alexandria (the downwind leg), then an east turn until
over the Potomac River (the base leg), then northwardly
over the river to a point a short distance northeast of
Alexandria, where it curves to the left over the Potomac
Yards, and then a curve to the right in a line for a
straight approach to runway 3. The drawing itself was
5a
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
published in the Airman’s Guide March 1, 1949, but was
not published in the Federal Register until August 7,
1952, long after the accident here involved. The regu-
lation published October 14, 1949, referred to but did not
include the traffic pattern.
Over Eastern Air Lines’ vehement objection, the trial
court admitted the traffic pattern when it was offered in
evidence by the *rnellees, and charged the jury that it
was a binding Federal regulation, and that an unauthor-
ized deviation therefrom would be negligence per se.
Eastern admittedly had knowledge of the pattern.
On the morning of the accident Glenn D. Tigner, one
of the seven traffic control operators who were working
in the tower, was advised by the Eastern DC-4 at about
11:38 a. m. that it was over Beltsville, Maryland, 15
miles northeast of the airport, and was asked for landing
instructions. Tigner authorized it to enter a left traffic
pattern for landing on runway 3 and advised the pilot
to contact the tower again from a point closer to the
airport. Tigner testified that in a second communication,
when the Eastern plane was still north of the airport, he
cleared it to land on runway 3.3 He fixed the time of the
3The Administrator of Civil Aeronautics was called by the
court as a witness on the meaning of the phrase ‘‘cleared to land.’’
He testified that when a plane in the traffic pattern of an airport
is ‘‘cleared to land,’’ the pilot of the plane is thereby authorized
to commence his landing approach operation immediately; in
other words, when a pilot receives that clearance, wherever he may
be in the traffic pattern, there is no plane ahead of him and he
may make his turn at his discretion and consistently with the safe
management of his plane, and may come in and land at once on
the runway which has been designated by the tower. That this
is the only meaning of the phrase ‘‘cleared to land’’ was the
unanimous testimony of all the certified air traffie controllers who
testified on the subject. The trial judge instructed the jury as
a cory of law that such was the meaning of the phrase ‘‘cleared
to land.’
6a
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
clearance as approximately 11:44 a. m. The DC-4 con
tinued its flight and entered the traffic pattern as it hac
been directed to do. It had circled from the patter
and was on final approach for runway 3 when it wa
struck by the Bolivian plane.
The Bolivian P-38 had taken off from runway 3 at 11:3
a. m. and therefere had been in the air only between nin
and ten minutes when the collision occurred. Shortly afte
he had cleared the DC-4 to land, Tigner observed the P-3
at a high altitude, circling Alexandria about seven mile
south of the airport, heading toward the east and startin,
a turn to its left. Tigner was then talking to anothe
plane. He was informed by a tower colleague the P-38 wa
requesting landing instructions. He saw it continuing it
left turn and said by radio, “Bolivian 927, did you reques
landing instructions?” Bridoux replied he had done s
whereupon Tigner told him he was cleared to enter th
left traffic pattern for runwaj 3 and asked him to repo!
on his downwind leg west of the airport.
Tigner said when he next saw the P-38 it was abot
five miles southwest of the airport at about 4,000 fe«
heading northeastwardly with its gear down and in
steep and rapid descent. At 11:45 a. m. he warned tl
DC-4 that the P-38 was in traffic. He said to the P-3
“Bolivian 927, make a 360 to your left. You are No.
to land. Traffic is an Eastern DC-4, turning final ahea
and below you.” Bridoux did not acknowledge the messag
and did not turn as directed. Tigner then called, “Bolivia
927, turn left, turn left. You are No. 2 to land, followir
an Eastern DC-4 turning final ahead and below you
Bridoux did not ack.owledge or comply.
During these transmissions the DC-4 was on its ba:
leg turning into final approach. When Tigner saw tl
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
7a
P-38 was not complying with his instructions, he called
the DC-4 and said, “Eastern 527, make an immediate
left turn. Traffic is P-38 above and behind you.” The
DC-4, which had gone only about a quarter of a mile on
final approach, responded with a surge of power into
a left turn. As it did so, the Bolivian plaue struck i:
Bridoux testified that a minute after his take-off le
began to have engine trouble. He reported that fact to
the tower and requested landing instructions. Receiving
no answer, he repeated his request and the tower said,
“Land 2 on Runway 3,” which he understood to mean there
was another plane ahead of him behind which he was
to land. He testified he also understood this message to
constitute a clearance to land rather than merely clear-
ance to enter the traffic pattern.
When he was about two miles west of the airport
descending at a rate of 500 to 600 feet a minute, F vidoux
said he saw a plane making a final approach for a landing
either on runway 36 or 3, which was either a Beechcraft
C-45 or a Lockheed C-60. He said, “* * * I realized
that that was the reason I was No. 2 to land.” He con-
tinued flying south until he was about five or six miles
south of the field and then made a 90-degree left turn.
As he did so, he observed the Lockheed or Beecheraft on
the ground taxiing toward the buildings. He had not
seen it actually land.
Having been told by the tower he was No. 2 to land on
runway 3 and having seen, as he thought, that the plane
which was No. 1 to land on that runway had already done
so and had taxied away, Bridoux concluded it was unneces-
sary for him to check with the tower to learn wheth.
the plane ahead of him had landed. We reproduce in the
7
8a
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
margin‘ his testimony that he regarded the tower’s state-
ment, “You are No. 2 to land on runway 3,” as absolute
clearance to land after he had decided for himself, without
further communication with or from the tower, that the
No. 1 plane was out of the way.
After seeing the Lockheed or Beechcraft taxiing from
runway 3, Bridoux flew on for about one and one-quarter
miles and made another 90-degree left turn to proceed
on final approach, after which he headed north flying
at 150 m. p. h. and at an altitude of about 1,200 feet. He
said he then called the tower, advising he was on final
approach and that the tower responded, saying, “Bolivian
P-38, prepare to land on runway 3,” and gave him the
wind direction; and that he acknowledged the instruction.
He then put his flaps down, reduced his speed to about
130 m. p. h., and began an § turn to line up with runway 3.
As he did so he heard over the radio, “Clear to the left,
clear to the left,’ but thought the instruction was for
somebody on the ground. He did not turn to the left or
4‘*Q. As a matter of fact, at that point you not only accepted
that clearance which you told us was given, but you made another |
complete 360-degree turn around the airport; and then after you ©
had done that, you started downwind leg five or six miles. A.
Because I was No. 2 to land, sir.
‘““Q. You at no time, Captain, asked the identity of the plane
that was ahead of you, did you, Captain? A. No, sir.
‘*Q. And you had no way of knowing, based upon information
from the tower, that that plane was ahead of you, did you,
Captain? A. Unless I see.
‘“*Q. And you didn’t see it. A. I saw it on final approach, the
C-45 or C-60.
‘“Q. What you are telling us is after getting that clearance,
you assumed the plane you saw was the one they meant was ahead
of you? A. Yes, sir.
‘*Q. But you didn’t check with the tower to see if that was the
plane? A. Why have I got to check, if I am seeing?
‘‘Q. I am not asking you why. I am simply asking you if it
isn’t a fact that you didn’t check back with the tower to see if
9a
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
take any other action, but continued on his course and
the collision occurred two or three seconds later.
The visibility from the P-38 was structurally limited so
that Bridoux could not see ahead of him except at a
considerable distance. He was flying entirely by time,
computing the distance covered by multiplying his speed
per minute by the number of minutes traveled. He said
that at an altitude of 1,200 feet and four and a half miles
from the airport he could see nothing ahead and below
for a distance of two and one-half miles. It is also ob-
served that Bridoux said that as he descended the nose
of his plane was not more than ten degrees under hori-
zontal, and that he was accomplishing the descent by
reducing his speed. Thus there was not enough nose
declination to increase appreciably the extent of visibility
immediately in front of and below the P-38. Bridoux did
not see the Eastern DC-4 at any time.
that plane you saw was the one ahead of you. A. It isn’t neces-
sary, because I was seeing the airplane.
‘**Q. Would you please answer yes or no to my question? You
didn’t check back with the tower to see if that plane you told us
you noticed on final approach was the one ahead of you, did you?
A. When I was on final approach, I called the tower.
“*Q. Captain, I am asking you, sir, if after you saw that plane,
which you said seemed to be lined up for landing, which seemed
to be on approach for landing on runway 38, did you at any time
thereafter ask the tower if that was the plane that had been ahead
of you? A. No, I didn’t ask. It wasn’t necessary to.
“*Q. You did not ask the tower— A. Because it wasn’t neces-
sary. I was seeing the airplane. I was watching it.
““Q. What you mean is you saw a plane. A. Yes, sir.
**Q. You have no way of knowing whether that one was the
one the tower was referring to, or some other plane, have you,
Captain? A. There was a way, because he was on final approach.
If he didn’t land yet, I understand he is No. 1.
““Q. Isn't it a fact that from that point on there was a lapse
of four or five minutes before you came in, on your own final
approach? <A. More or less.
“*Q. And you never contacted the tower to find out where the
7
be]
10a
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
II
With the foregoing background, we turn to Eastern’s
contention that the court erred in admitting as evidence
the approach and landing pattern offered as an exhibit
by the appellees; and in instructing the jury it was a
binding Federal regulation, a breach of which would con-
stitute negligence per se.
With respect to the traffic pattern, the court charged
the jury as follows:
«* * * [T]his pattern in a general sense provided
that an aircraft arriving from the north and desiring
to land at the Washington National Airport on Run-
way 3 would proceed from north to west, in the gen-
eral vicinity of the Pentagon, and then proceed from
that direction south, on * * * its downwind leg, and
continue in that southerly direction south in the di-
rection of the George Washington Memorial Temple
and south of the city of Alexandria; then turning due
plane that was No. 1 was, did you? A. I called on final approach,
advising them I was on final, and they could tell me anything
at that time, in order to realize that.
‘*Q. That was after you had lined up for runway 3, wasn’t it?
A. No, sir.
**Q. You said you were on final approach. A. On final; but
the final is not just the straight line. The final is after the turn
from base leg.
**Q. Did you ask the tower for any permission before you lined
up for final approach? A. No.
“Mr. Bress: He hadn’t said he lined up for final approach.
‘The Witness: I called to the tower, after the turn from
base and I began the final approach.
“*By Mr. Galiher:
**Q. And you didn’t ask the tower for permission before you
began the final approach, did you? A. I didn’t have to ask the
tower for permission, after I had been cleared for landing, sir.
“*Q. You hadn’t been cleared to land at that point, had you,
lla
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1995
east on what is called the base leg, and ultimately
what is called the final approach, a north or northeast
heading.
“* * * This is the prescribed pattern. But you are
instructed as a matter of law that there is nothing
rigid about it. It must be conformed to in a general
way. In other words, the pattern is not a line drawn
over the ground which must be followed by the air-
plane in question. It is just exactly as the word
itself indicates, a pattern which must be followed, but
not with the rigidity and the inflexibility of a line
from one point to another. Indeed, the very purpose
of flight traffic patterns is to control traffic, and at
an uncontrolled airport it must be followed; but at
a controlled airport, such as Washington, the con-
troller has the final say; and you are so instructed.
“However, the unauthorized stepping out of the
Captain? A. I had been cleared for landing, and the first call
from the tower cleared me for landing.
‘**Q. You mean when you were told you were No. 2 to land
on runway 3? A. Yes.
**Q. And that is the only clearance you have had up to this
point? A. I know I was the second.
**Q. And that was issued upon the final approach? A. No; it
was before the final approach.
**Q. Whether it was after or before you had begun the final
approach, you had begun the final approach before you got any
landing clearance from the tower. A. No, sir. The first call from
the tower was when I was cleared for landing.
““Q. For what? A. They cleared me for landing.
““Q. For landing No. 2% A. Yes, sir.
**Q. Did you tell us that being cleared for landing No. 2 is a
landing clearance, a final landing clearance? A. If they mention
that word, it is.
“*Q. You say it was a final landing clearance, the clearance that
told you you were cleared to land on runway 3, behind another
plane, or No. 2, as I think you used it? A. No. 2. That was all.
*“*Q. No. 2. You have no way of knowing whether that plane
you told us you saw when you were on downwind leg was the
12a
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
pattern, leaving the pattern, departing from it—and
note my language—the unauthorized stepping out of
the pattern, leaving the pattern, departing from it,
would be a violation of law, because the pattern is
prescribed by rule which has the force and effect of
law. And so, therefore, unauthorized action of the
character I have just referred to would be negligence,
as I have defined that term to you, and would be,
as we lawyers say, negligence per se, in other words,
would be negligence as a result of the very act itself
and no further proof would be necessary. This is
the negligence, in this aspect of the case, which the
plaintiff alleges against Eastern. * * *”
plane you later saw on the landing strip or not, do you? A. I
saw the craft, and I assumed it was the No. 1, sir.
**Q. That plane you told us you saw as you were on downwind
leg, west of the tower— A. Before.
‘*Q. Then you told us when you got down south, when you
were turning on base leg, you noticed a plane that was landing
or had landed—I think you used the expression— A. Yes.
‘*Q. —on the landing strip. <A. Yes.
**Q. It was actually on the ground? A. Yes, sir.
‘*@. You had no way of knowing from that distance of five
or six miles away, did you, whether that was the same plane you
had previously seen, or some other plane, did you? A. I don’t
know exactly. But I saw more or less the same airplane.
“*Q. And you never tried to contact the tower to inquire
whether or not the plane you had seen on final approach, as you
call it, when you were on downwind leg, was the plane that was
No. 1, did you? A. But how am I going to ask the tower that?
Am I going to say ‘Is the plane I am seeing No. 1%’ How is the
tower going to know what plane I am seeing? There was no
reason of calling back to the tower.
**Q. It would have prevented this accident, wouldn’t it, if you
had called the tower and inquired as to the identity of the plane
ahead of you? A. Except that I happened to observe this plane
on final approach, not any other plane. Therefore I assumed
this was the No. 1. This was the only one on final approach.
‘“*Q. And that is where the trouble came in, because you as-
sumed that was the plane that was ahead of you, isn’t it, Captain?
A. Probably, sir.’’
13a
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
In insisting the court erred in admitting the traffic pat-
tern as an exhibit and in instructing the jury that it was
a binding regulation and that an unauthorized deviation
from the pattern would be negligence per se, Eastern
relied on the fact that the traffic pattern had not been
published in the Federal Register and cited Hotch v.
United States, 9 Cir., 1953, 208 F. 2d 244, 250, as authority
that it was therefore not a binding regulation. The pat-
tern had been officially prescribed, however, and Eastern
had actual knowledge of it. In those circumstances we
think the pilots of the DC-4 were required to follow the
pattern and, since it is obviously a safety measure to
some extent, the court correctly charged the jury that an
unauthorized departure from it was negligence per se.
It is undisputed that the Eastern plane did leave the
traffic pattern and circled into it again on final approach
to the runway. Its departure from the pattern was not
negligence if the tower had cleared the plane to land.
Conceiving that an issue of fact had been developed as
to whether the DC-4 had been cleared to land, the trial
judge submitted that question to the jury and authorized
it to return a verdict against Eastern if it should deter-
mine landing clearance had not been given,—that the
Eastern plane had not been authorized by the tower to
leave the traffic pattern as it did.
Whether this was error, as Eastern contends, depends
on whether there was substantial evidence showing the
DC+4 had not been cleared to land. On this charge of
negligence against Eastern, as on all others, the burden
of proof lay on the appellees. As substantial evidence
sustaining the burden and showing the DC-4 had not been
cleared to land when it deviated from the pattern, they
rely upon (a) their contention that the Eastern plane was
late and, in order to make up time, short-cut the pattern
Without authority; (b) the testimony of Captain Ator;
l4a
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
and (c) the testimony of Lt. Shaw. We consider those
points in the order named.
(a) Even if it be conceded that the Eastern plane was
late, it by no means follows that its pilots attempted an
unauthorized landing to make up time. The point is with-
out substantial weight as evidence of lack of landing clear-
ance to the DC-4.
(b) Appellees further argue that, if Eastern was given
any clearance, it was to land after the P-38; and in sup-
port of the suggestion they point to the testimony of
Captain M. D. Ator, the check pilot of American Flight
No. 1, which at the time of the crash was at the south
end of runway 3 waiting to take off. Ator said his plane
was informed by the tower ground control that it could
take off after an eastern DC-4 had landed. On the basis
of this evidence, appellees argue as follows:
«“* * * According to Tigner, he cleared Eastern to
land first and the P-38 to follow Eastern. But if
Ator was to take off after Eastern landed, he would
have conflicted with the P-38. Thus the Ator testi-
mony indicates that if Eastern was cleared, it was to
land after the P-38.”
The argument rests on a false premise. Tigner did
not testify that he cleared the P-38 to land. He testified
that he told the P-38 it was “No. 2 to land on runway 3.”
This did not authorize it to leave the traffic pattern
and descend. That it was No. 2 to land does not mean
that Ator could not take off before it was cleared to land
and after Eastern landed. In any event this testimony
of Ator is insufficient to furnish a basis for a finding that
if Eastern was cleared to land it was to be after the
P-38.
—
15a
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
(c) Lt. Meredith D. Shaw, co-pilot, was flying a Na-
tional Airlines DC-4 en route from New York to Wash-
ington on the morning of November 1, 1949. The pilot,
Captain Porter, was handling the radio. Shaw testified
that when he was over Beltsville, Maryland, he heard the
Eastern plane report by radio to the tower, giving its
position and trip number; and heard the tower clear
it to enter the left traflic pattern for runway 3. Immedi-
ately afterward, at approximately 11:42 or 11:43 a. m., he
said his own plane was also cleared to enter the left
traffic pattern for runway 3, but was told to check again
with the tower when over Hains Point. He reached Hains
Point at 11:45 or 11:46, and at that time heard another
radio communication which said, “Eastern, traffic, a P-38,”
with a direction added which he did not remember. Shaw
testified he did not at any time hear any clearance to
Eastern to land, although he had earphones on continu-
ously> and was on tower frequency, just as Eastern was.
To the contrary, Tigner testified positively that he
cleared the DC-4 to land, after which it swung from the
pattern in a wide turn to approach runway 3. He ad-
hered to that statement despite vigorous cross-examina-
tion. Tigner further said the Eastern DC—4 followed his
instructions throughout the entire flight. The first notice
to Eastern that the P-38 was in the air was a few seconds
before the impact when the tower said, “Eastern 537,
make an immediate left turn. Traffic is P-38 above and
behind you.” Instantly responding to this direction, the
engines of the DC-4 roared and the plane began a left
turn but was struck before it could escape.
Thus the question is whether Shaw's negative testimony
that he heard no landing clearance given Eastern had
5 He qualified this statement somewhat by saving that, from the
time he was over Beltsville until his plane landed, ‘‘to the best
of my recollection I never took off the headset.’’
l6a
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
-enough probative value, as against Tigner’s affirmative
statement that he gave the clearance, to form an issue of
fact for the jury.
It is generally held in railroad crossing cases that nega-
tive testimony of a witness that he did not hear a warning
signal from a locomotive is sufficient to form an issue of
fact, in the face of affirmative evidence that the warning
was sounded, provided the witness was in a position to
hear, and provided his attention was not distracted. A
different situation is presented, however, when the wit-
ness is shown not to have been in a position to hear
or appears to have been inattentive. The testimony of
such a witness that he did not hear the warning signal
has little or no probative force. Small v. Pennsylvania
R. Co., 1935, 65 App. D. C. 112, 80 F. 2d 704; Strider v.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 6 Cir., 1932, 60 F. 2d 2387; V enchik
v. Pennsylvainia R. Co., 1941, 143 Pa. Super. 465, 18 A.
94 118; Lanier v. Missouri P. R. Co., 1929, 9 La. App.
586, 119 So. 710; Zotter v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 1924,
280 Pa. 14, 124 A. 284; Jensen v. Oregon Short Line R.
Co., 1922, 59 Utah 367, 204 P. 101; Rickert v. Union fe A
Co., 1916, 100 Neb. 304, 160 N. W. 86; Young v. Erie R.
Co., 1913, 158 App. Div. 14, 143 N Y. S. 176; Jordan v.
Osborne, 1911, 147 Wis. 623, 133 N. W. 32; Hubbard v.
Boston & A. R. Co., 1893, 159 Mass. 320, 34 N. E. 459.
Under the rule just stated Shaw’s negative testimony was
insufficient to form an issue if he either (a) was not in a
position during all the crucial nine-minute period to hear
messages sent from the tower to the Eastern plane 36 or
(b) appears not to have been attentive to all tower broad-
casts during that period.
It is an unquestioned and unquestionable fact that Shaw
was not in a position to hear messages from the tower
6 The period from 11:38 a. m., when Eastern was cleared into
the pattern, until 11 :46-11:47 a. m., when the crashed occurred.
;
17a
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
during all the critical nine-minute period. He testified
that, when the radio switch button was depressed for
transmission from his plane, incoming messages on that
frequency could not be heard by him or Captain Porter.
Consequently, whenever the latter called the tower during
the nine-minute period, or depressed the switch button
for that purpose, it was impossibe for him or Shaw to
hear a message broadcast from the tower to Eastern.
Captain Porter did not turn his radio selector to the
tower until approximately 11:42 or 11:43. It follows that
Shaw’s plane was on tower frequency only during the last
four or five minutes of the critical nine-minute period.
The evidence is not clear as to when and how often during
that brief period Porter depressed the switch button to
call the tower and so shut off Shaw’s ability to hear a
message from the tower to Eastern.
In this connection it is to be noted that Shaw could
not have heard the tower clearing Eastern to enter the
left traffic pattern, which he said he heard at approxi-
mately 11:42 or 11:43 while he was over Beltsville. This
is so because the parties agreed and stipulated that
Kastern received traffic pattern clearance at 11:38 a. m.—
the exact time at which Shaw unequivocally said he was
over the Baltimore relay about 15 miles northwardly from
Beltsville,?7 with his radio not yet tuned to the tower. It
is therefore clear that Shaw did not hear—as he said and
7 He was positive of that time and said the times of all other
incidents thereafter to which he testified were fixed by him through
arithmetical computations based on his presence at the Baltimore
relay at 11:38 a. m.
He described the Baltimore relay as ‘‘a radio fixing where two
beams meet * * * when you get a solid hum.”’ which is approxi-
mately 15 miles northwardly from the Beltsville fan marker. The
latter is a 75-megacycle transmitter just slightly northeast of
Beltsville, Maryland. It makes a fan-shaped transmission into
the air, by which planes are informed ihey are at Beltsville.
Se ew ®
18a
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
no doubt thought he did—the tower clear Eastern to enter
the traffic pattern.
What, then, cid Shaw hear at approximately 11:42 or
11:43 a. m.? Tigner testified that at approximately 11:44
a. m. he cleared Eastern to land. Since both Shaw and
Tigner were approximating the time, it may well have
been that Shaw heard the landing clearance given at
that time and inadvertently mistook it for traffic pattern
clearance.8 As we have said, it is certain he did not hear
Fastern’s clearance for the pattern. It follows that Shaw’s
statement that he heard no landing clearance to Eastern
is unconvincing.
Moreover, Shaw’s general situation was not conducive
to careful attention, as he was operating the controls of
his plane as it came over Beltsville to Hains Point and
to the airport. The pilot, Captain Porter, was therefore
primarily responsible for radio communications during
that time. Shaw was handling the controls of a huge
airplane and knew his colleague was charged with the
duty of sending and receiving radio messages. We cannot
attribute to him undivided attention to tower broadcasts
to other planes, although he may have had earphones
on. This is not to say he could not hear the communica-
tions he said he heard; but that he was not in the favorable
attitude of one whose negative testimony is for that
reason held to make an issue of fact.®
8 We observe that in a statement given March 4, 1950, to an
investigator of the CAB in Miami, Florida, Shaw said he ‘*heard
the tower giving Eastern landing clearance.’’ To be sure, he
testified that in making the statement he had misused the term
‘landing clearance.’’ But whether he in fact misused the term
‘landing clearance’ in describing the clearance he heard, is
open to serious question because, as we have shown, he could not
have heard the actual traffic pattern clearance which was given
earlier to Eastern.
9 Captain Porter did not testify.
19a
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
As to whether his testimony shows he listened carefully
to the messages sent to Eastern by the tower—an illus-
tration will be indicative: After testifying that at 11:45
or 11:46 he heard the tower say, “Eastern, traffic, a P-38,”
Shaw said, “And at that point he gave them a direction;
but the direction didn’t register.” (By “direction” he
said he meant the position of the P-38.) The direction of
the Bolivian plane given to Eastern by the tower “doesn’t
stick in my mind,” he said, although he remembered that a
direction was given. The full message was stated thus
by Tigner, who sent it: “Eastern 537, make an immediate
left turn. Traffic is P-38 above and behind you.” (Tigner
is corroborated by other tower operators and also by
undisputed evidence that thereupon Eastern began an
immediate left turn.) So, Shaw’s possible inattention is
shown by the fact he heard only part of the message, and
remembered only part of what he heard.
All these considerations show the inadequacy of Shaw’s
negative testimony ; that his claimed failure to hear Tigner
clear Eastern to land was due to the depression of the
switch which cut off radio reception, or due either to
inattention or misinterpretation, and was not enough to
raise an issue of fact for the jury as to whether the DC-4
had left the traffie pattern without tower authority to
do so.
The negative testimony is weakened further by the
fact that, because of the human instinct of self-preserva-
tion and the disposition of men to avoid personal harm,
Kastern’s dead pilots are presumed to have acted with
diligence and due care. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v.
Toops, 1930, 281 U. 8. 351, 356, 50 S. Ct. 281, 74 L. Bad.
896; Looney v. Metropolitan R. Co., 1906, 200 U. S. 480,
488, 26 S. Ct. 3038, 50 L. Ed. 564; Campbell v. District of
Columbia, 1935, 64 App. D. C. 375, 78 F. 2d 725; Baltimore
€ P. R. Co, v. Carrington, 1894, 3 App. D. C. 101; Bratt
20a
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
v. Western Air Lines, 10 Cir., 1948, 169 F. 2d 214, 216;
Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Spike, 8 Cir., 1903, 121 F. 44, 47.
It has been said the presumption “rises to the dignity of
evidence.” United States v. Fotopulos, 9 Cir., 1950, 180
F.. 2d 631, 637.
As we said in Universal Airline, Inc. v. Eastern Air
Lines, Inc., 1951, 88 U. S. App. D. C. 219, 188 F. 2d 993,
it is not for us to substitute our views for those of the
trier of fact in the District Court when there is conflicting
evidence. But here, as in that case, the evidence con-
cerning the crucial fact is without substantial conflict.
Affirmative testiruony that the Eastern plane was cleared
to land was not countered by evidence sufficient to form
a factual issue; hence the appellees failed to carry their
burden of showing the contrary by a preponderance of the
proof. The intervention of the jury is required only
where some question of fact is actually in controversy.
Oscanyan v. Arms Ce., 1880, 103 U. S. 261, 266, 26 L. Ed.
539.
While there were other charges of negligence against
Eastern which were submitted to the jury, certainly the
principal accusation was that it attempted to land with-
out having been cleared by the tower to do so. Since the
trial court simply asked the jury, “Is Eastern Air Lines
liable?” and the jury simply answered, “Yes,” we do not
know in what way its members considered Eastern had
been negligent; but we do know the jury was authorized
by the court to find against the Air Lines if it should con-
clude the DC-4 had not received landing clearance. We
are therefore forced to hold the trial court erred in sub-
mitting to the jury the question whether the Eastern
plane unauthorizedly deviated from the traffic pattern.
Having so held, we think it unnecessary to discuss the
other grounds for reversal advanced by Eastern Air
Lines. The judgments against it will be reversed, and
the cases will be remanded for a new trial.
2la
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
Ill
The principal question presented by the Government’s
appeal is whether the United States has consented to be
sued for negligence of its control tower employees in
regulating air traffic at a public airport. In answering
the question, we must construe the Federal Tort Claims
Act which limits the liability of the United States to
that which a “private individual” would have “under like
circumstances,” and excludes claims arising from the
performance of a discretionary function or duty.1!
1028 U. S. C. §1346(b) and § 2674 are as follows:
§1346(b). ‘Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of
this title, the district courts * * * shall have exclusive jurisdic-
tion of civil actions on claims against the United States, for
money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for
injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused
by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee
of the Government while acting within the scope of his office
or employment, under circumstances where the United States,
if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accord-
ance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.”’
§ 2674. ‘The United States shall be liable, respecting the
provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior
to judgment or for punitive damages.
“If, however, in any case wherein death was caused, the
law of the place where the act or omission complained of
occurred provides, or has been construed to provide, for
damages only punitive in nature, the United States shall be
liable for actual or compensatory damages, measured by the
pecuniary injuries resulting from such death to the persons
respectively, for whose benefit the action was brought, in lieu
thereof. June 25, 1948, ¢. 646, §1, 62 Stat. 983.”
11The pertinent portion of 28 U. S. C. § 2680 is as follows:
‘“‘The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of
this title shall not apply to—
““(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an em-
ployee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execu-
22a
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
The Government insists that its tower operators per-
form governmental functions of a regulatory nature; that
no private individual has such power of regulation; that
therefore the Act does not permit suit based on negligent
performance of their duties. The situation involved here,
says the Government, when viewed in all the circum-
stances, “cannot be equated to one which would predicate
analogous private liability,” and so it is said the claims
are excluded from the coverage of the Tort Claims Act.
The history of the development of the control tower
is helpful in considering whether there is or may be
private liability analogous to that sought to be imposed
upon the United States in this case. What is said to
be the forerunner of the present control tower was con-
structed in 1931 at an airport in Cleveland, Ohio. During
the following five years 20 other cities erected and operated
towers, and by 1939 there were 52 towers being operated
by municipalities.
Regulations promulgated under the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938 provided for the issuance of certificates of
competence to tower operators; and standard procedures,
equipment, installations and tower operating techniques
were suggested, but were not required to be adopted.
November 1, 1941, the CAA issued a Manual of Opera-
tions setting forth Standard Airport Traffic Control Pro-
cedures, and shortly thereafter all certificated tower
operators were required to apply them.
In August, 1941, Congress appropriated funds to enable
CAA to maintain and operate a number of towers.
Through gradual increase in funds available, the CAA
tion of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or
regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or perform-
ance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion
involved be abused.’’
23a
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
was operating 165 of the country’s 200 towers on Novem-
ber 1, 1949, the date of the accident involved here. As
late as April, 1954, there were stil! a number of towers
in operation which had not been taken over by CAA
personnel. The operators in those non-Government towers
must be certificated by CAA before they may control
civil aircraft in air commerce.!2, Such towers are subject
to CAA inspection;!#3 and the Administrator of Civil
Aeronautics has prescribed procedures and techniques
which must be followed by the towermen. Nevertheless,
these non-CAA controllers are not government employees,
and perform no governmental function.
Airports are usually constructed, maintained and oper-
ated by municipalities, probably because the cost of con-
struction is great and the prospect of financial reward
does not attract private capital. But, as far as we know,
as of November 1, 1949, there was no reason why a private
individual or a private corporation could not construct an
airport and operate a control tower manned by its own
operators certificated by the CAA. Such an individual or
corporation would of course be liable for the negligence
1249 U. S. C. A. §401(6) includes within its definition of an
airman ‘‘any individual who serves in the capacity of * * * ai--
traffic control-tower operator.’’ And 49 U. S. C. A. §560(a) (2)
prohibits any person from serving as an airman in any capacity
without an appropriate certificate to so serve. To be eligible for
a control tower operator certificate an applicant must meet physi-
eal, experience and other qualifications and must pass an examina-
~e on the subject of air traffic control. 14 Code Fed. Regs.
art 26.
1349 U. S. C. A. § 556 is as follows:
‘“‘The Administrator of Civil Aeronautics is empowered to
inspect, classify, and rate any air navigation facility available
for the use of civil aircraft of the United States, as to its
suitability for such use. The Administrator of Civil Aero-
nautics is empowered to issue a certificate for any such air
navigation facility.’’
24a
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
of privately employed tower operators. It follows that,
when the United States entered the business of operating
a civil airport and an air traffic control tower in connec-
tion therewith, it assumed a role which might be and was
assumed by private interests. Hence, under 28 U. S. C.
§§ 1346(b) and 2674, the Government is liable for the
negligent acts or omissions of its control tower operators
in the performance of their functions and duties, unless
those Code provisions do not apply because the operators’
activities are of the sort described in the exceptions sub-
section, § 2680(a).
The United States insists that the subsection applies,
and shields it from liability here. It argues that
§ 2680(a)
«“* * * incorporates into the Act the historic prin-
ciple that the courts will not, in a private action,
revise or review executive conduct involving the
exercise of judgment or discretion of a public char-
acter”;
that the tower operators’ duties are public in nature and
involve the exercise of discretion and judgment, with the
result that neither the operators nor the United States can
be held liable for their negligent performance.
The principle referred to is indeed historic, as it was
stated in Marbury v. Madison, 1803, 1 Cranch 137, 169-
170, 5 U. S. 137, 169-170, 2 L. Ed. 60, and has since been
consistently adhered to. We have no doubt that the
principle was consciously restated by Congress when it
declared in § 2680(a) that the United States should not
be liable on
“Any claim * * * based upon the exercise or per-
formance or the failure to exercise or perform a dis-
cretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
—
:
25a
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
agency or an employee of the Government, whether
or not the discretion involved be abused.”
The heart of the question, however, is whether this case
falls within the historic principle; whether the Govern-
ment is correct in saying, as the second step in its argu-
ment, “that the tower operators’ duties are public in
nature and involve the exercise of discretion and judg-
ment.” We think the statement is incorrect, for the rea-
sons hereinafter given. We hold that the tower operators
merely handle operational details which are outside the
area of the discretionary functions and duties referred
to in 4 2680(a); and that, consequently, the Tort Claims
Act permits the Government to be sued for damages sus-
tained because of their negligence.
Applicable authority is available to sustain our view,
as comparable questions have been considered by other
courts. Costley v. United States, 5 Cir., 1950, 181 F. 2d
723, involved the question whether the Tort Claims Act
permitted the Government to be sued for the negligence
of its employees in an army hospital. A master sergeant’s
wife was admitted to the maternity section. As an inci-
dent to delivering her child, employees of the United
States prepared and injected into her body a drug which
yas intended to be a spinal anaesthetic but in fact was
a very harmful substance which caused the woman to be
permanently paralyzed from the waist down.
The question on appeal from the District Court’s dis-
missal was whether the employees were under a duty to
use due skill and reasonable care in attending Mrs. Cost-
ley after having admitted her to the hospital under an
army regulation authorizing her admission, or whether
they were performing a discretionary duty or function
which, under § 2680(a), cannot be made the basis of a
tort claim against the Government. The Court of Ap-
26a
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
peals quoted the army regulation that wives of soldiers
may be admitted to army hospitals when suitable facilities
for hospitalization are available, and then said, 181 F. 2d
at page 725:
“With facilities available for her care, Mrs. Costley
was admitted to the hospital pursuant to the above
regulation. Having decided that there were facilities
available, and having admitted her for treatment, the
hospital authorities no longer had any discretion to
exercise with regard to whether she was to receive
careful or negligent treatment. A duty arose at this
point to treat her with the same care, skill, diligence,
and ability, that would be owing by a private person
or corporation under the same or similar circum-
stances.”
In accord are Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 4
Cir., 1951, 193 F. 2d 631, and United States v. Gray, 10
Cir., 1952, 199 F. 2d 239. Judge Dobie’s Somerset opinion
sufficiently distinguishes Feres v. United States, 1950, 340
U. S. 135, 71 S. Ct. 153, 95 L. Ed. 152, by saying, 193 F. 2d
at page 634:
«* * * All that case really decided was the ‘Govern-
ment is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act
for injuries to servicemen where the injuries (arose)
out of or are in the course of activity incident to
service.’ ”
The holding of the Costley, Somerset and Gray cases
was neither overruled nor impaired by the later decision
of the Supreme Court in Dalehite v. United States, 1953,
346 U. S. 15, 73 S. Ct. 956, 97 L. Ed. 1427.14 That was a
14 The Government says the Somerset Seafood Co. case was over-
ruled by the Dalehite opinion. We think not; our analysis of that
opinion convinces us to the contrary.
—
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
27a
test case representing some 300 separate personal and
property claims aggregating $200,000,000 which were based
on explosions of fertilizer with an ammonium nitrate base,
at Texas City, Texas, in 1947. Suing under the Tort
Claims Act, the plaintiffs claimed negligence substantially
on the part of the entire body of federal officials and em-
ployees involved in a program of production of the mate-
rial—Fertilizer Grade Ammonium Nitrate (FGAN)—in
which the original fire occured and which exploded. This
fertilizer had been produced and distributed at the in-
stance, according to the specifications, and under the con-
trol of the United States.
The question before the Court was whether the acts
and omissions alleged as negligence were done or omitted
in th performance of or failure to perform a discretion-
ary function or duty within the meaning of § 2680(a).
The Court said, 346 U. S. at page 34, 73 S. Ct. at page
697 :
«“* * * The ‘discretion’ protected by the section
* * * is the discretion of the executive or the admin-
istrator to act according to one’s judgment of the
best course, a concept of substantial historical an-
cestry in American law.”
The statement just quoted was supported in 73 S. Ct. at
page 967, by footnote 30, which is as follows:
“It seems sufficient to cite Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch 137, 170, 2 L. Ed. 60; Spalding v. Vilas, 161
U. S. 483, 498, 16 S. Ct. 631, 637, 40 L. Ed. 780; Alzna
v. Johnson, 231 U. S. 106, 34 S. Ct. 27, 58 L. Ed. 142;
15 This is the ‘‘historie principle,’’ referred to in the Govern-
ment’s brief, about which there can be no dispute. But, as we
have said, the real question here is whether tower activities fall
within the principle.
¥y
6
:
28a
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
State of Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U. 8. 627, 663, 34
S. Ct. 938, 940, 58 L. Ed. 1506; Perkins v. Lukens
Steel Co., 310 U. S. 113, 131, 60 S. Ct. 869, 878, 84
L. Ed. 1108.”
The Court went on to say, 346 U. S. at pages 35 and 36,
73 S. Ct. at page 968:
“It is unnecessary to define, apart from this case,
precisely where discretion ends. It is enough to
hold, as we do, that the ‘discretionary function or
duty’ that cannot form a basis for suit under the
Tort Claims Act includes more than the initiation of
programs and activities. It also includes determina-
tions made by executives or administrators in estab-
lishing plans, specifications or schedules of opera-
tions. Where there is room for policy judgment and
decision there is discretion. * * *”
It was then pointed out that the Cabinet-level decision to
institute the fertilizer export program was a discretionary —
act; that the basic “Plan” for the production of FGAN |
was drafted by the Office of the Field Director of Am-
munition Plants in June 1946, prior to beginning pro-
duction. It was further stated that each of the specific
acts of negligence charged in the manufacture of FGAN
was in accordance with and done under specifications and
directions set forth in the basic Plan for the production
of fertilizer. Each of the acts looked upon as negligence
was directed by this Plan. The Court concluded as fol-
lows, 346 U. S. at page 42, 73'S. Ct. at page 971:
“In short, the alleged ‘negligence’ does not sub-
ject the Government to liability. The decisions held
culpable were all responsibly made at a planning
rather than operational level and involved considera-
29a
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
tions more or less important to the practicability of
the Government’s fertilizer program.”
We may fairly infer from the statement just quoted
that the United States is liable for the negligence of its
employees at the operational level, where there is no
“room for policy judgment and decision.” This leads us
to the Government’s argument that the negligence charged
against the tower operators is the same as that charged
against th Coast Guard in the Dalehite case, which the
Supreme Court held was not actionable because of the
discretionary exception. We quote in the margin the
Supreme Court’s disposition of the alleged negligence of
the Coast Guard.!6
16 346 U. S. at pages 42-43 and 44, 73 S. Ct. at pages 971-972:
‘*The findings of negligence on the part of the Coast Guard
in failing to supervise the storage of the FGAN, and in fight-
ing the fire after it started, were rejected by a majority of
the Court of Appeals. [Dalehite v. United States, 5 Cir.]
197 F. 2d at 777, 780, 781. We do not enter into an examina-
tion of these factual findings. We prefer, again, to rest
our decision on the Act.
*‘The District Court’s holding that the Coast Guard and
other agencies were negligent in failing to prevent the fire by
regulating storage or loading of the fertilizer in some different
fashion is like his specifie citations of negligence discussed
above. They are classically within the exception. ‘The power
to adopt regulations or by-laws * * * for the preservation
of the public health, or to pass ordinances preseribing and
regulating the duties of policemen and firemen * * * are
generally regarded as discretionary, because, in their nature,
they are legislative.’ Weightman v. Corporation of Washing-
ton, 1 Black 39, 49, 17 L. Ed. 52. The courts have tradi-
tionally refused to question the judgments on which they are
based. Zywicki v. Jos. R. Foard Co., D. C., 206 F. 975;
Gutowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 127 Md. 502, 96 A. 630;
State of Maryland to use of Goralski v. General Stevedoring
Co., D. C., 213 F. 51.
‘* As to the alleged failure in fighting the fire, we think this
a
30a
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
The Court made it clear that, as far as the alleged
official dereliction of duty in failing to police the ship-
board loading was concerned, the decision not to do so
had been made at a policy-forming level and was not the
decision of the individual members of the Coast Guard
whose duty it would have been to do the policing had
they been instructed to do it. The Court said:
«“* * © To impose liability for the alleged nonfeas-
ance of the Coast Guard would be like holding the
United States liable in tort for failure to impose a
quarantine for, let us say, an outbreak of foot-and-
mouth disease.”
We may paraphrase the quoted sentence thus:
“To impose liability for the alleged nonfeasance of
the Coast Guard would be like holding the United
States liable in tort for the failure of the CAA to
take over for maintenance and operation a certain air
traffic control tower.”
Had the Coast Guard authorities decided to supervise the
storage, we have no doubt the United States would have
too without the Act. The Act did not create new causes
of action where none existed before.
‘««@ # ® the liability assumed by the Government here is
that created by ‘‘all the circumstances,’’ not that which a
few of the circumstances might create. We find no parallel
liability before, and we think no new one has been created
by, this Act. Its effect is to waive immunity from recognized
causes of action and was not to visit the Government with
novel and unprecedented liabilities.’ Feres v. United States,
340 U. S. 135, 142, 71 S. Ct. 153, 157, 95 L. Ed. 152.
‘*It did not change the normal rule that an alleged failure
or carelessness of public firemen does not create private ac-
tionable rights. * * * To impose liability for the alleged non-
feasance of the Coast Guard would be like holding the United
States liable in tort for failure to impose a quarantine for,
let us say, an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease.’’
3la
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
been liable in tort for any causal negligence of its per-
sonnel acting at the operational level. So it is here:
discretion was exercised when it was decided to operate
the tower, but the tower personnel had no discretion to
operate it negligently.
The distinction between non-actionable planning and
actionable negligence in carrying out the plan, was clearly
stated by the Supreme Court in Johnston v. District of
Columbia, 1886, 118 U. S. 19, 6 S. Ct. 923, 30 L. Ed. 75.
Johnston’s property was damaged when a sewer over-
flowed. He sued the District of Columbia, alleging that it
“knowing!y coustructed and continued upon an unreason-
able and defective plan, and of inadequate capacity for its
purpose, and wrongfully permitted [it] to become clogged
up.” The Court said, 118 U. S. at pages 20-21, 6 S. Ct.
at page 924:
“The duties of the municipal authorities, in adopt-
ing a general plan of drainage, and determining
when and where sewers shall be built, of what size
and at what level, are of a quasi judicial nature,
involving the exercise of deliberate judgment and
large discretion, and depending upon considerations
affecting the public health and general convenience
throughout an extensive territory; and the exercise
of such judgment and discretion, in the selection and
adoption of the general plan or system of drainage,
is not subject to revision by a court or jury in a
private action for not sufficiently draining a par-
ticular lot of land. But the construction and repair
of sewers, according to the general plan so adopted,
are simply ministerial duties; and for any negligence
in so constructing a sewer, or keeping it in repair,
the municipality which has constructed and owns
the sewer may be sued by a person whose property
is thereby injured.”
i. en et oo ee i ec So oS a
32a
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
With this distinction in mind, we turn to the trial
court’s opinion and find the following statement as to the
nature of the acts and omissions of the tower operators
which were held to constitute negligence :
“* * * As to negligence, I find that there was
failure of the control tower personnel to issue a
timely warning to the Eastern plane as to the P-38
being on final approach; in the failure, also, to warn
the P-38 that Eastern was on final approach; in
clearing both planes for the same runway at ap-
proximately the same time, having in mind their
respective positions in relation to each other and
the speed of both their approach and descent; and
the failure to keep both planes advised as to the
activities of the other; I find this to be negligence
and concurrent both in character and in relation
to that found by the jury with respect to the defend-
ant Eastern. I find, further, that such negligence
contributed proximately to the injury complained of.”
The three negligent omissions and the one affirmative
negligent act found by the court were not “decisions
responsibly made at a planning level” and did not in-
volve any consideration important to the practicability of
the Governnent’s program of controlling air traffic at
public airports. The tower operators acted, and failed
to act, at an operational level. While they were in a
sense exercising discretion as to what they should and
should not do, they were not performing the sort of
discretionary functions contemplated by § 2680(a) and
clearly described in the Dalehite decision.
It is therefore our opinion that, if a Government tower-
man negligently clears two planes to land on the same
runway at the same time, or is guilty of some other
negligent act or omission in doing his work, the Govern-
33a
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
ment is liable for resulting injury in the same manner
and for the same reason that it is liable for injury done
by the driver of a mail truck who, in exercising discretion
as to how to drive, negligently runs through a red traffic
light. ,
The Government contends, however, that even though
its theory of non-liability under § 2680(a) be rejected,
the judgments against it should be reversed because the
trial court’s findings do not provide sufficient factual bases
for its ultimate conclusion of negligence. We deem it
unnecessary to do more than quote the pertinent findings
of fact, which expanded the above quotation from the
trial court’s opinion:
“3. At all times in question, there was available
in good operating condition in the control tower at
said airport and in each plane voice radio equipment
for two-way contact between said tower and either
plane or between the tower and both planes simul-
taneously.
“4. For an adequate period of time before the
collision, both planes were visible to the control
tower personnel who observed said planes and knew
that said planes were on converging approaches for
landing on runway 3, and said personnel had an
adequate opportunity to give timely warnings and
instructions to each plane.
“>. At all times in question, weather conditions
at and near the airport were excellent and visibility
unimpeded.
“6. At pll times in question, the Washington Na-
tional Airport and the control tower facilities thereat
were owned by the defendant, United States of Amer-
ica, and were being operated by it through its agents
34a
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
and employees (the tower personnel) assigned there-
to by the Civil Aeronautics Administration, an agency
of the United States.
“7. The said agents and employees of the United
States in their operation of the control tower at said
airport failed to exercise reasonable care and were
guilty of negligence in the circumstances in question
in that, having in mind the respective positions of
said planes in relation to each other and their speed
of approach and descent:
“a) they failed to issue a timely warning to the
Eastern plane concerning the P-38 on final approach;
“b) they failed to warn the P-38 that the Eastern
plane was on final approach;
“e) they cleared both planes for the same runway
at approximately the same time; and
“d) they failed to keep both planes advised of the
activities of the other.
“8. The negligence of United States through its
agents and employees, as set out in finding No. 7
above, was a proximate cause of the fatal collision
resulting in the deaths of plaintiffs’ decedents, and
such negligence of the United States also concurred
with the negligence of Eastern as the proximate
cause of said collision.
“9. The collision occurred over the Potomac River
within the boundary of the District of Columbia.”
These findings seem to us to be sufficiently in detail to
justify the conclusion of negligence.
It is observed that the Government does not directly
charge that the evidence is insufficient to support the find-
ings of fact which were made by the trial judge. We have
35a
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
considered the question, however, and have concluded
there was proof adequate to support the findings, although
it is meager with respect to the finding that the tower
cleared both planes for the same runway at approximately
the same time—which is probably the most important of
the findings. For, although the trial court was amply
justified in finding (contrary to the jury’s apparent con-
clusion) that the Eastern plane was cleared to land—and
indeed could hardly have found otherwise,—there is only
slight evidence tending to show the Bolivian plane was
ever cleared to land.
Bridoux himself practically conceded his own negligence
of which the jury rather unaccountably exonerated him)
n mistaking the message “You are No. 2 to land” for
ictual and absolute landing clearance. But he did say:
‘I said ‘Washington Tower, Bolivian P-38 on final ap-
roach.” They responded to me immediately, * * * ‘Boli-
‘lan P-38, prepare to land on runway 3” Consequently,
f the trial judge believed, as apparently he did, that
sridoux actually sent such a message and received such
in answer from the tower, there was some evidence that
he tower gave landing clearance to the Bolivian as well
s to the DC-+4. We cannot substitute our judgment on a
actual issue for that of the trial judge simply because
re might have reached a different conclusion.
As to all the foregoing, the court is unanimous. We
re divided, however, as to another contention of the
‘nited States which remains to be considered: that it
‘as error to measure the Government's liability under the
iw of the District of Columbia,!7 which does not limit the
mount of damages for wrongful death, instead of under-
ne law of Virginia, which limits recovery to $15,000 for
17 The trial judge found from conflicting evidence that the
cident oceurred over the Potomae River, which is in the District
f Columbia.
36a
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
the death of one person. The contention is based on the
fact, that although the planes collided in the District of
Columbia, the negligent acts and omissions of the tower
operators occurred in the tower, which is in Virginia.
The general conflicts rule disregards the law of the place
of the negligent act or omission and, instead, uses the law
of the place where the injury was sustained. My brothers
Edgerton and Fahy are of the view that the trial court
erred in applying the general rule here because the Tort
Claims Act provides in § 1346(b) that
«“* * * the district courts * * * shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the
United States, for money damages, * * * for * * *
death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omis-
sion of any employee of the government * * * under
circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.” (Emphasis supplied.)
They hold that Congress thus provided in explicit terms
for the Government's liability to be measured under the
law of the place where its negligent employee’s act or
omission occurred, and that therefore the Act requires
Virginia law to be applied in this case.
I do not agree that the language of § 1346(b) compels
us to conclude that Congress had in mind the general
conflicts rule to which reference has been made and in-
tended to make it inapplicable in situations such as this.
I think the legislative expression “in accordance with the
law of the place where the act or omission occurred” was
intended to mean, and therefore should be construed as
meaning, “in accordance with the law of the place where
the tort occurred.” An act, in legal as well as in popular
use; is not merely a voluntary muscular contraction, but
~
-
37a
Oriqimal Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
something more. The word commonly includes the con-
sequences of the muscular contraction. If the defendant
pulls the trigger and the bullet kills a man, in legal as
in popular usage the killing is said to be the defendant’s
act.
In accordance with this usage, I interpret the statutory
words “act or omission” as including not only the mes-
sages negligently sent or omitted by the tower operators,
but also their immediate consequences. This is consistent
with § 377 of Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934), which
reads: “The place of wrong is in the state where the
last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged
tort takes place.” .
My interpretation also accords with that indicated by
Assistant Attorney General Shea in his testimony before
the House Committee on the Judiciary concerning the
Tort Claims bill,!8 as being the then interpretation of the
Department of Justice. Ie said, when asked where a
claimant brings suit,.“Either where the claimant resides,
or in the locale of the injury or damage.” (Italics sup-
plied.) The witness was referring to the venue provision
of the then pending legislation which is now 28 U.S. C.
§ 1402(b):
“(b) Any civil action on a tort claim against the
United States under subsection (b) of section 1346 of
this title may be prosecuted only in the judicial district
where the plaintiff resides or wherein the act or omis-
sion complained of occurred. June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
§1, 62 Stat. 937.”
The words of § 1402(b) which he was construing are not
only the same words which oceur in § 1346(b), with which
18 Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 77th
Cong., 2nd Sess.. on H. R. 5373 and H. R. 6463 (Jan. 29, 1942),
p. 9.
38a
Original Opinion of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated February 8, 1955
we are concerned, but also were used with a direct refer-
ence to that section.
The judgments against the United States will be af-
firmed, except that the judgment for $150,000 in No, 12,017
will be reduced to $15,000 to meet the limitation imposed
by the law of Virginia on the amount of recovery.
The judgments in Nos. 11,991 and 11,992 are reversed
and the cases are remanded for a new trial restricted to
the issue of liability. The judgment in No. 12,017 is
affirmed as modified and the judgment in No. 12,018 is
affirmed.
Per Curiam Decision of United States Supreme Court
Dated December 5, 1955, United States v. Union
Trust Co. et all.
Octroser TERM 1955
Per Curtam Deciston—December 5, 1955
(350 U. S$. 907)
No. 296. United States v. Union Trust Co. et al. On
petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Perr
Curtam: The petition for writ of certiorari is granted
and the judgment is affirmed. Indian Towing Co. v. United
States, 350 U. S. 61. Solicitor General Sobeloff, Assistant
Attorney General Burger, Paul A. Sweeney and Lester S.
Jayson for the United States. David G. Bress, Sheldon
E. Bernstein, Alvin L. Newmyer and Jo V. Morgan, Jr.
for respondents. Reported below: 95 U. S. App. D. C.
189, 221 F. 2d 62.
eee
39a
Per Curiam Decision of United States Supreme Court
Dated December 5, 1955, Union Trust Co. et al. v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc.
OctToser Term 1955
Per Curtam Deciston—December 5, 1955
(350 U. S. 907)
No. 298. Union Trust Co. et al. v. Eastern Air Lines,
Inc. On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
Per Curiam: The petition for writ of certiorari is granted
and the judgment is reversed. Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER
and Mr. Justice Harian would not grant certiorari. David
G. Bress, Sheldon E. Bernstein, Alvin L. Newmyer and
Jo V. Morgan, Jr. for petitioners. Joseph W. Henderson,
Richard W. Galiher and John M. Aherne for respondent.
Reported below: 95 U.S. App. D. C. 189, 221 F, 2d 62.
—___.
Per Curiam Decision of United States Supreme Court
Dated February 27, 1956, Union Trust Co. et al. v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc.
Per Curiam Deciston—February 27, 1956
(350 U. S. 962)
No. 298. Union Trust Co. et al. v. Eastern Air Lines,
Inc. On consideration of the petition for rehearing, the
order of December 5, 1955, is reopened and is modified by
directing that the case be remanded to the Court of Ap-
peals to permit that court to pass upon the several issues
left undecided by our reversal of its judgment.
40a
Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For tur District or CotumBia Crrcvit
Nos. 11,991 and 11,992
>
—_
Eastern Air Lives, Ivc.,
Appellant,
Vv.
Uxiox Trust Co., et al.,
Appellees.
Argued June 6, 1996
Decided Sept. 20, 1956
Petition for Rehearing In Bane Denied Jan. 9, 1957
Messrs. Joseph W. Henderson, Philadelphia, Pa., and
Richard W. Galiher, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr.
John M. Aherne, New York City, of the bar of the Su-
preme Court of New York, was on the brief, for appel-
lant.
Mr. David G. Bress, Washington, D. C., with whom
Messrs. Sheldon E. Bernstein, Alvin L, Newmyer and Jo
V. Morgan, Jr., Washington, D, C., were on the brief, for
appellees.
Before Epcertox, Chief Judge, and WILBcR KK. MiIcuer
and Fauy, Cireuit Judges.
Wiscr K. Mutter, Circuit Judge: When these cases
were first before us, we reversed the judgments against
r
Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956
4la
Eastern Air Lines in an opinion to which reference is
made for a statement of the factual situation. 1955, 95
U. S. App. D. C. 189, 221 F. 2d 62. We held that,
since the pilot of a National airliner flying in the general
vicinity was admittedly not in a position during all of
the critical period to hear radio messages sent by the
contro] tower to the Eastern plane, and since he appeared
not to have been fully attentive to such tower broadcasts
as he actually did hear during that period, the National
pilot’s negative testimony that he heard no landing clear-
ance given the Eastern plane did not have enough proba-
tive value, as against the tower operator’s affirmative
statement that he gave such clearance, to form an issue
of fact for the jury.
Having so held, we concluded the trial court erred in
submitting to the jury the question whether the Eastern
plane had negligently deviated from the traffic pattern
without tower clearance to do so, when it was struck from
above and behind by the Bolivian plane. Because of that
conclusion, we reversed the judgments without reaching
other grounds for reversal advanced by Eastern Air
Lines.
There followed a petition for a writ of certiorari, with
respect to which the Supreme Court said December 5,
1955, “The petition for writ of certiorari is granted and
the judgment is reversed.” 350 U.S. 907, 76 S. Ct. 192.
On petition for rehearing by Eastern Air Lines, the
Supreme Court ordered on February 27, 1956:
“On consideration of the petition for rehearing,
the order of December 5, 1955, ante, p. 907, is re-
opened and is modified by directing that the case be
remanded to the Court of Appeals to permit that
court to pass upon the several issues left undecided
by our reversal of its judgment.” 350 U. S. 962. 76
S. Ct. 429.
a
42a
Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956
Thus the cases are again before us. Supplemental briefs
have been filed and further oral argument has been heard.
Eastern Air Lines urges it was deprived of a fair trial
by the plaintiff's “clear design to destroy the character,
integrity and credibility of the tower witnesses by base-
less charges of fabrication and concoction.” The trial
judge told the jury such charges had first been made and
then withdrawn, and then charged in regard thereto:
“So, therefore, 1 want to immediately have you dispel
that from your minds, because counsel have said there
is no charge of fabrication or concoction or subornation
of perjury, if you will, in this case.” While the record
furnishes some basis for supposing the plaintiffs had the
design attributed to them by Eastern, we think the court's
admonition was adequate to remove any possible prejudice
from the minds of the jurors if they were otherwise un-
prejudiced, and that reversal on this ground alone is not
warranted,
Kastern says it was gravely prejudiced by the fact that
the jury heard all the evidence in the non-jury case; that
alleged fault on the part of the tower operators was im-
puted to it by the jury. Even though we assume that
Eastern was disadvantaged because the cases against it
and the non-jury cases against the Government were tried
at the same time, Eastern for reasons then deemed pru-
dent consented to consolidation of the cases for simul-
taneous trial. It cannot now complain because this was
done.
In our first opinion we rejected Eastern’s contention
that the trial court erred in receiving in evidence the
approach and landing pattern offered as an exhibit by
the appellees because it had not properly been officially
prescribed; and held the Eastern pilots were required to
follow the pattern unless landing clearance, which au-
thorizes deviation from it, had been given by the tower.
43a
Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956
Eastern urges that we reconsider the ruling and hold the
pattern inadmissible. We adhere to our original holding
in this regard.
Finally, Eastern urges that the trial judge erred in
denying its alternative motions for judgment non obstante
veredicto or for a new trial, filed under Rule 50(b), Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.1| The motion asked the
court to set aside the verdicts in favor of Bridoux, the
Bolivian pilot, as well as those against Eastern. The
appellees moved for a new trial of their cases against
Bridoux if a new trial were awarded to Eastern Air
Lines.
The new trial issue includes the inquiry whether the
verdicts were against the clear weight of the evidence,
whether they were induced by passion, sympathy and
prejudice, and whether a miscarriage of justice will re-
sult therefrom, These included inquires, particularly the
latter, contain a combination of questions. One phase of
1The pertinent portion of the Rule is as follows:
“*(b) Reservation of Decision on Motion. Whenever a
motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the
evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the
court is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury
subject to later determination of the legal questions raised
by the motion. Within 10 days after the reception of a
verdict, a party who has moved for a directed verdict may
move to have the verdict and any judgment entered thereon
set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with
his motion for a directed verdict * * ® A motion for a
new trial may be joined with this motion, or a new trial
may be prayed for in the alternative. If a verdict. was
returned the court may allow the judgment to stand or may
reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct
the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been
directed. °° *" 980.8.C. A.
44a
Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956
resulting injustice is asserted by the appellant in this
quotation from its supplemmental brief, at pages 2 and 3:
«* * * The District Court, in the Tort Claims
Act cases, found that Eastern had been cleared
to land, and this Court ruled that such finding
was ‘amply justified’ (Op. p. 38; [95 U. S. App.
D. C. 189], 221 F. 2d 62, 79). Under the trial court’s
charge to the jury, Eastern could have been found
liable only if it had not been cleared to land.
Having found against Eastern the jury necessarily
found that Eastern was not cleared to land, thus
placing it in direct conflict with the fact finding
of the Trial Judge. The result is an extraordinary
and unusual situation in which, having heard the
same evidence from the same witnesses, at the same
time, and on the same record, the court (as a trier
of the facts) and jury reach precisely contradictory
conclusions. Based upon the court’s fact finding, final
judgments have been entered against the United
States and duly affirmed by this Court and by the
United States Supreme Court. The jury finding
against Eastern is now before this Court for exam-
ination to determine if a new trial should be had.
“It is a self-evident truth that the same proposition
é cannot be true and false at the same time, and under
3 the same aspect. Therefore either the jury was wrong
3 in finding that Eastern was not cleared to land, or
; the Trial Judge was wrong in finding that Eastern
was cleared to land. The existence of this extraordi-
nary and unseemly conflict of findings speaks most
eloquently to the necessity for a new trial.”
Before considering the new trial issue, we must decide
whether the phase of it suggested in the foregoing quota-
s.. ee Age ered te te
eal
45a
Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956
tion remains open after remand, in view of the Supreme
Court’s decision that the District Court did not err in
submitting the clearance question to the jury. We think it
is still open. In submitting the clearance question t» the
jury, the trial judge simply held that, viewing the evi-
dence in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, an issue
of fact had been raised, and in this he has been upheld
by the Supreme Court; but he did not weigh or evaluate
‘ae evidence pro and con until he ruled on the motion
for a new trial and this ruling has not been passed on
by the Supreme Court.
A holding that a verdict for the defendant should not
be directed does not necessarily mean that a verdict
against him should not be set aside on a motion for a
new trial. There is a clear distinction between a trial
judge’s duty in ruling on a motion for a directed verdict
and his duty in ruling on a motion for a new trial. The
distinction is reflected in Rule 50(b) and is shown in the
cases. For example, in Garrison vy. United States, 4 Cir.,
1932, 62 F. 2d 41, Judge Parker said, at page 42:
“e * * Where there is substantia! evidence in sup-
port of plaintiff’s case, the judge may not direct a
verdict against him, even though he may not believe
his evidence or may think that the weight of the
evidence is on the other side: for, under the consti-
tutional guaranty of trial by jury, it is for the jury
to weigh the evidence and pass upon its credibility.
He may, however, set aside a verdict supported by
substantial evidence where in his opinion it is con-
trary to the clear weight of the evidence, or is based
upon evidence which is false; for, even though the
evidence be sufficien preclude the direction of a
verdict, it is still his to exercise his power over
the proceedings before him to prevent a miscarriage
of justice. * * *”
Ge eT eal Aelita Fit Be 4
2 SRF ee,
oa
Buiswe ‘-
46a
Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956
In Aetna Casualty &€ Surety Co. v. Yeatts, 1941, 122 F.
2d 350, the Fourth Circuit again discussed the subject,
and said at pages 352-53:
“* * * On such a motion {for a new trial] it is the
duty of the judge to set aside the verdict and grant
a new trial, if he is of opinion that the verdict is
against the clear weight of the evidence, or is based
upon evidence which is false, or will result in a mis-
carriage of justice, even though there may be sub-
stantial evidence which would prevent the direction
of a verdict. The exercise of this power is not in
derogation of the right of trial by jury but is one
of the historic safeguards of that right. Smith v.
Times Pub. Co., 178 Pa. 481, 36 A. 296, 35 L.R.A.
$19; Bright v. Eynon 1 Burr. 390; Mellin v. Taylor
3 B.N.C. 109, 132 Eng. Reports 351. The matter was
well put by Mr. Justice Mitchell, speaking for the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Smith v. Times
Publishing Co., supra * * * as follows: “The authority
of the common pleas in the control and revision of
excessive verdicts through the means of new trials
was firmly settled in England before the foundation
of this colony, and has always existed here without
challenge under any of our constitutions. It is a
power to examine the whole case on the law and the
evidence, with a view to securing a result, not merely
legal, but also not manifestly against justice,—a
power exercised in pursuance of a sound judicial
discretion, without which the jury system would be a
capricious and intolerable tyranny, which no people
could long endure, This court has had occasion mere
than once recently to say that it was @ power the
courts ought to exercise unflinchingly.’ (Italics sup-
plied).”
47a
Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956
And at page 354, the court said:
“To the federal trial judge, the law gives ample
power to see that justice is done in causes pending
before him; and the responsibility attendant upon
such power is his in full measure. While according
due respect to the findings of the jury, he should not
hesitate to set aside their verdict and grant a new
trial in any case where the ends of justice so re-
quire.”
The foregoing paragraph was repeated in Virginian Ry.
Co. v. Armentrout, 4 Cir., 1948, 166 F. 2d 400, 408, 4 A. L.
R. 2d 1064, with this addition:
“The power of this court to reverse the trial court
for failure to exercise the power, where such failure,
as here, amounts to an abuse of discretion, is like-
wise clear. * * *”
Other cases setting forth these principles include the
following: Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 1940, 311
U. S. 243, 251, 61 S. Ct. 189, 85 L. Ed. 147; Mt. Adams &
E. P. Inclined Ry. Co. v. Lowery, 6 Cir., 1896, 74 Fed.
463; Felton v. Spiro, 6 Cir., 1897, 78 Fed. 576: Adams v.
United States, 7 Cir., 1940, 116 F. 2d 199; General Ameri-
can Life Ins. Co. v. Central Nat. Bank, 6 Cir., 1948, 136 F.
2d 821; Marsh vy. Illinois Central R. R., 5 Cir. 1949, 175
F. 2d 498; Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 9 Cir., 1951, 186
F. 2d 926, 932 note 10; Snead v. New York Central R. R.,
4 Cir., 1954, 216 F. 2d 169.
We conclude, on the authorities and on reason as well,
that the trial judge had the power and duty to grant a
new trie! if the verdicts were against the clear weight of
the evidence, or if for any reason or combination of rea-
sons justice would miscarry if they were allowed to
stand; and that this court has the power and duty to
48a
Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956
reverse and order a new trial if the trial judge abused
his diseretion in denying the metion therefor.
As to what has been said so far in this opinion, the
court is unanimous, We are not in agreement, however,
as to the disposition of the new trial issue. My brothers
Kdgerton and Fahy take the view that the verdicts were
not so clearly against the weight of the evidence or so
plainly the result of passion, prejudice and sympathy, or
otherwise so unjust that the trial judge can be said to
have abused his discretion in refusing to grant a new
trial. It follows that this final point urged by Eastern is
rejected by a majority of the court and the judgn..#‘s
against the appellant will be affirmed.
I think Eastern Air Lines is entitled to a new trial and
that the trial judge abused the judicial discretion com-
mitted to him when he denied the motion. Although the
discretion is broad and appellate review thereof is limited
in scope, I suggest that the denial of a aew trial must
he held an abuse of discretion when it is demonstrable
bevond peradventure that the verdict was flagrantly
against the great weight of the evidence and that grave
injustice will flow from it. Such is the situation here,
in my opinion.
In the first place, a simple statement of what happened
on the fatal morning is sufficient to arouse misgivings as
to the validity of the jury’s verdict. Shortly before noon
on a clear, bright day, the Eastern airliner with two
experienced pilots and 53 other persons aboar@ was
swinging into final approach for landing. The Bolivian
pilot, in a warplane so constructed that he could not see
before and below him, was hurrying to land because of
an ailing engine. He mistakenly thought, without asking
the tower, that the plane authorized to land ahead of him
on the runway he was approaching had already landed
and was out of the way. So he came hurtling downward
pina
49a
Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956
and, without ever seeing the Eastern plane, struck it
from above and behind, cut it in two, and killed the 55
persons who were aboard. Yet the jury said the Bolivian
pilet was not negligent, and that the collision was caused
by negligence on the part of the airliner’s pilot.
There is no basis whatever for exonerating the Bolivian
of negligence, as 1 shall show. The only substanaal basis
for attributing negligence to the stricken airliner is the
charge that it had not been cleared to land and so had
unauthorizedly deviated from the pattern when it swung
into final approach, and had negligently placed itself in
the path of danger. Undoub‘edly the jury decided to con-
clude that the tower had not cleared the Eastern plane
for landing, so the weight of the evidence on that subject
must be examined.
The tower operator unqualifiedly said he had given
clearance to Eastern. He said the liner responded imme-
diately to all his instructions from the time of its first
appearance, including his direction to turn, unfortunately
given too late, when he saw Bridoux was coming on re-
gardless. The dead pilots are presumed to have done
their duty. They were experienced men entrusted with
the lives of a large number of people, and were of course
imbued with the universal instinct of self-preservation.
Moreover, the tower operator was confirmed by Bridoux
himself, perhaps unwittingly, when he said the tower told
him, “You are No. 2 to land on runway 3.” The evidence
shows no plane but Eastern which could have been No. 1
to land on that runway.
There was no affirmative evidence tending to show that
landing clearance had not been given to the airliner.
2 The appellees urge, unconvincingly I think, that the jury may
have thought Eastern was cleared to land and may have found
it negligent for some other reason. The other negligence attrib-
uted to Eastern was too slight, and too much dependent upon
lack of clearance, to give credence to the argument.
. > ner eae
_ aie
py SS BOI LOSE Cte ADB EL LD ch aM
TOR RAS An
Benicia wire
50a
Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956
Lt. Shaw, the National pilot flying near Hains Point,
merely said se heard none. His negative testimony is
the on'y basis for the jury’s conclusion. Shaw admitted,
however, that he could not hear tower messages when his
colleague depressed the transmitting key. He was en-
gaged at the controls of a large airplane and did not
remember all the tower communications which he did
hear.
The jury’s finding that Eastern had not been cleared
to land, based on such flimsy evidence, when considered
in connection with its astonishing verdict in favor of Bri-
doux, impresses me as having been the product of emo-
tion rather than of evidence. I think the trial judge
abused his discretion in not setting aside the verdicts as
arbitrarily arrived at, contrary to the overwhelming
weight of the evidence.
This brings me to a consideration of the jury’s exon-
eration of Bridoux and the part it probably played in
producing the verdicts against Eastern Air Lines. There
may be some question as to whether the verdict in favor
of the Bolivian pilot, who was of course a defendant in
the jury trial along with Eastern, is before us for review,
since there was no appeal from the judgment thereon.
The propriety of the verdict was before the district
judge, however, on the motion for a new trial; it was
expressly drawn to his attention and he had the power
sua sponte to grant a new trial of the cases against
Bridoux. Sulzbacher v. Continental Casualty Co., 8 Cir.
1937, 88 F. 2d 122. Regardless of that, the fact that
the jury found for Bridoux is pertinent for consider-
ation; for, if the verdict in his favor was contrary to the
weight of the evidence and was dictated by sympathy, as
I think it clearly was, the jury’s willingness to depart
from the evidence and to be swayed by emotion is
demonstrated.
5la
Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956
The source of the jury’s sympathy for Bridoux is
easily seen in his testimony. His story was a moving
one, even in cold print. It must have been even more
dramatic and appealing when he told from the witness
stand in faulty English how he had never seen the
Eastern craft, how he plui.ged into the Potomac, and
how he escaped from bis plane as it lay on the bottom
of the river, although he was grievously injured.
But the fact is that, to all intents and purposes, he
admitted guilt of the grossest sort of negligence, except
for which the collision would not have occurred. He was
flying over the busy National Airport a plane which
probably should not have been permitted to ascend into
such crowded air because its structural design limited
visibility and because it had a defective engine which
developed trouble when he had been aloft only a few
minutes. He was in a hurry to land.
In this situation, when the tower said in response to
his request for landing instructions, “You are No. 2 to
land on runway 3,” Bridoux said he regarded the state-
ment as actual and absolute landing clearance as soon
as he should decide for himself, without further commu-
nication from or with the tower, that the No. 1 plane to
land on runway 3 was out of the way. Not only did he
testify that he so regarded the tower statement when it
was made to him, but he also argumentatively insisted
from the witness stand that he had correctly interpreted
the tower message.
This misinterpretation, due either to stupidity or un-
familiarity with the English language, was the primary
cause of the collision, for Bridoux acted in accordance
with his misunderstanding. He said he saw a plane on
the ground ahead of him which he concluded was the
No. 1 plane already landed, and so he thought it unneces-
sary to check with the tower to learn whether the plane
- ve areing
52a
Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956
cleared to land before him had actually landed. Instead
he proceeded to descend blindly at the rate of 500 feet
per minute and at a forward speed of 150 miles per hour.
As a consequence he struck the Eastern plane, which he
never saw and which was vainly trying to escape from
him in response to frantic warning given by the tower
operator when he saw Bridoux was not turning to the
left as he had been told to do. Bridoux said he heard
this instruction but thought it was directed to a plane on
the ground. The fact that the Bolivian pilot’s mistaken
idea that he had been authorized to land without further
clearance was the primary cause of the collision is also
reflected in these questions to Bridoux and his answers
to them:
“Q. It would have prevented this accident, wouldn't
it, if you had called the tower and inquired as to the
identity of the plane abhead of you? A. Except that
I happened to observe this plane on final approach,
not any other plane. Therefore I assumed this was |
the No. 1. This was the only one on final approach.
“Q@. And that is where the trouble came in, be-
cause you assumed that was the plane that was ahead
of you, isn’t it, Captain’ A. Probably, sir.”
In view of the foregoing, it is unthinkable that the jury
had any reason except sympathy for finding that the
probably judgment-proof Bridoux was not negligent. It
was an easy step for such an impressionable jury, through
sympathy for the more than 50 dead and their bereaved
dependents, to find against the luckless appellant, whose
witnesses were killed in the crash.
Other factors, insufficient sta’. ng alone to require re-
versal, may have contributed to the totality of unfairness.
For example, the appellees’ attempt to show “that the
tower statements and testimony did in fact result from |
53a
Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956
mutual consultations between the tower men and their
superiors”? may have been regarded by the jury as a
charge of fabrication and concoction and therefore as an
attack on the veracity and integrity of the tower oper-
ators. To be sure, the appellees disclaimed any intention
of charging them with corruption, and the court conse-
quently admonished the jury to put out of their minds
the idea there was any charge of concocted or fabricated
testimony by the tower witnesses. But a jury willing to
depart from the evidence so far as to find a verdict for
the Bolivian pilot might well have been willing to ignore
the court’s admonition, and to seize upon the idea of
fabrication as a reason for rejecting the tower testimony.
We have seen that it is the duty of a trial judge to
grant a new trial when it is clearly necessary to do so
in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice. He ought
to perform the duty by exercising the power “unflinch-
ingly,” as the Pennsylvania court said. It is equally our
duty to see that a miscarriage of justice does not result
from a jury’s verdict. From the same evidence which
the jury heard, the trial judge found the tower operators
had negligently cleared both Eastern and Bolivian to land
on the same runway at approximately the same time, and
awarded judgment against the Government principally
because of that negligence. Thus he did not agree with
the jury on the fundamental issue as to whether Eastern
was negligent, but found that its plane had been cleared
to land. His finding has in effect been affirmed by the
Supreme Court, and I think is conclusively correct. Cer-
tainly it was amply justified by the evidence. Had the
jury reached the same sound conclusion, it would have
been bound to absolve Eastern.
3 Appellee’s brief on remand, p. 3.
DAE ie Sangha Beit 4
» tes
dat Lin
Beecarniscsaniaxc:
54a
Opinion on Remand of Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Dated September 20, 1956
This court’s affirmance of the judgments against the
appellant produces this anomalous situation: Eastern
Air Lines and the United States have both been mulcted
in damages because of contrary findings on a single fun-
damental factual issue. The judgments against both de-
fendants cannot possibly be correct; justice has miscar-
ried either as to Eastern or as to the Government.
Since the Supreme Court has affirmed the judgments
against the latter, and so has stamped approval on the
finding that the Eastern plane was cleared to land, I see
no escape from the conclusion that Eastern Air Lines is
the victim of injustice.
I would resolve the anomaly by reversing the judg-
ments and remanding the cases for a new trial with direc-
tions that, if the evidence on the subject is substantially
the same as before, the landing clearance question should
not be submitted to the jury, since the question has now,
as it had not when the first jury was instructed, been
authoritatively answered; other acts of negligence alleged
against Eastern, if supported sufficiently by evidence,
should be submitted for the jury’s consideration. I am
unwilling to believe the court is powerless to right the
wrong which has been done in these cases.
Affirmed.
4United States v. Union Trust Co., 1955, 350 U. S. 907, 76
S. Ct. 192.
J Sohal eons
55a
Opinion of United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
For tHe District or CoLUMBIA
>
>
Civ. Nos. 4691-50, 4692-50
Union Trust Co. or District or CoLtumsia et al.,
Plaintiffs,
V.
Unitep Srates,
Defendants.
(Two cases)
>
—< >
Galiher & Stewart, Washington, D. C., and Bigham,
Englar, Jones & Houston, New York City, for defendant
Eastern Air Lines, Ine.
David G. Bress and Sheldon Bernstein, Washington,
D. C., for Union Trust Co.
Ross O’Donoghue and Vincent Burke, Jr., Asst. U S.
Attys., Washington, D. C., for U. S.
McGume, District Judge.
These are wrongful death actions by the executor of
the estates of Ralph E. Miller and Mildred Miller, hus-
band and wife, who died in an air collision of November 1,
1949, in the vicinity of Washington National Airport while
they were passengers in an Eastern Airlines plane.
Before trial the parties had stipulated and agreed on
the following facts:
At approximately 11:46-11:47 A. M., E. S. T. on Novem-
ber 1, 1949, an Eastern Airlines DC-4 No. N88727, de-
| | Pee ged ae
56a
Opinion of United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953
nominated as Eastern flight 537, and a P-38 military type
aircraft No. NX-26927 collided in mid-air while the East-
ern DC-4 plane was approximately 300 feet in the air on
final approach for landing on runway number 3 at the
Washington National Airport, Washington, D. C. Eastern
flight 537 was carrying a crew of 4 persons (pilot, copilot,
steward and stewardess) and 51 passengers, all of whom,
including plaintiffs’ decedents, were killed in and as a
direct and proximate result of said accident. The P-38
was carrying only the pilot, Eric Rios Bridoux, a citizen
of Bolivia and an officer in the Bolivan Air Force who was
then operating the P-38. Bridoux was seriously injured
in said collision but survived. Both aircraft were com-
pletely wrecked and such debris or components of the
planes as were thereafter found in or near the scene of
the collision are indicated on a stipulated chart.
Kastern’s flight 537 was enroute from Boston, Massa-
chusetts, via intermediate points to Washington, D. C.
Over Beltsville, Maryland, 15 miles northeast of the
Washington National Airport, flight 537 contacted the
Washington control tower on 119.1 megacycles voice radio
communications and the flight was cleared by the tower
to enter a left traffic pattern for landing on runway num-
ber 3. One minute before that clearance, that is, at 11:37
A. M., E. S. T., the P-38 had taken off from runway num-
ber 3 at Washington National Airport on a test flight.
From the time the P-38 departed until after the accident,
visibility in the vicinity of the airport remained at 15
miles, ceiling was 6,500 feet with scattered clouds at 3,500
and surface wind was from the northeast 20-25 miles
per hour.
As to the defendant Eastern Airlines, there was a jury
verdict against it, while the defendant Bridoux was
exonerated.
The case of the defendant United States was tried to
———— tae
57a
Opinion of United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953
the Court at the same time, the plaintiff alleging negli-
gence of a concurring character specifically set forth in a
pretrial stipulation:
a. The failure of the control tower personnel to issue
a timely warning to the Eastern plane as to the P-38 being
on final approach;
b. The failure of the tower personnel to take appro-
priate steps to warn the P-38 that the Eastern plane was
on final approach and to deter him from flight actions in-
consistent with or dangerous thereto;
ce. The failure of the tower personnel to take appro-
priate action to separate the two planes involved so as to
avoid collision;
d. The failure of the tower personnel to employ simul-
taneous radio transmissions to both planes to assure each
being advised as to the actions of and the directions to
the other;
e. The failure of the tower personnel to require the
Eastern plane to follow the prescribed landing pattern
and toleration of a shortcut thereof;
f. The failure of the tower to warn the P-38 that the
Eastern plane was not following the prescribed landing
pattern but was shortcutting same;
g. Violation of air regulations then and there in full
force and effect, as follows: Civil Air Regulations, Part
26, § 26.26, Aeronautical Rules for the Washington Na-
tional Airport, § 571.3.
I conclude under the statute, the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 28 U. S. C. A. §§ 1346, 2671 et seq., so-called relied
upon by the plaintiff in its suit against the Government,
that the United States has waived immunity, and the
Court has jurisdiction.
Ae ee Fe EN
58a
Opinion of United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953 |
The case of Feres, Exrecutrix v. United States, 340 U.S.
135, 71 S. Ct. 153, 95 L. Ed. 152, relied on heavily by the
Government in support of its motion for a directed judg-
ment in its favor, can be distinguished.
True, Mr. Justice Jackson, who spoke for the Court and
interpreting the statute said: “* * * It will be seen that
this is not the creation of new causes of action but accep-
tance of liability under circumstances that would bring
private [emphasis supplied] liability into existence.” 340
U. S. at page 141, 71 S. Ct. at page 157.
And it is on this language that the Government seizes
with avidity. It contends that since the United States,
through the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Administra-
tor of Civil Aeronautics, in discharge of a congressional
mandate, has promulgated exhaustive and complete air
traffic rules governing all phases of air traffic operation
and control, which have nationwide force and application
—that this is a function sovereign in character and con-
stitutional in genesis:
“Congress has recognized the natural responsibility
for regulating air commerce. Federal control is inten-
sive and exclusive. Planes do not wander about in
the sky like vagrant clouds. They move only by
federal permission, subject to federal inspection, in
the hands of federally certified personnel and under
an intricate system of federal commands. The moment
a ship taxis onto a runway it is caught up in an
elaborate and detailed system of controls. Jt takes off
only by instruction from the control tower, té travels
on prescribed beams, it may be diverted from its in-
tended landing, and it obeys signals and orders.
{Emphasis supplied] Its privileges, rights, and pro-
tection, so far as transit is concerned, it owes to the
Federal Government alone and not to any state gov-
—— “ ~e wu tate cure — OSE AEE RL AR SS
59a
Opinion of United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953
ernment.” Northwest Air Lines v. State of Minnesota,
1944, 322 U. S. 292, 303, 64 S. Ct. 990, 956, 88 L. Ed.
1283.
With the duty thus imposed of the “regulation of air
commerce in such manner as to best promote its develop-
ment and safety * * *”, Title 49 U. S. C. A. § 402(e),
there follows as a matter of course the corollary re-
sponsibility to promote safety of flight, by the prescrip-
tion of air traffic rules, and their revision from time to
time as circumstances and conditions warrant and dictate,
«* * * for the prevention of collisions between aircraft,
and between aircraft and land or water vehicles.” 49
U.S. C. A. § 551(a) (7).
Thus the Government concludes since this function is
purely governmental—that is, sovereign—there is no lia-
bility since the only allowable claims are those which “* * °
in the same manner and to the same extent a private indi-
vidual under like circumstances * * *” would be liable
for, with certain exceptions not material here, and since
there is no liability of a private individual “even re-
motely analogous to that * * *” now asserted against the
Unted States, the claim falls.
For it is argued no private individual has power to
assume the prerogatives of sovereignty, for no private
person, individual or corporate could possibly act in the
capacity in which the United States acts in its regulation
of air commerce, citing Feres, supra.
But the Feres case as has been said can be distinguished
for it went off on the matter of status. And the distine-
tion is one of substance. Feres was a soldier who per-
ished in a barracks fire while on active duty; the negli-
gence alleged being the quartering him in barracks which
were known or should have been known to have been un-
60a
Opinion of United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953
safe because of a defective heating plant—the Court con-
cluding : .
“We know of no American law which ever has per-
mitted a soldier to recover for negligence, against
either his superior officers or the Government he is
serving. [Italics supplied.] Nor is there any liability
‘under like circumstances,’ for no private individual
has power to conscript or mobilize a private army
with such authorities over persons as the Govern.
ment vests in echelons of command.” 340 U. S. supra,
at page 141, 71 S. Ct. at page 157.
It is upon this language which the Government strongly
relies, but in support of the distinction made, it is sug-
gested that the concluding paragraph of the upinion, 340
U. S. supra, at page 146, 71 S. Ct. 153, clearly and con-
clusively shows that the Government’s argument is actu-
ally what it purports to be—analogous only, and remotely
so. That paragraph as is germane reads as follows:
“We conclude that the Government is not liable
under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to
servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in
the course of activity incident to service. * * * We do
not think that Congress, in drafting this Act, created
a new cause of action dependent on local law for
service-connected injuries or death due to negligence.”
(Emphasis supplied.) 340 U. S. supra, at page 146,
71S. Ct. at page 159.
Thus it appears emphasizing the distinction made.
In this connection it is interesting to note the case of
United States v. Spelar, 338 U. S. 217, 70 S. Ct. 10, 94
L. Ed. 3, decided in October Term 1949 and just about
eleven months before the decision in Feres. There, the
= PRE ERNE ARE OE RN A CAE, CMR Oy ee MR ESSER PR
6la
Opinion of United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953
District Court of the United States for the Eastern
District of New York dismissed an action brought against
the United States under the Act to recover for the wrong-
ful death of a flight engineer at an airfield in Newfound-
land leased by the United States from Great Britain,
alleging, it appears, negligence upon the part of the
United States in the operation of the field. Spelar v. U.S.,
D. C., 75 F. Supp. 967. The Court of Appeals, 2 Cir.,
reversed, 171 F. 2d 208.
The decedent Spelar was an employee of American
Overseas Airlines and was killed in a take-off crash. The
plane involved was that of the decedent. The District
Court as has been said dismissed the action,—not, how-
ever, on the ground of governmental immunity but pre-
dicated its action on the fact of the incident occurring in
a “foreign country” and thus within a specific exception
set forth in the statute! The Supreme Court reversed
the Court of Appeals, holding with the Court of first
instance.
Now this is of interest solely as an indication that
apparently the government in the Spelar case was not
quite so certain of the point it argues here with such
urgency, and it must have had some doubt about it, be-
cause it preferred to take its position on the more certain
ground of a statutory exception. Nor was an appeal taken
in Cerri v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 831 at page 833,
in which Judge Roche met the issue head on and decided
it adversely to the government, and in an opinion that
has since been liberally quoted and relied on.
Certainly if the regulation of air commerce is a sov-
ereign function that of the Coast Guard is sovereign also,
being as it is “a military service and a branch of the
armed forces of the United States at all times * * *”,
128 U.S. C. § 2680(k).
62a
Opinion of United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953
Title 14, U. S. C. A. ¢1, and an essential part of its
function is aids to navigation. 14 U. S. C. A. § 81.
And further, part of its function in this respect is to
maintain Loran stations “(b) required to serve the needs
of the maritime commerce of the United States; or (ce)
required to serve the needs of the air commerce of the
United States as determined by the Administrator of
Civil Aeronautics.” (Italies supplied.) Id.; ef. also 14
U.S. C. A. § 82. |
Yet it has been held that a case was stated against the |
United States under the Federal Tort Claims <Act, the
negligence alleged being that of creating and marking the
wreck of an old battleship. The Court, citing and adopting
the distinction herein made of the reach and effect of the
Feres case, supra.
Somerset Seafood Co, v. United States, 4 Cir., 1951, 193
F. 2d 631, 633, 634, 635, citing Cerri v. U.S. supra, with
approval.
The conclusions thus reached, it seems to me, are
indicative of the fact that the technical niceties hitherto
drawn between what are governmental and other fune.
tions are rapidly being done away with in an age in which
the activities of the Government impinge so manifoldly
upon the individual citizen in nearly all of his. The pres-
ent climate of public opinion, of which the Federal Tort
Claims Act is the most conspicuous example, is to the
effect that the fiction of sovereign immunity is for the
most part outmoded and as far as it relates to the 2~ in
question, preserved only in those specific exceptions which
Congress has specifically indicated and of which the ae-
tivity with which we are here concerned is not one. See
generally, Federal Crop Ins. Co. v. Merrill, 1947, 332 U.S.
380, 383, 68 S. Ct. 1, 92 L. Ed. 10.
As the Supreme Court has further said, in United States
v. Fellow Cab Co., 1950, 340 U. S. 543, at page 547, 548,
ae oo ——e
63a
pinion of United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953
49 and 550, 71 S. Ct. 399, 402, 95 L. Ed. 523, in relation
» the Federal Tort Claims Act:
“Tie Federal Tort Claims Act waives the Govern-
ment’s immunity from suit in sweeping language. It
unquestionably waives it in favor of an injured per-
adidas
“This Act does not subject the Government to a
previously unrecognized type of obligation. Through
hundreds of private relief acts, each Congress for
many years has recognized the Government’s obliga-
tion to pay claims on account of damage to or loss of
property or on account of personal injury or death
caused by negligent or wrongful acts of employees
of the Government. This Act merely substitutes the
District Courts for Congress as the agency to de-
termine the validity and amount of the claims. It
suggests no reason for reading into it fine distinctions
between various types of such claims. * * *
«* * * The proceedings emphasized the benefits to
be derived from relieving Congress of the pressure
of private claims. Recognizing such a clearly defined
breadth of purpose for the bill as a whole, and the
general trend toward increasing the scope of the
waiver by the United States of its sovereign immunity
from suit, it is inconsistent to whittle it down by
refinements.”
New York State has had a similar statute for some
vears. See: Jackson v. State of New York, 1933, 261 N. Y.
134, 184 N. FE. 735; Bloom v. Jewish Board of Guardians,
1941, 286 N. Y. 349, 36 N. E. 2d 617; Foley v. State of
New York, 1945, 294 N. Y. 275, 62 N. E. 2d 69, citing
Jackson v. State of New York and Bloom vy. Jewish Board
of Guardians, supra. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co.,
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64a
Opinion of United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953
247 N. Y. 160, 159 N. E. 896, 62 A. L. R. 1199 ean be
distinguished.
All of which leads to this: When the Government, as
here, takes upon itself the function—as it claims it
must—of the regulation of air commerce and the respon-
sibility, among other things, of regulating the flow of
traffic at a public airport, the assumption of such a re-
sponsibility involves something further, namely, not only
an activity designed to be protective of the interest of
that a morphous group known as the publie as & whole,
but that of individuals as well, against potential hazards
incident to such performance and implicit in its under-
taking. And if injury or death results as a consequence
of the negligence of its servants or agents so engaged,
Congress has decreed that the mantle of sovereignty
which heretofore has protected it, falls from its shoulders
and thus what was formerly at best an unenforceable
moral obligation is thus transmuted into an actionable
legal right. And whatever exceptions there are, this is
not one of them.
Such | find to be the situation here and so hold.
So much for liability. As to negligence, I find that
there was failure of the control tower personnel to issue
a timely warning to the Eastern plane as to the P-38
being on final approach; in the failure, also, to warn the
P-38 that Eastern was on final approach; in clearing both
planes for the same runway at approximately the same
time, having in mind their respective positions in relation
to each other and the speed of both their approach and
descent, and the failure to keep both planes advised as
to the activities of the other; I find this to be negligence
and concurrent both in character and in relation to that
found by the jury with respect to the defendant Eastern.
I find, further, that such negligence contributed proxi-
mately to the injury complained of.
nl nest CRATE DISET IIE
65a
Opinion of United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953
With respect to the locale, the Court concurs in the
finding ef the jury that the accident occurred in the Dis-
trict of Columbia. This particular question was not easy
of resolution. The presentation of evidence with respect
to it took many trial days and it was a very long trial.
But a careful evaluation of it, having in mind such perti-
nent and persuasive factors as the narrowness, so to speak,
of the geographical area involved in relation to the line
of demarcation between the District of Columbia and the
Commonwealth of Virginia; the allowing for the widening
angle of vision from the position of an observer on the
ground in relation to an object in the air unless directly
overhead; and the grave possibility of error resulting
therefrom; the very suddenness of the business, so to
speak; the nature and character of the terrain, ete., all
lead to this conclusion. In addition, by way of corollary
and in support of this finding, the testimony of an ex-
pert, skilled in the science of aerodynamics and predicated
basically on admitted facts as to where the major wreckage
of the carrrier was found, and his mathematical recon-
struction as a consequence of the episode, allowing as
he did for such factors as speed, wind velocity, weight,
altitude, position, direction; the type of aircraft involved;
the character of the collision, and result to the passenger
plane and where, in relation to its fuselage; the aero-
dynamic characteristics involved from the time its tail
fell off; the horizontal advance of the forward section;
the character and nature of falling bodies generally and
those specifically involved here; conclusively resolves the
question as far as the Court is concerned, indicating as
it did in relation to all of the evidence that it prepon-
derated decisively in favor of the factual resolution
reached.
With reference to damages, I also concur in the
verdict of the jury and find accordingly, i. e., $50,000 for
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66a
Opinion of United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, Dated May 5, 1953
the estate of the male decedent and $15,000 for that of the
female. Nor do I in the present state of the economic
worth of the dollar and the evidence adduced herein con-
clude in either case such sums to be in any way excessive.
Counsel will prepare tentative findings of fact and judg.
ment. Order accordingly.
Statutes
ADMINISTRATIVE ProcepurE Act—d U.S. C. 1001 et seq,
See. 1001. Definitions.
As used in this chapter
(c) Rule and rule making.
“Rule” means the whole or any part of any agency |
statement of general or particular applicability and future —
effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law
or policy * * *. “Rule making” means agency process for
the formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule.
* * *
(g) Agency proceeding and action.
“Agency proceeding” means any agency process as de-
fined in subsections (c), (d), and (e) of this section.
“Agency action” includes the whole or part of every |
agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equiva- :
lent or denial thereof, or failure to act. (June 11, 1946,
ch. 324, see. 2, 60 Stat. 237)
——_— saa AIR NEC BENE ABD LAD Ret ECE LE LTO E LIS DEI EIIE A
67a
Statutes
See. 1002. Publication of information, rules, opinions
orders and public records.
(a) Every agency shall separately state and currently
publish in the Federal Register * * * (3) substantive rules
adopted as authorized by law and statements of general
policy or interpretations formulated and adopted by the
agency for the guidance of the public, but not rules ad-
dressed to and served upon named persons in accordance
with law. No person shall in any manner be required to
resort to organization or procedure not so published.
See. 1003. Rule making.
Except to the extent that there is involved (1) any
military, naval, or foreign affairs function of the United
States or (2) any matter relating to agency management
or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits,
or contracts——
(a) Notice; publication and contents.
General notice of proposed rule making shall be pub-
lished in the Federal Register (unless all persons subject
thereto are named and either personally served or other-
wise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law)
and shall include (1) a statement of the time, place, and
nature of public rule making proceedings; (2) reference
to the authority under which the rule is proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule
or a description of the subjects and issues involved. Ex-
cept where notice or hearing is required by statute, this
subsection shall not apply to interpretative rules, general
statements of policy, rules of agency organization, pro-
cedure, or practice, or in any situation in which the agency
for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a
brief statement of the reasons therefor in the rules issued)
SETI AN kDa oe REI BPR Naa Pe aise:
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68a
Statutes
that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable,
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.
(b) Procedures.
After notice required by this section, the agency shall
afford interested persons an opportunity to participate
in the rule making through submission of written data,
views, or arguments with or without opportunity to pre-
sent the same orally in any manner; and, after considera-
tion of all relevant matter presented, the agency shall
incorporate in any rules adopted a concise general state-
ment of their basis and purpose. Where rules are re-
quired by statute to be made on the record after oppor-
tunity for an agency hearing, the requirements of sections
1006 and 1007 of this title shall apply in place of the
provisions of this subsection.
(c) Time of publication or service of rules.
The required publication or service of any substantive
rule (other than one granting or recognizing exemption
or relieving restriction or interpretative rules and state-
ments of policy) shall be made not less than thirty days
prior to the effective date thereof except as otherwise pro-
vided by the agency upon good cause found and published
with the rule.
FeperaL Recister Act—44 U.S. C. 301 et seq.
Sec. 301. Custody and printing of Federal documents;
“Division” created in Archives Establishment;
Director, appointment and compensation.
The Administrator of General Services, acting through
a division established by him-in the National Archives
Kstablshment, hereinafter referred to as the “Division”,
is charged with the custody and, together with the Public
EIR ReA ss Manes 2 een NORE NA IA AABN AT eR YP AEG ARLES WPAN LINCO SIRS OU RETR
69a
Statutes
Printer, with the prompt and uniform printing and dis-
tribution of the documents required or authorized to be
published under section 305 of this title.
See. 302. Filing documents with “Division”; notation of
time; public inspection; transmission for
printing.
The original and two duplicate originals or certified
copies of any document required or authorized to be pub-
lished under section 305 of this title shall be filed with the
Division, which shall be open for that purpose during all
hours of the working days when the Archives Building
shall be open for official business. The Administrator
of General Services shall cause to be noted on the ori-
ginal and duplicate originals or certified copies of each
document the day and hour of filing thereof: Provided,
That when the original is issued, prescribed, or promul-
gated outside of the District of Columbia and certified
copies are filed before the filing of the original, the nota-
tion shall be of the day and hour of filing of the certi-
fied copies. Upon such filing, at least one copy shall
be immediately available for public inspection in the office
of the Administrator of General Services. The original
shall be retained in the archives of the National Archives
Establishment and shall be available for inspection under
regulations to be prescribed by the Administrator of Gen-
eral Services. The Division shall transmit immediately
to the Government Printing Office for printing, as pro-
vided in this chapter, one duplicate original or certified
copy of each document required or authorized to be pub-
lished under section 305 of this title. Every Federal
agency shall cause to be transmitted for filing as herein
required the original and the duplicate originals or certi-
fied copies of all such documents issued, prescribed, or
promulgated by the agency. (July 26, 1935, ch. 417, see.
Bie i
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£5 AORN R OME IG LL ERAN RU NIH il LORE AMARANIS AAI T Bad MANOEL IAS PE DP MAAN GENE AIBN EARLS Ee ne LSU TRIE Vigetin Mech ASS
70a
Statutes
2, 49 Stat. 500; June 30, 1949, ch. 288 title I, see. 104 (a),
63 Stat. 381.)
See. 303. “Federal Register”; printing; contents; dis-
tribution; price.
All documents required or authorized to be published
under section 305 of this title shall be printed and dis-
tributed forthwith by the Government Printing Office in a
serial publication designated the “Federal Register.”
See. 304. Definitions.
As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise
requires, the term “document” means any Presidential
proclamation or Executive order and any order, regula-
tion, rule, certificate, code of fair competition, license,
notice, or similar instrument issued, prescribed, or promul-
gated by a Federal agency; the terms “Federal agency”
or “agency” mean the President of the United States, or
any executive department, independent board, establish-
ment, bureau, agency, institution, commission, or separate
office of the administrative branch of the Government of
the United States but not the legislative or judicial
branches of the Government; and the term “person” means
any individual, partnership, association, or corporation.
(July 26, 1935, ch. 417, sec. 4, 49 Stat. 501.)
See. 305. Documents to be published in Federal Regis-
ter; comments and news items excluded.
(a) There shall be published in the Federal Register
* * * (2) such documents or classes of documents as the
President shall determine from time to time have general
applicability and legal effect; and (3) such documents
or classes of documents as may be required so to be pub-
lished by Act of the Congress: Provided, That for the
purposes of this chapter every document or order which
— DERI ER 6 AND EE TOE. RENE
7la
Statutes
shall prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have general
applicability and legal effect.
(b) In addition to the foregoing there shall also be pub-
lished in the Federal Register such other documents or
classes of documents as may be authorized to be published
pursuant hereto by regulations prescribed hereunder with’
the approval of the President, but in no case shall com-
ments or news items of any character whatsoever be
authorized to be published in the Federal Register.
(July 26, 1935, ch. 417, see. 5, 49 Stat. 501.)
Sec. 307. Filing document as constructive notice; publi-
cation in Register as presumption of validity;
judicial notice; citation.
No document required under section 305 (a) of this
title to be published in the Federal Register shall be valid
as against any person who has not had actual knowledge
thereof until the duplicate originals or certified copies of
the document shall have been filed with the Division and
a copy made available for public inspection as provided
in section 02 of this ‘itle; and, unless otherwise spe-
cifically provided by statute, such filing of any document,
required or authorized to be published under section 305
of this title, shall, except in cases where notice by publi-
cation is insufficient in law, be sufficient to give notice of
the contents of such document to any person subject
thereto or affected thereby. The publication in the Fed-
eral Register of any document shall create a rebuttable
presumption (a) that it was duly issued, prescribed, or
promulgated; (b) that it was duly filed with the Division
and made available for public inspection at the day and
hour stated in the printed notation; (c) that the copy
contained in the Federal Register is a true copy of the
original; and, (d) that all requirements of this chapter and
the regulations prescribed hereunder relative to such
a, Se ei. eo ee ee
72a
Statutes
document have been complied with. The contents of the
Federal Register shall be judicially noticed and, without
prejudice to any other mode of citation, may be cited by
volume and page number. (July 26, 1935, ch. 417, see. 7,
49 Stat. 502.)
See. 308. Publication in Register as notice of hearing.
Whenever notice of hearing or of opportunity to be
heard is required or authorized to be given by or under an
Act of the Congress, or may otherwise properly be given,
the notice shall be deemed to have been duly given to all
persons residing within the continental United States
(not including Alaska), except in cases where notice by
publication is insufficient in law, if said notice shall be
published in the Federal Register at such time that the
period between the publication and the date fixed in such
notice fur the hearing or for the termination of the oppor-
tunity to be heard shall be (a) not less than the time
specifically prescribed for the publication of the notice by
the appropriate Act of the Congress; or (b) not less than
fifteen days when no time for publication is specifically
prescribed by the Act, without prejudice, however, to the
effectiveness of any notice of less than fifteen days where
such shorter period is reasonable. (July 26, 1935, ch. 417,
sec. 8, 49 Stat. 502.)
Unrrep States Statutes at Larer, Vor. 59, Part 1,
Chapter 443, Public Law 208, October 31, 1945
“See. 101. The boundary line between the District of
Columbia and the Commonwealth of Virginia is hereby
established as follows:
Said boundary line shall begin at a point where the
northwest boundary of the District of Columbia intercepts
73a
Statutes
the high-water mark on the Virginia shore of the Potomac
River and following the present mean high-water mark;
thence in a southeasterly direction along the Virginia
shore of the Potomac River to Little River, along the
Virginia shore of Little River to Boundary Channel, along
the Virginia side of Boundary Channel to the main body
of the Potomac River, along the Virginia side of the
Potomac River across the mouths of all tributaries af-
fected by the tides of the river to Second Street, Alexan-
dria, Virginia, from Second Street to the present estab-
lished pierhead line, and following said pierhead line to
its connection with the District of Columbia-Maryland
boundary line; that whenever said mean high-water mark
on the Virginia shore is altered by artificial fills and
excavations made by the United States, or by alluvion or
erosion, then the boundary shall follow the new mean
high-water mark on the Virginia shore as altered, or
whenever the location of the pierhead line along the
Alexandria water front is altered, then the boundary
shall follow the new location of the pierhead line.
See. 102. All that part of the territory situated on
the Virginia side of the Potomac River lying between
the boundary line as described in section 101 and the
mean high-water mark as it existed January 24, 1791, is
hereby ceded to and declared to be henceforth within the
territorial boundaries, jurisdiction, and the sovereignty
of the State of Virginia: Provided, however, That con-
current jurisdiction over the said area is hereby reserved
to the United States.”
74a
Statutes
District or Cotumpra Cope—Washington
National Airport (Chapter 13)
Sec. 7-1301. Administration of airport—Definitions.
(a) “Administrator” means the Administrator of the
Civil Aeronautics Authority.
(b) “Airport” means the Washington National Airport,
which shall consist of, and include, the tract of land,
together with all structures, improvements, and other
facilities located thereon, lying partly in the District of
Columbia, and partly in the state of Virginia, * * *.
Sec. 7-1302. Powers and duties of Administrator—Rules
and regulations.
The Administrator shall have control over, and responsi-
bility for, the care, operation, maintenance, and protection
of the airport, together with the power to make and
amend such rules and regulations as he may deem neces-
sary to the proper exercise thereof. (June 29, 1940, o4
Stat. 687, ch. 444, sec. 2.)
See. 7-1305. Penalty for violations.
Any person who knowingly and willfully violates any
rule or regulation prescribed under this chapter shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof,
shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more
than six months, or both. (June 29, 1940, ch. 444, sec. 5,
as added May 15, 1947, 61 Stat. 94, ch. 62.)
75a
Statutes
Arm Trarric Rutes—14 CFR, Part 60
(as of Nov. 1, 1949)
§60.1. Scope. The air traffic rules in this part shall
apply to aircraft operated anywhere in the United
States, including the several States, the District of Colum-
bia, and the several Territories and possessions of the
United States, including the territorial waters and the
overlying airspace thereof, except:
(a) Military aircraft of the United States armed forces
when appropriate military authority determines that
non-compliance with this part is required and prior notice
thereof is given to the Administrator, and
(b) Aircraft engaged in special flight operations, re-
quiring deviation from this part, which are conducted in
accordance with the terms and conditions of a certificate
of waiver issued by the Administrator.
Note: Specific operations which cannot be conducted
within the provisions of the regulations in this part, such
as air races, air meets, acrobatic flights, or certain pest
control or seeding operations require, prior to commence-
ment of the operation, a certificate of waiver which may
be obtained from the nearest office of CAA.
_ §60.14. Right-of-way. An aircraft which is obliged by
A the following rules to keep out of the way of an-
other shall avoid passing over or under the other, or
crossing ahead of it, unless passing well clear;
Nore. Right-of-way rules do not apply when, for rea-
sons beyond the pilot’s control, aircraft cannot be seen
due to restrictions of visibility. The aircraft which has
the right-of-way will normally maintain its course and
*
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76a
Statutes
speed, but nothing in this part relieves the pilot from the
responsibility for taking such action as will best aid to
avert collision.
§60.18. Operation on and in the vicinity of an airport.
Aircraft shall be operated on and in the vicinity
of an airport in accordance with the following rules:
(b) If air traffic control is in operation at the airport,
contact shall be maintained with such control, either
visually or by radio, to receive any air traffic control in-
structions which may be issued;
(c) Aircraft operating from an airport shall conform to
the traffic patterns prescribed for that airport;
(d) The Administrator may, when necessary in the in-
terest of safety, prescribe traffic patterns for an airport
which shall supersede any other traffic patterns previously
prescribed ;
§60.19. Air traffic control instructions.
No person shall operate an aircraft contrary to
air traffic control instructions in areas where air traffic
control is exercised.
:. soe steed cobs tebakeckkbebudiancadeas 1
I. Eastern’s First Reason ror GRANTING THE WRIT *
—THE ALLEGED ADMINISTRATIVE PrRocepURE ACT
Issup—Was Not an Issue By REASON OF THE
MANNER IN WHICH THE Case Was SUBMITTED TO
THE JuRY; It Has Aureapy Been Finatriy Dts-
POSED OF HERE AND BELOW; AND IN ANY EVENT
Is WHotty Wirnovut Merit .................. 2
A. The Admissibility or Violation of the Traffic
Pattern Is Wholly Academic in the Context
of the Case as Submitted to the Jury ...... 2
. Even Assuming the Traffic Pattern Issue Is
Not Academic in This Case, It Has Already
Been Finally Adjudicated Here and Below.. 6
. In Any Event, There Is No Merit to the Con-
tention That the Traffic Pattern Was Inad-
CEE os Sin xvcncadsanvecebabsssecantates 9
1. There Was Sufficient Compliance With
Statute in the Manner of Publication .... 9
2. Any Question as to the Propriety of the
Manner of Publication Was Cured by
Eastern’s Actual Notice ............... 12
. Eastern’s Seconp Reason For GRANTING THE
Writ Is Essentiatty an Attack Upon Tuis
Court’s Eartier ReversaL, AND, IN ANY Event,
Presents No ReEvIEWABLE QUESTION ........... 14
NE. on aun oe ue Ribas kackeek dakenks bins 21
TABLE OF CASES
Borak v. Biddle, 78 U.S. App. D.C. 374, 376 (1944) ... 13
Helvering v. Lerner Stores Corp. (Md.), 314 U.S. 463
SUED a dc vanhdbecneieeenshuste AbeeeeeeCe
Hotch v. United States, 208 F.2d 244, reh. 208 F.2d 249,
2d reh. 212 F.2d 280 (C.A. 9, 1953-4) ........... 11,12
ii Index Continued
Page
Illinois ex rel. Hunt v. Illinois C. R. Co., 184 U.S. 77
SE SRR aN etree hen See
Insurance Group Committee v. Denver & R. G. RR.
oe Be 8s err 9
Interstate Consolidated Street Ry. Co. v. Mass., 207
oe ee Er eee cee eee 10
Jaffke v. Dunham, 1 L. Ed. 2d 314 (1957) ........... 6
Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 (1931) .............. 6
United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36 (1951) ....... 6
United States v. Esnault-Pelterie, 303 U.S. 26 (1938).. 8
United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
EE UNS och 05.5 Unc pa ha ous bad nhoedbs ones 19
United States Trust Co. v. New Mexico, 183 U.S. 536
SEE NaGibinceiahekeudek caw nates 6s bie bis ss 6
Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 196 (1949) .......... 6
Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928) ............. 12
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
Se So as CALS ctidGceWude dave nwanueseasheraaas 9
§ 7, Federal Register Act (44 U.S.C. 307) ........... 12
MISCELLANEOUS
po RO eer errs per rt te reer 13
92 Cong. Record, Part XIV, p. A2987 (May 25, 1946).. 13
S. Doe. No. 248, 79th Cong., 54 een. p. 415 ... 2.005. 13
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OctToBer Term, 1956
No. 841
Eastern AIRLINES, INc., Petitioner,
v.
Union Trust CoMPANY, ET AL.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
BRIEF FOR UNION TRUST COMPANY, ET AL.
IN OPPOSITION
INTRODUCTION
On November 1, 1949, fifty-five families were be-
reaved by a tragic mid-air crash on the approaches to
the Washington National Airport which, on March 13,
1953, a jury found to have been negligently caused by
petitioner, Eastern Air Lines, Inc. The sufficiency of
the evidence of Eastern’s negligence was impressively
sustained by this Court’s order of December 5, 1955,
granting certiorari in No. 298, O. T. 1955 (Union
Trust Company, et al. v. Eastern Air Tines, Inc.) and
reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
LESLIE LEOPOLDO, ELIE EARLE AEA IEE A FG a i a
2
Yet almost seven and one-half years after their
tragic loss, after bereaved minors have already kecome
adults, the families of the decedents are still awaiting
relief which cannot come until final termination of
this seemingly interminable litigation — litigation
again being extended by a petition for a writ of certio-
rari which by a combination of sophistry, legerdemain
and distortion of the record attempts to manufacture
issues for certiorari consideration.
EASTERN’S FIRST REASON FOR GRANTING THE WRIT—
THE ALLEGED ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
ISSUE—WAS NOT AN ISSUE BY REASON OF THE
MANNER IN WHICH THE CASE WAS SUBMITTED TO
THE JURY: IT HAS ALREADY BEEN FINALLY DIS-
POSED OF HERE AND BELOW; AND IN ANY EVENT
IS WHOLLY WITHOUT MERIT
A. THE ADMISSIBILITY OR VIOLATION OF THE TRAFFIC
PATTERN IS WHOLLY ACADEMIC IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
CASE AS SUBMITTED TO THE JURY
The traffic pattern for Washington National Air-
port was admitted in evidence at a point in plaintiffs’
case in chief when plaintiffs sought to prove, inter alia,
that when the Eastern plane ‘‘shortcut’’ the estab-
lished pattern for landing (i.e., started its landing
from west or southwest of the airport rather than
continuing around south of Alexandria and then north
to the airport) that shortcut was in and of itself an
act of negligence. The defense then offered evidence
in its case which tended to show that if Eastern re-
ceived a clearance to land it had a right then and there
to leave the pattern, regardless of its then position,
and proceed to land from that point without com-
pleting the entire course of the pattern. Eastern never
contended that there was no pattern nor that there was
PREM eve ew
3
any pattern different from the one received in evi-
dence. It simply contended that it was in the pattern
and had the right to depart therefrom when it received
clearance to land. The trial judge then adopted East-
ern’s contention and stated that he would charge the
jury that, if it found Eastern was cleared to land, then
it was authorized to leave the pattern at that point
and Eastern could not be held liable by reason of
anything connected with the pattern (X J.A. 2090).
In this connection, the trial court charged the jury
as follows:
“This is the prescribed pattern. But you are in-
structed as a matter of law that there is nothing
rigid about it... It... must be followed but not
with the rigidity and the inflexibility of a line
from one point to another. Indeed, the very pur-
pose of flight traffic patterns is to control traffic
. . . but at a controlled airport, such as Washing-
ton, the controller has the final say; and you are
so instructed.
**However, the unauthorized stepping out of the
pattern, leaving the pattern, departing from it—
and note my language—the unauthorized stepping
out of the pattern, leaving the pattern, departing
from it, would be a violation of law, because the
pattern is prescribed by rule which has the force
and effect of law. And so, therefore, unauthor-
ized action of the character I have just referred
to would be negligence ...’? (X J.A. 2108-2109).
x * *
‘“‘And therefore, by virtue of the fact of his [the
air traffic control officer’s] control of operations
in and around the zone in question, and the air-
port in particular, he may authorize, upon request
or without such request, a departure or a leaving
or a stepping out from the so-called traffic pattern.
It is asserted by the defendant Eastern Air Lines
Bere
——. eal
4
that they were given such authority, in the form
of an instruction ‘cleared to land’, and if you find
that to be a fact upon all of the evidence in this
case, then the plaintiff’s allegation of negligence
in this respect falls, because authority to leave
the pattern—or to depart from the pattern, if you
will—was granted, and the Eastern airliner would
be in the place where it was permitted to be at the
time in question. If you should find there was
an authorized departure, either by request or
order, your finding would be for the defendant
Kastern, because the allegation of negligence in
this respect, as I have said, would not have been
established.’’ (X J.A. 2111-2112).
The entirety of the charge on the pattern and clear-
ance pvuint is set out as Appendix A hereto (pp. la-5a).
In order to present an ostensible issue for consider-
ation on petition for a writ of certiorari, Eastern has
now distorted the issue submitted to the jury. East-
ern’s first reason for granting the writ (questions pre-
sented 1 and 2) is bottomed upon the assumption that
the jury was permitted to decide that Eastern’s negli-
gence lay in not following the detailed prescriptions
of the traffic pattern. But the charge quoted above
makes it self-evident that the only issue submitted to
the jury (with respect to pattern or clearance—as
distinguished from lookout’) was whether Eastern had
been cleared to land.
1 Eastern also implies that the clearance issue was the only one
in the case. For example, Eastern asserts (Pet. 9), that because
the trial court instructed the jury that a plane cleared to land is
entitled to assume no other aircraft is a hazard ‘‘the other minor
and trifling allegations of fault, such as lookout, right of way,
ete., were expressly removed from jury consideration if the DC-4
had been cleared to land’’ (Emphasis supplied; see also Pet. 30).
Only desperation could father such bald distortion. Early in
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Under the charge, if the jury found Eastern had
been cleared to land, then ipso facto its subsequent
actions could not—said the court—be considered any
violation or negligence (See also IV J. A. 860, 861).
On the other hand, if the jury found that Eastern was
not cleared, its unauthorized departure from the pat-
tern—that is, attempting to land without clearance—
became the act of negligence. In either event, the
detailed specifications and requirements of the traffic
pattern itself were not a permissible predicate for
decision. In short (apart from the lookout and other
his charge, the trial judge listed the several acts of negligence
claimed against Eastern and enumerated as the first ‘‘The failure
to maintain a proper lookout and to take appropriate steps to
avoid collision, when its pilot or its pilots saw or should have seen
... the imminence of collision’’ (X J.A. 2107; note also third act
of negligence there enumerated). Thereafter, the trial court gave
further detailed instructions as to the jury’s evaluation of these
other acts of negligence upon which its verdict might be based
apart from the clearance issue (X J.A. 2107-8, 2109, 2110-11, 2112,
2113).
Aside from the pertinent violation of miscellaneous air regu-
lations referred to in the trial court’s charge, from the record it
was unquestionable that the Eastern pilots could and should have
seen the P-38 at all times while they were on their so-called down-
wind (headed south) leg of the pattern and while they were turn-
ng into their final turn to land. During this several minute period
intil the very last seconds before the crash, the Eastern pilots
hould have realized the P-38 was a hazard, or vice versa, and
hould have taken action to avoid it. Indeed the supporting evi-
lence was so strong that in its candid brief on the facts in the
ourt below, the Government stated (p. 9) ‘‘There is no testimony
0 show that Eastern’s pilots took any action to avoid the collision
intil the last moment although from the description of the paths
f flight it seems clear that the P-38 could have been seen by the
C-4 pilots.’’
That there was substantial evidence of negligence apart from the
learance issue is also apparent from the Court of Appeals orig-
ial judgment remanding for a new trial on the issue of liability
ut extracting from that new trial any issue with respect to
learance.
Biagmescamones PEERS OMAIE Vas BINT EE RN TPE IF: PELE ROT IM TONNE A Nt, SOR aRRER RENE
a
6
issues), the verdict was required to turn upon whether
or not Eastern was cleared to land without regard to
the specifications of the traffic pattern or any traffic
pattern. Therefore, whether or not the pattern was
admissible or a valid and binding fedéral regulation
played no part whatsoever in the verdict and cannot
now, therefore, be any basis upon which to attack that
verdict.
In these circumstances, petitioner’s first ‘‘reason”’
for granting the writ raises an academic issue insofar
as this case is concerned and is, as the trial judge him-
self stated (IV J.A. 860; see also 861) ‘‘much ado
about nothing.’’ Accordingly, the supposed irrecon-
cilable conflict between Courts of Appeals postured
as the first reason for granting the writ is a concocted
effort to have this Court decide a question not in issue
on the record.
B. EVEN ASSUMING THE TRAFFIC PATTERN ISSUE IS NOT
ACADEMIC IN THIS CASE, IT HAS ALREADY BEEN FINALLY
ADJUDICATED HERE AND BELOW
When this case was first before this Court on
respondent’s petition for certiorari, the Court of
Appeals had entered judgment in Eastern’s favor re-
versing the trial court and remanding the case for a
new trial. In opposing respondent’s petition, Eastern
had the right, without filing a cross-petition, to raise
any ground which, although rejected by the Court of
Appeals, would support that court’s determination.
Jaffke v. Dunham, 1 L. Ed. 2d 314 (1957); United
States v. Carignan, 342 U. 8. 36 (1951); Helvering v.
Lerner Stores Corp. (Md.), 314 U. S. 463 (1941);
Langnes v. Green, 282 U. 8S. 531 (1931). Since the
admission of the traffic pattern, if error as claimed by
Eastern, would have supported the earlier judgment of
PBS NERO ARR OAR APT
7
the Court of Appeals in reversing the trial court’s
judgment and remanding, and since the Court of
Appeals had, in its first opinion, rejected Eastern’s
argument and sustained the admissibility of the
pattern (App. to Pet. 13a), that point was plainly
available to Eastern when these cases were first before
this Court in No. 298, O. T. 1955. By not having
raised the traffic pattern issue in its opposition to
certiorari as an alternative basis for affirmance,
Eastern waived that issue. Urie v. Thompson, 337
U.S. 163, 196 (1949) ; United States Trust Co. v. New
Mexico, 183 U. 8S. 536 (1901).
This Court’s order of December 5, 1955, reversing
the judgment of the Court of Appeals, caused Eastern
to sense that its own failure to seasonably raise the
traffic pattern issue had cut-off review thereof by this
Court.’ By its Petition for Rehearing in No. 298, O.T.
1955, addressed to this Court’s order of December 5,
Kastern’s silence was broken, and a hue and ery was
raised on the traffic pattern issue—tacitly urged as an
alternative ground for affirmance. That argument
was captioned (Point V, p. 48): ‘‘The per curiam
order should be vacated for the further reason that
the Court of Appeals erroneously decided, and this
Court did not review, a major issue of law under the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act; and because
its decision in this regard is in conflict with a decision
of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.’
Bottomed on the traffic pattern issue was Eastern’s
alternative plea in its rehearing petition (p. 50) that
2**. . . if the per curiam of December 5th was not intended to
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals as to the validity of
the purported regulation, then [Eastern] has been deprived of the
opportunity to seek review in this Court ...’’ Eastern’s Petition
Fer Rehearing in No. 298, O. T. 1955, at 49.
—_ SO PRUNE ONSET ar BEER
8
‘“so much of the order as reversed the judgment below
should be vacated, and the case should be placed on
the calendar of this Court for briefs and oral argument
on the merits of all issues’? (emphasis supplied)—
including the traffic pattern issue.
But this Court, by its order of February 27, 1956,
refused to grant such relief. Instead, it left intact its
reve~sal of December 5, 1955 with only the modification
that ‘‘the case be remanded to the Court of Appeals
to permit that court to pass upon the several issues
left undecided by [this Court’s] reversal of its judg-
ment.’’? And whether or not this Court’s refusal to
grant such relief to Eastern amounted to an approval
of the Court of Appeal’s disposition of the traffic
pattern issue—which we think it did (compare United
States v. Esnault-Pelterie, 303 U. S. 26 (1938) )—the
modification of this Court’s previous order was in all
respects consistent with, and in response to, the final
alternative prayer for relief in Eastern’s Petition for
Rehearing. That prayer (p. 50) sought further con-
sideration below only in respect to ‘‘undecided issues’’;
it did not request remand on the traffic pattern issue.
Accordingly, at Eastern’s own request the traffic
pattern issue was then effectively eliminated from the
case, and it
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