Brief for the Respondent in Opposition — Giz v. Brownell (No. 832)
Supreme Court brief1956
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_ Ceballos v. Shaughnessy, No. 71, this Term, decided March
SRS See er eerreerircere se eo 8, 10
_ Machado v. McGrath, 193 F. 2d 706, certiorari denied,
SN I Soon ins sc ic ss na dnwncatnasdanusieens 9
_ Mannerfrid v. United States, 200 F. 2d 730, certiorari
Smead, 945 US. 918 ..... ccc ccc cece ccc neecencee 9
- McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162 ................225. 7,8
- Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41 ........0c eee eeeeeeee 7
Francisco Ballester Pons v. United States, 220 F. 2d 399,
- certirorai denied, 350 U.S. 830 ............... ccc eens 8
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS:
Act of December 20, 1941, 55 Stat. 844 ............00000. 3
Immigration Act of 1924, Sec. 28(c), as amended by the
Act of October 29, 1945, 59 Stat. 551, 8 U.S.C. (1946 ed.)
MEMMA(]) ccc re cccccccccceseccccncceccccesecccceecess 15
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163,
8 U.S.C. 1101 et segq.:
Oh EAS CMOD rac cas ddadunsdheh nade nsesenen 15
BED: Sekdaeyicaccks es Goaeeen cee kiwecekbun 16
Index Continued
Page
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Sec. 3(a), 54
Stat. 885, as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. (1946 ed.)
BORA) coi cco cscescccccccvcscccccnsecsccecces 2, 3, 7, 9, 12
Selective Service Regulation 611.13, as amended July 8,
1943 (8 F.R. 9861) ...... 2... cece eee eee eee eee eeee 13
Selective Service Regulations:
Section 611.12 (7 F.R. 855) .. 6... cece ee eee eee ees 5, 9, 12
G1L.18 (7 FR. 655) ..... www cesscccccncves 5, 9, 12
611.21 (7 F.R. 2084) ....... cece eee ee eee eens 5, 14
Guthe Supreme Court of the Wnited States
OcToBER TERM, 1956
No. 832
MEHMET SABAHITTEN Giz, Petitioner
Vv.
HERBERT BROWNELL, JR.,
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED StTaTEs
Sea!
On Petition For a Writ of Certiorari To The United States
Court of Appeals For The District of Columbia
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinions in the Court of Appeals (Pet. 18-24)
are reported at 240 F. 2d 25. The opinion of the
District Court appears at pages 57-59 of the record.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered
December 13, 1956 (Pet. 24-25). The petition for a
1
2
writ of certiorari was filed on March 12, 1957. The
jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
1254(1).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Petitioner, a Turkish national, applied for exemp-
tion from military service as a neutral alien in
December 1942, when regulations of the Selective
Service System provided that every male alien then in
the country should be deemed to be ‘‘residing’’ here
(and thus subject to the draft) if, before May 16, 1942,
he failed to file an application to have his ‘‘residence”’
determined. Petitioner had not made such application
when he applied for the exemption which was granted
to him, but two years later he made an untimely appli-
cation to be determined a non-resident, which was
denied.
The questions are:
1. Whether petitioner signed the Selective Service
exemption form, in December 1942, voluntarily and
intelligently.
2. Whether, in the circumstances of this case, peti-
tioner had a right to relitigate before the Immigration
and Naturalization Service the issue of whether, when
he signed the exemption form, he was a ‘‘resident”’
within the meaning of Section 3 (a) of the Selective
Training and Service Act of 1940 and thus subject to
the draft.
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED
The pertinent provisions of the Selective Training
and Service Act of 1940, the pertinent Immigration
Acts, and the applicable Selective Service regulations,
are set forth in the Appendix, infra, pp. 12-16.
3
STATEMENT
Petitioner seeks review of the judgment of the Court
of Appeals affirming the denial by the District Court
of his action for declaratory relief and review of the
immigration proceedings finding him subject to de-
portation and ineligible for suspension of deportation
or pre-exarmination on the ground that he was debarred
from citizenship under Section 3(a) of the Selective
Training and Service Act of 1940, by virtue of the fact
that on December 31, 1942, he sought exemption from
liability to military training and service as a resident
alien and citizen of a neutral country.
Petitioner, a native and citizen of Turkey, was
admitted to the United States on November 9, 1939,
as a student (R. 59, 62). On December 16, 1940, he
registered for the draft and shortly thereafter was
classified IV-C (exempt as a non-declarant alien),
since Section 3(a) of the Selective Training and Serv-
ice Act of 1940 (54 Stat. 885) originally made only
those alien residents who had declared their intention
to become citizens liable for service. The Act of De-
cember 20, 1941 (55 Stat. 844, 845), passed shortly
after our entrance into World War II, amended Sec-
tion 3(a) of the Selective Service Act to make ail male
persons ‘‘residing in the United States’? between the
ages of twenty and forty-five so liable, with a provision
‘That any citizen or subject of a neutral country shall
be relieved from liability for training and service
under this Act if, prior to his induction into the land or
naval forces, he has made application to be relieved
?The symbol ‘‘R’’ will be used to designate the pagination of
the record, and the symbol ‘‘Immig.’’ to designate the pagination
of the immigration file lodged as an original exhibit with the Court.
4
from such liability in the manner prescribed by and in
accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by
the President, but any person who makes such appli-
cation shall thereafter be debarred from becoming a
citizen of the United States.”’
On December 31, 1942, petitioner executed D.S.S.
Form 301 claiming exemption from service as a res-
ident alien and citizen of the then neutral country of
Turkey (Immig. 96; R. 59, 62). This form contained
the following statement on its face (Immig. 96;
Pet. 23):
I do hereby make application to be relieved
from liability for training and service in the land
or naval forces of the United States, under the
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, in
accordance with the Act of Congress, approved
December 20, 1941. I understand that the making
of this application to be relieved from such lia-
bility will debar me from becoming a citizen of the
United States. I have not filed a declaration of
intention to become a citizen of the United States.
{Emphasis added.]
Petitioner’s explanation of the signing of the form
was that, while a sophomore in dental school, he re-
ceived from the local Selective Service Board a request
for his appearance. While at the board, he heard two
Turkish boys arguing with the clerk of the board and
heard her tell them that if they signed the form they
would be relieved. He said, ‘‘It sounded to me very
reasonable to sign this paper because my program to
study was so heavy and by signing that I would not be
bothered again and so I signed, by suggestion of the
clerk’’ (see R. 64).
5
The then current Selective Service regulations pro-
vided that every male alien in the United States or
entering it thereafter should be deemed to be a ‘‘male
person residing in the United States’’ for the purposes
of the Selective Service law if, before May 16, 1942
or within three months after his entry, he failed to file
an application to have his residence determined.? Peti-
tioner had made no such application at the time he
filed his application for exemption in December 1942.
On his filing of Form 301, petitioner was continued in
Class IV-C as a diaft-exempt alien (R. 62).
On May 31, 1944, petitioner filed an application for
a certificate of non-residenece (R. 22, 45-46, 59) which
was denied by his local Selective Service Board on
June 27, 1944 (R. 59, 62), and on July 11, 1944 he was
classified II-A (medical student deferment) (R. 62,
70). On August 25, 1944, petitioner was notified by his
local board that the Director of Selective Service had
considered his request for non-resident status and had
determined that he was ‘ ‘a male person residing in
the United States’ within the meaning of Sections 2
and 3 of the Selective Training and Service Act of
1940”? (R. 63).
From the time of his entry in 1939 to 1944, petitioner
was a student, completing a course at a junior college,
® Section 611.12, 7 F.R. 855, infra, p. 12; Section 611.13, 7 FR.
855, infra, pp. 12-13; Section 611.21, 7 F.R. 2084, infra, pp. 14-15.
This latter regulation which became effective March 17, 1942, pro-
vided that if a non-declarant alien had legally entered the United
States prior to February 16, 1942, and desired to have a deter-
mination of residence made he must have filed such application on
or before May 16, 1942. Petitioner thus had from March 17,
1942 to May 16, 1942, to make such an application but he failed
to do so.
6
and graduating from dental school in October 1944
(Immig. 60), after which he took a postgraduate
course in dental surgery (Pet. 21). He took the exam-
ination entitling him to practice dentistry in April
1945 (Immig. 60). During this entire period, he had re-
ceived extensions of his visa until July 21, 1945,
beyond which date he remained in the United States
illegally without seeking a further extension (R. 62).
Novertheless, he opened an office for the practice of
dentistry and was practicing that profession at the
time of the immigration proceedings (Immig. 58).
Turkey became a co-belligerent in February 1945,
and petitioner was classified 1-A and ordered to report
for a preinduction physical on July 26, 1946 (R. 59;
Immig. 110). He was subsequently rejected because
of alienage (Pet. 12). He made an effort in 1947 to
have his D.S.S. Form 301 withdrawn from his Selec-
tive Service record, and his local board, in a letter to
the State Director of Selective Service dated March 11,
1947, recommended that this be permitted (R. 69-70;
Immig. 97). On March 17, 1947, the State Director
informed the local board that this was not permissible
under the statute or the existing regulations, pointing
out also that petitioner, an educated man, was aware
of the implications of his signing the form from the
specific statement thereon that the signing would debar
him from citizenship (Immig. 109).
In 1947, the deportation proceedings were instituted.
The Assistant Commissioner and the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals held that petitioner was deportable
and was also statutorily ineligible for citizenship
because of his application for exemption from service,
and, accordingly, was ineligible for suspension of
deportation (Immig. 2-9, 17-18).
ual
Although he was granted voluntary departure, peti-
tioner filed an action for declaratory relief in the Dis-
trict Court claiming that he had not been “residing
in”’ in the United States within the meaning of Section
3(a) of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940
and therefore was not bound by the provisions of the
Selective Service form, and of the 1940 Act, debarring
him from future citizenship. See McGrath v. Kristen-
sen, 340 U.S. 162. After trial and oral argument, the
district judge entered findings of fact and conclusions
of law and ordered judgment for the defendant (R.
59-60). On appeal, the District Court’s judgment was
affirmed by a majority of the Court of Appeals; J udge
Bazelon, dissenting, would have remanded the case for
further administrative proceedings on the question of
petitioner’s residence status (Pet. 18-25).
7
ARGUMENT
1. Petitioner contends that when, on December 31,
1942, he executed Selective Service Form No. 301,
applying for exemption from military service as a
resident alien and citizen of a neutral country, he, like
the petitioner in Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41,
was unaware of the implications of his act, and did so
on the suggestion of a clerk at his local draft board.
As both the Board of Immigration Appeals and the
two courts below have held,’ this claim has no founda-
tion in this record. Petitioner’s own testimony at the
immigration hearing shows that, in executing the
form, in the midst of World War II, he was primarily
interested that he (R: 64) ‘‘not be bothered again”’ by
Selective Service demands since they threatened to
* On this issue, the Court of Appeals was unanimous (Pet. 20-21).
interrupt his studies (he was then a second-year
dental student), and that, after hearing a con-
versation between the board clerk and two other
students who claimed to be citizens of Turkey, a
neutral country, he procured the D.S.S. Form 301 and
executed it. The record refutes any suggestion that
the clerk misrepresented the legal effect of signing the
form. According to his own testimony, she merely
stated that the form would relieve him from an obli-
gation to serve (R. 64-65).
The form signed by petitioner plainly bore on its
face the qualification that one who applied for ex-
emption from military service as a resident alien and
citizen of a neutral country would be barred from
citizenship (Immig. 96). Supra, p. 4. Petitioner,
an educated man, who was then a student in a graduate
school, clearly was apprised of the consequences of
his act and knew what he was doing when he executed
the form. There is in this case even less substance to
the claim of mistake than in Ceballos v. Shaughnessy,
No. 71, this Term, decided March 11, 1957, where that
petitioner claimed that in executing the form he did
so ‘‘in the belief that he was required to do so to obtain
assignment to a Latin American contingent of the
United States Army”’, [bid., slip op., p. 5, fn. 11. Here,
as there, the Board of Immigration Appeals found
that petitioner (ibid.) ‘‘fully understood the legal con-
sequences of his action and that he was not duly in-
fluenced by other considerations.” And see Francisco
Ballester Pons v. United States, 220 F. 2d 399, 404
(C.A. 1), certiorari denied, 350 U.S. 830.
2. Petitioner erroneously seeks to bring his case
within the holding of McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S.
9
162, by arguing that, although he executed the D.S.8.
Form 301 as a resident alien and citizen of a neutral
country, he was in fact a non-resident within the mean-
ing of Section 3(a) of the Selective Service Act (infra,
p. 12), and therefore unaffected by the citizenship
bar which the execution of that form would otherwise
impose.
At the time petitioner executed D.S.S. Form 301,
there were in effect Selective Service regulations
(Sections 611.12 and 611.13, infra, pp. 12-13), which
ruled that every male alien then in the country,
or entering it thereafter, should be deemed to be
“‘residing’’ here, if, before May 16, 1942, or within
three months after his entry, whichever was iater,
he did not file an application to have his **resi-
dence’’ determined. Petitioner, who executed Form
301 on December 31, 1942, had been eligible between
March 17, 1942, and May 16, 1942, to make such an
application but had failed to do so. See fn. 2, supra,
p. 5. He therefore was deemed a “resident”? when
he executed Form 301 in December 1942, as the courts
have expressly held in comparable cases. Mannerfrid
v. United States, 200 F. 24 730 (C.A. 2), certiorari
denied, 345 U.S. 918; Machado v. McGrath, 193 F. 24
706, 708 (C.A. D.C.), certiorari denied, 342 U.S. 948.
Kristensen, on the other hand, had claimed exemption
between February 7 and May 17, 1942, at a time when
he still had an opportunity to apply for the determi-
nation of his residence, and until that latter date ‘“‘he
was in the same category as the newly arrived non-
declarant alien who, under the regulations and the Act,
did not become a resident for three reonths.”’ 340 U.S.
at p. 174.
10
Petitioner contends that, notwithstanding his fail-
ure to make a timely request for a ruling on his
residence, the question of his status as a resident
should now be deemed open because in May 1944 he
filed an untimely application for a determination of
residence which was considered by the Director of
Selective Service. But on that subsequent consider-
ation the Director determined that petitioner was a
resident, and did not change his status. This confirm-
ing decision on the merits cannot be said to be a waiver
of the requirements of timely filing under which peti-
tioner was barred. He was in no way misled or injured
by the later consideration.
Moreover, in Benzian v. Godwin, 168 F. 2d 952 (C.A.
2), certiorari denied, 335 U.S. 886, the case upon which
petitioner particularly relies (Pet. 9), the court held
that such a determination by the Director of Selective
Service, if it had basis in fact, was not subject to re-
view by the courts. Here, the fact that the Director
‘‘affirmed in 1944 what the law had already deter-
mined, that Giz had been a resident for the purposes
of the Act’’ (Pet. 24), and denied him a Certificate of
Non-Residence, does not demand relitigation of the
issue of his 1942 residence in further immigration pro- —
ceedings, eighteen years after his entry into this
country, and over fourteen years after execution of
the Selective Service form. The facts stated above
(supra, pp. 3-6) and in Judge Danaher’s opinion in
the Court of Appeals (Pet. 20-24) show that there was
4 Judge Bazelon agreed with petitioner on this point (Pet. 20).
ee
11
a clear basis in fact for the Director’s decision as to
residence.*®
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the petition for a
writ of certiorari should be denied.
J. Lez Rank,
Solicitor General.
Warren Oxney III,
Assistant Attorney General.
BEatRICE RosENBERG,
Cart H. Imnay,
Attorneys.
APRIL 1957.
* Petitioner’s attempt to enlist in 1946 after he had been placed
in Class 1-A, following Turkey’s co-belligerency, did not alter the
effect of his claim to exemption as a neutral alien. Ceballos v.
Shaughnessy, No. 71, this Term, decided March 11, 1957.
12
APPENDIX
Section 3 (a) of the Selective Training and Service
Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 885, as amended, 50 U.S.C. App.
(1946 ed.) 303 (a), provided:
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, every
male citizen of the United States, and every other
male person residing in the United States, who is
between the ages of nineteen and forty-five * * *
shall be liable for training and service in the land
and naval forces of the United States: Provided,
That any citizen or subject of a neutral country
shall be relieved from liability for training and
service under this Act if, prior to his induction
into the land or naval forces, he has made appli-
eation to be relieved from such liability in the
manner prescribed by and in accordance with rules
and regulations prescribed by the President, but
any person who makes such application shall
thereafter be debarred from becoming a citizen of
the United States * * *
Selective Service regulations in force in December
1942 provided:
§ 611.12 When a nondeclarant alien is residing
in the United States. Every male alien who is now
in or hereafter enters the United States who has
not declared his intention to become a citizen of
the United State, unless he is in one of the cate-
gories specifically excepted by the provisions of
§ 611.13, is ‘‘a male person residing in the United
States’’ within the meaning of section 2 and sec-
tion 3 of the Selective Training and Service Act
of 1940, as amended. [7 F.R. 855]
§ 611.13 When a nondeclarant alien is not resid-
ing in the United States. (a) A male alien who is
now in or hereafter enters the United States who
has not declared his intention to become a citizen |
of the United States is not ‘‘a male person resid-
ing in the United States” within the meaning of
13
section 2 or section 3 of the Selective Training and
Service Act of 1940, as amended:
* * *
has entered or hereafter enters the United States
in a manner prescribed by its laws and remains in
the United States after May 16, 1942, or for more
States’’ within the meaning of section 2 or section
3 of the Selective Training and Service Act of
1940, as amended, in either of which events he
§ 611.21 What aliens may apply for a determi-
nation. (a) Within the time specified in para-
*An amendment to Selective Service Regulation 611.13
which became effective July 8, 1943, provided in pertinent
part (8 F.R. 9361);
§ 611.13 When a nondeclarant alien is not residing in the
United States. (a) A male alien who is now in or hereafter
enters the United States who has not declared his intention
14
graph (b) of this section, a nondeclarant alien
who has entered or hereafter enters the United
States in a manner prescribed by its laws may file
with his local soaed (if he is registered) or with
the local board where he is at the time located (if
he is not registered) an Alien’s Application for
Determination of Residence (Form 302), request-
ing that the local board determine whether he is
‘ta male person residing in the United States”
within the meaning of section 2 and section 3 of
the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940,
as amended. An Alien’s Personal History and
Statement (Form 304) must be filed with such
application.
(b) An Alien’s Application for Determination
of Residence (Form 302) must be filed within the
following time:
to become a citizen of the United States is not ‘‘a male person
residing in the United States’’ within the meaning of section
2 or section 3 of the Selective Training and Service Act of
1940, as amended ; provided he has in his personal possession
an official document issued pursuant to authorization of or
described by the Director of Selective Service which iden-
tifies him as a person not required to present himself for and
submit to registration and provided:
* e &
(7) He has, within the time prescribed and in the manner
provided in § 611.21, filed with the local board with which
he is registered, or if he is not registered, with the local
board having jurisdiction over the area in which he ~
is located, an Alien’s Application for Determination of Resi-
dence (Form 302), together with an Alien’s Personal History
and Statement (Form 304), and such application is either
pending or has resulted in the issuance by the local board
of an Alien’s Certificate of Nonresidence (Form 303) which
has not expired; * * *.
15
(1) If a nondeclarant alien has entered the
United States prior to February 16, 1942, in a
manner prescribed by the laws of the United
States and desires to have a determination made
under the provisions of paragraph (a) of this sec-
tion, he must file such application on or before
May 16, 1942; or
(2) If a nondeelarant alien enters the United
States on or after February 16, 1942, in a manner
prescribed by the laws of the United States and
desires to have a determination made under the
provisions of paragraph (a) of this section, he
must file such application within 3 months after
the date of his entrance into the United States.
[7 F.R. 2084].
Section 28 (c) of the Immigration Act of 1924, as
amended by the Act of October 29, 1945, 59 Stat. 551,
8 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) 224 (ce) provided:
The term ‘‘ineligible to citizenship”’, when used
in reference to any individual, includes an indi-
vidual who is debarred from becoming a citizen
of the United States under * * * section 3 (a) of
the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940,
as amended (55 Stat. 845; U.S.C., title 50, App.
Supp. III), section 303 (a), or under any law
amendatory of, supplementary to, or in substi-
tution for, any such sections; * * *,
The Immigration and N ationality Act of 1952, Sec-
tions 101 (a) (19) and 315, 66 Stat. 169, 242, 8 U.S.c.
1101 (a) (19), 1426, provide:
[$101 (a)] (19). The term “ineligible to
citizenship,”” when used in reference to any indi-
vidual, means, notwithstanding the provisions of
any treaty relating to military service, an indi-
vidual who is, or was at any time, permanently de-
barred from becoming a citizen of the United
States under section 3 (a) of the Selective Train-
16
ing and Service Act of 1940, as amended (54 Stat.
885; 55 Stat. 844), or under section 4 (a) of the
Selective Service Act of 1948, as amended (62
Stat. 605; 65 Stat. 76), or under any section of
this Act, or any other Act * * *.
[§ 315] (a). Notwithstanding the provisions of
section 405 (b), any alien who applies or has
applied for exemption or discharge from training
or service in the Armed Forces or in the National
Security Training Corps of the United States on
the ground that he is an alien and is or was re-
lieved or discharged from such training or service
on such ground, shall be permanently ineligible
to become a citizen of the United States.
(b) The records of the Selective Service System
or of the National Military Establishment shall be
conclusive as to whether an alien was relieved or
discharged from such liability for training or
service because he was an alien.
4 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1957—422206/P.0. 1073
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