Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Dilatush v. Wilson (No. 730)

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JAW oT

bis PEY, Clerk

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1956

No. an =

Frank V. DiuatussH,

Petitioner,

v.

Cartes EK. Wizson, Secretary of Defense, et al.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.

DanieL L. O’Connor

1010 Vermont Avenue, N.W.

Washington 5, D. C.

Attorney for Petitioner

nie mae

WILSON - EPES PRINTING Co. - RE 7-6002 - WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

INDEX

PAGE

Opinions Below 1

Jurisdiction 2

Questions Involved 2

Statute Involved 2

Statement of the Case 4

Specifications of the Errors to be Urged .................... 5

Reasons for Granting Writ 5

Appendix 13

Cases Cited

Washington v. Summerfield (1955) 228 F. 2d. 452 ........ 6

Washington v. U.S., U.S. Court of Claims, U.S. Ct.

of Claims No. 44-56, Decided January 16, 1957.

Not reported, set forth at page 15 of the Ap-

pendix 7

Staiutes Cited

Title 5—U.S.C. 863 2

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1956

No.

Frank V. DitatusH,

Petitioner,

v.

Cuartes EB. Witson, Secretary of Defense, et al.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.

To the Honorable Chief Justice,and the Associate Justices

of the Supreme Court of the United States:

The petitioner, Frank V. Dilatush, Appellant below,

prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the judg-

ment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-

trict of Columbia Circuit entered on November 1, 1956.

OPINIONS BELOW

The United States District Court for the District of

Columbia did not render an opinion but instead entered

an order granting a summary judgment to defcudant»

and appellees below. The opinion of the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is not yet

2

officially reported but is set forth on page 13 of the

Appendix.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Uni ed States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia was entered on November 1,

1956. This petition for certiorari is filed within 90 days

thereafter in accordance with the provision of Title 28

U.S.C. Section 2101 (e).

QUESTIONS INVOLVED

1. Whether a federal agency can discharge a perma-

nent preference eligible civil service employee in the

absence of a specific finding that such discharge is for

cause and will promote the efficiency of the service.

2. Whether a federal agency can discharge a perma-

nent preference eligible civil service employee without

advising such employee, so as to enable him to properly

prepare his answer, of (1) the identity of witnesses to the

alleged acts of misconduct and (2) the dates, time and

circumstances of the alleged acts of misconduct.

3. Whether a federal agency can discharge a perma-

nent preference eligible civil service employee for reasons

other than those included in the written Notice of Inten-

tion to Discharge.

4. Whether an administrative officer can deprive a

preference eligible civil service employee of a personal

hearing prior to discharge.

STATUTES INVOLVED

Title 5 U.S.C. 863

“No permanent or indefinite preference eligible, who

has completed a probationary or trial period employed in

3

the civil service, or in any establishment, agency, bureau,

administration, project, or department, hereinbefore re-

ferred to shall be discharged, suspended for more than

thirty days, furloughed without pay, reduced in rank or

compensation, or debarred for future appointment except

for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the serv-

ice and for reasons given in writing, and the person whose

discharge, suspension for more than thirty days, furlough

without pay, or reduction in rank or compensation is

sought shall have at least thirty days’ advance written

notice (except where there is reasonable cause to believe

the employee to be guilty of a crime for which a sentence

of imprisonment can be imposed), stating auy and all

reasons, specifically and in detail, for any such proposed

action; such preference eligible shall be allowed a reason-

able time for answering the same personally and in writ-

ing, and for furnishing affidavits in support of such

answer, and shall have the right to appeal to the Civil

Service Commission from an adverse decision of the

administrative officer so acting, such appeal to be made in

writing within a reasonable length of time after the date

of receipt of notice of such adverse decision: Provided,

That such preference eligible shall have the riglt to make

a personal appearance, or an appearance through a desig-

nated representative, in accordance with such reasonable

rules and regulations as may be issued by the Civil Serv-

ice Commission; after investigation, and consideration of

the evidence submitted, the Civil Service Commission

shall submit its findings and recommendations to the

proper administrative officer and shall send copies of the

same to the appellant or to his designated representative,

and it shall be mandatory for such administrative officer

to take such corrective action as the Commission finally

recommends: Provided further, That the Civil Service

Commission may “declare any such preference eligible

who may have been dismissed or furloughed without pay

to be eligible for the provisions of section 864 of this

title. (June 27, 1944, c. 287, Sec. 14, 58 Stat. 390)

peat aemmarernaanemammane

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The petitioner brought this suit against the Secretary

of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force and Members

of the United States Civil Service Commission praying

for a declaratory judgment, and for a mandatory injune-

tion requiring the defendants to restore him to his posi-

tion in governmental service.

Prior to discharge petitioner was a preference eligible

civil service employee of the Department of the Air Force

entitled to all rights, benefits and privileges of the Vet-

erans Preference Act of June 27, 1944.

Petitioner was a $4,330 per year civilian clerk in a

Military installation. On November 28, 1952, he filed a

formal grievance of incompetence against his section

chief, a commissioned officer of the Air Force. There-

after, on March 13, 1953, while this grievance was still

pending, he received a written notice of intention to re-

move him from the Federal Service. The reasons for

removal were denied by petitioner and the animosity

created as a result of his charges against the military

supervisor were set forth in detail. Petitioner requested

a personal hearing before the administrative officer re-

sponsible for his removal which was denied. On May 28,

1953, petitioner was removed from his civil service posi-

tion. He thereafter appealed his discharge to the United

States Civil Service Commission in accordance with Sec-

tion 14 of the Veterans Preference Act and on January

10, 1955, the agency action was affirmed by the Commis-

sion.

The United States District Court for the District of

Columbia refused to upset the administrative decision,

which action was affirmed by the U. S. Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia on November 1, 1956.

5

SPECIFICATIONS OF ERRORS TO BE URGED

Petitioner will argue that procedural rights guaranteed

to him by Section 14 of the Veterans Proference Act of

June 27, 1944, as a veteran and as a preference eligible

employed in the civil service, were denied him, in that :—

1. A specific finding must be made by the Department

of the Air Force that his discharge would be for

such cause as will promote the efficiency of the

service.

2. Prior to discharge he was entitled to a statement

of any and all reasons, specifically and in detail, for

the proposed action to be taken against him. (This

is particularly significant in view of his categorical

denial of the charges; the offering of cogent reason

why his superior desired his dismissal ; and basing

the discharge on conclusions and reasons not con-

tained in the original written charges.)

3. A mandatory procedural safeguard is that the ad-

ministrative agency must make specific findings that

the acts of which the employee is accused were, in

fact, committed.

4. The employee is entitled, as a matter of right, to

answer charges personally before the administrative

officer responsible for his removal.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THIS WRIT

This writ should be granted for the obvious impact

which the issues of this case have upon governmental

personnel policies. ‘Thousands employed in the civil

service on military reservations are entitled to protection

afforded by Section 14 of the [Veterans Preference Act of

June 27, 1944. A civilian employee of the United States

Government should not be under the domination of mili-

tary authority in matters pertaining to the efficient opera-

tion of his government. Fear of disciplinary action

should never deter a civilian employee from filing a

6

charge of incompetency or grievance against a military

superior.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia and the United States Court of Claims have

rendered decisions in direct conflict on the question of

whether a preference eligible civil service employee is

entitled, as a matter of right, to a personal hearing be-

fore an administrative officer prior to discharge.

MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 14

Nowhere in these proceedings has it been established

that the Department of the Air Force has fulfilled the

mandatory requirements of Section 14 of the Act. The

Act specifically requires:

1. That there be a finding that the discharge is for

such cause as will promote the efficiency of the serv-

ice.

2. That the employee have written notice stating any

and all reasons, specifically and in detail, for the

proposed action.

3. That the employee shall have a reasonable time for

answering the charges personally before the admin-

istrative officer responsible for the removal.

CONFLICT OF DECISIONS EXISTS AS TO

WHETHER PERSONAL HEARINGS IN AGENCY

MUST BE AFFORDED PRIOR TO DISCHARGE.

There now exists a direct conflict in decisions between

the U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

and the U. S. Court of Claims on the question of whether

a preference eligible civil service employee is, under the

Act, entitled to a personal hearing before the administra-

tive officer responsible for his removal.

In Washington v. Summerfield (1955) 228 F.2d 452 the

Cireuit Court held that Section 14 of the Act did not

provide for a conference or ‘‘minimal hearing’’ for the

employee within the administrative agency.

7

The Court says at page 454:—

‘‘The Veterans’ Preference Act, Sec. 14, Act of

June 27, 1944, c. 287, 58 Stat. 390, 5 U.S.C.A. § 863,

provides that a veterans preference eligible ‘shall be

allowed a reasonable time for answering the same

(the charges) personally and in writing’. It does

not provide for a conference or ‘‘minimal hearing”’,

as appellant would urge. We conclude that this

means that he shall personally answer the charges

in writing. Such has been the administrative practice,

with which, in the absence of a misconstruction of

the governing statute, we should not interfere.”

The Court of Claims in Washington v. U. S., No. 44

56, decided January 16, 1957 (which opinion is set forth

in the Appendix at page 15) considered the identical

case as was considered by the Circuit Court and found

a directly opposite result. The Court said:

‘“‘The phrase ‘‘personally and in writing’’ is clear

and unambiguous. It means exactly what it says. A

veteran who has been charged with certain offenses

and given notice that he is to be discharged from

his position is given a reasonable time within which

to answer the charges personally if he so chooses, or

in writing, or both. We can find nothing in the Vet-

erans’ Preference Act or in the legislative history of

that act which causes us to believe that Congress in-

tended anything other than what it plainly said, and

this court has previously indicated that a veteran is

given the right to answer the charges against him

in person at the agency level. Wittner v. United

States, 110 C. Cls. 231.”’

Petitioner, prior to discharge, made repeated requests

for a personal conference with the administrative officer

responsible for removal proceedings. All such requests

were denied and, instead, he was referred to a Miss

Klenk, an employee relations adviser. The notice of in-

tention to remove petitioner from Federal Service set

forth at page 22 of the appendix reads:

‘6. You have the right to reply personally and in

writing to this notice of proposed removal, and to

8

show cause why the action should not be taken. You

may submit affidavits and evidence in support of

your answer. Your reply must be made within seven

(7) days from receipt of this notice. A written reply

should be brought or mailed to the undersigned so as

to be received not later than March 21, 1953.

“‘7. You may discuss your case with Miss Isabel

Klenk, telephone 2-4225, room 018, Building 15, this

Headquarters, (the placement and employee relations

adviser) who will advise you on preparation of your

reply.’’

Despite this apparent opportunity to appear person-

ally, such right was denied when request therefor was

made. Likewise, all requests for a personal conference or

hearing with the administrative officer responsible for

removal were denied with instructions that petitioner

should consult Miss Klenk.

This issue was not urged in the lower courts because

of the decision in Washington v. Summerfield, supra. In

view of the present conflicting opinions and in the interest

of justice this Court should now permit petitioner to raise

the issue of a personal hearing at the administrative level.

REASONS FOR DISCHARGE MUST BE

SUPPORTED BY SPECIFIC FINDING

The Court will read in vain for any reference by the~

Department of the Air Force that a finding was made

that petitioner’s discharge was for a cause which would

promote the efficiency of the service. Instead, petitioner’s

discharge is predicated upon unsubstantiated conclusions

and reasons. (Appendix page 27).

Reasons given for petitioner’s discharge are (1) mis-

conduct, (2) lack of responsibility, ( 3) failure to offer

information to nullify the charges, and (4) failure to

answer a question relating to torn documents.

Reasong (3) and (4) are not contained in the written

charges served upon petitioner and reasons (1) and (2)

9

are conclusions unsupported by amy facts or findings

knowledgable to petitioner. It is elementary to state

that conclusions, unsupported by findings, are insufficient

to constitute the ‘‘reasons’’ required by Section 14 of

the Act. It is urged that the requirement that ‘‘reasons’’

be specifically set forth, is a mandatory procedural safe-

guard to be strictly adhered to by the administrative

agency.

CHARGES MUST BE SPECIFIC AND DETAILED

Specificity and detail are the essence of charges and

findings required by the mandatory provisions of the

Act and lack of specificity is a fatal procedural error.

Petitioner was charged as principal to a series of

events in a chain of circumstances without establishing

the identity of witnesses, the date, time or circumstances

so as to enable him to refute the allegations. To enumer-

ate a few:

1. Petitioner is charged with having been paid a visit

on or about February 26, 1953. Who was this individual?

What transpired? Petitioner denied knowledge of any

visit so how is he to answer the charge without knowing

the identity of the visitor and the actual date of the

visit?

2. The charges then set forth that ‘‘later” petitioner

was ‘‘observed’’ removing certain documents ‘‘later re-

covered’’ and identified. Petitioner denied knowledge of

this vague accusation. The obvious query is how much

‘later’? Was it immediately—hours—days or weeks

later? What files were involved? Were they copies or

originals? Did the originals remain in the files? How

were the documents ‘‘later recovered’’ identified as be-

longing to petitioner’s file? Who ‘‘observed’’ petitioner

and when was the observation made? Without identify-

ing the person alleged to have made the observation and

the time of such observation, how can petitioner establish

10

whether such complainant was actually in the room at the

time or may have been on leave or taking a coffee-break?

3. Petitioner is also charged with attempting to de-

stroy certain identified documents ‘a few days prior’’.

Prior to what? How was this destruction attempted; who

witnessed it; when were the documents obtained; where

were they found; was petitioner present; was petitioner

the only one having access to the documents; who saw

him and was the observer in a position to see?

4. The charges set forth a telephone call which through

innuendo apparently resulted in the destruction of docu-

ments. Who were the parties to this conversation, what

was said, when was it made, could not petitioner have

had several calls over a period of time relative to this

matter; how is this call related to the alleged action of

petitioner?

5. Did not petitioner’s supervisor hive sufficient mo-

tive for having him removed from office? Did not peti-

tioner file charges of incompetency and deriliction of

duty against the supervisor? Does not this raise a

question in the minds of administrative Officials so as to

warrant a specific and detailed letter of charges which

would allow petitioner to fully and completely answer

each charge and give reasons therefor? Is petitioner’s

counter-charge of an attempt to ‘“‘frame’’ him without

fundation? Actually who was responsible—the accused or

the accuser?

Clarity and specificity of issues is the very basis for

charges seeking the removal of a preference eligible from

a civil service position. Ambiguity, vagueness, indefinite-

ness cannot be tolerated and a mandatory prohibition

against such is written into Section 14 of the Act. If

the Departments charges were of such specificity and

detail as required by the Act then why does the letter of

dismissal relate the following? (Appendix page 27)

1l

“2. You were given an opportunity to ruply to the

charges, and your reply of March 19, 1983, as well

as your supplementary letter of April 27, 1953, have

been carefully considered. On 13 May 1953, an in-

formal discussion was held in the office of your

Branch Chief, attended by you, three representatives

of management, and three representatives of the

Civilian Personnel Office, in an attempt te clarify

the issues involved and to be sure that the decision

regarding your proposed removal could be made as

fairly as possible.”

No new or amended charges were filed against peti-

tioner after this informal discussion and the foregoing

is a acit admission of uncertainty and doubt. Petitioner

was, therefore, dismissed upon questionable issues.

It is conceded that torn documents had been found and

pieced back together. There is vigorous objection, how-

ever, to the implication that these torn fragments were

the result of a wrongful act by petitioner; that petitioner

had access to the particular wastebasket in which these

documents were found, and that the torn documents were

the only torn papers in the basket. There is no finding

of fact on this charge by the Department. In addition,

there is no indication as to who recovered the documents,

who pieced such documents together or whether such

documents exhibited to petitioner were the documents

removed from the files and allegedly subsequently found

in a torn condition.

Likewise, it is conceded that action was not taken within

a six month period upon a stated administrative duty.

But was this the responsibility of a $4,330 a year clerk

who is accused—or was it the primary responsibility of

petitioner’s superior against whom petitioner had filed

charges of irresponsibility some three months prior to

this action. In the absence of specific findings it can be

presumed that petitioner was “framed” as he alleged.

The Departmental charges do nothing but set forth a

series of events and circumstances which could be applied

12

to anyone of many employees in similar activities. Peti-

tioner has the right to explain the circumstances but he

cannot blindly do so. He must know who his accusers

are so that he can prepare a refutation. He must know

when, where and how the alleged acts are reported to

have taken place so that he can either deny and offer

evidence in support thereof, or confess and show cir-

cumstances which will justify his action.

In the interest of all preference eligible employees this

petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted; other-

wise, thousands are subject to being deprived of rights

guaranteed to them as veterans and as civil service em-

ployees.

WHEREFORE, the petitioner prays that a writ of

certiorari may issue under the seal of this Honorable

Court in this cause, directed to the United States Court

of Appeals for the District of Columbia’ Circuit, and

that upon such a review that the decision and judgment

of the Court be vacated, reversed, and set aside, and this

cause remanded to the said Court of Appeals in ac-

cordance ~.th the views of this Court.

Dantet L. O’Connor

1010 Vermont Avenue, N.W.

Washington 5, D. C.

Attorney for Petitioner

13

APPENDIX

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 13262

Frank V. DitatusH, APPELLANT

v.

Cuartes E. Witson, Secretary of Defense,

et al., APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

Decided November 1, 1956

Mr. Frank V. Dilatush, appellant, pro se, and Mr.

Claude L. Dawson, for appellant.

Mr. Robert S. Green, Attorney, Department of Justice,

of the bar of the Court of Appeals ~f New York, pro hac

vice, by special leave of Court, with whom Messrs. Oliver

Gasch, United States Attorney, and Melvin Richter, At-

torney, Department of Justice, were on the brief, for

appellees. Mr. Lewis Carroll, Assistant United States At-

torney, also entered an appearance for appellees.

Before Epcerton, Chief Judge, and Pretryman and

Fany, Circuit Judges.

a

14

Psr Curiam: The District Court granted the motion

of appellees * for summary judgment and denied that of

appellant. He had sued in the District Court for a de-

claratory judgment that he had been unlawfully discharged

from Government service and for kindred relief. As an

employee eligible for veteran’s preference he alleged in

the District Court and here contends that his discharge

did not accord with the procedural requirements of sec-

tion 14 of the Veterans Preference Act, 58 Stat. 390 (1944),

as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 863 (1952). Particularly he con-

tends that the notice given him of the reasons for his pro-

posed discharge was lacking in the required specificity

and detail, and also that the action finally taken was not

supported by proper findings and the reasons assigned

therefor did not conform with those of which he had been

given notice. No issues of fact were involved. The ques-

tions for decision in the District Court were the sufficiency

in law of the findings and procedures followed by appellees.

Accordingly the court properly decided the case on motion

for summary judgment.

We conclude that the findings and proceedings which

eventuated in appellant’s discharge met the requirements

of the applicable statute and regulations. See Blackman

v. Lee, 92 U.S. App. D.C. 268, 205 F.2d 13.

Affirmed.

? Appellees, defendants in the District Court, are the Sec-

retary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the

i and Members of the Civil Service Commission, all

described in the complaint by name as well as by office.

15

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS

No. 44-56

(Decided January 16, 1957)

WILLIAM ODY WASHINGTON v. THE UNITED

STATES

Mr. Frank Smith for the plaintiff.

Mr. Herbert M. Canter, with whom was Mr. Assistant

Attorney General George Cochran Doub, for the defendant.

ON DEFENDANT’S AND PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

Jones, Chief Judge, delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, a preference eligible within the meaning of the

Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944, as amended, 5 U. S. C.

§ 851, et seg., sues to recover wages which he alleges are

due him as a result of his unlawful removal from his posi-

tion as a clerk in the City Post Office of the District of

Columbia. Both parties move for summary judgment.

There is no dispute as to the facts involved in this case.

Prior to November 22, 1952, plaintiff was employed as a

clerk in the Post Office Department, Bureau of Post Office

Operations, Washington, D. C. On July 7, 1952, the Post-

master for the District of Columia notified plaintiff by

letter that in view of his unsatisfactory scheme examina-

tion record, disciplinary action would be necesary unless

immediate improvement was shown. On September 18,

1952, plaintiff was given an unsatisfactory efficiency rating

effective September 15, 1952. The reasons given for this

action were plaintiff’s unsatisfactory scheme examination

record, his absences from duty without permission, and his

failure to comply with instructions.

meg:

16

By letter dated October 16, 1952, the Postmaster charged

the plaintiff with “unsatisfactory scheme examinations”

and “unsatisfactory attendance.” Details of each charge

were set forth and plaintiff was informed of his right to

answer the charges “personally and in writing.” In a let-

ter to the Postmaster dated October 21, 1952, plaintiff, in

effect, admitted the charges against him and set forth cer-

tain extenuating circumstances stemming from financial

and marital difficulties. He concluded his letter with a re-

quest to see the Postmaster personally so that he could

explain his case more fully. Subsequently, in a letter to

the Postmaster dated November 20, 1952, plaintiff stated

that he had attempted to see the Postmaster personally

but had “been blocked at every attempt.” This letter set

out in detail the marital and financial difficulties of the

plaintiff and requested that he be given “another chance.”

On October 29, 1952, the Postmaster forwarded a copy

of the letter of charges, dated October 21, 1952, to the

Assistant Postmaster General with a request that authority

be issued for plaintiff’s removal. The Postmaster’s ac-

companying letter set forth additional irregularities in

plaintiff’s performance which did not appear in the letter

of charges served on plaintiff.

On November 6, 1952, the Assistant Postmaster General

notified the plaintiff that his removal from the position of

Clerk had been authorized effective November 22, 1952.

This letter made reference to the charges preferred against

plaintiff for unsatisfactory scheme examination and unsat-

isfactory attendance. On November 7, 1952, the Postmas-

ter notified plaintiff of his removal which was to become

effective at the close of business on November 22, 1952.

The Postmaster’s letter stated that this action was being

taken after the Post Office Department had given careful

consideration to the charges preferred against the plaintiff

for unsatisfactory scheme examination and unsatisfactory

attendance.

Thereafter, plaintiff appealed his removal to the Fourth

17

United States Civil Service Region of the United States

Civil Service Commission. He submitted an affidavit and

on January 26, 1953, a de novo hearing was held. Plain-

tiff was represented by counsel and did not testify in his

own behalf. On February 19, 1953, the Fourth Region

rendered an opinion upholding plaintiff’s removal.

Plaintiff then appealed to the Board of Appeals and

Review of the Civil Service Commission, and on October

30, 1953, that Board sustained the decision of the Fourth

Region. Plaintiff next appealed to the Commissioners of

the Civil Service Commission and by letter dated May 25,

1954, the Commissioners upheld plaintiff’s dismissal by

the Post Office Department.

On August 6, 1954, plaintiff filed a complaint in the

District Court for the District of Columbia (Civil No.

3360-54) seeking a declaratory judgment that his removal

was not in accordance with law, and praying for rein-

statement. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the

District Court held that plaintiff was not entitled to re-

instatement, and on November 23, 1955, the Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the action

of the district court in Washington v. Summerfield (No.

12,644, decided November 23, 1955).

Plaintiff does not allege that the administrative action

taken in the present case was arbitrary or capricious or

‘9 clearly erroneous as to impute bad faith. He contends

merely that certain procedural rights given him by the

Veterans’ Preference Act were denied him by the Post

Office Department. In this situation we are not author-

ized to consider the merits of plaintiff’s case but merely

whether or not his procedural rights have been violated.

Eberlein v. United States, 257 U. S. 82; Engelhardt v.

United States, 125 C. Cls. 603; O’Brien v. United States,

124 C. Cls. 655.

Plaintiff takes the position that the Post Office Depart-

ment, in removing him from his position as clerk, denied

18

him two of his procedural rights under section 14 of the

Veterans’ Preference Act. First, he alleges that he was

denied his right to be heard in person by the Postmaster,

and, second, he alleges that his removal was based upon

charges other than those communicated to him in the let-

ter of charges dated October 16, 1952.

The defendant denies that plaintiff’s rights were vio-

lated in any way.

Section 14 of the Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944, 5

U.S.C. § 863, provides as follows:

No permanent or indefinite preference eligible, who

has completed a probationary or trial period employed

in the civil service, or in any establishment, agency,

bureau, administration, project, or department, here-

inbefore referred to shall be discharged, suspended

for more than thirty days, furloughed without pay,

reduced in rank or compensation, or debarred for

future appointment except for such cause as will

promote the efficiency of the service and for reasons

given in writing, and the person * * * shall have at

least thirty days’ advance written notice * * * stating

any and all reasons, specifically and in detail, for any

such proposed action; such preference eligible shall

be allowed a reasonable time for answering the same

personally and in writing, and for furnishing affidavits

in support of such answer, and shall have the right

to appeal to the Civil Service Commission from an

adverse decision of the administrative officer so act-

ing, such appeal to be made in writing within a rea-

sonable length of time after the date of receipt of

notice of such adverse decision: Provided, That such

preference eligible shall have the right to make a

rsonal appearance, or an appearance through a

esignated representative, in accordance -with such

reasonable rules and regulations as may be issued by

the Civil Service Commission; after investigation

and consideration of the evidence submitted, the Civil

Service Commission shall submit its findings and

recommendations to the proper administrative officer

and shall send copies of the same to the appellant or

to his designated representative, * * *.

19

We shall first consider plaintiff’s allegation that his

removal was based upon charges other than those com-

municated to him in the letter of charges, dated October

16, 1952. The basis for this allegation is the fact that on

October 29, 1952, when the Postmaster forwarded a copy

of the letter of charges to the Assistant Postmaster Gen-

eral, the accompanying letter set forth additional irregu-

larities in plaintiff’s conduct which were not contained in

the letter of charges.

A careful examination of the record has failed to re-

veal that plaintiff’s removal was based upon any charges

other than the two specific ones set out in detail in the

Postmaster’s letter of charges to plaintiff. When the

Assistant Postmaster General notified plaintiff that his

removal had been authorized, the letter of notification

referred only to these two specific charges. This was also

true of the Postmaster’s letter notifying plaintiff of the

effective date of his removal. The case was subsequently

heard de movo by the Fourth Region of the Civil Service

Commission and in its opinion the Fourth Region made it

absolutely clear that it was concerned only with the two

specific charges preferred against the plaintiff in the let-

ter of charges.

There is nothing in the record to indicate that the addi-

tional irregularities referred to be the Postmaster in his

letter of October 29, 1952, were ever considered by any-

one in connection with plaintiff’s removal. The mere fact

that these additional irregularities were mentioned in the

letter is insufficient to support the conclusion that plain-

tiff’s removal was based in part upon such irregularities.

In the light of the record we must conclude that there is

no merit in plaintiff’s contentions that his removal was

based in part upon charges not communicated to him.

Plaintiff’s other contention, i.e., that he was denied his

procedural right under the Veterans’ Preference Act to be

heard in person in the agency of his employment, presents

20

a more difficult problem. Plaintiff bases this contention

upon that portion of section 14 of the act which provides

as follows:

* * * such preference eligible shall be allowed a rea-

sonable time for answering the same [the charges

preferred against him] personally and in writing.

(Emphasis added.)

The defendant takes the position that the section does

not give plaintiff the right to appear personally at the

agency level to answer the charges but merely gives

him the right to answer the charges in writing. We can

not accept this interpretation.

The phrase “personally and in writing” is clear and un-

ambiguous. It means exactly what it says. A veteran who

has been charged with certain offenses and given notice

that he is to be discharged from his position is given a

reasonable time within which to answer the charges per-

sonally if he so chooses, or in writing, or both. We can

find nothing in the Veterans’ Preference Act or in the

legislative history of that act which causes us to believe

that Congress intended anything other than what it plainly

said, and this court has previously indicated that a vet-

eran is given the right to answer the charges against

him in person at the agency level. Witimer v. Umited

States, 110 C. Cls. 231.

Defendant further contends that even if the plaintiff

was entitled to a personal hearing at the agency level,

this right was waived since he, in effect, admitted the

charges against him. While it is true that the plaintiff

did not deny his guilt in his letter to the Postmaster dated

October 21, 1952, he. ended the letter with the following

statement:

If you will give me an opportunity to come in to see

you personally, I am certain that I can explain my

case more fully.

21

We believe that this language constituted a definite re-

quest by plaintiff for a personal hearing.

To “answer” to charges, or claims, one need not neces-

sarily plead the general issue, denying that he did the

things which he is alleged to have done. He may plead

in confession and avoidance, and that is an answer, in

law, and in life. In employment relations particularly,

mitigating circumstances, often of a_ highly personal

nature, may save a job for a person who, but for these

circumstances, would and should be discharged. Whether,

if the plaintiff had been permitted to make this kind of

a personal appeal to his superior, it would have saved his

job, we do not know. But when Congress gave to the

veteran the right to appear personally, it must have in-

tended to give him the chance of succeeding in such an

appeal. The naked facts, without the personal appeal,

could be just as well stated in writing. And Congress

knew, as we all know, that bureaucratic superiors, like

other human beings, are susceptible to the effects of per-

sonal appeals.

The procedural rights of a veteran under section 14

are clear and simple. In the present case one of those

rights was denied. The plaintiff was denied his right to

answer the charges against him in person at the agency

level. The fact that he was subsequently given a de novo

hearing at a higher level does not cure this procedural

defect. Since the agency did not follow the procedure

laid down by Congress plaintiff’s discharge was unlawful.

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied

and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted.

Plaintiff is entitled to recover and judgment will be en-

tered to that effect. The amount of recovery will be

determined pursuant to Rule 38 (c).

Tt is so ordered.

Laramore, Judge; Mavpven, Judge; Wurraxer, Judge;

and Lirrteton, Judge, concur.

22

HEADQUARTERS

AIR MATERIAL COMMAND

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio

March 13, 1953

SUBJECT: Removal—Misconduct

THRU: MCPPEE

TO: Frank V. Dilatush

1. This is your official notification that you are being

considered for removal from the Federal Service due to

your misconduct and lack of responsibility in the per-

formance of your duties as Contract Specialist, grade

GS-1102-7, salary $4330.00 per annum, in the Power Plant

Section of th. Aeronautical Equipment Branch, Procure-

ment Division.

2. You have demonstrated your misconduct and lack

of responsibility by attempting to destroy, i.e., tearing in-

to small pieces and depositing in your waste basket, cer-

tain signed original documents having a direct bearing on

your regularly assigned duties. These documents were

recovered, pieced together, and are available for exami-

nation by you or any other interested person or persons.

The documents under discussion are listed and described

here:

a. Disposition Form, 9 April 1952, Subject: ‘*Time

Compliance Technical Orders and ECP’s for Aircooled

Motors 0-335-4-5, YO-335-5, O-425-1’’, from MCMMXF

to MCPPAE55.

b. Disposition Form, 7 June 1952, Subject: same as in

a. above, from MCPPAE55 to MCMMXF-11. It is noted

that you prepared this Disposition Form in answer to the

Disposition Form described in a. above, and coordinated

it with your signature.

c. Disposition Form, Comment 2 to Disposition Form

deseribed in b. above, dated 13 June 1952, from MCMF to

MCPPAE-55. In further explanation you will no doubt

| — ern nanan nena armen

recall that a representative from MCPPBO, Data Unit,

Production Control Office, came to your desk on or about

25 February 1953 to see why—in view of the interchange

represented by the documents listed earlier in this para-

graph under a., b. and c.,—Provisions for Technical

Order Compliance had not been included in Supplemental

Agreement No. 17 to AF (33-038)-22896, for which you

were responsible, and that you disclaimed any knowledge

or receipt of those documents or of Aircraft Subdivision

Policy Memo No. 6 dated 19 April 1952 or Amendment

No. 1 thereto dated 8 May 1952, which set up the

34 + requirement for Technical Order Compliance in lieu

of Service Bulletins. Later—and after you had

received a telephone call on this same matter—you were

observed extracting from your files certain documents

later recovered and identified as those listed under a., b.,

and c. above, and tearing them up and depositing them

in your waste basket.

d. Letter from Aircooled Motors, Inc., dated 2 Decem-

ber 1952, addressed to the attention of MCPPAE-55, Sub-

ject: “Service Bulletins for 0-335 Engines.” This letter

has a direct bearing on the Service Bulletin situation

which eventually resulted in Supplemental Agreement No.

17 to contract AF(33-038)-22896 which established con-

tractual coverage and money for the Service Bulletins

rather than for the Time Compliance Technical Orders as

required under the Aircraft Subdivision Policy Memo No.

6 and Amendment No. 1 thereto mentioned earlier in this

paragraph.

e. Your letter 25 November 1952 to Commander Gen-

eral, SAAMA, Kelly Air Force Base, Texas, Subject:

“Contract AF 33(600)-18388, Item No. 7, Change Order

No. 3”.

f. First Indorsement from Hq. SAAMA, Kelly Air

Force Base, Texas, which is an answer to letter described

in e. above.

24

Letter—e. above—replied to copy of SAAMA, letter of

29 August 1952 to Aircooled Motors through Rochester

Regional Office, which asked, among other things, for de-

letion of Item 171, Valves, Part No. 0238-18285 as these

were being procured under another item on the contract,

your letter stating that the 29 August letter was wrong

and that the referenced part number in that letter was

0238-18258. (Stock number was correct and part number

was transposed).

First Indorsement—f. above—answers your letter—e.

above—and reiterates what was stated in the 29 August

letter, i.e., that the part number of 0258-18285 (reference

to the file copy of the SAAMA letter of 29 August 1952

discloses reference to be 0258-18285 as stated by SAAMA).

The attempt to destroy documents, identified as e. and f.

above was a few days prior to the attempted destruction

of a., b., c., and d.

Copy of SAAMA letter 29 August 1952 was forwarded

to this Headquarters from the Rochester Air Regional

Office with its transmittal letter of 11 September 1952

(NEHRSSC/GEF/MIS), the third paragraph of this

transmittal letter reading as follows: ‘‘It is requested that

you initiate action to incorporate the changes referred to

in referenced letter”, (29 August letter from SAAMA).

The action referred to was in connection with Item Ne.

7 to Contract AF 33(600) 18388 (Items 171 and 286 of

Exhibit A2, and new items 105a and 310a). Items 171

and 286, the over all cost of which on the priced exhibit

was $5,831.17, were to be cancelled, and items 105a and

310a, not then on contract, were to be procured.

35 No Contractual action was taken to either cancel the

items or procure the items as requested. The pos-

sible result from non-accomplishment of that action, which

‘was your responsibility, would have been a useless ex-

penditure of up to $5,831.17 on the one hand and on the

other a critical shortage position on the two items not

procured. Had Items that you failed to procure been

required for combat engines the effect might well have

been very serious and far reaching.

Mr. Chadwick of Aircooled Motors received shipping

instructions on the contract pursuant to OTT 12-1616 on

19 December 1952 with a note from SAAMA to the effect

Items 171 and 286 were to be deleted. That is the reason

no cost was incurred as Mr. Chadwick had already—on 14

October—quoted SAAMA on the two (2) items (105a and

310a) to be procured and agreed to incur no cost on the

items (171 and 286) that were to be deleted. In telephone

conversation with this Headquarters 10 March 1952, Mr.

Chadwick stated that he could not understand why there

had been no further contractual action. This lack of

proper action on your part during this six months period,

and your subsequent attempt to destroy original signed

correspondence relating to it are considered conclusive

evidence of lack of responsibility and misconduct.

3. There is no information available on the relative

cost of the Service Bulletins which were furnished pur-

suant to Supplemental Agreement No. 17 of Contract

W33-(038) 22896 and the Time Compliance Technical

Orders that should have been furnished (see subpara-

graphs a, b, and ¢, of preceeding paragraph 2).

4. The Base Security Officer will be informed of the

general content of the preceding paragraphs for such ac-

tion as may be deemed necessary in connection with your

security clearance.

5. In accordance with the Veterans Preferance Act of

1944 you are being given thirty (30) days advance notice

of the proposed removal action. During this thirty (30)

day period you will be retained in a work status, and will

be assigned duties by the Unit Chief of your organiza-

tional component. You will not be permitted to exercise

sole custody of correspondence files pertaining to contracts

v

26

on which you would normally perform administrative

functions, nor on new procurements which normally would

require your services in a negotiating capacity.

6. You have the right to reply personally and in writ-

ing to this notice of proposed removal, and to show cause

why the action should not be taken. You may submit affi-

davits and evidence in support of your answer. Your reply

must be made within seven (7) days from receipt of this

notice. A written reply should be brought or mailed to the

undersigned so as to be received not later than March

21, 1953.

7. You may discuss your case with Miss Isabel Klenk,

telephone 2-4225, room 018, Building 15, this Headquar-

ters (the placement and employee relations adviser) who

will advise you on preparation of your reply.

36 8. No decision to separate you has been made,

or will be made until after the time allowed for

your reply. Your reply will be given careful consideration

before final decision is made. Whether you reply or not,

a written notice of final decision will be given you.

/s/ Charles F. Burley

CHARLES F. BURLEY

Lt. Colonel, USAF

Chief, Aeronautical

Equipment Branch

Procurement Division

27

HEADQUARTERS

WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE

OHIO

28 May 1953

EWACUB

SUBJECT: Removal—Misconduct

THRU: MCPPEE

TO: Mr. Frank V. Dilatush

1. You are advised that the decision has been made to

remove you from the Federal service due to misconduct.

You were notified by letter dated 13 March 1953 from the

Chief of the Aeronautical Equipment Branch that removal

action was contemplated because of misconduct and lack

of responsibility as demonstrated by your attempt to de-

stroy certain signed original documents having a direct

bearing on your regularly assigned duties, The specific

documents were identified in that letter, and were later

made available for your personal inspection.

2. You were given an opportunity to reply to the

charges, and your reply of March 19, 1953, as well as

your supplementary letter of April 27, 1953, have been

carefully considered. On 13 May 1953, an informal dis-

cussion was held in the office of your Branch Chief, at-

tended by you, three representatives of management, and

three representatives of the Civilian Personnel Office, in

an attempt to clarify the issues involved and to be sure

that the decision regarding your proposed removal could

be made as fairly as possible.

3. The documents involved internal correspomence

within Headquarters, Air Material Command and corres-

pondence with Headquarters, SAAMA, Kelly Air Force

Base, Texas, pertaining to the requirement for Time Com-

pliance Technical Orders as opposed to Service Bulletins

pertaining to two contracts with the same firm. The pieces

of the torn correspondence between your office and the

28

Maintenance Division of this Headquarters were found

in a waste basket near your desk shortly after you de-

nied any knowledge of such correspondence, although you

had personally dictated and coordinated a part of it.

Since both sets of correspondence pertained to situations

where you had failed to take proper action for which you

were responsible regarding Air Force Procurement Con-

tracts, and since you have offered no information to

nullify the charges, the decision has been made to remove

you from the service. At no time have you given a direct

answer to the question, ‘‘Did you attempt to destroy the

documents in question?’’ Instead, you have attempted to

answer the charges against you by making counter

charges of conspiracy to ‘‘frame’’ you against other per-

sonnel of your immediate office.

38 4. It is noted that in your letters of reply to

the charges, you have stressed the fact that you

are an attorney. Your education and legal e».perience

make the offense especially serious. The lack of responsi-

bility which has been demonstrated is most unfortunate in,

a man of your years and background, and gives rise to

justified doubt as to your suitability for government em-

ployment. You are most fortunate, indeed, that loss of

life or loss or damage to government aircraft did not

result from your misconduct.

5. If you so desire, you may appeal this decision under

the Air Force grievance procedure established by Chapter

AF E2 of Air Force Manual 40-1. Appeal under the Air

Force grievance procedure must be made in writing within

thirty (30) days after the effective date of your removal.

The appeal should be addressed to the Commanding Gen-

eral, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, Attention:

EWACUB.

6. You are also advised of your right to appeal to the

Civil Service Commission under Section 14, of the Veter-

ans’ Preference Act. Any such appeal should be addressed

29

to the Sixth United States Civil Service Region, United

States Post Office and Courthouse Building, Cincinnati 2,

Ohio, and must be received in that office within ten (10)

days from the effective date of your separation.

7. You should understand, however, that if an appeal

is accepted by the Civil Service Commission, no future

appeal of your removal may be made under the Air

Force grievance procedure and action on any appeal you

may already have made will cease.

8. Standard form 50, ‘‘Notification of Personnel Ac-

tion,’ showing the effective date of your removal is en-

closed and you should report to your Placement and Enm-

ployee Relations Adviser, Miss Klenk, whose office is lo-

cated at Room 018, Building 15, Area B, immediately

upon receipt of this letter in order to complete your

clearance.

9, The original letter of charges is returned to you for

your disposition, and a copy of the letter recently ad-

dressed to your attorney is also enclosed.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL BROWN:

/s/ C. E. Gray

C. E. GRAY

Chief, Civilian Personnel

‘ Branch

Directorate, Base Personnel

and Training

INDEX

Page

OPE toy Seen ks PEC eee 1

«RRR rasa Se ae :

tion presented _..--.-.---------------------------- 1

ieee SAWONWOR .... .. = a - 0 oc dna nec ene ne eee nce eneesese 2

Bn in eemen eee wens sank hie 2

The Statement of Charges- - - --------------------- 3

The Letter of Dismissal_......-.------------------ 7

ee oe ks sae cbsedbe ead ee enke anes 9

eS ee cee beds tibwananaseunes 14

CITATIONS

Baughman v. Green, 229 F. 2d 33. -..-------------- 10

Blackmon v. Lee, 205 F. 2d 13....----------------- 11, 12

Deak v. Pace, 185 F. 2d 997...-.------------------ 10

DeBusk v. United States, 132 C. Cls. 790.---.-------- 11

Engelhardt v. United States, 125 C. Cls. 603 - - - - ----- 10

Green v. Baughman, C. A. D. C. No. 13,500 (January

$1, 1957)...-.--.------------------------------ 13

_ Malligan v. Dunlap, 108 F. Supp. 296, reversed sub

nom. Mulligan v. Andrews, 211 F. | ARS 10

_ Washington v. Summerfield, 228 F. 2d 452_-.----.---- 13

' Washington v. United States, C. Cls. No. 44-56, de-

cided January 16, 1957 - ..---------------------- 13

Williams v. 210 F. 2d 874, certiorari denied,

348 U.S. 819.-.--2 SRE deer weer 10

te:

Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 387, as

amended, 5 U. S. C. 863, Section 14..-..---------- 2,12

163)

— 418089—57—1

GInthe Supreme Court of the Bnited States

OcToBER TERM, 1956

No. 730

Frank V. DILaATUSH, PETITIONER

v.

Cuartes E. Witson, SEcrETARY OF DEFENSE, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPHALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

OIROUIT

———

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The District Court rendered no opinion, The per

curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals (Pet. App.

13—14) is reported at 239 F. 2d 44.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered

November 1, 1956 (R. 39). The petition for a writ

of certiorari was filed on January 30, 1957. The

jurisdiction of this Court is presumably invoked un-

der 28 U. S. ©, 1254 (1). .

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether péetitioner’s dismissal from his Govern-

ment employment was in accord with the procedural

9 (1) ‘se

2

requirements of Section 14 of the Veterans’ Prefer-

ence Act.

STATUTE INVOLVED

Section 14 of the Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944,

58 Stat. 387, 390, as amended, 5 U. 8S. C. 863, provides

in pertinent part:

No permanent or indefinite preference elig-

ible * * * shall be discharged, suspended for

more than thirty days, furloughed without pay,

reduced in rank or compensation, or debarred

for future appointment except for such cause

as will promote the efficiency of the service and

for reasons given in writing, and the person

whose discharge, suspension for more than

thirty days, furlough without pay, or reduction

in rank cr compensation is sought shall have at

least thirty days’ advance written notice (ex-

cept where there is reasonable cause to believe

the employee to be guilty of a crime for which

a sentence of imprisonment can be imposed),

stating any and all reasons, specifically and in

detail, for any such proposed action; such

preference eligible shall be allowed a reasonable

time for answering the same personally and in

writing, and for furnishing affidavits in support

of such answer, and shall have the right to

appeal to the Civil Service Commission from

an adverse decision of the administrative officer

80 acting, such appeal to be made in writing

within a reasonable length of, time after the

date of receipt of notice of such adverse de-

cision: * ***,

This is ‘a disthissal ease in which petitioner, an

honorably discharged veteran, claims that respondents”

actions in dismissing him from Government service

were in violation of Section 14 of the Veterans’ Pref-

erence Act, supra, p. 2.

In his complaint in the District Court, petitioner

alleged: (1) that the Statement of Charges leading

to his dismissal was not sufficiently specific (R. 5);

and (2) that the Letter of Dismissal contains no

finding of guilt and no express determination that

the dismissal was for such cause as would promote

the efficiency of the service (R. 5-6). He sought a

declaratory judgment that his dismissal was unlawful

and an injunction ordering his reinstatement (R. 7).

Upon cross motions for summary judgement, the

District Court granted respondents’ motion and

denied that of petitioner. The Court of Appeals af-

firmed, holding ‘“‘ * * * that the findings and pro-

ceedings which eventuated in [petitioner’s] discharge

met the requirement of the applicable statute and

regulations’’ (Pet. App. 14).

The facts, as disclosed by the affidavits and docu-

ments attached to the respective motions, are as

follows:

The Statement of Charges. Petitioner was em-

ployed by the United States at Wright-Patterson

Material Field, Dayton, Ohio, as a Contract Specialist,

GS-7 (Pet. App. 22). On March 13, 1953, he was

served with a Statement of Charges advising him that

he was being considered for removal from the Federal

Service for ‘misconduct and lack of responsibility’’

(Pet. App. 22). Headed “Removal—Misconduct,”’

the Statement of Charges in paragraph 1 advised peti-

tioner “This is your official notification that you are

oe NRRRRDURNRNRRNRIRRRERRR :

being considered for removal from the Federal Serv.

ice due to your misconduct and lack of responsibility

in the performance of your duties as Contract

Specialist * * *.”’ (Pet. App. 22). Paragraph 2

stated (Pet. App. 22):

You have demonstrated your misconduct and

lack of responsibility by attempting to destroy,

i. e., tearing into small pieces and depositing in

your waste basket, certain signed original docu-

ments having a direct bearing on your regularly

assigned duties. ‘These documents were re-

covered, pieced together, and are available for

examination by you or any other interested per-

son or persons. * * *

Under subparagraphs a, b, and c, the Statement listed

and specifically described by date and subject matter

the three documents so destroyed (Pet. App. 22-23).

“In further explanation,” the Statement advised peti-

tioner (Pet. App. 22-23) that a representative from

the Production Control Office

came to your desk on or about 26 February

1953 to see why—in view of the interchange

represented by the documents listed earlier in

0-885-4-5, YO-335-5, 0-495-1’,. from MCMMXF to

“b. Disposition Form, 7 June 1952, Subject: same as in a.

above, from MCPPAE55 to MCMMXF-11. It is noted that

this Disposition Form in answer to the Disposi-

you prepared

tion Form described in a. above, and coordinated it with your

Form, Comment 2 to Disposition Form de-

| in -b, above, dated 18 June 1952, from MCMF to

er 18 June 1952, fro

5

this paragraph under a., b., and ¢.,—Provisions

for Technical Order Compliance had not been

included in Supplemental Agreement No. 17

to AF (35-038)-22896, for which you were

responsible, and that you disclaimed any

knowledge or receipt of those documents or of

Aircraft Subdivision Policy Memo No. 6 dated

19 April 1952 or Amendment No. 1 thereto

dated 8 May 1952, which set up the require-

ment for Technical Order Compliance in lieu

of Service Bulletins. Later—and after you

had received a telephone call on this same

matter—you were observed extracting from

your files certain documents later recovered

and identified as those listed under a., b., and

C. above, and tearing them up and depositing

them in your waste basket.

The Statement of Charges then listed, under sub-

paragraphs d, e, and f, three additional documents

which petitioner had similarly destroyed, likewise de-

scribing these documents in great detail * and stating

that (Pet. App. 24):

*** The attempt to destroy documents,

identified as e. and f. above was a few days

prior to the attempted destruction of a., b.,

c., and d.

*The letter described these documents as follows (Pet. App.

23):

“d. Letter from Aircooled Motors, Inc., dated 2 December

1952, addressed to the attention of MCPPAE-55, Subject:

‘Service Bulletins for O-335 Engines.’ This letter has a direct

bearing on the Service Bulletin situation which eventually re-

sulted in Supplemental Agreement No. 17 to contract AF (33-

038)-22896 which established contractual coverage and money

for the Service Bulletins rather than for the Time Compliance

Technical Orders as required under the Aircraft ‘Subdivision

6

The Statement pointed out that these documents

involved certain proposed changes in a contract for

procurement of airplane parts and that petitioner

had been requested to initiate action to incorporate

such change (Pet. App. 24). It noted that no such

action was taken by petitioner and advised him of

the serious consequences that might have resulted

from such inaction on his part (Pet. App. 24-25).

Paragraph 2 of the Statement of Charges concluded

(Pet. App. 25) :

* * * This lack of proper action on your

part during this six months period, and your

Policy Memo No. 6 and Amendment No. 1 thereto mentioned

earlier in this paragraph.

“e. Your letter 25 November 1952 to Commanding General,

SAAMA, Kelly Air Force Base, Texas, Subject: ‘Contract

AF 33 (600)-18388, Item No. 7, Change Order No. 3’.

“f. First Indorsement from Hq. SAAMA, Kelly Air Force

Base, Texas, which is an answer to letter described in e. above.

Letter—e. above—replied to copy of SAAMA, letter of 29

August 1952 to Aircooled Motors through Rochester Regional

Office, which usked, among other things, for deletion of Item

171, Valves, Part No. 0238-18285 as these were being procured

under another item on the contract, your letter stating that the

29 August letter was wrong and that the referenced part num-

ber in that letter was 0238-18258. (Stock number was correct

and part number was transposed).

7

subsequent attempt to destroy original signed

correspondence relating to it are considered

conclusive evidence of lack of responsibility

and misconduct.*

The Letter of Dismissal. On March 19, 1953, and

again on April 27, 1953, petitioner submitted written

answers to the charges (Pet. App. 27). On May 13,

1953, a conference was held on the matter in the office

of petitioner’s Branch Chief, attended by petitioner,

three representatives of management, and three repre-

sentatives of the Civilian Personnel Office (Pet. App.

27). On May 28, 1953, petitioner was advised by the

Chief of the Civilian Personnel Branch of the deci-

sion to remove him (Pet. App. 27). The Letter of

Dismissal referred to the Statement of Charges, which

it noted had advised petitioner (Pet. App. 27):

* * * that removal action was contemplated

because of misconduct and lack of responsibil-

ity as demonstrated by your attempt to destroy

certain signed original documents having a

direct bearing on your regularly assigned

duties. * * *

and again pointed out that the specific documents

were identified in that Statement and were made

* In this connection, the charges stated (Pet. App. 24-25) :

“ * * * The possible result from non-accomplishment of that

action, which was your responsibility, would have been a

useless expenditure of. up to $5,831.17 on the one hap*® and on

the other a critical shortage position on the two “ems not

procured. Had Items that you failed to procure been required

for combat engines the effect might well have been very serious

and far reaching.”

The next paragraph of the statement (Pet. App. 25) ex

plained how such damage was fortuitously avoided.

8 7

available for his personal inspection. The Letter fur-

ther stated that his answers had been ‘‘carefully con-

sidered’’ and that the May 13, 1952, conference had

been held ‘‘in an attempt to clarify the issues in-

volved and to be sure that the decision regarding your

proposed removal could be made as fairly as pos-

sible’? (Pet. App. 27).

The Letter of Dismissal summarized the corre

spondence involved and pointed out that the pieces

of torn correspondence were found in a waste basket

near petitioner’s desk after he had denied any knowl-

edge of such correspondence although he had per-

sonally dictated and coordinated a part of it. The

Letter continued (Pet. App. 28) :

* * * Since both sets of correspondence per-

tained to situations where you had failed to

take proper action for which you were respon-

sible regarding Air Force Procurement Con-

tracts, and since you have offered no informa-

tion to nullify the charges, the decision has been

made to remove you from the service. At no

time have you given a direct answer to the ques-

tion, ““Did you attempt to destroy the docu-

ments in question?’’ Instead, you have at-

tempted to answer the charges against you by

making counter charges of conspiracy to

‘“‘frame’’ you against other personnel of your

immediate office. [Emphasis added.]

Emphasizing the seriousness of his offense, the Letter

couclided (Pet. App. 28) : |

* * * The lack of responsibility which has

been demonstrated is most unfortunate in a

. man of your years and background, and gives

rise to justified doubt as to your suitability for

| 9

“ government employment. You are most for-

tunate, indeed, that loss of life or loss or dam-

age to government aircraft did not result from

your misconduct.

Following his unsuccessful appeal to the Civil Serv-

ice Commission under Section 14 of the Veterans’

Preference Act, petitioner instituted the present

action.

ARGUMENT

_ This is a simple dismissal case involving no dispute

as to the facts and no important issue of law. Peti-

tioner’s dismissal was accomplished in observance of

all of the procedural safeguards to which he is en-

titled, and there is no conflict of decisions on any of

the issues presented and decided below.

1, Three of petitioner’s four objections to the pro-

ceedings leading up to his dismissal relate to the legal

sufficiency of the Statement of Charges and the Letter

of Dismissal. Both courts below were clearly correct

rejecting these contentions and in holding that the

documents fully complied with the applicable statute

and regulations.

a. Petitioner contends first that the Statement of

Charges was not sufficiently specific to meet the re-

quirements of Section 14 of the Veterans’ Preference

Act.

The Statement charged petitioner with “misconduct

and lack of responsibility’’ in carrying out his duties

as a Contract Specialist (Pet. App. 22), a charge

which the Statement pointed out was substantiated by

petitioner’s attempt to destroy certain material Gov-

ernment letters and documents. The Statement went

10

on to identify in meticulous detail the dates and sub-

ject matters of these documents and their relation to

petitioner’s work (Pet. App. 22-24), and advise that

the documents had been ‘‘recovéred, pieced together,

and [made] available for examination by you or any

other interested person or persons” (Pet. App. 22).

See also supra, p. 4. Petitioner’s inaction in the

matters concerned in these documents and his sub-

sequent attempts to destroy the documents consti-

tuted, the Statement concluded, evidence of his lack

of responsibility and misconduct (Pet. App. 25).

This charge of ‘“‘misconduct and lack of responsi-

bility,’ amplified by so detailed a statement, fully

supplied the required degree of specificity. It is well

settled that no particular form is required in a State-

ment of Charges so long as, “‘in the circumstances”

of the particular case, it informs the employee “‘with

reasonable certainty and precision of the cause for

his removal’’ (Deak v. Pace, 185 F. 2d 997, 999

(C. A. D. C.)), and affords an employee ‘‘a fair

chance to defend himself’? (Baughman v. Green, 229

F. 2d 33, 34 (C. A. D. C.)). Where these conditions

are met, the courts have repeatedly upheld statements

of charges against attacks on their specificity. See,

é. g., Baughman v. Green, supra; Williams v. Cravens,

210 F. 2d 874 (C. A. D. C.), certiorari denied, 348

U. S. 819; Mulligan v. Dunlap, 108 F. Supp. 296

(D. D. C.), reversed on other grounds sub nom.

Mulligan v. Andrews, 211 F. 2d 28 (C. A. D. C.)5

and Engelhardt v. United States, 125 ©. Cls. 603.

In the instant case, the employing agency, after being

apprised of highly improper action on the part of

ll

petitioner, proceeded promptly to draft and serve

upon him a carefully drawn statement of charges,

spelling out in detail not only the allegations of

improper activity, but also the background, surround-

These charges were at least as specific as those sus-

tained by the courts in the above-cited cases and

clearly met the requirements of Section 14.

b. Equally without merit is petitioner’s further

objection that the employing agency should have

made an express finding that his discharge was for

such cause as will promote the efficiency of the serv-

ice. The Letter of Dismissal made clear that peti-

tioner was being dismissed because of ‘‘misconduct

and lack of responsibility as demonstrated’’ (Pet.

App. 27) by his attempt to destroy certain letters,

and expressly informed him that ‘‘The lack of re-

sponsibility which has been demonstrated is most un-

fortunate in a man of your years and background,

and gives rise to justified doubt as to your su tability

for government employment’’ (Pet. App. 28). It is

settled that “‘the mere absence of an express invoca-

tion of the statutory standard cannot, under such

circumstances, have an effect on the validity of an

otherwise valid personnel action.’”’ DeBusk v. United.

States, 132 C. Cls. 790, 794; see also Blackmon v. Lee,

205 F.2d 13 (C. A. D.C.).

scaaliatibiannen clhiasiacalen stendatthennammheation:inietinn

failed to make specific findings that he in fact com-

mitted the actions with which he was charged.

As notéd above, the Statement of Charges had ad-

Vised petitioner specifically and in detail of the rea~

ing circumstances, and effect of this misconduct.

12

sons for his proposed discharge, charging him with

‘‘misconduct and lack of responsibility’? and pro-

ceeded in explicit detail to document this charge. The

Letter of Dismissal expressly stated that the deci-

sion had been made to remove him for ‘‘miscon-

duct’’ (Pet. App. 27) and demonstrated ‘“‘lack of

responsibility’? (Pet. App. 28). The letter referred

directly to the Statement of Charges, restated the

reasons that the removal action was contemplated,

and pointed out that petitioner had had opportunity

to examine the documents involved, to reply to the

charges, and to attend a hearing (Pet. App. 27). It

summarized the documents involved (Pet. App. 27),

recapitulated the facts upon which the removal action

was based, and then stated (Pet. App. 28) ‘“‘* * *

since you have offered no information to nullify the

chaiges, the decision has been made to remove you

from the service.’’? The Letter also pointed out that

at no time had petitioner ever given a direct answer

to the question whether he had attempted io destroy

the documents in question, but instead had attempted

to answer the charges against him only by making

countercharges of conspiracy (Pet. App. 28). Fi-

nally, the Letter expressly stated (Pet. App. 28), “‘The

lack of responsibility which has been demonstrated is

most unfortunate in a man of your years and back-.

ground, and gives rise to justified doubt as to your

suitability. for government: employment’ (emphasis.

added). Clearly this lengthy and carefully considered.

letter amply supplied the ‘‘reasons given in writing”

as required by Section 14 of the Veterans’ Prefer-

ence Act (supra, p. 2). Blackmon v. Lee, 205 F: 2d

13

13, 14 (C. A. D. C.); Green v. Baughman, C. A. D. C.

No. 13500 (January 31, 1957).

2. Petitioner, for the first time in these proceedings,

makes the additional contention that he was denied

the right to answer charges personally before the ad-

ministrative officer responsible for his removal. As-

serting that there is a conflict of decisions on the ques-

tion of whether Section 14 confers a right to a per-

sonal hearing before the employing agency in addition

to the hearing by the Civil Service Commission,* he

urges this Court to resolve the issue by granting cer-

tiorari in the instant case.

The issue, however, is raised too late in this case;

at no point in the course of the administrative or

judicial proceedings did petitioner make any claim

of right to a preliminary hearing before the em-

ploying agency. In any eveut, the undisputed facts

of record clearly demonstrate thui petitioner, subse-

quent to the service upon him of the Stetement of

Charges, did in fact personally appear at a conforence

in the office of his Branch Chief ‘‘in an attempt to

clarify the issues involved and to be sure that the deci-

sion regarding [his] propesed removal could be made

as fairly as possible’ (Pet. App. 27). This conference

satisfied whatever right petitioner may have had to

answer the charges against him ‘‘personally”’ within

the meaning of Section 14. The issue on which the

alleged conflict exists, therefore, is not reached in this

case.

*Compare Washington v. Swmmerfield, 228 452

F. 2d

(C. A. D. C.), with Washington v. United States, C. Cis. No.

44-56, decided January 16, 1957. :

be denied. <

J. Lee Rankin, ‘

Solicitor General. .

/%0. STEPHEN LEONARD, a

‘Acting Assistant Attorney General.

Me.vin RICHTER, .

Rosert 8. GREEN,

Attorneys.

Marcu 1957.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1087

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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