Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Dilatush v. Wilson (No. 730)
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JAW oT
bis PEY, Clerk
In THE
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1956
No. an =
Frank V. DiuatussH,
Petitioner,
v.
Cartes EK. Wizson, Secretary of Defense, et al.,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.
DanieL L. O’Connor
1010 Vermont Avenue, N.W.
Washington 5, D. C.
Attorney for Petitioner
nie mae
WILSON - EPES PRINTING Co. - RE 7-6002 - WASHINGTON 1, D. C.
INDEX
PAGE
Opinions Below 1
Jurisdiction 2
Questions Involved 2
Statute Involved 2
Statement of the Case 4
Specifications of the Errors to be Urged .................... 5
Reasons for Granting Writ 5
Appendix 13
Cases Cited
Washington v. Summerfield (1955) 228 F. 2d. 452 ........ 6
Washington v. U.S., U.S. Court of Claims, U.S. Ct.
of Claims No. 44-56, Decided January 16, 1957.
Not reported, set forth at page 15 of the Ap-
pendix 7
Staiutes Cited
Title 5—U.S.C. 863 2
In THE
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1956
No.
Frank V. DitatusH,
Petitioner,
v.
Cuartes EB. Witson, Secretary of Defense, et al.,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.
To the Honorable Chief Justice,and the Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court of the United States:
The petitioner, Frank V. Dilatush, Appellant below,
prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit entered on November 1, 1956.
OPINIONS BELOW
The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia did not render an opinion but instead entered
an order granting a summary judgment to defcudant»
and appellees below. The opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is not yet
2
officially reported but is set forth on page 13 of the
Appendix.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Uni ed States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia was entered on November 1,
1956. This petition for certiorari is filed within 90 days
thereafter in accordance with the provision of Title 28
U.S.C. Section 2101 (e).
QUESTIONS INVOLVED
1. Whether a federal agency can discharge a perma-
nent preference eligible civil service employee in the
absence of a specific finding that such discharge is for
cause and will promote the efficiency of the service.
2. Whether a federal agency can discharge a perma-
nent preference eligible civil service employee without
advising such employee, so as to enable him to properly
prepare his answer, of (1) the identity of witnesses to the
alleged acts of misconduct and (2) the dates, time and
circumstances of the alleged acts of misconduct.
3. Whether a federal agency can discharge a perma-
nent preference eligible civil service employee for reasons
other than those included in the written Notice of Inten-
tion to Discharge.
4. Whether an administrative officer can deprive a
preference eligible civil service employee of a personal
hearing prior to discharge.
STATUTES INVOLVED
Title 5 U.S.C. 863
“No permanent or indefinite preference eligible, who
has completed a probationary or trial period employed in
3
the civil service, or in any establishment, agency, bureau,
administration, project, or department, hereinbefore re-
ferred to shall be discharged, suspended for more than
thirty days, furloughed without pay, reduced in rank or
compensation, or debarred for future appointment except
for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the serv-
ice and for reasons given in writing, and the person whose
discharge, suspension for more than thirty days, furlough
without pay, or reduction in rank or compensation is
sought shall have at least thirty days’ advance written
notice (except where there is reasonable cause to believe
the employee to be guilty of a crime for which a sentence
of imprisonment can be imposed), stating auy and all
reasons, specifically and in detail, for any such proposed
action; such preference eligible shall be allowed a reason-
able time for answering the same personally and in writ-
ing, and for furnishing affidavits in support of such
answer, and shall have the right to appeal to the Civil
Service Commission from an adverse decision of the
administrative officer so acting, such appeal to be made in
writing within a reasonable length of time after the date
of receipt of notice of such adverse decision: Provided,
That such preference eligible shall have the riglt to make
a personal appearance, or an appearance through a desig-
nated representative, in accordance with such reasonable
rules and regulations as may be issued by the Civil Serv-
ice Commission; after investigation, and consideration of
the evidence submitted, the Civil Service Commission
shall submit its findings and recommendations to the
proper administrative officer and shall send copies of the
same to the appellant or to his designated representative,
and it shall be mandatory for such administrative officer
to take such corrective action as the Commission finally
recommends: Provided further, That the Civil Service
Commission may “declare any such preference eligible
who may have been dismissed or furloughed without pay
to be eligible for the provisions of section 864 of this
title. (June 27, 1944, c. 287, Sec. 14, 58 Stat. 390)
peat aemmarernaanemammane
4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The petitioner brought this suit against the Secretary
of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force and Members
of the United States Civil Service Commission praying
for a declaratory judgment, and for a mandatory injune-
tion requiring the defendants to restore him to his posi-
tion in governmental service.
Prior to discharge petitioner was a preference eligible
civil service employee of the Department of the Air Force
entitled to all rights, benefits and privileges of the Vet-
erans Preference Act of June 27, 1944.
Petitioner was a $4,330 per year civilian clerk in a
Military installation. On November 28, 1952, he filed a
formal grievance of incompetence against his section
chief, a commissioned officer of the Air Force. There-
after, on March 13, 1953, while this grievance was still
pending, he received a written notice of intention to re-
move him from the Federal Service. The reasons for
removal were denied by petitioner and the animosity
created as a result of his charges against the military
supervisor were set forth in detail. Petitioner requested
a personal hearing before the administrative officer re-
sponsible for his removal which was denied. On May 28,
1953, petitioner was removed from his civil service posi-
tion. He thereafter appealed his discharge to the United
States Civil Service Commission in accordance with Sec-
tion 14 of the Veterans Preference Act and on January
10, 1955, the agency action was affirmed by the Commis-
sion.
The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia refused to upset the administrative decision,
which action was affirmed by the U. S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia on November 1, 1956.
5
SPECIFICATIONS OF ERRORS TO BE URGED
Petitioner will argue that procedural rights guaranteed
to him by Section 14 of the Veterans Proference Act of
June 27, 1944, as a veteran and as a preference eligible
employed in the civil service, were denied him, in that :—
1. A specific finding must be made by the Department
of the Air Force that his discharge would be for
such cause as will promote the efficiency of the
service.
2. Prior to discharge he was entitled to a statement
of any and all reasons, specifically and in detail, for
the proposed action to be taken against him. (This
is particularly significant in view of his categorical
denial of the charges; the offering of cogent reason
why his superior desired his dismissal ; and basing
the discharge on conclusions and reasons not con-
tained in the original written charges.)
3. A mandatory procedural safeguard is that the ad-
ministrative agency must make specific findings that
the acts of which the employee is accused were, in
fact, committed.
4. The employee is entitled, as a matter of right, to
answer charges personally before the administrative
officer responsible for his removal.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THIS WRIT
This writ should be granted for the obvious impact
which the issues of this case have upon governmental
personnel policies. ‘Thousands employed in the civil
service on military reservations are entitled to protection
afforded by Section 14 of the [Veterans Preference Act of
June 27, 1944. A civilian employee of the United States
Government should not be under the domination of mili-
tary authority in matters pertaining to the efficient opera-
tion of his government. Fear of disciplinary action
should never deter a civilian employee from filing a
6
charge of incompetency or grievance against a military
superior.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia and the United States Court of Claims have
rendered decisions in direct conflict on the question of
whether a preference eligible civil service employee is
entitled, as a matter of right, to a personal hearing be-
fore an administrative officer prior to discharge.
MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 14
Nowhere in these proceedings has it been established
that the Department of the Air Force has fulfilled the
mandatory requirements of Section 14 of the Act. The
Act specifically requires:
1. That there be a finding that the discharge is for
such cause as will promote the efficiency of the serv-
ice.
2. That the employee have written notice stating any
and all reasons, specifically and in detail, for the
proposed action.
3. That the employee shall have a reasonable time for
answering the charges personally before the admin-
istrative officer responsible for the removal.
CONFLICT OF DECISIONS EXISTS AS TO
WHETHER PERSONAL HEARINGS IN AGENCY
MUST BE AFFORDED PRIOR TO DISCHARGE.
There now exists a direct conflict in decisions between
the U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
and the U. S. Court of Claims on the question of whether
a preference eligible civil service employee is, under the
Act, entitled to a personal hearing before the administra-
tive officer responsible for his removal.
In Washington v. Summerfield (1955) 228 F.2d 452 the
Cireuit Court held that Section 14 of the Act did not
provide for a conference or ‘‘minimal hearing’’ for the
employee within the administrative agency.
7
The Court says at page 454:—
‘‘The Veterans’ Preference Act, Sec. 14, Act of
June 27, 1944, c. 287, 58 Stat. 390, 5 U.S.C.A. § 863,
provides that a veterans preference eligible ‘shall be
allowed a reasonable time for answering the same
(the charges) personally and in writing’. It does
not provide for a conference or ‘‘minimal hearing”’,
as appellant would urge. We conclude that this
means that he shall personally answer the charges
in writing. Such has been the administrative practice,
with which, in the absence of a misconstruction of
the governing statute, we should not interfere.”
The Court of Claims in Washington v. U. S., No. 44
56, decided January 16, 1957 (which opinion is set forth
in the Appendix at page 15) considered the identical
case as was considered by the Circuit Court and found
a directly opposite result. The Court said:
‘“‘The phrase ‘‘personally and in writing’’ is clear
and unambiguous. It means exactly what it says. A
veteran who has been charged with certain offenses
and given notice that he is to be discharged from
his position is given a reasonable time within which
to answer the charges personally if he so chooses, or
in writing, or both. We can find nothing in the Vet-
erans’ Preference Act or in the legislative history of
that act which causes us to believe that Congress in-
tended anything other than what it plainly said, and
this court has previously indicated that a veteran is
given the right to answer the charges against him
in person at the agency level. Wittner v. United
States, 110 C. Cls. 231.”’
Petitioner, prior to discharge, made repeated requests
for a personal conference with the administrative officer
responsible for removal proceedings. All such requests
were denied and, instead, he was referred to a Miss
Klenk, an employee relations adviser. The notice of in-
tention to remove petitioner from Federal Service set
forth at page 22 of the appendix reads:
‘6. You have the right to reply personally and in
writing to this notice of proposed removal, and to
8
show cause why the action should not be taken. You
may submit affidavits and evidence in support of
your answer. Your reply must be made within seven
(7) days from receipt of this notice. A written reply
should be brought or mailed to the undersigned so as
to be received not later than March 21, 1953.
“‘7. You may discuss your case with Miss Isabel
Klenk, telephone 2-4225, room 018, Building 15, this
Headquarters, (the placement and employee relations
adviser) who will advise you on preparation of your
reply.’’
Despite this apparent opportunity to appear person-
ally, such right was denied when request therefor was
made. Likewise, all requests for a personal conference or
hearing with the administrative officer responsible for
removal were denied with instructions that petitioner
should consult Miss Klenk.
This issue was not urged in the lower courts because
of the decision in Washington v. Summerfield, supra. In
view of the present conflicting opinions and in the interest
of justice this Court should now permit petitioner to raise
the issue of a personal hearing at the administrative level.
REASONS FOR DISCHARGE MUST BE
SUPPORTED BY SPECIFIC FINDING
The Court will read in vain for any reference by the~
Department of the Air Force that a finding was made
that petitioner’s discharge was for a cause which would
promote the efficiency of the service. Instead, petitioner’s
discharge is predicated upon unsubstantiated conclusions
and reasons. (Appendix page 27).
Reasons given for petitioner’s discharge are (1) mis-
conduct, (2) lack of responsibility, ( 3) failure to offer
information to nullify the charges, and (4) failure to
answer a question relating to torn documents.
Reasong (3) and (4) are not contained in the written
charges served upon petitioner and reasons (1) and (2)
9
are conclusions unsupported by amy facts or findings
knowledgable to petitioner. It is elementary to state
that conclusions, unsupported by findings, are insufficient
to constitute the ‘‘reasons’’ required by Section 14 of
the Act. It is urged that the requirement that ‘‘reasons’’
be specifically set forth, is a mandatory procedural safe-
guard to be strictly adhered to by the administrative
agency.
CHARGES MUST BE SPECIFIC AND DETAILED
Specificity and detail are the essence of charges and
findings required by the mandatory provisions of the
Act and lack of specificity is a fatal procedural error.
Petitioner was charged as principal to a series of
events in a chain of circumstances without establishing
the identity of witnesses, the date, time or circumstances
so as to enable him to refute the allegations. To enumer-
ate a few:
1. Petitioner is charged with having been paid a visit
on or about February 26, 1953. Who was this individual?
What transpired? Petitioner denied knowledge of any
visit so how is he to answer the charge without knowing
the identity of the visitor and the actual date of the
visit?
2. The charges then set forth that ‘‘later” petitioner
was ‘‘observed’’ removing certain documents ‘‘later re-
covered’’ and identified. Petitioner denied knowledge of
this vague accusation. The obvious query is how much
‘later’? Was it immediately—hours—days or weeks
later? What files were involved? Were they copies or
originals? Did the originals remain in the files? How
were the documents ‘‘later recovered’’ identified as be-
longing to petitioner’s file? Who ‘‘observed’’ petitioner
and when was the observation made? Without identify-
ing the person alleged to have made the observation and
the time of such observation, how can petitioner establish
10
whether such complainant was actually in the room at the
time or may have been on leave or taking a coffee-break?
3. Petitioner is also charged with attempting to de-
stroy certain identified documents ‘a few days prior’’.
Prior to what? How was this destruction attempted; who
witnessed it; when were the documents obtained; where
were they found; was petitioner present; was petitioner
the only one having access to the documents; who saw
him and was the observer in a position to see?
4. The charges set forth a telephone call which through
innuendo apparently resulted in the destruction of docu-
ments. Who were the parties to this conversation, what
was said, when was it made, could not petitioner have
had several calls over a period of time relative to this
matter; how is this call related to the alleged action of
petitioner?
5. Did not petitioner’s supervisor hive sufficient mo-
tive for having him removed from office? Did not peti-
tioner file charges of incompetency and deriliction of
duty against the supervisor? Does not this raise a
question in the minds of administrative Officials so as to
warrant a specific and detailed letter of charges which
would allow petitioner to fully and completely answer
each charge and give reasons therefor? Is petitioner’s
counter-charge of an attempt to ‘“‘frame’’ him without
fundation? Actually who was responsible—the accused or
the accuser?
Clarity and specificity of issues is the very basis for
charges seeking the removal of a preference eligible from
a civil service position. Ambiguity, vagueness, indefinite-
ness cannot be tolerated and a mandatory prohibition
against such is written into Section 14 of the Act. If
the Departments charges were of such specificity and
detail as required by the Act then why does the letter of
dismissal relate the following? (Appendix page 27)
1l
“2. You were given an opportunity to ruply to the
charges, and your reply of March 19, 1983, as well
as your supplementary letter of April 27, 1953, have
been carefully considered. On 13 May 1953, an in-
formal discussion was held in the office of your
Branch Chief, attended by you, three representatives
of management, and three representatives of the
Civilian Personnel Office, in an attempt te clarify
the issues involved and to be sure that the decision
regarding your proposed removal could be made as
fairly as possible.”
No new or amended charges were filed against peti-
tioner after this informal discussion and the foregoing
is a acit admission of uncertainty and doubt. Petitioner
was, therefore, dismissed upon questionable issues.
It is conceded that torn documents had been found and
pieced back together. There is vigorous objection, how-
ever, to the implication that these torn fragments were
the result of a wrongful act by petitioner; that petitioner
had access to the particular wastebasket in which these
documents were found, and that the torn documents were
the only torn papers in the basket. There is no finding
of fact on this charge by the Department. In addition,
there is no indication as to who recovered the documents,
who pieced such documents together or whether such
documents exhibited to petitioner were the documents
removed from the files and allegedly subsequently found
in a torn condition.
Likewise, it is conceded that action was not taken within
a six month period upon a stated administrative duty.
But was this the responsibility of a $4,330 a year clerk
who is accused—or was it the primary responsibility of
petitioner’s superior against whom petitioner had filed
charges of irresponsibility some three months prior to
this action. In the absence of specific findings it can be
presumed that petitioner was “framed” as he alleged.
The Departmental charges do nothing but set forth a
series of events and circumstances which could be applied
12
to anyone of many employees in similar activities. Peti-
tioner has the right to explain the circumstances but he
cannot blindly do so. He must know who his accusers
are so that he can prepare a refutation. He must know
when, where and how the alleged acts are reported to
have taken place so that he can either deny and offer
evidence in support thereof, or confess and show cir-
cumstances which will justify his action.
In the interest of all preference eligible employees this
petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted; other-
wise, thousands are subject to being deprived of rights
guaranteed to them as veterans and as civil service em-
ployees.
WHEREFORE, the petitioner prays that a writ of
certiorari may issue under the seal of this Honorable
Court in this cause, directed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia’ Circuit, and
that upon such a review that the decision and judgment
of the Court be vacated, reversed, and set aside, and this
cause remanded to the said Court of Appeals in ac-
cordance ~.th the views of this Court.
Dantet L. O’Connor
1010 Vermont Avenue, N.W.
Washington 5, D. C.
Attorney for Petitioner
13
APPENDIX
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 13262
Frank V. DitatusH, APPELLANT
v.
Cuartes E. Witson, Secretary of Defense,
et al., APPELLEES
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
Decided November 1, 1956
Mr. Frank V. Dilatush, appellant, pro se, and Mr.
Claude L. Dawson, for appellant.
Mr. Robert S. Green, Attorney, Department of Justice,
of the bar of the Court of Appeals ~f New York, pro hac
vice, by special leave of Court, with whom Messrs. Oliver
Gasch, United States Attorney, and Melvin Richter, At-
torney, Department of Justice, were on the brief, for
appellees. Mr. Lewis Carroll, Assistant United States At-
torney, also entered an appearance for appellees.
Before Epcerton, Chief Judge, and Pretryman and
Fany, Circuit Judges.
a
14
Psr Curiam: The District Court granted the motion
of appellees * for summary judgment and denied that of
appellant. He had sued in the District Court for a de-
claratory judgment that he had been unlawfully discharged
from Government service and for kindred relief. As an
employee eligible for veteran’s preference he alleged in
the District Court and here contends that his discharge
did not accord with the procedural requirements of sec-
tion 14 of the Veterans Preference Act, 58 Stat. 390 (1944),
as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 863 (1952). Particularly he con-
tends that the notice given him of the reasons for his pro-
posed discharge was lacking in the required specificity
and detail, and also that the action finally taken was not
supported by proper findings and the reasons assigned
therefor did not conform with those of which he had been
given notice. No issues of fact were involved. The ques-
tions for decision in the District Court were the sufficiency
in law of the findings and procedures followed by appellees.
Accordingly the court properly decided the case on motion
for summary judgment.
We conclude that the findings and proceedings which
eventuated in appellant’s discharge met the requirements
of the applicable statute and regulations. See Blackman
v. Lee, 92 U.S. App. D.C. 268, 205 F.2d 13.
Affirmed.
? Appellees, defendants in the District Court, are the Sec-
retary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the
i and Members of the Civil Service Commission, all
described in the complaint by name as well as by office.
15
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS
No. 44-56
(Decided January 16, 1957)
WILLIAM ODY WASHINGTON v. THE UNITED
STATES
Mr. Frank Smith for the plaintiff.
Mr. Herbert M. Canter, with whom was Mr. Assistant
Attorney General George Cochran Doub, for the defendant.
ON DEFENDANT’S AND PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Jones, Chief Judge, delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff, a preference eligible within the meaning of the
Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944, as amended, 5 U. S. C.
§ 851, et seg., sues to recover wages which he alleges are
due him as a result of his unlawful removal from his posi-
tion as a clerk in the City Post Office of the District of
Columbia. Both parties move for summary judgment.
There is no dispute as to the facts involved in this case.
Prior to November 22, 1952, plaintiff was employed as a
clerk in the Post Office Department, Bureau of Post Office
Operations, Washington, D. C. On July 7, 1952, the Post-
master for the District of Columia notified plaintiff by
letter that in view of his unsatisfactory scheme examina-
tion record, disciplinary action would be necesary unless
immediate improvement was shown. On September 18,
1952, plaintiff was given an unsatisfactory efficiency rating
effective September 15, 1952. The reasons given for this
action were plaintiff’s unsatisfactory scheme examination
record, his absences from duty without permission, and his
failure to comply with instructions.
meg:
16
By letter dated October 16, 1952, the Postmaster charged
the plaintiff with “unsatisfactory scheme examinations”
and “unsatisfactory attendance.” Details of each charge
were set forth and plaintiff was informed of his right to
answer the charges “personally and in writing.” In a let-
ter to the Postmaster dated October 21, 1952, plaintiff, in
effect, admitted the charges against him and set forth cer-
tain extenuating circumstances stemming from financial
and marital difficulties. He concluded his letter with a re-
quest to see the Postmaster personally so that he could
explain his case more fully. Subsequently, in a letter to
the Postmaster dated November 20, 1952, plaintiff stated
that he had attempted to see the Postmaster personally
but had “been blocked at every attempt.” This letter set
out in detail the marital and financial difficulties of the
plaintiff and requested that he be given “another chance.”
On October 29, 1952, the Postmaster forwarded a copy
of the letter of charges, dated October 21, 1952, to the
Assistant Postmaster General with a request that authority
be issued for plaintiff’s removal. The Postmaster’s ac-
companying letter set forth additional irregularities in
plaintiff’s performance which did not appear in the letter
of charges served on plaintiff.
On November 6, 1952, the Assistant Postmaster General
notified the plaintiff that his removal from the position of
Clerk had been authorized effective November 22, 1952.
This letter made reference to the charges preferred against
plaintiff for unsatisfactory scheme examination and unsat-
isfactory attendance. On November 7, 1952, the Postmas-
ter notified plaintiff of his removal which was to become
effective at the close of business on November 22, 1952.
The Postmaster’s letter stated that this action was being
taken after the Post Office Department had given careful
consideration to the charges preferred against the plaintiff
for unsatisfactory scheme examination and unsatisfactory
attendance.
Thereafter, plaintiff appealed his removal to the Fourth
17
United States Civil Service Region of the United States
Civil Service Commission. He submitted an affidavit and
on January 26, 1953, a de novo hearing was held. Plain-
tiff was represented by counsel and did not testify in his
own behalf. On February 19, 1953, the Fourth Region
rendered an opinion upholding plaintiff’s removal.
Plaintiff then appealed to the Board of Appeals and
Review of the Civil Service Commission, and on October
30, 1953, that Board sustained the decision of the Fourth
Region. Plaintiff next appealed to the Commissioners of
the Civil Service Commission and by letter dated May 25,
1954, the Commissioners upheld plaintiff’s dismissal by
the Post Office Department.
On August 6, 1954, plaintiff filed a complaint in the
District Court for the District of Columbia (Civil No.
3360-54) seeking a declaratory judgment that his removal
was not in accordance with law, and praying for rein-
statement. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the
District Court held that plaintiff was not entitled to re-
instatement, and on November 23, 1955, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the action
of the district court in Washington v. Summerfield (No.
12,644, decided November 23, 1955).
Plaintiff does not allege that the administrative action
taken in the present case was arbitrary or capricious or
‘9 clearly erroneous as to impute bad faith. He contends
merely that certain procedural rights given him by the
Veterans’ Preference Act were denied him by the Post
Office Department. In this situation we are not author-
ized to consider the merits of plaintiff’s case but merely
whether or not his procedural rights have been violated.
Eberlein v. United States, 257 U. S. 82; Engelhardt v.
United States, 125 C. Cls. 603; O’Brien v. United States,
124 C. Cls. 655.
Plaintiff takes the position that the Post Office Depart-
ment, in removing him from his position as clerk, denied
18
him two of his procedural rights under section 14 of the
Veterans’ Preference Act. First, he alleges that he was
denied his right to be heard in person by the Postmaster,
and, second, he alleges that his removal was based upon
charges other than those communicated to him in the let-
ter of charges dated October 16, 1952.
The defendant denies that plaintiff’s rights were vio-
lated in any way.
Section 14 of the Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944, 5
U.S.C. § 863, provides as follows:
No permanent or indefinite preference eligible, who
has completed a probationary or trial period employed
in the civil service, or in any establishment, agency,
bureau, administration, project, or department, here-
inbefore referred to shall be discharged, suspended
for more than thirty days, furloughed without pay,
reduced in rank or compensation, or debarred for
future appointment except for such cause as will
promote the efficiency of the service and for reasons
given in writing, and the person * * * shall have at
least thirty days’ advance written notice * * * stating
any and all reasons, specifically and in detail, for any
such proposed action; such preference eligible shall
be allowed a reasonable time for answering the same
personally and in writing, and for furnishing affidavits
in support of such answer, and shall have the right
to appeal to the Civil Service Commission from an
adverse decision of the administrative officer so act-
ing, such appeal to be made in writing within a rea-
sonable length of time after the date of receipt of
notice of such adverse decision: Provided, That such
preference eligible shall have the right to make a
rsonal appearance, or an appearance through a
esignated representative, in accordance -with such
reasonable rules and regulations as may be issued by
the Civil Service Commission; after investigation
and consideration of the evidence submitted, the Civil
Service Commission shall submit its findings and
recommendations to the proper administrative officer
and shall send copies of the same to the appellant or
to his designated representative, * * *.
19
We shall first consider plaintiff’s allegation that his
removal was based upon charges other than those com-
municated to him in the letter of charges, dated October
16, 1952. The basis for this allegation is the fact that on
October 29, 1952, when the Postmaster forwarded a copy
of the letter of charges to the Assistant Postmaster Gen-
eral, the accompanying letter set forth additional irregu-
larities in plaintiff’s conduct which were not contained in
the letter of charges.
A careful examination of the record has failed to re-
veal that plaintiff’s removal was based upon any charges
other than the two specific ones set out in detail in the
Postmaster’s letter of charges to plaintiff. When the
Assistant Postmaster General notified plaintiff that his
removal had been authorized, the letter of notification
referred only to these two specific charges. This was also
true of the Postmaster’s letter notifying plaintiff of the
effective date of his removal. The case was subsequently
heard de movo by the Fourth Region of the Civil Service
Commission and in its opinion the Fourth Region made it
absolutely clear that it was concerned only with the two
specific charges preferred against the plaintiff in the let-
ter of charges.
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the addi-
tional irregularities referred to be the Postmaster in his
letter of October 29, 1952, were ever considered by any-
one in connection with plaintiff’s removal. The mere fact
that these additional irregularities were mentioned in the
letter is insufficient to support the conclusion that plain-
tiff’s removal was based in part upon such irregularities.
In the light of the record we must conclude that there is
no merit in plaintiff’s contentions that his removal was
based in part upon charges not communicated to him.
Plaintiff’s other contention, i.e., that he was denied his
procedural right under the Veterans’ Preference Act to be
heard in person in the agency of his employment, presents
20
a more difficult problem. Plaintiff bases this contention
upon that portion of section 14 of the act which provides
as follows:
* * * such preference eligible shall be allowed a rea-
sonable time for answering the same [the charges
preferred against him] personally and in writing.
(Emphasis added.)
The defendant takes the position that the section does
not give plaintiff the right to appear personally at the
agency level to answer the charges but merely gives
him the right to answer the charges in writing. We can
not accept this interpretation.
The phrase “personally and in writing” is clear and un-
ambiguous. It means exactly what it says. A veteran who
has been charged with certain offenses and given notice
that he is to be discharged from his position is given a
reasonable time within which to answer the charges per-
sonally if he so chooses, or in writing, or both. We can
find nothing in the Veterans’ Preference Act or in the
legislative history of that act which causes us to believe
that Congress intended anything other than what it plainly
said, and this court has previously indicated that a vet-
eran is given the right to answer the charges against
him in person at the agency level. Witimer v. Umited
States, 110 C. Cls. 231.
Defendant further contends that even if the plaintiff
was entitled to a personal hearing at the agency level,
this right was waived since he, in effect, admitted the
charges against him. While it is true that the plaintiff
did not deny his guilt in his letter to the Postmaster dated
October 21, 1952, he. ended the letter with the following
statement:
If you will give me an opportunity to come in to see
you personally, I am certain that I can explain my
case more fully.
21
We believe that this language constituted a definite re-
quest by plaintiff for a personal hearing.
To “answer” to charges, or claims, one need not neces-
sarily plead the general issue, denying that he did the
things which he is alleged to have done. He may plead
in confession and avoidance, and that is an answer, in
law, and in life. In employment relations particularly,
mitigating circumstances, often of a_ highly personal
nature, may save a job for a person who, but for these
circumstances, would and should be discharged. Whether,
if the plaintiff had been permitted to make this kind of
a personal appeal to his superior, it would have saved his
job, we do not know. But when Congress gave to the
veteran the right to appear personally, it must have in-
tended to give him the chance of succeeding in such an
appeal. The naked facts, without the personal appeal,
could be just as well stated in writing. And Congress
knew, as we all know, that bureaucratic superiors, like
other human beings, are susceptible to the effects of per-
sonal appeals.
The procedural rights of a veteran under section 14
are clear and simple. In the present case one of those
rights was denied. The plaintiff was denied his right to
answer the charges against him in person at the agency
level. The fact that he was subsequently given a de novo
hearing at a higher level does not cure this procedural
defect. Since the agency did not follow the procedure
laid down by Congress plaintiff’s discharge was unlawful.
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied
and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted.
Plaintiff is entitled to recover and judgment will be en-
tered to that effect. The amount of recovery will be
determined pursuant to Rule 38 (c).
Tt is so ordered.
Laramore, Judge; Mavpven, Judge; Wurraxer, Judge;
and Lirrteton, Judge, concur.
22
HEADQUARTERS
AIR MATERIAL COMMAND
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
March 13, 1953
SUBJECT: Removal—Misconduct
THRU: MCPPEE
TO: Frank V. Dilatush
1. This is your official notification that you are being
considered for removal from the Federal Service due to
your misconduct and lack of responsibility in the per-
formance of your duties as Contract Specialist, grade
GS-1102-7, salary $4330.00 per annum, in the Power Plant
Section of th. Aeronautical Equipment Branch, Procure-
ment Division.
2. You have demonstrated your misconduct and lack
of responsibility by attempting to destroy, i.e., tearing in-
to small pieces and depositing in your waste basket, cer-
tain signed original documents having a direct bearing on
your regularly assigned duties. These documents were
recovered, pieced together, and are available for exami-
nation by you or any other interested person or persons.
The documents under discussion are listed and described
here:
a. Disposition Form, 9 April 1952, Subject: ‘*Time
Compliance Technical Orders and ECP’s for Aircooled
Motors 0-335-4-5, YO-335-5, O-425-1’’, from MCMMXF
to MCPPAE55.
b. Disposition Form, 7 June 1952, Subject: same as in
a. above, from MCPPAE55 to MCMMXF-11. It is noted
that you prepared this Disposition Form in answer to the
Disposition Form described in a. above, and coordinated
it with your signature.
c. Disposition Form, Comment 2 to Disposition Form
deseribed in b. above, dated 13 June 1952, from MCMF to
MCPPAE-55. In further explanation you will no doubt
| — ern nanan nena armen
recall that a representative from MCPPBO, Data Unit,
Production Control Office, came to your desk on or about
25 February 1953 to see why—in view of the interchange
represented by the documents listed earlier in this para-
graph under a., b. and c.,—Provisions for Technical
Order Compliance had not been included in Supplemental
Agreement No. 17 to AF (33-038)-22896, for which you
were responsible, and that you disclaimed any knowledge
or receipt of those documents or of Aircraft Subdivision
Policy Memo No. 6 dated 19 April 1952 or Amendment
No. 1 thereto dated 8 May 1952, which set up the
34 + requirement for Technical Order Compliance in lieu
of Service Bulletins. Later—and after you had
received a telephone call on this same matter—you were
observed extracting from your files certain documents
later recovered and identified as those listed under a., b.,
and c. above, and tearing them up and depositing them
in your waste basket.
d. Letter from Aircooled Motors, Inc., dated 2 Decem-
ber 1952, addressed to the attention of MCPPAE-55, Sub-
ject: “Service Bulletins for 0-335 Engines.” This letter
has a direct bearing on the Service Bulletin situation
which eventually resulted in Supplemental Agreement No.
17 to contract AF(33-038)-22896 which established con-
tractual coverage and money for the Service Bulletins
rather than for the Time Compliance Technical Orders as
required under the Aircraft Subdivision Policy Memo No.
6 and Amendment No. 1 thereto mentioned earlier in this
paragraph.
e. Your letter 25 November 1952 to Commander Gen-
eral, SAAMA, Kelly Air Force Base, Texas, Subject:
“Contract AF 33(600)-18388, Item No. 7, Change Order
No. 3”.
f. First Indorsement from Hq. SAAMA, Kelly Air
Force Base, Texas, which is an answer to letter described
in e. above.
24
Letter—e. above—replied to copy of SAAMA, letter of
29 August 1952 to Aircooled Motors through Rochester
Regional Office, which asked, among other things, for de-
letion of Item 171, Valves, Part No. 0238-18285 as these
were being procured under another item on the contract,
your letter stating that the 29 August letter was wrong
and that the referenced part number in that letter was
0238-18258. (Stock number was correct and part number
was transposed).
First Indorsement—f. above—answers your letter—e.
above—and reiterates what was stated in the 29 August
letter, i.e., that the part number of 0258-18285 (reference
to the file copy of the SAAMA letter of 29 August 1952
discloses reference to be 0258-18285 as stated by SAAMA).
The attempt to destroy documents, identified as e. and f.
above was a few days prior to the attempted destruction
of a., b., c., and d.
Copy of SAAMA letter 29 August 1952 was forwarded
to this Headquarters from the Rochester Air Regional
Office with its transmittal letter of 11 September 1952
(NEHRSSC/GEF/MIS), the third paragraph of this
transmittal letter reading as follows: ‘‘It is requested that
you initiate action to incorporate the changes referred to
in referenced letter”, (29 August letter from SAAMA).
The action referred to was in connection with Item Ne.
7 to Contract AF 33(600) 18388 (Items 171 and 286 of
Exhibit A2, and new items 105a and 310a). Items 171
and 286, the over all cost of which on the priced exhibit
was $5,831.17, were to be cancelled, and items 105a and
310a, not then on contract, were to be procured.
35 No Contractual action was taken to either cancel the
items or procure the items as requested. The pos-
sible result from non-accomplishment of that action, which
‘was your responsibility, would have been a useless ex-
penditure of up to $5,831.17 on the one hand and on the
other a critical shortage position on the two items not
procured. Had Items that you failed to procure been
required for combat engines the effect might well have
been very serious and far reaching.
Mr. Chadwick of Aircooled Motors received shipping
instructions on the contract pursuant to OTT 12-1616 on
19 December 1952 with a note from SAAMA to the effect
Items 171 and 286 were to be deleted. That is the reason
no cost was incurred as Mr. Chadwick had already—on 14
October—quoted SAAMA on the two (2) items (105a and
310a) to be procured and agreed to incur no cost on the
items (171 and 286) that were to be deleted. In telephone
conversation with this Headquarters 10 March 1952, Mr.
Chadwick stated that he could not understand why there
had been no further contractual action. This lack of
proper action on your part during this six months period,
and your subsequent attempt to destroy original signed
correspondence relating to it are considered conclusive
evidence of lack of responsibility and misconduct.
3. There is no information available on the relative
cost of the Service Bulletins which were furnished pur-
suant to Supplemental Agreement No. 17 of Contract
W33-(038) 22896 and the Time Compliance Technical
Orders that should have been furnished (see subpara-
graphs a, b, and ¢, of preceeding paragraph 2).
4. The Base Security Officer will be informed of the
general content of the preceding paragraphs for such ac-
tion as may be deemed necessary in connection with your
security clearance.
5. In accordance with the Veterans Preferance Act of
1944 you are being given thirty (30) days advance notice
of the proposed removal action. During this thirty (30)
day period you will be retained in a work status, and will
be assigned duties by the Unit Chief of your organiza-
tional component. You will not be permitted to exercise
sole custody of correspondence files pertaining to contracts
v
26
on which you would normally perform administrative
functions, nor on new procurements which normally would
require your services in a negotiating capacity.
6. You have the right to reply personally and in writ-
ing to this notice of proposed removal, and to show cause
why the action should not be taken. You may submit affi-
davits and evidence in support of your answer. Your reply
must be made within seven (7) days from receipt of this
notice. A written reply should be brought or mailed to the
undersigned so as to be received not later than March
21, 1953.
7. You may discuss your case with Miss Isabel Klenk,
telephone 2-4225, room 018, Building 15, this Headquar-
ters (the placement and employee relations adviser) who
will advise you on preparation of your reply.
36 8. No decision to separate you has been made,
or will be made until after the time allowed for
your reply. Your reply will be given careful consideration
before final decision is made. Whether you reply or not,
a written notice of final decision will be given you.
/s/ Charles F. Burley
CHARLES F. BURLEY
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Chief, Aeronautical
Equipment Branch
Procurement Division
27
HEADQUARTERS
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE
OHIO
28 May 1953
EWACUB
SUBJECT: Removal—Misconduct
THRU: MCPPEE
TO: Mr. Frank V. Dilatush
1. You are advised that the decision has been made to
remove you from the Federal service due to misconduct.
You were notified by letter dated 13 March 1953 from the
Chief of the Aeronautical Equipment Branch that removal
action was contemplated because of misconduct and lack
of responsibility as demonstrated by your attempt to de-
stroy certain signed original documents having a direct
bearing on your regularly assigned duties, The specific
documents were identified in that letter, and were later
made available for your personal inspection.
2. You were given an opportunity to reply to the
charges, and your reply of March 19, 1953, as well as
your supplementary letter of April 27, 1953, have been
carefully considered. On 13 May 1953, an informal dis-
cussion was held in the office of your Branch Chief, at-
tended by you, three representatives of management, and
three representatives of the Civilian Personnel Office, in
an attempt to clarify the issues involved and to be sure
that the decision regarding your proposed removal could
be made as fairly as possible.
3. The documents involved internal correspomence
within Headquarters, Air Material Command and corres-
pondence with Headquarters, SAAMA, Kelly Air Force
Base, Texas, pertaining to the requirement for Time Com-
pliance Technical Orders as opposed to Service Bulletins
pertaining to two contracts with the same firm. The pieces
of the torn correspondence between your office and the
28
Maintenance Division of this Headquarters were found
in a waste basket near your desk shortly after you de-
nied any knowledge of such correspondence, although you
had personally dictated and coordinated a part of it.
Since both sets of correspondence pertained to situations
where you had failed to take proper action for which you
were responsible regarding Air Force Procurement Con-
tracts, and since you have offered no information to
nullify the charges, the decision has been made to remove
you from the service. At no time have you given a direct
answer to the question, ‘‘Did you attempt to destroy the
documents in question?’’ Instead, you have attempted to
answer the charges against you by making counter
charges of conspiracy to ‘‘frame’’ you against other per-
sonnel of your immediate office.
38 4. It is noted that in your letters of reply to
the charges, you have stressed the fact that you
are an attorney. Your education and legal e».perience
make the offense especially serious. The lack of responsi-
bility which has been demonstrated is most unfortunate in,
a man of your years and background, and gives rise to
justified doubt as to your suitability for government em-
ployment. You are most fortunate, indeed, that loss of
life or loss or damage to government aircraft did not
result from your misconduct.
5. If you so desire, you may appeal this decision under
the Air Force grievance procedure established by Chapter
AF E2 of Air Force Manual 40-1. Appeal under the Air
Force grievance procedure must be made in writing within
thirty (30) days after the effective date of your removal.
The appeal should be addressed to the Commanding Gen-
eral, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, Attention:
EWACUB.
6. You are also advised of your right to appeal to the
Civil Service Commission under Section 14, of the Veter-
ans’ Preference Act. Any such appeal should be addressed
29
to the Sixth United States Civil Service Region, United
States Post Office and Courthouse Building, Cincinnati 2,
Ohio, and must be received in that office within ten (10)
days from the effective date of your separation.
7. You should understand, however, that if an appeal
is accepted by the Civil Service Commission, no future
appeal of your removal may be made under the Air
Force grievance procedure and action on any appeal you
may already have made will cease.
8. Standard form 50, ‘‘Notification of Personnel Ac-
tion,’ showing the effective date of your removal is en-
closed and you should report to your Placement and Enm-
ployee Relations Adviser, Miss Klenk, whose office is lo-
cated at Room 018, Building 15, Area B, immediately
upon receipt of this letter in order to complete your
clearance.
9, The original letter of charges is returned to you for
your disposition, and a copy of the letter recently ad-
dressed to your attorney is also enclosed.
BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL BROWN:
/s/ C. E. Gray
C. E. GRAY
Chief, Civilian Personnel
‘ Branch
Directorate, Base Personnel
and Training
INDEX
Page
OPE toy Seen ks PEC eee 1
«RRR rasa Se ae :
tion presented _..--.-.---------------------------- 1
ieee SAWONWOR .... .. = a - 0 oc dna nec ene ne eee nce eneesese 2
Bn in eemen eee wens sank hie 2
The Statement of Charges- - - --------------------- 3
The Letter of Dismissal_......-.------------------ 7
ee oe ks sae cbsedbe ead ee enke anes 9
eS ee cee beds tibwananaseunes 14
CITATIONS
Baughman v. Green, 229 F. 2d 33. -..-------------- 10
Blackmon v. Lee, 205 F. 2d 13....----------------- 11, 12
Deak v. Pace, 185 F. 2d 997...-.------------------ 10
DeBusk v. United States, 132 C. Cls. 790.---.-------- 11
Engelhardt v. United States, 125 C. Cls. 603 - - - - ----- 10
Green v. Baughman, C. A. D. C. No. 13,500 (January
$1, 1957)...-.--.------------------------------ 13
_ Malligan v. Dunlap, 108 F. Supp. 296, reversed sub
nom. Mulligan v. Andrews, 211 F. | ARS 10
_ Washington v. Summerfield, 228 F. 2d 452_-.----.---- 13
' Washington v. United States, C. Cls. No. 44-56, de-
cided January 16, 1957 - ..---------------------- 13
Williams v. 210 F. 2d 874, certiorari denied,
348 U.S. 819.-.--2 SRE deer weer 10
te:
Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 387, as
amended, 5 U. S. C. 863, Section 14..-..---------- 2,12
163)
— 418089—57—1
GInthe Supreme Court of the Bnited States
OcToBER TERM, 1956
No. 730
Frank V. DILaATUSH, PETITIONER
v.
Cuartes E. Witson, SEcrETARY OF DEFENSE, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPHALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
OIROUIT
———
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The District Court rendered no opinion, The per
curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals (Pet. App.
13—14) is reported at 239 F. 2d 44.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered
November 1, 1956 (R. 39). The petition for a writ
of certiorari was filed on January 30, 1957. The
jurisdiction of this Court is presumably invoked un-
der 28 U. S. ©, 1254 (1). .
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether péetitioner’s dismissal from his Govern-
ment employment was in accord with the procedural
9 (1) ‘se
2
requirements of Section 14 of the Veterans’ Prefer-
ence Act.
STATUTE INVOLVED
Section 14 of the Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944,
58 Stat. 387, 390, as amended, 5 U. 8S. C. 863, provides
in pertinent part:
No permanent or indefinite preference elig-
ible * * * shall be discharged, suspended for
more than thirty days, furloughed without pay,
reduced in rank or compensation, or debarred
for future appointment except for such cause
as will promote the efficiency of the service and
for reasons given in writing, and the person
whose discharge, suspension for more than
thirty days, furlough without pay, or reduction
in rank cr compensation is sought shall have at
least thirty days’ advance written notice (ex-
cept where there is reasonable cause to believe
the employee to be guilty of a crime for which
a sentence of imprisonment can be imposed),
stating any and all reasons, specifically and in
detail, for any such proposed action; such
preference eligible shall be allowed a reasonable
time for answering the same personally and in
writing, and for furnishing affidavits in support
of such answer, and shall have the right to
appeal to the Civil Service Commission from
an adverse decision of the administrative officer
80 acting, such appeal to be made in writing
within a reasonable length of, time after the
date of receipt of notice of such adverse de-
cision: * ***,
This is ‘a disthissal ease in which petitioner, an
honorably discharged veteran, claims that respondents”
actions in dismissing him from Government service
were in violation of Section 14 of the Veterans’ Pref-
erence Act, supra, p. 2.
In his complaint in the District Court, petitioner
alleged: (1) that the Statement of Charges leading
to his dismissal was not sufficiently specific (R. 5);
and (2) that the Letter of Dismissal contains no
finding of guilt and no express determination that
the dismissal was for such cause as would promote
the efficiency of the service (R. 5-6). He sought a
declaratory judgment that his dismissal was unlawful
and an injunction ordering his reinstatement (R. 7).
Upon cross motions for summary judgement, the
District Court granted respondents’ motion and
denied that of petitioner. The Court of Appeals af-
firmed, holding ‘“‘ * * * that the findings and pro-
ceedings which eventuated in [petitioner’s] discharge
met the requirement of the applicable statute and
regulations’’ (Pet. App. 14).
The facts, as disclosed by the affidavits and docu-
ments attached to the respective motions, are as
follows:
The Statement of Charges. Petitioner was em-
ployed by the United States at Wright-Patterson
Material Field, Dayton, Ohio, as a Contract Specialist,
GS-7 (Pet. App. 22). On March 13, 1953, he was
served with a Statement of Charges advising him that
he was being considered for removal from the Federal
Service for ‘misconduct and lack of responsibility’’
(Pet. App. 22). Headed “Removal—Misconduct,”’
the Statement of Charges in paragraph 1 advised peti-
tioner “This is your official notification that you are
oe NRRRRDURNRNRRNRIRRRERRR :
being considered for removal from the Federal Serv.
ice due to your misconduct and lack of responsibility
in the performance of your duties as Contract
Specialist * * *.”’ (Pet. App. 22). Paragraph 2
stated (Pet. App. 22):
You have demonstrated your misconduct and
lack of responsibility by attempting to destroy,
i. e., tearing into small pieces and depositing in
your waste basket, certain signed original docu-
ments having a direct bearing on your regularly
assigned duties. ‘These documents were re-
covered, pieced together, and are available for
examination by you or any other interested per-
son or persons. * * *
Under subparagraphs a, b, and c, the Statement listed
and specifically described by date and subject matter
the three documents so destroyed (Pet. App. 22-23).
“In further explanation,” the Statement advised peti-
tioner (Pet. App. 22-23) that a representative from
the Production Control Office
came to your desk on or about 26 February
1953 to see why—in view of the interchange
represented by the documents listed earlier in
0-885-4-5, YO-335-5, 0-495-1’,. from MCMMXF to
“b. Disposition Form, 7 June 1952, Subject: same as in a.
above, from MCPPAE55 to MCMMXF-11. It is noted that
this Disposition Form in answer to the Disposi-
you prepared
tion Form described in a. above, and coordinated it with your
Form, Comment 2 to Disposition Form de-
| in -b, above, dated 18 June 1952, from MCMF to
er 18 June 1952, fro
5
this paragraph under a., b., and ¢.,—Provisions
for Technical Order Compliance had not been
included in Supplemental Agreement No. 17
to AF (35-038)-22896, for which you were
responsible, and that you disclaimed any
knowledge or receipt of those documents or of
Aircraft Subdivision Policy Memo No. 6 dated
19 April 1952 or Amendment No. 1 thereto
dated 8 May 1952, which set up the require-
ment for Technical Order Compliance in lieu
of Service Bulletins. Later—and after you
had received a telephone call on this same
matter—you were observed extracting from
your files certain documents later recovered
and identified as those listed under a., b., and
C. above, and tearing them up and depositing
them in your waste basket.
The Statement of Charges then listed, under sub-
paragraphs d, e, and f, three additional documents
which petitioner had similarly destroyed, likewise de-
scribing these documents in great detail * and stating
that (Pet. App. 24):
*** The attempt to destroy documents,
identified as e. and f. above was a few days
prior to the attempted destruction of a., b.,
c., and d.
*The letter described these documents as follows (Pet. App.
23):
“d. Letter from Aircooled Motors, Inc., dated 2 December
1952, addressed to the attention of MCPPAE-55, Subject:
‘Service Bulletins for O-335 Engines.’ This letter has a direct
bearing on the Service Bulletin situation which eventually re-
sulted in Supplemental Agreement No. 17 to contract AF (33-
038)-22896 which established contractual coverage and money
for the Service Bulletins rather than for the Time Compliance
Technical Orders as required under the Aircraft ‘Subdivision
6
The Statement pointed out that these documents
involved certain proposed changes in a contract for
procurement of airplane parts and that petitioner
had been requested to initiate action to incorporate
such change (Pet. App. 24). It noted that no such
action was taken by petitioner and advised him of
the serious consequences that might have resulted
from such inaction on his part (Pet. App. 24-25).
Paragraph 2 of the Statement of Charges concluded
(Pet. App. 25) :
* * * This lack of proper action on your
part during this six months period, and your
Policy Memo No. 6 and Amendment No. 1 thereto mentioned
earlier in this paragraph.
“e. Your letter 25 November 1952 to Commanding General,
SAAMA, Kelly Air Force Base, Texas, Subject: ‘Contract
AF 33 (600)-18388, Item No. 7, Change Order No. 3’.
“f. First Indorsement from Hq. SAAMA, Kelly Air Force
Base, Texas, which is an answer to letter described in e. above.
Letter—e. above—replied to copy of SAAMA, letter of 29
August 1952 to Aircooled Motors through Rochester Regional
Office, which usked, among other things, for deletion of Item
171, Valves, Part No. 0238-18285 as these were being procured
under another item on the contract, your letter stating that the
29 August letter was wrong and that the referenced part num-
ber in that letter was 0238-18258. (Stock number was correct
and part number was transposed).
7
subsequent attempt to destroy original signed
correspondence relating to it are considered
conclusive evidence of lack of responsibility
and misconduct.*
The Letter of Dismissal. On March 19, 1953, and
again on April 27, 1953, petitioner submitted written
answers to the charges (Pet. App. 27). On May 13,
1953, a conference was held on the matter in the office
of petitioner’s Branch Chief, attended by petitioner,
three representatives of management, and three repre-
sentatives of the Civilian Personnel Office (Pet. App.
27). On May 28, 1953, petitioner was advised by the
Chief of the Civilian Personnel Branch of the deci-
sion to remove him (Pet. App. 27). The Letter of
Dismissal referred to the Statement of Charges, which
it noted had advised petitioner (Pet. App. 27):
* * * that removal action was contemplated
because of misconduct and lack of responsibil-
ity as demonstrated by your attempt to destroy
certain signed original documents having a
direct bearing on your regularly assigned
duties. * * *
and again pointed out that the specific documents
were identified in that Statement and were made
* In this connection, the charges stated (Pet. App. 24-25) :
“ * * * The possible result from non-accomplishment of that
action, which was your responsibility, would have been a
useless expenditure of. up to $5,831.17 on the one hap*® and on
the other a critical shortage position on the two “ems not
procured. Had Items that you failed to procure been required
for combat engines the effect might well have been very serious
and far reaching.”
The next paragraph of the statement (Pet. App. 25) ex
plained how such damage was fortuitously avoided.
8 7
available for his personal inspection. The Letter fur-
ther stated that his answers had been ‘‘carefully con-
sidered’’ and that the May 13, 1952, conference had
been held ‘‘in an attempt to clarify the issues in-
volved and to be sure that the decision regarding your
proposed removal could be made as fairly as pos-
sible’? (Pet. App. 27).
The Letter of Dismissal summarized the corre
spondence involved and pointed out that the pieces
of torn correspondence were found in a waste basket
near petitioner’s desk after he had denied any knowl-
edge of such correspondence although he had per-
sonally dictated and coordinated a part of it. The
Letter continued (Pet. App. 28) :
* * * Since both sets of correspondence per-
tained to situations where you had failed to
take proper action for which you were respon-
sible regarding Air Force Procurement Con-
tracts, and since you have offered no informa-
tion to nullify the charges, the decision has been
made to remove you from the service. At no
time have you given a direct answer to the ques-
tion, ““Did you attempt to destroy the docu-
ments in question?’’ Instead, you have at-
tempted to answer the charges against you by
making counter charges of conspiracy to
‘“‘frame’’ you against other personnel of your
immediate office. [Emphasis added.]
Emphasizing the seriousness of his offense, the Letter
couclided (Pet. App. 28) : |
* * * The lack of responsibility which has
been demonstrated is most unfortunate in a
. man of your years and background, and gives
rise to justified doubt as to your suitability for
| 9
“ government employment. You are most for-
tunate, indeed, that loss of life or loss or dam-
age to government aircraft did not result from
your misconduct.
Following his unsuccessful appeal to the Civil Serv-
ice Commission under Section 14 of the Veterans’
Preference Act, petitioner instituted the present
action.
ARGUMENT
_ This is a simple dismissal case involving no dispute
as to the facts and no important issue of law. Peti-
tioner’s dismissal was accomplished in observance of
all of the procedural safeguards to which he is en-
titled, and there is no conflict of decisions on any of
the issues presented and decided below.
1, Three of petitioner’s four objections to the pro-
ceedings leading up to his dismissal relate to the legal
sufficiency of the Statement of Charges and the Letter
of Dismissal. Both courts below were clearly correct
rejecting these contentions and in holding that the
documents fully complied with the applicable statute
and regulations.
a. Petitioner contends first that the Statement of
Charges was not sufficiently specific to meet the re-
quirements of Section 14 of the Veterans’ Preference
Act.
The Statement charged petitioner with “misconduct
and lack of responsibility’’ in carrying out his duties
as a Contract Specialist (Pet. App. 22), a charge
which the Statement pointed out was substantiated by
petitioner’s attempt to destroy certain material Gov-
ernment letters and documents. The Statement went
10
on to identify in meticulous detail the dates and sub-
ject matters of these documents and their relation to
petitioner’s work (Pet. App. 22-24), and advise that
the documents had been ‘‘recovéred, pieced together,
and [made] available for examination by you or any
other interested person or persons” (Pet. App. 22).
See also supra, p. 4. Petitioner’s inaction in the
matters concerned in these documents and his sub-
sequent attempts to destroy the documents consti-
tuted, the Statement concluded, evidence of his lack
of responsibility and misconduct (Pet. App. 25).
This charge of ‘“‘misconduct and lack of responsi-
bility,’ amplified by so detailed a statement, fully
supplied the required degree of specificity. It is well
settled that no particular form is required in a State-
ment of Charges so long as, “‘in the circumstances”
of the particular case, it informs the employee “‘with
reasonable certainty and precision of the cause for
his removal’’ (Deak v. Pace, 185 F. 2d 997, 999
(C. A. D. C.)), and affords an employee ‘‘a fair
chance to defend himself’? (Baughman v. Green, 229
F. 2d 33, 34 (C. A. D. C.)). Where these conditions
are met, the courts have repeatedly upheld statements
of charges against attacks on their specificity. See,
é. g., Baughman v. Green, supra; Williams v. Cravens,
210 F. 2d 874 (C. A. D. C.), certiorari denied, 348
U. S. 819; Mulligan v. Dunlap, 108 F. Supp. 296
(D. D. C.), reversed on other grounds sub nom.
Mulligan v. Andrews, 211 F. 2d 28 (C. A. D. C.)5
and Engelhardt v. United States, 125 ©. Cls. 603.
In the instant case, the employing agency, after being
apprised of highly improper action on the part of
ll
petitioner, proceeded promptly to draft and serve
upon him a carefully drawn statement of charges,
spelling out in detail not only the allegations of
improper activity, but also the background, surround-
These charges were at least as specific as those sus-
tained by the courts in the above-cited cases and
clearly met the requirements of Section 14.
b. Equally without merit is petitioner’s further
objection that the employing agency should have
made an express finding that his discharge was for
such cause as will promote the efficiency of the serv-
ice. The Letter of Dismissal made clear that peti-
tioner was being dismissed because of ‘‘misconduct
and lack of responsibility as demonstrated’’ (Pet.
App. 27) by his attempt to destroy certain letters,
and expressly informed him that ‘‘The lack of re-
sponsibility which has been demonstrated is most un-
fortunate in a man of your years and background,
and gives rise to justified doubt as to your su tability
for government employment’’ (Pet. App. 28). It is
settled that “‘the mere absence of an express invoca-
tion of the statutory standard cannot, under such
circumstances, have an effect on the validity of an
otherwise valid personnel action.’”’ DeBusk v. United.
States, 132 C. Cls. 790, 794; see also Blackmon v. Lee,
205 F.2d 13 (C. A. D.C.).
scaaliatibiannen clhiasiacalen stendatthennammheation:inietinn
failed to make specific findings that he in fact com-
mitted the actions with which he was charged.
As notéd above, the Statement of Charges had ad-
Vised petitioner specifically and in detail of the rea~
ing circumstances, and effect of this misconduct.
12
sons for his proposed discharge, charging him with
‘‘misconduct and lack of responsibility’? and pro-
ceeded in explicit detail to document this charge. The
Letter of Dismissal expressly stated that the deci-
sion had been made to remove him for ‘‘miscon-
duct’’ (Pet. App. 27) and demonstrated ‘“‘lack of
responsibility’? (Pet. App. 28). The letter referred
directly to the Statement of Charges, restated the
reasons that the removal action was contemplated,
and pointed out that petitioner had had opportunity
to examine the documents involved, to reply to the
charges, and to attend a hearing (Pet. App. 27). It
summarized the documents involved (Pet. App. 27),
recapitulated the facts upon which the removal action
was based, and then stated (Pet. App. 28) ‘“‘* * *
since you have offered no information to nullify the
chaiges, the decision has been made to remove you
from the service.’’? The Letter also pointed out that
at no time had petitioner ever given a direct answer
to the question whether he had attempted io destroy
the documents in question, but instead had attempted
to answer the charges against him only by making
countercharges of conspiracy (Pet. App. 28). Fi-
nally, the Letter expressly stated (Pet. App. 28), “‘The
lack of responsibility which has been demonstrated is
most unfortunate in a man of your years and back-.
ground, and gives rise to justified doubt as to your
suitability. for government: employment’ (emphasis.
added). Clearly this lengthy and carefully considered.
letter amply supplied the ‘‘reasons given in writing”
as required by Section 14 of the Veterans’ Prefer-
ence Act (supra, p. 2). Blackmon v. Lee, 205 F: 2d
13
13, 14 (C. A. D. C.); Green v. Baughman, C. A. D. C.
No. 13500 (January 31, 1957).
2. Petitioner, for the first time in these proceedings,
makes the additional contention that he was denied
the right to answer charges personally before the ad-
ministrative officer responsible for his removal. As-
serting that there is a conflict of decisions on the ques-
tion of whether Section 14 confers a right to a per-
sonal hearing before the employing agency in addition
to the hearing by the Civil Service Commission,* he
urges this Court to resolve the issue by granting cer-
tiorari in the instant case.
The issue, however, is raised too late in this case;
at no point in the course of the administrative or
judicial proceedings did petitioner make any claim
of right to a preliminary hearing before the em-
ploying agency. In any eveut, the undisputed facts
of record clearly demonstrate thui petitioner, subse-
quent to the service upon him of the Stetement of
Charges, did in fact personally appear at a conforence
in the office of his Branch Chief ‘‘in an attempt to
clarify the issues involved and to be sure that the deci-
sion regarding [his] propesed removal could be made
as fairly as possible’ (Pet. App. 27). This conference
satisfied whatever right petitioner may have had to
answer the charges against him ‘‘personally”’ within
the meaning of Section 14. The issue on which the
alleged conflict exists, therefore, is not reached in this
case.
*Compare Washington v. Swmmerfield, 228 452
F. 2d
(C. A. D. C.), with Washington v. United States, C. Cis. No.
44-56, decided January 16, 1957. :
be denied. <
J. Lee Rankin, ‘
Solicitor General. .
/%0. STEPHEN LEONARD, a
‘Acting Assistant Attorney General.
Me.vin RICHTER, .
Rosert 8. GREEN,
Attorneys.
Marcu 1957.
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1087
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.