Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Nachtman v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.

Supreme Court brief1957

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser TERM, 1956

No. 5 9 8

Joun S. Nacutman, Petitioner

V.

Jones & LAvuGHLIN STEEL CorPoRATION

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE THIRD CIRCUIT

—_——

Davin G. Bress

Suetpon EF, Bernstein

Attorneys for Petitioner

Rust Bldg., 1001 Fifteenth St., N.W.

Washington 5, D. C.

Of Counsel:

Newmyer & Bress

Rust Bldg., 1001 Fifteenth St., N.W.

Washington 5, D. C.

Patterson, CrawFrorp, ARENSBERG & DuNN

First National Bank Building

Pittsburgh 22, Pa.

Sot SHApPPIRIO

Washington Loan & Trust Bldg.

Washington, D. C.

Press or Byron S. ApaMs, WasnrIncton, D.C.

EE

NOV 27 956

JOHN T. FEY, Clerk

ee

—)

P. one . SADA le ERAS ene RR LO GE Oh ETT Sk eee een ee Se ee eT ee ee eT)

INDEX

Page

SOE: TY no a tied ecennsdcekdekesnckistinan 2

PIII on. hc cic ccaasundetsandevacakeatktswees 2

COUN TID ia occ scecsccisescccsdnnasce 2

ORR i SS GI ok 0 0.6 6665068 ce cneeeckenrnd 3

i: FO THE hci c a nnincdecanctnaeceanss 3

PA Se ME: Kkin whehcbcadcdckachétiesvonuass 4

5, Fe Oe IONS inks ckcéwancctcnincacs 4

URE TE, TE nn 0 kas a Scwdceedeasdands 4

Bom, TRUUAR GE. DIMA acdc cccnccscnnccscas 6

te ES vnc d nec cacicbanenensaavea 7

Marion T. ARGANBRIGHT—ALBERT BRoWN..... 7

I TD oi. in ca chkd tan weesnses 8

Frank Bursa, AnTHUR W. Kizroy anp ARTHUR

Se: MN. wacacdcdéaacccncsaceustansens 8

SE A FE Gh a nN kdeckécdeseckencekbsscann 10

Bee BD ooo. ka cdncecicccddncesnene 13

BNE WOOD: ccd dnienwcnsnetcctecetensataceces 13

REASONS FoR GRANTING THE WRIT ................05- 14

I. The Trial Judge, With the Court Below’s Later

Approval, Usurped the Jury’s Exclusive Function

By Granting Judgment N.O.V. on Conflicting Evi-

dence as to Validity of the Patents; That Action

is a Shocking Invasion of the Jury’s Authority

and a Gross Impairment of the Constitutional

Right to Trial by Jury in Patent Cases as in Other

SN BORD os navncensecccicasevknctacuccene 14

2 See ete ee

5

4

pw rry.

1 Ne eal Ret atl ROUT SEK rete

yak they

ee Cs oe

eee Petty i ge FEMA RII Si Rane IMTS 8 eR AS le Se -* anew ay + — oe ti ~ ey

il Index Continued.

Page

A. Resolution of the Validity Issues Necessarily

Turned on Numerous Open Factual Questions,

Which the Trial Court Improperly Resolved

Contrary to the Verdict ......ccscccccccsess 14

B. No Question Has Been Raised That the Jury

Acted Other than Under Proper Instructions

of Law; The Question is Whether Judge or

Jury are to Resolve Evidentiary Disputes

Within the Framework of the Legal Principles

Underlying the Concept of Invention ........ 19

C. This Court Has Had No Oceasion in This

Century to Define the Limits of Judicial Re-

view of Jury Verdicts in Patent Cases; A Re-

statement of the Constitutional Limits of Re-

view Would be Timely Because of the Current

Trend to Substitute Judicial Views of the Facts

POE GEE FUE coon cvsaccccsccnsccsees 32

II. The Evidence of Patentability Was not More Sub-

stantial Because of the Procedural Error of the

Trial Court in Exeluding Rebuttal Proof of Va-

lidity; the Trial Court’s Ruling is Contrary to

the Statutory Presumption of Validity Impos-

ing the Burden of Proof of Invalidity on the De-

SN wa HRSG UKE CRTAE SADR BAGO RNGeE San Genaens 33

III. The Directed Verdict on the Cause of Action for

Wrongful Misappropriation Deprived Plaintiff of

His Right to a Jury Trial on This Claim; The

Rulings Below That a Cause of Action Was Not

Kstablished Conflict With Decisions of Other Cir-

SE cc NAR EN KANG COSEAAVEROSAD SS UDGES RON GSO bh0% 34

EERE ES CONIDIA Se ee OO Ee ee 38

Aprenprix A—Oprtnion or Court oF APPEALS

AppenbIx B—Some or THE Factuat Issues IMPROPERLY

Reso.vepD By TRIAL JUDGE ON DispuTED EVIDENCE

Index Continued. iii

CITATIONS

CasEs: Page

Abott v. Coe, 71 App. D.C. 195, 109 F.2d 449, 451

EA eer erry Tee rr ee eee 19

Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Moyer, 113 F.2d 974, 980 (C.A.

Re eo er ik eae Tek 17

Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88, 35 L.ed.

i Ek eek ov inhds véaakaas Rhu dkehewee as 26

A. & P. v. Super-Market Equip. Co.; 340 U.S. 147, 95

SB gs TSE erry errr eee 30

Barbed Wire Patent, 143 U.S. 275, 284, 36 Lied. 154

PE tcc wurst ekse bh RscRcubaend cokwheneneas 18, 22

Battin v. Taggert, 17 Howard 74, 15 L.ed. 37 (1854) . .27, 32

Bischoff v. Wethered, 76 U.S. 812, 19 L.ed. 829 (1869) 28

Booth v. Stutz Motor Car Co., 56 F.2d 962 (C.A. 7,

SE vane bh aGERADS KA AAD AASS ObENE RAKES RK KODE E NOS 36

Burcham v. J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 209 F.2d 35, 38

SR A Eb kang 54h ohn duke kk chadekd ce awes 26

Carver v. Braintree Mfg. Co., Fed. Case No. 2,485, 2

Beery GEE (00, Bieat., ORB) oun ncscaccacascces 28

Charles Peckat Mfg. Co. v. Jacobs, 178 F. 2d 794 (C.A.

7, 1949) ; cert. dem. 339 U.S. 915 .............00. 22

Consolidated Contract Co. v. Hassam Paving Co., 227

ee OR Or ED kd a bch ea cunt an ksGaandes 8

Deering v. Winona Harvester Works, 155 U.S. 286, 39

i Sr CE nest be hsbbaheansatveeekhaheah 22

Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Tire Co., 220 U.S.

— ee ee Se ot | errr 20

Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 269 (C.A. 2, 1952) 16

Foote v. Selsby, Fed. Case No. 4,916 (C.C. N.Y., 1849),

a % Roo Saree preererT pe ee 28

Gen’l Talking Pictures Corp. v. Amer. Tri-Ergon

Corp., 96 F.2d 800, 811 (C.A. 3, 1938) ........... 19

Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U.S. 90, 74 L.ed. 720 (1930).. 26

Heide v. Panoulias, 188 Fed. 914, 916-917 (C.A. 2,

SEE. c<cckcue cds Reb k bus MASnensedechestiinses 28

Hoeltke v. C. M. Kemp Mfg. Co., 80 F.2d 912 (C.A. 4,

1936), cert. den. 298 U.S. 673 ................05. 36

Hunt Bros. Fruit Packing Co. v. Cassidy, 53 Fed. 257

Deis te SE Shs cudeevchshnnddnkes spa n'eéaksa's 28

James Heddon’s Sons v. South Bend Bait Co., 14 F.2d

805 (C.A. 7, 1926), cert. den. 273 U.S. 137 (1927) 22

Keyes v. Grant, 118 U.S. 25, 36, 30 L.ed. 54, 58 (1886) 27

iv Index Continued.

Page

Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. Schnelbach, 239 Pa. 76, 86

PE ELIE, SAT IOS 35

Miehle Printing Press & Mfg. Co., et al. v. Miller Saw

Trimmer Co., 6 F.2d 417, 418 (C.A. 3, 1925)...... 19

Morgan v. Daniels, 153 U.S. 120, 38 L.ed. 657 (1894)... 19

Mumm v. Decker & Sons, 301 U.S. 168, 171-2, 81 L.ed.

ARO: ATCO 34

Neff v. Pa. R.R. Co., 173 F.2d 931 (C.A. 3, 1949)...... 17

Neville Coke & Chemical Co. vy. Comm. Internal Rev-

enue, 148 F.2d 599, 603 (C.A. 3, 1945), cert. den.

Pik &, & ye ee err Peer rrr rs 16

N.L.R.B. v. Howell Chevrolet Co., 204 F.2d 79, 86 (C.A.

RD kis setnkacdsndnvadkescscummsencvarvass 16

Packwood v. Briggs & Stratton Corp., 195 F.2d 971

(C.A. 3, 1952), cert. den. 344 U.S. 844 ........... 30

Poppenhusen v. Falke, Fed. Case No. 11,279 (C.C.

N.Y, BOGD) oo. cecncsncsncecsesnecsscsesesauces 28

Quock Ting v. U.S., 140 U.S. 417, 35 Led. 501 (1891)... 16

Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 190 F.2d 921

OF SE OR RE orn RR ENE 16

Schreyer v. Casco Products Corp., 190 F.2d 921 (C.A.

BORNE conchae winenanvusesnevessvessensavas 36, 37

Schulz v. Pa. R.R. Co., 100 L.ed. 430, 432-433 ........ 29

The S.C.L. No. 9, 114 F.2d 964 (C.A. 3, 1940)......... 16

Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369 (C.A. 7,

et eee eo eee 35, 36, 37

Sonnetheil v. Christian Moerlein Brewing Co., 172 U.S.

S00. GOB. 65 Tae, GOO ERGSGE. osc sccccavscevcasen 16

T.H. Symington Co. v. National Malleable Casting Co.,

250 U.S. 383, 63 L.ed. 1045 (1919) .............. 8

Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union R. Co., 321 U.S. 29,

ae, GD Ee. GD CMO 5 66 cc ace icsrdccasusaenes 26

The Conqueror, 166 U.S. 110, 131, 41 L.ed. 937 (1897) 16

The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Whet. (U.S.) 283, 5 L.ed.

ee ee oo aA et ee a 16

Thompson Spot Welder Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 265 U.S.

eae. Wk Be WG COO oo cleanin. 28

Turril v. Michigan Southern & N.I.R. Co., 68 U.S. 491,

Oe els. Ge CEE had 6 c04 poo dnb entunsyakebas 28

Washburn v. Gould, Fed. Case No. 17,214, 3 Story 122

CEs Ss MED -Litadancaekeeces Keeeuveeac es 28

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser Term, 1956

No.

Joun §. Nacutman, Petitioner

Vv.

Jones & LAUGHLIN STEEL CoRPORATION

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Petitioner, Joun S. Nacutman, prays that a writ of

certiorari issue to review the judgment of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirming a judg-

ment of the United States District Court for the Western

District of Pennsylvania, the trial court having directed

a verdict on petitioner’s cause of action for wrongful mis-

appropriation of ideas and plans and having granted

judgment n.o.v. on his cause of action for patent infringe-

ment after a jury verdict finding said patents valid and

awarding petitioner damages for their infringement.

2

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at 235

F. 2d 211 (also reprinted as Appendix A hereto). The

opinion of the District Court is reported at 90 F. Supp.

739 (also I 327-358a).

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered June

27, 1956. A timely petition for rehearing was denied on

August 31, 1956. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked

under 28 U.S.C. 1254 (1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

In a suit for infringement based on four complex com-

bination patents covering processes and apparatus in the

art of electro-tinning of steel strip and for misappropriation

of know-how and operating information to practice electro-

tinning disclosed in the course of negotiations contemplat-

ing the sale of electro-tinning apparatus, the trial court

directed a verdict on the misappropriation cause of action

and granted judgment n.o.v, after a jury verdict for plain-

tiff-petitioner in the infringement action. The questions

presented are:

1. Whether petitioner was effectively denied his con-

stitutional right of trial by jury when the trial court, by

substituting its own comparison and analysis of structures

and its own selection and views of evidence, held the patents

to be anticipated unpatentable aggregations after the jury

had made special findings of validity on the basis of con-

flicting evidence with respect thereto submitted to the jury

under the very instructions requested by the defendant-

respondent.

2. Whether in view of (a) the statutory presumption of

validity, (b) the wide acceptance and use of petitioner’s

patents under license, (c) the extreme complexity of the

patents, (d) the art’s need for the solution furnished, (e)

3

uncontradicted evidence that petitioner was the first to

install and operate continuous electro-tinning systems and

(f) expert testimony with respect to the interdependence

of the several steps in the combination patents—the trial

court can, by judgment n.o.v., intrude into the jury’s

exclusive fact-finding province and substitute its own views

of novelty, invention, anticipation, patentable combina-

tion, ete.

3. Whether the trial court’s power to review the evidence

on motion for judgment n.o.v. is any greater in patent

litigation than in other jury cases,

4. Whether petitioner was denied a fair trial in view

of the trial court’s refusal to permit him to offer rebuttal

testimony on the validity issues to contravene the defense

of invalidity.

5. Whether the trial court erred in directing a verdict

on the claim for misappropriation, and the Court of Ap-

peals erred in affirming that direction, in the light of

conflicting decisions in other courts of appeal that an

actionable breach of confidential disclosure exists in such

circumstances,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. PROCEEDINGS BELOW

On July 3, 1950, petitioner filed an amended complaint

charging: (1) infringement of certain of his electro-tinning

patents’ and (2) wrongful misappropriation of ideas and

1 Reissue 20,788—PIl. Ex. 1, IT 356*-358a; 2,240,265—PI. Ex. 2,

IT 359-372a ; 2,459,674—PI1. Ex. 3, I] 373-382a. Nachtman 2,341,157

listed in the complaint was voluntarily dropped at the pre-trial,

and Nachtman 2,576,074 (Pl. Ex. 4, I] 383-392a) was brought in

by counterclaim filed January 25, 1952. Claim for damages on

the latter patent was withdrawn before the case was submitted to

the jury (1 321-322a; see also I 312-313a).

[*II 356a refers to Appellant’s Appendix below, Volume II.

Use of the letter ‘‘b’’ after the page number indicates Appellee’s

Appendix. |

Oe Nee

4

plans submitted to respondent via the Blaw-Knox Company

with whom petitioner was associated. Trial by jury ter-

minated by a directed verdict on the latter cause of action

(I 320-321a; see also I 284-285a, I 309-310a, 31la) and by

a plaintiff’s verdict in the sum of $1,474,495.72 for infringe-

ment of the first three patents in issue (I 324, 326a)

after the jury had specially found each of petitioner’s four

patents in issue valid and infringed (I 324-326a). There-

after, in an opinion and order of August 4, 1955 (I 327-

354a), the trial court granted judgment n.o.v. on the

ground petitioner’s patents were invalid, the thrust of

the opinion being that they were anticipated by prior art

and were unpatentable aggregations.” The Court below

affirmed by an opinion which, insofar as the patent issues

were concerned, was in effect merely an adoption by refer-

ence of the trial court’s opinion.

B. THE EVIDENCE?

1. Plaintiff's Witnesses:

Joun S. NacHTMAN

After describing his academic background in metallurgy

and his continuous practical industrial experience from

1922 until shortly before trial when he was supervisor of

materials and research for the Navy (I 11-14a), petitioner

? Simultaneously, the trial court entered an alternative order

granting a motion for new trial on the ground there was no sub-

stantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict on damages and

that the verdict was excessive (I 355a; I 352-353a).

While petitioner is of the view, urged below, that in the eviden-

tiary situation on the damage issue this was an abuse of discretion,

that question is not presented here because it was not passed upon

below.

3 Because the questions here presented involve the sufficiency of

the evidence—most favorably construed for plaintiff—to support

causes of action upon which a jury verdict for petitioner should

have been invulnerable from judicial interference, it will, unfor-

tunately, be necessary to discuss the evidence at some length to

show how petitioner has been denied his constitutional right of

trial by jury.

0

testified that in 1929 he installed at Thomas Steel Company

the first pilot line and in 1931-1932, the first commercial

line for continuous electro-tinplating, that to the best of

his knowledge this was the first such continuous tin line

in this country or Europe and that he alone determined

and was responsible for the components and setup of those

lines (I 16-21a); that until that time tinplate had been

produced by slower and inferior, non-continuous hot-dip

methods (I 21-22a); that the Thomas line, which he laid

out and installed, was essentially that covered by his Re-

issue Patent 20,788 (I 49-53a) and produced the first con-

tinuous electro-tinplate satisfactory for deep drawing,

stamping and forming (I 48a); that in 1936, while at

Crucible Steel Company, he installed another continuous

electro-tinning line, the lay-out and components of which

were his own creation incorporating his inventions (I 45a),

which tin line included novel advances over the Thomas

line (such as higher speed, tension control, wet mechanical

brushing, a brightening unit, ete.) and that, to his knowl-

edge, this Crucible line was the first continuous electro-

tinning installation in the world for production of bright

tinplate (I 22-26a).

Petitioner further testified (I 26-40a) that in the late

30’s he became associated with the Blaw-Knex Company

to head a newly created Electro-Chemical Division set up

to design and manufacture continuous electro-plating

equipment; that he had a contract with Blaw-Knox—the

terms of which the trial court erroneously excluded from

evidence, but which was proffered to show petitioner’s

financial interest in Blaw-Knox activities (see I 155-159a,

I 27-30a) ; that in 1938 and 1939, he and other Blaw-Knox

officials negotiated with Jones & Laughlin officials for the

sale of continuous electro-tinning lines; that under dates

of May 12, 1938 (PI. Ex. 41, I 32-36a) and September 19,

1939 (Pl. Ex. 42, I 37-39a), submitting detailed engineering

drawings and specifications, detailed offers to sell such

equipment were made—the disclosures of which on their

ELE ION, PEPE Se Y

ROR RAP EKG AY LAE

PLIES

—

6

face, show that they were basea on petitioner’s ideas and

inventions, which petitioner corroborated by testifying

that he was the only one at Blaw-Knox with a background

and know-how in electro-tinning and that he furnished the

necessary technical data and information for composing

the tin lines in question (I 39-40a).

Petitioner also testified that subsequent to his associa-

tion with Blaw-Knox he became head of researeh at Sharon

Steel where a pilot (experimental) tin line, the components

of which he determined, was set up under his supervision

and direction and that during this period (1944-1945)

J. & L. officials inspected the Sharon installation and

talked with him because, as they told him, J. & L. was

encountering difficulties in its then new continuous electro-

tinning lines (I 41-43a, I 57-58a). Finally, petitioner

testified he had licensed the majority (eleven) of the steel

companies producing tinplate, to produce under his patents

(I 44-45a).

Dr. Reetnatp 8S. Dean

After stating his extensive experience in metallurgical

engineering (I 72-77a), Dr. Dean made a step by step

comparison of the Blaw-Knox disclosures with respond-

ent’s electro-tinning lines (I 77-97a). He concluded ‘‘that

the succession of steps is identical in the two lines. Every

important step... every significant step in the continuous

plating of tin is found in both of these lines . . . the

sequence is the same ... [and] the function of each piece

of equipment is equivalent, particularly the functioning

of each element in these two lines are equivalent’? (I 97a).

On cross-examination, he further testified that the Blaw-

Knox submission (including the specifications, letters of

transmittal, ete.) ‘*... provided a general engineering basis

to teach one how to carry out the general process .. .’’

(I 134a).

7

Dr. Dean made similar step by step comparisons of

respondent’s infringing structure with the disclosures of

petitioner’s patents and concluded that the elements or

steps of each of petitioner’s patents was duplicated in the

required sequence in respondent’s infringing structure by

identical or equivalent elements or steps. As to Reissue

20,788, see I 98-106a; as to 2,240,265 see I 108-117a; as to

2,459,674 see I 117-121a, and; as to 2,576,074 see I 121-126a.

There was only token opposition to Dr. Dean’s overwhelm-

ing proof of infringement.

Dr. Dean also explained the inter-relationship of the

several Nachtman patents in issue (I 106-107a) and their

relation to the Blaw-Knox submission, the latter occupying

‘‘a somewhat different position than these patents [in

that it] is an attempt on the part of the inventor or his

associates to provide an engineering basis, description,

drawings, to teach the people to whom it was presented

and who were presumably skilled in the general art, how

to carry out the continuous tinning operation’’ (I 107a).

James R. Powe

Powell, a J. & L. official, testified that the installation of

electro-tinning at J. & L. was a ‘‘war baby’’ brought about

by the urgent need for conservation of basic tin (I 152a;

see also I 257a where trial judge inhibited cross-examina-

tion of defense witness Reed on this subject).

Marion T. ARGANBRIGHT—ALBERT Brown

Arganbright, a J. & L. fiscal official, testified to the pro-

duction and sales figures for hot-dip and electro-tin for

the six year infringing period (I 159-166a; see also I 285-

286a) which showed that during the period in question

(1944-1950), the sales of electro-tin sharply increased while

those of hot-dip decreased. Brown, another J. & L. official,

confirmed that electro-tin production increased year by

year while hot-dip decreased (I 161-165a), and further

PO SRO LL LOI GN CS EOIN | PASO INS SS SRLS. TONE OP

PPR

8

that electro-tinning permitted thinner and variable coating

of basic tin not possible under the old hot-dip methods

(I 165-166a ; to same effect see testimony of defense witness

Reed at I 201-202a, I 206-207a).

2. Defense Witnesses:

Frank Bursa, ArtHuR W. Kitroy anp Artuur M. Hatrir:»

These employees (or former employees) of Acme Steel

Company testified, on deposition, in a defense effort to

establish that the Acme electro-galvanizing practice antici-

pated petitioner’s inventions. In so accepting that testi-

mony (I 335a), the trial court’s opinion omits vital

testimony of these witnesses seriously reflecting upon the

probative weight of their effort to establish the Acme prac-

tice as prior use.

Bursa was a mechanic (I 167a, I 172a, I 63b) without

any knowledge of physics or chemistry or of the solutions

used at Aeme (I 168a, 172a), nor did he have any technical

knowledge of the details of the alleged Acme installations

(see, e.g., I 169a, I 171a, I 173-174a). He handled gener-

ators and the cleaning of a zine electro-galvanizing line,

yet he was called upon to testify from memory as to a

chemical zine electro-galvanizing process and apparatus

forty years (Bursa I 64b) after the event! The Acme No.

1 line was admittedly experimental (I 173a, I 57b, I 65b)

and was dismantled when No. 2, which was entirely differ-

ent (I 52b), was built in 1916 (I 178a, I 171a, I 65b).*

Bursa’s testimony as to Acme lines 3 [installed a year

after No. 2 (1 171a)] through 12 is worthless because after

1917 he had nothing to do with this gaivanizing equipment

(I 170a, I 64b). In any event, Bursa’s testimony that

4 Having been an abandoned experiment, the No. 1 line could not,

of course, constitute anticipation. 7. H. Symington Co. v. National

Malleable Casting Co., 250 U.S. 383, 63 L. ed. 1045 (1919) ; Con-

solidated Contract Co. v. Hassam Paving Co., 227 F. 436, 441

(C.A. 9, 1915).

9

Acme’s lines 2-12 all used a lead pan to heat the strip

and not box annealing (I 176a, I 52b), plainly destroyed

that practice as prior public use of petitioner’s Reissue

process because uncontradicted evidence for petitioner

(See Tour infra) established that a lead pan process can-

not be used as suitable preparation for tin electro-plating.

Finally, as to Bursa’s testimony (as well as that of the

other Acme personnel) there were no correlated drawings

or other physical exhibits to corroborate or support his

putative forty-year memory of the actual continuous opera-

tion of an involved electro-chemical process and apparatus

with which he, a mechanic, had nothing to do after

1917, and precious little to do with prior to 1917!

A transparent attempt was made to introduce some

exhibits, but they were directed to isolated elements

in the Aeme line susceptible to any interpretation desired;

some were not clearly identified, some were after Bursa’s

time with these lines and most were old and well known

brackets and tanks commonly used for all kinds of things.

None could possibly corroborate the existence of any spe-

cific continuous or other electro-plating process or appara-

tus; all were nondescript items with no specificity to indi-

eate any process or apparatus predecessor to the patents

in suit.

The other Acme mechanic, Hatfield, is even less accept-

able. Hatfield contradicted Bursa as to who installed No.

2, Bursa saying Meaker (I 168a, I 55b), while Hatfield

claimed he built it (I 182a, I 79b). Hatfield said they

started out with brushes on line No. 7 which gave trouble,

whereas Bursa suggested that the absence of brushing

rolls on No. 7 was because the drawing was merely a

layout (original Trial Transcript pp. 460, 398). Yet Hat-

field insisted there were brushes with wood cores and

said nothing of brushing rolls (original Trial Transcript

p. 461). Hatfield insisted Acme built No. 7 (I 182a) and

he saw nobody from Meaker (I 183a, I 75b).

a ER ie

s PLP GME OAT, LW ED NO I TRO ONES ANE oe iE SY RR

r

10

Kilroy, the other Acme witness, agreed with Bursa

that No. 1 was only experimental (I 178a). He admitted

they used acid with too high a temperature on the steel

strip in operating the No. 2 line (original Trial Transcript

pp. 438-439). He contradicted Bursa by saying No. 2 was

not a Meaker installation (original Trial Transcript p.

439). He did not know the proportions in the zine plating

solution. He testified that there was no electro-galvanizing

of strip at the Riverdale plant of Acme until he came out

in 1928 and installed the No. 7 line (original Trial Tran-

script p. 431). There was no hoist in the No, 2 line as

originally installed (original Trial Transcript p. 440).

He discredited the Meaker installations by testifying they

created brittleness in the strip (I 179a), but he did not

tell how or when he cured that deficiency.

One of the features in Nachtman patent 2,240,265 making

a major contribution to the continuous method of produc-

ing steel strip with bright electro-tinplate, is wet mechani-

eal cleaning. The trial court below said that Hatfield’s

uncontradicted testimony showed the same brushing at

Acme (I 343-344a). But, as shown, Hatfield was a mechanic

testifying from memory to an electro-chemical process

some twenty years after the event, his testimony was in

part inconsistent with other Acme witnesses and there

were no exhibits or other tangible evidence to support his

assertion that Acme used wet mechanical brushing.

Lovts J. Reep

This J. & L. official sought to establish that a series

of prior patents and uses anticipated Nachtman and that,

in several respects, the J. & L. tin lines did not conform

to the Nachtman disclosures. On cross-examination each

of those alleged prior art patents or uses and each of the

alleged distinctions between J. & L. and Nachtman was

inquired into with the result: that Reed admitted to

numerous material differences between the Acme-Meaker

electro-galvanizing practice as compared to Nachtman—

————

pie

11

J. & L. electro-tinning (I 194-199a, I 216-217a); that Reed

admitted to material distinctions between the Kirschner

patent and Nachtman—J. & L. (I 219-226a); that Reed

admitted to material distinctions between Nachtman—J. &

L. and the Aronson patent (I 226-234a), the Aylsworth

patent (1 234-240a),° the King patent (I 240-242a), the

Mascuch patent (I 242-250a, I 273-276a), the Coe patent

(I 250-251a), the Ferm patent (I 252-254a), the Stahl und

Eisen disclosures (I 254-255a) and the Madsenell process

(I 255-256a).

Reed in effect admitted that he could not point to any

alleged prior art which individually or collectively described

a complete continuous electro-tinning line in its indicated

sequence of steps (I 240a, I 218-220a) and he did not know

of any continuous electro-tinning mill before 1929 (when

petitioner instelled the first Thomas line) or of any line

for bright tin plate before 1936 (when petitioner installed

the line with a brightener at Crucible—I 261a).

Finally, Reed attempted to show non-invention by testi-

fying that continuous electro-tinning was not practicable

until development of the so-called 4-high mill for rolling

of thin sheet steel and he identified an obviously inad-

missible article from a technical magazine purporting to

prove the relatively late development of the 4-high mill.®

5 On direct, Reed compared the pickling step in Aylsworth with

that provided in Nachtman and J. & L. On cross, however, he

admitted that Aylsworth called for an alkaline pickle while Nacht-

man and J. & L. used an acid pickle to remove scale and rust before

plating. He could not state whether an alkaline could perform the

same function—which it cannot—because he said, he did not know

enough about chemistry (I 234-238a).

® Petitioner validly objected to introduction of this alleged his-

torical article from the American Iron & Steel Institute Year Book

on the ground its assertions offered to prove the advent of thin-

gauge rolling were hearsay and admission of the article would

defeat cross-examination. The article was erroneously admitted

(I 187-189a) and relied upon by the trial court in its opinion imply-

ing that the Nachtman developments were inevitable after thin-

gauge rolling was developed as indicated in that article (I 338a).

PEP LIE

Beertyco wn sesen: SEIT ANDERE PW TOOT AOA IE RAE LOA PRE TA

? =

12

llowever, cross-examination revealed that thin rolled strip

sveel had long been available and that Reed’s knowledge

of the subject was itself thin (I 208-213a).

Because of its impact from a credibility standpoint

(reflecting on his interpretation of alleged prior art patents

and uses adopted by the trial court on the validity issues),

it is important to briefly refer to Reed’s testimony on the

infringement issue. Reed noted several distinctions be-

tween the J. & L. line and the Nachtman patents, which,

upon cross-examination, were shown to be questionable

and/or falsified. Thus: (1) Reed claimed that when

J. & L. was foreed to put in a continuous electro-tinning

line during the war [to save tin], it eut short its own

investigations and bought the plans of an established

producer, Crown Cork & Seal Company, but he admitted

that examination of the Crown Cork drawings, which were

not produced at the trial, would offer the best means of

determining whether J. & L. had in fact based its line on

Crown Cork (I 258-261a); (2) based on alleged schematic

drawings of its wet brusher, Reed claimed that it did not

brush ‘‘areuate’’ surfaces of the tin strip (as claimed in

Nachtman 2,240,265)—Dr. Dean to the contrary (I 139-

140a)—but on cross-examination Reed conceded that there

were original installation drawings for the brusher not

produced in court which he had not compared with the

schematic—after the fact—reproductions (I 261-263a; see

also I 190-19la where petitioner objected to the admis-

sibility of schematic drawings in lieu of the original

installation drawings) ;’ (3) Reed testified that while

Nachtman’s patent 2,459,674 called for a two-zone fusing

chamber, in the J. & L. brightener there was only one zone

and he demonstrated from a colored schematic drawing

prepared by him to so establish the fact, but on cross-

7 Dr. Dean and petitioner both testified that when they inspected

the J. & L. line [as provided by court order], the brusher had a

cover on it which, they were told, could not be removed while the

line was in operation (I 139a, I 7la, I 68-69a).

13

examination, when faced with a photograph of the J. & L.

brightener, Reed admitted that because the spacing of the

induction coils at the top and bottom of its brightener

and the current applied in each area was substantially

disparate, it was in effect a two-zone fusion chamber (I 264-

266a); (4) Reed, testifying from a large-scale coloramic

rendering of the J. & L. line prepared under his direction

shortly before trial and purporting to be the same as cer-

tain of petitioner’s exhibits which had been prepared under

his (Reed’s) supervision when this case was in its infancy

(and then delivered to petitioner), stated that the J. & L.

line was different than Nachtman patent 2,240,265 in that

Nachtman called for the strip to proceed ‘‘immediately’”’

from the wet brusher to the plating tank whereas at J. & L.

the strip first went through a rinse tank, but on cross-

examination when confronted with the fact that that pur-

ported rinse tank did not appear on petitioner’s exhibits

he could not explain the discrepancy (I 214-216a).

3. Rebuttal Evidence:

Sam Tour

This witness, long experienced, academically and prac-

tically, in the metallurgical field (I 286-289a), was called

principally to rebut the defense evidence of invalidity and

to explain the inter-relationship of the elements in the

Nachtman patents so as to prove invention and that there

was a true combination rather than mere aggregation, but

after an extended colloquy the trial judge inhibited such

rebuttal proof on the erroneous ground that having relief

on the presumption of validity, rebuttal proof could not

extend to the same matter except insofar as such rebuttal

was directed to specific prior art patents testified to by

witnesses for the defense (see Reasons For Granting the

Writ, infra, Point II). To the extent he was permitted

to testify on matters affecting validity, Tour briefly differ-

entiated the Meaker, Acme and Stahl und Eisen practices

and disclosures relating to electro-galvanizing from electro-

vm ere,

14

tinning as disclosed by Nachtman and practiced by J. & L.,

pointing out that the essential difference between the two

arts was in the pre-treatment and that the sequence of

pre-treatment or preparatory steps for electro-tinning

was essentially different and what would work for electro-

galvanizing would not work for electro-tinning (I 296-

301a). The witness further testified that he had examined

the several other prior art references relied upon by the

defense and compared them with the Nachtman patents

and that in his opinion none of them read on the Nachtman

patents and none disclosed a method or apparatus suitable

for continuous electro-tinning (I 301-302a).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I

THE TRIAL COURT USURPED THE JURY'S EXCLUSIVE FUNC-

TION BY GRANTING JUDGMENT N.O.V. ON CONFLICTING

EVIDENCE AS TO VALIDITY OF THE PATENTS: THAT

ACTION IS A SHOCKING INVASION OF THE JURY’S AU-

THORITY AND A GROSS IMPAIRMENT OF THE CONSTITU-

TIONAL RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY IN PATENT CASES AS

IN OTHER JURY ACTIONS.

A. Resolution of the Validity Issues Necessarily Turned on

Numerous Open Factual Questions, Which the Trial Court

Improperly Resolved Contrary to the Verdict

If the ‘‘facts’’ are as marshalled in the trial court’s

opinion, then the conclusions reached below are probably

sound. But, notwithstanding the lip service given by the

trial judge (I 332-333a) to the requirement that ‘‘. . . the

evidence in the case is now to be reviewed on the basis

that plaintiff is entitled to all the inferences and the evi-

dence is to be considered in the light most favorable to

him, because he has the verdict of the jury .. .’’, the

trial judge did not in fact so approach the evidentiary

record. Regardless what the trial judge said about judicial

limits upon review of jury verdicts, he im fact completely

pre-empted the jury’s prerogative and reached the con-

clusion he did only by following his personal conclusions

cali

angie,

15

on the evidence, his personal views as to relative credibility,

his personal views as to relative probative weight of the

evidence and his personal comparison of structures.

Symptomatic and typical of that gross departure from

the constitutional dichotomy of functions between judges

and juries, is the trial court’s extensive quotation from

and reliance upon an article which appeared in a trade

magazine ‘‘Steel’’ on June 19, 1939, under the name of

plaintiff, John S. Nachtman, to indicate as a ‘‘fact’’? what

the state of the art was when petitioner applied for and

obtained his patents (I 330-333a; see also references at

I 338a, I 348a).

Over petitioner’s objection (I 187-189a), on cross-

examination the defense offered this article in evidence and

examined petitioner as to whether he had written it. It

needs no extended argument to demonstrate that the article

was pure hearsay as to the truth of the matter therein

asserted and was admissible, if at all, only to show admis-

sions against interest or to impeach petitioner if he had

written the article. But petitioner denied he had written

the article or had seen or approved it, and he explained

on redirect examination that the article was probably

written by a Vice-President of Blaw. <nox Company (with

which he was then associated) for sales promotional pur-

poses (I 59-61a). There was no other evidence (at trial

or on pre-trial discovery) as to responsibility for the

‘*Steel’’ article.

Thus the jury clearly had the right, if on the state of

the record it was not compelled, to conclude that petitioner

did not write the article and that, therefore, nothing

therein could be taken against him. We have stressed this

point not because the ‘‘Steel’’ article is detrimental to

petitioner’s case (see, e.g., Appendix B, infra, item 10),

but because it is emphatic and positive and obvious proof

that the trial court did not, as it professed to have dore,

Porritt ered oe marien coon es * . ‘ eos és » ‘ é ” Lake

16

approach the question of validity of the patents on the

basis of conclusions or inferences taken most favorably

to the plaintiff. And the same gross invasion of the

jury’s function was continued with respect to almost every

single facet of evidentiary matter bearing on the validity

issue.

Even though there were myriad differences between the

structures and/or disclosures of the alleged prior art pat-

ents and uses and Nachtman’s (see, e.g., portion of

Statement supra, summarizing Reed testimony), the trial

court presumed to make its own comparisons. In so doing

the trial court overlooked the jury’s exclusive right to

have entirely ignored Reed’s ‘‘expert’’ testimony for the

defense purporting to show prior art for which, as the

summary of Reed’s testimony shows, the jury had ample

cause in: (1) Reed’s obvious interest, bias and partiality ;°

(2) his lack of candor; (3) the misleading and/or falsified

exhibits prepared under his direction in an effort to show

differences between Nachtman and J. & L. which did not

exist ;® (4) his admissions of substantial differences between

the Nachtman disclosures and patents he (Reed) had

8 Even if uncontradicted, Reed’s testimony could have been

ignored. Quock Ting v. U.S., 140 U.S. 417, 35 L. ed. 501 (1891) ;

The Conqueror, 166 U.S. 110, 131, 41 L. ed. 937 (1897); Neville

Coke & Chemical Co. v. Comm. Internal Revenue, 148 F. 2d 599,

603, (C.A. 3, 1945), cert. den. 326 U.S. 726, 90 L. ed. 431; The

S.C.L. No. 9, 114 F. 2d 964 (C.A. 3, 1940), holding that the fact

that expert opinion evidence was not controverted did not make

it binding upon the court, ‘‘being oral, its credibility was for the

court {or jury] at all times, even though unrefuted.’’

Reed’s interest was even more warrant. Sonnetheil v. Christian

Moerlein Brewing Co., 172 U.S. 401, 408, 43 L. ed. 492 (1898);

Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 88 L. ed. 967

(1944), no error where jury disbelieved defendant’s employees

who were presented as ‘‘experts’’ as to the value of gas leases;

see also Wigmore on Evidence (3rd ed.) Vol. IIT, § 949, p. 449.

® The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. (U.S.) 283, 5 L. ed. 454,

(1822); Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F. 2d 265, 269 (C.A. 2, 1952) ;

N.L.R.B. v. Howell Chevrolet Co., 204 F. 2d 79, 86 (C.A. 9, 1953).

cs aaa MD SRE RAK ota ‘ RS RAE ON Ao hal MERE RAL IIUA DAA A CAIN Tel i RL SACP ORE NRRL iit Kes A ARNG

17

cited as prior art and; (5) his admitted lack of expertese

at critical points of inquiry (see, e.g., fn. 5, supra).'°

That the jury may have properly disregarded the en-

tirety of Reed’s testimony—on the validity as well as the

infringement issues—is of prime significance in appreciat-

ing the trial court’s statement of the ‘‘facts’’, because much

of what that statement assumes to have been established

with respect to the disclosures of alleged prior art patents

and uses does not clearly appear on the face of the pub-

lished patents but is actually an adoption of Reed’s in-

terpretation, Reed having been the only ‘‘expert’’ appear-

ing for the defense.’' Thus if, as it had the right and

indeed good reason to do, the jury chose to ignore Reed,

then there was ruled out as a factual basis for judicial

review of the validity questions any interpretations of

1 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Moyer, 113 F. 2d 974, 980 (C.A. 3, 1940) ;

Neff v. Pa. R.R. Co., 173 F. 2d 931 (C.A. 3, 1949).

1 For example, the statement by the court (I 345a) that Kirsch-

ner brightens by passing the strip through a hot air furnace and

then cooling was obviously based on acceptance of Reed’s testi-

mony despite the fact that Reed was thoroughly discredited.

Reed testified (I 156b) that ‘‘The apparatus for brightening by

heating the strip . . . is shown in 13 on the Kirschner draw-

ing ...’’ This is a false statement. There is no brightening in

Kirschner furnace 13 nor does Kirschner say so. There can be

no brightening at this point because Kirschner uses an adhesion

flux which produces oxides and there can be no brightening until

the oxides are eliminated. Kirschner gets no bright coating until :

after he washes in bath 14. (II 437a, lines 15-20).

Similarly the trial court (I 348a) relied on Reed’s testimony

as to the Masecuch patent which testimony misled the Court into

the view that Mascuch showed the general arrangement used by

defendant insofar as patent 2,459,674 is concerned. Reed testi-

fied that Maseuch device shows an electrict heater (I 152b) that

could heat the steel high enough to brighten tin coated electro-

coated strip (I 153b, last paragraph). But Reed knew (I 247a)

that Mascuch taught nothing of the kind because Masecuch does

not disclose any temperature for his heating which would give ¥

brightening and actually Mascuch does not use furnace 26 to a

brighten but uses the entirely separate and distinct polishing rollers 4

27 and 27a (II 45la, lines 84-85). The furnace in Mascuch is z

for annealing, not brightening (I 244a). é

18

alleged prior art offered by Reed in an effort to show

anticipation.

Similarly, in construing the terminology of Reissue

20,788 as against the original patent to determine whether

it was for the same invention, the trial judge took it upon

himself to make this comparison (or to adopt Reed’s

comparison based on Reed’s interpretation) again pre-

empting the jury’s exclusive prerogative to make the

comparison as a question of fact based on the jury’s

evaluation of what evidence to accept or reject. In deter-

mining whether the testimony as to the Aeme practice was

sufficiently credible’ the judge again pre-empted the jury’s

exclusive function of resolving this comparison of struc-

tures and its credibility as a matter of fact. And in

resolving whether what Nachtman developed went beyond

prior art in the field and whether it was mere mechanical

improvement or invention, the trial judge again encroached

upon the jury’s exclus.ve province.

Finally, having given the jury the very instruction re-

quested by defendant as to the applicable law under which

it should determine whether plaintiff’s patents involved

mere aggregation or patentable combination—the hind-

sight conclusion which, apart from constitutional principle,

the jury was equally capable of making as the judge—the

trial judge again encroached upon the jury’s exclusive

prerogative of making that determination as a matter

of fact.

Obviously the jury rightfully may have disbelieved the al-

leged Acme practice because: (1) The Acme witnesses were not

qualified; (2) The Acme people were largely testifying to events

many years past; (3) The Acme witnesses contradicted each other;

(4) The Acme witnesses were hazy or uninformed on details;

(5) No connected and informative plans, specifications or other

records were offered to corroborate the alleged Acme practice, and;

(6) Petitioner was denied an opportunity to inspect and compare

the Acme line (I 183-184a). See Barbed Wire Patent, 143 U.S

275, 36 L. ed. 154 (1891) diseussed infra IT.

19

To avoid any contention that the foregoing assertions

are overstatements to create an issue on petition for a

writ of certiorari, counsel have prepared and attach hereto

as Appendix B an analysis of some of the factual issues

showing with respect to each such issue what was said by

the trial judge in his opinion as contrasted with what the

evidentiary record shows. That analysis unquestionably

reflects that upon factual issue after factual issue, where

the evidence or the inferences therefrom were in dispute

or open to question, the trial court, although purporting

to resolve the factual issue most favorably to petitioner

actually resolved the issue most favorably to the defense

by ignoring evidence or inferences favorable to petitioner

and by adopting as fact certain evidence the probative

weight of which was seriousiy in doubt.

B. No Question Has Been Raised That the Jury Acted Other

Than Under Proper Instructions of Law: the Question Is

Whether Judge or Jury Are to Resolve Evidentiary Dis-

putes Within the Framework of the Legal Principles Un-

derlying the Concept of Invention.

In summary the evidence showed:

1. That petitioner’s patents were issued as combination

patents and that, therefore, the Patent Office, after con-

sideration of the same issues raised by the defense, had

given its expert view that they were valid combinations.

Since by definition a combination does not depend for its

validity upon the novelty (or non-anticipation) of any

of its constituent elements, that expert appraisal is obvi-

ously entitled to far greater weight than the normal pre-

sumption of validity flowing from issuance and must be

accepted in the absence of evidence in character and

amount to carry thorough conviction. Morgan v. Daniels,

153 U.S. 120, 38 L. ed. 657 (1894); Miehle Printing Press

€ Manufacturing Co., et al vy. Miller Saw Trimmer Co.,

6 F. 2d 417, 418 (C. A. 3, 1925); Abbott v. Coe, 71 App.

D.C. 195, 109 F. 2d 449, 451 (1940); General Talking

20

Pictures Corp. v. Amer. Tri-Ergon Corp., 96 F. 2d 800,

811 (C.A. 3, 1938).

2. One of petitioner’s experts (Mr. Tour) testified to

the critical necessity of the claimed pretreatment or pre-

paratory steps for electro-tinning, thus giving in combina-

tion with the plating operation, a unitary result that was

neither disclosed nor even conceived in the prior art or

putative uses.

3. It is undenied and undeniable that continuous electro-

tinning resulted in an entirely new product suitable for

deep drawing, forming and stamping and commercially

produceable in substantial quantity—an established cri-

terion of invention. Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated

Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428, 484, 55 L. ed, 527 (1911).

4. It is undenied and undeniable that industry had long

needed and sought that new result—also a recognized

indicium of invention. T. W. Lippert, Metallurgical Edi-

tor, The Iron Age, in an article entitled ‘‘A Unique Tin

Plate—A New Producer’’, on July 2, 1936, wrote:

“Thus it is not impossible that the conventional

hot-dip tin plate industry may have an_ incipient

revolution on its hands—the first radical change in

a product which has been familiar for centuries and

is today made in essentially the same manner as it

was in 77 A. D.

“The United States was long dependent on the

British Isles for its tin plate ...’’

5. It is undenied that petitioner designed and installed

the first continuous electro-tinning installations—also

recognized as an earmark of invention (I 16-21a; I 22-26a;

I 45a; and the admissions of defense witness Reed I 218-

220a, IT 240a, I 261a).

6. The law presumes a patent valid until the person

attacking it proves the contrary. 35 U.S.C. 282. The

only proof offered by the defense was a mumbo-jumbo

21

assortment of alleged prior art patents and unproved prior

uses, none of which is readily understandable or applicable

without expert interpretation—and the only ‘‘expert’’

interpretation offered by the defense (and apparently

relied upon below) was that of the thoroughly impeached

and discredited Mr. Reed.

In the face of the foregoing evidentiary situation there

is no basis for the trial court’s statements that it ‘*. . . is

unable to pinpoint any contribution to the art which

would amount to an invention when applied to tin rather

than zine’’ [referring to the Acme practice] (I 339a),

and that ‘‘there is no showing of a new or surprising result

or a result which is more than the mere sum of the expected

result of the several steps’’ (I 34la). That there was

a new result in the Nachtman process is indubitably re-

flected by the record fact that Nachtman was the first

to conceive of and execute a process for producing electro-

plated tin suitable for deep drawing and stamping, never

before available in the art. When the trial court says the

result was not surprising nor unexpected, this is clearly

a hindsight judgment—substituted for the jury’s judgment

to the contrary—ignoring the realities of an industry

seeking a result but never having obtained it before

Nachtman.

The error below becomes more apparent upon an analysis

of the distinct contributions of the several Nachtman pat-

ents which were improperly lumped in the determination

below that all of the patents were unpatentable aggrega-

tions. Reissue 20,788, (Pl. Ex. 1, II 356a), the granddaddy,

gave the world a new result that created a new industry—

production of an adherent, uniform, non-porous electro-

tinplate on annealed and tempered steel strip resulting

in a product permitting mechanical operations such as

deep drawing, stamping and forming (I 21a).

The burden of the trial court’s opinion appears to be

that this patent was no more than a Roebling annealing

22

furnace plus an Acme type of plating line, so that the

reissue was both anticipated and a mere aggregation.

The first error in this approach—an invasion of the jury’s

province—is the assumption of fact that the Acme practice

was actually what the Acme witnesses said it was. But,

as already shown, there were many reasons for the jury

to have discarded the alleged Acme use (see fn. 12, supra),

not the least of which was the fact that the evidence

offered was practically entirely oral. See Barbed Wire

Patent, 143 U.S. 275, 284 36 L. ed. 154 (1891), where 24

witnesses testified orally (143 U.S. at 287) and putative

specimen of the wire produced (143 U.S. at 291), which

this Court deemed wholly unsatisfactory proof of alleged

prior use. To the same effect see Deering v. Winona

Harvester Works, 155 U.S. 286, 39 L. ed. 153 (1894).

The second error in the conclusion below that merely

putting a Roebling furnace together with an Acme line

did not constitute patentable combination was the assump-

tion that the court was better equipped than the jury to

make this ex post facto judgment of fact and that the

jury’s conclusion that the evidence pointed to the fact

of combination rather than mere aggregation was con-

stitutionally assailable in the evidentiary circumstances.

Among such circumstances was evidence that the Acme

line was no more than a zine plating system, was intended

as no more and neither it nor the Meaker system were

adapted to electro-tinning (I 137a). Cogent evidence that

the Acme-Meaker zine electro-plating processes are worth-

less for tin electro-plating is the fact that J. & L. itself

does not use Acme-Meaker. Prior use to invalidate must

establish that identically the same process or apparatus

constituted the prior use. Charles Peckat Mfg. Co. v.

Jacobs, 178 F. 2d 794 (C.A. 7, 1949), cert. den. 339 U.S.

915 (1950); James Heddon’s Sons v. South Bend Bait Co.,

14 F. 2d 805 (C.A. 7, 1926), cert. den. 273 U.S. 137 (1927).

The wisdom of this rule in the context of the instant

situation is obvious when we consider the uncontradicted

Tait be A Beat

evidence that the Acme zine electro-plating process could

not be used to tinplate and would be inoperative if so

applied. Zine can be prepared for electro-plating by

processes which will not prepare the surface properly

for tin plating (I 298a). In Acme a lead pan is used to

heat the strip, which emerges in red hot condition and

thus renders the strip worthless for electro-tinplating

(I 299a; see also Reed at I 195a). In short, zine electro-

plating and tin electro-plating are distinct arts (Dean:

I 137a) and each requires different critical conditions so

that the Meaker-Acme zine processes do not describe a

satisfactory process for electro-tinning (I 298a).

But even assuming the Reissue merely put a Roebling

furnace together with an established Acme practice, this

constituted far more than merely stringing beads or using

two old devices to perform their same old independent

functions in the same old way without any new or different

unanticipatable result: In the first place, the resultant

product is not only entirely different, but has utility for

purposes not possible with prior art tin-dip products. In

the second place, the Acme-Meaker zine plating could not

be used to make tinplate, and no one ever succeeded in

making commercial electro-tinplate of uniform, nonporous,

acerent coat prior to petitioner. J. & L. itself does not

use the Acme-Meaker line. In the third place, Tour’s

testimony showed that heating to anneal in combination

with slow cooling out of air gave a surface that could be

acid-pickled to remove any oxide or coat without producing

a useless acid-brittle strip, which strip would be so clean

on mere water wash as to obtain in the plating step the

adherent, nonporous, uniform electro-tinplate for the first

time in the history of the world. Each step modified the

next succeeding step as to make the final result possible.

Thus, there was more than sufficient basis for the jury

to conclude as a basis for factually finding a true combina-

tion that each of the two basic subdivisions of the com-

bination therefore mutually contribute to a new, different

24

and unitary result. Finally, keeping in mind that ‘‘ Knowl-

edge after the event is always easy,’"* we find the real

answer to the assertion below that the ‘‘court is unable

to pinpoint any contribution to the art which would amount

to an invention when applied to tin rather than zine’’

(I 339a). The plain and simple truth is that the need

and the demand were there, Acme-Meaker and all other

prior art were there, yet no one, prior to Nachtman, knew

how to make electro-tinplate to give an adherent, uniform,

nonporous coat—let alone a bright coat! And when peti-

tioner solved the problems of the industry his contributions

were warmly embraced. That his methods and apparatus

were novel is not open to doubt. The question is, did it

involve invention to take these steps and combine them to

produce a new article and a new industry? To suggest

that reasonable men could not conclude in such cireum-

stances that putting together the indicated elements was

unanticipated and invention elevates ex post facto wishful

thinking to unrealistic dignity.

But even if, arguendo, Reissue 20,788 were invalid as

anticipated and a mere aggregation, there is no basis for

the summary assertion below that the other Nachtman

patents in issue were similarly invalid. While the Reissue

was the granddaddy patent, nevertheless each of the suc-

ceeding patents themselves introduced new revolutionary

features essential to their new total unitary result and

giving them distinct standing as patentable combinations

independent of the validity or invalidity of the Reissue

patent. For example, patent 2,240,265 contains claims

covering the first teaching in the art of a commercial

method for the production of bright electrotinplate made

possible by a combination, inter alia, of (1) wet mechanical

brushing with (2) heating to alloy the tin to the strip while

(3) controlling the tension in the electroplating line. It

was one of the great contributions to the development of

18 Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428,

435, 55 L. ed. 527 (1911).

25

the tin can industry. This combination of steps is essen-

tially different from that claimed in the Reissue patent

and created a function and result beyond anything taught

in that reissue. Hence any holding of invalidity against

Reissue 20,788 is in no way determinative of the validity

of 2,240,265, whether based on prior art or on the ground

of aggregation.

Similar considerations apply to tae two remaining Nacht-

man patents. 2,459,674 covers an apparatus which gave

the world for the first time a commercially useful com-

bination for producing bright electro-tinplate, by requiring

(1) means to preheat the coated strip but below fusion,

in combination with (2) separate means for brief heating

to fusion of the coat to get bright plate and (3) quick

solidification of the fused coat to set it in unmarred condi-

tion, all made possible by (4) control of tension on the

strip. It was brilliantly new in both concept and execution.

Here again it is at once apparent that the mechanism

is entirely different from that necessary to practice the

methods of Reissue 20,788 or 2,240,285, so that any holding

of invalidity of either of those two prior patents, whether

on anticipation by art or of aggregation, does not dispose

of the question of the validity of 2,459,674.

And finally, 2,567,074 was also a novel contribution of

apparatus elements that made possible modern automatic

high-velocity, high-volume production of electro-tinplate,

in a plating line that requires, inter alia, storage equip-

ment, e.g., loopers at both near the beginning and end of

the line, properly placed in an electro-gtating system to be

coordinated with elements to stop the strip completely at

certain points in the line while maintaining rapid continu-

ous movement at other points in the line under controlled

tension. This was made possible by the use of elements

to provide drag tension to prevent surges of strip and

uneven travel, ete., while maintaining control of tension

throughout. And all being capable of being handled

26

mechanically, thus making automatic operation possible.

Here again it will be seen that the features go far beyond

those of any of the first three mentioned patents to Nacht-

man and this last patent also contributes a function and

result beyond them. So that once again any reasons for

invalidity of Reissue 20,788 or 2,240,265 or 2,459,674 do

not obtain against 2,567,074.

In the face of the substantial evidence of patentability

noted above—of the patentability of each of the Nachtman

patents for their several distinct contributions—and the

firm basis indicated upon which a jury of reasonable men

could conclude, within accepted and undisputed standards

of invention, that true patentable combinations were in-

volved, the only explanation for the action of both courts

below appears to lie in an approach to jury verdicts in

patent cases different from that in other types of litigation.

But in all cases where a jury sits, patent cases or other-

wise, it behooves judges to resist

‘*. . . the seductive argument [often] made that a

conclusion of fact which appears to the court to be

reasonable is so clear that reasonable men could reach

no other. If this sort of reasoning is allowed to

prevail, however, it means that the courts are substi-

tuting their judgment for that of the jury on fact

questions in violation of the constitutional require-

ment.’’"*

The constitutional assurance of a jury trial cannot be

impaired by judicial tampering with the jury’s resolution

of disputed facts or inferences within that realm in which

reasonable men could differ. See: Aetna Lafe Insurance

Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88, 35 L. ed. 371, 376 (1890) ;

Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union R. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35,

88 L. ed. 525 (1943); Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U.S. 90, 74

L. ed. 720 (1930).

44 From opinion of Chief Judge Parker in Burcham v. J. P.

Stevens & Co., Inc., 209 F. 2d 35, 38 (C.A. 4, 1954).

27

This Court’s decisions in the patent field early laid

down the judicial approach to the jury function in patent

eases. In Battin v. Taggert, 17 Howard 74, 85, 15 L. ed.

37, 41 (1854), the trial court had directed a verdict for

the alleged infringer on the basis of patent invalidity.

Reversing, this Court stated:

‘“‘This .. . took from the jury, facts which it was

their province to examine and determine. It was the

right of the jury to determine from the facts in the

ease whether the specifications, including the claim,

were so precise as to enable any person skilled in the

structure of machines, to make the one described. This

the statute required, and of this the jury are to judge.

‘‘The jury are also to judge of the novelty of the

invention, and whether the renewed patent is for the

same invention as the original patent; and they are

to determine whether the invention has been aban-

doned to the public. There are other questions of

fact which come within the province of a jury, such

as the identity of the machine used by the defendant

with that of the plaintiff or whether they have been

constructed and act on the same principle.’’

In similar vein, and parallel to the instant case, is

Keyes v. Grant, 118 U.S. 25, 36, 30 L. ed. 54, 58 (1886),

where in an action for infringement of an improvement

in furnaces for smelting, the defense claimed anticipation

by a machine described in an earlier publication. There

were differences in the machines and their arrangements

and experts disagreed as to whether these differences

were material to the result and whether any improvement

in plaintiff’s machine was the result of invention. Revers-

ing a directed verdict for defendant, this Court held that:

‘Clearly it was not a matter of law that the specifi-

cations of the plaintiff’s patent, and the publication

of Karsten, taken in connection with the drawings,

... described the same thing ... this was a question

of fact properly to be left for determination to the

jury, under suitable instructions . . .”’

k

FEMI LO TIO POR 4

MPO EVE ISG

28

So too in Bischoff v. Wethered, 76 U.S. 812, 19 L. ed. 829

(1869), the Court held that the trial court could not in-

struct the jury as a matter of law that the specifications

of a patent in issue compared with those of an alleged

prior art patent, but that whether or not they did compare

was a matter to be determined by the jury on all the

evidence. To the same effeet see Turril v. Michigan

Southern & NAR. Co., 68 U.S. 491, 17 L. ed. 668 (1863).

So too in Thompson Spot Welder Co. v. Ford Motor Co.,

265 U.S. 445, 68 L. ed. 1098 (1924), the Court held that

the question whether an improvement requires mere

mechanical skill or the exercise of the faculty of invention

is one of fact, and in an action at law for infringement

is to be left to the determination of the jury.

Farlier lower court decisions are to the same effect.”

Well might the courts below have heeded the opinion in

Heide v. Panoulias, 188 F. 914, 916-917 (C.A. 2, 1911) that:

‘‘Ordinarily the presence or absence of ‘invention’

and ‘infringement’ are questions of fact. When dis-

posed of by the trier of facts in an equity suit, his

decision may be reviewed on appeal. When disposed of

by the verdict of a jury, properly instructed, its

decision on those points are not reviewable on appeal.

1 Thus in Hunt Bros. Fruit Packing Co. v. Cassidy, 53 Fed.

257 (C.A. 3, 1892), the court held that whether there was in-

fringement of a patent for fruit dryers and whether the use of

a particular device therein was known at the time of plaintiff’s

application, were questions of fact to be left to the jury. In

Carver v. Braintree Mfg. Co., Fed. Case No. 2,485, 2 Story, 432

(C.C. Mass., 1843), the court held that objections that a patent

invention is old, or that the original and the renewed patent are

not for the same invention or that either were obtained with a

fraudulent intent, all involve matters of fact, and are for the

jury to decide. To the same effect see Poppenhusen v. Falke,

Fed. Case No. 11,279, (C.C. N.Y., 1861), holding that whether a

reissued patent is for the same invention as the original, is a ques-

tion of fact for the jury. See also Foote v. Selsby, Fed. Case,

No. 4,916 (C.C. N.Y., 1849), aff'd 55 U.S. 218; Washburn v.

Gould, Fed. Case No. 17,214, 3 Story 122 (C.C. Mass., 1844).

RR

29

‘*In the case at bar there was conflicting testimony

as to both invention and infringement. The experts

disputed as to how prior patents worked and as to

whether they were practical. They disputed vigor-

ously as to the meaning of the phrase ‘dipping frame’,

used in the claim, whether it would convey to one

skilled in the art the idea both of a pin-bar and of a

wire mesh basket. They disputed as to whether a

machine made under the patent in suit would or would

not work. We are satisfied that under the authorities

cited the trial judge would have committed error,

had he decided these questions of validity and infringe-

ment, instead of sending them to the jury.’? (Empha-

sis supplied.)

Cf. Walker on Patents (Sth ed.) § 536.

On the conflicting evidence in the record in this case

the issues incident to the question of patentability were

essentially no different than the issue of negligence in a

tort action, as to which this Court, in Schulz v. Pa. RR.

Co., 100 L. ed. 430, 432-433, stated:

‘*In considering the scope of the issues entrusted to

juries in cases like this, it must be borne in mind that

negligence cannot be established by direct, precise

evidence such as can be used to show that a piece

of ground is or is not an acre. Surveyors can measure

an acre. But measuring negligence is different. The

definitions of negligence are not definitions at all,

strictly speaking. Usually one discussing the subject

will say that negligence consists of doing that which

a person of reasonable prudence would not have done,

or of failing to do that which a person of reasonable

prudence would have done under like circumstances.

Issues of negligence, therefore, call for the exercise

of common sense and sound judgment under the cir-

cumstances of particular cases. ‘We think these are

questions for the jury to determine. We see no reason,

so long as the jury system is the law of the land, and

the jury is made the tribunal to decide disputed

questions of fact, why it should not decide such ques-

tions as these, as well as others.’ ...

Oi Sis 4

TIMP OPO RTT TET

PA MR a I

30

‘¢. . “The very essence of its function is to select

from among conflicting inferences and conclusions that

which it considers most reasonable.’ Fact finding

does not require mathematical certainty. Jurors are

supposed to reach their conclusions on the basis of com-

mon sense, common understanding and fair beliefs,

grounded on evidence consisting of direct statements

by witnesses or proof of circumstances from which

inferences can fairly be drawn.’’

The effort below to equate the situation here with that

in such eases as Packwood vy. Briggs & Stratton Corp.,

195 F. 2d 971 (C.A. 3, 1952), cert. den, 344 U.S. 844, or

A, & P. vy. Super Market Equipment Co., 340 U.S. 147,

95 L. ed. 162 (1950), as a self-justification for interference

with the jury’s verdict ignores the realities of a simple,

obvious structure on the one hand and the complexities of

that involved on the other. There is no parity between

the simple devices of Packwood and A. & P. and those

here requiring resolution of complex disputed evidence

and comparison of complex structures in order to arrive

at a conclusion whether there was anticipation and whether

the elements of the structures in issue mutually contributed

to each other to create a new unitary combination result.

To assume the absence of an area of factual dispute

over the involved structures here would be to ignore even

the trial judge’s own involved and labored analysis of

evidence and comparison of structures to reach the result

he did. It would also ignore the Patent Office expert con-

clusion of patentability, the testimony of expert witnesses

at trial that true elements of combination were involved,

and finally, it would ignore that on defense motion for

summary judgment and on defense motion for a directed

verdict, the trial judge himself could not find such a simple

and obvious anticipation or lack of patentable combination

as to warrant granting either of said motions.

Whether Nachtman contributed a new and surprising

result is no more measurable with certainty than is the

31

issue of negligence and, therefore, both are issues of fact

for the jury. Moreover, while in an ordinary negligence

or contract action the constitutional assurance of a right

to jury trial is merely for the protection of the litigants

themselves, in patent cases resolution of the issue of

invention vitally affects the community at large which

ultimately pays for the monopoly of the patent and which

likewise benefits from its fruits. In such circumstances

there is warrant for having the determination of invention

or lack of invention made by a broader representative

base of the community, namely the jury.

We do not take issue with the views below that the

jury’s verdict must be consistent with standards and rules

developed for use as guides to the systematic and orderly

definition and application of the concept of invention (slip

opinion, page 3). But that statement of principle cannot

be used, as it has below, to avoid the ultimate question

whether judges or juries are to be given the right to sift

and analyze the evidence to ascertain whether it does so

aceord with such rules and principles. When, as here,

application of the rules and standards for invention in-

volves determining points of similarity and dissimilarity

between the structures of the patents in issue and alleged

prior art, whether there is novelty in the patents in issue,

whether those patents are true combinations (i.e., whether

there is mutual interdependence of their elements to obtain

a new unitary result or whether the elements are merely

old devices strung together like beads, each element per-

forming in the same old way with new result)—when, as

here, resolution of such problems necessarily involves

selective review of the evidentiary record, an evaluation

of credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of

testimony—then in these circumstances application of the

pertinent standards for invention is necessarily a function

solely for the jury acting under appropriate instructions

from the trial court.

OF! PPAR LI SHER NIL IEA LEE CREA IRE IE

RPER ULES

32

C. This Court Has Had No Occasion in This Century to Define

the Limits of Judicial Review of Jury Verdicts in Patent

Cases; a Restatement of the Constitutional Limits of

Review Would be Timely Because of the Current Trend

to Substitute Judicial Views of the Facts for Jury

Findings.

As we have shown, notwithstanding the lip service given

below to the respective spheres of judge and jury, the trial

judge, with later appellate approval, entirely misconceived

his function in relation to the jury verdict. Battin v.

Taggert and the other early decisions of this Court noted

supra clearly articulated the supremacy of the jury in

resolving evidentiary disputes, comparing structures and

performing the other incidents of fact finding in patent

litigation (whether on the issue of validity or that of

infringement) just as in other jury cases. But with the

passage of time the lower courts have departed from the

constitutional standards thus expressed.

The decisions below are evidence of a not episodice—

though erroneous—modern notion that in patent litigation

the jury is not to be trusted with, or is not capable of

making, ultimate factual resolutions, particularly on ques-

tions of validity. Unless the constitutional expressions

of Battin v. Taggert are authoritatively restated increas-

ing currency may be given the notions below that the

jury’s prerogatives and functions are diminished and

those of the judiciary correspondingly enlarged in resolv-

ing factual matters incident to the determination of the

validity of patents. It is therefore imperative, we submit,

that this Court take this occasion to exercise its super-

visory jurisdiction to bring the lower courts back within

the limits of the constitutional standards for review of

jury verdicts applicable to patent and other litigation

alike.

33

II.

THE EVIDENCE OF PATENTABILITY WAS NOT MORE SUB-

STANTIAL BECAUSE OF THE PROCEDURAL ERROR OF THE

TRIAL COURT IN EXCLUDING REBUTTAL PROOF OF

VALIDITY; THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING IS CONTRARY

TO THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY IMPOS-

ING THE BURDEN OF PROOF OF INVALIDITY ON THE

DEFENSE.

On plaintiff’s case in chief there was no particular effort

to adduce evidence of the validity of the patents in issue

because 35 U.S.C. 282 provides that ‘‘a patent shall be

presumed valid. The burden of establishing invalidity

of a patent shall rest on a party asserting it.’’ After an

extensive defense effort to establish invalidity of the pat-

ents, petitioner, in rebuttal, attempted to go into the

validity question to show, for example, through the witness

Tour, the relation of the alleged prior art to petitioner’s

patents from the standpoint of showing that petitioner’s

patents covered patentable combinations (I 289a, 291a,

292a, 295a, 308a). This was the subject of an extensive

colloquy between the trial court and counsel at the begin-

ning of Tour’s rebuttal testimony (see particularly I 289-

289a), resulting in the court’s conclusion that because

petitioner had relied, in his ease in chief, on the presump-

tion of validity he could not in rebuttal go back to the

issue of validity except to rebut specific assertions with

respect to prior art patents relied upon in the defense.

In the face of the clear language of the statute this

was plain error which was urged upon the court below

but not commented upon in its opinion. Certainly the

inhibiting effects of the trial court’s ruling in establishing

the validity of petitioner’s patents is obvious and in the

petition for rehearing below petitioner summarized the

type of evidence that would have been offered but for

the trial judge’s erroneous ruling (see Petition For Re-

hearing, pp. 9-12).

The question here raised does not appear to have been

the subject of any direct holding previously by this Court

34

or any of the lower courts, possibly because the statute is

so clear on the subject. However, in Mumm vy. Decker &

Sons, 301 U.S. 168, 171-2 81 L. ed. 983, 985-6 (1937), this

Court did say:

‘‘In a suit for infringement of a patent it is not a

part of the plaintiff’s case to negative prior publica-

tion or prior use... These are matters of affirmative

defense. The issue of the patent is enough to show,

until the contrary appears, that all conditions under

which a discovery is patentable in accordance with

the statutes have been met. Hence, the burden of

proving want of novelty is upon him who avers it.

Walker, Patents, §116. Not only is the burden to

make good this defense upon the party setting it up,

but his burden is a heavy one, as it has been held that

‘every reasonable doubt should be resolved against

him.’ . .. What must be so completely established

by the defendant cannot be regarded as a part of the

plaintiff’s case ...’’

Thus, Mumm v. Decker & Sons, supra, would indicate

material error in the trial judge’s procedural approach

to proof on the issue of validity. But the matter is of

such substantial significance that it ought to be squarely

considered and determined by this Court as a guide for

the future trial of patent eases in the lower courts,

Ill.

THE DIRECTED VERDICT ON THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR

WRONGFUL MISAPPROPRIATION DEPRIVED PLAINTIFF

OF HIS RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL ON THIS CLAIM: THE

RULINGS BELOW THAT A CAUSE OF ACTION WAS NOT

ESTABLISHED CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS OF OTHER

CIRCUITS.

As reflected more fully in the Statement, supra, the

evidence showed that while petitioner was associated with

the Blaw-Knox Company, he and other officials negotiated

with Jones & Laughlin with a view to selling and installing

electro-tinning lines at J. & L. incorporating petitioner’s

conceptions, and that, in the course of those negotiations,

35

they disclosed to J. & L. engineering detail and data beyond

the disclosures of then or later patents, and finally, that

the tin lines disclosed in the so-called Blaw-Knox sub-

missions to J. & L. corresponded with the tin lines later

constructed and in use at J. & L.’s plant.

In this evidentiary posture it was plain error for the

trial court to have directed a verdict on the misappropria-

tion claim. Independent of the protection afforded by the

patent laws, equity will not suffer one to use or disclose

an idea or trade secret when such use or disclosure would

constitute a breach of confidence. Restatement, Torts,

§757(b). Thus Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. Schnelbach,

239 Pa. 76, 86 A. 688 (1913) held that a plaintiff is en-

titled to relief when he has shown the following elements:

(1) the existence of a trade secret or secret process of

manufacture (2) which is communicated to the defendant

(3) while he is in a position of trust and confidence and

(4) use by the defendant to the injury of the plaintiff.

(Note: The disclosures here in question were made and

misappropriated in Pennsylvania.)

Since petitioner possessed detailed plans and specifica-

tions for a complicated process of electro-tinning, then

unknown and not in general use in the industry, it is clear

that he (via Blaw-Knox) was in possession of a ‘‘trade

secret’’ or a ‘‘secret process of manufacture’’. See Re-

statement, Torts, §757, Comment b, Definition of trade

secret. See also Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F. 2d 369

(C.A. 7, 1953), decided under Pennsylvania law. The

detailed plans and specifications for electro-tinning equip-

ment provided, as Dr. Dean testified, an engineering basis

beyond the disclosures of the patents and are thus clearly

encompassed within the definition of a ‘‘trade secret’”’ or a

**seeret process of manufacture’’. And it was admitted

defendant received and reviewed those detailed plans and

specifications in the course of and as a result of negotia-

tions looking towards its purchase of a tinning line. Simi-

SO POOPIE

PPE LOR EL OOO

By Por: REPT DS

SEE aS

FY ELEY TOILETTE YG SMT PS RI

IEP,

AGLI 8.

36

larly the evidence unquestionably established, by com-

parison of structures, Jones and Laughlin’s ultimate use

of the Blaw-Knox disclosures.

In the circumstances the only real question of fact was

whether Jones & Laughlin was in a position of trust and

confidence when it received these disclosures. In this

connection, stripped of all surplusage, the relationship of

the parties was one of prospective buyer and seller;

petitioner had an electro-tinning process he desired to

market and J. & L. was a potential buyer. And the detailed

plans, together with prices, were submitted to enable J. & L.

to evaluate them for the purpose of consummating a sale.

In those circumstances, although there were no express

terms that J. & L. would hold petitioner’s plans in trust

and not use or disclose them, a disclosure in confidence was

implicit. It was so held on almost identical facts in Smith

v. Dravo Corp., supra. See also Hoeltke v. C. M. Kemp

Mfg. Co., 80 F. 2d 912, (C.A. 4, 1986), cert. den. 298 U.S.

673; Schreyer v. Casco Products Corp., 190 F. 2d 921

(C.A, 2, 1951). See also Restatement, Torts, § 757, Com-

ment on clause (b), p. 18; Booth v. Stutz Motor Car Co.,

56 F. 2d 962 (C.A. 7, 1932).

While the trial court did not clearly articulate the

reasons for its direction of a verdict on the misappropria-

tion claim beyond referring to an insufficiency of evidence

thereon (see I 321a), the court below purported to find

a series of reasons justifying that action, none of which,

in our view, detracts from the clear conflict between the

rulings below and the decisions in other circuit courts of

appeal and the highest court of Pennsylvania enunciating

Pennsylvania law applicable in this case. That conflict of

decisions was noted in the Petition for Rehearing below

which analyzed, seriatim, each step of the last paragraph

of the opinion below to show the lack of foundation there-

for. That petition showed: (1) that the assertion that

the misappropriation claim ‘‘was not strongly pressed’’,

even if it were true—which the record plainly shows it

37

is aot—is no reflection on the merits of the claim and that

claims for misappropriation are frequently asserted sup-

plementary to patent claims and upheld even when the

primary patent claim fails; (2) that the assertion peti-

tioner abandoned his claim for separate damages with

respect to the cause of action for misappropriation, is

without record foundation; (3) that even if petitioner’s

patents were unpatentable aggregations, they were not

freely available to Jones & Laughlin because, as Dr. Dean’s

uncontradicted testimony showed, the Blaw-Knox submis-

sions (which were the subject of the distinct cause of

action for wrongful misappropriation) went beyond the

disclosures of the patents, and because the validity or

invalidity of the patents themselves would legally have

no effect on the distinct cause of action for wrongful mis-

appropriation (citing Schreyer v. Casco Products Corp.

and Smith v. Dravo Corp., both supra); (4) that the asser-

tion that ‘‘there was no evidence that a trust relationship

between plaintiff and defendant was created by the trans-

action’’ ignores numerous decisions of other circuits and

in Pennsylvania that a confidential relationship is implicit

in the type of transaction in question, and that if, in a

non-jury case, a court could imply confidence from such

circumstances, there was no basis below to foreclose the

jury from finding as a fact that confidence should be im-

plied in like cireumstances; and (5) that the assertion it

was Blaw-Knox and not petitioner which made the sub-

missions and that Blaw-Knox has not complained, was

grossly unfair to petitioner’s strenuous efforts, blocked by

the trial court, to offer evidence of his financial relationship

with Blaw-Knox and his interest in any disclosures made

by them.

Thus, the decision below is plainly in conflict with the

decisions of other courts of appeal holding that a confiden-

tial relationship, breach of which is actionable, may be

implied in circumstances such as are here present so that

certainly whether such confidence could be implied in

38

the circumstances here was a factual matter for resolution

by the jury.

CONCLUSION

The decision below, both with respect to the cause of

action for patent infringement and that for wrongful

misappropriation, represents a gross departure from our

constitutional jury tradition applicable in patent cases

as well as in other litigation, requiring the exercise of this

Court’s supervisory jurisdiction to assure the integrity

of the jury process and the right to constitutional trial

by jury. If more than lip service to the jury system is

to be compelled in patent litigation, and if, in such litiga-

tion, the power of review of trial courts on motion for

judgment n.o.v. or of appellate courts, is to be kept within

historically proper channels, then the action of the court

below must be reviewed and reversed here.

Additionally, the courts below have decided an impor-

tant question of procedure, relating to method of proof in

patent litigation, contrary to the terms of statute and

requiring this Court’s consideration for the future guid-

ance of lower courts, and have decided a question of sub-

stantive law in a manner in conflict with the decisions of

other Courts of Appeal so that resolution of the conflict

by this Court is both desirable and necessary.

PRE GY) ERS eae Re NR CR err RO REI, 1S Lt RS ng aE, ES —

39

Accordingly, this petition for a writ of certiorari should

be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Davin G. Bress

SxHeupon E. Bernstein

Attorneys for Petitioner

Rust Bidg., 1001 Fifteenth St., N.W.

Washington 5, D. C.

Of Counsel:

Newmyer & Bress

Rust Bldg., 1001 Fifteenth St., N.W.

Washington 5, D. C.

Pattrerson, Crawrorp, ARENSBERG & DunNN

First National Bank Building

Pittsburgh 22, Pa.

Sot SHapprrio

Washington Loan & Trust Bldg.

Washington, D. C.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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