Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Alabama v. Plantation Pipe Line Co.

Supreme Court brief1956

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

OCT 11 1956

JOHN T. FEY, Clerk

ane

IN THE

| SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,

OCTOBER TERM, 1956,

STATE OF ALABAMA,

Petitioner,

ve

PLANTATION PIPE LINE COMPANY, a Corporation,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To the Supreme Court of Alabama.

WILLIAM N. McQUEEN,

Assistant Attorney General of

Alabama,

WILLIAM H. BURTON,

Assistant Counsel, Department of

Revenue of the State of Ala-

bama, and Assistant Attorney

General of Alabama,

Counsel for Petitioner,

Uf Counsel:

JOHN PATTERSON,

Attorney General of Alabama,

WILLARD W. LIVINGSTON,

Counsel, Department of Revenue of

the State of Alabama, and Assist-

ant Attorney General of Alabama.

Sr. Louis Law Printing Co., #25 North Eighth Street. CEntral 1-4477,

INDEX.

Citations to opinion below

SSSSSeats eae as see eeusaneeas

Jurisdiction

LEELA ee eee Ce ee ee Le ee ee ere an eS oon oe eo es

Questions presented

LARRSGKREAAERORSAEASCEASEOHOGAAERE OER OES

Statutes involved

CARESADALAVCEA SHREDDERS SO HEEB EO EHO S EOL

ID one KR xw ian avene Cawcussnseuesceasde Kaos 4

Activities engaged in by respondent pipe line com-

ORE Th ND TE Tis os soc sccdcecascnvanes 6

Reassas for granting the writ..............0.ecceees 11

DIR cctanac pe vixsnkceecabheresscana aaa reeins 28

ae ery Serer ey err rr Try Tre ee 29-69

| ECCT TELUTRTT ECTS TCT TT TTT ete ee 70

RE ES icc nas sew edes taxon sennaveseaenreenens 71

oa ick in Kish wen kanes eksendecdc ane une 2

TG TR Ss ck cans We bab eks teeksancncceenanee 73-74

Re I ascda vac cvcnccesccbbsasstuctensenks 79

NE ON Sink dnd aedekvieandadenavangheeennaven 76

NE acc vnc cesaskdeneaeetacaccinstucnnne 77

Cases Cited.

Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Commonwealth of

Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203, 45 S. Ct. 477 ....... 20

Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corporation v. State of

Alabama, 288 U. S. 218, 53 8. Ct. 373

Canton R. R. Co. v. Rogan, 340 U. S. 511, 71 S. Ct. 447 15

PRON SE | TM, EAN

;

,

b

3

3

3

ig

:

4

i

N

=

©

il

Capitol Greyhound Lines vy. Brice, 339 U. S. 542, 70

eat e cok Cheb bAckeeeeeNseeitatnesasas 18

Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U. S. 363, 367, 50 S. Ct. 121,

DUT CRLEGROeeN Chet R sea khbhd Chane eh haba 4 OEes 26

Caskey Baking Co. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 315

ee ee cee asskhcacuacen rf

Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U. S. 653, 68

ss ERR ay Par tare eR 13, 15, 16, 18

Consolidated Coal Co. v. State, 236 Ala. 489, 183 So.

DP eURN a teie Ck EL GAdksdaes GNSS A4KES ESSE ORKOS 24

Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303

ee es hk hc ake ek baeeak eae aens 15

Educational Film Corporation v. Ward, 282 U. S. 379,

oe ee lavan chen 26

Great Lakes Pipe Line Company v. Oklahoma Tax

Commission, 204 Okla. 518, 231 P. 2d 655 22.2.0... 24

Interstate Natural Gas Company v. Stone, 308 U. S.

er ree ae tree 11, 19, 20, 27

International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U. S. 416,

ae cece tebe abeh lees endeeed dees 15

Interstate Oil Pipe Line Company v. Stone, 337 U.S

yn Rh eee ee 11, 16, 27

Interstate Oil Pipe Line Company v. Stone, 203 Miss.

7aG, Go GO. SU fa, SS Bo. Bd BED . ww cc cccnnnces 11,17

International Paper Co. v. Curry, 243 Ala. 228, 9 So.

Pa CSG RULS Shee NGSLA NS OCRRAS KAWEAR OAK Ae Oe be 24, 25

MeCullough v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 21

Memphis Matera Gas Company v. Stone, 385 U. S

ee 2 at te re ee 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 27

Memphis Brea Laundry Cleaner v. Stone, 342 U. S.

SR | Ree er eee 16

Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249,

ee a Ga bes bok 0 on 4nd Roh 44 wks ER Weeks 15

New Jersey Realty Title Insurance Co. v. Division of

Tax Appeals, 338 U. S. 665, 674, 70 S. Ct. 413, 418 26

iii

Offutt Housing Company v. County of Sarpy, 351 U.S.

..., (68. Ct. 814, 817, decided May 28, 1956 ....... 21

Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U. S. D095, 45

oe Se. ee RO ASTI Bn hr RE 17, 19, 20

Society for Savings in City of Cleveland v. Bowers,

349 U.S. 143, 75 S. Ct. 607, 611 .................. 26

Southern Natural Gas Corporation v. State of Ala-

bama, 301 U. S. 148, 57 S. Ct. 696 ....-11, 17, 18, 19, 20

99 93 94 25 7

Sey Oy Ey oy &

Southern Pae. Co. v. Gallagher, 303 U. S. 167, 59 S. Ct.

SPM ENMANDAAS a AG CLLSSeNce ceueeras priceuetonee Lit. 15

Spector Motor Service vy. O’Connor, 340 U. S. 602,

oh ee Be he, eA Ene ey Pree LES 14, 16, 20

State v. Bradley, 207 Ala. 677, 93 So. 595, 597 ...... 23

State v. Pullman-Standard Car Mfg. Co., 235 Ala. 493,

sacinibi cn Fuso ETRE RTE De TERETE EOE ee 24, 25

State v. Southern Natural Gas Corporation, 233 Ala.

vac Be aa MOET a ee 11, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24

Stone v. Interstate Natural Gas Company, 103 F. 2d

MN TSS tastes aetna bas rieas b shidakxe oul ci 11, 19

Stone v. Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co., 203 Miss. 715,

35 So. 2d 73, 36 So. 2d 142 .................0..... 16

Stone v. Memphis Natural Gas Company, 201 Miss.

Oe OE WM hoon ve ck dasiccueccucceeenki. 11,16

Texas Gas Transmission Company v. Atkins (Tenn.),

Os OM Rn sn dak ik vdkwacncticaccoc cu 24

Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S.

vies Bina Mg: Sogn CE CERT CT ae 15, 16

Western Maryland R. R. Co. v. Rogan, 340 U. S. 520,

sass Pace Basmaet CT OTE TTT pe 15

Statutes Cited.

Code of Alabama 1940, Title7 ...........000.-...5.. 6

Code of Alabama 1940, Title PO, Beotion Th occ. cceccs 10

Code of Alabama 1940, Title 10, Section 189 .......... 10

iv

Code of Alabama 1940, Title 10, Section 192 .......... 7

Code of Alabama 1940, Title 51, Section 140 .......... 4

Code of Alabama 1940, Title 51, Section

MS ccc kRUhaGeencaneuehaahen ane 2, 3, 4, 5, 11, 23, 25, 26

Code of Alabama 1940, Title 51, Sections 351, 354,

ae heh ahaa ea ued Gun antas dons 3, 23

General Acts of Alabama, 1935, page 256 ........... 25

Mississippi Code 1942, Section 9313 ................ 12

2 eee 8 Brees | 2

Constitutions Cited.

Constitution of Alabama 1901, Section 282 ...3,7, 11, 25, 26

Constitution of the United States, Article 1, Section 8,

SE UE Suxihe dcGhkaveukawercwd ouene ck 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,

OCTOBER TERM, 1956,

STATE OF ALABAMA,

Petitioner,

v.

PLANTATION PIPE LINE COMPANY, a Corporation,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To the Supreme Court of Alabama.

Petitioner prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to re-

view the judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama

entered in the above-styled case on August 2, 1956 (R.

174-213), rehearing denied on September 13, 1956 (R. 218).

CITATIONS TO OPINION BELOW.

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Montgomery

County, Alabama, in Equity (R. 162), is unreported. The

opinion of the Supreme Court of Alabama (R. 174-213)

idee Ee inc ee ee er

_

is not as yet reported, rehearing having been denied on

September 13, 1956 (R. 218). (Printed in Appendix as

“2°? ood “Be.

JURISDICTION.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama was

entered on August 2, 1956 (R. 174-213), and rehearing

was denied on September 13, 1956 (R. 218). The juris-

diction of this Court is invoked under 26 U. S. C., See-

tion 1257 (3), in that as applied to Respondent Pipe Line

Company, the validity of a state statute (the Alabama

foreign corporation franchise tax levied under Title 51,

Section 348, as amended, Code-of Alabama 1940) has been

drawn in question on the grounds that it is repugnant to

the provisions of Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3, of the

Constitution of the United States.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.

1. Was Respondent, a pipe line company engaged in

transporting gasoline and distillates through its pipe lines

from a point in the State of Louisiana to points in the

State of Alabama, and in other states, engaged exclusively

in interstate business and interstate commerce in Alabama

in 1952 in doing construction work, and in maintaining

and operating some, to-wit, 483 miles of pipe lines and

rights-of-way and other facilities in Alabama, and in em-

ploying capital in this State in that year to the extent of,

to-wit, $17,095,063.34, when said Company had previously

voluntarily qualified to do business in this State, and

enjoyed the same rights, privileges, and protections ac-

corded other corporations, foreign or domestic, in Ala-

bama in 1952?

2. Was the Alabama foreign corporation franchise tax

levied under Title 51, Section 348, as amended, Code of

a

Alabama 1940, invalid and unconstitutional under the pro-

visions of Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3, of the Constitu-

tion of the United States, as applied to and assessed

against Respondent Pipe Line Company by the State of

Alabama in 1952, and measured by and computed only

on the amount of, to-wit, $17,095,063.34 of capital which

was employed by Respondent Pipe Line Company in said

year exclusively within the State of Alabama?

3. Was Respondent Pipe Line Company clothed with

Federal immunity from taxation in 1952 as to state taxes

such as the Alabama foreign corporation franchise tax

levied under Title 51, Section 348, as amended, Code of

Alabama 1940, when said Company was engaged in con-

structing, maintaining, and operating its some, to-wit, 483

miles of pipe lines and rights-of-way, and making de-

liveries to some 14 different customers or shippers within

the State of Alabama, and in carrying on certain other

activities within the State, as well as enjoying all of the

rights, privileges, and protection accorded by the State

of Alabama to other corporations, both foreign and do-

mestic?

STATUTES INVOLVED.

The pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions

involved are: Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3, of the Constitu-

tion of the United States (the Commerce Clause); Title 51,

Section 348, as amended, Code of Alabama 1940 (the

Alabama foreign corporation franchise tax); Title 51, See-

tions 351, 354, and 357, Code of Alabama 1940 (the Sections

under which the Alabama foreign corporation franchise

tax is administered and enforced); and Section 232 of the

Constitution of Alabama 1901. (Printed in Appendix as

“i a” “AR 800, ** “8G od RE respectively.)

en et te -

a eo

STATEMENT.

This cause originated on December 12, 1954, as an appeal

(R. 2-4; 19-22) taken by Respondent Pipe Line Company to

the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama, in

Equity, under the provisions of Title 51, Section 140, Code

of Alabama 1940, from a final assessment of Alabama for-

eign corporation franchise tax for the calendar year 1952.

Respondent, Plantation Pipe Line Company, is a corpora

tion organized under the laws of the State of Delaware

which was constructing, maintaining and operating some

483 miles of pipe lines and rights-of-way in Alabama, as

well as carrying on other activities in Alabaina, and em-

ploying some, to-wit, $17,095,063.54 of capital within the

State of Alabama in said year. The assessment was made

by the State of Alabama against Respondent under the

provisions of Title 51, Section 548 et seq., Code of Alabama

1940, and the tax was computed and measured by said

amount of £17 ,095,063.34 of capital which Respondent em-

ployed exclusively within this State in 1952. The total

amount of the assessment so made was $22,695.00 (R.

18-19).

Insofar as material hereto, Respondent charged in its

Bill of Complaint (R. 23-30) that it was engaged exclu-

sively in interstate commerce in Alabama in 1952, and that

the Alabama foreign corporation franchise tax as assessed

against it by Petitioner for said year was invalid as being

repugnant to Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3, of the Constitu-

tion of the United States. To such Bill of Complaint,

Petitioner filed a Demurrer (R. 31-37), which was over-

ruled by the Cireuit Court as assigned to said aspect of the

Bill of Complaint (R. 38).

On August, 11, 1954, Petitioner filed its Answer to Re-

spondent’s Bill of Complaint, with certain pertinent exhibits

—

attached thereto (39-75). Such Answer denied that Re-

spondent Pipe Line Company was engaged exclusively in

interstate commerce in Alabama in 1952, and affirmatively

charged to the contrary that Respondent was engaged in

certain local activities within the State of Alabama at

which the Alabama foreign corporation franchise tax

levied under Title 51, Section 348, as amended, Code of

Alabama 1940, could be validly directed without contra-

vening the Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the

United States.

On June 30, 1955, the Cireuit Court of Montgomery

County, Alabama, sitting in Equity, rendered its final

Decree and Judgment (R. 153-162), and, in doing so, made

certain findings of fact and conclusions of law. Said Court

held that the Alabama foreign corporation franchise tax

was a license tax for the privilege of doing business in

Alabama and that inasmuch as Respondent was allegedly

engaged exclusively in interstate business in Alabama dur-

ing the year 1952, the final assessment so made was void

and the taxing statute as applied to Respondent invalid as

being in direct conflict with Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3,

of the Constitution of the United States.

On July 6, 1955, Petitioner appealed from the Decree

and Judgment of the Cireuit Court of Montgomery County,

Alabama, directly to the Supreme Court of Alabama (R.

163). There the case was submitted upon Briefs filed by

the parties and oral arguments made by counsel. On,

to-wit, August 2, 1956, the Supreme Court of Alabama

rendered an opinion and judgment (R. 174-213) affirming

the judgment of the Cireuit Court of Montgomery County,

Alabama, in Equity, and holding in effect as follows:

1. That Respondent Pipe Line Company was engaged ex-

clusively in interstate commerce and in interstate business

in Alabama in 1952.

athens

2. That the Alabama foreign corporation franchise tax

as applied to Respondent Pipe Line Company by the State

of Alabama in 1952 was invalid, and the assessment made

thereunder void, as being in conflict with Article 1, Section

8, Clause 3, of the Constitution of the United States.

3. That the Alabama foreign corporation franchise tax

was a license tax levied on the privilege of a foreign cor-

poration doing business within the State of Alabama, and

did not apply to a foreign corporation doing exclusively

interstate business in Alabama.

On August 9, 1956, and within the time prescribed by

law, Petitioner filed its Motion for a rehearing (R. 215-

216), which was denied on September 13, 1956 (R. 218).

Title 7, Code of Alabama 1940, Appendix, Supreme Court

Rule 3s,

Activities Engaged in by Respondent Pipe Line Company

in Alabama in 1952.

Plantation Pipe Line Company is a private corporation

organized under the laws of the State of Delaware and in

1952 was engaged in transporting gasoline and distillates

in its pipe lines originating from the vicinity of Baton

Rouge, Louisiana, to points in Mississippi, Alabama,

Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina. It was

qualified with the Interstate Commerce Commission as a

certified carrier by pipe line, and its tariffs were filed with

the Commission.

While the judgments and findings of the Lower Courts

are somewhat misleading on this point, the Company ac-

tually was not a Federal agency or instrumentality but

was undisputedly a private enterprise organized with

private capital, and owned and operated as such. At the

trial in the Cireuit Court, the undisputed evidence showed

om, ee

that in 1941 Respondent Pipe Line Company voluntarily

qualified with the Secretary of State under the provisions

of Title 10, Section 192, Code of Alabama 1940, and Sec-

tion 252 of the Constitution of Alabama 1901, to do busi-

ness in Alabama. It filed with said Secretary a copy of

its certificate of incorporation, and designated an agent

and a place of business. Certificates of incorporation,

permit to do business, and certificate designating its agent

in Alabama, as well as other documents pertinent to its

so qualifying, were introduced in evidence as Petitioner's

Exhibits “BY, “C", "Db, and “E” (R. 133-151).

During the year 1952 Respondent owned and operated

pipe lines and rights-of-way, and had other extensive

facilities in Alabama. The pipe lines ran from Baton

Rouge, Louisiana, to Greensboro, North Carolina, and in-

cluded so-called lateral lines from Helena, Alabama, to

Birmingham, Alabama, and from Helena to Montgomery,

Alabama. The length of the lines and rights-of-way, in-

cluding the so-called lateral lines, was approximately 1968

miles, of which approximately 483 miles of lines and

rights-of-way were located in Alabama (R. 23, 154). The

total investment of capital, including construction work in

progress in 1952, was approximately $69,615,442.47, OF

this amount approximately —$17,095,063.34 (or approx-

imately 14 of such investment) represented capital em-

ployed in said year within the State of Alabama (R. 23,

101, 102). Respondent operated and maintained two sets

of pipe lines from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, into and

through the State of Alabama, in addition to the so-called

lateral lines running to and from said points in Alabama.

One of these lines was an 18” line used to transport

gasoline and the other was a 12” line which was used to

transport oil products other than gasoline, namely, dis-

tillates (R. 104). The so-called lateral] line running from

Helena to the delivery terminal at Montgomery was a

TARO ENS FE ME Ae

BORE ET OE NIA OP

PRT 0p

4” line, and the line running from Helena to Birmingham,

an &” line (R. 92).

Respondent had 4 different delivery terminals in Ala-

bama in 1952 located at Moundville, Birmingham, Mont-

gomery and Oxford. It had some 10 customers or shippers

to whom it made deliveries at Birmingham via the so-

called lateral line running from Helena to Birmingham.

It had, to-wit, 6 customers or shippers to whom it made

deliveries at M. atgomery via the line running from

Helena to Montgomery. It had 1 customer at Moundville

and 1 customer at Oxford, with deliveries being made at

said points from the main lines (R. 103-104). Respond-

ent had 7 pumping or booster stations with extensive

facilities connected therewith, including buildings and

other improvements, which were located at Akron, Helena,

Oxford, Coaling, Vincent, Boyd and Heflin (R. 85-108).

The stations at Akron, Helena and Oxford were active

during 1952; the ones at Coaling, Vincent, Boyd and Heflin

were on a ‘stand-by’? basis. During at least a part of

said year Respondent maintained its Central Division Con-

struction Office at Anniston, where, to-wit, 14 persons were

employed (R. 181).

Respondent employed a total of some 82 persons in

Alabama in 1952. Broken down by terminals, pumping

or booster stations, and other facilities, including office

facilities, Respondent had a total of 20 employees at its

Akron station; 21 at Helena; 1 at Boyd; 1 at Coaling;

2 at Vincent; 12 at Siler Run (Oxford); 1 at the Heflin

delivery terminal; 4 at the Birmingham delivery terminal;

6 at the Montgomery delivery terminal, and, to-wit, 14

employees at the Central Division Construction Office at

Anniston (R. 131; also see R. 93-99). The Helena station

was the largest facility in Alabama during 1952 and might

in some respects be said to be typical of the other stations

(some to a lesser degree). In addition to its pumping

a

=

facilities there located, Respondent had 17 bulk tanks

where gasoline and the other oil products involved were

sometimes stored for as long as a week, but on an average

of 3 days, before being transported by separate pumps

through the small lateral lines from Helena to Birming-

ham and from Helena to Montgomery. The pumping sys-

tem used on the main lines was entirely different from

that used on these so-called lateral lines. The system

used on the main lines was a push-and-pull system, or

centrifugal pumping system, while that used on the so-

ealled lateral lines running from Helena to Birmingham

and from Helena to Montgomery was a gravity system, the

elevation at Helena being higher than that at either

Birmingham or Montgomery. So, the operation of these

lateral lines was separate and distinct from that of the

main lines (R. 90-92). At Helena and at each of the

other said pumping or booster stations Respondent had,

in addition to the other extensive facilities connected

therewith, a well, pump, and water system, as well as a

tank of some 500-barrel capacity in which the water was

stored for use in fire protection, and for general use at

said stations. Also, at each of said 7 stations Respondent

owned an attractive dwelling house which was contiguous

to or in some instances, adjacent to its other facilities.

These houses were rented to its Chief Supervisor at each

station for a monthly rental of $37.50. Water from the

said 5000-barrel tank was pumped to these dwelling

houses,

At Helena Respondent maintained a fire station and a

fire truck which was used to protect the tanks and facili-

ties located there. It maintained a warehouse at Helena

where it stored the different types of materials and sup-

plies needed in maintaining and keeping in repair its pipe

lines and rights-of-way in Alabama, and its other facilities

in this State.

RAR Pe GT Pe

2m es

ee

—

Respondent kept and used 5 trucks in Alabama during

the year 1952 which were registered in Alabama and used

on its highways.

Respondent had crews stationed in Alabama engaged in

repairing and maintaining its pipe lines and rights-of-way,

and other facilities. A full list of Respondent’s some 82

employees in this State in 1952, including operators, crew

men, utility men, delivery men, construction men, laborers,

engineers, accountants, clerks, et cetera, is contained on

page 131 of the Record.

The evidence shows that after voluntarily qualifying to

do business in the State of Alabama in 1941, Respondent

has continued to be so qualified (R. 101, 133-138). When

Respondent voluntarily qualified to do business in Ala-

bama (R. 150), it filed a copy of its charter with the

Secretary of State. The terms of this charter are broad

and are not confined to the right to operate a pipe line

solely in interstate commerce. Many of the rights granted

thereunder are of a local nature and have been exercised

within the State of Alabama. Respondent has acquired

considerable real estate in this State and in 1952 paid

ad valorem taxes in Alabama ‘in the amount of $97,219.36.

It also paid income taxes in the amount of $19,408.59,

and unemployment compensation taxes in the amount ot

$1,268.55 (R. 120).

Since qualifying in 1941, Respondent has enjoyed the

right of eminent domain in acquiring its rights-of-way

in this State. Its extensive properties have been pro-

tected by the State, and it has enjoyed all of the other

rights and privileges of a corporation, foreign or domestic,

in Alabama. Title 10, Sections 71 and 189, Code of Ala-

bama 1940.

ee

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.

Neither Title 51, Section 348, as amended, Code of Ala-

bama 1940 (the statute which levies the Alabama foreign

corporation franchise tax), nor Section 232 of the Constitu-

tion of Alabama 1901 contains any prohibition whatsoever,

either expressly or by implication, precluding the State

from levying this tax on a corporation engaged exclusively

in interstate commerce. Therefore, the only reason for the

Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama, and the

Supreme Court of Alabama holding that Respondent Pipe

Line Company was engaged exclusively in interstate com-

meree in Alabama in 1952 was for the purpose of constru-

ing the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. This

case clearly presents a consideration and interpretation of

Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3, of the Constitution of the

United States. All three of the ‘Questions Presented”

resolve themselves around such consideration and interpre-

tation.

1. The holding of the Supreme Court of Alabama that

Respondent Pipe Line Company was engaged exclusively in

interstate commerce in Alabama in 1952 is in direct conflict

with the decisions of this Court in Memphis Natural Gas

Company v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80, 68 S. Ct. 1475 (affirming

Stone v. Memphis Natural Gas Company, 201 Miss. 670,

29 So. 2d 268), and Interstate Natural Gas Company v.

Stone, 308 U.S. 522, 60'S. Ct. 292 (affirming per curiam the

decision of the Fifth Circuit in Stone v. Interstate Natural

Gas Company, 103 F. 2d 544), and apparently, Southern

Natural Gas Corporation v. State of Alabama, 301 U. S.

148, 07 S. Ct. 696 (affirming State v. Southern Natural Gas

Corporation, 233 Ala. 81, 170 So. 178), and apparently with

Interstate Oil Pipe Line Company v. Stone, 337 U. S. 662,

69 S. Ct. 1264 (affirming Interstate Oil Pipe Line Com-

pany v. Stone, 203 Miss. 715, 35 So. 2d 73, 36 So. 2d 142).

OED PETE LLG AL ROLLA ILI) POL? OEE

=. oo

In Memphis Natural Gas Company v. Stone, supra, the

majority of this Court affirmed the decision of the Supreme

Court of Mississippi which held that Mississippi's foreign

corporation franchise tax (Miss. Code, Section 9315

[1942]) was valid as applied against Memphis Natural Gas

Company, a Delaware corporation owning and operating a

pipe line for the transportation of natural gas.

“The line runs from the Monroe Gas Field in the

State of Louisiana through the States of Arkansas and

Mississippi to Memphis and other points in the State

of Tennessee. Approximately 135 miles of the pipe

line lie within Mississippi; at two points within that

state there are compressing stations. It is stipulated

that the Gas Company has never engaged in any intra-

state commerce in Mississippi, . . .” (Kmphasis

added.) (335 U. S. 80-81.)

It was further brought out that the Gas Company had

paid all ad valorem taxes assessed against its property in

Mississippi, but that in addition to the ad valorem tax,

Mississippi also imposed a ‘‘franchise or excise tax’? upon

all corporations ‘‘doing business’? within the State. The

Gas Company had never qualified to do business in Mis-

sissippi nor did it have an agent for the service of process

or a designated place of business in the State. Its only

employees and representatives in Mississippi were those

necessary to maintain the pipe line and its auxiliary ap-

purtenances. Mississippi's franchise tax was measured as

is Alabama's foreign corporation franchise tax—on_ the

amount of capital employed by a foreign corporation in

that State (335 U. S. 80, 81, 82). The majority opinion of

this Court affirmed the holding of the Supreme Court of

Mississippi (201 Miss. 670, 29 So, 2d 268, 270) that Missis-

sippi, in levying its franchise tax against said corporation,

had made ‘‘‘no attempt to tax interstate commerce as

such, but the levy is an exaction which the State requires

es

as a recompense for its protection of lawful activities

carried on in this State by the corporation, foreign or do-

mestie, activities which are incidental to the powers and

privileges possessed by it by the nature of its organiza-

tion—here the local activities in maintaining, keeping in

repair, and otherwise in manning the facilities of the sys-

tem throughout the 135 miles of its line in this State.’

The Supreme Court of Mississippi then went on to con-

clude that such activities were local activities and that

Mississippi’s franchise tax, as applied to this foreign cor-

poration did not bear directly upon interstate commerce

but on these local activities, and that any burden imposed

upon that commerce was remote and unsubstantial. In

affirming the judgment of the Mississippi Supreme Court,

four of the Justices of this Court did so (335 U. S. 80, 96)

by stating:

“We think that the state is within its constitutional

rights in exacting compensation under this statute

for the protection it affords the activities within its

borders. Of course, the interstate commerce could

not be conducted without these local activities. But

that fact is not conclusive. These are events apart

from the flow of commerce. This is a tax on activities

for which the state, not the United States, gives pro-

tection and the state is entitled to compensation when

its tax cannot be said to be an unreasonable burden

or a toll on the interstate business.”

In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Rutledge pointed

out that the tax was non-discriminatory (as is the present

tax) and observed that in Central Greyhound Lines vy.

Mealey, 334 U. S. 653, 68 S. Ct. 1260, this Court had sus-

tained a New York privilege tax upon gross receipts from

interstate transportation of the bus company operating in

interstate commerce, provided the tax could be properly

ica A cee

apportioned. He noted that the local activities for the

protection of which the Mississippi tax purported to be

laid “are incidents of carrying on that business taking

place in Mississippi and only there, for which Mississippi

affords protection received from no other state or the

United States. Nor can any other state give that protec-

tion. For that portion of the business and the protection

given it, 1 think the state is entitled to levy such a tax as

has been placed here. Nothing in the commerce clause or

its great purposes forbids such an exaction. Nor is the

state limited to a single exaction for different or indeed

like protections afforded, so long as each is safeguarded

against prohibited effects upon commerce, as are those

laid by Mississippi, and their aggregate cannot be shown

to contravene the clause’s purpose.”

While this Court held the activities of maintaining,

operating, and otherwise manning the pipe line to be local

activities at which Mississippi’s franchise tax could be

‘alidly directed for the protection afforded by the State

and the benefits derived by the taxpayer (301 U.S. 82, 83),

the Alabama Supreme Court, on the contrary, held these

same activities not to be local activities but activities so

closely related to interstate commerce as to be a part of

such commerce. In this respect, the Court was obviously

confused by, and seems to have completely misconstrued

the case of Spector Motor Service v. O’Connor, 340 U.S.

602, 71S. Ct. 508. It appears that a clarification by this

Ilonorable Court of the Spector case is needed, not only for

the sake of the instant case, but for the sake of other cases

where such questions arise. If the activities of Memphis

Natural Gas Company were said to be local activities

apart “rom the flow of interstate commerce, and on which

Mississippi's franchise tax could be validly levied, then it

appears beyond a doubt that the much more widespread

and extensive activities carried on by Respondent Pipe

a ees

Line Company in Alabama in 1952 were certainly local ac-

tivities, and that the Respondent was not engaged ex-

clusively in interstate commerce within Alabama in said

year.

Moreover, under several other existing decisions, it

would appear that in 1952 Respondent Pipe Line Company

was carrying on considerable local activity in Alabama

and these decisions sanction the levy on such a corpo-

ration of a tax similar to the Alabama foreign corporation

franchise tax for the protection and other privileges ac-

corded by the State. It would be too tedious to cite all

of these cases, but among them are the following:

Canton R. R. Co. v. Rogan, 340 U. S. 511, 71S. Ct. 447;

Western Maryland R. R. Co. v. Rogan, 340 U. S. 520,

71S. Ct. 450;

Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U. S. 653, 68

S. Ct. 1260;

International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U. S. 416, 67

S. Ct. 444;

Caskey Baking Co. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 313

U.S. 117, 61S. Ct. 881;

Southern Pac. Co. v. Gallagher, 303 U. S. 167, 59 S.

Ct. 389;

Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303

U. S. 604, 58 S. Ct. 736;

Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S.

250, 58 S. Ct. 546;

Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249,

53 S. Ct. 345.

In Caskey Baking Co. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 313

U.S. 117, 61S. Ct. 881, this Court sanctioned a license tax

levied by the State of Virginia on the Baking Company

for tne privilege of peddling bread in Virginia when all

of the bread involved was transported in interstate com-

merce into Virginia from another state. This Court held

LR a |

that the Act hit the peddling or selling and not the trans-

portation or commerce, although interstate commerce was

very clearly involved.

In Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner v. Stone, 342 U. 5.

389, 72.8. Ct. 424, this Court struck down Mississippi's

tax, insofar as it was levied on foreign corporations or

concerns soliciting business for laundries when the plant

was located in another state, because it was said to have

been laid on the privilege of soliciting interstate business,

and on the further grounds that the tax was discrim-

inatory. From what was stated therein, and by implica-

tion, this Court appeared to hold that if the tax had been

construed to apply only to the privilege of exercising the

local activity of picking up and delivering laundry, and

had not been discriminatory, it would have been valid,

notwithstanding the fact that the laundry was transported

across the state line.

In Spector Motor Service v. O’Connor, 340 U. S. 602,

71S. Ct. 508, while striking down Connecticut’s privilege

license tax measured by net income on the grounds that it

was a tax levied on Spector for the privilege of engaging

in an exclusively interstate business, this Court made

several significant statements in the controlling opinion

to indicate that the tax could properly have been levied

upon local activities, benefits and protections received in

Connecticut by said interstate trucking company. To sup-

port these statements, this Court cited, among other cases,

Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co., v. Stone, 337 U. S. 662, 69

S. Ct. 1264 (affirming Stone v. Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co.,

203 Miss. 715, 35 So. 2d 73, 36 So, 2d 142); Central

Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 68 S. Ct. 1260;

Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250,

58 S. Ct. 546; and Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335

U.S. 80, 68 S. Ct. 1475 (affirming Stone v. Memphis Nat-

ural Gas Co., 201 Miss. 670, 29 So. 2d 268).

—

roe :

—

=,

2. The decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama would

also appear to be in direct conflict with the decisions of this

Court in Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, supra, and

Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, supra, and Southern

Natural Gas Co. v. State of Alabama, 301 U. S. 148, 57

S. Ct. 696, when that Court very clearly held that the im-

position of the Alabama foreign corporation franchise

tax against Respondent Pipe Line Company was uncon-

stitutional and void as being repugnant to the Commerce

Clause of the Federal Constitution. In so deciding, the

Court relied mainly upon the case of Ozark Pipe Line

Corp. v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555, 45 S. Ct. 184. In holding

Mississippi’s franchise tax (very similar to Alabama’s

franchise tax) valid in Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone,

this Court appears to have overruled the decision in the

Ozark case insofar as that case would relate to the cir-

cumstances described in the Memphis case.

“In Ozark Pipe Line v. Monier, supra, this Court,

226 UL S., at page 565, 45 S. Ct. 186, 69 L. Ed. 439,

spoke of such activities as set out below. If it was

intended to say that such in-the-state activities as

there described could not be taxed, we disagree with

that conclusion.’’ (Emphasis added.) (335 U.S. 94.)

In the Memphis case the Court also asserted that the

local activities (apart from the flow of commerce) on

Which Mississippi’s franchise tax was said to have been

validly levied, were ‘the local activities . . . involved

in the maintenance of the pipe line.’? The Company was

said to be paying for the protection given and the bene-

fits enjoyed by it in Mississippi, which protection and

benefits, insofar as the activities in Mississippi were con-

cerned, could be given by that State only. The tax was

said to be recompense to Mississippi for the protection

and benefits so granted; this being particularly true since

the tax was measured solely on the amount of capital

~ won

which the Company employed within the State of Mis-

sissippi.

There is no difference whatsoever between the situation

whieh prevailed in Mississippi in the case of Memphis

Natural Gas Company and the situation which now prevails

in Alabama in regard to the activities of Respondent Pipe

Line Company in 1952. The only difference which might

be said to exist is that the activities of Respondent Pipe

Line Company are much more widespread and extensive

than those of Memphis Natural Gas Company, as_ the

foregoing Statement will reveal. If the Mississippi fran-

chise tax was said to be valid in Memphis Natural Gas

Company v. Stone, supra, then it appears without doubt

that the Alabama tax was validly laid on Respondent

Pipe Line Company for the much more extensive pro-

tection and benefits which have been accorded it by Ala-

bama. Having qualified to do business in this State, Re-

spondent Pipe Line Company received protection and

numerous local benefits, including the right of eminent

domain. It is compensation for these benefits so given

for which the State of Alabama levies its foreign corpo-

ration franchise tax. Southern Natural Gas Corporation

v. State, 301 U. S. 148, 57 S. Ct. G96 (aflirming State v.

Southern Natural Gas Corporation, 23:3 Ala. 81, 170 So.

178). The Alabama foreign corporation franchise tax

then is as much a ‘‘value received’? tax as is the gross

receipts tax levied in Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey,

334 U.S. 653, 68 S. Ct. 1260, or the tax of 2% of the fair

market value of motor vehicles used in interstate com-

merce whieh was levied by the State of Maryland in

Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 33!) U.S. 542, 70.5. Ct.

806, which taxes were sustained by this Court, where prop-

erly apportioned, for the use of the highways, or other

benefits accorded by the states involved. The benefits and

protection accorded by Alabama to Respondent Pipe Line

Company were just as important and just as costly to the

ee

State as those aecorded by the States of New York and

Maryland in the two above-cited cases,

These were the same benefits to which the Cireuit Court

of Appeals for the 5th Circuit had reference when it

upheld Mississippi’s foreign corporation franchise tax in

Stone v. Interstate Natural Gas Company, 103 I. 2d 544,

and which was affirmed per curiam by this Court in 308

U.S. 622, GOS. Ct. 292, expressly on the doctrine of this

Court in Southern Natural Gas Corporation v. State of

Alabama, 301 U. S. 148, 57S. Ct. 696 (affirming State v.

Southern Natural Gas Corporation, 233 Ala. 81, 170 So.

178).

It was also pointed out in that decision that said Com-

pany was operating a pipe line through the State of Mis-

sissippi transporting natural gas in exclusively interstate

commeree, except for the local activities of maintaining,

operating, and otherwise manning the pipe line within

that State, and that Mississippi’s franchise tax was levied

as recompense to the State of Mississippi for the pro-

tection and benefits which it gave in connection with

these local activities.

In sustaining the then Mississippi foreign corporation

franchise tax in Memphis Natural Gas Company v. Stone,

dd. UL S. 80, 68S. Ct. 1475, this Court referred to Interstate

Natural Gas Company v. Stone, 308 U. S. 522, GO S. Ct.

292, in the majority opinion and stated that the only dif-

ference between that case and the Memphis Natural Gas

Company case was the fact that Interstate Natural Gas

Company had qualified to do business in the State of Mis-

sissippi while Memphis Natural Gas Company had not

(335 U.S. 92, G8 S. Ct. 1481). The Memphis Natural Gas

Company case and the Interstate Natural Gas Company

case appear then to have clearly overruled Ozark Pipe

Line Corporation v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555, 45 S. Ct. 184,

= ek

insofar as that case is applicable to the situations de-

scribed in those cases or to that presented in this case,

Ozark Pipe Line Corporation v. Monier, supra, also

seems to be distinguishable from the case at bar in that in

that case it was pointed out that Ozark Pipe Line Corpo-

ration did not receive any gas nor did it deliver any gas

in the State of Missouri, while in this case Respondent

Pipe Line Company had some 14 customers in Alabama in

1952 to whom it was making constant deliveries through-

out the year.

The decision of the Alabama Supreme Court in this

case has the effect of misinterpreting the decisions of this

Court to such an extent that it virtually overrules Mem-

phis Natural Gas Company v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 68 S. Ct.

1475, and Interstate Natural Gas Company v. Stone, 30s

U.S. 522, GO S. Ct. 292, and makes the decision in South-

ern Natural Gas Corporation v. State of Alabama, 301

U. S. 148, 57 S. Ct. 696, both uncertain and ineffective.

Such a situation has very serious implications not only in

this State but, generally speaking, throughout this coun-

try, and should be corrected by this Honorable Court.

5. In its decision (R. 174-213) the Supreme Court of

Alabama asserts that under the more recent decisions of

this Court, including Spector Motor Service v. O’Connor,

340 U.S, 602, 71S. Ct. 508, this Court has restored to full

vigor the decisions in Ozark Pipe Line Company v. Monier,

266 U.S. 555, 45 S. Ct. 184, and Alpha Portland Cement Co.

v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203, 45 S. Ct.

477. This being tie case, and as it was said that Ozark Pipe

Line Company was engaged exclusively in interstate com-

meree (even though it maintained its offices, kept its bank

account, and carried on other activities within the State of

Missouri in connection with its pipe line), then that would

be equivalent to clothing Respondent Pipe Line Company,

has

and those similarly situated, with the Federal immunity

insofar as state franchise taxes of the same nalure as the

tax levied by Alabama are concerned. In other words,

this would free such pipe line companies from state tax-

ation in all of the states in which they carried on any ae-

livities connected with the pipe line, and place them in

the same position as an agency and instrumentality of the

Federal Government. This Court appears to very clearly

frown upon private corporation’s attempting to clothe

themselves with the Federal immunity from taxation.

Offutt Housing Company v. County of Sarpy, 351 U. S.

., 46S. Ct. 814, 817, decided May 28, 1956.

The Supreme Court of Alabama also appears to have

lent what assistance it could toward such a construction in

this case as it has used an entire page (R. 177) of its

opinion in explaining how Respondent Pipe Line Com-

pany Was organized in accordance with an Act of Congress

and under a proclamation issued by the President of the

United States on August 23, 1941, to meet an emergency

then allegedly existing as to the transportation and dis-

tribution of petroleum and petroleum products moving in

interstate commerce. It is very notable in this respect

that such emergency has long since ceased to exist, but

Respondent Pipe Line Company grows more robust and

affluent each year. It does not appear that either the

framers of our Constitution or the Congress ever intended

that such a private corporation enjoy the immunity from

taxation of the Federal Government or that it fail to pay

its just share of state taxation, particularly for valuable

benefits and protection Which it receives from the state

and for which it should pay like any other corporation,

foreign or domestic. It certainly appears that such cases

as McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, + L. Ed. 579, were

never intended to include such private corporations Within

the immunity. In reaping these benefits from the states,

ewer ra) a |

99

they should pay recompense just as much as the interstete

motor carriers who pay taxes for the use of state highways.

In Southern Natural Gas Corporation v. State of Ala-

bama, 301 U.S. 148, 57 S. Ct. 696, this Court unanimously

affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama in

State v. Southern Natural Gas Corporation, 233 Ala. 81,

170 So. 178, wherein that Court clearly adopted the minor-

ity opinion of this Court in Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales

Corporation v. State of Alabama, 288 U. 8. 218, 53 S. Ct.

373, which opinion was prepared by the late Mr. Justice

Cardozo and in which he was joined by Mr. Justice Stone

and Mr. Justice Brandeis. The Supreme Court of Ala-

bama was then made up of uiusually able and distin-

guished justices, and it held that the Alabama foreign

corporation franchise tax was not a tax on business or the

right of doing business in Alabama.

** . . we hold that the franchise tax here exacted

and being considered is not on any basis a tax on

business or a burden on the corporation’s interstate

commerce, but is laid on the exercise of corporate

functions, or on the privilege of exercising corporate

functions within the state and its employment of its

capital in Alabama, . . .”’ (170 So. 190).

Since this decision on June 11, 1936, the Alabama foreign

corporation franchise tax has been treated as a tax on

the right of a corporation to do business in Alabama and

is laid on the right of a corporation to exercise its corpo-

rate functions in this State, as distinguished from a license

or privilege tax on the right of doing business in this

State. In other words. as stated by the Supreme Court of

Alabama, in effect, in State v. Southern Natural Gas

Corporation, supra, it is an excise tax and not a license

which a corporation must procure before it engages in

business in this State. There is quite a distinction, and

—- 2,

-*

the provisions contained in the Alabama Code relating to

the administration and enforcement of the tax very clearly

bear this out. In the first place, a license tax for the privi-

lege of doing business in a state is generally required to

be paid prior to the business being done or conducted: in

the state. In this case, the tax is very clearly an excise

tax in that under the provisions of Title 51, Sections 301

and 354, Code of Alabama 1940, the tax is both levied and

paid at the end of the calendar year and under Section

348, is to be paid on the amount of capital which has been

employed exclusively within the State of Alabama. The

tax, then, is not a license or a prerequisite for a foreign

corporation doing business in Alabama, but is an excise

tax levied at the end of the calendar year for a corpora-

tion exercising its corporate functions within the State.

This was very clearly held to be the case by the Alabama

Supreme Court in State v. Southern Natural Gas Corpora-

tion (170 So. 190), and recognized to be the case by this

Court in Southern Natural Gas Corporation v. State of

Alabama (301 U.S. 153).

In addition to State v. Southern Natural Gas Corpora.

tion, supra, other cases by the Supreme Court of Alabama

appear to have clearly held. that the Alabama foreign

corporation franchise tax is an excise tax levied on the

right of a corporation to do business in this State and not

a tax on business or on the right of doing business in this

State. In State v. Bradley, 207 Ala. 677, 93 So. 595, 597,

the Supreme Court of Alabama held:

“The subject of the creator’s imposition of this

‘franchise tax’ is the existence of the corporation, not

the ‘continued exercise of the corporate franchise,’

K. C., M. & B. R. Co. vy. Stiles, 182 Ala. 138, 142, 62

South. 734, 735, Id., 242 U. S. 111, 87 Sup. Ct. 58, 61

L. Ed. 176. A domestic corporation not excepted by

the Constitution cannot avoid or escape this ‘franchise

tax’ by even complete corporate inactivity.”

In State v. Southern Natural Gas Corporation (170 So.

183), the Supreme Court of Alabama further asserted:

“That is, a domestic corporation, taxed upon its

mere existence, pay a franchise tax on its capital

stock, ete. Detroit International Bridge Co. v. Cor-

poration Tax Appeal Board of Michigan, 287 U. S.

295, 53 S. Ct. 137, 77 L. Ed. 314.

‘‘By section 232 of the Constitution, the Legislature

is required to levy a franchise tax on foreign corpo-

rations qualifying to do business in the state. The

policy of the state as to domestic and foreign corpora-

tions is uniform as far as possible; hence, the fran-

chise tax on foreign corporations is levied upon the

right to do business [not the right of doing business

in this State].’’ (Emphasis added.)

Also, see State v. Pullman-Standard Car Mfg. Co., 235 Ala.

493, 179 So. 541; Consolidated Coal Co. v. State, 236 Ala.

489, 183 So. 650; International Paper Co. v. Curry, 243 Ala.

298, 9 So. 2d 8.

The interpretation of the Alabama Supreme Court as to

the nature of the tax in State v. Southern Natural Gas

Corporation, supra, and of this Court in Southern Natural

Gas Corporation v. State, supra, to the effect that the tax

is an excise tax not on business or the right of doing busi-

ness, but on the right to do business and on the existence

of the corporation within the State has not only been ae-

cepted in this State, but has also been the interpretation

placed on the taxing statute by other state Supreme Courts.

Great Lakes Pipe Line Company v. Oklahoma Tax Com-

mission, 204 Okla. 518, 231 P. 2d 655; Texas Gas Transmis-

sion Company v. Atkins (Tenn.), 270 S. W. 2d 584.

Notwithstanding what appears to have been the well-

established principle that the Alabama foreign corpora-

tion franchise tax was not a tax on business or the right

eee

of doing business, the Supreme Court of Alabama now,

obviously, attempts to overrule these decisions by holding

that the tax is a tax as a condition or right of doing busi-

ness. This holding of the Court seems a Dit cloudy, and

the interpretation rather strained and unre: ilistic, particu-

larly in view of the decision in State v. Southern Natural

Gas Corporation, supra, which case was decided after the

Alabama foreign corporation franchise tax was amended

in 1985 (General Acts of Alabama, 1935, page 256), and

after the decisions of the same Court in State v. Pullman-

Standard Car Mfg. Co., 235 Ala. 493, 179 So. d41, and

International Paper Company v. Curry, 243 Ala. 228,

So. 2d 8. These cases, which were decided after the Ala-

hama foreign corporation franchise tax was amended in

1939, all appear to hold that it is a tax not on business or

the right of doing business, but is a tax on the right of

a corporation to exist in Alabama and to do business in

Alabama. Consequently, the holding of the Alabama

Supreme Court to the effect that the tax is levied on the

right or privilege of a foreign corporation doing business

in Alabama not only appears to be an erroneous one, not

in keeping with the laws and Constitution of the State of

Alabama, but apparently secks to overturn the past de-

cisions of the same Court, and also of this rg in South-

ern Natural Gas Corporation v. State, 301 U. S. 148, 57

S. Ct. 696. This holding by the Alabama ieee Court

is completely unrealistic and totally out of keeping with

Title 51, Section 348, Code of Alabama, 1940, and Section

232 of the Alabama Constitution, 1901, particularly as the

tax is measured by express direction of said constitutional

provision and the levying statute itself on the amount of

capital employed by a foreign corporation exclusively

within the State of Alabama. The tax is in no wise lev ied

against transportation, but is directed solely at the activi-

ties and functions carried on by such a corporation within

this State, measured by the amount of capital employed

Within the State of Alabama.

°C DES oa |

=

There is no prohibition either in the levying section of

the tax (Title 51, Section 348, Code of Alabama 1940) or

in Section 232 of the Constitution of Alabama 1901 which

would prevent the State from levying this tax on any

type of business done within the State of Alabama,

whether it be interstate or intrastate, as they merely pro-

vide that a franchise tax is to be levied on foreign corpo-

rations within the State of Alabama, measured by the

amount of capital which such corporations employ within

the State of Alabama. The only restriction upon the State

levying the tax on interstate business might be found in

the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. Cer-

tainly, Respondent Pipe Line Company was in Alabama in

1952 to the extent of some $17,095,063.34 of capital em-

ployed in this State, which represented approximately 14

of its total capital investment. No other state could law-

fully tax such capital so employed, or the activities car-

ried on by Respondent in Alabama in said year. The tax

so levied was not discriminatory, nor was it contended

that it was.

We believe that in all fairness and justice, this Court

should clarify this very confused situation by construing

the tax realistically, and as it really is, for the purpose

of determining the very important Federal questions

which are here involved. Under the decisions of this

Court, it appears that the Court is not bound by the inter-

pretation placed on a state taxing statute by a state Su-

preme Court, where such interpretation appears to be

unrealistic and where it vitally affects (as in this case)

the important Federal questions involved. Society for

Savings in City of Cleveland v. Bowers, 349 U.S. 143, 75

S. Ct. 607, 611; Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U. S. 363, 367, 50

S. Ct. 121, 123; New Jersey Realty Title Insurance Co. v.

Division of Tax Appeals, 338 U. S. 665, 674, 70 S. Ct. 413,

418; Educational Film Corporation v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379,

387, 51S. Ct. 170, 171.

sae HO

Notwithstanding, and even if Alabama's foreign corpo-

ration franchise tax is said to be on the privilege of a

foreign corporation doing business in Alabama, it still ap-

pears that under this Court’s decision in Memphis Natural

Gas Company v. Stone, 3:35 U.S. 80, 68 S. Ct. 1475, Inter-

state Natural Gas Company v. Stone, 308 U. S. 522, 60 St.

(Ct. 292, Southern Natural Gas Company v. State of Ala-

bama, 301 U.S. 148, 57 S. Ct. 696, and Interstate Oil Pipe

Line Company v. Stone, 337 U. S. 662, 69 S. Ct. 1264, the

tax as levied against Respondent Pipe Line Company was

valid as directed at the extensive activities carried on by

Respondent within the State of Alabama in 1952, and

measured by the amount of capital employed by Respon-

dent within this State in the same year, as a recompense

for the protection accorded to Respondent’s vast holdings

within this State and also for the numerous benefits and

privileges accorded to it by the State. This seems par-

ticularly true in view of the fact that Mississippi’s fran-

chise tax in both the Memphis Natural Gas Company case

and the Interstate Natural Gas Company case was held

to be a tax on such corporations for the privilege of doing

business in Mississippi, and it was agreed in both cases

that the pipe line companies involved were engaged ex-

clusively in interstate commerce in Mississippi. The tax

Was nevertheless said to be validly levied in those cases

as it was said that it hit the local activities of the com-

panies in Mississippi in maintaining, operating, and other-

Wise manning the pipe line facilities within the State and

measured by the amount of capital employed within Mis-

sissippi. The situations involved in the Mississippi cases

seem identical with the situation involved in this ease. Tf

the tax in the one instance was said to be valid, then the

tax in the other instance also appears to have been validly

levied.

= ae

CONCLUSION.

For the foregoing reasons, this Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

eee eee eee eee eee eee eee ee eee eee eee ee ens

WILLIAM N. McQUEEN,

Assistant Attorney General of Alabama,

TOS G24 SHRGE BASES AEE SERA ES AOE 604 OE 6 OES OS OD

WILLIAM H. BURTON,

Assistant Counsel, Department of Reve-

nue of the State of Alabama, and

Assistant Attorney General of Ala-

bama,

Counsel for Petitioner.

Of Counsel:

“etre rtogeraiwyenepe @ ot Cae eens foe ee ee

JOHN PATTERSON,

Attorney General of Alabama,

WILLARD W. LIVINGSTON,

Counsel, Department of Revenue of

the State of Alabama, and Assistant

Attorney General of Alabama.

—

APPENDIX ‘‘A.’’

August 2, 1956.

THE STATE OF ALABAMA, JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.

THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA.

SPECIAL TERM, 1956.

3 Div. 735.

State of Alabama

Vv.

Plantation Pipe Line Company.

Appeal from Montgomery Cireuit Court,

In Equity.

Stakely, Justice.

The State Department of Revenue made an assessment

for franchise taxes under the provisions of § 348, Title 51,

Code of 1940, covering the tax year 1952 against Plantation

Pipe Line Company, a corporation, in the amount of

$22,655.00. Plantation Pipe Line Company appealed from

the foregoing final assessment to the Cireuit Court of

Montgomery County, in Equity. In the Cireuit Court of

Montgomery County, in Equity, Plantation Pipe Line Com-

pany filed its bill of complaint to which the State filed a

demurrer. The court entered a decree in which the court

sustained the demurrer to certain aspects of the bill of

complaint which are now not under consideration and at

the same time overruled the demurrer to other aspects of

the bill. The aspects of the bill of complaint to which the

demurrers were overruled are stated in the decree to be:

**(3) That the demurrer to that aspect of the bill

which seeks to recover the franchise tax of $22,655.00

ra

“ Se |

=

paid to the Department of Revenue for the year 1952

be and are hereby overruled.

**(4) That the demurrers to that aspect of the bill

which seek to reeover interest on the franchise tax be

and the same are overruled.

‘*(5) That the demurrers to all other aspects of the

bill not specifically enumerated herein be and the same

are overruled.”’

Thereafter the State filed its answer to the foregoing bill

of complaint. Attached to the answer of appellant were

Exhibits A, B and C, which were made a part of the an-

swer. These exhibits were introduced in evidence as a part

of the record through a stipulation wherein it was agreed

that such documentary evidence could be introduced with-

out objection as to form.

On a hearing of the issues made by the bill of complaint

and the answer the court rendered its final deeree and in

doing so made certain findings of faet and conclusions of

law. In substance the court declared the final assessment

of franchise tax made against Plantation Pipe Line Com-

pany for the tax year 1952, was invalid in its entirety and

ordered the Comptroller of the State of Alabama to refund

to Plantation Pipe Line Company the amount of $22,655.00

which the company had paid for the sake of taking the

appeal, as provided in § 140, Title 50 (sic), Code of 1949,

together with interest on the aforesaid amount from De-

cember 12, 1952, and ordered the costs to be paid by the

appellant.

In its answer the State pleaded, among other things, res

adjudicata to the bill, which was made a part of the an-

swer. The State attached as Exhibit ‘‘B’’ a copy of a bill

of complaint which the company had filed in Case No.

13040 in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, in

——;

Kquity, setting up, in substance, a cause of action claimed

to be identical in all respects with the cause of action here

involved, except that the tax involved was for the vear

1942. In that case the court held that Plantation Pipe Line

Company was due to pay the State of Alabama the sum of

$7,849.73 as franchise tax for the year 1942. We shall

consider the issue of res ad judicata separately from the

other matters considered in this opinion and shall herein-

after outline the contentions as to res adjudicata at greater

length.

The case was tried orally before the court and we have

given careful consideration to the evidence introduced in

the cause. We find that the facts as summarized by the

court in its decree are substantially in accordance with

the facts introduced in evidence and will be stated by us

as briefly as possible as follows,

Plantation Pipe Line Company is a corporation which

Was organized under the laws of the State of Delaware on

July 8, 1940. On July 30, 1941, Congress enacted a law

which provides, in part, ‘‘Whenever the President finds

that the construction of any pipe line for the transporta-

tion and/or distribution of petroleum or petroleum prod-

ucts moving in interstate commerce, or the extension or

completion of any such pipe line already wholly or partly

constructed, is or may be necessary for national-defensi™

purposes, he shall by proclamation declare such finding.’’

The President, on August 23, 1941, issued a proclamation

to that effect, as to the pipe line proposed to be constructed

by Plantation Pipe Line Company, which contained among

other things the statement that the President does “*hereby

find and proclaim (1) that it is necessary for national de-

fense purposes that there be constructed and completed a

pipe line system for the transportation and distribution of

petroleum and petroleum products moving in interstate

commeree, * * * commencing in the vicinity of Baton

vu

Rouge, Louisiana, and extending to a northeasterly diree-

tion through the States of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama,

Georgia and South Carolina, and into North Carolina to

a point in the vicinity of Greensboro, North Carolina, with

branch lines extending to Montgomery and Birmingham,

Alabama, Columbus and Macon, Georgia, and Chattanooga

and Knoxville, Tennessee; (2) that Plantation Pipe Line

Company, a private corporation organized under the laws

of the State of Delaware, has commenced the work neces-

sary for the construction of such a pipe line system and

represents that it is prepared to undertake the construe-

tion of and will complete said pipe line system * * *.”

The pipe line as originally contemplated and as de-

seribed by the President of the United States in his proce-

lamation was completed and put into operation during the

vear 1942. The pipe line could not have been financed,

organized and the project completed and put into opera-

tion except by means of a corporation organized for that

purpose and having the customary charter powers, such as

the right to issue securities to represent the investment,

continuity of existence, ete.

Plantation Pipe Line Company qualified to do business

in Alabama in 1941.

Plantation Pipe Line Company was in 1952 and at all

times has been a common carrier pipe line company within

the meaning of the Interstate Commerce Act, operating

solely under tariffs filed with the Interstate Commerce

Commission.

Plantation Pipe Line Company has never filed nor sought

approval of its rates and tariffs by the State of Alabama

or any other state, and the State of Alabama has never

asserted any regulatory authority or jurisdiction over any

of the rate or practices of the Plantation Pipe Line Com-

pany.

— Uw —

During the year 1952 Plantation Pipe Line Company

owned and operated a pipe line running from Baton Rouge,

Louisiana, to Greensboro, North Carolina, with lateral lines

from Helena, Alabama, to Birmingham and Montgomery,

Alabama, and from Bremen, Georgia, to Columbus and

Macon, Georgia, and to Chattanooga and Knoxville, Ten-

nessee. The length of the lines, with laterals, was approxi-

mately 1,968 miles, of which approximately 483 miles were

located in Alabama. The total investment in carrier prop-

erty, including construction work in progress as of Jan-

uary 1, 1952, was approximately $69,615,442.47 for the en-

tire system and within the State of Alabama on the same

date was approximately $17,095,063.34.

The business of Plantation Pipe Line Company is and was

in 1952 conducted as follows: It receives at Baton Rouge,

Louisiana, in tanks owned by it, gasoline and petroleum oil

distillate for transmission to terminals, located in other

states specified in its tariff. The capacity of its line has

been at all times since its construction and Was during

1952 and is now absorbed by shipments tendered at Baton

Rouge. Plantation Pipe Line Company has never received

in Alabama any petroleum products for shipment and has

never maintained any facilities in Alabama for receiving

such products for shipment. The products received at

Baton Rouge are tendered by various shippers and differ

in kind and specifications. From the tanks the products

are pumped into its pipe line in lots or batches of sufficient

volume to remain separate and distinguishable from pre-

ceding or succeeding lots. These basic requirements of the

business are reflected in tariff T. C. C. No. 14 under which

Plantation Pipe Line Company was doing business on Jan-

uary 1, 1952.

After the products are pumped into the pipe line at

Baton Rouge the flow gradually slows down as the product

moves, requiring the use of pumps located at intervals to

Cote: a |

a

—)

maintain the flow. Three pumping stations were operated

in Alabama in 1952 with stand-by facilities at four points

in the State of Alabama.

Plantation Pipe Line Company had four delivery termi-

nals in Alabama in 1952, at Moundville, Birmingham,

Montgomery and Oxford. It did not make delivery of any

products shipped through its pipe line at any point in Ala-

bama other than at these terminals. This was in conformity

with its tariff. Plantation did not maintain any storage

tanks at any delivery terminal or elsewhere in Alabama.

As required by the tariff, shippers receive their products

from the pipe line without delay.

The pipe line through Alabama consists of an 18-inch

pipe line and a 12-inch pipe line. The line from Helena to

Birmingham is an 8-ineh line and the line from Helena to

Montgomery is a 4-inch line. Due to the difference in size

between the main pipe line passing through Helena and the

branch lines to Birmingham and Montgomery, it is impos-

sible to take the product directly from either main line

into the branch lines. Accordingly, Plantation Pipe Line

Company maintains at Helena seventeen tanks into which

are diverted the products from the main lines destined for

the terminals at Birmingham and Montgomery. This num-

ber of tanks is necessary to insure that the identity of the

preducts being transported be maintained. From the tanks

at Helena the product is pumped into the pipe line to Bir-

mingham or Montgomery at high pressure.

Quantities of products destined for Birmingham and

Montgomery are not sufficient to require or permit the

constant use of the branch lines and, therefore, the Bir-

mingham and Montgomery delivery terminals are not

always open, the products remaining in the tanks at Helena

for an average of two or three days before continuing to

final destinations. Products are never stored at Helena

at the request of a shipper and no deliveries are made

ff

—od—

there. These tanks are not used for storage and reship-

ment, but are, in fact, only necessary parts Of the trans-

portation facilities without which the deliveries of prod-

ucts received in Louisiana could not be made to the tariff

destinations, The tanks at Helena are used in the same

Way as railroad classification or marshalling yards and

the products in the tanks are at all times considered to

he and are in fact still in the course of interstate transpor-

tation. The tariff does not provide for in transit storage.

In order to assure uninterrupted operation of the pipe

line, it is necessary that the person in charge of each pump-

ing station and stand-by facility be on duty or on call at

all times and for this purpose the company maintains at

each station one house which it requires the responsible

employee to occupy and for which he is charged rent in

an amount less than the annual depreciation and repairs.

At each of the operating pumping stations there is a

water tank primarily for fire protection. Water from the

tank is never sold commercially, but is used; incidentally

and without charge, by employees at the pumping station

and in the company house.

The company maintains at Helena a warehouse where

are stored maintenance materials for the operation of

the pipe line. It also maintains a fire truck at Helena.

Plantation Pipe Line Company had 82 employees in

Alabama on January 1, 1952, and 68 on January 1, 1953.

The only employees in Alabama in 1952 were those engaged

solely and directly in the service of constructing, maintain-

ing and operating the pipe line. The company had three

trucks at Akron and a truck at Helena and Silver Run in

1952, which were used only to carry empleyees from place

to place in connection with their work in the construction,

maintenance and operation of the pipe line, to carry needed

Supplies and for other purposes directly connected with

S Le a |

renege

hc a

the construction, maintenance and operation of the pipe

line.

Some construction was carried on in 1952 by an inde-

pendent contractor, consisting of enlarging the pumping

facilities on the main lines. Similar work was done at

Helena in 1951 and some clean-up work in connection

with such construction was done at Helena in 1952.

To keep its pipe line system in operation Plantation

Pipe Line Company maintained, by means of lines leased

from others, a communications system between its termi-

nals, pumping stations, and its chief operating office in

Atlanta. Plantation Pipe Line Company has never main-

tained any general or corporate office in Alabama. — Its

statutory domicile is and has been Delaware and its prin-

cipal corporate and operating office is and has been in

Atlanta, Georgia. Plantation Pipe Line Company has

never kept any records in Alabama except pumping: sta-

tion and terminal operating records necessary to the trans-

portation of products received into the pipe line in Louisi-

ana. It has never performed any functions in Alabama

except those of constructing, maintaining and operating

the pipe line.

All of the business, activities and operations of the Plan-

tation Pipe Line Company in Alabama are carried on

solely in furtherance of and are inherent, integral and

necessary parts of the interstate transportation of petro-

leum products. All of the property of Plantation Pipe

Line Company located in Alabama, both real and personal,

is committed to and used solely in said interstate business.

Plantation does not, and did not in 1952, engage in any

local or intrastate business or activity whatsoever in

Alabama.

Plantation Pipe Line Company has paid all ad valorem

taxes assessed by proper state authority on its property

aa ee

located in Alabama, income taxes to the State of Alabama

on its net income allocated to the interstate business done

by Plantation Pipe Line Company in

ployment compensation taxes with respect to its employees

in Alabama. Prior to 1952, Plantation Pipe Line Company

had paid into the State of Alabama ad valorem taxes ag-

gregating $384,866.74; income taxes aggregating $144,466.06

and unemployment compensation taxes aggregating

$26,653.88. For the year 1952, it paid ad valorem taxes of

$97,219.36; income taxes of $19,408.59, and unemployment

compensation taxes of $1,268.55,

Alabama and unem-

(, 1952, Plantation Pipe Line Company

made application for a permit and paid, under protest,

to the State Department of Revenue a permit fee for the

year 1952 in the amount of $100.00, disclaiming any de-

sire for a permit to do or any intent to do any business in

Alabama except that of interstate commerce,

On January

Plantation Pipe Line Company duly filed on forms pre-

scribed by the State Department of Revenue a franchise

tax return for the year 1952, stating on the face of the

return that the kind of business conducted in Alabama

Was interstate transportation by pipe line of products re-

fined from petroleum and disclaiming the transaction of

or any intention of transacting any local or intrastate

business in Alabama. After hearing protests on behalf of

Plantation Pipe Line Company against the assessment of

any franchise tax for the year 1952, a final assessment in

the amount of $22,655.00 was made by the State Depart-

ment of Revenue on November 21, 1952.

The trial court made no findings of fact with

to the issue of res adjudicata raised by the State,

said, this matter will be separately considered |

opinion.

reference

As was

ater in this

The questions involved in this case may be stated as fol-

lows: (1) Was Plantation Pipe Line Company engaged

TOTES Ss

— PNET SPRINT ORIN ZR CIP ONE:

CLR OTE PEMEPIT TS

wre

GO Dar HOPE PING BAILLIE EMS,

= ae PPR TIN NC,

eh cr ep te e8 REAR EIN DENT '

—,

solely in interstate commerce in Alabama in 1992? (2)

Assuming that the first question is answered in the af-

firmative, does the Alabama Foreign Corporation Fran-

chise Tax purport to levy a tax on a foreign corporation

engaged solely in interstate commerce in Alabama? (3)

Is the Alabama Franchise Tax as here imposed uncon-

stitutional as violative of the Interstate Commerce Clause

of the United States Constitution? (4) Are the proceed-

ings with respect to the 1942 Franchise Tax res adjudicata

on the issue in this case? The court held the answer to

question one to be in the affirmative, to question two in

the negative, to question three in the affirmative and the

answer to question four to be in the negative.

I. Was Plantation Pipe Line Company engaged exclu-

sively in interstate commerce in Alabama in 1952?) With

respect to this issue the lower court concluded:

“Plantation was engaged solely in interstate com-

merce in Alabama in 1952. Interstate commerce can-

not be conducted in a vacuum without tangible prop-

erty, personnel, or incidental activities within the

boundaries of a state. All activities of Plantation in

Alabama were necessary and integral parts of its

interstate business and cannot realistically be sapa-

rated from it.”

Taking the undisputed facts in the case, we consider

that the court correctly held that Plantation was engaged

exclusively in interstate commerce in Alabama in 1952.

In Spector Motor Service, Inc., v. O’Connor, 340 U. S.

602, 95 L. Ed. 578, the Supreme Court of the United States

held Spector was engaged exclusively in interstate com-

meree in Connecticut. The facts upon which this conelu-

sion was based were clearly stated by the Supreme Court

of Connecticut in Spector Motor Service, Inc., v. Walsh, 61

A. 2d (Conn.) 89,-as follows:

ii:

——

“The finding of the trial court and the exhibits

made a part of it present the following situation. The

plaintiff is a Missouri corporation. It originally had

its principal place of business in St. Louis but later

moved to Chicago. Its business, during the period in-

volyed in this action, was exclusively

tion of freight in interstate commerce as a common

carrier, Originally, it carried freight only from St.

Louis to New York, but, in order to secure the ad-

vantages of a two-way haul, it set up facilities to ob-

tain goods for shipment from the east to the west

and, in particular, shipments of less than full truck

loads. In addition to its terminals in St. Louis and

New York, it set up terminals in Chicago, New Britain

and Bridgeport, Connecticut, and in cities in Mas-

sachusetts, Rhode Island and New Jersey.

full truek load is to be shipped to or

tomer in Connectie

the transporta-

Where a

from any cus-

ut, trucks making the long haul go

directly to the customer's place of business.

In case

of smaller shipments, the fr

eight is taken from the

customer's’ place of business by pickup trucks to the

terminal, where it is trans-shipped to the long-haul

trucks. The pickup trucks merely act as a part of

the interstate transportation of the freight. The busi-

hess of the company as outlined above was established

prior to the enactment by the Congress of the Motor

Carrier Act, 1935, 49 Stat. 043, 49 UL S, C., § 301 et

seq. (1940), 49 UL S.C. AL §

its business thereafter under

allowing it to continue to operate as it was doing on

June 1, 1935, until in February, 1942, it received a

permit from the interstate commerce co.umission, Of

its total business during the years 1936 to 1940, the

following portions originated in, was attributable to

or was derived from this state: 1936, 47 per cent of

a total business of $233,787.78; 1927 (sic), 37.86 per

301 et seq., it carried on

a provision in that act

8 OOP MITES PLA MLE EIA PEI,

aM QU iatenT ERO

pet

WEN Ao BANDED

gy ka end ae

eet as

cent of a total business of $440,025.92; first five months

of 1938, 47 per cent of a total business of $318,786.85;

last seven months of 1938, 50 per cent of a total busi-

ness of $432,087.39; 1939, 42 per cent of a total busi-

ness of $1,202,210.35; 1940, 34 per cent of a total busi-

ness of $1,728,510.65.

“The plaintiff uses in the operation of its business

about 85 trucks or tractors and 115 trailers. Most of

these are leased from the Wallace Transport Com-

pany. This is a corporation organized by officers of

the plaintiff; the plaintiff furnished the money to pur-

chase the vehicles; and all the capital stock of the

Transport Company is owned by the same four per-

sons who own all the stock of the plaintiff, that is,

its two principal officers and their wives. The Trans-

port Company was organized under the laws of Illi-

nois for the purpose of securing certain advantages

of reciprocity agreements between that state and

other states and to avoid certain taxes which would

otherwise be imposed upon it by states through which

it carries freight. All the drivers of the trucks are

employees of and are paid by the plaintiff. Several

of the pickup trucks are registered with the motor

vehicle department of Connecticut in the name of the

plaintiff, and during the years involved in this action

it obtained permits to purchase tires from the ration-

ing board at New Britain for its commercial vehicles

registered in this state. It leases its terminals at

New Britain and Bridgeport. It owns personal prop-

erty in Connecticut consisting of office equipment val-

ued at $1500 to $2000, upon which it pays property

taxes in New Britain. It has a bank account in

Bridgeport for the deposit of cash payments made by

shippers, but no one in this State has authority to

draw upon it; all checks received in this state are

sent to Chicago and cash received at New Britain is

roe || oe

converted into bank drafts and sent to Chicago; and,

except for a small amount of cash kept at New Britain

to pay incidental expenses, all expenses and wages of

employees are paid by draft on the Plaintiff at Chi-

cago. The plaintiff employed ten persons at Bridge-

port and seventeen persons at New Britain; of these,

five persons, employed two or three at a time, were

engaged in soliciting business, straightening out com-

plaints and generally promoting the plaintiff’s busi-

ness.

“In connection with the leasing of its terminal at

New Britain, the landlord insisted that the plaintiff

qualify in Connecticut as a foreign corporation and

name the secretary of the state as its agent for service

so that it would be subject to the jurisdiction of our

courts in the event that litigation should arise out of

the lease; the plaintiff did so qualify on May 5, 1934;

this was apparently done under ¢ 3489 of the General

Statutes, which provides that every foreign corpora-

tion having an office or place of business in this state

shall, before entering upon such business, appoint the

secretary of the state its attorney for the service of

process; but the plaintiff never otherwise applied for

or received authority to do business in this state, and

its business is limited entirely to interstate commerce

as specified by permits from the Connecticut public

utilities commission. In accordance with the require-

ments of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935, 49 Stat. 064, 49

U.S.C. § 321 (e) (1940), 49 UL S.C. AL § 321 (ce), it

also designated a person in New Haven upon whom

process might be served.” 61 A. 2d at 93, 94,

It is obvious from this statement of the Connecticut Court

that the activities of Spector in Connecticut were substan-

tiaily similar to the activities of Plantation in Alabama

in 1952. Spector was a common carrier of freight in inter-

state commerce. Plantation is a common carrier of petro-

POSE oo tefl

a ee

leum products in interstate commerce. Spector had em-

ployees in Connecticut, some of whom solicited business,

straightened out complaints and in general promoted the

plaintiff’s business. Plantation had employees in Alabama

who were engaged solely in the construction, maintenance

and operation of its pipe line. Spector had two terminals

in Connecticut at which goods destined for Connecticut

consignees were unloaded from large trucks for further

transportation by smaller pickup trucks or at which goods

to be shipped out of the state were brought by pickup

trucks so that they could be loaded into large trucks. The

products carried by Plantation are delivered direct to the

shipper by Plantation at delivery terminals in Alabama.

Spector used pickup trucks registered in its own name with

the Motor Vehicle Department of Connecticut. Plantation

used trucks with Alabama license tags for purposes di-

rectly connected with the construction, maintenance and

operation of its pipe line. Spector had to maintain its

facilities and equipment in Connecticut. Plantation had

to maintain its pipe line in Alabama. Spector received

goods for shipment in Connecticut. Plantation did not

receive in Alabama any products for shipment.

As we understand the situation the State insists that the

operation of the lateral lines from Helena to Birmingham

and Montgomery is not interstate commerce. This over-

looks the indisputable fact that the product moving in

such lines is received by Plantation at Baton Rouge,

Louisiana, for transportation to Birmingham and Mont-

gomery as tariff destinations, and that such lines are an

integral part of its interstate transportation system. Spec-

tor maintained two terminals in Connecticut where goods

were brought from out of the state in large trucks. The

goods were unloaded from such large trucks at the termi-

nal and then placed on smaller trucks for delivery to the

ultimate consignee, but this was held to be merely a neces-

sary and incidental part of the interstate delivery and

; . . Sta 0% AA Aaa

ey Nae

not intrastate commerce. It certainly appears that Planta-

tion’s use of smaller lines to deliver products received by

it in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, is no less incidental and

necessary to the completion of its interstate delivery.

Deis i A i

In Ozark Pipe Line Corporation v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555,

69 L. Ed. 439 (1925), the activities of the corporation in

Missouri were described by the court substantially as

follows. Ozark Pipe Line Corporation was a Maryland

corporation which owned and operated a pipe line extend-

ing from within Oklahoma through Missouri to points in

Illinois, with certain lines in Oklahoma. Through this

line crude petroleum was conducted to Illinois and there

delivered. Oil was neither received nor delivered within

the State of Missouri. Sinee it began its operation it had

been assessed and had paid general property taxes upon

that portion of its line and upon its other assets in Mis-

souri. It maintained its principle office in Missouri where

it kept its books and bank accounts from which it paid its

employees within and without the State, purchased sup-

plies, employed labor, maintained telephone and telegraph

lines, entered into contracts for transportation of erude oil

and carried on various other activities connected with and

in furtherance of its pipeline operation. Along the pipe-

line in Missouri there were three pumping stations, the sole :

-use of which was to accelerate the passage of oil through

the line. It owned and operated passenger and truck

automobiles but these, as well as its other property in Mis-

souri, were used exclusively in prosecution of its interstate

business. In compliance with the Laws of Missouri, appli- :

cable to corporations formed in other states desirous of

transacting business in Missouri, it filed with the Secretary

of the State its articles of incorporation and amended t

articles, paid license taxes and obtained a license and au-

thority to engage ‘exclusively in the business of trans-

VANE

MOTE Hi Se TRADE ENE OA NIN BEA EA! AR NELD GREYS

DPA AS IA ar ST GLO AO

porting crude petroleum by pipeline.’ 266 U. S., at

061, 69 L. Ed., at 441. It thereby acquired the right of :

—_ en

eminent domain under the Law of Missouri. Missouri

sought to impose a franchise tax ‘‘upon the privilege or

right to do business.’’ 266 U. S. 562, 69 L. Ed. 442. It

was held that Ozark was engaged solely in interstate

commerce,

The facts of the Ozark case and the facts of the instant

case are similar in that in the state which sought to impose

the tax both companies owned and operated a pipe line,

both had pumping stations to accelerate the passage of

the product through the line, both carried essentially the

same product, both employed labor and maintained com-

munications facilities in connection with the operation of

the pipe line, both owned and operated trucks which were

used exclusively in prosecution of its interstate business,

both paid the ad valorem taxes assessed by the taxing an-

thorities and both were qualified to do business in the

state in which the tax was sought to be imposed.

A study of the difference in the facts between the Ozark

ease and the facts in the case at bar is worthwhile. Ozark

maintained in Missouri its principal office where it kept

its books and bank accounts from which it paid its em-

ployees within and without Missouri. Plantation main-

tained its principal office at Atlanta, Georgia, and kept no

books or records in Alabama except such as were neces-

sary to the transportation and delivery of products in

Alabama. Ozark entered into contracts for the transporta-

tion of products in Missouri. Plantation did not. enter into

any contracts in Alabama for the transportation of prod-

ucts. It seems to us conclusive that if Ozark was engaged

exclusively in interstate commerce in Missouri under the

facts outlined above, and it was so held by the Supreme

Court of the United States, then Plantation necessarily

was engaged exclusively in interstate commerce in Ala-

bama in 1952.

In United Air Lines, Inc., v. Joseph, 282 App. Div. 48,

121 N. H. S. 2d 692, affirmed 307 N. Y. 762, 121 N. E. 2d

P gaye ~

ay ee

ov, United Air Lines operated in many states from coast

to coast and even beyond the continental boundaries of

the United States. Its main and financial office was in

Illinois, its chief maintenance base in Wyoming. It car-

ried air mail, passengers and freight in interstate and

foreign commerce. It carried no intrastate traffie in New

York. The sale of passenger tickets in New York City

averaged over $2,000,000 cach year. It was estimated that

an equal amount was sold outside the city for transporta-

tion into the city. It operated in New York City the usual

facilities including three traffic offices, a hangar, a stock

room of parts and supplies and a repair and maintenance

shop. It employed about 300 persons in New York City

including a district traffic manager.

It was contended that the vast business establishment

of the United Air Lines within the city as has been de-

scribed, the depositing and checking out of moneys in

local banks, the handling of baggage and the convenience

of passengers at the terminal, * * * constitute such a

separation, distinction and localizing of its generally inter-

state operations as to subject United Air Lines to a tax

by the city on its gross receipts.

In holding that the United Air Lines was engaged solely

in interstate commerce in New York the court held:

6c%#® *

* We think the activities of United Air in

New York City are simply a continuous, logical and

necessary extension of its interstate air transporta-

tion, and that, therefore, the tax imposed here is a

local tax on interstate commerce, forbidden by the

Federal Constitution. The size of its activities in

New York City is but a reflection of the size of United

Air's interstate operations and the importance of New

York City as a land, sea and air center of transporta-

tion. In any event, mere size of operations is im-

material if, in fact, the operations are solely in inter-

SRI ISY ead 20 SPEAR. Ae DA

+ ORR erty

ss ni

state or foreign commerce. Also, it has never been

held that merely because an interstate transaction

stops or starts in a state, that the stop or start is

localized or intrastate; nor does the city claim that.

“oe ** all the matters that the city contends localize

United Air’s activities are nothing more than the

necessary incidents to operating a terminal point for

its interstate transportation to and from New York

City. The presence of officers, hangar, repair shops,

employees, and the handling of moneys locally are all

a direct part of the interstate operation. The sale

of tickets for interstate trips is obviously a necessary

incident. Indeed, but for these incidents there could

be no interstate transportation by United Air. One

transport for hire, therefore one is paid. The pas-

senger must get a ticket or other evidence of paid

passage. The aircraft must be loaded. It must be

discharged. These acts must take place somewhere.

These are as essential to commercial air transport as

the aircraft itself, or the route to be traversed. As

Mr. Justice Cardozo said on behalf of the Supreme

Court in the Puget Sound Co. case, 502 U. S. 90, 92,

08 S. Ct. 72, at page 73, supra, speaking of independ-

ent stevedore activities done entirely within the state

of Washiigton, but holding them to be interstate in

character:

‘* «Transportation of a cargo by water is impossible

or futile unless the thing to be transported is put

aboard the ship and taken off at destination. A steve-

dore who in person or by servants does work so in-

dispensable is as much an agency of commerce as

shipowner or master. No one would deny that

the crew would be engaged in interstate or foreign

commerce if busied in loading or unloading an inter-

* * @

* * »*

state or foreign vessel.

er aes

‘**What was done by this appellant in the business

of foading and unloading was not prolonged beyond

the stage of transportation and its reasonable inci-

dents.’

‘**The holding and the reasoning in the Puget Sound

Co. case was later reaffirmed in Joseph v. Carter &

Weeks Co., 330 U. S. 422, 67 S. Ct. 815, 91 L. Ed. 993,

supra. Since it involved stevedore operations by an

independent contractor, its holding and reasoning go

well beyond the necessities of this case.

‘“*The Spector case, mentioned earlier several times,

is of course even more applicable to the problem here.

There the taxpayer maintained offices, employees and

pick-up trucks in the taxing state. Nevertheless, it

was held that the state could not tax the gross re-

ceipts because they were derived from interstate truck

transportation.’ 121 N. Y. S. 2d, at 695, 699, 700.

It is well to observe that United maintained in New

York City stock rooms of parts or supplies and a repair

and maintenance shop, and it was held that those aspects

of its business could not be “localized”? and disassociated

from its interstate operations. So in the present case, the

existence of a warehouse at Helena where there are stored

xoods necessary for the operation of the pumping and

other transportation facilities located there does not

change the fact that Plantation is engaged solely in inter-

state commerce in Alabama.

The State emphasizes the fact that Plantation owned

at each pumping station and stand-by facility a house

which was rented, for less than the amount of depreciation

and repairs, to the person in charge of the facility who

Was required to be on duty or on call for duty twenty-four

hours a day. In Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Atkins,

270 S. W. 2d 384, Texas Gas had in Tennessee compressor

oan

stations, meter men and dispatchers, maintenance camps,

materials and supplies, rights of way, easements and per-

mits to cross highways, ete., and all other facilities neces-

sary for the operation of a gas pipe line. Yet it was held

to be engaged solely in interstate commerce in Tennessee,

It certainly follows that if the presence of maintenance

camps in Tennessee was not held to be doing a local or

intrastate business, the ownership of one house by Planta-

tion at each pumping and stand-by facility could not be

so hela.

The State also emphasizes that there were tank facili-

ties at Helens. The seventeen tanks at Helena are integral

parts of the trausportation system. They are necessary to

insure that the identity of the products being transported

to Birmingham and Montgomery will be maintained. Quan-

tities of products destined for Birmingham and Mont-

vomery are not sufficient to require the constant use of

the lines to those two terminals "4 therefore, such

terminals are not always open. Products which are des-

tined for either Birmingham or Montgomery stay in the

tanks at Helena for an average of two or three days be-

fore being placed in the branch pipe line to either of these

delivery terminals. While the shipments are held at

Helena they are still in the course of interstate transporta-

tion. The shipments are never stored at Helena at the

request of a shipper. So we point to the recent opinion

of the Supreme Court. of Illinois in Mississippi River Fuel

Corp. v. Hoffman, 123 N. ©. 2d (Ill.) 503, cert. den. 349

U.S. 985, 99 L. Ed. 651, wherein the court said:

‘‘Appellants devote a considerable part of their

argument to a discussion of an attempt which is being

made by appellee to create a gas storage field in IIli-

nois in an exhausted gas field in Monree County. It

is enough to say that even if appellee had fully sue-

ceeded in this endeavor and if some of the gas sold

to its industrial customers had for a time been held

in storage in the places mentioned, it would not, in

our opinion, detract in any way from the interstate

character of the whole transaction. A freight train

carrying an interstate shipment may pause for a long

time at a railroad siding in the course of the ship-

ment without changing the interstate character of the

whole act. It is well known, at least to those ac-

quainted with the natural gas pipeline industry, that

in several parts of the country such gas storage fields

exist, and it has never been supposed that the exist-

ence and use of this method of underground storage

has in any way detracted from or minimized the inter-

state character of the business of such pipeline com-

panies.

7 * * * ~ * *

‘The same considerations apply to appellants’ argu-

ment that appellee’s business is in some way reduced

to a local intrastate one by reason of the fact that

appellee sometimes finds it advisable to ‘pack’ gas

in its pipelines at higher than normal pressure. Such

‘packing’ is treated by appellants as identical with

‘storage.’ What we have said above with respect to

underground storage of gas as a proper and useful

part of interstate commerce disposes of this question

of ‘packing.’ ”’

Far more mechanically necessary than the gas storage

fields referred to in the foregoing authority, the Helena

tanks are essential parts of the transportation facilities

required by the special and highly developed technique of

pipe line transmission. They are in no sense merely op-

tional storage facilities. The interstate transportation

could not take place without them any more than railroad

freight could be handled without classification yards and

side tracks.

Even in the situation where gasoline is brought into a

state by truck or rail and put into storage tanks pending

ae aa 1

=

further distribution to ultimate consumers in a regular

‘flow of trade,’’ interstate commerce is not interrupted.

Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 340 U. S.

931, 95 L. Ed. 239, 245.

It cannot be asserted that interstate commerce, to be

immune from taxation, must be conducted in some sort of

vacuum without tangible property, personnel or incidental

activities within the boundaries of the state. The falacies

of such contention was demonstrated in Ozark Pipe Line

Corporation, supra, where the Court said:

‘“‘The maintenance of an office, the purchase of sup-

plies, employment of labor, maintenance and _ opera-

tion of telephone and telegraph lines and automobiles,

and appellant’s other acts within the state, were all

exclusively in furtherance of its interstate business;

and the property itself, however extensive or of what-

ever character, was likewise devoted only to that end.

They were the means and instrumentalities by which

that business was done, and in no proper sense con-

stituted, or contributed to, the doing of a local busi-

ness. The protection against imposition of burdens

upon interstate commerce is practical and substantial,

and extends to whatever is necessary to the complete

enjoyment of the right protected. Heyman v. Hays.

supra, p. 186 (59 L. Ed. 531, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 403).”

266 U. S., at 565, 69 L. Ed., at 443.

A consideration of the foregoing authorities causes us

to reach the conclusion that Plantation was engaged ex-

clusively in interstate commerce in Alabama in 1952.

II. The Alabama franchise tax on foreign corporations

is not applicable to foreign corporations doing an exclu-

sively interstate business in Alabama. In Anglo-Chilean

Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama, 288 U. S. 218, 77 L. Ed.

710, the court held that the Alabama franchise tax on

=

foreign corporations is laid upon the actual doing of busi-

ness and ‘‘not upon the authorization, right or privilege

to do business in Alabama.’’ It will be recalled that a

permit to do business in Alabama was issued by the state

authorities under protest of Plantation on the ground that

it was engaged in doing an exclusively interstate business

in Alabama,

A study of the history of the franchise tax, including

amendments made after the Anglo-Chilean decision, supra,

and the constitutional provision under which it was levied

and the decisions of this court demonstrate to us that the

franchise tax on foreign corporations is only applicable to

foreign corporations actually doing an intrastate business

in this State.

Article XTV, Section 4, of the Constitution of 1875, pro-

vided:

‘*‘No foreign corporation shall do any business in

this State without having at least one known place of

business and an authorized agent or agents therein;

and such corporation may be sued in any county where

it does business by service of process upon an agent

anywhere in this State.’’

Article 12, Section 232, of the Constitution of 1901, pro-

vides:

‘*‘No foreign corporation shall do any business in

this State without having at least one known place

of business and an authorized agent or agents therein

and without filing with the secretary of state a certi-

fied copy of its articles of incorporation or association.

Such corporation may be sued in any county where it

does business, by service of process upon an agent

anywhere in the State. The legislature shall, by gen-

eral law, provide for the payment to the State of

Alabama of a franchise tax by such corporation, but

nts

such franchise tax shall be based on the actual amount

of capital employed in this State. Strictly benevolent,

educational or religious corporations shall not be re-

quired to pay such a tax.’’

These sections relate to a foreign corporation that ‘‘does

business’? in Alabama or to foreign corporations that ‘do

any business in this State.’’ The decisions of this Court

hold that these words are construed as holding that a

foreign corporation doing an exclusively interstate busi-

ness in Alabama does not ‘‘do any business in this State”’

and that the constitutional provision is not applicable to

such a corporation—Ware v. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co.,

92 Ala. 145, 9 So. 136; Nelms v. Edinburg American Land

Mortgage Co., 92 Ala. 157, 9 So. 141; Hurst v. Fitz Wheel

Co., 197 Ala. 10, 72 So. 314; Puffer Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 198

Ala. 131, 73 So. 403; Cobb v. York Ice Machine Corp., 230

Ala. 95, 159 So. 811, and Ewart Lumber Co. v. American

Cement Plaster Co., 9 Ala. App. 152, 62 So. 560. This Court

well stated the rule in the Hurst case, supra, when it said,

‘“*The constitutional and statutory provisions under con-

sideration were not intended and cannot be made to inter-

fere with, or to apply to, interstate commerce.”’

The Constitution of 1901 provides for the payment of a

franchise tax by ‘‘such corporation.’” The words ‘‘such

corporation’? can only apply to foreign corporations that

‘*do any business in this State’’ or to a foreign corporation

that ‘‘does business’’ in Alabama. As previously shown,

these words do not apply to a foreign corporation doing

exclusively an interstate business in Alabama.

In 1907 the legislature levied (Act No. 334, General Acts

of 1907, p. 418) a franchise tax on ‘‘every foreign corpora-

tion authorized to do business in this State under the laws

of the State of Alabama, except strictly benevolent, educa-

tional or religious corporations.’’ After the 1907 Act was

declared unconstitutional in Southern Railway Company v.

ee

Greene, 216 U. S. 400, 54 L. Ed. 036, the legislature enacted

the forerunner of our present franchise tax law (Section 12

ef Act No. 216, Acts of 1911, p. 170). As for domestic

corporations the Act provided for a franchise tax on ‘All

corporations organized under the laws of this State.”’ As

for foreign corporations the Act provided for a franchise

tax on **All corporations organized under the laws of any

other State, nation or territory, and doing business in this

State.”’ While the language of the franchise tax statute

has changed some since 1911, the quoted words have

always been contained in each statute. Since 1911 the

enactment of the foreign franchise tax ‘‘implementing

(State v. Travelers Ins. Co., 256 Ala. 61, 58 So. 2d 745)

the constitutional provision has been in conformity to the

mandate of the Constitution’? (State v. Jackson Securities

& Inv. Co., 243 Ala. 83, 8 So. 24 573) and ‘‘in the words of

the Constitution, indicating the purpose of the Legislature

to make the statutory levy conform with the Constitution’’

(International Paper Co. v. Curry, 243 Ala. 228 9 So. 2d 8).

The words ‘‘doing business in this State’? as used in the

franchise tax cannot have any different meaning from the

words ‘‘do any business”? or ‘‘does business”’ in the Consti-

tution.

Before the enactment of any franchise tax in Alabama

this Court held that a license tax for doing business as a

corporation was a tax ‘or ‘ ‘doing business as a corpora-

tion,’ and not for the mere privilege of existing as a corpo-

ration.’? The State v. Anniston Rolling Mills, 125 Ala.

121, 27 So. 921. This decision establishes a basie distine-

tion. The Court distinguished between a tax on the privi-

lege of using the corporate form and a tax on the actual

doing of business and held that a tax imposed on ‘doing

business as a corporation’? was a tax on the actual doing

of business and not merely on the corporate privilege.

The question now under discussion came before this

Court in State v. National Cash Credit Association, 294

ee

pe ee

Ala. 629, 141 So. 541, where the taxpayer argued in brief

that,

‘Tn order for a foreign corporation to be liable for

a franchise tax in Alabama, it must both be doing

business and employing capital within the state. These

prerequisites must exist concurrently, and, in the ab-

sence of either, the power to impose the tax does not

exist. * * * Mere qualification by a foreign corporation

to do business in Alabama does not constitute doing

business within the State.’’

In response to this argument this Court on rehearing

held:

‘““We merely hold a franchise tax to be what it

purports to be, a tax upon the exercise or use of its

franchise in Alabama for the purposes of such fran-

chise.’’

This is an express holding that the Alabama franchise

tax on foreign corporations is only applicable when the

foreign corporation is doing business in Alabama. The

holding of the United States Supreme Court in the Anglo-

Chilean case, supra, is in harmony with the decision of this

Court in the National Cash Credit Association case, supra.

The United States Supreme Court held that the Anglo-

Chilean Nitrate Sales Corporation was engaged solely in

interstate commerce in Alabama and that therefore the

Alabama foreign corporation franchise tax was not ap-

plicable to such corporation, even though it had qualified

to do business in Alabama.

In State v. Southern Natural Gas Corporation, 233 Ala.

81, 170 So. 178, this Court again reviewed the Alabama

franchise tax as it existed prior to the 1935 amendment

(General Acts 1935, p. 3888). After considerable discussion

it was said, ‘‘We hold that the franchise tax here exacted

and being considered is * * * laid on the exercise of corpo-

rate functions, or on the privilege of exercising corporate

— 0 —

functions within the state.” The Court held that Southern

Natural was doing an intrastate business in Alabama and

was therefore liable for the tax. If the tax had been laid

merely on the right of a foreign corporation to exercise

its functions solely within the State of Alabama or the

right to do business in Alabama in corporate form, the

Court could have held the tax applicable without consid-

ering or deciding the question of whether or not the com-

pany was doing an intrastate business, since Southern

Natural had qualified in Alabama and thus obtained such

rights. The Southern Natural Gas case Was aflirmed by the

United States Supreme Court, 301 U.S, 148, 81 L. Ed. 970,

after it found that Southern Natural “‘earried on in Ala-

bama activities of an intrastate character.”’

After the decision in the Anglo-Chilean case the Alabama

legislature in 1935 added Section 318 of Act No. 194

(General Acts of 1935, p. 888), containing the following

proviso to the foreign corporation franchise tax:

‘*Provided, that if a corporation has qualified to do

business in this State it shall for the purpose of fran-

chise tax prima facie be held to be doing business in

the State of Alabama within the meaning of this Act.’’

This proviso has remained a part of the law ever since,

Section 348, Title o1, Code of 1940.

This proviso makes it clear that after 1935 the Alabama

franchise tax is not, if it ever was, laid on the bare right

of a foreign corporation to exercise its corporate functions

within the State of Alabama or the right to do business in

Alabama in corporate form. If the tax was applicable to

any foreign corporation which had qualified to do business

in Alabama, even though the business done was exclusively

interstate, there was no need for the proviso, as such a

corporation had the right to exercise its corporate fune-

tion within the State and the right to do business in Ala-

~~

bama in corporate form. In other words, the proviso is

an express legislative recognition of the fact that a foreign

corporation must be doing some intrastate commerce be-

fore the tax is applicable. The Act makes the fact of

qualification merely prima facie evidence of such intra-

state commerce, recognizing that the bare fact of qualifi-

cation would not be conclusive. It is clear, therefore, that

a corporation engaged exclusively in interstate commerce

is not intended to be subject to the tax. The decisions

rendered since the enactment of the proviso also make it

clear that a foreign corporation must be doing some intra-

state commerce in Alabama before it is subject to the tax.

Consolidated Coal Co. v. State, 236 Ala. 489, 183 So. 690.

In Hollingsworth & Whitney Co. v. State, 241 Ala. 96,

1 So. 2d 387, the franchise tax as amended was before the

Court and this Court said: ‘‘The franchise tax is not a

condition or qualification to ‘doing business,’ ’’ and ‘‘We

have often noted that this tax is an excise for the privi-

lege of doing business in Alabama.”’ And analyzing the

record further the Court continued: ‘‘We think that this

status shows a doing of business in Alabama, by the tax-

payer, so as to subject it to the franchise tax.”’

We are satisfied that the franchise tax is only applicable

to foreign corporations doing intrastate business in Ala-

bama.

III. The Alabama franchise tax, if applicable to a for-

eign corporation engaging exclusively in interstate com-

merce in Alabama, would be unconstitutional. The ques-

tion here presented is controlled by the recent decision of

the Supreme Court of the United States in Spector Motor

Service, Inc., v. O’Connor, 340 U. S. 602, 95 L. Ed. 573. In

that case the same kind of tax with the same operating

incidence as the Alabama tax involved in this case was

held invalid. The foregoing decision is the result of

lengthy litigation in which the various facts and issues

were fully considered. It appears that there were seven

decisions rendered before the Supreme Court of the United

States finally held that the Connecticut franchise tax con-

travened the Commerce Clause when applied to a corpora-

tion qualified to do business in Connecticut, doing exelu-

sively an interstate business. We cite these decisions be-

eause they will add an understanding to the final decision.

The Connecticut Corporation Business Tax of 1935 im-

posed a tax upon every corporation ‘“‘earrying on business

in this state.’’ This act was amended in 1987 so as to im-

pose the tax on every corporation “‘earrying on or having

the right to carry on business in this state.’ We refer

now to Spector Motor Service, Inc., v. McLaughlin, 47 F.

Supp. 671; Spector Motor Service, Inc., v. Walsh, 139 F.

2d 809; Spector Motor Service, Ine., v. McLaughlin, 323

U.S. 101, 89 L. Ed. 101; Spector Motor Service, Inc., v.

Tax Commission of Conn., 15 Conn. Sup. 205; Spector Mo-

tor Service, Inc., v. Walsh, 135 Conn. 37, 61 A. 2d 89;

Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 88 F. Supp. 711;

Spector Motor Service, Inc., v. O’Connor, 181 F. 2d 150.

This brings us to a consideration of the final decision

of the Supreme Court of the United States, which granted

certiorari ‘“‘because of the fundamental nature of the issue

and the apparent conflict between the judgment below and

previous judgments of this Court.’’—340 U. S. 602, at 605,

9) L. Ed., at 576. A brief resume of the basic positions

of the various Federal judges who considered the matter

will bring into proper perspective the conflict of views

presented to the Supreme Court of the United States. On

the one hand, Judges Clark and Frank, constituting the

majority of the Second Circuit, felt that decisions such as

Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250,

82 L. Ed. 823; Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335

U. S. 80, 92 L. Ed. 1832, and Interstate Oi] Pipeline Co.

SPE ELAR OMY TE NG! PIE ELIE EI ILE IL TILE NS IPG ep

OORT

aa sk a ei

—

v. Stone, 337 U. S. 662, 93 L. Ed. 1618, decisions which are

relied upon by the State in this case, indicated a trend

toward a holding of constitutionality and a departure

from earlier precedents such as Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v.

Monier, 266 U.S. 555, 69 L. Ed. 489, and Alpha Portland

Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203, 69 L. Ed. 916.

On the other hand, Judges Hand (first appeal) and Swann

of the Cireuit Court (second appeal) and Smith of the

District Court followed what Judge Hand so aptly called

‘fan unbroken line of decisions,’’ which included the Ozark

and Alpha Portland cases.

The Supreme Court adopted the interpretation of the

Supreme Court of Connecticut as to the incidence of the

tax and pointed out that its decision as to the validity of

the tax was the same without regard to the amendment.

In holding that the tax as applied to Spector Motor Serv-

ice, which was engaged, according to the Court, exclu-

sively in interstate commerce, contravened the Commerce

Clause of the United States Constitution, the Court, speak-

ing through Justice Burton, said:

‘‘The incidence of the tax provides the answer. The

courts of Connecticut have held that the tax before

us attaches solely to the franchise of petitioner to do

interstate business. The State is not precluded from

imposing taxes upon other activities or aspects of this

business which, unlike the privilege of doing inter-

state business, are subject to the sovereign power of

the State. Those taxes may be imposed although

their payment may come out of the funds derived

from petitioner’s interstate business, provided the

taxes are so imposed that their burden will be reason-

ably related to the powers of the State and nondis-

criminatory.

‘‘This Court heretofore has struck down, under the

Commerce Clause, state taxes upon the privilege of

ie

carrying on a business that was exclusively interstate

in character. The constitutional infirmity of such a

tax persists no matter how fairly it is apportioned to

business done within the state. Alpha Portland Ce-

ment Co. y. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203, 68 L. Ed.

916, 45 S. Ct. 477, 44 A. L. R. 1219 (measured by per-

centages of corporate excess and net income); Ozark

Pipe Line Corp. vy. Monier, 266 U. S. 595, 69 L. Ed.

439, 45 S. Ct. 184 (measured by percentage of capital

stock and surplus). See Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co.

v. Stone, 337 U.S. 662, 669 et seq., 93 L. Ed. 1613,

1621, 69 S. Ct. 1264 (dissenting opinion which dis.

cusses the issue on the assumption that the activities

were in interstate commerce); Joseph v. Carter &

Weeks Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 442, 91 L. Ed. 993,

67 S. Ct. 815; Freeman y. Hewitt, 329 U. Ss. 249, 91

L. Ed. 265, 67 S. Ct. 274, supra.

‘Our conclusion is not in conflict with the principle

that, where a taxpayer is engaged both in intrastate

and interstate commeree, a state may tax the privilege

of carrying on intrastate business and, within reason-

able limits, may compute the amount of the charge by

applying the tax rate to a fair proportion of the tax-

payer’s business done within the state, including both

interstate and intrastate. Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co.

v. Stone, 337 U.S. 662, 93 L. Ed. 1613, 69 S. Ct. 1264,

supra; International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S.

416, 91 L. Ed. 1328, 56 S. Ct. 887. The same is true

where the taxpayer’s business activity is local in na-

ture, such as the transportation of passengers between

points within the same state, although including inter-

state travel, Central Greyhound Lines y. Mealey, 334

U.S. 653, 92 L. Ea. 1633, 68 S. Ct. 1260, or the publi-

cation of a newspaper, Western Live Stock y, Bureau

of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 82 L. Ed. 823, 58 §. Ct. 546,

115 A. L. R. 944. See also Memphis Gas Co, y, Stone,

335 U. S. 80, 92 L. Ed. 1332, 68 S. Ct. 1475.

ey tte ees |

LEILA TS APRIL IPS

Te

PEED GOS ge RAED

1 PO Rg tT

SOY, ree

® Cne

=, Sen

‘In this field there is not only reason but long-

established precedent for keeping the federal privilege

of carrying on exclusively interstate commerce free

from state taxation. To do so gives lateral support to

one of the cornerstones of our constitutional law.—

M’Culloch v. Maryland (U.S.), 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed.

579, supra.’’—340 U.S., at 608-610, 95 L. Ed., at 578,

579.

Justices Clark, Black and Douglas dissented on the

ground that a tax even on exclusively interstate commerce

is valid when fairly apportioned and nondiscriminatory.

In holding that a tax upon the franchise of a corpora-

tion for the privilege of carrying on or doing business was

unconstitutional when applied to a qualified foreign cor-

poration engaged exclusively in interstate commerce, the

Court followed that ‘‘unbroken line of decisions,’’ ineclud-

ing Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, supra, and Alpha-

Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, supra; Joseph v.

Carter & Weeks Stevedoring Co., 330 U. S. 422, 91 L. Ed.

993, and Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U. S. 249, 91 L. Ed. 265.

The first two of these cases had been considered by a ma-

jority of the Second Circuit to be outmoded by recent

‘*trends.’’ However, the Supreme Court reaffirms or, as

one commentator (20 Ford L. R. 217, at 218) put it, ‘‘ex-

plicitly ‘restores to full vigor’ ’’ the decisions in Ozark

Pipe Line Corp. and Alpha Portland Cement Co., supra.

In an effort not to prolong unreasonably this opinion,

attention will be directed to only one of the foregoing

cases, namely, Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, supra, as

the facts of that case closely parallel the facts in the case

now before us.

The Supreme Court of the United States in the follow-

ing manner stated the position of the taxing authorities:

“But the contention in justification of the tax is

that appellant is also engaged in doing local business,

‘ns

the basis of such contention being the facts econcern-

ing its ownership and use of property other than the

pipe line, and its various acts and activities within

the state hereinabove recited; and, further, that the

purposes for which it is incorporated as declared in

its articles, comprehend other activities than that of

transporting petroleum; namely, the acquisition and

operation of telegraph and telephone lines, dealing in

and transporting merchandise, ete.” 266 U.S. at 562,

69 L. Ed at 442.

However the Court held that Ozark Pipe Line Corpora-

tion was not liable for the tax and said:

“The business actually carried on by appellant was

exclusively in interstate commerce. The maintenance

of an office, the purchase of supplies, employment of

labor, maintenance and operation of telephone and

telegraph lines and automobiles, and appellant’s other

acts within the state, were all exclusively in further-

ance of its interstate business; and the property it-

self, however extensive or of whatever character, was

likewise devoted only to that end. They were the

means and instrumentalities by which that business

was done, and in no proper sense constituted, or con-

tributed to, the doing of a local business. The pro-

tection against imposition of burdens upon interstate

commerce is practical and substantial, and extends to

whatever is necessary to the complete enjoyment of

the right protected. Heyman y. Hays, supra, p. 186

(09 L. Ed. 531, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 403). * * *

“Some stress is laid upon the fact that the objects

and purposes specified in appellant’s articles of in-

corporation are not confined to the transportation of

petroleum, but include the doing of other business

local in character. As to this, it is enough to say that

none of these powers were in fact exercised in the

=

state of Missouri; and, so far as this case is concerned,

the power to tax depends upon what was done, and

not upon what might have been done. Moreover, the

license issued by the state authorized appellant to en-

gage ‘exclusively in the business of transporting crude

petroleum by pipe line.’

“Nor is it material that appellant applied for and

received a Missouri license, or that it had the power

thereunder to exercise the right of eminent domain.

These facts could not have the effect of conferring

upon the state an authority, denied by the Federal

Constitution, to regulate interstate commerce. The

state has no such power even in the case of domestic

corporations. See Philadelphia & S. Mail S. 8. Co. v.

Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326, 342, 30 L. Ed. 1200, 1203,

1 Inters. Com. Rep. 308, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1118. The

statute, as applied to appellant, is unconstitutional.”

266 U.S. at 565-567, 69 L. Ed. at 448, 444.

The opinion of the Supreme Court in the Spector case

clarifies the disparity of views between the Justices that

appeared in 1949 in the case of Interstate Oil Pipe Line

Co. v. Stone, 337 U. S. 662, 93 L. Ed. 1613. The facts of

the case are simple. A Delaware corporation owned and

operated pipe lines in Mississippi. It picked up oil in the

oil fields in Mississippi and transported it to railroad

loading tracks also in Mississippi. At the loading tracks

the oil was pumped into railroad cars for shipment out of

the state. The pipeline company acted as agent of the

owners of the oil in transporting it and in arranging with

the railroad for the out-of-state shipment. The State of

Mississippi imposed “annual privilege taxes, measured by

the amount of volume of business done” upon a_ wide

variety of enterprises. With respect to persons transport-

ing oil or gas in pipeline for compensation or hire between

two points in the State, the tax levied was 2% of the gross

income of the business. The Mississippi court held this

— 63 —

tax validly applicable to the business of the pipeline com-

pany.

Mr. Justice Rutledge delivercd an opinion in which he

Was joined by Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy. These

Justices found it unnecessary to decide whether the ae-

tivity of the pipe line company was technically interstate

or intrastate commerce; in either event, they said, Missis-

sippi had the power to impose the tay, They rejected the

contention that the tax was invalid merely because it im-

posed “a ‘direct’ tax on the ‘privilege’ of engaging in inter-

state commerce” and argued that the commerce clause did

not invalidate the tax. This position was not accepted by

a majority of the court and was repudiated by the Spector

case,

Ina separate opinion Mr. Justice Burton concluded that

the tax was upon the privilege of transporting oil in intra-

state rather than interstate commerce. Such conclusion

enabled him to uphold the validity of the tax without fur-

ther consideration of its actual effect upon interstate com-

merece, On that basis he stated that it Was unnecessary to

decide whether or not a privilege tax could validly be im-

posed upon the privilege of transporting oil in Mississippi

in interstate commerce. He expressly refused to join in

Mr. Justice Rutledge’s opinion.

Mr. Justice Reed delivered an opinion in which he was

joined by Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Frankfurter

and Jackson. In the first part of the opinica he concinded

that the pipe line company actually was engaged in inter-

State commerce. In the second part of the opinion he con-

cluded that a privilege tax for carrying on a wholly inter-

state transportation business measured by a fairly appor-

tioned part of the gross receipts was invalid. In so con-

cluding he observed:

**Phrased in terms of a privilege for carrying on an

interstate business, such a tax historically has been

TS

Oe Te eS

a

deemed unconstitutional. The cases abound in state-

ments to the effect that the privilege of carrying on

interstate commerce itself is immune from state taxa-

tion. This is because it is a privilege beyond the power

of a state to grant. ‘* * * it is a right which every

citizen of the United States [and every corporation] is

entitled to exercise under the Constitution and laws of

the United States: * * *.’ Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141

U. S. 47, 57, 35 L. Ed. 649, 652, 11 S. Ct. 851; Interna-

tional Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 54 1. Ed.

678, 30S. Ct. 481, 27 L. R. A. (NX. S.) 493, 18 Ann. Cas.

1103. The cases hold not only that a state may not

exact a tax as a condition precedent to the doing of

interstate business, but also that it may not levy privi-

lege, excise or franchise taxes on a foreign corporation

for the privilege of carrying on or the actual doing of

solely interstate business after its admission to the

state. Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555,

69 L. Ed. 489, 45 S. Ct. 184; Alpha Portland Cement

Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 208, 69 L. Ed. 916, 45

S. Ct. 477, 44 A. L. R. 1219.”’

So by virtue of the limited approval of Mr. Justice Bur-

ton of the Mississippi Court’s decision, and not for the rea-

sons advanced by Justice Rutledge, did the decision of

Justice Rutledge temporarily (until Spector) become the

decision of the Court.

In the Spector case the Court followed the opinion of Mr.

Justice Reed in the Interstate Oil Pipe Line case, and not

that of Mr. Justice Rutledge. Thus the quotations from

the Interstate Oil Pipe Line case in the State’s brief are

now not controlling and Justice Reed's pertinent statement,

quoted above, controls the decision in the case at bar. Later

decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and

other decisions since Spector have reaffirmed without ques-

tion that the holding that a tax on the privilege of doing

ee ae

a 65

an exclusively interstate business contravenes the Com

merce Clause of the Constitution of the United States.

Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaners, Inc., v. Stone, 342 U. S.

389, 96 L. Ed. 436; Railway Express Agency, Inc., v. Com-

monwealth of Virginia, 347 U. S. 309, 98 L. Ed. 757.

In the case at bar the State has sought to emphasize the

fact that Plantation has qualified to do business in Ala-

bama and has obtained an annual permit. These facts are

immaterial. Plantation qualified and sought under protest

a permit to engage only in ‘interstate transportation by

pipe line of products refined from petroleum.’’ In the

Spector case Spector qualified to do business in Connecticut

and the tax was on the doing of business and the privilege

of doing business. As a matter of fact, Plantation has

followed the exact procedure followed by the taxpayer in

Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, supra, in which the im-

position of the tax was held invalid.

We note that the State also relies upon decisions by this

Court in Sanford v. City of Clanton, 244 Ala. 671, 15 So. 2d

309, and Sanford v. City of Andalusia, 256 Ala. 507, 55 So.

2d 856. These cases are clearly not applicable in the case

at bar since in these cases there is no tax or burden upon

commerce. The burden falls and the duties are laid not

upon the transportation but upon the delivery as an act in

consummating a sale between persons who may or may

not have an interest in the transportation but whose rela-

tionship is exclusive of transportation. And so we say

again that imposition of the Alabama franchise tax in the

case at bar is unconstitutional and void and this brings us

to the last question in the case in which the State contends

that the proceedings in regard to the 1942 franchise tax

are res adjudicata in this case.

IV. The appellant appears to insist upon its plea of res

judicata claiming that the decree in the Plantation Pipe

Line case involving the 1942 franchise taxes, Case No.

ee et er to teria tr ad

VOM EFT

LAUT OED

BO eye OR nD IMS

-

om 65

13040, is binding upon Plantation with respect to its fran-

chise tax for 1952.

It appears that by agreement between Plantation Pipe

Line and the State, Plantation settled its tax liability for

1942-48 for franchise taxes and permit fees. The agreement

of the parties with respect to that settlement is set forth

in a letter dated December 30, 1948. The agreement, ac-

cording to this letter, provided:

‘“*The Company will not appeal from or otherwise

attack assessment of the franchise taxes or permit fees

for these years, reserving, however, all rights with re-

spect to taxes for future years.’

The letter is dated December 30th, 1948. It states that a

consent decree dismissing the appeal with respect to the

vear 1942 initialed by the attorney for Plantation at a con-

ference in Montgomery on December 28th will be entered

today or tomorrow. The consent decree which was entered

on December 30th, 1948, bears in the lower left-hand corner

opposite the Judge's signature “OK J. F. J.’’ It now ap-

pears that there is a misunderstanding about the matter

and the State takes the position that the statement con-

tained in the letter is purely unilateral, as there is no evi-

dence to the effect that the State ever agreed to any such

thing. The lower court made no finding or determination

as to any question of fact in connection with the settlement

of Plantation’s 1942 franchise tax liability. Accordingly,

we are unable to say that the present suit is concluded by

the former adjudication, since we do not know that the

matters of the two suits are the same and the issues in the

former suit were broad enough to have comprehended all

that is involved in the second suit. Tankersley’s Admr. v.

Pettis, 71 Ala. 179.

There is an annotation on the question of ‘‘ Judgment in

tax cases in respect of one period as res judicata in respect

=

to another period”’ in 150 A. L. R., beginning at page 5. A

statement of applicable principles as here set forth is suf-

ficient to disclose that the consent decree with respect to

the 1942 franchise tax is not res judicata in this pro-

ceeding.

‘‘Generally, where in a proceeding concerning a tax

for a particular period a judgment is rendered which

determines that the taxpayer or his property is tax-

able or is exempt from taxation, but is not supported

by a finding or findings specifying the grounds or facts

upon which the conclusion is reached, such judgment

has been held not to settle conclusively the question

that the taxpayer or his property is taxable, or exempt

from taxation, for a different period not involved in

the former proceeding. This observation is borne out

by nearly all the cases, irrespective of the theory upon

which the result is reached under the particular cir-

cumstances of an individual case.’’ 150 A. L. R., at p. 63.

“The general rule that ‘a judgment on one cause of

action is not conclusive in a subsequent action based

upon a different cause of action as to questions of fact

which might have been but were not litigated and de-

termined in the prior action’ (see Am. Law. Inst. Re-

statement, Judgments, § 68, Comment d) has been ap-

plied where taxes for different periods were involved

in successive proceedings.’’ 150 A. L. R., at p. 32.

The settlement with respect to 1942 was by agreement.

Assuming that the State is not legally bound by agreement

that Plantation would have the right to litigate with

respect to other years, there is no finding in connection

With 1942 specifying the grounds upon which the conclu-

sion as to taxability was predicated. In fact there is no

judicial finding or determination as to any question of fact

in connection with the agreed settlement of Plantation’s

1942 franchise tax liability.

Berercogecgsent Piers ORME CIS TAR EME RESTING ER PO i I A 80

08

In Gillespie v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 151

Fed. 2d 903, the court, in speaking of the doctrine of res

judicata, said:

‘*The doctrine does not apply when the judgment

pleaded as an estoppel is based upon controlling state

decisions subsequently repudiated by supervening de-

cisions, thereby necessitating re-examination and ap-

plication of state law to the Federal question. Blair v.

Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 57 S. Ct. 330, 81 L. Ed. 465.

Or where authoritative decisions of the Federal Courts

repudiate the judgment pleaded as an estoppel, thereby

having the effect of perpetuating acknowledged error.

Henricksen v. Seward, supra. But see Commissioner

v. Western Union Telegraph Co., supra. It is rightly

said that the doctrine should be sparingly applied in

tax cases involving liability for different years, and

generally it is not applied where the taxable events

and transactions are by their nature fluid and subject

to change from year to year.’’

Under the cireumstanees we do not consider that the

consent decree of 1942 constitutes res adjudicata of the

issues in the present case.

It results that the decree of the lower court is due to be

affirmed.

Affirmed.

Livingston, C. J., and Merrill, J., coneur in the result and

Lawson, J., concurs specially.

[over]

Lawson, Justice (Concurring specially).

I concur in the opinion prepared for the Court by Mr.

Justice Stakely except insofar as it treats of the constitu-

tionality of the statutes here involved. Since the Court

SR

RRR ech. « 7

;

3

—

.

. . :

holds those statutes to be applicable only to intrastate :

business and that the taxpayer is engaged exclusively in HM

interstate business, there is no occasion to write to the §

constitutional question as to whether those statutes would ;

. . 2 ° ° 2

be constitutional if construed as applying to interstate :

commerce. We have a long line of cases Which hold that :

the constitutionality of a statute will not be determined 5

i

unless absolutely necessary to determine the merits of the ‘

suit in which the constitutionality of such statute has been

drawn in question. Smith v. Speed, 50 Ala. 276; Shehane

v. Bailey, 110 Ala. 308, 20 So. 359; Smith v. McQueen, 232

Ala. 90, 166 So. 788: State ex rel. Bland v. St. John, 244

Ala. 269, 13 So. 2d 161; Moses vy. Tarwater, 257 Ala. 361,

08 So. 2d 757; Donaghey y. Owen, 259 Ala. 376, 66 So. 2d

895. See Alabama State Federation of Labor, Local Union

No. 103 ete. et al. v. Robert E. McAdory, as Solicitor etc.,

825 U. S. 450, 65S. Ct. 1384, 89 L. Ed. 1725. The opinion in

this case shows no reason why this salutary rule is not

applicable and I feel that to ignore that rule wil] result

in having the instant case cited in the future as showing

that the Court followed the rule only when it feels it con-

venient to do so.

SPORE eR INT MICH W I aire RNa OS RENN Kee al Sal

VOTE Seb

oe

a

APPENDIX ‘‘B.’’

THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA.

Thursday, September 13, 1956.

The Court Met in Special Session Pursuant to Adjourn-

ment.

Present:

Chief Justice Livingston and Associate Justices Lawson,

Simpson, Stakely, Goodwyn, Merrill and Spann.

3 Div. 735.

The State of Alabama

VS.

Plantation Pipe Line Company,

a Corporation.

Montgomery Circuit Court, in Equity.

It Is Ordered, that the application for rehearing filed by

the appellant in the above cause on August 9, 1956, after

being duly examined and considered by the Court, be and

the same is hereby overruled. [Pages 3 and 6 of the opin-

ion as originally announced rewritten for corrections. }

=a

APPENDIX ‘‘C.”’

Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 8,

Clause 3:

“Section 8. The congress shall have power:— .

* * . * * * *

‘To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among

the several states, and with the Indian tribes;’’

APPENDIX ‘‘D.’’

Title 51, Section 348, as Amended, Code of Alabama 1940:

‘$348. Amount of Levy on Foreign Corporations.—

Every corporation organized under the laws of any other

state, nation or territory and doing business in this state,

except strictly benevolent, educational or religious corpo-

rations, shall pay annually to the state an annual franchise

tax of two and one-half dollars ($2.50) on each one thou-

sand dollars ($1,000.00) of the actual amount of capital em-

ployed in this state. In ascertaining the annual franchise

tax which will be paid by any foreign corporation doing

business in this state under this section there shall be de-

ducted from the amount of the capital employed by such

corporation in this state the aggregate amount of loans of

money made by such corporation in this state and which

shall be secured by existing mortgage or mortgages to it

on real estate in this state and upon which mortgage or

mortgages there shall have been paid the recording privi-

lege tax provided by law. Provided, that if a corporation

has qualified to do business in this state it shall for the

purpose of franchise tax prima facie be held to be doing

business in the State of Alabama within the meaning of

this title.’’

es

APPENDIX “‘E.”’

Title 51, Section 351, Code of Alabama 1940:

**$ 351. Report to Department of Revenue.—The presi-

dent or any executive officer or the secretary of every do-

mestie corporation subject to the franchise tax under this

title shall make a written statement under oath to the

department of revenue showing the following facts: The

date and place of incorporation and the total amount of

subscribed stock with which it began business; the total

authorized capital stock of the corporation; a brief state-

ment of all property, real and personal, owned by the cor-

poration in Alabama, giving the location and value of such

property by counties; the balance sheet of such corporation

as shown after closing its books on December thirty-first

preceding, or after closing its books at the end of its pre-

ceding fiscal year; such other detailed information as the

department of revenue may deem necessary to insure the

collection of the tax due. The president or any executive

oflicer or the secretary of every foreign corporation subject

to the franchise tax under this title, or qualified to do busi-

ness in Alabama, shall make a written statement under oath

to the department of revenue showing the following facts:

First, the date and place of incorporation and the date

such corporation qualified to do business in this state:

second, the total amount of its capital employed in this

state; third, a brief statement of all property, real and per

sonal, owned by the corporation in Alabama, giving the

location and value of such property by counties; fourth,

the amount of capital employed in this state which is se-

cured by existing mortgages in real estate in this state,

upon which mortgage there shall have been paid the re-

cording privilege tax provided by law; fifth, the balance

sheet of such corporation as shown after closing its books

on December thirty-first preceding, or after closing its

LL TTA AAALAC ALI OO, et fl

ERIE P LILLE I ILI TEES

_

cua 8,

oF

=;

books at the end of its preceding fiscal year; sixth, such

other detailed information as the department of revenue

may deem necessary to insure the collection of the tax due,

The statement required by this section shall be made on

blanks prepared and furnished by the department of reve-

nue on application of the corporation or otherwise. Such

written statements under oath to the department of reve-

nue shall be made and filed with said department of reve-

nue between the first day of January and the fifteenth day

of March of the calendar year for the franchise tax to he

paid for that calendar year.’’

APPENDIX ‘‘F.”’

Title 51, Section 354, Code of Alabama 1940:

*§ 354. Calendar Year Tax.—The franchise tax of do-

mestic and foreign corporations as authorized and levied

by this title shall run according to the calendar year and

shall be due on the first day of April of each year for the

tax of the current calendar year. Such corporations shall

be allowed thirty days after the first day of April within

which to pay said tax, but if delinquency continues after

thirty days there shall be collected a penalty of one per-

cent for each month or part thereof that the tax shall re-

main unpaid after the beginning of the delinquent period.

This penalty shall be in addition to the penalties herein-

before prescribed for failure to make returns by Mareh 15.

A foreign corporation, however, which has complied with

provisions of this title as to filing a sworn statement shall

not be considered delinquent nor subject to the one percent

monthly penalty until after thirty days from the date of

the assessment against it by the department of revenue.

Provided that where a foreign corporation has failed to

make the required report, the department of revenue shall

he authorized to make an assessment against such corpo-

ration upon information, of which assessment such corpo-

ration shall be given notice as is in this title provided, or

suit may be filed therefor in the name of the state against

such corporation, either in law or equity. The department

of revenue may for good cause remit the penalty provided

by this section.”

is

=

APPENDIX ‘‘G.’’

Title 51, Section 357, Code of Alabama 1940:

**$ 357. Assessment of Tax Against Foreign Corpora-

tions.—The department of revenue shall as soon as pos-

sible, after the required report has been filed with it by a

foreign corporation, ascertain and assess the amount of

franchise tax due by such corporation. The department of

revenue shall give notice by registered mail, return receipt

demanded, to the corporation, giving notice of the assess-

ment as fixed by the department of revenue, stating that

on a day specified, not less than ten days from the date of

the service of such notice, the department of revenue will

determine any complaint against such assessment. Upon

hearing such complaint or protest, or if there has been no

complaint or protest filed on or before the date specified

in such notice for the determination of the matter, the de-

partment of revenue shall proceed to determine and fix the

assessment for franchise tax. The corporation shall with-

out delay be given notice of such assessment as finally

fixed. The assessment shall have the full force and effect

of a judgment on which an execution may be issued by

the department of revenue directed to any sheriff in the

State of Alabama unless the corporation appeals from such

assessment as allowed by this title.’’

aS gz

APPENDIX ‘‘H.”’

Constitution of Alabam:. of 1901, Article 12, Section 232:

“See. 232. No foreign corporation shall do any business

in this state without having at least one known place of

business and an authorized agent or agents therein, and

without filing with the secretary of state a certified copy

of its articles of incorporation or association. Such corpo-

ration may be sued in any county where it does business,

by service of process upon an agent anywhere in the state.

The legislature shall, by general law, provide for the pay-

ment to the State of Alabama of a franchise tax by such

corporation, but such franchise tax shall be based on the

actual amount of capital employed in this state. Strictly

benevolent, educational or religious corporations shall not

be required to pay such a tax.”’

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Alabama v. Plantation Pipe Line Co. · 352 U.S. 943 | Frix