Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Alabama v. Plantation Pipe Line Co.
Supreme Court brief1956
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
OCT 11 1956
JOHN T. FEY, Clerk
ane
IN THE
| SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
OCTOBER TERM, 1956,
STATE OF ALABAMA,
Petitioner,
ve
PLANTATION PIPE LINE COMPANY, a Corporation,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To the Supreme Court of Alabama.
WILLIAM N. McQUEEN,
Assistant Attorney General of
Alabama,
WILLIAM H. BURTON,
Assistant Counsel, Department of
Revenue of the State of Ala-
bama, and Assistant Attorney
General of Alabama,
Counsel for Petitioner,
Uf Counsel:
JOHN PATTERSON,
Attorney General of Alabama,
WILLARD W. LIVINGSTON,
Counsel, Department of Revenue of
the State of Alabama, and Assist-
ant Attorney General of Alabama.
Sr. Louis Law Printing Co., #25 North Eighth Street. CEntral 1-4477,
INDEX.
Citations to opinion below
SSSSSeats eae as see eeusaneeas
Jurisdiction
LEELA ee eee Ce ee ee Le ee ee ere an eS oon oe eo es
Questions presented
LARRSGKREAAERORSAEASCEASEOHOGAAERE OER OES
Statutes involved
CARESADALAVCEA SHREDDERS SO HEEB EO EHO S EOL
ID one KR xw ian avene Cawcussnseuesceasde Kaos 4
Activities engaged in by respondent pipe line com-
ORE Th ND TE Tis os soc sccdcecascnvanes 6
Reassas for granting the writ..............0.ecceees 11
DIR cctanac pe vixsnkceecabheresscana aaa reeins 28
ae ery Serer ey err rr Try Tre ee 29-69
| ECCT TELUTRTT ECTS TCT TT TTT ete ee 70
RE ES icc nas sew edes taxon sennaveseaenreenens 71
oa ick in Kish wen kanes eksendecdc ane une 2
TG TR Ss ck cans We bab eks teeksancncceenanee 73-74
Re I ascda vac cvcnccesccbbsasstuctensenks 79
NE ON Sink dnd aedekvieandadenavangheeennaven 76
NE acc vnc cesaskdeneaeetacaccinstucnnne 77
Cases Cited.
Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203, 45 S. Ct. 477 ....... 20
Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corporation v. State of
Alabama, 288 U. S. 218, 53 8. Ct. 373
Canton R. R. Co. v. Rogan, 340 U. S. 511, 71 S. Ct. 447 15
PRON SE | TM, EAN
;
,
b
3
3
3
ig
:
4
i
N
=
©
il
Capitol Greyhound Lines vy. Brice, 339 U. S. 542, 70
eat e cok Cheb bAckeeeeeNseeitatnesasas 18
Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U. S. 363, 367, 50 S. Ct. 121,
DUT CRLEGROeeN Chet R sea khbhd Chane eh haba 4 OEes 26
Caskey Baking Co. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 315
ee ee cee asskhcacuacen rf
Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U. S. 653, 68
ss ERR ay Par tare eR 13, 15, 16, 18
Consolidated Coal Co. v. State, 236 Ala. 489, 183 So.
DP eURN a teie Ck EL GAdksdaes GNSS A4KES ESSE ORKOS 24
Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303
ee es hk hc ake ek baeeak eae aens 15
Educational Film Corporation v. Ward, 282 U. S. 379,
oe ee lavan chen 26
Great Lakes Pipe Line Company v. Oklahoma Tax
Commission, 204 Okla. 518, 231 P. 2d 655 22.2.0... 24
Interstate Natural Gas Company v. Stone, 308 U. S.
er ree ae tree 11, 19, 20, 27
International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U. S. 416,
ae cece tebe abeh lees endeeed dees 15
Interstate Oil Pipe Line Company v. Stone, 337 U.S
yn Rh eee ee 11, 16, 27
Interstate Oil Pipe Line Company v. Stone, 203 Miss.
7aG, Go GO. SU fa, SS Bo. Bd BED . ww cc cccnnnces 11,17
International Paper Co. v. Curry, 243 Ala. 228, 9 So.
Pa CSG RULS Shee NGSLA NS OCRRAS KAWEAR OAK Ae Oe be 24, 25
MeCullough v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 21
Memphis Matera Gas Company v. Stone, 385 U. S
ee 2 at te re ee 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 27
Memphis Brea Laundry Cleaner v. Stone, 342 U. S.
SR | Ree er eee 16
Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249,
ee a Ga bes bok 0 on 4nd Roh 44 wks ER Weeks 15
New Jersey Realty Title Insurance Co. v. Division of
Tax Appeals, 338 U. S. 665, 674, 70 S. Ct. 413, 418 26
iii
Offutt Housing Company v. County of Sarpy, 351 U.S.
..., (68. Ct. 814, 817, decided May 28, 1956 ....... 21
Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U. S. D095, 45
oe Se. ee RO ASTI Bn hr RE 17, 19, 20
Society for Savings in City of Cleveland v. Bowers,
349 U.S. 143, 75 S. Ct. 607, 611 .................. 26
Southern Natural Gas Corporation v. State of Ala-
bama, 301 U. S. 148, 57 S. Ct. 696 ....-11, 17, 18, 19, 20
99 93 94 25 7
Sey Oy Ey oy &
Southern Pae. Co. v. Gallagher, 303 U. S. 167, 59 S. Ct.
SPM ENMANDAAS a AG CLLSSeNce ceueeras priceuetonee Lit. 15
Spector Motor Service vy. O’Connor, 340 U. S. 602,
oh ee Be he, eA Ene ey Pree LES 14, 16, 20
State v. Bradley, 207 Ala. 677, 93 So. 595, 597 ...... 23
State v. Pullman-Standard Car Mfg. Co., 235 Ala. 493,
sacinibi cn Fuso ETRE RTE De TERETE EOE ee 24, 25
State v. Southern Natural Gas Corporation, 233 Ala.
vac Be aa MOET a ee 11, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24
Stone v. Interstate Natural Gas Company, 103 F. 2d
MN TSS tastes aetna bas rieas b shidakxe oul ci 11, 19
Stone v. Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co., 203 Miss. 715,
35 So. 2d 73, 36 So. 2d 142 .................0..... 16
Stone v. Memphis Natural Gas Company, 201 Miss.
Oe OE WM hoon ve ck dasiccueccucceeenki. 11,16
Texas Gas Transmission Company v. Atkins (Tenn.),
Os OM Rn sn dak ik vdkwacncticaccoc cu 24
Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S.
vies Bina Mg: Sogn CE CERT CT ae 15, 16
Western Maryland R. R. Co. v. Rogan, 340 U. S. 520,
sass Pace Basmaet CT OTE TTT pe 15
Statutes Cited.
Code of Alabama 1940, Title7 ...........000.-...5.. 6
Code of Alabama 1940, Title PO, Beotion Th occ. cceccs 10
Code of Alabama 1940, Title 10, Section 189 .......... 10
iv
Code of Alabama 1940, Title 10, Section 192 .......... 7
Code of Alabama 1940, Title 51, Section 140 .......... 4
Code of Alabama 1940, Title 51, Section
MS ccc kRUhaGeencaneuehaahen ane 2, 3, 4, 5, 11, 23, 25, 26
Code of Alabama 1940, Title 51, Sections 351, 354,
ae heh ahaa ea ued Gun antas dons 3, 23
General Acts of Alabama, 1935, page 256 ........... 25
Mississippi Code 1942, Section 9313 ................ 12
2 eee 8 Brees | 2
Constitutions Cited.
Constitution of Alabama 1901, Section 282 ...3,7, 11, 25, 26
Constitution of the United States, Article 1, Section 8,
SE UE Suxihe dcGhkaveukawercwd ouene ck 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
OCTOBER TERM, 1956,
STATE OF ALABAMA,
Petitioner,
v.
PLANTATION PIPE LINE COMPANY, a Corporation,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To the Supreme Court of Alabama.
Petitioner prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to re-
view the judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama
entered in the above-styled case on August 2, 1956 (R.
174-213), rehearing denied on September 13, 1956 (R. 218).
CITATIONS TO OPINION BELOW.
The judgment of the Circuit Court of Montgomery
County, Alabama, in Equity (R. 162), is unreported. The
opinion of the Supreme Court of Alabama (R. 174-213)
idee Ee inc ee ee er
_
is not as yet reported, rehearing having been denied on
September 13, 1956 (R. 218). (Printed in Appendix as
“2°? ood “Be.
JURISDICTION.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama was
entered on August 2, 1956 (R. 174-213), and rehearing
was denied on September 13, 1956 (R. 218). The juris-
diction of this Court is invoked under 26 U. S. C., See-
tion 1257 (3), in that as applied to Respondent Pipe Line
Company, the validity of a state statute (the Alabama
foreign corporation franchise tax levied under Title 51,
Section 348, as amended, Code-of Alabama 1940) has been
drawn in question on the grounds that it is repugnant to
the provisions of Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3, of the
Constitution of the United States.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED.
1. Was Respondent, a pipe line company engaged in
transporting gasoline and distillates through its pipe lines
from a point in the State of Louisiana to points in the
State of Alabama, and in other states, engaged exclusively
in interstate business and interstate commerce in Alabama
in 1952 in doing construction work, and in maintaining
and operating some, to-wit, 483 miles of pipe lines and
rights-of-way and other facilities in Alabama, and in em-
ploying capital in this State in that year to the extent of,
to-wit, $17,095,063.34, when said Company had previously
voluntarily qualified to do business in this State, and
enjoyed the same rights, privileges, and protections ac-
corded other corporations, foreign or domestic, in Ala-
bama in 1952?
2. Was the Alabama foreign corporation franchise tax
levied under Title 51, Section 348, as amended, Code of
a
Alabama 1940, invalid and unconstitutional under the pro-
visions of Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3, of the Constitu-
tion of the United States, as applied to and assessed
against Respondent Pipe Line Company by the State of
Alabama in 1952, and measured by and computed only
on the amount of, to-wit, $17,095,063.34 of capital which
was employed by Respondent Pipe Line Company in said
year exclusively within the State of Alabama?
3. Was Respondent Pipe Line Company clothed with
Federal immunity from taxation in 1952 as to state taxes
such as the Alabama foreign corporation franchise tax
levied under Title 51, Section 348, as amended, Code of
Alabama 1940, when said Company was engaged in con-
structing, maintaining, and operating its some, to-wit, 483
miles of pipe lines and rights-of-way, and making de-
liveries to some 14 different customers or shippers within
the State of Alabama, and in carrying on certain other
activities within the State, as well as enjoying all of the
rights, privileges, and protection accorded by the State
of Alabama to other corporations, both foreign and do-
mestic?
STATUTES INVOLVED.
The pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions
involved are: Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3, of the Constitu-
tion of the United States (the Commerce Clause); Title 51,
Section 348, as amended, Code of Alabama 1940 (the
Alabama foreign corporation franchise tax); Title 51, See-
tions 351, 354, and 357, Code of Alabama 1940 (the Sections
under which the Alabama foreign corporation franchise
tax is administered and enforced); and Section 232 of the
Constitution of Alabama 1901. (Printed in Appendix as
“i a” “AR 800, ** “8G od RE respectively.)
en et te -
a eo
STATEMENT.
This cause originated on December 12, 1954, as an appeal
(R. 2-4; 19-22) taken by Respondent Pipe Line Company to
the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama, in
Equity, under the provisions of Title 51, Section 140, Code
of Alabama 1940, from a final assessment of Alabama for-
eign corporation franchise tax for the calendar year 1952.
Respondent, Plantation Pipe Line Company, is a corpora
tion organized under the laws of the State of Delaware
which was constructing, maintaining and operating some
483 miles of pipe lines and rights-of-way in Alabama, as
well as carrying on other activities in Alabaina, and em-
ploying some, to-wit, $17,095,063.54 of capital within the
State of Alabama in said year. The assessment was made
by the State of Alabama against Respondent under the
provisions of Title 51, Section 548 et seq., Code of Alabama
1940, and the tax was computed and measured by said
amount of £17 ,095,063.34 of capital which Respondent em-
ployed exclusively within this State in 1952. The total
amount of the assessment so made was $22,695.00 (R.
18-19).
Insofar as material hereto, Respondent charged in its
Bill of Complaint (R. 23-30) that it was engaged exclu-
sively in interstate commerce in Alabama in 1952, and that
the Alabama foreign corporation franchise tax as assessed
against it by Petitioner for said year was invalid as being
repugnant to Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3, of the Constitu-
tion of the United States. To such Bill of Complaint,
Petitioner filed a Demurrer (R. 31-37), which was over-
ruled by the Cireuit Court as assigned to said aspect of the
Bill of Complaint (R. 38).
On August, 11, 1954, Petitioner filed its Answer to Re-
spondent’s Bill of Complaint, with certain pertinent exhibits
—
attached thereto (39-75). Such Answer denied that Re-
spondent Pipe Line Company was engaged exclusively in
interstate commerce in Alabama in 1952, and affirmatively
charged to the contrary that Respondent was engaged in
certain local activities within the State of Alabama at
which the Alabama foreign corporation franchise tax
levied under Title 51, Section 348, as amended, Code of
Alabama 1940, could be validly directed without contra-
vening the Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the
United States.
On June 30, 1955, the Cireuit Court of Montgomery
County, Alabama, sitting in Equity, rendered its final
Decree and Judgment (R. 153-162), and, in doing so, made
certain findings of fact and conclusions of law. Said Court
held that the Alabama foreign corporation franchise tax
was a license tax for the privilege of doing business in
Alabama and that inasmuch as Respondent was allegedly
engaged exclusively in interstate business in Alabama dur-
ing the year 1952, the final assessment so made was void
and the taxing statute as applied to Respondent invalid as
being in direct conflict with Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3,
of the Constitution of the United States.
On July 6, 1955, Petitioner appealed from the Decree
and Judgment of the Cireuit Court of Montgomery County,
Alabama, directly to the Supreme Court of Alabama (R.
163). There the case was submitted upon Briefs filed by
the parties and oral arguments made by counsel. On,
to-wit, August 2, 1956, the Supreme Court of Alabama
rendered an opinion and judgment (R. 174-213) affirming
the judgment of the Cireuit Court of Montgomery County,
Alabama, in Equity, and holding in effect as follows:
1. That Respondent Pipe Line Company was engaged ex-
clusively in interstate commerce and in interstate business
in Alabama in 1952.
athens
2. That the Alabama foreign corporation franchise tax
as applied to Respondent Pipe Line Company by the State
of Alabama in 1952 was invalid, and the assessment made
thereunder void, as being in conflict with Article 1, Section
8, Clause 3, of the Constitution of the United States.
3. That the Alabama foreign corporation franchise tax
was a license tax levied on the privilege of a foreign cor-
poration doing business within the State of Alabama, and
did not apply to a foreign corporation doing exclusively
interstate business in Alabama.
On August 9, 1956, and within the time prescribed by
law, Petitioner filed its Motion for a rehearing (R. 215-
216), which was denied on September 13, 1956 (R. 218).
Title 7, Code of Alabama 1940, Appendix, Supreme Court
Rule 3s,
Activities Engaged in by Respondent Pipe Line Company
in Alabama in 1952.
Plantation Pipe Line Company is a private corporation
organized under the laws of the State of Delaware and in
1952 was engaged in transporting gasoline and distillates
in its pipe lines originating from the vicinity of Baton
Rouge, Louisiana, to points in Mississippi, Alabama,
Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina. It was
qualified with the Interstate Commerce Commission as a
certified carrier by pipe line, and its tariffs were filed with
the Commission.
While the judgments and findings of the Lower Courts
are somewhat misleading on this point, the Company ac-
tually was not a Federal agency or instrumentality but
was undisputedly a private enterprise organized with
private capital, and owned and operated as such. At the
trial in the Cireuit Court, the undisputed evidence showed
om, ee
that in 1941 Respondent Pipe Line Company voluntarily
qualified with the Secretary of State under the provisions
of Title 10, Section 192, Code of Alabama 1940, and Sec-
tion 252 of the Constitution of Alabama 1901, to do busi-
ness in Alabama. It filed with said Secretary a copy of
its certificate of incorporation, and designated an agent
and a place of business. Certificates of incorporation,
permit to do business, and certificate designating its agent
in Alabama, as well as other documents pertinent to its
so qualifying, were introduced in evidence as Petitioner's
Exhibits “BY, “C", "Db, and “E” (R. 133-151).
During the year 1952 Respondent owned and operated
pipe lines and rights-of-way, and had other extensive
facilities in Alabama. The pipe lines ran from Baton
Rouge, Louisiana, to Greensboro, North Carolina, and in-
cluded so-called lateral lines from Helena, Alabama, to
Birmingham, Alabama, and from Helena to Montgomery,
Alabama. The length of the lines and rights-of-way, in-
cluding the so-called lateral lines, was approximately 1968
miles, of which approximately 483 miles of lines and
rights-of-way were located in Alabama (R. 23, 154). The
total investment of capital, including construction work in
progress in 1952, was approximately $69,615,442.47, OF
this amount approximately —$17,095,063.34 (or approx-
imately 14 of such investment) represented capital em-
ployed in said year within the State of Alabama (R. 23,
101, 102). Respondent operated and maintained two sets
of pipe lines from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, into and
through the State of Alabama, in addition to the so-called
lateral lines running to and from said points in Alabama.
One of these lines was an 18” line used to transport
gasoline and the other was a 12” line which was used to
transport oil products other than gasoline, namely, dis-
tillates (R. 104). The so-called lateral] line running from
Helena to the delivery terminal at Montgomery was a
TARO ENS FE ME Ae
BORE ET OE NIA OP
PRT 0p
4” line, and the line running from Helena to Birmingham,
an &” line (R. 92).
Respondent had 4 different delivery terminals in Ala-
bama in 1952 located at Moundville, Birmingham, Mont-
gomery and Oxford. It had some 10 customers or shippers
to whom it made deliveries at Birmingham via the so-
called lateral line running from Helena to Birmingham.
It had, to-wit, 6 customers or shippers to whom it made
deliveries at M. atgomery via the line running from
Helena to Montgomery. It had 1 customer at Moundville
and 1 customer at Oxford, with deliveries being made at
said points from the main lines (R. 103-104). Respond-
ent had 7 pumping or booster stations with extensive
facilities connected therewith, including buildings and
other improvements, which were located at Akron, Helena,
Oxford, Coaling, Vincent, Boyd and Heflin (R. 85-108).
The stations at Akron, Helena and Oxford were active
during 1952; the ones at Coaling, Vincent, Boyd and Heflin
were on a ‘stand-by’? basis. During at least a part of
said year Respondent maintained its Central Division Con-
struction Office at Anniston, where, to-wit, 14 persons were
employed (R. 181).
Respondent employed a total of some 82 persons in
Alabama in 1952. Broken down by terminals, pumping
or booster stations, and other facilities, including office
facilities, Respondent had a total of 20 employees at its
Akron station; 21 at Helena; 1 at Boyd; 1 at Coaling;
2 at Vincent; 12 at Siler Run (Oxford); 1 at the Heflin
delivery terminal; 4 at the Birmingham delivery terminal;
6 at the Montgomery delivery terminal, and, to-wit, 14
employees at the Central Division Construction Office at
Anniston (R. 131; also see R. 93-99). The Helena station
was the largest facility in Alabama during 1952 and might
in some respects be said to be typical of the other stations
(some to a lesser degree). In addition to its pumping
a
=
facilities there located, Respondent had 17 bulk tanks
where gasoline and the other oil products involved were
sometimes stored for as long as a week, but on an average
of 3 days, before being transported by separate pumps
through the small lateral lines from Helena to Birming-
ham and from Helena to Montgomery. The pumping sys-
tem used on the main lines was entirely different from
that used on these so-called lateral lines. The system
used on the main lines was a push-and-pull system, or
centrifugal pumping system, while that used on the so-
ealled lateral lines running from Helena to Birmingham
and from Helena to Montgomery was a gravity system, the
elevation at Helena being higher than that at either
Birmingham or Montgomery. So, the operation of these
lateral lines was separate and distinct from that of the
main lines (R. 90-92). At Helena and at each of the
other said pumping or booster stations Respondent had,
in addition to the other extensive facilities connected
therewith, a well, pump, and water system, as well as a
tank of some 500-barrel capacity in which the water was
stored for use in fire protection, and for general use at
said stations. Also, at each of said 7 stations Respondent
owned an attractive dwelling house which was contiguous
to or in some instances, adjacent to its other facilities.
These houses were rented to its Chief Supervisor at each
station for a monthly rental of $37.50. Water from the
said 5000-barrel tank was pumped to these dwelling
houses,
At Helena Respondent maintained a fire station and a
fire truck which was used to protect the tanks and facili-
ties located there. It maintained a warehouse at Helena
where it stored the different types of materials and sup-
plies needed in maintaining and keeping in repair its pipe
lines and rights-of-way in Alabama, and its other facilities
in this State.
RAR Pe GT Pe
2m es
ee
—
Respondent kept and used 5 trucks in Alabama during
the year 1952 which were registered in Alabama and used
on its highways.
Respondent had crews stationed in Alabama engaged in
repairing and maintaining its pipe lines and rights-of-way,
and other facilities. A full list of Respondent’s some 82
employees in this State in 1952, including operators, crew
men, utility men, delivery men, construction men, laborers,
engineers, accountants, clerks, et cetera, is contained on
page 131 of the Record.
The evidence shows that after voluntarily qualifying to
do business in the State of Alabama in 1941, Respondent
has continued to be so qualified (R. 101, 133-138). When
Respondent voluntarily qualified to do business in Ala-
bama (R. 150), it filed a copy of its charter with the
Secretary of State. The terms of this charter are broad
and are not confined to the right to operate a pipe line
solely in interstate commerce. Many of the rights granted
thereunder are of a local nature and have been exercised
within the State of Alabama. Respondent has acquired
considerable real estate in this State and in 1952 paid
ad valorem taxes in Alabama ‘in the amount of $97,219.36.
It also paid income taxes in the amount of $19,408.59,
and unemployment compensation taxes in the amount ot
$1,268.55 (R. 120).
Since qualifying in 1941, Respondent has enjoyed the
right of eminent domain in acquiring its rights-of-way
in this State. Its extensive properties have been pro-
tected by the State, and it has enjoyed all of the other
rights and privileges of a corporation, foreign or domestic,
in Alabama. Title 10, Sections 71 and 189, Code of Ala-
bama 1940.
ee
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.
Neither Title 51, Section 348, as amended, Code of Ala-
bama 1940 (the statute which levies the Alabama foreign
corporation franchise tax), nor Section 232 of the Constitu-
tion of Alabama 1901 contains any prohibition whatsoever,
either expressly or by implication, precluding the State
from levying this tax on a corporation engaged exclusively
in interstate commerce. Therefore, the only reason for the
Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama, and the
Supreme Court of Alabama holding that Respondent Pipe
Line Company was engaged exclusively in interstate com-
meree in Alabama in 1952 was for the purpose of constru-
ing the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. This
case clearly presents a consideration and interpretation of
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3, of the Constitution of the
United States. All three of the ‘Questions Presented”
resolve themselves around such consideration and interpre-
tation.
1. The holding of the Supreme Court of Alabama that
Respondent Pipe Line Company was engaged exclusively in
interstate commerce in Alabama in 1952 is in direct conflict
with the decisions of this Court in Memphis Natural Gas
Company v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80, 68 S. Ct. 1475 (affirming
Stone v. Memphis Natural Gas Company, 201 Miss. 670,
29 So. 2d 268), and Interstate Natural Gas Company v.
Stone, 308 U.S. 522, 60'S. Ct. 292 (affirming per curiam the
decision of the Fifth Circuit in Stone v. Interstate Natural
Gas Company, 103 F. 2d 544), and apparently, Southern
Natural Gas Corporation v. State of Alabama, 301 U. S.
148, 07 S. Ct. 696 (affirming State v. Southern Natural Gas
Corporation, 233 Ala. 81, 170 So. 178), and apparently with
Interstate Oil Pipe Line Company v. Stone, 337 U. S. 662,
69 S. Ct. 1264 (affirming Interstate Oil Pipe Line Com-
pany v. Stone, 203 Miss. 715, 35 So. 2d 73, 36 So. 2d 142).
OED PETE LLG AL ROLLA ILI) POL? OEE
=. oo
In Memphis Natural Gas Company v. Stone, supra, the
majority of this Court affirmed the decision of the Supreme
Court of Mississippi which held that Mississippi's foreign
corporation franchise tax (Miss. Code, Section 9315
[1942]) was valid as applied against Memphis Natural Gas
Company, a Delaware corporation owning and operating a
pipe line for the transportation of natural gas.
“The line runs from the Monroe Gas Field in the
State of Louisiana through the States of Arkansas and
Mississippi to Memphis and other points in the State
of Tennessee. Approximately 135 miles of the pipe
line lie within Mississippi; at two points within that
state there are compressing stations. It is stipulated
that the Gas Company has never engaged in any intra-
state commerce in Mississippi, . . .” (Kmphasis
added.) (335 U. S. 80-81.)
It was further brought out that the Gas Company had
paid all ad valorem taxes assessed against its property in
Mississippi, but that in addition to the ad valorem tax,
Mississippi also imposed a ‘‘franchise or excise tax’? upon
all corporations ‘‘doing business’? within the State. The
Gas Company had never qualified to do business in Mis-
sissippi nor did it have an agent for the service of process
or a designated place of business in the State. Its only
employees and representatives in Mississippi were those
necessary to maintain the pipe line and its auxiliary ap-
purtenances. Mississippi's franchise tax was measured as
is Alabama's foreign corporation franchise tax—on_ the
amount of capital employed by a foreign corporation in
that State (335 U. S. 80, 81, 82). The majority opinion of
this Court affirmed the holding of the Supreme Court of
Mississippi (201 Miss. 670, 29 So, 2d 268, 270) that Missis-
sippi, in levying its franchise tax against said corporation,
had made ‘‘‘no attempt to tax interstate commerce as
such, but the levy is an exaction which the State requires
es
as a recompense for its protection of lawful activities
carried on in this State by the corporation, foreign or do-
mestie, activities which are incidental to the powers and
privileges possessed by it by the nature of its organiza-
tion—here the local activities in maintaining, keeping in
repair, and otherwise in manning the facilities of the sys-
tem throughout the 135 miles of its line in this State.’
The Supreme Court of Mississippi then went on to con-
clude that such activities were local activities and that
Mississippi’s franchise tax, as applied to this foreign cor-
poration did not bear directly upon interstate commerce
but on these local activities, and that any burden imposed
upon that commerce was remote and unsubstantial. In
affirming the judgment of the Mississippi Supreme Court,
four of the Justices of this Court did so (335 U. S. 80, 96)
by stating:
“We think that the state is within its constitutional
rights in exacting compensation under this statute
for the protection it affords the activities within its
borders. Of course, the interstate commerce could
not be conducted without these local activities. But
that fact is not conclusive. These are events apart
from the flow of commerce. This is a tax on activities
for which the state, not the United States, gives pro-
tection and the state is entitled to compensation when
its tax cannot be said to be an unreasonable burden
or a toll on the interstate business.”
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Rutledge pointed
out that the tax was non-discriminatory (as is the present
tax) and observed that in Central Greyhound Lines vy.
Mealey, 334 U. S. 653, 68 S. Ct. 1260, this Court had sus-
tained a New York privilege tax upon gross receipts from
interstate transportation of the bus company operating in
interstate commerce, provided the tax could be properly
ica A cee
apportioned. He noted that the local activities for the
protection of which the Mississippi tax purported to be
laid “are incidents of carrying on that business taking
place in Mississippi and only there, for which Mississippi
affords protection received from no other state or the
United States. Nor can any other state give that protec-
tion. For that portion of the business and the protection
given it, 1 think the state is entitled to levy such a tax as
has been placed here. Nothing in the commerce clause or
its great purposes forbids such an exaction. Nor is the
state limited to a single exaction for different or indeed
like protections afforded, so long as each is safeguarded
against prohibited effects upon commerce, as are those
laid by Mississippi, and their aggregate cannot be shown
to contravene the clause’s purpose.”
While this Court held the activities of maintaining,
operating, and otherwise manning the pipe line to be local
activities at which Mississippi’s franchise tax could be
‘alidly directed for the protection afforded by the State
and the benefits derived by the taxpayer (301 U.S. 82, 83),
the Alabama Supreme Court, on the contrary, held these
same activities not to be local activities but activities so
closely related to interstate commerce as to be a part of
such commerce. In this respect, the Court was obviously
confused by, and seems to have completely misconstrued
the case of Spector Motor Service v. O’Connor, 340 U.S.
602, 71S. Ct. 508. It appears that a clarification by this
Ilonorable Court of the Spector case is needed, not only for
the sake of the instant case, but for the sake of other cases
where such questions arise. If the activities of Memphis
Natural Gas Company were said to be local activities
apart “rom the flow of interstate commerce, and on which
Mississippi's franchise tax could be validly levied, then it
appears beyond a doubt that the much more widespread
and extensive activities carried on by Respondent Pipe
a ees
Line Company in Alabama in 1952 were certainly local ac-
tivities, and that the Respondent was not engaged ex-
clusively in interstate commerce within Alabama in said
year.
Moreover, under several other existing decisions, it
would appear that in 1952 Respondent Pipe Line Company
was carrying on considerable local activity in Alabama
and these decisions sanction the levy on such a corpo-
ration of a tax similar to the Alabama foreign corporation
franchise tax for the protection and other privileges ac-
corded by the State. It would be too tedious to cite all
of these cases, but among them are the following:
Canton R. R. Co. v. Rogan, 340 U. S. 511, 71S. Ct. 447;
Western Maryland R. R. Co. v. Rogan, 340 U. S. 520,
71S. Ct. 450;
Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U. S. 653, 68
S. Ct. 1260;
International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U. S. 416, 67
S. Ct. 444;
Caskey Baking Co. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 313
U.S. 117, 61S. Ct. 881;
Southern Pac. Co. v. Gallagher, 303 U. S. 167, 59 S.
Ct. 389;
Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303
U. S. 604, 58 S. Ct. 736;
Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S.
250, 58 S. Ct. 546;
Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249,
53 S. Ct. 345.
In Caskey Baking Co. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 313
U.S. 117, 61S. Ct. 881, this Court sanctioned a license tax
levied by the State of Virginia on the Baking Company
for tne privilege of peddling bread in Virginia when all
of the bread involved was transported in interstate com-
merce into Virginia from another state. This Court held
LR a |
that the Act hit the peddling or selling and not the trans-
portation or commerce, although interstate commerce was
very clearly involved.
In Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner v. Stone, 342 U. 5.
389, 72.8. Ct. 424, this Court struck down Mississippi's
tax, insofar as it was levied on foreign corporations or
concerns soliciting business for laundries when the plant
was located in another state, because it was said to have
been laid on the privilege of soliciting interstate business,
and on the further grounds that the tax was discrim-
inatory. From what was stated therein, and by implica-
tion, this Court appeared to hold that if the tax had been
construed to apply only to the privilege of exercising the
local activity of picking up and delivering laundry, and
had not been discriminatory, it would have been valid,
notwithstanding the fact that the laundry was transported
across the state line.
In Spector Motor Service v. O’Connor, 340 U. S. 602,
71S. Ct. 508, while striking down Connecticut’s privilege
license tax measured by net income on the grounds that it
was a tax levied on Spector for the privilege of engaging
in an exclusively interstate business, this Court made
several significant statements in the controlling opinion
to indicate that the tax could properly have been levied
upon local activities, benefits and protections received in
Connecticut by said interstate trucking company. To sup-
port these statements, this Court cited, among other cases,
Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co., v. Stone, 337 U. S. 662, 69
S. Ct. 1264 (affirming Stone v. Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co.,
203 Miss. 715, 35 So. 2d 73, 36 So, 2d 142); Central
Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 68 S. Ct. 1260;
Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250,
58 S. Ct. 546; and Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335
U.S. 80, 68 S. Ct. 1475 (affirming Stone v. Memphis Nat-
ural Gas Co., 201 Miss. 670, 29 So. 2d 268).
—
roe :
—
=,
2. The decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama would
also appear to be in direct conflict with the decisions of this
Court in Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, supra, and
Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, supra, and Southern
Natural Gas Co. v. State of Alabama, 301 U. S. 148, 57
S. Ct. 696, when that Court very clearly held that the im-
position of the Alabama foreign corporation franchise
tax against Respondent Pipe Line Company was uncon-
stitutional and void as being repugnant to the Commerce
Clause of the Federal Constitution. In so deciding, the
Court relied mainly upon the case of Ozark Pipe Line
Corp. v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555, 45 S. Ct. 184. In holding
Mississippi’s franchise tax (very similar to Alabama’s
franchise tax) valid in Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone,
this Court appears to have overruled the decision in the
Ozark case insofar as that case would relate to the cir-
cumstances described in the Memphis case.
“In Ozark Pipe Line v. Monier, supra, this Court,
226 UL S., at page 565, 45 S. Ct. 186, 69 L. Ed. 439,
spoke of such activities as set out below. If it was
intended to say that such in-the-state activities as
there described could not be taxed, we disagree with
that conclusion.’’ (Emphasis added.) (335 U.S. 94.)
In the Memphis case the Court also asserted that the
local activities (apart from the flow of commerce) on
Which Mississippi’s franchise tax was said to have been
validly levied, were ‘the local activities . . . involved
in the maintenance of the pipe line.’? The Company was
said to be paying for the protection given and the bene-
fits enjoyed by it in Mississippi, which protection and
benefits, insofar as the activities in Mississippi were con-
cerned, could be given by that State only. The tax was
said to be recompense to Mississippi for the protection
and benefits so granted; this being particularly true since
the tax was measured solely on the amount of capital
~ won
which the Company employed within the State of Mis-
sissippi.
There is no difference whatsoever between the situation
whieh prevailed in Mississippi in the case of Memphis
Natural Gas Company and the situation which now prevails
in Alabama in regard to the activities of Respondent Pipe
Line Company in 1952. The only difference which might
be said to exist is that the activities of Respondent Pipe
Line Company are much more widespread and extensive
than those of Memphis Natural Gas Company, as_ the
foregoing Statement will reveal. If the Mississippi fran-
chise tax was said to be valid in Memphis Natural Gas
Company v. Stone, supra, then it appears without doubt
that the Alabama tax was validly laid on Respondent
Pipe Line Company for the much more extensive pro-
tection and benefits which have been accorded it by Ala-
bama. Having qualified to do business in this State, Re-
spondent Pipe Line Company received protection and
numerous local benefits, including the right of eminent
domain. It is compensation for these benefits so given
for which the State of Alabama levies its foreign corpo-
ration franchise tax. Southern Natural Gas Corporation
v. State, 301 U. S. 148, 57 S. Ct. G96 (aflirming State v.
Southern Natural Gas Corporation, 23:3 Ala. 81, 170 So.
178). The Alabama foreign corporation franchise tax
then is as much a ‘‘value received’? tax as is the gross
receipts tax levied in Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey,
334 U.S. 653, 68 S. Ct. 1260, or the tax of 2% of the fair
market value of motor vehicles used in interstate com-
merce whieh was levied by the State of Maryland in
Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 33!) U.S. 542, 70.5. Ct.
806, which taxes were sustained by this Court, where prop-
erly apportioned, for the use of the highways, or other
benefits accorded by the states involved. The benefits and
protection accorded by Alabama to Respondent Pipe Line
Company were just as important and just as costly to the
ee
State as those aecorded by the States of New York and
Maryland in the two above-cited cases,
These were the same benefits to which the Cireuit Court
of Appeals for the 5th Circuit had reference when it
upheld Mississippi’s foreign corporation franchise tax in
Stone v. Interstate Natural Gas Company, 103 I. 2d 544,
and which was affirmed per curiam by this Court in 308
U.S. 622, GOS. Ct. 292, expressly on the doctrine of this
Court in Southern Natural Gas Corporation v. State of
Alabama, 301 U. S. 148, 57S. Ct. 696 (affirming State v.
Southern Natural Gas Corporation, 233 Ala. 81, 170 So.
178).
It was also pointed out in that decision that said Com-
pany was operating a pipe line through the State of Mis-
sissippi transporting natural gas in exclusively interstate
commeree, except for the local activities of maintaining,
operating, and otherwise manning the pipe line within
that State, and that Mississippi’s franchise tax was levied
as recompense to the State of Mississippi for the pro-
tection and benefits which it gave in connection with
these local activities.
In sustaining the then Mississippi foreign corporation
franchise tax in Memphis Natural Gas Company v. Stone,
dd. UL S. 80, 68S. Ct. 1475, this Court referred to Interstate
Natural Gas Company v. Stone, 308 U. S. 522, GO S. Ct.
292, in the majority opinion and stated that the only dif-
ference between that case and the Memphis Natural Gas
Company case was the fact that Interstate Natural Gas
Company had qualified to do business in the State of Mis-
sissippi while Memphis Natural Gas Company had not
(335 U.S. 92, G8 S. Ct. 1481). The Memphis Natural Gas
Company case and the Interstate Natural Gas Company
case appear then to have clearly overruled Ozark Pipe
Line Corporation v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555, 45 S. Ct. 184,
= ek
insofar as that case is applicable to the situations de-
scribed in those cases or to that presented in this case,
Ozark Pipe Line Corporation v. Monier, supra, also
seems to be distinguishable from the case at bar in that in
that case it was pointed out that Ozark Pipe Line Corpo-
ration did not receive any gas nor did it deliver any gas
in the State of Missouri, while in this case Respondent
Pipe Line Company had some 14 customers in Alabama in
1952 to whom it was making constant deliveries through-
out the year.
The decision of the Alabama Supreme Court in this
case has the effect of misinterpreting the decisions of this
Court to such an extent that it virtually overrules Mem-
phis Natural Gas Company v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 68 S. Ct.
1475, and Interstate Natural Gas Company v. Stone, 30s
U.S. 522, GO S. Ct. 292, and makes the decision in South-
ern Natural Gas Corporation v. State of Alabama, 301
U. S. 148, 57 S. Ct. 696, both uncertain and ineffective.
Such a situation has very serious implications not only in
this State but, generally speaking, throughout this coun-
try, and should be corrected by this Honorable Court.
5. In its decision (R. 174-213) the Supreme Court of
Alabama asserts that under the more recent decisions of
this Court, including Spector Motor Service v. O’Connor,
340 U.S, 602, 71S. Ct. 508, this Court has restored to full
vigor the decisions in Ozark Pipe Line Company v. Monier,
266 U.S. 555, 45 S. Ct. 184, and Alpha Portland Cement Co.
v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203, 45 S. Ct.
477. This being tie case, and as it was said that Ozark Pipe
Line Company was engaged exclusively in interstate com-
meree (even though it maintained its offices, kept its bank
account, and carried on other activities within the State of
Missouri in connection with its pipe line), then that would
be equivalent to clothing Respondent Pipe Line Company,
has
and those similarly situated, with the Federal immunity
insofar as state franchise taxes of the same nalure as the
tax levied by Alabama are concerned. In other words,
this would free such pipe line companies from state tax-
ation in all of the states in which they carried on any ae-
livities connected with the pipe line, and place them in
the same position as an agency and instrumentality of the
Federal Government. This Court appears to very clearly
frown upon private corporation’s attempting to clothe
themselves with the Federal immunity from taxation.
Offutt Housing Company v. County of Sarpy, 351 U. S.
., 46S. Ct. 814, 817, decided May 28, 1956.
The Supreme Court of Alabama also appears to have
lent what assistance it could toward such a construction in
this case as it has used an entire page (R. 177) of its
opinion in explaining how Respondent Pipe Line Com-
pany Was organized in accordance with an Act of Congress
and under a proclamation issued by the President of the
United States on August 23, 1941, to meet an emergency
then allegedly existing as to the transportation and dis-
tribution of petroleum and petroleum products moving in
interstate commerce. It is very notable in this respect
that such emergency has long since ceased to exist, but
Respondent Pipe Line Company grows more robust and
affluent each year. It does not appear that either the
framers of our Constitution or the Congress ever intended
that such a private corporation enjoy the immunity from
taxation of the Federal Government or that it fail to pay
its just share of state taxation, particularly for valuable
benefits and protection Which it receives from the state
and for which it should pay like any other corporation,
foreign or domestic. It certainly appears that such cases
as McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, + L. Ed. 579, were
never intended to include such private corporations Within
the immunity. In reaping these benefits from the states,
ewer ra) a |
99
they should pay recompense just as much as the interstete
motor carriers who pay taxes for the use of state highways.
In Southern Natural Gas Corporation v. State of Ala-
bama, 301 U.S. 148, 57 S. Ct. 696, this Court unanimously
affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama in
State v. Southern Natural Gas Corporation, 233 Ala. 81,
170 So. 178, wherein that Court clearly adopted the minor-
ity opinion of this Court in Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales
Corporation v. State of Alabama, 288 U. 8. 218, 53 S. Ct.
373, which opinion was prepared by the late Mr. Justice
Cardozo and in which he was joined by Mr. Justice Stone
and Mr. Justice Brandeis. The Supreme Court of Ala-
bama was then made up of uiusually able and distin-
guished justices, and it held that the Alabama foreign
corporation franchise tax was not a tax on business or the
right of doing business in Alabama.
** . . we hold that the franchise tax here exacted
and being considered is not on any basis a tax on
business or a burden on the corporation’s interstate
commerce, but is laid on the exercise of corporate
functions, or on the privilege of exercising corporate
functions within the state and its employment of its
capital in Alabama, . . .”’ (170 So. 190).
Since this decision on June 11, 1936, the Alabama foreign
corporation franchise tax has been treated as a tax on
the right of a corporation to do business in Alabama and
is laid on the right of a corporation to exercise its corpo-
rate functions in this State, as distinguished from a license
or privilege tax on the right of doing business in this
State. In other words. as stated by the Supreme Court of
Alabama, in effect, in State v. Southern Natural Gas
Corporation, supra, it is an excise tax and not a license
which a corporation must procure before it engages in
business in this State. There is quite a distinction, and
—- 2,
-*
the provisions contained in the Alabama Code relating to
the administration and enforcement of the tax very clearly
bear this out. In the first place, a license tax for the privi-
lege of doing business in a state is generally required to
be paid prior to the business being done or conducted: in
the state. In this case, the tax is very clearly an excise
tax in that under the provisions of Title 51, Sections 301
and 354, Code of Alabama 1940, the tax is both levied and
paid at the end of the calendar year and under Section
348, is to be paid on the amount of capital which has been
employed exclusively within the State of Alabama. The
tax, then, is not a license or a prerequisite for a foreign
corporation doing business in Alabama, but is an excise
tax levied at the end of the calendar year for a corpora-
tion exercising its corporate functions within the State.
This was very clearly held to be the case by the Alabama
Supreme Court in State v. Southern Natural Gas Corpora-
tion (170 So. 190), and recognized to be the case by this
Court in Southern Natural Gas Corporation v. State of
Alabama (301 U.S. 153).
In addition to State v. Southern Natural Gas Corpora.
tion, supra, other cases by the Supreme Court of Alabama
appear to have clearly held. that the Alabama foreign
corporation franchise tax is an excise tax levied on the
right of a corporation to do business in this State and not
a tax on business or on the right of doing business in this
State. In State v. Bradley, 207 Ala. 677, 93 So. 595, 597,
the Supreme Court of Alabama held:
“The subject of the creator’s imposition of this
‘franchise tax’ is the existence of the corporation, not
the ‘continued exercise of the corporate franchise,’
K. C., M. & B. R. Co. vy. Stiles, 182 Ala. 138, 142, 62
South. 734, 735, Id., 242 U. S. 111, 87 Sup. Ct. 58, 61
L. Ed. 176. A domestic corporation not excepted by
the Constitution cannot avoid or escape this ‘franchise
tax’ by even complete corporate inactivity.”
In State v. Southern Natural Gas Corporation (170 So.
183), the Supreme Court of Alabama further asserted:
“That is, a domestic corporation, taxed upon its
mere existence, pay a franchise tax on its capital
stock, ete. Detroit International Bridge Co. v. Cor-
poration Tax Appeal Board of Michigan, 287 U. S.
295, 53 S. Ct. 137, 77 L. Ed. 314.
‘‘By section 232 of the Constitution, the Legislature
is required to levy a franchise tax on foreign corpo-
rations qualifying to do business in the state. The
policy of the state as to domestic and foreign corpora-
tions is uniform as far as possible; hence, the fran-
chise tax on foreign corporations is levied upon the
right to do business [not the right of doing business
in this State].’’ (Emphasis added.)
Also, see State v. Pullman-Standard Car Mfg. Co., 235 Ala.
493, 179 So. 541; Consolidated Coal Co. v. State, 236 Ala.
489, 183 So. 650; International Paper Co. v. Curry, 243 Ala.
298, 9 So. 2d 8.
The interpretation of the Alabama Supreme Court as to
the nature of the tax in State v. Southern Natural Gas
Corporation, supra, and of this Court in Southern Natural
Gas Corporation v. State, supra, to the effect that the tax
is an excise tax not on business or the right of doing busi-
ness, but on the right to do business and on the existence
of the corporation within the State has not only been ae-
cepted in this State, but has also been the interpretation
placed on the taxing statute by other state Supreme Courts.
Great Lakes Pipe Line Company v. Oklahoma Tax Com-
mission, 204 Okla. 518, 231 P. 2d 655; Texas Gas Transmis-
sion Company v. Atkins (Tenn.), 270 S. W. 2d 584.
Notwithstanding what appears to have been the well-
established principle that the Alabama foreign corpora-
tion franchise tax was not a tax on business or the right
eee
of doing business, the Supreme Court of Alabama now,
obviously, attempts to overrule these decisions by holding
that the tax is a tax as a condition or right of doing busi-
ness. This holding of the Court seems a Dit cloudy, and
the interpretation rather strained and unre: ilistic, particu-
larly in view of the decision in State v. Southern Natural
Gas Corporation, supra, which case was decided after the
Alabama foreign corporation franchise tax was amended
in 1985 (General Acts of Alabama, 1935, page 256), and
after the decisions of the same Court in State v. Pullman-
Standard Car Mfg. Co., 235 Ala. 493, 179 So. d41, and
International Paper Company v. Curry, 243 Ala. 228,
So. 2d 8. These cases, which were decided after the Ala-
hama foreign corporation franchise tax was amended in
1939, all appear to hold that it is a tax not on business or
the right of doing business, but is a tax on the right of
a corporation to exist in Alabama and to do business in
Alabama. Consequently, the holding of the Alabama
Supreme Court to the effect that the tax is levied on the
right or privilege of a foreign corporation doing business
in Alabama not only appears to be an erroneous one, not
in keeping with the laws and Constitution of the State of
Alabama, but apparently secks to overturn the past de-
cisions of the same Court, and also of this rg in South-
ern Natural Gas Corporation v. State, 301 U. S. 148, 57
S. Ct. 696. This holding by the Alabama ieee Court
is completely unrealistic and totally out of keeping with
Title 51, Section 348, Code of Alabama, 1940, and Section
232 of the Alabama Constitution, 1901, particularly as the
tax is measured by express direction of said constitutional
provision and the levying statute itself on the amount of
capital employed by a foreign corporation exclusively
within the State of Alabama. The tax is in no wise lev ied
against transportation, but is directed solely at the activi-
ties and functions carried on by such a corporation within
this State, measured by the amount of capital employed
Within the State of Alabama.
°C DES oa |
=
There is no prohibition either in the levying section of
the tax (Title 51, Section 348, Code of Alabama 1940) or
in Section 232 of the Constitution of Alabama 1901 which
would prevent the State from levying this tax on any
type of business done within the State of Alabama,
whether it be interstate or intrastate, as they merely pro-
vide that a franchise tax is to be levied on foreign corpo-
rations within the State of Alabama, measured by the
amount of capital which such corporations employ within
the State of Alabama. The only restriction upon the State
levying the tax on interstate business might be found in
the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. Cer-
tainly, Respondent Pipe Line Company was in Alabama in
1952 to the extent of some $17,095,063.34 of capital em-
ployed in this State, which represented approximately 14
of its total capital investment. No other state could law-
fully tax such capital so employed, or the activities car-
ried on by Respondent in Alabama in said year. The tax
so levied was not discriminatory, nor was it contended
that it was.
We believe that in all fairness and justice, this Court
should clarify this very confused situation by construing
the tax realistically, and as it really is, for the purpose
of determining the very important Federal questions
which are here involved. Under the decisions of this
Court, it appears that the Court is not bound by the inter-
pretation placed on a state taxing statute by a state Su-
preme Court, where such interpretation appears to be
unrealistic and where it vitally affects (as in this case)
the important Federal questions involved. Society for
Savings in City of Cleveland v. Bowers, 349 U.S. 143, 75
S. Ct. 607, 611; Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U. S. 363, 367, 50
S. Ct. 121, 123; New Jersey Realty Title Insurance Co. v.
Division of Tax Appeals, 338 U. S. 665, 674, 70 S. Ct. 413,
418; Educational Film Corporation v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379,
387, 51S. Ct. 170, 171.
sae HO
Notwithstanding, and even if Alabama's foreign corpo-
ration franchise tax is said to be on the privilege of a
foreign corporation doing business in Alabama, it still ap-
pears that under this Court’s decision in Memphis Natural
Gas Company v. Stone, 3:35 U.S. 80, 68 S. Ct. 1475, Inter-
state Natural Gas Company v. Stone, 308 U. S. 522, 60 St.
(Ct. 292, Southern Natural Gas Company v. State of Ala-
bama, 301 U.S. 148, 57 S. Ct. 696, and Interstate Oil Pipe
Line Company v. Stone, 337 U. S. 662, 69 S. Ct. 1264, the
tax as levied against Respondent Pipe Line Company was
valid as directed at the extensive activities carried on by
Respondent within the State of Alabama in 1952, and
measured by the amount of capital employed by Respon-
dent within this State in the same year, as a recompense
for the protection accorded to Respondent’s vast holdings
within this State and also for the numerous benefits and
privileges accorded to it by the State. This seems par-
ticularly true in view of the fact that Mississippi’s fran-
chise tax in both the Memphis Natural Gas Company case
and the Interstate Natural Gas Company case was held
to be a tax on such corporations for the privilege of doing
business in Mississippi, and it was agreed in both cases
that the pipe line companies involved were engaged ex-
clusively in interstate commerce in Mississippi. The tax
Was nevertheless said to be validly levied in those cases
as it was said that it hit the local activities of the com-
panies in Mississippi in maintaining, operating, and other-
Wise manning the pipe line facilities within the State and
measured by the amount of capital employed within Mis-
sissippi. The situations involved in the Mississippi cases
seem identical with the situation involved in this ease. Tf
the tax in the one instance was said to be valid, then the
tax in the other instance also appears to have been validly
levied.
= ae
CONCLUSION.
For the foregoing reasons, this Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
eee eee eee eee eee eee eee ee eee eee eee ee ens
WILLIAM N. McQUEEN,
Assistant Attorney General of Alabama,
TOS G24 SHRGE BASES AEE SERA ES AOE 604 OE 6 OES OS OD
WILLIAM H. BURTON,
Assistant Counsel, Department of Reve-
nue of the State of Alabama, and
Assistant Attorney General of Ala-
bama,
Counsel for Petitioner.
Of Counsel:
“etre rtogeraiwyenepe @ ot Cae eens foe ee ee
JOHN PATTERSON,
Attorney General of Alabama,
WILLARD W. LIVINGSTON,
Counsel, Department of Revenue of
the State of Alabama, and Assistant
Attorney General of Alabama.
—
APPENDIX ‘‘A.’’
August 2, 1956.
THE STATE OF ALABAMA, JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.
THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA.
SPECIAL TERM, 1956.
3 Div. 735.
State of Alabama
Vv.
Plantation Pipe Line Company.
Appeal from Montgomery Cireuit Court,
In Equity.
Stakely, Justice.
The State Department of Revenue made an assessment
for franchise taxes under the provisions of § 348, Title 51,
Code of 1940, covering the tax year 1952 against Plantation
Pipe Line Company, a corporation, in the amount of
$22,655.00. Plantation Pipe Line Company appealed from
the foregoing final assessment to the Cireuit Court of
Montgomery County, in Equity. In the Cireuit Court of
Montgomery County, in Equity, Plantation Pipe Line Com-
pany filed its bill of complaint to which the State filed a
demurrer. The court entered a decree in which the court
sustained the demurrer to certain aspects of the bill of
complaint which are now not under consideration and at
the same time overruled the demurrer to other aspects of
the bill. The aspects of the bill of complaint to which the
demurrers were overruled are stated in the decree to be:
**(3) That the demurrer to that aspect of the bill
which seeks to recover the franchise tax of $22,655.00
ra
“ Se |
=
paid to the Department of Revenue for the year 1952
be and are hereby overruled.
**(4) That the demurrers to that aspect of the bill
which seek to reeover interest on the franchise tax be
and the same are overruled.
‘*(5) That the demurrers to all other aspects of the
bill not specifically enumerated herein be and the same
are overruled.”’
Thereafter the State filed its answer to the foregoing bill
of complaint. Attached to the answer of appellant were
Exhibits A, B and C, which were made a part of the an-
swer. These exhibits were introduced in evidence as a part
of the record through a stipulation wherein it was agreed
that such documentary evidence could be introduced with-
out objection as to form.
On a hearing of the issues made by the bill of complaint
and the answer the court rendered its final deeree and in
doing so made certain findings of faet and conclusions of
law. In substance the court declared the final assessment
of franchise tax made against Plantation Pipe Line Com-
pany for the tax year 1952, was invalid in its entirety and
ordered the Comptroller of the State of Alabama to refund
to Plantation Pipe Line Company the amount of $22,655.00
which the company had paid for the sake of taking the
appeal, as provided in § 140, Title 50 (sic), Code of 1949,
together with interest on the aforesaid amount from De-
cember 12, 1952, and ordered the costs to be paid by the
appellant.
In its answer the State pleaded, among other things, res
adjudicata to the bill, which was made a part of the an-
swer. The State attached as Exhibit ‘‘B’’ a copy of a bill
of complaint which the company had filed in Case No.
13040 in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, in
——;
Kquity, setting up, in substance, a cause of action claimed
to be identical in all respects with the cause of action here
involved, except that the tax involved was for the vear
1942. In that case the court held that Plantation Pipe Line
Company was due to pay the State of Alabama the sum of
$7,849.73 as franchise tax for the year 1942. We shall
consider the issue of res ad judicata separately from the
other matters considered in this opinion and shall herein-
after outline the contentions as to res adjudicata at greater
length.
The case was tried orally before the court and we have
given careful consideration to the evidence introduced in
the cause. We find that the facts as summarized by the
court in its decree are substantially in accordance with
the facts introduced in evidence and will be stated by us
as briefly as possible as follows,
Plantation Pipe Line Company is a corporation which
Was organized under the laws of the State of Delaware on
July 8, 1940. On July 30, 1941, Congress enacted a law
which provides, in part, ‘‘Whenever the President finds
that the construction of any pipe line for the transporta-
tion and/or distribution of petroleum or petroleum prod-
ucts moving in interstate commerce, or the extension or
completion of any such pipe line already wholly or partly
constructed, is or may be necessary for national-defensi™
purposes, he shall by proclamation declare such finding.’’
The President, on August 23, 1941, issued a proclamation
to that effect, as to the pipe line proposed to be constructed
by Plantation Pipe Line Company, which contained among
other things the statement that the President does “*hereby
find and proclaim (1) that it is necessary for national de-
fense purposes that there be constructed and completed a
pipe line system for the transportation and distribution of
petroleum and petroleum products moving in interstate
commeree, * * * commencing in the vicinity of Baton
vu
Rouge, Louisiana, and extending to a northeasterly diree-
tion through the States of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama,
Georgia and South Carolina, and into North Carolina to
a point in the vicinity of Greensboro, North Carolina, with
branch lines extending to Montgomery and Birmingham,
Alabama, Columbus and Macon, Georgia, and Chattanooga
and Knoxville, Tennessee; (2) that Plantation Pipe Line
Company, a private corporation organized under the laws
of the State of Delaware, has commenced the work neces-
sary for the construction of such a pipe line system and
represents that it is prepared to undertake the construe-
tion of and will complete said pipe line system * * *.”
The pipe line as originally contemplated and as de-
seribed by the President of the United States in his proce-
lamation was completed and put into operation during the
vear 1942. The pipe line could not have been financed,
organized and the project completed and put into opera-
tion except by means of a corporation organized for that
purpose and having the customary charter powers, such as
the right to issue securities to represent the investment,
continuity of existence, ete.
Plantation Pipe Line Company qualified to do business
in Alabama in 1941.
Plantation Pipe Line Company was in 1952 and at all
times has been a common carrier pipe line company within
the meaning of the Interstate Commerce Act, operating
solely under tariffs filed with the Interstate Commerce
Commission.
Plantation Pipe Line Company has never filed nor sought
approval of its rates and tariffs by the State of Alabama
or any other state, and the State of Alabama has never
asserted any regulatory authority or jurisdiction over any
of the rate or practices of the Plantation Pipe Line Com-
pany.
— Uw —
During the year 1952 Plantation Pipe Line Company
owned and operated a pipe line running from Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, to Greensboro, North Carolina, with lateral lines
from Helena, Alabama, to Birmingham and Montgomery,
Alabama, and from Bremen, Georgia, to Columbus and
Macon, Georgia, and to Chattanooga and Knoxville, Ten-
nessee. The length of the lines, with laterals, was approxi-
mately 1,968 miles, of which approximately 483 miles were
located in Alabama. The total investment in carrier prop-
erty, including construction work in progress as of Jan-
uary 1, 1952, was approximately $69,615,442.47 for the en-
tire system and within the State of Alabama on the same
date was approximately $17,095,063.34.
The business of Plantation Pipe Line Company is and was
in 1952 conducted as follows: It receives at Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, in tanks owned by it, gasoline and petroleum oil
distillate for transmission to terminals, located in other
states specified in its tariff. The capacity of its line has
been at all times since its construction and Was during
1952 and is now absorbed by shipments tendered at Baton
Rouge. Plantation Pipe Line Company has never received
in Alabama any petroleum products for shipment and has
never maintained any facilities in Alabama for receiving
such products for shipment. The products received at
Baton Rouge are tendered by various shippers and differ
in kind and specifications. From the tanks the products
are pumped into its pipe line in lots or batches of sufficient
volume to remain separate and distinguishable from pre-
ceding or succeeding lots. These basic requirements of the
business are reflected in tariff T. C. C. No. 14 under which
Plantation Pipe Line Company was doing business on Jan-
uary 1, 1952.
After the products are pumped into the pipe line at
Baton Rouge the flow gradually slows down as the product
moves, requiring the use of pumps located at intervals to
Cote: a |
a
—)
maintain the flow. Three pumping stations were operated
in Alabama in 1952 with stand-by facilities at four points
in the State of Alabama.
Plantation Pipe Line Company had four delivery termi-
nals in Alabama in 1952, at Moundville, Birmingham,
Montgomery and Oxford. It did not make delivery of any
products shipped through its pipe line at any point in Ala-
bama other than at these terminals. This was in conformity
with its tariff. Plantation did not maintain any storage
tanks at any delivery terminal or elsewhere in Alabama.
As required by the tariff, shippers receive their products
from the pipe line without delay.
The pipe line through Alabama consists of an 18-inch
pipe line and a 12-inch pipe line. The line from Helena to
Birmingham is an 8-ineh line and the line from Helena to
Montgomery is a 4-inch line. Due to the difference in size
between the main pipe line passing through Helena and the
branch lines to Birmingham and Montgomery, it is impos-
sible to take the product directly from either main line
into the branch lines. Accordingly, Plantation Pipe Line
Company maintains at Helena seventeen tanks into which
are diverted the products from the main lines destined for
the terminals at Birmingham and Montgomery. This num-
ber of tanks is necessary to insure that the identity of the
preducts being transported be maintained. From the tanks
at Helena the product is pumped into the pipe line to Bir-
mingham or Montgomery at high pressure.
Quantities of products destined for Birmingham and
Montgomery are not sufficient to require or permit the
constant use of the branch lines and, therefore, the Bir-
mingham and Montgomery delivery terminals are not
always open, the products remaining in the tanks at Helena
for an average of two or three days before continuing to
final destinations. Products are never stored at Helena
at the request of a shipper and no deliveries are made
ff
—od—
there. These tanks are not used for storage and reship-
ment, but are, in fact, only necessary parts Of the trans-
portation facilities without which the deliveries of prod-
ucts received in Louisiana could not be made to the tariff
destinations, The tanks at Helena are used in the same
Way as railroad classification or marshalling yards and
the products in the tanks are at all times considered to
he and are in fact still in the course of interstate transpor-
tation. The tariff does not provide for in transit storage.
In order to assure uninterrupted operation of the pipe
line, it is necessary that the person in charge of each pump-
ing station and stand-by facility be on duty or on call at
all times and for this purpose the company maintains at
each station one house which it requires the responsible
employee to occupy and for which he is charged rent in
an amount less than the annual depreciation and repairs.
At each of the operating pumping stations there is a
water tank primarily for fire protection. Water from the
tank is never sold commercially, but is used; incidentally
and without charge, by employees at the pumping station
and in the company house.
The company maintains at Helena a warehouse where
are stored maintenance materials for the operation of
the pipe line. It also maintains a fire truck at Helena.
Plantation Pipe Line Company had 82 employees in
Alabama on January 1, 1952, and 68 on January 1, 1953.
The only employees in Alabama in 1952 were those engaged
solely and directly in the service of constructing, maintain-
ing and operating the pipe line. The company had three
trucks at Akron and a truck at Helena and Silver Run in
1952, which were used only to carry empleyees from place
to place in connection with their work in the construction,
maintenance and operation of the pipe line, to carry needed
Supplies and for other purposes directly connected with
S Le a |
renege
hc a
the construction, maintenance and operation of the pipe
line.
Some construction was carried on in 1952 by an inde-
pendent contractor, consisting of enlarging the pumping
facilities on the main lines. Similar work was done at
Helena in 1951 and some clean-up work in connection
with such construction was done at Helena in 1952.
To keep its pipe line system in operation Plantation
Pipe Line Company maintained, by means of lines leased
from others, a communications system between its termi-
nals, pumping stations, and its chief operating office in
Atlanta. Plantation Pipe Line Company has never main-
tained any general or corporate office in Alabama. — Its
statutory domicile is and has been Delaware and its prin-
cipal corporate and operating office is and has been in
Atlanta, Georgia. Plantation Pipe Line Company has
never kept any records in Alabama except pumping: sta-
tion and terminal operating records necessary to the trans-
portation of products received into the pipe line in Louisi-
ana. It has never performed any functions in Alabama
except those of constructing, maintaining and operating
the pipe line.
All of the business, activities and operations of the Plan-
tation Pipe Line Company in Alabama are carried on
solely in furtherance of and are inherent, integral and
necessary parts of the interstate transportation of petro-
leum products. All of the property of Plantation Pipe
Line Company located in Alabama, both real and personal,
is committed to and used solely in said interstate business.
Plantation does not, and did not in 1952, engage in any
local or intrastate business or activity whatsoever in
Alabama.
Plantation Pipe Line Company has paid all ad valorem
taxes assessed by proper state authority on its property
aa ee
located in Alabama, income taxes to the State of Alabama
on its net income allocated to the interstate business done
by Plantation Pipe Line Company in
ployment compensation taxes with respect to its employees
in Alabama. Prior to 1952, Plantation Pipe Line Company
had paid into the State of Alabama ad valorem taxes ag-
gregating $384,866.74; income taxes aggregating $144,466.06
and unemployment compensation taxes aggregating
$26,653.88. For the year 1952, it paid ad valorem taxes of
$97,219.36; income taxes of $19,408.59, and unemployment
compensation taxes of $1,268.55,
Alabama and unem-
(, 1952, Plantation Pipe Line Company
made application for a permit and paid, under protest,
to the State Department of Revenue a permit fee for the
year 1952 in the amount of $100.00, disclaiming any de-
sire for a permit to do or any intent to do any business in
Alabama except that of interstate commerce,
On January
Plantation Pipe Line Company duly filed on forms pre-
scribed by the State Department of Revenue a franchise
tax return for the year 1952, stating on the face of the
return that the kind of business conducted in Alabama
Was interstate transportation by pipe line of products re-
fined from petroleum and disclaiming the transaction of
or any intention of transacting any local or intrastate
business in Alabama. After hearing protests on behalf of
Plantation Pipe Line Company against the assessment of
any franchise tax for the year 1952, a final assessment in
the amount of $22,655.00 was made by the State Depart-
ment of Revenue on November 21, 1952.
The trial court made no findings of fact with
to the issue of res adjudicata raised by the State,
said, this matter will be separately considered |
opinion.
reference
As was
ater in this
The questions involved in this case may be stated as fol-
lows: (1) Was Plantation Pipe Line Company engaged
TOTES Ss
— PNET SPRINT ORIN ZR CIP ONE:
CLR OTE PEMEPIT TS
wre
GO Dar HOPE PING BAILLIE EMS,
= ae PPR TIN NC,
eh cr ep te e8 REAR EIN DENT '
—,
solely in interstate commerce in Alabama in 1992? (2)
Assuming that the first question is answered in the af-
firmative, does the Alabama Foreign Corporation Fran-
chise Tax purport to levy a tax on a foreign corporation
engaged solely in interstate commerce in Alabama? (3)
Is the Alabama Franchise Tax as here imposed uncon-
stitutional as violative of the Interstate Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution? (4) Are the proceed-
ings with respect to the 1942 Franchise Tax res adjudicata
on the issue in this case? The court held the answer to
question one to be in the affirmative, to question two in
the negative, to question three in the affirmative and the
answer to question four to be in the negative.
I. Was Plantation Pipe Line Company engaged exclu-
sively in interstate commerce in Alabama in 1952?) With
respect to this issue the lower court concluded:
“Plantation was engaged solely in interstate com-
merce in Alabama in 1952. Interstate commerce can-
not be conducted in a vacuum without tangible prop-
erty, personnel, or incidental activities within the
boundaries of a state. All activities of Plantation in
Alabama were necessary and integral parts of its
interstate business and cannot realistically be sapa-
rated from it.”
Taking the undisputed facts in the case, we consider
that the court correctly held that Plantation was engaged
exclusively in interstate commerce in Alabama in 1952.
In Spector Motor Service, Inc., v. O’Connor, 340 U. S.
602, 95 L. Ed. 578, the Supreme Court of the United States
held Spector was engaged exclusively in interstate com-
meree in Connecticut. The facts upon which this conelu-
sion was based were clearly stated by the Supreme Court
of Connecticut in Spector Motor Service, Inc., v. Walsh, 61
A. 2d (Conn.) 89,-as follows:
ii:
——
“The finding of the trial court and the exhibits
made a part of it present the following situation. The
plaintiff is a Missouri corporation. It originally had
its principal place of business in St. Louis but later
moved to Chicago. Its business, during the period in-
volyed in this action, was exclusively
tion of freight in interstate commerce as a common
carrier, Originally, it carried freight only from St.
Louis to New York, but, in order to secure the ad-
vantages of a two-way haul, it set up facilities to ob-
tain goods for shipment from the east to the west
and, in particular, shipments of less than full truck
loads. In addition to its terminals in St. Louis and
New York, it set up terminals in Chicago, New Britain
and Bridgeport, Connecticut, and in cities in Mas-
sachusetts, Rhode Island and New Jersey.
full truek load is to be shipped to or
tomer in Connectie
the transporta-
Where a
from any cus-
ut, trucks making the long haul go
directly to the customer's place of business.
In case
of smaller shipments, the fr
eight is taken from the
customer's’ place of business by pickup trucks to the
terminal, where it is trans-shipped to the long-haul
trucks. The pickup trucks merely act as a part of
the interstate transportation of the freight. The busi-
hess of the company as outlined above was established
prior to the enactment by the Congress of the Motor
Carrier Act, 1935, 49 Stat. 043, 49 UL S, C., § 301 et
seq. (1940), 49 UL S.C. AL §
its business thereafter under
allowing it to continue to operate as it was doing on
June 1, 1935, until in February, 1942, it received a
permit from the interstate commerce co.umission, Of
its total business during the years 1936 to 1940, the
following portions originated in, was attributable to
or was derived from this state: 1936, 47 per cent of
a total business of $233,787.78; 1927 (sic), 37.86 per
301 et seq., it carried on
a provision in that act
8 OOP MITES PLA MLE EIA PEI,
aM QU iatenT ERO
pet
WEN Ao BANDED
gy ka end ae
eet as
cent of a total business of $440,025.92; first five months
of 1938, 47 per cent of a total business of $318,786.85;
last seven months of 1938, 50 per cent of a total busi-
ness of $432,087.39; 1939, 42 per cent of a total busi-
ness of $1,202,210.35; 1940, 34 per cent of a total busi-
ness of $1,728,510.65.
“The plaintiff uses in the operation of its business
about 85 trucks or tractors and 115 trailers. Most of
these are leased from the Wallace Transport Com-
pany. This is a corporation organized by officers of
the plaintiff; the plaintiff furnished the money to pur-
chase the vehicles; and all the capital stock of the
Transport Company is owned by the same four per-
sons who own all the stock of the plaintiff, that is,
its two principal officers and their wives. The Trans-
port Company was organized under the laws of Illi-
nois for the purpose of securing certain advantages
of reciprocity agreements between that state and
other states and to avoid certain taxes which would
otherwise be imposed upon it by states through which
it carries freight. All the drivers of the trucks are
employees of and are paid by the plaintiff. Several
of the pickup trucks are registered with the motor
vehicle department of Connecticut in the name of the
plaintiff, and during the years involved in this action
it obtained permits to purchase tires from the ration-
ing board at New Britain for its commercial vehicles
registered in this state. It leases its terminals at
New Britain and Bridgeport. It owns personal prop-
erty in Connecticut consisting of office equipment val-
ued at $1500 to $2000, upon which it pays property
taxes in New Britain. It has a bank account in
Bridgeport for the deposit of cash payments made by
shippers, but no one in this State has authority to
draw upon it; all checks received in this state are
sent to Chicago and cash received at New Britain is
roe || oe
converted into bank drafts and sent to Chicago; and,
except for a small amount of cash kept at New Britain
to pay incidental expenses, all expenses and wages of
employees are paid by draft on the Plaintiff at Chi-
cago. The plaintiff employed ten persons at Bridge-
port and seventeen persons at New Britain; of these,
five persons, employed two or three at a time, were
engaged in soliciting business, straightening out com-
plaints and generally promoting the plaintiff’s busi-
ness.
“In connection with the leasing of its terminal at
New Britain, the landlord insisted that the plaintiff
qualify in Connecticut as a foreign corporation and
name the secretary of the state as its agent for service
so that it would be subject to the jurisdiction of our
courts in the event that litigation should arise out of
the lease; the plaintiff did so qualify on May 5, 1934;
this was apparently done under ¢ 3489 of the General
Statutes, which provides that every foreign corpora-
tion having an office or place of business in this state
shall, before entering upon such business, appoint the
secretary of the state its attorney for the service of
process; but the plaintiff never otherwise applied for
or received authority to do business in this state, and
its business is limited entirely to interstate commerce
as specified by permits from the Connecticut public
utilities commission. In accordance with the require-
ments of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935, 49 Stat. 064, 49
U.S.C. § 321 (e) (1940), 49 UL S.C. AL § 321 (ce), it
also designated a person in New Haven upon whom
process might be served.” 61 A. 2d at 93, 94,
It is obvious from this statement of the Connecticut Court
that the activities of Spector in Connecticut were substan-
tiaily similar to the activities of Plantation in Alabama
in 1952. Spector was a common carrier of freight in inter-
state commerce. Plantation is a common carrier of petro-
POSE oo tefl
a ee
leum products in interstate commerce. Spector had em-
ployees in Connecticut, some of whom solicited business,
straightened out complaints and in general promoted the
plaintiff’s business. Plantation had employees in Alabama
who were engaged solely in the construction, maintenance
and operation of its pipe line. Spector had two terminals
in Connecticut at which goods destined for Connecticut
consignees were unloaded from large trucks for further
transportation by smaller pickup trucks or at which goods
to be shipped out of the state were brought by pickup
trucks so that they could be loaded into large trucks. The
products carried by Plantation are delivered direct to the
shipper by Plantation at delivery terminals in Alabama.
Spector used pickup trucks registered in its own name with
the Motor Vehicle Department of Connecticut. Plantation
used trucks with Alabama license tags for purposes di-
rectly connected with the construction, maintenance and
operation of its pipe line. Spector had to maintain its
facilities and equipment in Connecticut. Plantation had
to maintain its pipe line in Alabama. Spector received
goods for shipment in Connecticut. Plantation did not
receive in Alabama any products for shipment.
As we understand the situation the State insists that the
operation of the lateral lines from Helena to Birmingham
and Montgomery is not interstate commerce. This over-
looks the indisputable fact that the product moving in
such lines is received by Plantation at Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, for transportation to Birmingham and Mont-
gomery as tariff destinations, and that such lines are an
integral part of its interstate transportation system. Spec-
tor maintained two terminals in Connecticut where goods
were brought from out of the state in large trucks. The
goods were unloaded from such large trucks at the termi-
nal and then placed on smaller trucks for delivery to the
ultimate consignee, but this was held to be merely a neces-
sary and incidental part of the interstate delivery and
; . . Sta 0% AA Aaa
ey Nae
not intrastate commerce. It certainly appears that Planta-
tion’s use of smaller lines to deliver products received by
it in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, is no less incidental and
necessary to the completion of its interstate delivery.
Deis i A i
In Ozark Pipe Line Corporation v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555,
69 L. Ed. 439 (1925), the activities of the corporation in
Missouri were described by the court substantially as
follows. Ozark Pipe Line Corporation was a Maryland
corporation which owned and operated a pipe line extend-
ing from within Oklahoma through Missouri to points in
Illinois, with certain lines in Oklahoma. Through this
line crude petroleum was conducted to Illinois and there
delivered. Oil was neither received nor delivered within
the State of Missouri. Sinee it began its operation it had
been assessed and had paid general property taxes upon
that portion of its line and upon its other assets in Mis-
souri. It maintained its principle office in Missouri where
it kept its books and bank accounts from which it paid its
employees within and without the State, purchased sup-
plies, employed labor, maintained telephone and telegraph
lines, entered into contracts for transportation of erude oil
and carried on various other activities connected with and
in furtherance of its pipeline operation. Along the pipe-
line in Missouri there were three pumping stations, the sole :
-use of which was to accelerate the passage of oil through
the line. It owned and operated passenger and truck
automobiles but these, as well as its other property in Mis-
souri, were used exclusively in prosecution of its interstate
business. In compliance with the Laws of Missouri, appli- :
cable to corporations formed in other states desirous of
transacting business in Missouri, it filed with the Secretary
of the State its articles of incorporation and amended t
articles, paid license taxes and obtained a license and au-
thority to engage ‘exclusively in the business of trans-
VANE
MOTE Hi Se TRADE ENE OA NIN BEA EA! AR NELD GREYS
DPA AS IA ar ST GLO AO
porting crude petroleum by pipeline.’ 266 U. S., at
061, 69 L. Ed., at 441. It thereby acquired the right of :
—_ en
eminent domain under the Law of Missouri. Missouri
sought to impose a franchise tax ‘‘upon the privilege or
right to do business.’’ 266 U. S. 562, 69 L. Ed. 442. It
was held that Ozark was engaged solely in interstate
commerce,
The facts of the Ozark case and the facts of the instant
case are similar in that in the state which sought to impose
the tax both companies owned and operated a pipe line,
both had pumping stations to accelerate the passage of
the product through the line, both carried essentially the
same product, both employed labor and maintained com-
munications facilities in connection with the operation of
the pipe line, both owned and operated trucks which were
used exclusively in prosecution of its interstate business,
both paid the ad valorem taxes assessed by the taxing an-
thorities and both were qualified to do business in the
state in which the tax was sought to be imposed.
A study of the difference in the facts between the Ozark
ease and the facts in the case at bar is worthwhile. Ozark
maintained in Missouri its principal office where it kept
its books and bank accounts from which it paid its em-
ployees within and without Missouri. Plantation main-
tained its principal office at Atlanta, Georgia, and kept no
books or records in Alabama except such as were neces-
sary to the transportation and delivery of products in
Alabama. Ozark entered into contracts for the transporta-
tion of products in Missouri. Plantation did not. enter into
any contracts in Alabama for the transportation of prod-
ucts. It seems to us conclusive that if Ozark was engaged
exclusively in interstate commerce in Missouri under the
facts outlined above, and it was so held by the Supreme
Court of the United States, then Plantation necessarily
was engaged exclusively in interstate commerce in Ala-
bama in 1952.
In United Air Lines, Inc., v. Joseph, 282 App. Div. 48,
121 N. H. S. 2d 692, affirmed 307 N. Y. 762, 121 N. E. 2d
P gaye ~
ay ee
ov, United Air Lines operated in many states from coast
to coast and even beyond the continental boundaries of
the United States. Its main and financial office was in
Illinois, its chief maintenance base in Wyoming. It car-
ried air mail, passengers and freight in interstate and
foreign commerce. It carried no intrastate traffie in New
York. The sale of passenger tickets in New York City
averaged over $2,000,000 cach year. It was estimated that
an equal amount was sold outside the city for transporta-
tion into the city. It operated in New York City the usual
facilities including three traffic offices, a hangar, a stock
room of parts and supplies and a repair and maintenance
shop. It employed about 300 persons in New York City
including a district traffic manager.
It was contended that the vast business establishment
of the United Air Lines within the city as has been de-
scribed, the depositing and checking out of moneys in
local banks, the handling of baggage and the convenience
of passengers at the terminal, * * * constitute such a
separation, distinction and localizing of its generally inter-
state operations as to subject United Air Lines to a tax
by the city on its gross receipts.
In holding that the United Air Lines was engaged solely
in interstate commerce in New York the court held:
6c%#® *
* We think the activities of United Air in
New York City are simply a continuous, logical and
necessary extension of its interstate air transporta-
tion, and that, therefore, the tax imposed here is a
local tax on interstate commerce, forbidden by the
Federal Constitution. The size of its activities in
New York City is but a reflection of the size of United
Air's interstate operations and the importance of New
York City as a land, sea and air center of transporta-
tion. In any event, mere size of operations is im-
material if, in fact, the operations are solely in inter-
SRI ISY ead 20 SPEAR. Ae DA
+ ORR erty
ss ni
state or foreign commerce. Also, it has never been
held that merely because an interstate transaction
stops or starts in a state, that the stop or start is
localized or intrastate; nor does the city claim that.
“oe ** all the matters that the city contends localize
United Air’s activities are nothing more than the
necessary incidents to operating a terminal point for
its interstate transportation to and from New York
City. The presence of officers, hangar, repair shops,
employees, and the handling of moneys locally are all
a direct part of the interstate operation. The sale
of tickets for interstate trips is obviously a necessary
incident. Indeed, but for these incidents there could
be no interstate transportation by United Air. One
transport for hire, therefore one is paid. The pas-
senger must get a ticket or other evidence of paid
passage. The aircraft must be loaded. It must be
discharged. These acts must take place somewhere.
These are as essential to commercial air transport as
the aircraft itself, or the route to be traversed. As
Mr. Justice Cardozo said on behalf of the Supreme
Court in the Puget Sound Co. case, 502 U. S. 90, 92,
08 S. Ct. 72, at page 73, supra, speaking of independ-
ent stevedore activities done entirely within the state
of Washiigton, but holding them to be interstate in
character:
‘* «Transportation of a cargo by water is impossible
or futile unless the thing to be transported is put
aboard the ship and taken off at destination. A steve-
dore who in person or by servants does work so in-
dispensable is as much an agency of commerce as
shipowner or master. No one would deny that
the crew would be engaged in interstate or foreign
commerce if busied in loading or unloading an inter-
* * @
* * »*
state or foreign vessel.
er aes
‘**What was done by this appellant in the business
of foading and unloading was not prolonged beyond
the stage of transportation and its reasonable inci-
dents.’
‘**The holding and the reasoning in the Puget Sound
Co. case was later reaffirmed in Joseph v. Carter &
Weeks Co., 330 U. S. 422, 67 S. Ct. 815, 91 L. Ed. 993,
supra. Since it involved stevedore operations by an
independent contractor, its holding and reasoning go
well beyond the necessities of this case.
‘“*The Spector case, mentioned earlier several times,
is of course even more applicable to the problem here.
There the taxpayer maintained offices, employees and
pick-up trucks in the taxing state. Nevertheless, it
was held that the state could not tax the gross re-
ceipts because they were derived from interstate truck
transportation.’ 121 N. Y. S. 2d, at 695, 699, 700.
It is well to observe that United maintained in New
York City stock rooms of parts or supplies and a repair
and maintenance shop, and it was held that those aspects
of its business could not be “localized”? and disassociated
from its interstate operations. So in the present case, the
existence of a warehouse at Helena where there are stored
xoods necessary for the operation of the pumping and
other transportation facilities located there does not
change the fact that Plantation is engaged solely in inter-
state commerce in Alabama.
The State emphasizes the fact that Plantation owned
at each pumping station and stand-by facility a house
which was rented, for less than the amount of depreciation
and repairs, to the person in charge of the facility who
Was required to be on duty or on call for duty twenty-four
hours a day. In Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Atkins,
270 S. W. 2d 384, Texas Gas had in Tennessee compressor
oan
stations, meter men and dispatchers, maintenance camps,
materials and supplies, rights of way, easements and per-
mits to cross highways, ete., and all other facilities neces-
sary for the operation of a gas pipe line. Yet it was held
to be engaged solely in interstate commerce in Tennessee,
It certainly follows that if the presence of maintenance
camps in Tennessee was not held to be doing a local or
intrastate business, the ownership of one house by Planta-
tion at each pumping and stand-by facility could not be
so hela.
The State also emphasizes that there were tank facili-
ties at Helens. The seventeen tanks at Helena are integral
parts of the trausportation system. They are necessary to
insure that the identity of the products being transported
to Birmingham and Montgomery will be maintained. Quan-
tities of products destined for Birmingham and Mont-
vomery are not sufficient to require the constant use of
the lines to those two terminals "4 therefore, such
terminals are not always open. Products which are des-
tined for either Birmingham or Montgomery stay in the
tanks at Helena for an average of two or three days be-
fore being placed in the branch pipe line to either of these
delivery terminals. While the shipments are held at
Helena they are still in the course of interstate transporta-
tion. The shipments are never stored at Helena at the
request of a shipper. So we point to the recent opinion
of the Supreme Court. of Illinois in Mississippi River Fuel
Corp. v. Hoffman, 123 N. ©. 2d (Ill.) 503, cert. den. 349
U.S. 985, 99 L. Ed. 651, wherein the court said:
‘‘Appellants devote a considerable part of their
argument to a discussion of an attempt which is being
made by appellee to create a gas storage field in IIli-
nois in an exhausted gas field in Monree County. It
is enough to say that even if appellee had fully sue-
ceeded in this endeavor and if some of the gas sold
to its industrial customers had for a time been held
in storage in the places mentioned, it would not, in
our opinion, detract in any way from the interstate
character of the whole transaction. A freight train
carrying an interstate shipment may pause for a long
time at a railroad siding in the course of the ship-
ment without changing the interstate character of the
whole act. It is well known, at least to those ac-
quainted with the natural gas pipeline industry, that
in several parts of the country such gas storage fields
exist, and it has never been supposed that the exist-
ence and use of this method of underground storage
has in any way detracted from or minimized the inter-
state character of the business of such pipeline com-
panies.
7 * * * ~ * *
‘The same considerations apply to appellants’ argu-
ment that appellee’s business is in some way reduced
to a local intrastate one by reason of the fact that
appellee sometimes finds it advisable to ‘pack’ gas
in its pipelines at higher than normal pressure. Such
‘packing’ is treated by appellants as identical with
‘storage.’ What we have said above with respect to
underground storage of gas as a proper and useful
part of interstate commerce disposes of this question
of ‘packing.’ ”’
Far more mechanically necessary than the gas storage
fields referred to in the foregoing authority, the Helena
tanks are essential parts of the transportation facilities
required by the special and highly developed technique of
pipe line transmission. They are in no sense merely op-
tional storage facilities. The interstate transportation
could not take place without them any more than railroad
freight could be handled without classification yards and
side tracks.
Even in the situation where gasoline is brought into a
state by truck or rail and put into storage tanks pending
ae aa 1
=
further distribution to ultimate consumers in a regular
‘flow of trade,’’ interstate commerce is not interrupted.
Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 340 U. S.
931, 95 L. Ed. 239, 245.
It cannot be asserted that interstate commerce, to be
immune from taxation, must be conducted in some sort of
vacuum without tangible property, personnel or incidental
activities within the boundaries of the state. The falacies
of such contention was demonstrated in Ozark Pipe Line
Corporation, supra, where the Court said:
‘“‘The maintenance of an office, the purchase of sup-
plies, employment of labor, maintenance and _ opera-
tion of telephone and telegraph lines and automobiles,
and appellant’s other acts within the state, were all
exclusively in furtherance of its interstate business;
and the property itself, however extensive or of what-
ever character, was likewise devoted only to that end.
They were the means and instrumentalities by which
that business was done, and in no proper sense con-
stituted, or contributed to, the doing of a local busi-
ness. The protection against imposition of burdens
upon interstate commerce is practical and substantial,
and extends to whatever is necessary to the complete
enjoyment of the right protected. Heyman v. Hays.
supra, p. 186 (59 L. Ed. 531, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 403).”
266 U. S., at 565, 69 L. Ed., at 443.
A consideration of the foregoing authorities causes us
to reach the conclusion that Plantation was engaged ex-
clusively in interstate commerce in Alabama in 1952.
II. The Alabama franchise tax on foreign corporations
is not applicable to foreign corporations doing an exclu-
sively interstate business in Alabama. In Anglo-Chilean
Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama, 288 U. S. 218, 77 L. Ed.
710, the court held that the Alabama franchise tax on
=
foreign corporations is laid upon the actual doing of busi-
ness and ‘‘not upon the authorization, right or privilege
to do business in Alabama.’’ It will be recalled that a
permit to do business in Alabama was issued by the state
authorities under protest of Plantation on the ground that
it was engaged in doing an exclusively interstate business
in Alabama,
A study of the history of the franchise tax, including
amendments made after the Anglo-Chilean decision, supra,
and the constitutional provision under which it was levied
and the decisions of this court demonstrate to us that the
franchise tax on foreign corporations is only applicable to
foreign corporations actually doing an intrastate business
in this State.
Article XTV, Section 4, of the Constitution of 1875, pro-
vided:
‘*‘No foreign corporation shall do any business in
this State without having at least one known place of
business and an authorized agent or agents therein;
and such corporation may be sued in any county where
it does business by service of process upon an agent
anywhere in this State.’’
Article 12, Section 232, of the Constitution of 1901, pro-
vides:
‘*‘No foreign corporation shall do any business in
this State without having at least one known place
of business and an authorized agent or agents therein
and without filing with the secretary of state a certi-
fied copy of its articles of incorporation or association.
Such corporation may be sued in any county where it
does business, by service of process upon an agent
anywhere in the State. The legislature shall, by gen-
eral law, provide for the payment to the State of
Alabama of a franchise tax by such corporation, but
nts
such franchise tax shall be based on the actual amount
of capital employed in this State. Strictly benevolent,
educational or religious corporations shall not be re-
quired to pay such a tax.’’
These sections relate to a foreign corporation that ‘‘does
business’? in Alabama or to foreign corporations that ‘do
any business in this State.’’ The decisions of this Court
hold that these words are construed as holding that a
foreign corporation doing an exclusively interstate busi-
ness in Alabama does not ‘‘do any business in this State”’
and that the constitutional provision is not applicable to
such a corporation—Ware v. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co.,
92 Ala. 145, 9 So. 136; Nelms v. Edinburg American Land
Mortgage Co., 92 Ala. 157, 9 So. 141; Hurst v. Fitz Wheel
Co., 197 Ala. 10, 72 So. 314; Puffer Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 198
Ala. 131, 73 So. 403; Cobb v. York Ice Machine Corp., 230
Ala. 95, 159 So. 811, and Ewart Lumber Co. v. American
Cement Plaster Co., 9 Ala. App. 152, 62 So. 560. This Court
well stated the rule in the Hurst case, supra, when it said,
‘“*The constitutional and statutory provisions under con-
sideration were not intended and cannot be made to inter-
fere with, or to apply to, interstate commerce.”’
The Constitution of 1901 provides for the payment of a
franchise tax by ‘‘such corporation.’” The words ‘‘such
corporation’? can only apply to foreign corporations that
‘*do any business in this State’’ or to a foreign corporation
that ‘‘does business’’ in Alabama. As previously shown,
these words do not apply to a foreign corporation doing
exclusively an interstate business in Alabama.
In 1907 the legislature levied (Act No. 334, General Acts
of 1907, p. 418) a franchise tax on ‘‘every foreign corpora-
tion authorized to do business in this State under the laws
of the State of Alabama, except strictly benevolent, educa-
tional or religious corporations.’’ After the 1907 Act was
declared unconstitutional in Southern Railway Company v.
ee
Greene, 216 U. S. 400, 54 L. Ed. 036, the legislature enacted
the forerunner of our present franchise tax law (Section 12
ef Act No. 216, Acts of 1911, p. 170). As for domestic
corporations the Act provided for a franchise tax on ‘All
corporations organized under the laws of this State.”’ As
for foreign corporations the Act provided for a franchise
tax on **All corporations organized under the laws of any
other State, nation or territory, and doing business in this
State.”’ While the language of the franchise tax statute
has changed some since 1911, the quoted words have
always been contained in each statute. Since 1911 the
enactment of the foreign franchise tax ‘‘implementing
(State v. Travelers Ins. Co., 256 Ala. 61, 58 So. 2d 745)
the constitutional provision has been in conformity to the
mandate of the Constitution’? (State v. Jackson Securities
& Inv. Co., 243 Ala. 83, 8 So. 24 573) and ‘‘in the words of
the Constitution, indicating the purpose of the Legislature
to make the statutory levy conform with the Constitution’’
(International Paper Co. v. Curry, 243 Ala. 228 9 So. 2d 8).
The words ‘‘doing business in this State’? as used in the
franchise tax cannot have any different meaning from the
words ‘‘do any business”? or ‘‘does business”’ in the Consti-
tution.
Before the enactment of any franchise tax in Alabama
this Court held that a license tax for doing business as a
corporation was a tax ‘or ‘ ‘doing business as a corpora-
tion,’ and not for the mere privilege of existing as a corpo-
ration.’? The State v. Anniston Rolling Mills, 125 Ala.
121, 27 So. 921. This decision establishes a basie distine-
tion. The Court distinguished between a tax on the privi-
lege of using the corporate form and a tax on the actual
doing of business and held that a tax imposed on ‘doing
business as a corporation’? was a tax on the actual doing
of business and not merely on the corporate privilege.
The question now under discussion came before this
Court in State v. National Cash Credit Association, 294
ee
pe ee
Ala. 629, 141 So. 541, where the taxpayer argued in brief
that,
‘Tn order for a foreign corporation to be liable for
a franchise tax in Alabama, it must both be doing
business and employing capital within the state. These
prerequisites must exist concurrently, and, in the ab-
sence of either, the power to impose the tax does not
exist. * * * Mere qualification by a foreign corporation
to do business in Alabama does not constitute doing
business within the State.’’
In response to this argument this Court on rehearing
held:
‘““We merely hold a franchise tax to be what it
purports to be, a tax upon the exercise or use of its
franchise in Alabama for the purposes of such fran-
chise.’’
This is an express holding that the Alabama franchise
tax on foreign corporations is only applicable when the
foreign corporation is doing business in Alabama. The
holding of the United States Supreme Court in the Anglo-
Chilean case, supra, is in harmony with the decision of this
Court in the National Cash Credit Association case, supra.
The United States Supreme Court held that the Anglo-
Chilean Nitrate Sales Corporation was engaged solely in
interstate commerce in Alabama and that therefore the
Alabama foreign corporation franchise tax was not ap-
plicable to such corporation, even though it had qualified
to do business in Alabama.
In State v. Southern Natural Gas Corporation, 233 Ala.
81, 170 So. 178, this Court again reviewed the Alabama
franchise tax as it existed prior to the 1935 amendment
(General Acts 1935, p. 3888). After considerable discussion
it was said, ‘‘We hold that the franchise tax here exacted
and being considered is * * * laid on the exercise of corpo-
rate functions, or on the privilege of exercising corporate
— 0 —
functions within the state.” The Court held that Southern
Natural was doing an intrastate business in Alabama and
was therefore liable for the tax. If the tax had been laid
merely on the right of a foreign corporation to exercise
its functions solely within the State of Alabama or the
right to do business in Alabama in corporate form, the
Court could have held the tax applicable without consid-
ering or deciding the question of whether or not the com-
pany was doing an intrastate business, since Southern
Natural had qualified in Alabama and thus obtained such
rights. The Southern Natural Gas case Was aflirmed by the
United States Supreme Court, 301 U.S, 148, 81 L. Ed. 970,
after it found that Southern Natural “‘earried on in Ala-
bama activities of an intrastate character.”’
After the decision in the Anglo-Chilean case the Alabama
legislature in 1935 added Section 318 of Act No. 194
(General Acts of 1935, p. 888), containing the following
proviso to the foreign corporation franchise tax:
‘*Provided, that if a corporation has qualified to do
business in this State it shall for the purpose of fran-
chise tax prima facie be held to be doing business in
the State of Alabama within the meaning of this Act.’’
This proviso has remained a part of the law ever since,
Section 348, Title o1, Code of 1940.
This proviso makes it clear that after 1935 the Alabama
franchise tax is not, if it ever was, laid on the bare right
of a foreign corporation to exercise its corporate functions
within the State of Alabama or the right to do business in
Alabama in corporate form. If the tax was applicable to
any foreign corporation which had qualified to do business
in Alabama, even though the business done was exclusively
interstate, there was no need for the proviso, as such a
corporation had the right to exercise its corporate fune-
tion within the State and the right to do business in Ala-
~~
bama in corporate form. In other words, the proviso is
an express legislative recognition of the fact that a foreign
corporation must be doing some intrastate commerce be-
fore the tax is applicable. The Act makes the fact of
qualification merely prima facie evidence of such intra-
state commerce, recognizing that the bare fact of qualifi-
cation would not be conclusive. It is clear, therefore, that
a corporation engaged exclusively in interstate commerce
is not intended to be subject to the tax. The decisions
rendered since the enactment of the proviso also make it
clear that a foreign corporation must be doing some intra-
state commerce in Alabama before it is subject to the tax.
Consolidated Coal Co. v. State, 236 Ala. 489, 183 So. 690.
In Hollingsworth & Whitney Co. v. State, 241 Ala. 96,
1 So. 2d 387, the franchise tax as amended was before the
Court and this Court said: ‘‘The franchise tax is not a
condition or qualification to ‘doing business,’ ’’ and ‘‘We
have often noted that this tax is an excise for the privi-
lege of doing business in Alabama.”’ And analyzing the
record further the Court continued: ‘‘We think that this
status shows a doing of business in Alabama, by the tax-
payer, so as to subject it to the franchise tax.”’
We are satisfied that the franchise tax is only applicable
to foreign corporations doing intrastate business in Ala-
bama.
III. The Alabama franchise tax, if applicable to a for-
eign corporation engaging exclusively in interstate com-
merce in Alabama, would be unconstitutional. The ques-
tion here presented is controlled by the recent decision of
the Supreme Court of the United States in Spector Motor
Service, Inc., v. O’Connor, 340 U. S. 602, 95 L. Ed. 573. In
that case the same kind of tax with the same operating
incidence as the Alabama tax involved in this case was
held invalid. The foregoing decision is the result of
lengthy litigation in which the various facts and issues
were fully considered. It appears that there were seven
decisions rendered before the Supreme Court of the United
States finally held that the Connecticut franchise tax con-
travened the Commerce Clause when applied to a corpora-
tion qualified to do business in Connecticut, doing exelu-
sively an interstate business. We cite these decisions be-
eause they will add an understanding to the final decision.
The Connecticut Corporation Business Tax of 1935 im-
posed a tax upon every corporation ‘“‘earrying on business
in this state.’’ This act was amended in 1987 so as to im-
pose the tax on every corporation “‘earrying on or having
the right to carry on business in this state.’ We refer
now to Spector Motor Service, Inc., v. McLaughlin, 47 F.
Supp. 671; Spector Motor Service, Inc., v. Walsh, 139 F.
2d 809; Spector Motor Service, Ine., v. McLaughlin, 323
U.S. 101, 89 L. Ed. 101; Spector Motor Service, Inc., v.
Tax Commission of Conn., 15 Conn. Sup. 205; Spector Mo-
tor Service, Inc., v. Walsh, 135 Conn. 37, 61 A. 2d 89;
Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 88 F. Supp. 711;
Spector Motor Service, Inc., v. O’Connor, 181 F. 2d 150.
This brings us to a consideration of the final decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States, which granted
certiorari ‘“‘because of the fundamental nature of the issue
and the apparent conflict between the judgment below and
previous judgments of this Court.’’—340 U. S. 602, at 605,
9) L. Ed., at 576. A brief resume of the basic positions
of the various Federal judges who considered the matter
will bring into proper perspective the conflict of views
presented to the Supreme Court of the United States. On
the one hand, Judges Clark and Frank, constituting the
majority of the Second Circuit, felt that decisions such as
Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250,
82 L. Ed. 823; Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335
U. S. 80, 92 L. Ed. 1832, and Interstate Oi] Pipeline Co.
SPE ELAR OMY TE NG! PIE ELIE EI ILE IL TILE NS IPG ep
OORT
aa sk a ei
—
v. Stone, 337 U. S. 662, 93 L. Ed. 1618, decisions which are
relied upon by the State in this case, indicated a trend
toward a holding of constitutionality and a departure
from earlier precedents such as Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v.
Monier, 266 U.S. 555, 69 L. Ed. 489, and Alpha Portland
Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203, 69 L. Ed. 916.
On the other hand, Judges Hand (first appeal) and Swann
of the Cireuit Court (second appeal) and Smith of the
District Court followed what Judge Hand so aptly called
‘fan unbroken line of decisions,’’ which included the Ozark
and Alpha Portland cases.
The Supreme Court adopted the interpretation of the
Supreme Court of Connecticut as to the incidence of the
tax and pointed out that its decision as to the validity of
the tax was the same without regard to the amendment.
In holding that the tax as applied to Spector Motor Serv-
ice, which was engaged, according to the Court, exclu-
sively in interstate commerce, contravened the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution, the Court, speak-
ing through Justice Burton, said:
‘‘The incidence of the tax provides the answer. The
courts of Connecticut have held that the tax before
us attaches solely to the franchise of petitioner to do
interstate business. The State is not precluded from
imposing taxes upon other activities or aspects of this
business which, unlike the privilege of doing inter-
state business, are subject to the sovereign power of
the State. Those taxes may be imposed although
their payment may come out of the funds derived
from petitioner’s interstate business, provided the
taxes are so imposed that their burden will be reason-
ably related to the powers of the State and nondis-
criminatory.
‘‘This Court heretofore has struck down, under the
Commerce Clause, state taxes upon the privilege of
ie
carrying on a business that was exclusively interstate
in character. The constitutional infirmity of such a
tax persists no matter how fairly it is apportioned to
business done within the state. Alpha Portland Ce-
ment Co. y. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203, 68 L. Ed.
916, 45 S. Ct. 477, 44 A. L. R. 1219 (measured by per-
centages of corporate excess and net income); Ozark
Pipe Line Corp. vy. Monier, 266 U. S. 595, 69 L. Ed.
439, 45 S. Ct. 184 (measured by percentage of capital
stock and surplus). See Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co.
v. Stone, 337 U.S. 662, 669 et seq., 93 L. Ed. 1613,
1621, 69 S. Ct. 1264 (dissenting opinion which dis.
cusses the issue on the assumption that the activities
were in interstate commerce); Joseph v. Carter &
Weeks Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 442, 91 L. Ed. 993,
67 S. Ct. 815; Freeman y. Hewitt, 329 U. Ss. 249, 91
L. Ed. 265, 67 S. Ct. 274, supra.
‘Our conclusion is not in conflict with the principle
that, where a taxpayer is engaged both in intrastate
and interstate commeree, a state may tax the privilege
of carrying on intrastate business and, within reason-
able limits, may compute the amount of the charge by
applying the tax rate to a fair proportion of the tax-
payer’s business done within the state, including both
interstate and intrastate. Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co.
v. Stone, 337 U.S. 662, 93 L. Ed. 1613, 69 S. Ct. 1264,
supra; International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S.
416, 91 L. Ed. 1328, 56 S. Ct. 887. The same is true
where the taxpayer’s business activity is local in na-
ture, such as the transportation of passengers between
points within the same state, although including inter-
state travel, Central Greyhound Lines y. Mealey, 334
U.S. 653, 92 L. Ea. 1633, 68 S. Ct. 1260, or the publi-
cation of a newspaper, Western Live Stock y, Bureau
of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 82 L. Ed. 823, 58 §. Ct. 546,
115 A. L. R. 944. See also Memphis Gas Co, y, Stone,
335 U. S. 80, 92 L. Ed. 1332, 68 S. Ct. 1475.
ey tte ees |
LEILA TS APRIL IPS
Te
PEED GOS ge RAED
1 PO Rg tT
SOY, ree
® Cne
=, Sen
‘In this field there is not only reason but long-
established precedent for keeping the federal privilege
of carrying on exclusively interstate commerce free
from state taxation. To do so gives lateral support to
one of the cornerstones of our constitutional law.—
M’Culloch v. Maryland (U.S.), 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed.
579, supra.’’—340 U.S., at 608-610, 95 L. Ed., at 578,
579.
Justices Clark, Black and Douglas dissented on the
ground that a tax even on exclusively interstate commerce
is valid when fairly apportioned and nondiscriminatory.
In holding that a tax upon the franchise of a corpora-
tion for the privilege of carrying on or doing business was
unconstitutional when applied to a qualified foreign cor-
poration engaged exclusively in interstate commerce, the
Court followed that ‘‘unbroken line of decisions,’’ ineclud-
ing Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, supra, and Alpha-
Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, supra; Joseph v.
Carter & Weeks Stevedoring Co., 330 U. S. 422, 91 L. Ed.
993, and Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U. S. 249, 91 L. Ed. 265.
The first two of these cases had been considered by a ma-
jority of the Second Circuit to be outmoded by recent
‘*trends.’’ However, the Supreme Court reaffirms or, as
one commentator (20 Ford L. R. 217, at 218) put it, ‘‘ex-
plicitly ‘restores to full vigor’ ’’ the decisions in Ozark
Pipe Line Corp. and Alpha Portland Cement Co., supra.
In an effort not to prolong unreasonably this opinion,
attention will be directed to only one of the foregoing
cases, namely, Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, supra, as
the facts of that case closely parallel the facts in the case
now before us.
The Supreme Court of the United States in the follow-
ing manner stated the position of the taxing authorities:
“But the contention in justification of the tax is
that appellant is also engaged in doing local business,
‘ns
the basis of such contention being the facts econcern-
ing its ownership and use of property other than the
pipe line, and its various acts and activities within
the state hereinabove recited; and, further, that the
purposes for which it is incorporated as declared in
its articles, comprehend other activities than that of
transporting petroleum; namely, the acquisition and
operation of telegraph and telephone lines, dealing in
and transporting merchandise, ete.” 266 U.S. at 562,
69 L. Ed at 442.
However the Court held that Ozark Pipe Line Corpora-
tion was not liable for the tax and said:
“The business actually carried on by appellant was
exclusively in interstate commerce. The maintenance
of an office, the purchase of supplies, employment of
labor, maintenance and operation of telephone and
telegraph lines and automobiles, and appellant’s other
acts within the state, were all exclusively in further-
ance of its interstate business; and the property it-
self, however extensive or of whatever character, was
likewise devoted only to that end. They were the
means and instrumentalities by which that business
was done, and in no proper sense constituted, or con-
tributed to, the doing of a local business. The pro-
tection against imposition of burdens upon interstate
commerce is practical and substantial, and extends to
whatever is necessary to the complete enjoyment of
the right protected. Heyman y. Hays, supra, p. 186
(09 L. Ed. 531, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 403). * * *
“Some stress is laid upon the fact that the objects
and purposes specified in appellant’s articles of in-
corporation are not confined to the transportation of
petroleum, but include the doing of other business
local in character. As to this, it is enough to say that
none of these powers were in fact exercised in the
=
state of Missouri; and, so far as this case is concerned,
the power to tax depends upon what was done, and
not upon what might have been done. Moreover, the
license issued by the state authorized appellant to en-
gage ‘exclusively in the business of transporting crude
petroleum by pipe line.’
“Nor is it material that appellant applied for and
received a Missouri license, or that it had the power
thereunder to exercise the right of eminent domain.
These facts could not have the effect of conferring
upon the state an authority, denied by the Federal
Constitution, to regulate interstate commerce. The
state has no such power even in the case of domestic
corporations. See Philadelphia & S. Mail S. 8. Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326, 342, 30 L. Ed. 1200, 1203,
1 Inters. Com. Rep. 308, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1118. The
statute, as applied to appellant, is unconstitutional.”
266 U.S. at 565-567, 69 L. Ed. at 448, 444.
The opinion of the Supreme Court in the Spector case
clarifies the disparity of views between the Justices that
appeared in 1949 in the case of Interstate Oil Pipe Line
Co. v. Stone, 337 U. S. 662, 93 L. Ed. 1613. The facts of
the case are simple. A Delaware corporation owned and
operated pipe lines in Mississippi. It picked up oil in the
oil fields in Mississippi and transported it to railroad
loading tracks also in Mississippi. At the loading tracks
the oil was pumped into railroad cars for shipment out of
the state. The pipeline company acted as agent of the
owners of the oil in transporting it and in arranging with
the railroad for the out-of-state shipment. The State of
Mississippi imposed “annual privilege taxes, measured by
the amount of volume of business done” upon a_ wide
variety of enterprises. With respect to persons transport-
ing oil or gas in pipeline for compensation or hire between
two points in the State, the tax levied was 2% of the gross
income of the business. The Mississippi court held this
— 63 —
tax validly applicable to the business of the pipeline com-
pany.
Mr. Justice Rutledge delivercd an opinion in which he
Was joined by Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy. These
Justices found it unnecessary to decide whether the ae-
tivity of the pipe line company was technically interstate
or intrastate commerce; in either event, they said, Missis-
sippi had the power to impose the tay, They rejected the
contention that the tax was invalid merely because it im-
posed “a ‘direct’ tax on the ‘privilege’ of engaging in inter-
state commerce” and argued that the commerce clause did
not invalidate the tax. This position was not accepted by
a majority of the court and was repudiated by the Spector
case,
Ina separate opinion Mr. Justice Burton concluded that
the tax was upon the privilege of transporting oil in intra-
state rather than interstate commerce. Such conclusion
enabled him to uphold the validity of the tax without fur-
ther consideration of its actual effect upon interstate com-
merece, On that basis he stated that it Was unnecessary to
decide whether or not a privilege tax could validly be im-
posed upon the privilege of transporting oil in Mississippi
in interstate commerce. He expressly refused to join in
Mr. Justice Rutledge’s opinion.
Mr. Justice Reed delivered an opinion in which he was
joined by Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Frankfurter
and Jackson. In the first part of the opinica he concinded
that the pipe line company actually was engaged in inter-
State commerce. In the second part of the opinion he con-
cluded that a privilege tax for carrying on a wholly inter-
state transportation business measured by a fairly appor-
tioned part of the gross receipts was invalid. In so con-
cluding he observed:
**Phrased in terms of a privilege for carrying on an
interstate business, such a tax historically has been
TS
Oe Te eS
a
deemed unconstitutional. The cases abound in state-
ments to the effect that the privilege of carrying on
interstate commerce itself is immune from state taxa-
tion. This is because it is a privilege beyond the power
of a state to grant. ‘* * * it is a right which every
citizen of the United States [and every corporation] is
entitled to exercise under the Constitution and laws of
the United States: * * *.’ Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141
U. S. 47, 57, 35 L. Ed. 649, 652, 11 S. Ct. 851; Interna-
tional Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 54 1. Ed.
678, 30S. Ct. 481, 27 L. R. A. (NX. S.) 493, 18 Ann. Cas.
1103. The cases hold not only that a state may not
exact a tax as a condition precedent to the doing of
interstate business, but also that it may not levy privi-
lege, excise or franchise taxes on a foreign corporation
for the privilege of carrying on or the actual doing of
solely interstate business after its admission to the
state. Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555,
69 L. Ed. 489, 45 S. Ct. 184; Alpha Portland Cement
Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 208, 69 L. Ed. 916, 45
S. Ct. 477, 44 A. L. R. 1219.”’
So by virtue of the limited approval of Mr. Justice Bur-
ton of the Mississippi Court’s decision, and not for the rea-
sons advanced by Justice Rutledge, did the decision of
Justice Rutledge temporarily (until Spector) become the
decision of the Court.
In the Spector case the Court followed the opinion of Mr.
Justice Reed in the Interstate Oil Pipe Line case, and not
that of Mr. Justice Rutledge. Thus the quotations from
the Interstate Oil Pipe Line case in the State’s brief are
now not controlling and Justice Reed's pertinent statement,
quoted above, controls the decision in the case at bar. Later
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and
other decisions since Spector have reaffirmed without ques-
tion that the holding that a tax on the privilege of doing
ee ae
a 65
an exclusively interstate business contravenes the Com
merce Clause of the Constitution of the United States.
Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaners, Inc., v. Stone, 342 U. S.
389, 96 L. Ed. 436; Railway Express Agency, Inc., v. Com-
monwealth of Virginia, 347 U. S. 309, 98 L. Ed. 757.
In the case at bar the State has sought to emphasize the
fact that Plantation has qualified to do business in Ala-
bama and has obtained an annual permit. These facts are
immaterial. Plantation qualified and sought under protest
a permit to engage only in ‘interstate transportation by
pipe line of products refined from petroleum.’’ In the
Spector case Spector qualified to do business in Connecticut
and the tax was on the doing of business and the privilege
of doing business. As a matter of fact, Plantation has
followed the exact procedure followed by the taxpayer in
Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, supra, in which the im-
position of the tax was held invalid.
We note that the State also relies upon decisions by this
Court in Sanford v. City of Clanton, 244 Ala. 671, 15 So. 2d
309, and Sanford v. City of Andalusia, 256 Ala. 507, 55 So.
2d 856. These cases are clearly not applicable in the case
at bar since in these cases there is no tax or burden upon
commerce. The burden falls and the duties are laid not
upon the transportation but upon the delivery as an act in
consummating a sale between persons who may or may
not have an interest in the transportation but whose rela-
tionship is exclusive of transportation. And so we say
again that imposition of the Alabama franchise tax in the
case at bar is unconstitutional and void and this brings us
to the last question in the case in which the State contends
that the proceedings in regard to the 1942 franchise tax
are res adjudicata in this case.
IV. The appellant appears to insist upon its plea of res
judicata claiming that the decree in the Plantation Pipe
Line case involving the 1942 franchise taxes, Case No.
ee et er to teria tr ad
VOM EFT
LAUT OED
BO eye OR nD IMS
-
om 65
13040, is binding upon Plantation with respect to its fran-
chise tax for 1952.
It appears that by agreement between Plantation Pipe
Line and the State, Plantation settled its tax liability for
1942-48 for franchise taxes and permit fees. The agreement
of the parties with respect to that settlement is set forth
in a letter dated December 30, 1948. The agreement, ac-
cording to this letter, provided:
‘“*The Company will not appeal from or otherwise
attack assessment of the franchise taxes or permit fees
for these years, reserving, however, all rights with re-
spect to taxes for future years.’
The letter is dated December 30th, 1948. It states that a
consent decree dismissing the appeal with respect to the
vear 1942 initialed by the attorney for Plantation at a con-
ference in Montgomery on December 28th will be entered
today or tomorrow. The consent decree which was entered
on December 30th, 1948, bears in the lower left-hand corner
opposite the Judge's signature “OK J. F. J.’’ It now ap-
pears that there is a misunderstanding about the matter
and the State takes the position that the statement con-
tained in the letter is purely unilateral, as there is no evi-
dence to the effect that the State ever agreed to any such
thing. The lower court made no finding or determination
as to any question of fact in connection with the settlement
of Plantation’s 1942 franchise tax liability. Accordingly,
we are unable to say that the present suit is concluded by
the former adjudication, since we do not know that the
matters of the two suits are the same and the issues in the
former suit were broad enough to have comprehended all
that is involved in the second suit. Tankersley’s Admr. v.
Pettis, 71 Ala. 179.
There is an annotation on the question of ‘‘ Judgment in
tax cases in respect of one period as res judicata in respect
=
to another period”’ in 150 A. L. R., beginning at page 5. A
statement of applicable principles as here set forth is suf-
ficient to disclose that the consent decree with respect to
the 1942 franchise tax is not res judicata in this pro-
ceeding.
‘‘Generally, where in a proceeding concerning a tax
for a particular period a judgment is rendered which
determines that the taxpayer or his property is tax-
able or is exempt from taxation, but is not supported
by a finding or findings specifying the grounds or facts
upon which the conclusion is reached, such judgment
has been held not to settle conclusively the question
that the taxpayer or his property is taxable, or exempt
from taxation, for a different period not involved in
the former proceeding. This observation is borne out
by nearly all the cases, irrespective of the theory upon
which the result is reached under the particular cir-
cumstances of an individual case.’’ 150 A. L. R., at p. 63.
“The general rule that ‘a judgment on one cause of
action is not conclusive in a subsequent action based
upon a different cause of action as to questions of fact
which might have been but were not litigated and de-
termined in the prior action’ (see Am. Law. Inst. Re-
statement, Judgments, § 68, Comment d) has been ap-
plied where taxes for different periods were involved
in successive proceedings.’’ 150 A. L. R., at p. 32.
The settlement with respect to 1942 was by agreement.
Assuming that the State is not legally bound by agreement
that Plantation would have the right to litigate with
respect to other years, there is no finding in connection
With 1942 specifying the grounds upon which the conclu-
sion as to taxability was predicated. In fact there is no
judicial finding or determination as to any question of fact
in connection with the agreed settlement of Plantation’s
1942 franchise tax liability.
Berercogecgsent Piers ORME CIS TAR EME RESTING ER PO i I A 80
08
In Gillespie v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 151
Fed. 2d 903, the court, in speaking of the doctrine of res
judicata, said:
‘*The doctrine does not apply when the judgment
pleaded as an estoppel is based upon controlling state
decisions subsequently repudiated by supervening de-
cisions, thereby necessitating re-examination and ap-
plication of state law to the Federal question. Blair v.
Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 57 S. Ct. 330, 81 L. Ed. 465.
Or where authoritative decisions of the Federal Courts
repudiate the judgment pleaded as an estoppel, thereby
having the effect of perpetuating acknowledged error.
Henricksen v. Seward, supra. But see Commissioner
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., supra. It is rightly
said that the doctrine should be sparingly applied in
tax cases involving liability for different years, and
generally it is not applied where the taxable events
and transactions are by their nature fluid and subject
to change from year to year.’’
Under the cireumstanees we do not consider that the
consent decree of 1942 constitutes res adjudicata of the
issues in the present case.
It results that the decree of the lower court is due to be
affirmed.
Affirmed.
Livingston, C. J., and Merrill, J., coneur in the result and
Lawson, J., concurs specially.
[over]
Lawson, Justice (Concurring specially).
I concur in the opinion prepared for the Court by Mr.
Justice Stakely except insofar as it treats of the constitu-
tionality of the statutes here involved. Since the Court
SR
RRR ech. « 7
;
3
—
.
. . :
holds those statutes to be applicable only to intrastate :
business and that the taxpayer is engaged exclusively in HM
interstate business, there is no occasion to write to the §
constitutional question as to whether those statutes would ;
. . 2 ° ° 2
be constitutional if construed as applying to interstate :
commerce. We have a long line of cases Which hold that :
the constitutionality of a statute will not be determined 5
i
unless absolutely necessary to determine the merits of the ‘
suit in which the constitutionality of such statute has been
drawn in question. Smith v. Speed, 50 Ala. 276; Shehane
v. Bailey, 110 Ala. 308, 20 So. 359; Smith v. McQueen, 232
Ala. 90, 166 So. 788: State ex rel. Bland v. St. John, 244
Ala. 269, 13 So. 2d 161; Moses vy. Tarwater, 257 Ala. 361,
08 So. 2d 757; Donaghey y. Owen, 259 Ala. 376, 66 So. 2d
895. See Alabama State Federation of Labor, Local Union
No. 103 ete. et al. v. Robert E. McAdory, as Solicitor etc.,
825 U. S. 450, 65S. Ct. 1384, 89 L. Ed. 1725. The opinion in
this case shows no reason why this salutary rule is not
applicable and I feel that to ignore that rule wil] result
in having the instant case cited in the future as showing
that the Court followed the rule only when it feels it con-
venient to do so.
SPORE eR INT MICH W I aire RNa OS RENN Kee al Sal
VOTE Seb
oe
a
APPENDIX ‘‘B.’’
THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA.
Thursday, September 13, 1956.
The Court Met in Special Session Pursuant to Adjourn-
ment.
Present:
Chief Justice Livingston and Associate Justices Lawson,
Simpson, Stakely, Goodwyn, Merrill and Spann.
3 Div. 735.
The State of Alabama
VS.
Plantation Pipe Line Company,
a Corporation.
Montgomery Circuit Court, in Equity.
It Is Ordered, that the application for rehearing filed by
the appellant in the above cause on August 9, 1956, after
being duly examined and considered by the Court, be and
the same is hereby overruled. [Pages 3 and 6 of the opin-
ion as originally announced rewritten for corrections. }
=a
APPENDIX ‘‘C.”’
Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 8,
Clause 3:
“Section 8. The congress shall have power:— .
* * . * * * *
‘To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among
the several states, and with the Indian tribes;’’
APPENDIX ‘‘D.’’
Title 51, Section 348, as Amended, Code of Alabama 1940:
‘$348. Amount of Levy on Foreign Corporations.—
Every corporation organized under the laws of any other
state, nation or territory and doing business in this state,
except strictly benevolent, educational or religious corpo-
rations, shall pay annually to the state an annual franchise
tax of two and one-half dollars ($2.50) on each one thou-
sand dollars ($1,000.00) of the actual amount of capital em-
ployed in this state. In ascertaining the annual franchise
tax which will be paid by any foreign corporation doing
business in this state under this section there shall be de-
ducted from the amount of the capital employed by such
corporation in this state the aggregate amount of loans of
money made by such corporation in this state and which
shall be secured by existing mortgage or mortgages to it
on real estate in this state and upon which mortgage or
mortgages there shall have been paid the recording privi-
lege tax provided by law. Provided, that if a corporation
has qualified to do business in this state it shall for the
purpose of franchise tax prima facie be held to be doing
business in the State of Alabama within the meaning of
this title.’’
es
APPENDIX “‘E.”’
Title 51, Section 351, Code of Alabama 1940:
**$ 351. Report to Department of Revenue.—The presi-
dent or any executive officer or the secretary of every do-
mestie corporation subject to the franchise tax under this
title shall make a written statement under oath to the
department of revenue showing the following facts: The
date and place of incorporation and the total amount of
subscribed stock with which it began business; the total
authorized capital stock of the corporation; a brief state-
ment of all property, real and personal, owned by the cor-
poration in Alabama, giving the location and value of such
property by counties; the balance sheet of such corporation
as shown after closing its books on December thirty-first
preceding, or after closing its books at the end of its pre-
ceding fiscal year; such other detailed information as the
department of revenue may deem necessary to insure the
collection of the tax due. The president or any executive
oflicer or the secretary of every foreign corporation subject
to the franchise tax under this title, or qualified to do busi-
ness in Alabama, shall make a written statement under oath
to the department of revenue showing the following facts:
First, the date and place of incorporation and the date
such corporation qualified to do business in this state:
second, the total amount of its capital employed in this
state; third, a brief statement of all property, real and per
sonal, owned by the corporation in Alabama, giving the
location and value of such property by counties; fourth,
the amount of capital employed in this state which is se-
cured by existing mortgages in real estate in this state,
upon which mortgage there shall have been paid the re-
cording privilege tax provided by law; fifth, the balance
sheet of such corporation as shown after closing its books
on December thirty-first preceding, or after closing its
LL TTA AAALAC ALI OO, et fl
ERIE P LILLE I ILI TEES
_
cua 8,
oF
=;
books at the end of its preceding fiscal year; sixth, such
other detailed information as the department of revenue
may deem necessary to insure the collection of the tax due,
The statement required by this section shall be made on
blanks prepared and furnished by the department of reve-
nue on application of the corporation or otherwise. Such
written statements under oath to the department of reve-
nue shall be made and filed with said department of reve-
nue between the first day of January and the fifteenth day
of March of the calendar year for the franchise tax to he
paid for that calendar year.’’
APPENDIX ‘‘F.”’
Title 51, Section 354, Code of Alabama 1940:
*§ 354. Calendar Year Tax.—The franchise tax of do-
mestic and foreign corporations as authorized and levied
by this title shall run according to the calendar year and
shall be due on the first day of April of each year for the
tax of the current calendar year. Such corporations shall
be allowed thirty days after the first day of April within
which to pay said tax, but if delinquency continues after
thirty days there shall be collected a penalty of one per-
cent for each month or part thereof that the tax shall re-
main unpaid after the beginning of the delinquent period.
This penalty shall be in addition to the penalties herein-
before prescribed for failure to make returns by Mareh 15.
A foreign corporation, however, which has complied with
provisions of this title as to filing a sworn statement shall
not be considered delinquent nor subject to the one percent
monthly penalty until after thirty days from the date of
the assessment against it by the department of revenue.
Provided that where a foreign corporation has failed to
make the required report, the department of revenue shall
he authorized to make an assessment against such corpo-
ration upon information, of which assessment such corpo-
ration shall be given notice as is in this title provided, or
suit may be filed therefor in the name of the state against
such corporation, either in law or equity. The department
of revenue may for good cause remit the penalty provided
by this section.”
is
=
APPENDIX ‘‘G.’’
Title 51, Section 357, Code of Alabama 1940:
**$ 357. Assessment of Tax Against Foreign Corpora-
tions.—The department of revenue shall as soon as pos-
sible, after the required report has been filed with it by a
foreign corporation, ascertain and assess the amount of
franchise tax due by such corporation. The department of
revenue shall give notice by registered mail, return receipt
demanded, to the corporation, giving notice of the assess-
ment as fixed by the department of revenue, stating that
on a day specified, not less than ten days from the date of
the service of such notice, the department of revenue will
determine any complaint against such assessment. Upon
hearing such complaint or protest, or if there has been no
complaint or protest filed on or before the date specified
in such notice for the determination of the matter, the de-
partment of revenue shall proceed to determine and fix the
assessment for franchise tax. The corporation shall with-
out delay be given notice of such assessment as finally
fixed. The assessment shall have the full force and effect
of a judgment on which an execution may be issued by
the department of revenue directed to any sheriff in the
State of Alabama unless the corporation appeals from such
assessment as allowed by this title.’’
aS gz
APPENDIX ‘‘H.”’
Constitution of Alabam:. of 1901, Article 12, Section 232:
“See. 232. No foreign corporation shall do any business
in this state without having at least one known place of
business and an authorized agent or agents therein, and
without filing with the secretary of state a certified copy
of its articles of incorporation or association. Such corpo-
ration may be sued in any county where it does business,
by service of process upon an agent anywhere in the state.
The legislature shall, by general law, provide for the pay-
ment to the State of Alabama of a franchise tax by such
corporation, but such franchise tax shall be based on the
actual amount of capital employed in this state. Strictly
benevolent, educational or religious corporations shall not
be required to pay such a tax.”’
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.