Respondents Brief — McHoney v. Marine Navigation Co.

Supreme Court brief1956

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

Me:

we

4

oe ae

te

INDEX

PAGE

Orrntons BELow ........-.--------+- = 1

JURISDICTION ......-- ais 1

SraTEMENT OF THE CASE.... 2

Questions PRESENTED 6

ARGUMENT:

Summary OF ARGUMENT......... ae 7

I. The construction of the regulation by the

Court of Appeals is correct..... 8

Il. The decision of the Court of Appeals has no

bearing on the exercise by the Coast Guard of

the statutory powers granted it... 10

III. The Court is the proper tribunal to interpret

the meaning of an administrative regulation

and not the Coast Guard..............-----.--------+----+-+ 11

IV. An appeal does not lie from an order denying

a motion for rehearing..........-.-----------+---++----00-000-- 12

V. There was no proof to establish that the Coast

Guard Regulation was violated, even though

interpreted to apply to unloading 13

VI. There was no exception taken by the Peti-

tioners to the failure of the Court to charge in

the respect complained of and counsel for the

Petitioners stated at the conclusion of the

charge that they had no requests and no excep-

tions -

gest 7 > ane od So ncaa bed ones

OLLI RT IPT 2 BI Chen a RNS 5 De

ConcLusION

PML AIOE IR RE

InpEx To APPENDIX.

Stipulation as to Contents of Record in Court of

Appeals

Extract from Table K of Coast Guard Regulation...

Extract from Table K of Coast Guard Amended

Regulation

TABLE OF CasEs.

Brown & Sons Lumber Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co.,

299 U. S. 393

Colley v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., 157 F. 2d 1007

(CCA 4)

Conboy v. First National Bank of Jersey City, 203

U.S. 141

Good Holding Co. v. Boswell, 173 F. 2d 395 (CCA 5)

cert. den. 338 U.S. 815

M. Kraus & Bros. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614........

Meadows v. United States, 144 F. 2d 751 (CCA 4)......

Pfister v. Finance Corp., 317 U. 8. 144

Spellman v. American Barge Lines Co., 176 F. (a)

pi! :

Steuber v. Admiral Corp., 177 F. 2d 777 (CCA 7)

cert. den. 336 U. S. 961

U. 8. v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150..............

Wright & Michigan Central R. Co., 130 F. 843

(CCA 6)

STaTures.

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 51..................

POSER ve

PAGE

la

13a

l4a

11

16

ayy HANS wed

| LENORE EON LE DANE DED AA BL Le ine amen

in nis Ein ER AA CCE MEG SD AO Bn NR SASSER IS

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States —

Ocroser TERM, 1956. é.

e

No. 245 Mise. 0. 'T. 1956. :

Sam McHoney, Hersert DunMeEYER, JoHN SirH, FRANKLIN p

Waitt, Rosert JENKINS, CHAPEL Movzon, Limon JOYNER, :

Feurx McKyicut, Lurner Moorr, Toomas Burcn and &

Joun Bowens,

Petitioners, 4

vs. ,

Marine Navication Company, Inc.,

Respondent.

x

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, MARINE NAVIGATION i

COMPANY, INC., IN OPPOSITION TO THE i

ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

u

Opinions BELow.

The opinion of the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of South Carolina is officially reported in

137 F. Supp. 263. The opinion of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is officially reported in

233 F. 2d 769.

JURISDICTION.

It is not disputed that there is jurisdiction under Title

28 USC Sections 1254 (1) and 2101 (c). However, the peti-

ee

2

tion fails to establish that there exists any of the grounds

for granting a writ set forth in Rule 19 of the Revised Rules

of this court.

Although this court is asked to review an alleged failure

of the Trial Judge to charge the legal effect of a regulation

of the Coast Guard, no request was made to the Trial Judge

to charge the regulation according to its terms. Moreover,

no exception was made to the alleged failure so to charge

(Petitioners’ Appendix in Court of Appeals, 30a, 32a).

Thus, irrespective of the correctness of the interpreta-

tion of the regulation by the Court of Appeals, Petitioners

never properly raised objection to the charge as required

by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 51, which

reads in part as follows:

‘‘No party may assign as error the giving or

the failure to give an instruction unless he objects

thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict,

stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and

the grounds of his objection.’’

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

It is necessary to state at the outset that the Petitioners

take many liberties with the facts and they frequently

refer to matters completely outside the record. There-

fore, this court cannot accept the Petitioners’ statements

and arguments as reliable guides as to the proceedings

below.

The SS Marine Merchant, owned by the Respondent,

was chartered by The Texas Sulphur Company to transport

a cargo of bulk sulphur to the Port of Charleston. The

charterer employed James Doran Company as the steve-

dore to unload the cargo and the Petitioners were long-

shoremen in the employ of the stevedore.

a

DARK PAGE

3

After the vessel was docked, the stevedore took charge

of those parts of the vessel necessary to the unloading of

the cargo, including the ship’s apparatus which was to be

used in lifting the stevedore’s metal buckets from the hold

to the dock. The function of the Petitioners was to shovel

loose sulphur from the hold into the lowered buckets. At

5 o’clock in the afternoon of February 5, 1952, while this

operation was in progress, a fire occurred in the #2 hold

where the Petitioners were working.

The Petitioners brought this suit against the Respond-

ent, alleging that they received injuries as a result of the

fire and asserting that the injuries so received were due to

the unseaworthiness of the vessel and the negligence of the

Respondent in various particulars. Respondent denied the

material allegations of the complaint. The cause came

on for trial before a United States District Judge and a

jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of South Carolina. It was agreed by the parties,

with the approval of the Court, that the only questions to be

resolved at the trial were whether the ship was unseaworthy

and whether the Respondent was guilty of negligence. The

outcome of the trial was a verdict by the jury which found

for Respondent, answering, in the negative both of the ques-

tions submitted.

During the course of the trial, the Petitioners attempted

to show that the ship’s apparatus was not in proper working

order and that this caused a bucket to strike a metal part

of the ship, thereby making a spark which set off the fire.

The Petitioners also attempted to show that in other

respects the Respondent was negligent or the vessel was

unseaworthy. Respondent introduced considerable testi-

mony which established that the ship’s apparatus was in

no respect inadequate or defective and that there was no

fault on the part of the Respondent in respect to any of

LEEDTHRU

——

es Nat RA OE SPN PI ETE POEL LAL OEE ARD LA me a

4

the matters claimed by Petitioners. By its verdict the jury

found that defendant was not negligent and that its vessel

was seaworthy.

The Petitioners also charged that the Respondent failed

to ‘‘connect the ship’s water connections with a shore supply

source of water’’ and argued that such failure consti-

tuted a violation of the Coast Guard regulation (13a)*

which read in part as follows:

‘*A fire hose supplied with fresh water from a shore

supply source shall be available at each hatch

through which the sulfur is being loaded.’’

Respondent maintained that by its very terms the regu-

lation did not apply to the unloading operation then in

progress and established by uncontradicted testimony that,

in any event, the regulation was not violated since there

was available and put into use a fire hose leading from

the dock to the hold of the ship, which hose was supplied

with fresh water from a shore supply source.

The Trial Court ruled that the Coast Guard regulation

was applicable to unloading and so instructed the jury.

However, the Vourt refused to charge that the regulation

required a ‘‘connection’’ from the shore with the ship’s

water supply, because the regulation required only that

the hose be ‘‘available’’. At the completion of the charge,

the Court asked counsel for both parties whether there

were any other requests to charge or any exceptions and

counsel for the Petitioners stated that they had no further

requests and no exceptions (30a, 32a; Record in the Court

of Appeals).

Upon the verdict of the jury, the trial court entered

judgment for the Respondent. The Trial Court denied Peti-

* References are to the Appendix attached to this brief.

LATO

mraDr DNDACC EF

prone SOREL APY IEN END Phan Ie OTE DN, in 0 alate Bnet hla ah SNe Oe TA Te SONNE . —

5

tioners’ motions for a new trial or, in the alternative, judg-

ment notwithstanding the verdict. The United States

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judg-

ment.

A stipulation*® was entered iato by the parties, setting

forth the sole question on appeal and the contents of the

record on appeal. The sole issue on appeal from the judg-

ment in the District Court was the following (la):

‘‘Did the Court below err in failing to charge the

jury as a matter of law that the U. 8. Coast Guard

regulation, referring to sulfur as a dangerously

inflammable cargo and requiring a ‘fire hose supplied

with fresh water from a shore supply source’ at each

hatch, was applicable herein during unloading of

sulfur, and that the violation thereof constituted

negligence per se?’’

The testimony and exhibits set forth in the stipulation

related only to the sole issue which Petitioners desired

to raise on appeal.

The Court of Appeals held that the regulation was

inapplicable to unloading operations and that there was

no error on the part of the Trial Judge in failing to charge

the jury in the respect complained of on appeal. The

Court of Appeals also stated in its opinion that the ques-

tion of Respondent’s negligence was fairly submitted to

the jury which found a verdict against the Petitioners and

that there was abundant evidence from which the jury

could have found that there was an adequate supply from

the shore of fresh water which was actually used to extin-

guish the fire. The judgment of the District Court was

affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which later denied Peti-

tioners’ application for rehearing. This Petition followed.

* Printed in the Appendix to this brief, pp. la-12a.

Sam cd Fe

SFEDTHRU

6

QuvueEsTions PRESENTED.

The questions for consideration on this Petition are:

1. Whether this Court should review the holding by

the Court of Appeals that the Coast Guard regulation

(now amended) did not by its terms apply to unloading of

sulfur.

2. Whether this Court should review the affirmance by

the Court of Appeals of the judgment of the District Court

because (he Trial Judge did not charge that the old regula-

tion required a ‘‘connection’’ between the shore and the

ship’s water system, particularly where the proof showed

that there was a shore fresh water hose available and actu-

ally used to extinguish the fire.

ResPponDENT’s Proor.

On the trial, Respondent showed that at 8 A. M. on the

morning of the fire, which occurred at 5 P. M., the ship’s

crew had laid out one of the ship’s hoses alongside the #2

hatch. It was in this hatch where the fire developed. The

nozzle was hung over the side of the ship through a chock

with water dribbling through it (lla).

When the fire broke out, the ship’s alarm was immedi-

ately sounded and the ship’s crew responded promptly

(10a, 11a). While the second assistant engineer hurried to

the engine room to increase the pressure on the ship’s

pump (10a), the mate and other members of the crew went

immediately to #2 hatch where two of the ship’s hoses

were manned and water from them played on the fire (11a).

Meanwhile, one of the longshoremen had procured from the

dock a hose which was abreast of the #2 hatch and water

from this hose was put on the fire (7a). Approximately

5 minutes after the fire started two of the ship’s personnel

|

DARK PAGE

ENA BE

Pe wha Ae A oe nredeeren —

7 :

o

descended into #2 hold to ascertain whether any of the

longshoremen pad failed to leave (9a). They found no one

in the hold but, aevertheless, they themselves remained there

some 10 to 19 minutes (9a, 10a). While in the hold, &

they noticed that the fire department of the City of Charles- S

ton had arrived on board the vessel (9a) by which time a

the fire had been extinguished (11a). The crew estimated =~

that the fire department arrived about 10 minutes after the

fire had started (11a).

ARGUMENT. 2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. &

(1) There are no circumstances presented by this peti-

tion which warrant the exercise by this Court of its judicial

discretion to issue a writ of certiorari. There are no

special or important issues for review by this Court. The

judgments of the Courts below are not in conflict with the

decisions of this Court or any Court of Appeals.

(2) Petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals

has decided important questions of federal law which now

require settlement by this Court, is not valid. The decision

below turned on a Coast Guard regulation which was

amended about six months after the trial. Thus the regu-

lation interpreted by the Court no longer has any effect on

the working conditions aboard vessels. Petitioners con-

| tended on the trial that despite the plain words of the old

regulation, which did not include ‘unloading’, the regu-

lation applied during unloading operations. The new

regulation is now applicable to both loading and unloading

so that the issue which Petitioners say should be settled by

this Court has already been settled by the Coast Guard

through the issuance of the new regulation.

LEEDTHRU

(3) Quite apart from the reasons given in its opinion,

the Court of Appeals could only have affirmed the judgment

of the Trial Court since the uncontradicted testimony

established that the requirements of the old regulation,

even if applicable, were fully complied with and, hence, a

charge on an abstract principle of law would have been

inappropriate.

(4) The Petitioners did not request the Court to charge

in respect to the Coast Guard regulation according to its

terms and did not except to the Court’s failure to charge

upon the consequences of a violation of the regulation.

Hence, they should not now be heard to complain of any

omission to charge on the subject.

Se

THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE REGULATION BY THE CoURT OF

APPEALS IS CORRECT.

Petitioners urged the Court of Appeals to decide that a

phrase ‘‘each hatch through which sulphur is being loaded’’

means the same thing as if it read ‘‘each hatch through

which sulphur is being loaded or unloaded’’. This inter-

pretation cannot be found in the clear and unambiguous

wording of the regulation and it is, therefore, impossible

to see how the Court of Appeals could have arrived at any

other result.

The opinion is clear and logical and Respondent adopts

the reasoning of the Court of Appeals.

The following language of this court in M. Kraus &

Bros. v. United States, 327 U. S. 614, p. 621 is appropriate

here:

‘« * * In other words, the Administrator’s pro-

visions must be explicit and unambiguous in order

DARK

PAGE |

2 A ne Ser EI FO

9

to sustain a criminal prosecution; they must ade-

quately inform those who are subject to their terms

what conduct will be considered evasive so as to bring

the criminal penalties of the Act into operation. See

United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. (US) 76, 94-

96, 5 L. ed 37, 42, 43. The dividing line between

unlawful evasion and lawful action cannot be left

to conjecture. The elements of evasive conduct

should be so clearly expressed by the Administrator

that the ordinary person can know in advance how

to avoid an unlawful course of action.

* * * But patent omissions and uncertainties can-

not be disregarded when dealing with a criminal

prosecution. A prosecutor in framing an indictment,

a court in interpreting the Administrator’s regula-

tions or a jury in judging guilt cannot supply that

which the Administrator failed to do by express word

or fair implication. Not even the Administrator’s

interpretations of his own regulations can cure an

omission or add certainty and definiteness to other-

wise vague language. The prohibited conduct must,

for criminal purposes, be set forth with clarity in the

regulations and orders which he is authorized by

Congress to promulgate under the Act. Congress

has warned the public to look to that source alone

to discover what conduct is evasive and hence likely

to create criminal liability. United States v. Resnick,

299 U. S. 207, 81 L. ed 127, 57 S. Ct. 126.”

It follows that it would have been error for the Trial

Court to have specifically charged that the regulation

applied to the facts established.

EEDTHRU

a,

THE DECISION OF ‘THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS NO BEARING

ON THE EXERCISE BY THE Coast GUARD OF THE STATUTORY

POWERS GRANTED IT.

The decision of the Court of Appeals does not hinder or

frustrate the Coast Guard in the promulgation and enforce-

ment of any regulation that it may determine to be desirable

and necessary in exercising the authority granted to it by

statute. The Coast Guard is charged, among other things,

with the duty of supervision over the safety of merchant

vessels, and to accomplish this purpose is authorized to

issue regulations. The decision of the Court of Appeals

interprets one of the regulations issued pursuant to this

statutory authority, but could not prevent the Coast Guard

from changing that regulation so that the meaning would

be wholly different from that of the earlier reguiation as

interpreted.

Furthermore, Petitioners do not suggest anywhere that

the regulation as originally worded is applicable in respect

to any other situation than the one before this Court or

that any other suit is awaiting final determination by this

Court as to the meaning of the old regulation.

Administration of the new regulation is in no way

affected by what the Court of Appeals said about the old

one.

- _—

. - ¢ oF

Fe ee tne Skt pt ee ee TS

DARK PAGE |

Rain Rane Ret ct OAISTER AIR UR OTL Nn chs 0 rad old ng Se0tiwN . - —_

- DENS AE OE ee LORENA Ad Leh A GD nse eet IS Ot. POPES ~~ ae

Ne

é

i

a

vw

PY

"=

Fe

z

&

rd

&

2

=

ll

iii.

Tue CouURT IS THE PROPER TRIBUNAL TO INTERPRET THE

MEANING OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION AND NOT THE

Coast GUARD.

Petitioners, on the one hand, assert that the Court

should properly interpret a Coast Guard regulation, but,

on the other hand, assert that a contrary interpretation by

the Coast Guard should be accepted. It is well established

that this is not the law. Brown & Sons Lumber Co. v. Louts-

ville & N. R. Co., 299 U.S. 393; Spellman v. American Barge

Lines Co., 176 F. (a) 716 (CCA 3); Wright & Michigan

Central R. Co., 130 F. 843 (CCA 6).

On the trial, the Court erroneously admitted, over the

objection of Respondent, a telegram interpreting the regu-

lation, although the Coast Guard conceded that never pre-

viously had the regulation been interpreted by it. The

actual enforcement of the regulation by the Coast Guard had

for years been contrary to the interpretation contained

in the telegram. (8a)

Thus Petitioners had the benefit of evidence, errone-

ously admitted, which was prejudicial to the Respondent.

Petitioners had the advantage also of the erroneous ruling

by the Trial Court that the regulation applied to unload-

ing operations, which ruling the Court of Appeals subse-

quently reversed.

Despite these errors which were seriously prejudicial

to the Respondent, the jury found that Respondent was not

guilty of negligence, its vessel was seaworthy and that the

Coast Guard regulation had not been violated.

EEDTHRU

a ar rn & warns

12

IV.

THE APPEAL DOES NOT LIE FROM AN ORDER DENYING A MOTION

FOR REHEARING.

The law is clear that a party may not appeal from the

denial of his application for rehearing.

U. S. v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 247;

Pfister v. Finance Corp., 317 U. S. 144, 149; Conboy v. First

National Bank of Jersey City, 203 U. 8. 141, 149.

In the guise of appealing from the denial of a rehearing

by the Court of Appeals, Petitioners argue and allege facts

which are not relevant to the sole point before this Court,

viz. whether the Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the

Coast Guard regulation. Many of the facts mentioned by

Petitioners in their argument bear the taint referred to at

the outset of this brief, but because of their irrelevancy no

effort is now made to outline the inaccuracies. It is thought

sufficient to say that matters which are irrelevant, even if

true, will not be considered by this Court.

Petitioners refer to Rule 32 of the Revised Rules of this

Court as a basis for extending their argument beyond the

issue voluntarily stipulated. This rule has no relation

whatever to Petitioners’ transparent attempt to appeal a

second time having failed on the first attempt. In the

Court of Appeals, instead of designations by the parties

as to the contents of the record on appeal, both parties

stipulated as to the contents of the record and Petitioners

have never asked to be relieved of this stipulation.

Moreover, the petition carefully avoids stating what

additional facts, omitted from the record in the Court of

Appeals, would justify reversal.

Aig

POAC DINE MENS

13

V.

THERE WAS NO PROOF TO ESTABLISH THAT THE Coast GUARD

REGULATION WAS VIOLATED, EVEN THOUGH INTERPRETED TO APPLY

TO UNLOADING.

The gist of Petitioners’ argument is that they were

entitled to a directed verdict because there was no ‘‘con-

nection’’ maintained between a shore water supply and the

ship’s fire-fighting system. This is based on their erroneous

interpretation of the regulation that when the Coast Guard

used the word ‘‘available’’ it meant a ‘‘shore connection’’.

Disregarding for the moment this extravagant interpreta-

tion, such a direction of a verdict against Respondent in

the face of the evidence which Respondent had adduced

would have been reversible error.

Petitioners, on page 18 of their petition, make the

unjustifiable misstatement that there was an ‘‘admitted

violation’’ of the Coast Guard regulation. No such admis-

sion was ever made. On the contrary, the proof showed

full compliance with the regulation in all respects even as

to that part of the regulation relating to the availability of

a hose with fresh water.

The uncontradicted testimony was that a fire hose sup-

plied with fresh water from a shore supply source was

available at the hatch through which the sulfur was being

unloaded and was actually used upon the fire (7a). Since

this evidence could lead to the sole conclusion that the

regulation of the Coast Guard was complied with, even if

it were applicable to unloading, it would have been error

for the Court to charge that a violation of that regulation

constituted negligence per se.

cae

A court should not charge on an abstract principle of

law when there are no facts from which the jury could find

upon the proposition of law as charged.

¥i.

THERE WAS NO EXCEPTION TAKEN BY THE PETITIONERS TO

THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO CHARGE IN THE RESPECT COM-

PLAINED OF AND COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONERS STATED AT THE

CONCLUSION OF THE CHARGE THAT THEY HAD NO REQUESTS AND

NO EXCEPTIONS.

At a conference in chambers prior to giving the charge,

Respondent presented a number of requests, which were

considered by the Court and passed upon. At the same

time, Petitioners presented their proposals to charge and

these likewise were discussed and passed upon. There-

after, the Court set forth in writing the complete charge

as he intended to deliver it and discussed this with counsel

for the parties, and counsel had full opportunity, before

addressing the jury, to consider the full text of the charge.

At the conclusion of his charge, the Trial Judge stated

‘*T believe there are no other requests to charge, are there?’’

to which Mr. Klonsky' replied ‘‘No, your Honor’’ (30a; rec-

ord in the Court of Appeals). Counsel for the Respondent

then inquired of the Court whether the requests previously

made on behalf of the Respondent had been recorded and

was informed that they had been recorded. After some dis-

cussion between the Court and the Clerk in respect to the

jurors, the following colloquy occurred (21a, Record Court

of Appeals) :

Mr. Waring:? I am just asking that the record

show that the exceptions made and discussed with

1Counsel for Petitioners (plaintiffs below).

2 Counsel for Respondent (defendant below).

NRE EIS :

¥ oe a . Wee a _ . x ant

PEP OEP RY eu aaa gel

f . -

—— a. se man rr

PORTE MU AN Raids AMG SR Say a

15

f" Pe ee OY ARO: OEE REET LEE TE ME TOR ae ho Me

the Court in connection with the charge shall apply

to the charge as given.

The Court: Yes, that is satisfactory. Didn’t you

have an exception?

Mr. Klonsky: I have no exceptions, your Honor.

Counsel for the Petitioners made it very clear to the

Court that they were fully content with the charge of the

Court as given. They now attempt to say that they had

previously made their point and were not required to urge

the Court further in the matter. However, from every-

thing that occurred, Petitioners made clear to the Court

that even though they may have previously wished to

except, they finally desired to withdraw any exceptions

previously indicated. The Court did not ask whether there

were any further exceptions to be made but asked whether

Petitioners ‘‘didn’t’’? have an exception and elicited the

response that the Petitioners had no exceptions.

It is submitted that at the termination of the trial,

counsel for the Petitioners realizing that their position in

respect of the alleged violation of the Coast Guard regu-

lation was at best tenuous and believing that the jury would

return a verdict in their favor on other grounds did not

wish to inject any possible charge which might subsequently

be held to be an error of law. Counsel for the Petitioners

were abundantly contented with the charge as a whole and

wished, therefore, to accept this charge without revision

in order to avoid a possible setting aside of the verdict

which they hoped to get. The Petitioners are now disap-

pointed with the result of the verdict and so are complain-

ing that the Court below did not do what the Petitioners

at that time did not, in point of fact, wish the Court to do.

If the Petitioners had actually wished the Court to correct

any errors which they believed existed in connection with

the charge, they would undoubtedly have urged their

a rece PMG wm

.CONTHPI!

te

N

16

requests and taken their exceptions when the Court invited

them to do so.

In numerous decisions, it has been held that a claim

of error is unavailable to a party in the absence of his

request for instructions, and an objection to the instrue-

tions given. Colley v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., 157 F. 2d

1007 (CCA 4); Meadows v. United States, 144 F. 2d 751

(CCA 4); Good Holding Co. v. Boswell, 173 F. 2d 395

(CCA 5), cert. den. 338 U. S. 815; Stueber v. Admiral Corp.,

177 F. 2d 777 (CCA 1) cert. den. 336 U. S. 961.

CONCLUSION.

PETITIONERS’ APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD

BE DENIED BECAUSE (1) THE CourT oF APPEAIS CORRECTLY

INTERPRETED THE Coast GUARD REGULATION HOLDING THAT IT

HAD NO APPLICATION TO AN UNLOADING OPERATION: (2) THE

MEANING OF THE REGULATION IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT AND IS

MOOT BECAUSE A NEW REGULATION HAS BEEN SUBSTITUTED: (3)

THERE IS NOTHING ELSE IN THE CASE WHICH MERITS THE CON-

SIDERATION OF THIS COURT BY WAY OF DIVERSITY OF OPINION

AMONG THE CIRCUITS OR OF THIS CouRT OR OTHERWISE.

It is respectfully submitted that the petition should be

denied.

Cuartes W. Wartne,

35 Broad Street,

Charleston, South Carolina,

Water X. Connor,

120 Broadway,

New York 5, New York,

Attorneys for Respondent, Marine

Navigation Company, Inc.

la

APPENDIX.

Stipulation as to Contents of Record in

Court of Appeals.

United States Court of Appeals

For tHe Fourts Circuit.

No. 7141.

Sam McHoney, Hersert Dunmeyer, Jonn Suiru, Franx-

LIN Wuirs, Rosert Jenkins, Cuapet Movzon, Limon

Joyner, Fevix McKnicut, Lurner Moore, THomas Burcu

and Joun Bowens,

Appellants,

vs.

Marine Navication Company, Inc.,

Appellee.

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between

counsel for the respective parties hereto that the sole issue

on appeal from the final judgment entered in the cause in

the United States District Court for the Eastern District of

South Carolina, is as follows:

Did the Court below err in failing to charge the

jury as a matter of law that the U. S. Coast Guard

regulation, referring to sulfur as a dangerously inflam-

mable cargo and requiring a ‘‘fire hose supplied with

fresh water from a shore supply source”’’ at each hatch,

was applicable herein during unloading of sulfur, and

that the violation thereof constituted negligence per se?

Ir IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between

counsel for the respective parties hereto that the following

ron Tupi

PRS DN NBA A We oF one y P— . " < = —

“ ae ale 2 + A Nh Petts

yor

OE LIT RYT MRE REIT LMT ABO SA: FPN SBE T ft.

2a

Stipulation as to Contents of Record in Court of Appeals.

shall constitute the entire record in the cause on appeal

to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit; all or part of which may appear in either or both

appendices of the parties herein.

1. All of the pleadings filed in the United States Dis-

trict Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina.

2. The Order for judgment of the United States Dis-

trict Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina

dated December 9, 1954.

3. The judgment entered in the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina dated

December 9, 1954.

4. The Opinion and Order of the Honorable Ashton H.

Williams, United States District Judge, dated September

3, 1955.

5. A transcription of the Court Reporter’s record of

the charge to the jury of the Honorable Ashton H. Williams,

United States District Judge.

6. A transcription of the Court Reporter’s record of

the colloquy between the Court and counsel following the

charge to the jury.

7. The deposition as read on the trial of the ship’s

master, Karl Seitz, taken March 9, 1954.

8. A transcription of the Court Reporter’s record of

all statements made and agreements reached at a confer-

ence between the Court and counsel for the parties in

Chambers on November 29, 1954.

9. A transcription of the Court Keporter’s record of

all statements made at a conference between the Court and

,

DARK PAGE 6

3a

Stipulation as to Contents of Record in Court of Appeals.

counsel for the respective parties in Chambers on December

1, 1954.

10. The following extract from the closing argument to

the jury of Charles W. Waring, Esquire :—

‘««* * * Then they say, ‘You should have had a hose

attached to a shore installation.’ Well now, the

Coast Guard regulation in existence at that time

states when sulphur is being unloaded—I mean, when

sulphur is being loaded. That is what the regulations

say. The Coast Guard now says that it is intended

that that shall mean unloading as well as loading.

But at that time, as Commander Thompson. testified

that his understanding of the meaning of that regu-

lation was that it applied to loading and not to

unloading.

Well so much for the regulation. Let’s say that

it may have been the proper interpretation at that

time, that it applied to unloading as well as loading.

Suppose it did. Is there any testimony that you know

of in this case that it would have helped put out that

fire to have had fresh water available instead of

salt water? Is fresh water any better for putting

out a fire than salt water? Now what is the differ-

ence and what is the effectiveness of one against the

other?’’

plus that additional portion up to line 3, page 12.

11. A transcription of Court Reporter’s record of objec-

tion by defendant, discussion thereon and Court’s ruling

in reference to offer of testimony through deposition of

Karl Seitz regarding alleged failure to have hose supplied

with fresh water from a shore supply source.

12. A transcription of the Court Reporter’s record of

the objection by defendant and the ruling of the Court dur-

=EDTHRU

aos ERR amped! NAN Fo U7 Renner

Pent Re en Sr ee a = —

a ORR SO tA HS Ae Sy PRES

4a

Stipulation as to Contents of Record in Court of Appeals.

ing the testimony of Ensign Marshall as to applicability of

the United States Coast Guard regulation with reference to

the availability of a hose supplied with fresh water from a

shore supply source.

13. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit ‘‘11’’, consisting of teletype dis-

patches to and from the Commandant of the United States

Coast Guard.

14. Defendant’s Exhibit ‘‘L’’, consisting of teletype dis-

patches to and from the Commandant of the United States

Coast Guard.

15. Extract from Plaintiffs’ Exhibit ‘‘17" relative to

the night relief engineer.

16. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit ‘‘18’’, consisting of an excerpt

from the log of the Charleston Fire Department.

17. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit ‘‘2’’, consisting of Section N-347,

Table K of the United States Coast Guard regulations

appearing on page 5256 of the Federal Register Reprint

Series No. 57-53.

18. The following extracts from the closing argument

to the jury of Robert Klonsky, Esquire :—

“c# * * You have the violation of the Coast Guard

regulation which has been interpreted to mean load-

ing as well as unloading. The Navy Captain said

there has never been a contrary interpretation. And

the law is fixed, and a violation of that law is

negligence.

* * * > * .

‘* * * You remember very definitely that the Coast

Guard regulation reads, and I will read it word for

word :—

Re TEL, n]

DARK PAGE Bl

(pene A UA RNS RT ES AINA RE EWN PCT ENN QTL. et —— = - =

SL AOI A tok NA ECE «

5a

Stepulation.as to Contents of Record in Court of Appeals.

‘In the loading or unloading of sulphur in bulk,

the following conditions shall be complied with: a

fire hose supplied with fresh water from a shore

supply source shall be available at each hatch

through which sulphur is being loaded.’

‘‘Thereafter, we had Ensign Arnold Marshall, who

came with a communication from the United States

Coast Guard, and he presented to you the fact that

the interpretation of a law, which is a binding inter-

pretation from the date it started,—in this case, 1940,

was that the hazards are equal and therefore the regu-

lation applies to unloading as well as loading, with

respect to having a shore supply source.’’

19. A transcription of the Court Reporter’s record of

the defendant’s and plaintiffs’ motions for a directed ver-

dict.

20. The following statements setting forth in narrative

form portions of the testimony of various witnesses at the

trial of the cause:

(a) Caspar Miller, a witness for the Plaintiff testi-

fied that on February 5, 1952, he was employed as

Superintendent of the Columbus Street Terminals,

State Ports Authority, Charleston, South Carolina;

that at the Columbus Street Terminal dock, where the

SS. Marine Merchant was moored on that date, there

were hydrants providing hose connections with a shore

supply source of fresh water placed approximately 60

feet apart; that on the South end of the docks there

were located three hydrants and that no hose connec-

tions were located beyond the end of the warehouse

buildings; that the ship was moored toward the South

end of the dock and abreast of where she was moored

there were three fresh water hydrants at a distance of

one foot from the side of the vessel; that he was in his

EDTHRU

Sag NPS NERY 4

&

Sy

:

%

&

Ee

:

:

:

6a

Stipulation as to Contents of Fecord in Court of Appeals.

office at the North end of the dock when the fire occurred

and knows nothing in regard to the fire.

(b) Walter J. Kruger, a witness for the Defendant,

testified that on February 5, 1952, he was a Stevedore

Superintendent of the James Doran Company, which

company was employed at that time to unload the SS.

Marine Merchant; that a gang of longshoremen work-

ing under him was unloading the #2 hatch on the

afternoon of that date; that at about 5 P. M. he was in

an office on the dock about 100 feet from the #2 hold,

when he heard a commotion outside and it was reported

to him that a flash fire had occurred; that he ran on

board and upon arriving found that there were 3 water

hoses putting water into the hold, 2 of which were

from connections on board the vessel and one of which

was from a connection on the dock; that the hose from

the dock was long enough to reach up over the main

deck of the vessel; that when he arrived at the hatch,

he saw smoke but no flame and at that time 2 or 3 long-

shoremen were still below; that the Fire Department

arrived within 5 to 10 minutes after the witness reached

the scene; that generally ships’ hose are rolled upon

the racks but sometimes a hose with water running

from the nozzle, is laid out on the deck near the hatch

being worked ; that he does not remember whether there

was any ship’s hose laid out on the deck on the SS.

Marine Merchant at the time of the fire; that sulphur,

when being unloaded from a vessel, causes dust and

sometimes catches fire; that he had never before seen

a sulphur fire in the hold of a ship but he had seen fires

on railroad cars, and the fires would go out by them-

selves.

(c) Frank Mathis, a witness for the Defendant,

testified that he was employed by James Doran Com-

pany as a header on February 5, 1952; that his position

was bossing the longshoremen in the unloading of the

a

a

DARK PAGE BL

7a

Stipulation as to Contents of Record in Court of Appeals.

#2 hatch of the SS. Marine Merchant at the time of

the fire; that as he came up the ladder and out of the

mast house, which is forward of the #2 hatch, he heard

hollering and noticed the smoke coming from the #2

hatch opening; that he went to where the ship’s hose

was located on the starboard side of the mast house

and found that this hose was coiled up in the box and

he could not get water out of it; that he then got from

the dock a hose which was near at hand, right by the

+2 hatch and with that put water in the hold; that

after he got the dock hose in operation the ship’s

crew put water on the fire from two ship’s hose; that

he does not know how long these hoses were in opera-

tion before the Fire Department got there but that all

of the men were out of the hold before the Fire Depart-

ment arrived; that he did not see any ship’s hose laid

out on the deck with water running from it before the

fire broke out.

(d) Willie Butler, a witness for the Defendant,

testified that he was employed by James Doran Com-

pany as a hatch tender on February 5, 1952; that on

the afternoon of that date he was working at the #2

hatch on board the SS. Marine Merchant; that his

duties required him to stand on the main deck, just

aft of the +2 hatch, in order to give signals to the

winch operators; that at about 5 o’clock in the after-

noon he saw a flash fire occur in the #2 hold and this

was followed by a lot of smoke which billowed out of

the hold; that the first hose put on the fire was from

the dock and afterward two ship’s hose were used to

put water on the fire; that before the fire broke out

there was a ship’s hose laid out on the deck, near the

aft end of the midsection of the #2 hatch, and water

from this hose was put into the hold; that he does not

know how long it took the Fire Department to arrive

after the fire first commenced but water was put into

the hold before the Fire Department arrived.

8a

Stipulation as to Contents of Record in Court of Appeals.

(e) J. D. Thompson, a witness for the Defendant,

testified that on February 5, 1952, he was and that he

is a Commander in the United States Coast Guard in

charge of Marine Inspection Office in Savannah,

Georgia, and was authorized by the Commandant of

the Coast Guard to testify in the cause. The witness

produced a communication from the Captain of the

Port to the Commandant of the United States Coast

Guard, and the answer thereto, which are in evidence

marked Defendant’s Exhibit ‘‘L’’. The witness fur-

ther testified that in connection with his inspections of

sulphur vessels, he had previously had occasion to

apply Subsection 6 of the Coast Guard regulation refer-

ring to availability of hose from a shore supply source

of fresh water and he had interpreted such regulation

to mean that it was not applicable during unloading of

sulphur from a vessel; that he had inspected the SS.

Marine Merchant on December 6, 1951, and had found

all safety appliances in order; that he had examined

and tested the ship’s hose and other fire fighting

equipment and found that they met Coast Guard

requirements; that as a result of his inspection he had

given a certificate to the vessel, certifying as to the

safety of the vessel and its appliances; that his inspec-

tion included safety of personnel as well as safety of

the vessel.

(f) Karl Seitz, a witness for the Defendant testi-

fied that he was the Master of the SS. Marine Merchant

on February 5, 1952; that there had been no change in

any of the safety appliances and equipment aboard

the vessel since the inspection made by Commander

Thompson on December 6, 1951; that when the fire

broke out aboard the vessel at about 5 o’clock on Feb-

ruary 5, 1992, he was in his office located behind the

wheel hous? on the bridge deck; that after the relief

mate rang ‘he general alarm it took him about one-half

minute to get to the scene of the fire at the #2 hatch;

a

DARK PAGE Bl

9a

Stipulation as to Contents of Record in Court of Appeals.

that the general alarm bell rings throughout the ship;

that when he arrived at the #2 hatch, dense smoke

was coming out of the hold, crew members were putting

water from one hose into the hold and were bringing

another hose to bear from another hydrant; that he

also saw two stevedores operating a hose; that the

Fire Department did not arrive at the scene until 5

minutes after he received his first notice of the fire;

that the Fire Department first used water and then

foamite; that before the Fire Department arrived,

crew members put a Jacob’s ladder into the hold and

went down to see if any longshoremen were still there,

but found none.

(g) Edward E. Gavin, a witness for the Defendant,

testified that on February 5, 1952, he was an able bodied

seaman employed aboard the SS. Marine Merchant;

that when the fire in the #2 hold broke out he was in

the mess hall and when he heard the general alarm he

ran out on the main deck, a distance of around 40 feet;

that he saw smoke coming out of the hold and a lot of

people around the #2 hatch; that he noticed that a fire

hose was being taken out of the rack but is not sure

whether any hose was being trained on the fire at that

time; that he and another crewman got a Jacob’s lad-

der and put it into the hold and went down to search

for any remaining longshoremen; that it was about

3 minutes from the time he arrived on the scene until

the time he went into the hold and by that time water

had been put into the hold; that he remained in the hold

about 10 or 15 minutes and during that time there was

a lot of water put down in the hold; that there were no

flames, just smoke; that he found no one down there;

that when he came up out of the hold the Fire Depart-

ment was there but he does not know when it arrived;

that the first hose brought to bear upon the fire was

from the #3 hydrant, which is located forward of the

EDTHRU

RA MLNS OS PEPE LOE BILE DNS ERE I PUN CR NMS

ed

10a

Stipulation as to Contents of Record in Court of Appeals.

midship’s house; that he does not remember whether

ary hose from a shore supply source was brought to

bear upon the fire.

(h) Anthony J. Arent, a witness for the Defendant,

testified that on February 5, 1952, he was employed as

the second assistant engineer on the SS. Marine Mer-

chant ; that he was standing on the boat deck when he

noticed smoke coming from the #2 hold, immediately

ran down to the engine room, pushed the steam valve

on the fire pump and increased the water pressure on

the fire lines and that full pressure was obtained within

30 seconds from the time that he turned on the valve;

that not more than 2 minutes elapsed between the time

that he first saw the smoke and the time that full water

pressure was obtained on the fire lines; that the night

engineer was in the engine room at the time that the

Witness turned on the steam valve and took over the

watch from the witness; that he went back on the main

deck to the #2 hatch and went down the Jacob’s ladder

into the hold to search for any longshoremen remain-

ing; he stayed in the hold from 10 to 15 minutes but

found no one.

(i) Robert P. Ruse, a witness for the Defendant,

testified that on February 5, 1952, he was employed as

chief mate on the SS. Marine Merchant; that on the

main deck of the vessel there were 9 fire stations with

hose attached; that the #1 fire station was aft of the

anchor windlass on the port side forward of the #1

hold ; that the #2 fire station was on the starboard side

at the mast house between the +1 and #2 holds; that

the #3 fire station was on the port side between the

#2 and #3 holds; that the #4 fire station was on the

starboard side on the bulkhead of the midships house;

that he was in his office one deck above the main deck

and about 75 feet from the +2 hatch when the night

relief mate ran in and told him there was a fire in the

DARK PAGE BI

ENE LIES bP LPR A RINE ALPEN 88

lla

Stipulation as to Contents of Record in Court of Appeals.

#2 hold; that he directed the night relief mate to sound

the general alarm and increase the water pressure;

that within 10 to 15 seconds the general alarm rang, and

the witness went down on deck to the scene of the fire;

that several crewmen arrived at the #2 hatch at about

the same time as the witness; that he saw the #3 hose

laid out on the deck with water trickling from it under

low pressure and within one-half minute a full head of

water was put into the hold by the crew members man-

ning this hose; that shortly thereafter the #2 hose was

taken from the rack and put in operation on the fire;

that he was not aware of a hose in use from a shore

connection until later but did see one after the Fire

Department arrived; that the Fire Department came to

the scene about 10 minutes after the witness arrived on

the main deck; that he did not observe any flames in the

hold and the smoke cleared up in about 15 minutes;

that prior to the fire, the #3 hose was laying on the

deck with its nozzle through a scupper or chock and

water trickling out of it over the side of the vessel.

(j) Gilbert Morgan, a witness for the Defendant,

testified that on February 5, 1952, he was employed as

boatswain on the SS. Marine Merchant; that he heard

the general alarm sound and went to the main deck

near the #2 hatch; that on arrival, he found the #3

hose in operation with water directed on the fire; that

he then stretched out the #2 hose and turned on the

valve, thereby obtaining immediate water pressure;

that he put the #2 hose on the fire in the hold; that he

did not notice whether any longshoremen were still in

the hold when he reached the #2 hatch; that he saw

crew members go into the hold within 4 or 5 minutes

after his arrival and they remained below about 10 to

15 minutes while water was directed into the hold; that

the #3 hose was laid out on the deck at 8:00 A. M. on

February 5, 1952, with its nozzle through the chock,

dribbling water over the side.

EDTHRU

1

pt

PO PILI F

TAS RAEN? Wee U MRE SO

Shy See RR SELES eo OEE RS. WE Se

12a

Stipulation as to Contents of Record in Court of Appeals.

(k) Manual Frieias, a witness for the Defendant,

testified that on February 5, 1952, he was employed as

an ordinary seaman on the SS. Marine M erchant ; that

when he was in the mess hall he heard the general alarm

and went to the main deck at the #2 hold; that the mas-

ter and chief mate were at the scene when he arrived;

that he directed water from the #3 hose upon the fire

in the hold under the supervision of the chief mate; that

at first a small trickle was coming out of the #3 hose

but in a half minute a full pressure of water came from

that hose and was put into the hold; that a few minutes

later the #2 hose was directed on the fire; that the Fire

Department arrived about 10 or 15 minutes after the

witness reached the scene of the fire; that he does not

recall the use of any shore hose until after the arrival

of the Fire Department; that he saw two crew members

go into the hold within 5 or 10 minutes after he got to

the scene and they remained below for about 10 to 15

minutes.

21. Testimony of William Schirmer.

22. Defendant-appellee is not hereby precluded from

incorporating in its appendix any testimony of any witness

or other parts of the proceedings below whether referred

to or not in this stipulation.

Rosert Kionskxy,

I. H. Jacosson,

Attorneys for Appellants.

Caries W. Warne,

Watrer X. Connor,

Attorneys for Appellee.

March 8, 1956.

DARK PAGE ¢

13a

Extract from Table K of Coast Guard Regulation.

46 Code of Federal Regulations (Cumulative Supplement)

§146.27-100, pages 11120-11121.

In the loading or unloading of sulphur in bulk the fol-

lowing conditions shall be complied with:

(a) When sulphur in bulk is loaded in a deep hold with

general cargo in the Tween Deck hold above the sulphur a

dust proof wooden bulkhead inclosure shall be built in the

hatchways from the over deck of the lower hold to the

weather deck forming a tight enclosure to prevent sulfur

dust entering the Tween Decks during loading.

(b) Holds shall be cleaned of all debris.

(c) Ceiling shall be made tight to prevent sulfur dust

finding its way into the bilges; any chinking necessary in the

way of tank tops or bilges shall be with non-combustible

material.

(d) In order to minimize the movement of fine sulfur

dust during the loading, cowl ventilators serving the hold

into which the sulfur is being loaded shall be blanked off

to prevent circulation of air.

(e) ‘NO SMOKING”? signs shall be conspicuously dis-

played, and the officer in charge of loading shall see that they

are observed.

(f) An oxygen breathing apparatus, or proper gas mask,

shall be made readily available.

(g) A fire hose, supplied with fresh water from a shore

supply source, shall be available at each hatch through

which the sulfur is being loaded. (italics ours)

(h) Upon completion of loading, the sulfur shall be

leveled off and the sulfur dust deposited during the process

of loading, being extremely inflammable, shall be cared for

by sweeping or washing it down. This applies to the decks

and to the overhead structure within the holds.

EEDTHRU

— > ALN PEE SIE Sat A SP IO So Tits, ne ip saree yea

|

=

S

Lair OPAL eh ea

SEK

PET LEA AIMS NORE a Re cen taRT YR RD eect Sty Omens spe

_ a ee

l4a

Extract from Table K of Coast Guard Amended Regulation.

(j) After unloading, all residue of sulfur dust shall be

thoroughly cleaned out of cargo holds before loading other

cargo therein.

(k) When sulfur is loaded by metal chute method, pro-

vision shall be made for proper grounding of the chute,

using flexible cable to prevent static discharge.

Extract from Table K of Coast Guard Amended

Regulation.

46 Code of Federal Regulations 146.27-100 (June 10, 1955).

Nore: In the loading, handling and unloading of sulphur

in bulk the following conditions shall be complied with:

(a) When sulphur in bulk is loaded in a deep hold with

general cargo in the tween deck hold above the sulphur a

dust proof wooden bulkhead enclosure shall be built in the

hatchways from the over deck of the lower hold to the

weather deck forming a tight enclosure to prevent sulphur

dust entering the tween decks during loading.

(b) Holds shall be cleaned of all debris.

(c) Ceiling shall be made to prevent sulphur dust find-

ing its way into the bilges; any chinking necessary in the

way of tank tops or bilges shall be with non-combustible

material.

(d) In order to minimize the movement of fine sulphur

dust, cowl ventilators serving the hold into which sulphur is

being loaded or discharged shall be blanked off to prevent

circulation of air.

(e) ‘‘No Smoking”’ signs shall be conspicuously dis-

played, and the officer in charge shall ensure that they are

observed.

DARK PAGE

——

BE DOE IIE SE TE athe pe

l5a

Extract from Table K of Coast Guard Amended Regulation.

(f) An oxygen breathing apparatus, or proper gas

mask, shall be made readily available.

(g) A fire hose, preferably supplied with fresh water

from a shore supply source, shall be available at each hatch

through which sulphur is being worked. (italics ours)

(h) Upon completion of loading, the sulphur shall be

leveled off and the sulphur dust deposited during the process

of loading, being extremely inflammable, shall be cared for

by sweeping or washing it down. This applies to the decks

and to the overhead structure within the holds.

(j) After unloading, all residue of sulfur dust shall be

thoroughly cleaned out of cargo holds before loading other

cargo therein.

(k) When sulfur is loaded by metal chute method, pro-

vision shall be made for proper grounding of the chute,

using flexible cable to prevent static discharge.

(3861)

LEEDTHRU

a

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.

Respondents Brief — McHoney v. Marine Navigation Co. · 352 U.S. 930 | Frix