Brief for the Respondents in Opposition — New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad v. Cereste
Supreme Court brief1956
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RTT 1956
HAROLD B. WILLEY, Clerk
In THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1955
No. 855
THE NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN AND HARTFORD
RAILROAD COMPANY,
against
FRANK CERESTE,
Petitioner,
Respondent.
Ox Prrrio ror Writ or CerTIORARI TO THE Unitep STATES
Court or APPEALS rox THE Seconp Cincurr,
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BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION
Jacos D. Fucussere,
Counsel for Respondent,
Office & P. O. Address,
320 Broadway,
Borough of Manhattan,
City of New York.
ACKERMAN PRESS, Phones BO 9-7107-8
Taste or Cases Crrep
Hilleary v. Earle Restaurant, 109 Fed. Supp. 829
. Me 0 hh 5
Mathis v. Tuttweiler, 295 Fed. 661 (6th Cir., 1924)
Southern Ry. Co. v. Puckett, 244 U. S. 571, 37 S. Ct.
DUD -tnesccnnecdsdentcdseseuts be0ctecesosccese
Tash v. St. Louis and San Francisco Ry. Co., 335
e , ² ˙.. K.
Orner AurRonrry Crrep
Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd Ed., §1058 ..............
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Ix THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1°55
No. 855
4
*
Tux New Vonk, New Haven Axp Hartrorp
Ran non Company,
Petitioner,
against
Frank Cereste,
Respondent.
1
*
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION
Questions Presented
The questions presented by the petitioner are non-
existent :
1. No question is presented for review concerning re-
spondent’s unwritten and unsworn statement to petitioner’s
representatives, since the jury had the right to disregard
the statement and believe respondent’s trial testimony.
2. No question is presented for review concerning
notice of the dangerous condition. Since the petitioner
created the dangerous condition, no notice of its existence
was necessary to prove respondent’s case. But, even if
it were necessary, notice was amply established by the
proof.
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3. No question is presented for review concerning the
admissibility of testimony showing a habit of negligence
since, in addition to the ground for its admisson advanced
by Judge Frank, all three judges of the Court of Appeals
agreed that ths very testimony is admissible on other
valid grounds.
4. Proof of petitioner’s custom of making up trains,
containing coal cars, and of its procedures for cleaning
up the yard, was properly received under Rule 43(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because, in addition
to the reasons given by Judge Waterman, New York
courts hold such testimony to be admissible. No question
as to its admissibility is therefore presented for reviev.
Statement of Case
Respondent brought this suit under the Federal En
ployers’ Liability Act to recover damages for injuries
sustained by him on April 11th, 1949, while working for
petitioner in its railroad freight yard, operated and con
trolled by it. Judgment for respondent, entered upon :
verdict of a jury, was unanimously affirmed by a Court of
Appeals.
The proof shows that respondent was walking in th
course of his work in the freight yard along a path ths
ran between two parallel sets of tracks (48);“ that th
path was strewn with pieces of coal (91, 92, 109, 146-1
164, 165, 190-191); that plaintiff tripped over a piece o
coal on the path (51-52), lost his balance and came in eos
tact with a moving freight train on one of the tracks, ani
that, as a result, his leg was badly crushed and had to be
amputated (53).
* Numbers in parentheses refer to pages of the Appendix.
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The proof further shows that loaded coal cars were
continually being shuttled back and forth on the tracks
in the yard and particularly the tracks on either side of
the path; that, in the process of moving the cars about,
they were made to bump against one another so that coal
would fall on the paths between the cars (118-119); that
the petitioner recognized the necessity for inspecting and
clearing these pathways (12-13, 26-27); that there had
been a lack of men assigned to clean the paths during the
period in question because the men normally available to
clean up work had been occupied with construction work
in another yard (31-32); that only a few men were left in
the yard where the accident occurred to take care of emer-
gencies; and that clean-up operations did not constitute
an emergency (32, 124-125).
“ss -—- Ss = co
ARGUMENT
There is no basis for the allowance of the writ.
(1)
The unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals affirm-
ing the right of the jury to disregard respondent’s alleged
pre-trial unsworn statement and to believe his trial testi-
mony is not in conflict with any decision of another Court
of Appeals nor with any applicable decision of this Court.
The so-called statement was made by respondent in an
informal inquiry conducted by petitioner about ten days
after respondent returned from the hospital. No attorney
was present to represent him (94). The questions and
answers were not shown to have been submitted to him or
signed by him. Such informal statements made out of
court do not have the force of a judicial admission and
are neither final nor conclusive. They merely may affect
the credibility of the witness, if claimed to be contradictory,
Sse PF As S&S
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and may be considered by the jury only in passing upos
credibility.
Wigmore on Evidence, zd Ed. Sec. 1058.
Mathis v. Tuttweiler, 295 Fed. 661 (6th Cir,
1924).
Hilleary v. Earle Restaurant, 109 Fed. Supp. 82,
(Dist. Ct., D. C 1952).
The decisions cited by the petitioner are not in confi
with the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case a
bar and are clearly distinguishable. They relate to what
Professor Wigmore refers to as ‘‘judicial admissions”,
that is, sworn to or stipulated statements made in th
course of a judicial proceeding, and not to informal pre
trial statements as is the one in this case.
(2)
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that no notice d
the dangerous condition was required, because the pet
tioner created the dangerous condition, is in accord wit
the decisions of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ax
of other Courts of Appeals. Since petitioner had so&
control of the premises, the jury properly found that only
its conduct could cause the dangerous condition.
Southern Ry. Co. v. Puckett, 244 U. S. 571, 7
S. Ct. 703.
Tash v. St. Louis and San Francisco Ry. Co.,
Mo. 1148, 76 S. W. 2d, 690.
Wherever the Court has held notice to be a requirement
it was either because the accident occurred on premise
not controlled or maintained by the defendant or becaut
the dangerous condition was caused by a third-party a
force not under the defendant’s control. In the case #
— FF & eT oe rT .* oe
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bar, proof was overwhelming that the danger was created
by the carelessness and negligence of the defendant at a
place solely maintained and controlled by it so that re-
spondent’s place of employment became unsafe by reason
thereof.
Moreover, there is ample testimony that petitioner did
have notice of the dangerous condition, as, for example:
(a) respondent's testimony that a week before the acci-
dent he had seen a lot of coal in the vicinity of the oceur-
rence (83-85); (b) the testimony of coal falling in the path
from coal cars bumping against each other (120); (e)
the testimony of complaints made by the Safety-First
Committee to the petitioner that coal scattered in its yard
constituted a menace to employees working there (27).
Finally, petitioner made no request to charge on the
question of notice and did not except to the Court’s omis-
sion to charge in that respect (217, 220, 228).
(3)
The petitioner presents for review Judge Frank’s ap-
proval of the admission of certain testimony because it
tended to show a habit of negligence. The petitioner con-
veniently overlooks the fact that this very same evidence
is held admissible by all three judges on other concededly
valid and proper grounds. The testimony sought to be
reviewed concerns the transfer to other places of a sub-
stantial portion of men who were supposed to be available
for clean-up operations, thus keeping them from doing
such work in the yard during the period immediately
prior to the injury. This testimony Judge Frank held
admissible as showing a habit of negligence. All three
judges of the Court of Appeals held its admission to be
free of error on grounds additional to that urged by Judge
Frank, to wit, (a) Judge Hincks held it admissible be-
cause such testimony was offered subject to connection
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and petitioner’s counsel had neither asked that it be con-
nected nor made any motion to strike out; (b) Judge
Waterman held that it was properly admissible because
it tended to round out the picture presented by the evi.
dence that complaints of litter, including coal, strewn over
the yard had been made by a Safety Committee of peti-
tioner and that no means or opportunity had existed for
its removal; (e) Even Judge Frank held that ‘Aside,
however, from the question whether this evidence was ad-
missible as tending to show a habit of negligence, it was
relevant to show that clean-up operations were not prop.
erly performed shortly before the accident.’’
Since there were these cogent reasons for the admission
of the testimony, it is unnecessary to consider whether it
was also admissible on the ground that it showed a habit
of negligence, though it is submitted that this additional
reason advanced by Judge Frank for admitting the testi-
mony is supported by compelling logic. Incidentally,
Judge Frank’s discussion does not conflict with the cases
cited by the petitioner, none of which are decisions under
the Federal Employees’ Liability Act and all of which
deal with the admissibility of either an isolated act of
negligence or of acts of negligence occurring on occasions
wholly disassociated from the basic act of negligence
charged.
Sd dase Vale RA eae Ai & iodine iabindiae
(4)
As pointed out by Judge Waterman, Rule 43(a) of the
Federal Rules of Procedure, 28 U. S. C. presents no ob-
stacle to the admission of the testimony concerning the
method petitioner employed in making up of trains con-
taining coal cars, resulting, as that did, in coal falling onto
the tracks and pathways from the coal cars. Nor does
it interdict proving the procedure for cleaning up the
debris in the yard and on the pathway in question. Such
testimony was clearly relevant to show the probability of
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the existence of the defective condition causing the acci-
dent and is admissible by the very language of 43 (a),
wuich reads, in part, as follows:
„All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible
* * * under the rules of evidence applied in the courts
of general jurisdiction of the state in which the United
States court is held.“
And which further provides:
In any case, the statute or rule which favors the
reception of the evidence governs, and the evidence
shall be presented according to the most convenient
method prescribed in any of the statutes or rules to
which reference is herein made.“
In addition to its admissibilty on the grounds stated in
(3) hereof, the evidence here involved is admissible be-
cause it tends to prove a particular fact, namely, the de-
fective condition of the pathway, as a result of a negli-
gent practice, routine or custom of a corporation, as dis-
tinguished from evidence relating to habits of individuals.
This type of evidence has been held to be admissible
by the New York state courts. (See Judge Waterman’s
opinion, pages 17a and 18a of Petition for Writ of Certio-
rari.) The evidence is, therefore, admissible under the
language of Rule 43(a).
Consequently, the admission of this evidence does not
conflict with any Federal decision or law, but is, on the
contrary, in accord therewith. The cases cited by the
petitioner are wholly inapplicable because they relate to
habitual responses of individuals.
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CONCLUSION
No substantial reasons having been presented to
indicate the need for review, the petition for a writ
of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
Jacos D. Fucussere,
‘Counsel for Respondent.
1 Nee
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