Brief for the Respondents in Opposition — New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad v. Cereste

Supreme Court brief1956

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RTT 1956

HAROLD B. WILLEY, Clerk

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1955

No. 855

THE NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN AND HARTFORD

RAILROAD COMPANY,

against

FRANK CERESTE,

Petitioner,

Respondent.

Ox Prrrio ror Writ or CerTIORARI TO THE Unitep STATES

Court or APPEALS rox THE Seconp Cincurr,

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BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

Jacos D. Fucussere,

Counsel for Respondent,

Office & P. O. Address,

320 Broadway,

Borough of Manhattan,

City of New York.

ACKERMAN PRESS, Phones BO 9-7107-8

Taste or Cases Crrep

Hilleary v. Earle Restaurant, 109 Fed. Supp. 829

. Me 0 hh 5

Mathis v. Tuttweiler, 295 Fed. 661 (6th Cir., 1924)

Southern Ry. Co. v. Puckett, 244 U. S. 571, 37 S. Ct.

DUD -tnesccnnecdsdentcdseseuts be0ctecesosccese

Tash v. St. Louis and San Francisco Ry. Co., 335

e , ² ˙.. K.

Orner AurRonrry Crrep

Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd Ed., §1058 ..............

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Ix THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1°55

No. 855

4

*

Tux New Vonk, New Haven Axp Hartrorp

Ran non Company,

Petitioner,

against

Frank Cereste,

Respondent.

1

*

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

Questions Presented

The questions presented by the petitioner are non-

existent :

1. No question is presented for review concerning re-

spondent’s unwritten and unsworn statement to petitioner’s

representatives, since the jury had the right to disregard

the statement and believe respondent’s trial testimony.

2. No question is presented for review concerning

notice of the dangerous condition. Since the petitioner

created the dangerous condition, no notice of its existence

was necessary to prove respondent’s case. But, even if

it were necessary, notice was amply established by the

proof.

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3. No question is presented for review concerning the

admissibility of testimony showing a habit of negligence

since, in addition to the ground for its admisson advanced

by Judge Frank, all three judges of the Court of Appeals

agreed that ths very testimony is admissible on other

valid grounds.

4. Proof of petitioner’s custom of making up trains,

containing coal cars, and of its procedures for cleaning

up the yard, was properly received under Rule 43(a) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because, in addition

to the reasons given by Judge Waterman, New York

courts hold such testimony to be admissible. No question

as to its admissibility is therefore presented for reviev.

Statement of Case

Respondent brought this suit under the Federal En

ployers’ Liability Act to recover damages for injuries

sustained by him on April 11th, 1949, while working for

petitioner in its railroad freight yard, operated and con

trolled by it. Judgment for respondent, entered upon :

verdict of a jury, was unanimously affirmed by a Court of

Appeals.

The proof shows that respondent was walking in th

course of his work in the freight yard along a path ths

ran between two parallel sets of tracks (48);“ that th

path was strewn with pieces of coal (91, 92, 109, 146-1

164, 165, 190-191); that plaintiff tripped over a piece o

coal on the path (51-52), lost his balance and came in eos

tact with a moving freight train on one of the tracks, ani

that, as a result, his leg was badly crushed and had to be

amputated (53).

* Numbers in parentheses refer to pages of the Appendix.

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The proof further shows that loaded coal cars were

continually being shuttled back and forth on the tracks

in the yard and particularly the tracks on either side of

the path; that, in the process of moving the cars about,

they were made to bump against one another so that coal

would fall on the paths between the cars (118-119); that

the petitioner recognized the necessity for inspecting and

clearing these pathways (12-13, 26-27); that there had

been a lack of men assigned to clean the paths during the

period in question because the men normally available to

clean up work had been occupied with construction work

in another yard (31-32); that only a few men were left in

the yard where the accident occurred to take care of emer-

gencies; and that clean-up operations did not constitute

an emergency (32, 124-125).

“ss -—- Ss = co

ARGUMENT

There is no basis for the allowance of the writ.

(1)

The unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals affirm-

ing the right of the jury to disregard respondent’s alleged

pre-trial unsworn statement and to believe his trial testi-

mony is not in conflict with any decision of another Court

of Appeals nor with any applicable decision of this Court.

The so-called statement was made by respondent in an

informal inquiry conducted by petitioner about ten days

after respondent returned from the hospital. No attorney

was present to represent him (94). The questions and

answers were not shown to have been submitted to him or

signed by him. Such informal statements made out of

court do not have the force of a judicial admission and

are neither final nor conclusive. They merely may affect

the credibility of the witness, if claimed to be contradictory,

Sse PF As S&S

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and may be considered by the jury only in passing upos

credibility.

Wigmore on Evidence, zd Ed. Sec. 1058.

Mathis v. Tuttweiler, 295 Fed. 661 (6th Cir,

1924).

Hilleary v. Earle Restaurant, 109 Fed. Supp. 82,

(Dist. Ct., D. C 1952).

The decisions cited by the petitioner are not in confi

with the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case a

bar and are clearly distinguishable. They relate to what

Professor Wigmore refers to as ‘‘judicial admissions”,

that is, sworn to or stipulated statements made in th

course of a judicial proceeding, and not to informal pre

trial statements as is the one in this case.

(2)

The ruling of the Court of Appeals that no notice d

the dangerous condition was required, because the pet

tioner created the dangerous condition, is in accord wit

the decisions of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ax

of other Courts of Appeals. Since petitioner had so&

control of the premises, the jury properly found that only

its conduct could cause the dangerous condition.

Southern Ry. Co. v. Puckett, 244 U. S. 571, 7

S. Ct. 703.

Tash v. St. Louis and San Francisco Ry. Co.,

Mo. 1148, 76 S. W. 2d, 690.

Wherever the Court has held notice to be a requirement

it was either because the accident occurred on premise

not controlled or maintained by the defendant or becaut

the dangerous condition was caused by a third-party a

force not under the defendant’s control. In the case #

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bar, proof was overwhelming that the danger was created

by the carelessness and negligence of the defendant at a

place solely maintained and controlled by it so that re-

spondent’s place of employment became unsafe by reason

thereof.

Moreover, there is ample testimony that petitioner did

have notice of the dangerous condition, as, for example:

(a) respondent's testimony that a week before the acci-

dent he had seen a lot of coal in the vicinity of the oceur-

rence (83-85); (b) the testimony of coal falling in the path

from coal cars bumping against each other (120); (e)

the testimony of complaints made by the Safety-First

Committee to the petitioner that coal scattered in its yard

constituted a menace to employees working there (27).

Finally, petitioner made no request to charge on the

question of notice and did not except to the Court’s omis-

sion to charge in that respect (217, 220, 228).

(3)

The petitioner presents for review Judge Frank’s ap-

proval of the admission of certain testimony because it

tended to show a habit of negligence. The petitioner con-

veniently overlooks the fact that this very same evidence

is held admissible by all three judges on other concededly

valid and proper grounds. The testimony sought to be

reviewed concerns the transfer to other places of a sub-

stantial portion of men who were supposed to be available

for clean-up operations, thus keeping them from doing

such work in the yard during the period immediately

prior to the injury. This testimony Judge Frank held

admissible as showing a habit of negligence. All three

judges of the Court of Appeals held its admission to be

free of error on grounds additional to that urged by Judge

Frank, to wit, (a) Judge Hincks held it admissible be-

cause such testimony was offered subject to connection

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and petitioner’s counsel had neither asked that it be con-

nected nor made any motion to strike out; (b) Judge

Waterman held that it was properly admissible because

it tended to round out the picture presented by the evi.

dence that complaints of litter, including coal, strewn over

the yard had been made by a Safety Committee of peti-

tioner and that no means or opportunity had existed for

its removal; (e) Even Judge Frank held that ‘Aside,

however, from the question whether this evidence was ad-

missible as tending to show a habit of negligence, it was

relevant to show that clean-up operations were not prop.

erly performed shortly before the accident.’’

Since there were these cogent reasons for the admission

of the testimony, it is unnecessary to consider whether it

was also admissible on the ground that it showed a habit

of negligence, though it is submitted that this additional

reason advanced by Judge Frank for admitting the testi-

mony is supported by compelling logic. Incidentally,

Judge Frank’s discussion does not conflict with the cases

cited by the petitioner, none of which are decisions under

the Federal Employees’ Liability Act and all of which

deal with the admissibility of either an isolated act of

negligence or of acts of negligence occurring on occasions

wholly disassociated from the basic act of negligence

charged.

Sd dase Vale RA eae Ai & iodine iabindiae

(4)

As pointed out by Judge Waterman, Rule 43(a) of the

Federal Rules of Procedure, 28 U. S. C. presents no ob-

stacle to the admission of the testimony concerning the

method petitioner employed in making up of trains con-

taining coal cars, resulting, as that did, in coal falling onto

the tracks and pathways from the coal cars. Nor does

it interdict proving the procedure for cleaning up the

debris in the yard and on the pathway in question. Such

testimony was clearly relevant to show the probability of

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the existence of the defective condition causing the acci-

dent and is admissible by the very language of 43 (a),

wuich reads, in part, as follows:

„All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible

* * * under the rules of evidence applied in the courts

of general jurisdiction of the state in which the United

States court is held.“

And which further provides:

In any case, the statute or rule which favors the

reception of the evidence governs, and the evidence

shall be presented according to the most convenient

method prescribed in any of the statutes or rules to

which reference is herein made.“

In addition to its admissibilty on the grounds stated in

(3) hereof, the evidence here involved is admissible be-

cause it tends to prove a particular fact, namely, the de-

fective condition of the pathway, as a result of a negli-

gent practice, routine or custom of a corporation, as dis-

tinguished from evidence relating to habits of individuals.

This type of evidence has been held to be admissible

by the New York state courts. (See Judge Waterman’s

opinion, pages 17a and 18a of Petition for Writ of Certio-

rari.) The evidence is, therefore, admissible under the

language of Rule 43(a).

Consequently, the admission of this evidence does not

conflict with any Federal decision or law, but is, on the

contrary, in accord therewith. The cases cited by the

petitioner are wholly inapplicable because they relate to

habitual responses of individuals.

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CONCLUSION

No substantial reasons having been presented to

indicate the need for review, the petition for a writ

of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Jacos D. Fucussere,

‘Counsel for Respondent.

1 Nee

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Brief for the Respondents in Opposition — New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad v. Cereste · 351 U.S. 951 | Frix