Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Summerfield

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED |STATES2 ? 1956

OCTOBER TERM, 1955 HAROLD B. WILEY, Clerk

No. 720

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAIL-

WAY COMPANY, GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY

COMPANY, NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COM-

PANY, SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY, AND

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,

Petiti

- etitioners,

ARTHUR E. SUMMERFIELD, Postmaster GENERAL OF

THE Unitep SratTEs,

Respondent

—

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.

Starr THOMAS, J. Canter Fort,

Of Counsel for the Atchison,

fntsedien hh hig Oe

Company. FRANOIS M. SHE,

T. J. Suarrery, Puiup F. Weiss,

Of Counsel for Great Northern [Lawrence J. Larro,

Railway Company. 734 Fifteenth Street, N.W.,

M. L. Countryman, Jr., Washington 5, D. C.,

Ear. F. Regva, Attorneys for Petitioners.

Of Counsel for Northern Pacific

Railway Company.

Sranrizip B. JoHnson,

Roszrt J. McLaan,

Of Counsel for Southern Pacific

Company.

F. J. Manu,

Of Counsel for Union Pacific

Railroad Company.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Opinions Below .........-.----- sc ececcecereccteeeeeenseeees

Jasiofidiion ............. Wi Poe 2 eee Bowes Cab ge ke rere

Question Presented ...........-.0. 00 eee eee e cee eeeeteeeeneces

i OD gcc cca ccencececdscbeccannsvceseressccens

iateteent of Che ORGS 2.55... c nc ccc ccs rccncessvsevesescovere

Reasons for Granting the Writ... 6... 6-0 eee e eee eee

1. The Court of Appeals has decided an important question of

federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by

ES ENE POE PELE en FET eT PTET

2. The decision of the Court of Appeals is erroneous .......

a, The welownnt GetUME..... . nce ccsiccvcccesccess

b. The legislative history ..........- 6... eee eeecuce,

e. The prior air-mail lerislation..................-.

d. The subsequent air-mail legislation .............

e. Administrative construction of the air-mail statutes .

f. The priorities allegedly accorded air-mail

g. The Congress has not ratified the operation in ques-

ua a pice be Shoah ERE Shakes) Cpe eekseees

CITATIONS

Cases:

Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. et al v. Summerfield, 128

F. Supp. 266 ........0- cece eee c cece cece sseeeesserecenes

Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Chicago River & Indiana R. Co., 170

F.2d 654, 658 (C.A. 7)....--0 2-02 c eee eee e eee tern eeeeeee

Beach v. United States, 226 U.S. 243... 0.06. e eee eeee

Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327, 337... «0... eee eee eres

Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354....... 006-0 e ccc eee ee eeenes

Crawford v. Burke, 195 U.S. 176, 190... ... 0. . eee eee ee evens

Employees v. Westinghouse Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 444............

Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Corp., 315 U.S. 126, CLR yaweee ke

Fleming v. Mohawk Co., 331 U.S. 111....-..---- 00ers e eens

Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 260..........-..-.. 000,

Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 456-457............

Muncie Gear Co. v. Outboard Co., 315 U.S. 759, 766............

Bchriber Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 305 U.S. 47, 50............

Scientific Mfg. Co. v. Walker, 40 F. Supp. 465 (M.D. Pa)......

Sturges v. Crowinshield, 4 Wheat. 122, ERS Cis oie f10 2's date

United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 561..................

United States v. Yuginovitch, 256 U.S. 450...........--.6. ss.

—6969-0

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INDEX

Statutes:

Stat. 805, 39 U.S.C. 462

Stat. 259 .

Stat. 933, 39 U.S.C. 469

Stat. 744 ey

Stat. 979, ;

U.S.C. 401(23)

U.S.C. 402 ..

SEERREEEEEE

HP SSSSSSRERRRERRSVSTSSSERLSTSTSEEE

°

ca

esses?

eseeoces

373, 83rd Cong.,

574, 73rd Cong.,

1834, 79th Cong., 2nd

416, 83rd Cong., 1st

563, 8lst Cong., 1st

911, 75th Cong.,

Page

2,10, 14,15

2,14

2, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17,18

19

2, 15, 22

15

15

15, 16, 17

2,7

2, 20

.. 2,9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 21, 25

. 2,9, 10

2, 22

2, 23

mo DBR RR ewe eens B

INDEX

Hearings:

Hearings on H.R. 9738 before House Committee on Interstate and

Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess.

Hearings on S. 3760 before Senate Committee on Commerce, 75th

Cong., 3rd Sess.

Hearings on Post Office Dept. Appropriations for fiscal 1956 before

Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations, 84th

Cong., Ist Sess. _.

Hearings on Post Office Dept. Appropriations for fiseal 1956 before

Subcommittee of Senate Committee on a 84th

Cong., Ist Sess. .

Hearings on H.R. 5560 before Senate Committee on Post Offices

and Post Roads, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess.

Hearings on H.R. 9500 before House Committee on Post Offices

and Post Roads, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess.

Miscellaneous:

C.F.R. 34.88(b)(2) (1949 ed.)

C.F.R. 34.89(a) (1949 ed.)

2

37

\R. 5234, 75th Cong.

R. 7273, 75th Cong.

No. A- 74912, 15 Comp. Gen. 1025

Surface Mail by Air Exemptions, Doc. 6882, 6905, 6940 (decided

May 2, 1955)

Post Office Department Press Release No. 229, dated October

6, 1955

US. Official Postal Guide, dated July, 1953

5, 6

13

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1955

No.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAIL-

WAY COMPANY, GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY

COMPANY, NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COM-

PANY, SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY, AND

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,

Petitioners,

res,

ARTHUR E. SUMMERFIELD, Postmaster Gexenat or

Tue Unxirep States,

Respondent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.

Petitioners pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review

the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia Circuit, entered in the above-entitled case on De-

cember 12, 1955.

Opinions Below

The opinion of the Court of Appeals, unreported at this

time, is set forth in Appendix B to this petition. The opin-

ion of the District Court granting petitioners’ motion for

2

summary judgment, reported at 128 F. Supp. 266, may be

found at pages 2-15 of the Joint Appendix. The opinion

of the District Court denying petitioners’ motion for a pre-

liminary injunction, unreported, may be found at pages

70-71 of the Joint Appendix.

Jurisdiction

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

1254(1). The judgment of the Court of Appeals, set forth

in Appendix C, was dated and entered on December 12,

1955. A petition for rehearing and, in the alternative, for

rehearing en banc was denied in orders dated January 27,

1956.

Question Presented

Is the Postmaster General, in transporting by air first-

class mail bearing only three-cents postage, acting beyond

the scope of his authority and in violation of the postal

statutes which require that ‘‘all mailable matter being

transported as mail by air’’ bear postage at the rate of **6

cents for each ounce or fraction thereof ?’’

Statutes Involved

The pertinent statutory provisions are set forth in Ap-

pendix A to this petition. They include: 43 Stat. 805; 46

Stat. 259; 48 Stat. 933; 52 Stat. 973 et seq., 49 U.S.C. 401

et seq. (1952 ed.) ; 54 Stat. 899, 49 U.S.C. preceding section

1 (1952 ed.) ; 54 Stat. 1175, 39 U.S.C. 488a (1952 ed.); @

Stat. 1062, 39 U.S.C. 462a (1952 ed.); 6? Stat. 1261, 39

U.S.C. 463a (1952 ed.) ; 62 Stat. 1097, 39 U.S.C. 475 (1952

ed.) ; 63 Stat. 680, 39 U.S.C. 470 (1952 ed.).

Statement of the Case

Petitioners are common carriers by railroad operating

primarily in the western part of the United States. They

are engaged in the transportation of the mail. The laws

an .

relating to the railway postal service, 3% TS. w22a79

(1952 ed.), compel them to aecept any mail tendered ‘pr the

Postmaster General and to provide ail facilities amé serv-

ices necessary for its safe and expeditions mevemenn. In

consequence of these obligations imposed apem ‘tem, jeti-

tioners have invested large amounts in essential) Sacilmes

for the mail service. For example, one of the petitivmers.

the Southern Pacific Company, has invested 2200000 m

such facilities. (J.A. 22.)

For many years, the great buik of ordinary dirstcines

mail has been transported between post offices lx mull 4c

the same time, air transportation has beem used REISE

for the transportation of air mail. with the Seen of

a few situations where, for one reason or anotlier.. «urtuce

transportation is inadequate or unavailable amd the Oen-

gress has specifically authorized air transpertation of «eréi-

nary mail. Commeneing in early Oetober of 92. hewever.

respondent, without obtaining statutory authority: Sum the

Congress, instituted what he has described as am eermrmeD-

tal operation in the transportation of first-class mail or air

between several large metropolitan centers im the amaern

and southeastern parts of the United States. (J_&. a&50)

This so-called experimental program has continued new Ser

over two years and has been progressively expamdied o» em-

brace transportation of first-class mail by air iwoween

numerous cities in other sections of the countrs. (J_& 3H

91.) Under the conditions prescribed tiv tie Phostmumster

General for the operation of the experimental) praccum.

the air carriers enter the program on @ volamtury ness and

need to accept the mail for transportation onir i ther hae

available space remaining after satisfving other coufic de

mands. (J.A. 52-53.) But, in faet, there ix newer » lack of

space. (See pp. 26-27, infra.)

On October 6, 1954, respondent filed « petitiom with the

Civil Aeronautics Board requesting the Board t» establish

4

a rate for the transportation of first-class mail by air car-

riers on a space-available basis between numerous points

in the western part of the United States served by peti-

tioners. (J.A. 51-52.) A temporary rate, subject to re-

troactive adjustment upon determination of the proper

permanent rate, was set by the Board and the experimental

program on the West Coast was instituted on November 22,

1954. (J.A. 52.) The program continues today under the

temporary rate.

Petitioners, on November 20, 1954, filed a complaint in

the District Court for the District of Columbia, requesting

a declaratory judgment that respondent is without author-

ity to transport first-class mail by air and preliminary and

permanent injunctions enjoining the institution or con-

tinuance of the west-coast experimental program. The ju-

risdiction of the District Court was rested upon 28 U.S.C.

1339, 1331, and 1332(a)(1) (1952 ed.), and upon 11 D. C.

Code 306, in each case supplemented by 28 U.S.C. 2201

(1952 ed.) and section 10 of the Administrative Procedure

Act, 60 Stat. 243, 5 U.S.C. 1009 (1952 ed.).

A preliminary injunction was denied by the District

Court, and both sides moved for summary judgment on the

basis of the pleadings and affidavits on file. The District

Court found and declared that it is beyond the scope of re-

spondent’s authority to arrange for the transportation by

air of any mailable matter that does not bear air-mail post-

age, except for experimental purposes for a period not ‘‘un-

duly prolonged.’’ That court also found that petitioners

have standing to sue, but failed to show that they were ir-

reparably injured ‘‘at the moment’’ as a result of the op-

erations complained of. Accordingly, the District Court

granted petitioners’ motion for summary judgment and en-

tered a declaratory judgment, denied respondent’s motion

for summary judgment, and denied petitioners’ request for

a permanent injunction. (J.A. 1-2.) Both petitioners and

respondent appealed from this order. The Court of Ap-

peals concluded that petitioners have standing to bring this

suit, but that resporident has authority to arrange for air

transportation of ordinary first-class mail. Consequently,

the Court of Appeals ordered that the judgment of the Dis-

trict Court be vacated and the case remanded with instrue-

tions to grant respondent's motion for summary judgment.

Judge Bastian concurred only in the result.

Reasons for Granting the Writ

1. The Court of Appeals has decided an important ques-

tion of federal law which has not been, but should be, set-

tled by this Court. This case presents a novel question con-

cerning the interpretation of federal statutes having great

importance to the transportation industry, the Federal

Government, and the general public. The decision will have

far-reaching consequences affecting the financial well-being

of large segments of the transportation industry and the

operation of the postal system.

The present relatively-limited experimental programs for

the transportation of three-cent mail by air have resulted

in substantial revenue losses to the railroads with resultant

gains to the airlines. Aceording to testimony given in Feb-

ruary of 1955 by the Postmaster General, approximately

four million pieces of first-class mail were being trans-

ported by air daily at that time, and about $2,000,000 was

paid to the airlines in 1954 alone for the transportation of

such mail.' The loss in mail revenues to petitioners from

the services already discontinued as a result of the in-

auguration of the west-coast program amounts to more than

' Hearings on Post Office Department Appropriations for fiseal 1956

before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, S4th

Cong., Ist Sess. pp. 51, 73. During the four-week period following the

inauguration of the west-coast program, a total of 1,555,508 pounds of

first-class mail was transported by air between the west-coast cities involved.

Id., at p. 160,

6

$850,000 annually (J.A. 24, 32, 35, 36, 39), and the revenue

loss to all the railroads affected by these experimental pro-

grams is, of course, much larger.

Furthermore, under the opinion of the Court of Appeals,

there is nothing to prevent the Postmaster General from

henceforth transporting all first-class mail, and, indeed, all

other classes of mail, by air on a permanent basis. The rail-

roads, therefore, are faced with the threat of a potential

loss of some substantial part of revenues amounting to

more than $300,000,000 a year.? And, the railroads are also

threatened with the loss of a substantial part of their huge

investment in facilities for the transportation of mail.

The continued operation of these experimental programs

has, moreover, given rise to a practical problem of consid-

erable significance to the railroads. They remain obligated

to maintain in stand-by readiness all the facilities and

services that may be required to move the first-class mail

now being carried by the airlines, should either the Post-

master General or the airlines decide that, for any reason,

the present arrangements are unsatisfactory. On the other

hand, so long as it remains completely uncertain what per-

centage of the mail is to be diverted to the airlines and

what, if any, limitations must be observed in that connec-

tion, it is impossible to justify making the investments

necessary to maintain and replace the facilities required of

the railroads for the transportation of the mail.

The great bulk of mail transported by rail is carried

in passenger trains. (J.A. 22, 39.) As this Court is

well aware, passenger-train service has operated under

increasingly severe economic handicaps. The maintenance

of an adequate system for the transportation of pas-

2 See, e.g., the railway mail pay estimates submitted to the Appropria-

tions subcommittees for fiscal 1956. Hearings on Post Office Department

Appropriations for fiscal 1956 before the Subcommittee of the House Com-

mittee on Appropriations, 84th Cong., Ist Sess., p. 161; Hearings on Post

Office Department Appropriations for fiscal 1956 before the Subcommittee

of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 84th Cong., Ist Sess., p. 62,

7

sengers by rail is one of the most vexing problems fac-

ing the nation’s transportation industry, and is of great

importance not only to the citizens that utilize that service,

but also to the national defense. Rail service is extensively

utilized for the movements of troops and the passenger-

train service has been among our most vital assets in times

of grave national emergencies. The material reduction in

passenger-train revenues resulting from a shift of three-

cent mail transportation to the airlines must ultimately

result in the discontinuance of many passenger trains now

in operation. (J.A. 22-23, 25, 33, 41.)

The consequence, if we are right on the merits, will be

that the Postmaster General, disregarding the instructions

of the Congress and with an eye only to the postal service,

will have done serious damage to the fundamental national

transportation policy of the Congress.

Implicit in the entire scheme of postal legislation is a

recognition that the postal service is more than a busi-

ness providing the public with a means for the delivery

of its letters and packages. The maintenance of a postal

service represents, also, a governmental function and

the Congress has often required that this function

be conducted so as to serve governmental purposes un-

related to the most efficient and rapid delivery of mail

at the lowest possible cost. Thus, the belief of the Congress

that all means of transportation must be maintained in a

healthy, well-functioning condition is expressed in the

National Transportation Policy of ‘developing, coordinat-

ing, and preserving a national transportation system by

water, highway, and rail, as well as other means, adequate

to meet the needs of the commerce of the United States,

of the Postal Service, and of the national defense.’’ 54

Stat. 899, 49 U.S.C. preceding section 1 (1952 ed.). The use

of mail pay has always been recognized by the Congress as

an important means of achieving this objective.

>

A decision that permits the Postmaster General in his

discretion to arrange for the transportation of mail with-

out giving adequate consideration to the ends that the

Congress has sought to achieve in both postal and trans-

portation legislation is obviously of great significance and

deserves scrutiny by this Court.

We do not claim that the decision of the Court of Appeals

on the merits conflicts with a decision of any other court.

But, as we show in the next section, that court departed

radically from the accepted cannons of statutory construc-

tion prescribed by this Court in many decisions. Moreover,

this is not a situation in which this Court can wait for a

conflict to develop, with the assurance that it will develop

if the question is really important and well-justified differ-

ences of view are possible. The decision in this case will

in all probability be the final word on the construction of

the statutes under consideration, as the matter cannot be

raised in any other circuit. The Postmaster General,

against whom suit must be brought, resides in the District

of Columbia, and venue in a civil action wherein jurisdic-

tion is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may

be laid ‘‘only in the judicial district where all defendants

reside.’’ 28 U.S.C. 1391(b) (1952 ed.) ; Scientific Mfg. Co.

v. Walker, 40 F. Supp. 465 (M.D. Pa.). Therefore, this im-

portant question of federal law which has not been, but

which should be, settled by this Covrt must be settled in this

ease, if at all. See Muncie Gear Co. v. Outboard Co., 315

US. 759, 766; Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Corp., 315 U.S. 126,

128; Schriber Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 305 U.S. 47, 50.

Review by this Court under these circumstances is

especially indicated since, as we show in the next section, the

decision of the Court of Appeals is plainly erroneous and

frustrates a long-standing Congressional policy of main-

taining a substantial postage-rate differential between

8

9

mail transported by air and mail transported on the

surface.

2. The decision of the Court of Appeals is erroneous.

The position of petitioners on the merits, summarily stated,

is as follows: The plain language of the relevant statutes,

the legislative history of those statutes, the entire course of

air-mail legislation, and the settled administrative con-

struction of that legislation prior to the inauguration of

the programs under attack make a uniform showing. They

establish that the consistent Congressional policy has been,

and is, to limit air transportation of mail to mail bearing

the premium air-mail postage, with the exception of a few

specific situations, expressly provided for by statute, where

surface transportation is inadequate or impractical.

Despite the refusal of the Court of Appeals to accord

the relevant statutes their literal meaning, because, in its

view, the literal meaning was contrary to the Congres-

sional intent, its opinion ignores most of the pertinent

legislative history of those statutes and fails to relate them

to other postal legislation and the course of development

of air-mail legislation. It is necessary to deal with those

matters at some length in this petition because the opinion

below gives little or no aid in placing the issues in their

relevant context.

a. The relevant statutes. The Congress in the Act of

August 14, 1946, 60 Stat. 1062, provided that ‘‘ ‘domestic

air mail’ shall embrace all mailable matter being trans-

ported as mail by air within the continental United States,

within any Territory or possession of the United States,

within any geographical area which is a protectorate of the

United States, or between any of the aforesaid.’’ 39 U.S.C.

462a (1952 ed.). The same statute, in a section carried into

the Code as 39 U.S.C. 463a (1952 ed.), provided that ‘‘the

rate of postage on all domestic air mail as defined in sec-

tion 462a of this title shall . . . be 6 cents for each ounce

10

or fraction thereof.’’* (Emphasis supplied.) The statu-

tory language is unambiguous and its meaning is plain—any

mail transported by air must bear the air-mail postage of

six cents per ounce. This Court has held that unambiguous

statutory language is to be given its ordinary, literal mean-

ing, unless there is a strong showing that a literal construe-

tion would be contrary to the intent of the Congress.

Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U. S. 244, 260; Sturges v.

Crowishield, 4 Wheat. 122, 202-203; see Employees v.

Westinghouse Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 444. And, as we show

below, the evidence is overwhelming that the language

chosen by the Congress reflects exactly the intent of the

Congress.

b. The legislative history. The Court of Appeals did not

deny that the Act of August 14, 1946 on its face bars air

transportation of first-class mail. The court nevertheless

refused to give the statute its literal meaning on the ground

that such was not the intent of the Congress. In reaching

this conclusion, the court relied almost entirely on prior

definitions of ‘‘air mail’’ in the Air Mail Acts of 1925

and 1934. In the Air Mail Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 805,

‘fair mail’? was defined as ‘‘first-class mail prepaid at

the rates of postage herein prescribed.’’ In the Air

Mail Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 933, ‘‘air mail’’ was defined

as ‘‘mail of any class prepaid at the rate of postage pre-

scribed in subsection (a) of this section.’’ (Both statutes

prescribed premium postage for ‘‘air mail.’’) Relying

on a reading of this language isolated from its context,

legislative history, and practical construction, the court

below concluded that the distinguishing characteristic of

air mail is not that “the Post Office transports [it] by air,”

but that ‘‘the sender has affixed [to it] special postage.’’

(In short, the purchase price rather than the character of

3 The 1946 Act provided for a postage rate of five cents per ounce. This

was subsequently increased to six cents. 62 Stat. 1261.

11

service becomes the critical distinction between air mail

and ordinary mail.) Hence, the argument proceeds, if we

understand it correctly, as air mail is not distinguished

from ordinary mail because it moves by air but because

it carries six-cents postage, there is no bar to moving

ordinary mail by air under these earlier definitions. ‘If

that view is correct,’’ the court continued, ‘‘the statu-

tory definition of ‘domestic air mail’ [in the 1946 Act]

does not preclude the Post Office from transporting by air

matter other than ‘air mail.’ It must, generally speak-

ing, transport by air matter to which the special post-

age has been affixed, but it is not required to demand the

special postage for all matter which it transports by air.’’ ‘

The court thus read out of the 1946 definition of ‘‘domestic

air mail’’ the words ‘‘all mailable matter being transported

as mail by air,’’ justifying its disregard of the plain words

of the Act because the legislative history does not ‘‘men-

tion any intent to cireumscribe or change the then exist-

ing powers of the Postmaster General’’ with regard to the

transportation of mail by air and in ‘‘the absence of clear

indication of a Congressional intent to discard the estab-

lished definition, we think the view urged by the railroads

is untenable.’’ ®

This is the first time to our knowledge that a court has

taken the position that where the plain language of a stat-

ute conflicts with an earlier statute, the subsequent enact-

ment is to be ignored unless it can be affirmatively shown

from the legislative history that the Congress intended what

~ 4See Appendix B, p. 43, infra.

5 See Appendiz B, pp. 49, 44, infra. The Court of Appeals correctly

concluded from the legislative history that the Congress in the 1946 Act

intended to reduce the disparity between the “premium air-mail rate” then

in effect and the “surface rate” and to extend the continental air-mail rate

to the territories. But to hold that these were the sole purposes of the Act

is to deny the words “all mailable matter being transported as mail by air”

any effect whatsoever. Certainly, this language is not a “geographical

description” and has nothing to do with the relationship between air-mail

and surface-mail postage rates.

12

it said. The rule prescribed by this Court is that while re-

peals by implication are not favored, the later statute will

be given effect when there is a clear inconsistency with an

earlier act. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 324 U.S. 439,

456-457; United States v. Yuginovitch, 256 U.S. 450. Al-

though a change in terminology will not be held to show a

change in the Congressional intent when there is ‘‘more

persuasive evidence”’ in the legislative history that a change

was not intended, United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554,

561, in the absence of such evidence it will be presumed that

a change was intended. Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327, 337;

Crawford v. Burke, 195 U.S. 176, 190.

In any event, the failure of the legislative history to indi-

cate affirmatively that the law was being changed is readily

explainable by the fact that no change was involved—the

law has always been, except in limited circumstances under

express statutory provisions, that only air mail can be

transported by air. The reports and hearings on the 1946

Act show conclusively that the Congress, in considering

and enacting that statute, was of the view that under the

then-existing law ‘‘air mail’’ included all mail transported

by air and that mail not bearing air-mail postage could be

transported only by surface means. Thus, in S. Rept. No.

1834, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., at p. 2, it is stated that:

‘‘The experience of the postal service indicates that

the disparity between the surface rate for first-class

mail of 3 cents per ounce and the premium air-mail

rate of 8 cents per ounce is too great for matter other

than that of high time value. Furthermore, evidence

was introduced at the hearings which indicates that a

penalty has been placed upon the use of air mail by

* The various definitions are not inconsistent. If the prior definitions

of “air mail” are read into the definition of “domestic air mail”, as sug-

gested by the Court of Appeals (Appendix B, p. 49, infra), the sense

of the 1946 Act would not be changed. It would read: “first-class mail

or mail of any class] prepaid at the rates of postage herein prescribed

shall embrace all mailable matter being transported as mail by air.”

13

the 8-cent rate which is all out of proportion as between

postage rate and postal cost.

‘‘Cost-ascertainment computations indicate that air

mail at a 5-cent rate would return a slightly higher net

profit per pound than does ordinary first-class mail at

the surface rate of 3 cents. Therefore, H. R. 5560 pro-

poses to remove the penalty and put these two services,

surface and air, on approximately equal footing—the

mailer to take his choice in accordance with the im-

portance of his communications, without being de-

terred by an excessive air-mail postage rate.

**. . . The 5-cent rate proposed by H. R. 5560

would restore the privilege [of using air mail]. . .,

and at the same time high-speed service will be afforded

to those patrons who must forego its use as long as the

differential between surface and air service remains as

3 to 8 cents,’’ (Emphasis supplied.) 7

That the 1946 Act in defining ‘‘domestic air mail’’ to

include ‘‘all mailable matter being transported as mail by

air’? merely made explicit what had theretofore been

clearly implicit, and that, as the Congress assumed in enact-

ing the 1946 law, the Postmaster General has never had a

general authority to transport all classes of mail by air, is

also clear from the statutory context, legislative history,

and settled administrative construction of the prior defini-

tions of ‘‘air mail,’’ and from the entire course of air-mail

legislation. This material, which was ignored in the opin-

ion of the Court of Appeals, is diseussed in the following

sections.

ec. The prior air-mail legislation. Respondent, of course,

must do more than show that the Congress has not pro-

hibited the transportation of first-class mail by air. He must

14

also establish that the Congress has affirmatively author-

ized such transportation. Beach v. United States, 226 U. S.

243. The Air Mail Act of 1925, the first general statute

providing for private transportation of mail by air, em-

powered the Postmaster General to contract ‘*for the trans-

portation of air mail by aircraft’’ and also ‘*for the trans-

portation by aircraft of first-class mail other than air mail.’’

The legislative history of the Act reveals that it was under-

stood that ordinary first-class mail would be carried only

when there was insufficient air mail to make up a capacity

load. See 66 Cong. Rec. 751. A 1930 amendment, 46 Stat.

259, retained the definition of ‘‘air mail’’ in the 1925 Act,

but expressly restricted air transportation of first-class

mail to that necessary to utilize space contracted for that

could not be used for air mail. °

The Air Mail Act of 1934 provided only for ‘‘the trans-

portation of air mail by airplane,’’ and thus eliminated

the limited prior authority of the Postmaster General to

transport first-class mail by air. The intentional repeal of

this prior authorization denotes that the Congress intended

by the Air Mail Act of 1934 to restrict air transportation of

mail to air mail, * as defined in the Act, and respondent ad-

mitted before the Court of Appeals that this was the effect

of the statute.** The Comptroller General has also ruled

that the 1934 Act did not permit air transportation of first-

class mail. No. A-74912, 15 Comp. Gen. 1025.

~S When, in 1930, revision of the 1925 Act was under consideration, the

Postmaster General testified that it was necessary to retain a provision

authorizing air transportation of non-air mail in order to permit any

utilization of this exeess space. Hearings on H.R. 9500 before House

Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 12-17.

® The committee reports on the 1934 Act also indicate that it was in-

tended to provide only for transportation of air mail. 8. Rept. No. 574,

73rd Cong., 2d Sess.; H. Rept. No. 1428, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess.; H. Rept.

No. 1754, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. (Conference Report).

1 At page 40 of his main brief filed with the Court of Appeals, in foot-

note 29, it is stated that: “. . . from 1934 to 1938 Alaska was the only

area where the Postmaster General coald contract for the transportation

of all classes of mail by air.”

15

Hence, the definitions of ‘‘air mail’’ enacted by the Con-

gress in the 1925 and 1934 Acts, when viewed in the light

of their statutory context, legislative history, and settled

administrative construction, lend no support to the conclu-

sion of the court below that the Postmaster General could

transport all classes of mail by air prior to the Act of August

14, 1946. Rather, their origin in statutes that admittedly

limited air transportation of mail to air mail except, in the

ease of the 1925 Act, where the use of first-class mail was

necessary to fill excess space contracted for, confirms pe-

titioners’ view that the Congress has never authorized the

Postmaster General to transport ordinary mail by air ex-

cept in limited circumstances where expressly authorized.

Respondent contended before the Court of Appeals that

authority for the transportation of three-cent mail by air

is given by the provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act of

1938 ** amending the post roads statute (39 U.S.C. 481-483

(1952 ed.)) to inelude ‘‘air routes,’’ authorizing the Post-

r ster General to tender mail ‘o certificated air carriers,

and defining ‘‘mail*’’ as used in the Act to include ‘‘ United

States mail and foreign-transit mail,’’ without express limi-

tation to air mail. Here again, however, the contention ig-

nores the statutory context and legislative history of the

Act, and is rested on language much more ambiguous than

that found in the Act of August 14, 1946 which the Court of

Appeals refused to give its ordinary meaning.

The Civil Aeronauties Act was primarily intended as a

broad and comprehensive charter governing federal regu-

lation of air transportation. It is natural, therefore,

"52 Stat. 973 et seq., 49 U.S.C. 401 et seq. (1952 ed.). Although its

opinion is not entirely clear on this point, the Court of Appeals appar-

ently did not rest its conelusion that the Postmaster General has authority

to transport first-class mail by air on these provisions, but only regarded

them as being “consistent” with its conclusion. See Appendix B, p. 46,

infra.

12 See the declaration of policy, 52 Stat. 980, 49 U.S.C. 402 (1952 ed.).

16

that in placing air carriers on a common-carrier basis and

requiring them to transport mail tendered by the Post-

master General, the draftsmen of the statute defined ‘‘mail’’

for purposes of the Civil Aeronautics Act in the broadest

terms. That Act was expected to remain substantially un-

changed for the foreseeable future, and the provisions of

the postal statutes, Title 39 of the Code, regulating the

kinds of mail that the Postmaster General could transport

by air very possibly would be varied substantially through-

out the years to come as they had been in the past. By

broadly defining ‘‘mail’’ for purposes of the Act, the Con-

gress could assure that whatever the extent of the authority

of the Postmaster General to arrange for the transportation

of mail by air under the postal statutes at any particular

time, the airlines could, under the Civil Aeronautics Act, be

compelled to transport such mail. It is clear, both from the

context of the Act and from its legislative history, that the

Congress intended to do no more than this; the Postmaster

General’s authority was to remain limited to arranging for

air transportation of mail bearing air-mail postage, as had

been the case since 1934.

While the Civil Aeronautics Act repealed the provisions

of the Air Mail Act of 1934 authorizing the Postmaster

General to contract for air transportation of air mail and

substituted a common-carrier obligation of certificated air

lines to move mail tendered by the Postmaster General,

section 1107(k) of the Civil Aeronautics Act excepted from

repeal sections 2(a) and 2(b)(1) of the earlier Act. See-

tion 2(a) fixed the air-mail postage rate and section 2(b)

(1) contained the definition of ‘‘air mail.’’ Thus, the

draftsmen of the Civil Aeronautics Act carefully left in

effect the key provisions of the 1934 Act that established

a special air-mail service to which alone air transportation

was, under that Act, available. Moreover, in section 405(k)

of the Civil Aeronautics Act, 49 U.S.C. 485(k) (1952 ed.),

17

the Congress expressly empowered the Postmaster Genera

to contract ‘‘for the transportation by aireradt of omy

or all classes of mail to or from loenlities affeensi™ er

calamitous visitations. (Emphasis supplied) Thus use

of the language ‘‘any or all classes of mail!” a+ umder re

spondent’s theory explainable only in terms ef megieent

drafting. If, as respondent contends, the Comeres+ teak

pains to define ‘‘mail”’ so as to include amy or ail) chaswes

of mail, with reference to the Postmaster Generail’+ o-

thority to provide air transportation for mui, them =

would be expected to have used the defined term catiner

than spelling out ‘‘any or all classes of madi!” im sectem

405(k). If on the other hand, as we contend, seetem 42)

is intended only to obligate the airlines te meee «uch aml

‘as the Postmaster General, under authemty «@f Ghe

postal laws, tenders them, then the use of “amy er all

classes of mail’’ in section 405(k) is readily expiumatiile ne

authorizing the Postmaster General, in emerzemes coeeum-

stances, to arrange, as he would not otherwise le auntinemued

to arrange, for air movement of ‘any or all classes ff muall™.

The legislative history of the Act likewise demumstmates

that the Congress did not intend to broadem the Pieetumster

General’s authority with respect to the Meimedis of musi) that

he could arrange to transport by air. Tw off the ‘tills

that preceded the one finally enacted as the (imi Sere

nauties Act (H.R. 5234, 75th Cong, and S. 2. Tatth Come.)

defined ‘‘mail’’ as mail prepaid at the airmail) pester

rate. Clearly, those bills were not intended % remere

the restriction in the Air Mail Act of 190% aeums the

transportation by air of non-air mail, as cespemdent

conceded before the Court of Appenis, = FAR. 223# was

13 At page 30 of his main brief filed with the Court of Spmemits. ‘ther -ctaed

bills are referred to with the statement that “the: restrrettom ‘ar mui!”

18

amended and reintroduced as H.R. 7273, 75th Cong. The

latter bill dropped the definition of ‘‘mail’’ but expressly

left in effect the similar definition of ‘‘air mail’’ contained

in the Air Mail Act of 1934. That this bill was intended to

authorize air transportation only of air mail is plain from

the House Report (No. 911, 75th Cong., Ist Sess.) where it

is stated, at p. 18, that: ‘‘Rates for the carriage of air mail

would be fixed by the Commission.’’ (Emphasis supplied.)

Various objections to the bills already introduced caused

the President to appoint an Interdepartmental Committee

on Civil Aviation to consider the matter. The Interdepart-

mental Committee drafted a bill, introduced as H.R. 9738,

75th Cong., that was virtually identical to the Civil Aero-

nautics Act, including the definition of ‘‘mail.’’ A repre-

sentative of the Interdepartmental Committee in pointing

out the 19 ‘‘major differences in policy’’ between H.R. 9738

and the previous bills did not indicate in any way that H.R.

9738 was intended to broaden the provisions of the earlier

bills to permit transportation by air of all classes of mail. ss

On the contrary, he used the terms ‘‘mail’’ and ‘‘air mail’’

interchangeably in discussing the provisions relating to the

transportation of mail in H.R. 9738 and in a companion

bill, S. 3760, 75th Cong. * We have not discovered any ref-

erence in the legislative history of the Civil Aeronautics

Act to an intention to change the policy expressed in the

1934 Act of requiring that all mail transported by air bear

the air-mail postage rate. This can hardly be accidental

in view of the importance of the matter and the thorough-

ness of the consideration given by the Congress to that

legislation.

Both the Congress and the Postmaster General, shortly

4 Hearings on H.R. 9738 before House Committee on Interstate and

Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong., 34 Sess., pp. 37-46.

15 hid; Hearings on 8. 3760 before the Senate Committee on Commerce,

75th Cong., 3d Sess., pp. 1-4.

19

after the enactment of the Civil Aeronauties Act, were

clearly of the view that that Act did not give the Post-

master General authority to transport all classes of mail

by air. The Civil Aeronautics Act had repealed the Act of

August 24, 1935, 49 Stat. 744, which had given the Post-

master General authority to contract for the transportation

by air of all classes of mail in Alaska. In 1940, the Post-

master General submitted to the Congress a request for

enactment of a bill permitting the transportation by air of

all classes of mail in Alaska, since the repeal of the earlier

Act had:

**. . . left the Department without specific authority

to continue the transportation of all classes of mail by

aircraft in Alaska and legislation is regarded as very

necessary to permit of the continued transportation of

all classes of mail by aircraft in the Territory without

conflict with the Civil Aeronauties Act of 1938.°" H.

Rept. No. 2736, 76 Cong., 3rd Sess., p. 3.

Congressional debate on this bill made clear that both

the Post Office Department and the Congress were of the

view that only air mail could be tendered to air carriers

certificated under the Civil Aeronautics Act."* The Con-

©Mr. Dimond:

“When the Civil Aeronautics Act with respect to air mail was passed

recently, one provision of the Act said that the existing contracts for the

earriage of all classes of mail in Alaska would be continued in effect until

the Civil Aeronauties Authority should apply the Act to Alaska by issuing

certificates of public convenience and necessity and prescribing rates of

compensation. Up to the present moment no such certificate has heen issued

for any of the routes carrying all classes of mail by air.

“The Civil Aeronauties Authority now desires to put the act into effect

in Alaska, and if that ix done all existing mail contract« for carriage of

mail by air will he cancelled. Under the Civil Arronautics Act it ix possible

to carry air mail only, as is said by the Post Office Department; therefore

the Post Office Department would in that event be required to carry other

elasses of mail by dog teams or horses, at a much greater cost to the Gov-

ernment.

“The purpose of this bill is to permit the continuance of the carriage of

20

gress thereupon enacted a law, 54 Stat. 1175, 39 U.S.C. 488a

(1952 ed.), substantially in the terms proposed by the Post-

master General, providing that, when required by the Post-

master General, air carriers certificated under the Civil

Aeronautics Act to engage in the transportation of mail in

the Territory of Alaska ‘‘shall . . . transport, in addition

to mail on which [air-mail] postage shall have been paid

. . any other classes of mail bearing the appropriate

postage for its respective class, and the Postmaster Gen-

eral is authorized to require such transportation.’’ (Em-

phasis supplied.)

The Court of Appeals did not attempt to explain why

this specific statutory authorization was necessary if

the Postmaster General has a broad, discretionary au-

thority to transport by air any class of mail whether or not

it bears air-mail postage, and, indeed, there is no satisfac-

tory explanation other than that the Congress has always

considered air transportation to be limited to air mail ex-

cept when otherwise provided by specific statutory lan-

guage.

The Court of Appeals did express concern that ‘‘to accord

‘domestic air mail’ the meaning urged by the railroads

would give rise to serious statutory conflicts’’ with the spe-

all classes of mail in Alaska by air under the Civil Aeronauties Act just

the same as is the case at the present time, and it will put the full control

in the hands of the Civil Aeronauties Authority. . . .”

Mr. Martin of Massachusetts:

“It is not really necessary to have this legislation. This compels them

to transport mail by air, whereas it would be optional otherwise?”

Mr. Dimond:

“No it would not be optional. In the opinion of the Solicitor of the Post

Office Department, as I understand, if the Civil Aeronauties Authority puts

the Civil Aeronautics Act completely in effect in Alaska, it would no longer

be possible to carry all classes of mail by air and it would be necessary to

go back to the old and more costly method of earrying all except air mail

on the ground by dog teams or on horseback or in some other kindred

fashion.” 86 Cong. Rec. 9680. (Emphasis supplied.)

eo

21

cial statutes permitting the Postmaster General to trans-

port by air ‘‘any or all classes of mail’’ in certain limited

situations, in that to’construe the Act of August 14, 1946

as requiring that all mail transported by air bear air-mail

postage would ‘‘nullify these prior statutes.’’ Appendix B,

at pp. 44-45, infra. But, this ignores the general rule of

statutory construction that ‘‘where there are two statutes,

the earlier special and the later general, the special controls

the general, and the fact that one is special and the other

is general creates a presumption that the special is to be

considered as remaining an exception to the general. The

general will not be understood as repealing the special,

unless a repeal is expressly named, or unless the provisions

of the general are manifestly inconsistent with those of the

special. Rogers v. United States, 185 U. S. 83... .” Bal-

timore € O. R. Co. v. Chicago River & Indiana R. Co., 170

F.2d 654, 658 (C.A. 7)."7 It seems to us that the Court of

Appeals might much more appropriately have been con-

cerned with the question of why the Congress bothered to

enact these special statutes if the Postmaster General has

a broad, discretionary authority to transport all classes of

mail by air under the provisions of the Civil Aeronautics

Act.

d. The subsequent air-mail legislation. The events lead-

ing up to the enactment of legislation authorizing an air

parcel-post service illustrate that both tie Post Office De-

partment and the Congress, after the passage of the Act of

August 14, 1946, understood that the Department did not

have a general authority to transport non-air mail by air,

even on a space-available basis. In 1948, some of the pay-

ments to air carriers for mail transportation were based

17 Moreover, once it is recognized that the Congress has always accepted

the principle that non-air mail can be carried by air only when expressly

authorized and that the 1946 Act merely reaffirmed this principle in

explicit terms, the apparent conflict disappears entirely.

22

on minimum load guarantees, millions of ton-miles of which

were not being used because of insufficient air-mail volume.

The Postmaster General did not fill this extra space with

first-class mail or ordinary parcel post since he considered

that this would be beyond his statutory authority. The

Congress shared this view, as is evident from the following

comments in H. Rept. No. 2163, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2:

‘‘The Civil Aeronautics Board has recently been es-

tablishing rates upon the volume of mail. They have

accomplished this by setting minimum load require-

ments upon which the Post Office Department pays the

ton-mile rate established for the particular carrier.

These minimum load requirements have been revised

consistently upward till now they are at the point

where the Post Office is paying for a large amount of

space which they cannot use under present laws and

conditions. The establishment of this service [parcel

post] will create an additional volume of mail which

will utilize this space at no extra cost to the Post Office

Department.’’ (Emphasis supplied.)

The Congress, therefore, enacted the Air Parcel Post Act,

62 Stat. 1097, 39 U.S.C. 475 (1952 ed.), establishing a pre-

mium ‘‘rate of postage on mailable matter exceeding eight

ounces in weight, but not weighing more than seventy pounds

nor measuring more than one hundred inches in length and

girth combined, when carried by air.’’ (Emphasis supplied.)

The same understanding by the Postmaster General and

by the Congress was shown as recently as 1949. The Air

Star Route Act, 52 Stat. 219, enacted by the same Congress

that enacted the Civil Aeronautics Act, had authorized the

Postmaster General to award contracts ‘‘for the transpor-

tation of any or all classes of mail by airplane upon star

routes not over two hundred airplane-miles in length”’

where necessary because of the inadequacy or imprac-

23

ticability of surface transportation. In 1949, the Post-

master General requested the Congress to remove the re-

striction limiting to 200 miles or less the length of such air

star routes, since:

‘“‘The certification of air routes under provisions of

the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, as amended, is not

justified in most of the areas herein considered because,

when restricted to air mail bearing the airmail postage

rate, the volume would not be sufficient to warrant the

high cost of conventional certified service. On the

other hand, if the service were obtained for all classes

of mail at a competitive contract rate, the cost might

be reasonable and fully warranted.”’ H. Rept. No. 563,

81st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3.

Consequently, the Congress amended the Act to remove

the restriction and permit the Postmaster General to

“award contracts for the transportation by aircraft

upon star routes of any or all classes of mail (includ-

ing but not limited to air mail and air parcel post)’’ where

surface transportation is impracticable or inadequate. (Em-

phasis supplied.) 63 Stat. 680, 39 U.S.C. 470 (1952 ed.).

e. Administrative construction of the air-mail statutes.

Until the inauguration of the recent experimental programs

for the transportation of three-cent mail by air, the con-

sistent view of the Post Office Department had been that

only air mail could be transported by air except in the spe-

cial situations covered by statute. We have already noted

repeated instances in which the Department advanced this

restriction as grounds for the enactment of legislation au-

thorizing air transportation of all classes of mail, as the

Alaska and Air Star Route Acts, or of particular classes

of mail not bearing the normal air-mail postage, as the Air

Parcel Post Act.

The Department’s regulations and its Postal Guide, be-

24

fore the institution of these experimental operations, also

indicated that only air mail could be transported by air

under the general authority of the Department. ‘‘ Domestic

air mail’’ was defined in the regulations in precisely the

statutory language as ‘‘all mailable matter being trans-

ported as mail by air,’’ 39 C.F.R. 34.89(a) (1949 ed.), and

it was provided that the ‘‘rate of 6 cents an ounce

.. will apply to all domestic air mail.’’ 39 C.F.R.

34.88(b)(2) (1949 ed.). The U.S. Official Postal Guide,

Part I, dated July 1953, under Chapter III entitled ‘‘ Domes-

tic Mail Matter,’’ carried the following Article 12:

‘612. Air Mail and air parcel post rates.—The rates

of postage in this article apply to mail transported by

air in the domestic mails. (See arts. 2 and 3 of this

chapter).

(a) Letters end packages, not exceeding 8 ounces

are chargeable with postage at the rate of 6 cents an

ounce or fraction of an ounce. Air post and postal

cards are acceptable at 4 cents each.

(b) Air Parcel Post. Parcels exceeding 8 ounces,

but not exceeding 70 pounds, which may include any

class of mail matter intended for air transportation,

are subject to the rates shown in the following sched-

ule, according to zone location and weight .. .’’

(Emphasis supplied.)

f. The priorities allegedly accorded air-mail. The Court

of Appeals, in support of its views as to the authority of

the Postmaster General to transport three-cent mail by air,

suggested that the distinguishing feature of a ‘‘real air-

mail service’’ for which air-mail postage is to be charged is

that it ‘‘involves many priorities’’ and that ‘‘the carriers

must transport this mail on an imperative priority basis.’’

Appendix B, p. 45, infra, The court reasoned that since

the three-cent mail is tendered to the air lines on a space-

available basis, such mail does not receive a ‘‘ real air-mail

service’’ justifying the higher air-mail postage charge. *

Respondent, in the court below, advanced a similar con-

tention and referred to priorities allegedly accorded air

mail in handling and distribution in the post offices, at ter-

minals and transfer points, and in transportation.

25

The Court of Appeals advanced those ‘‘considerations”’

only as a ‘‘support’’ for its conclusions already reached,

and did not suggest that, standing alone, they would provide

an alternative ground for its decision. The frailty of this

support becomes clear once the nature of the legislation

respecting air mail is considered. From the beginning of

the service to date the legislative provisions respecting

air mail have been confined basically to a definition of air

mail, a prescription of air-mail postages rates, and author-

ity to contract for or require on a common-carrier basis

the air movement of such mail. Prior to the 1946 Act, air

mail was defined as first-class mail, or as mail of any class,

prepaid at the premium air-mail rate. In the 1946 Act, the

definition became all mailable matter transported as mail by

air and it was prescribed that such mail should carry the

premium rate.

It cannot reasonably be denied that by these provisions

the Congress intended to establish an air-mail service.

That service was intended to be entirely distinct from the

%* The Court of Appeals stated that “so far as the record indicates, the

variation in eost between carriage by rail and carriage by air on a non-

priority, space-available basis is not substantial.” It should be pointed

out that permanent rates for the transportation of three-cent mail by air

under the west-coast program in question here have not yet been fixed

by the Civil Aeronautics Board. The mail is now being flown under

temporary rates subject to retroactive adjustment when the proper

permanent rates are determined, so that at this time the cost of air trans-

portation is uncertain. Petitioners believe that it will eventually exceed

the cost of rail transportation by a considerable margin.

26

service provided for first-class mail. Respondent conceded

as much in the courts below. Presumably, respondent also

would not contest the proposition that the Congress was

not practicing a fraud on the American people. When it

exacted a double price for air-mail service, it intended to

give in return something reasonably worth double the price

of ordinary first-class mail. But while respondent conceded

that these statutory provisions obligate him to provide an

air-mail service distinct from a..1 considerably better than

that accorded in the first-class mail service, he asserts that

this distinction does not lie in the air movement of air mail

as distinguished from surface movement of other classes of

mail.

What respondent says is that in providing for air mail the

Congress intended to establish a distinct service, but the

distinction intended is some difference in the priorities ac-

corded the two classes of mail while handled on the ground.

In the affidavits filed on behalf of respondent in this pro-

ceeding, the only substantial priority claimed to be ac-

corded an air mail letter that is not also received by an

ordinary first-class letter transported by air between the

same points is that the air carrier must accept the air

mail letter while it need accept the first-class letter only

if space is available on the flight after satisfying other

demands. ”

In point of fact, it appears that this co-called priority is

largely illusory, since the air carriers always have more

than enough space available. Thus, Member Gurney of the

1® The affidavit of Postmaster General Summerfield mentions only the

fact that the air carrier may reject first-class mail if space is not avail-

able. (J.A. 46.) The affidavit of Assistant Postmaster General Seidle

does refer to certain differences in the handling of the mails by post office

personnel, but on analysis these differences amount in substance to little

more than recognition of the possibility that the three-cent mail may be

rejected by the air carrier if space is not available. (J.A. 53-55.)

27

Civil Aeronautics Board, dissenting in Surface Mail by

Air Exceptions, Docket Nos. 6882, 6905, and 6940 (decided

May 2, 1955), stated: ‘‘. . . that so far as the Board is

aware, there has never been a smgle pound of surface mail

refused for lack of space by the certificated carriers.’’ (Em-

phasis in the original.) And, in a recent press release, the

Post Office Department announced that all mail between

many of the major cities served by the experimental pro-

grams is transported by air. ”

It seems clear that the possibilities that space will not be

available are sufficiently remote and any other priorities

accorded air mail are so inconsequential as completely to

negative any suggestion that such are the differences in-

tended by the Congress to justify the double postage rate

imposed on air mail. But even if today those distinctions

were significant, there is nothing in the statutes to prevent

the Postmaster General from tomorrow giving three-cent

mail the same handling on the ground as is given air mail.

There is no reference to such priorities in the entire thirty

years of legislation relating to air mail, either in the terms

of any statute or, insofar as we could find, in the legislative

history of any statute. *

That the Congress considered air transportation to be

the distinctive characteristic of air mail justifying the

premium postage rate charged therefor, rather than pri-

orities in handling on the ground, is obvious from its use

of the descriptive adjective ‘‘air.’’ The provisions in the

20 Post Office Department Press Release No. 229, dated October 6, 1955.

21 While the postal regulations direct that air mail is to reeeive expe-

ditious treatment, neither those regulations nor the Postal Guide ever

provided, until this controversy arose, any basis for an assertion that such

expeditious handling is the critical factor distinguishing air mail from other

classes of mail. See pp. 23-24, supra.

28

postal statutes relating to ‘‘special delivery’’ and ‘‘special

handling’’ of mail reveal that the Congress knows how to

provide for, and label, mail that is to receive priorities in

handling on the ground for which an extra charge is made,

when it so desires. See 39 U.S.C. 164-169a, 246f, 276d,

292a(f) (1952 ed.). If air transportation is not limited to air

mail, then the Congress in providing for air mail has enabled

the Postmaster General to collect a double charge from an

unsuspecting public for a service that the Congress did not

require be essentially different from that which a letter

would receive at the ordinary postage rate. It seems clear

that a decision attributing such an intention to the Congress

should be reviewed by this Court.

It is apparent that respondent’s present experimental

programs have already confused the distinction between air

mail and first-class mail, and that, under the opinion of the

court below, he may erase altogether any differences be-

tween the two services. It is inconceivable to us that the

Congress ever intended to entrust to the Postmaster Gen-

eral this power virtually to destroy a mail service for

which it has long expressly provided by statute, especially

in view of the frequently expressed Congressional concern

with maintaining and increasing revenues from air mail

and with eliminating the postal deficit. *

g. The Congress has not ratified the operation in ques-

tion. We will touch quickly on the Congressional ratifica-

tion argument advanced by respondent since it is referred

to in the opinion of the Court of Appeals. Essentially, this

argument is that Congressional approval and ratification

of the experimental programs should be inferred from ref-

erences to the programs in various committee reports and

22 See, e. g., H. Rept. No. 416, 83rd Cong., lst Sess., pp. 20-21; S. Rept.

No. 373, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., p. 4; H. Rept. No. 2619, 83rd Cong., Ist

Sess., p. 1; H. Rept. No. 1252, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 4-5; H. Rept.

No. 2358, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4; 8. Rept. No. 1834, 79th Cong., 2d Sess,

29

hearings and from a one-sentence proviso in an appropria-

tions act, 68 Stat. 148, requiring the Postmaster General to

report the total cost of ‘‘the eliminated and replacement

service for airline, truck and railroad transportation.’’

The Court of Appeals did not conclude that these limited

activities constituted a Congressional ratification of the

respondent’s experimental programs, and could not prop-

erly have done so, since such incidental activities in no wise

comprise the express recognition and approval of adminis-

trative action that has been found to amount to Congres-

sional ratification of such action in cases like Fleming v.

Mohawk Co., 331 U. S. 111, and Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U. 8S.

354.

But, the court below did state that ‘‘the indications of im-

plied legislative approval are entitled to weight.’’ Appen-

dix B, p. 47, infra. In this, the court is clearly in error. The

Congress has either ratified this experimental program or it

has not done so. Both lower courts proper!y found that

it had not done so. If there had been ratification that would

be the end of the matter. As there has not been ratification,

no help can properly be derived from the facts upon which

respondent urged that ratification could be found, just as

no effect can be given a bill that is considered but not en-

acted by the Congress.

Conclusion

This is a test case presenting a novel question of fed-

eral statutory construction having great importance to the

transportation industry in general and to the public, as

well as to the litigants. The decision in this case will, in

all probability, be the final word on the authority of the

Postmaster General to transport all classes of mail by air

under the existing statutory provisions. The opinion of

the Court of Appeals is demonstrably erroneous, and the

30

matter is one that should be finally, and correctly, settled

by this Court. Accordingly, this petition for a writ of cer-

tiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Srarr Tuomas, J. Caner Fort,

Of Counsel for the Atchison,

iti nan hae Se

way Company. Fraxois M. Sea,

T. J. Suarrery, Pauip F. Wersn,

Of Counsel for Great Northern Lawnexce J. Larro,

Railway Company. 734 Fifteenth Street, N.W.,

M. L. Countryman, Jr., Washington 5, D. C.,

Earn F. Regva, Attorneys for Petitioners.

Of Counsel for Northern Pacific

Railway Company.

Sranrieip B. Jounxson,

Rosert J. MoLzax,

Of Counsel for Southern Pacific

Company.

F. J. Mesa,

Of Counsel for Union Pacific

Railroad Company.

31

APPENDIX A

Sratutes Lyvotvep

Air Mail Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 406:

See. 2. That when used in this Act the term “ar

mail’’ means first-class mail prepaid at the comes of

postage herein prescribed.

Sec. 3. That the rates of postage om air maal siuill

not be less than 10 cents for each ounce or fractiom

thereof.

Sec. 4. That the Postmaster General is aunhumzed

to contract with any individual, firm, or corperstium

for the transportation of air mail by aircraft jwoweem

such points as he may designate at a rate nut to «sued

four-fifths of the revenues derived from sacit air musiL

and to further contract for the transpertatiom tr ai-

craft of first-class mail other than air mail at #2 mame

not to exceed four-fifths of the revenues derived Sram

such first-class mail.

Act of April 29, 1930, 46 Stat. 259:

* * * The Postmaster General is antlormzed w

award contracts for the transportation of air mull

aircraft between such points as he may desizmace ww

the lowest responsible bidder at fixed rates per mile

for definite weight spaces, one cubic fowt of +pmue in

ing computed as the equivalent of nine pounds off aor

mail, such rates not to exceed $1.25 per mile: Pronniieii.

That where the air mail moving between the desumaned

points does not exceed twenty-five enbic feet ar Tw

hundred and twenty-five pounds, per trip the Phe-

master General may award to the lowest respemsibile

bidder, who has owned and operated am air transper-

tation service on a fixed daily schedule over « distumere

32

of not less than two hundred and fifty miles and for

a period of not less than six months prior to the ad-

vertisement for bids, a contract at a rate not to exceed

40 cents per mile for a weight space of tventy-five

cubic feet, or two hundred twenty-five pounds. When-

ever sufficient air mail is not available, first-class mail

matter may be added to make up the maximum load

specified in such contract.

Air Mail Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 933:

Sec. 2 (a) Effective July 1, 1934, the rate of postage

on air mail shall be 6 cents for each ounce or frac-

tion thereof.

(b) When used in this Act—

(1) The term ‘air mail’ means mail of any class

prepaid at the rate of postage prescribed in subsection

(a) of this section.

Sec. 3 (a) The Postmaster General is authorized to

award contracts for the transportation of air mail by

airplane between such points as he may designate, and

for initial periods of not exceeding one year, to the

lowest responsible bidders tendering sufficient guar-

anty for faithful performance in accordance with the

terms of the advertisement at fixed rates per airplane

Yalan

Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973 et seq. (49

U.S.C. 401 et seq.):

Section 1. As used in this Act, unless the context

otherwise requires—

33

(23) ‘Mail’ means United States mail and foreign-

transit mail.

Sec. 2. In the exercise and performance of its pow-

ers and duties under this Act, the Authority shall con-

sider the following, among other things, as being in

the public interest, and in accordance with the public

convenience and necessity —

(a) The encouragement and development of an air-

transportation system properly adapted to the present

and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce

of the United States, the Postal Service, and of the

national defense;

(b) The regulation of air transportation in such

manner as to recognize and preserve the inherent ad-

vantages of, assure the highest degree of safety in,

and foster sound economic conditions in, such trans-

portation, and to improve the relations between, and

coordinate transportation by, air carriers:

(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and ef-

ficient service by air carriers at reasonable charges,

without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or

advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive prac-

tices ;

(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure

the sound development of an air-transportation system

properly adapted to the needs of the foreign and do-

mestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal

Service, and of the national defense:

(e) The regulation of air commerce in such manner

as to best promote its development and safety; and

(f) The encouragement and development of civil

aeronautics.

=

Sec. 405.

(g) From and after the issuance of any certificate

authorizing the transportation of mail by aircraft, the

Postmaster General shal] tender mail to the holder

thereof, to the extent required by the Postal Service,

for transportation between the points named in such

certificate for the transportation of mail, and such mail

shall be transported by the air carrier holding such cer-

tificate in accordance with such rules, regulations, and

requirements as may be promulgated by the Postmas-

ter General under this section.

(k) In the event of emergency caused by flood, fire,

or other calamitous visitation, the Postmaster General _

is authorized to contract, without advertising, for the

transportation by aircraft of any or all classes of mail

to or from localities affected by such calamity, where

available facilities of persons authorized to transport

mail to or from such localities are inadequate to meet

the requirements of the Postal Service during such

emergency. Such contracts may be only for such peri-

ods as may be necessitated, for the maintenance of

mail service, by the inadequacy of such other facili-

ties. No operation pursuant to any such contract, for

such period, shall be air transportation within the pur-

view of this Act. Payment of compensation for serv-

ice performed under such contracts shall be made, at

rates provided in such contracts, from appropriations

for the transportation of mail by the means normally

used for transporting the mail transported under such

contracts.

o * * ‘ oe o *

35

Sec. 1107.

(a) Section 3964 of the Revised Statutes is hereby

amended by adding ‘‘and all air routes’’, after the

words ‘‘or parts of railroads.’’

(k) Sections 2(b)(2) and (3), 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11,

12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, and so much

of section 8 as reads . . ., of the Act of June 12, 1934,

as amended (48 Stat. 933); . . . and all other Acts or

parts of Acts inconsistent with any provision of this

Act are hereby repealed.

Transportation Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 899 (49 U.S.C. pre-

ceding section 1):

It is hereby declared to be the national transporta-

tion policy of the Congress to provide for fair and im-

partial regulation of all modes of transportation sub-

ject to the provisions of this Act, so administered as to

recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of

each; to promote safe, adequate, economical, and effi-

cient service and foster sound economic conditions in

transportation and among the several carriers; to en-

courage the establishment and maintenance of reason-

able charges for transportation services, without un-

just discriminations, undue preferences or advan-

tages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices ; to

cooperate with the several States and the duly author-

ized officials thereof; and to encourage fair wages and

equitable working conditions ;—all to the end of devel-

oping, coordinating, and preserving a national trans-

portation system by water, highway, and rail, as well

as other means, adequate to meet the needs of the com-

merce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and

36

of the national defense. All of the provisions of this

Act shall be administered and enforced with a view to

carrying out the above declaration of policy.

Act of October 14, 1940, 54 Stat. 1175 (39 U.S.C. 488a):

* * * whenever required by the Postmaster General,

any air carrier authorized by the Civil Aeronautics

Authority under title IV of the Civil Aeronautics Act

of 1938 to engage in the transportation of mail in the

Territory of Alaska shall, within the limits of such

authorization, transport, in addition to mail on which

postage shall have been paid at the rate provided by

the Act of June 12, 1934 (48 Stat. 933), as amended,

any other classes of mail bearing the appropriate

postage for its respective class, and the Postmaster

General is authorized to require such transportation.

Act of August 14, 1946, 60 Stat. 1062 (39 U.S.C. 462a):

Sec. 2. As used in this Act, ‘‘domestic air mail’’

shall embrace all mailable matter being transported as

mail by air within the continental United States,

within any Territory or possession of the United

States, within any geographical area which is a pro-

tectorate of the United States, or between any of the

aforesaid: * * *

Postal Rate Revision and Federal Employees Salary Act

of 1948, 62 Stat. 1261 (39 U.S.C. 463a):

Sec. 201. The rate of postage on all domestic air

mail as defined in Public Law 730, Seventy-ninth Con-

gress, shall, except in the case of postal cards and pri-

vate mailing or post cards, be 6 cents for each ounce

or fraction thereof. The rate of postage on postal

cards and private mailing or post cards .. ., when

sent by air mail, shall be 4 cents each.

37

Air Parcel Post Act, 62 Stat. 1097 (39 U.S.C. 475):

* * © the rate of postage on mailable matter exceed-

ing eight ounces in weight, but not weighing more than

seventy pounds nor measuring more than one hun-

dred inches in length and girth combined, when car-

ried by air and including other transportation to and

from air mail routes, shall, except as otherwise herein

provided, be determined on the basis of the eight postal

zones established for fourth-class matter, as follows:

Air Star Route Act, as amended, 63 Stat. 680 (39 U.S.C.

470):

Sec. 6(a). Whenever he shall find it to be in the

public interest, because of the nature of the terrain,

or the impracticability or inadequacy of surface trans-

portation, and where the cost thereof is reasonably

compatible with the service to be provided, the Post-

master General may award contracts for the transpor-

tation by aircraft upon star routes of any or all classes

of mail (including but not limited to air mail and air

parcel post), payment for such service to be made from

the appropriation for inland transportation by star

routes: * * *

APPENDIX B

Before Epcertox, Chief Judge, and Pretryman and

Bastian, Circuit Judges.

Prettyman, Circuit Judge: This is an action brought

in the District Court by certain railroads for declaratory

judgment and injunctive relief against the Postmaster Gen-

eral. It was alleged in the complaint that the Postal Serv-

ice has conducted an experimental operation in the trans-

38

portation of first-class (three-cent) mail by air between

designated localities since early October, 1953; and that

on October 6, 1954, the Postmaster General filed a petition

with the Civil Aeronautics Board asking the Board to

establish a rate of compensation for such transportation

between additional localities, some or all of which are

served by one or more of the plaintiff railroads. The

railroads asserted that the proposed service is unlawful,

void, and beyond the statutory authority of the Postmaster

General. The Postmaster General answered. Both sides

moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted

summary judgment to the plaintiff railroads. It held that

the Postmaster General has the right to experiment in

the transportation of mail but that prolonged experimental

dispatch of three-cent mail by air is not within his statutory

authority. At the same time, the court denied the rail-

roads’ motion for a permanent injunction, on the ground

that irreparable injury had not been shown. The Post-

master General appealed, and the railroads then appealed

from those parts of the court’s order which sustained the

power to experiment provided the operation were not un-

duly prolonged, and from that part of the order denying

the permanent injunction.

The West Coast experiment is the fourth such operation

to be instituted. The plan is to tender to air carriers for

transportation ordinary first-class mail when, as and if

empty space is available on a flight after all other traffic,

including mail bearing the special air-mail postage, is ac-

commodated. Ordinary mail thus transported is not to re-

ceive expedited handling, transportation or distribution.

The object of the experiments, the Postmaster General says,

is to gain experience from which it can be determined

whether improvements and economies might be achieved

by this method.

We are met first with the contention of the Postmaster

39

General that the plaintiff railroads have no standing to

sue, that is, that they have no right to initiate judicial

inquiry into the legality of his action. He argues the

statutes bestow on the railroads only a right to reason-

able compensation for services actually performed; they

give the railroads no right to perform these services ;

but the lawsuit seeks to protect a right to perform. Fur-

ther, the Postmaster General says the plaintiffs have no

common-law right to contest his action, since they are

merely competitors of the airlines within the rule laid

down in such cases as Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes* and

Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay.?

The carriage of mail by the railroads is governed by

statute.* All railroad common carriers are required to

carry such mail as may be offered for transportation by

the Postmaster General, * and they are required to furnish

all necessary facilities for carrying and handling the mail

while it is in their custody, furnishing cars, station space,

and rooms for handling storage and transfer.° They must

carry the mail on the trains and in the manner the Postmas-

ter General prescribes. °

The statute imposes substantial obligations on the plain-

tiff railroads. Under its terms they have been compelled

to make substantial investments in special equipment for

handling and carrying the mails. A necessary effect of the

Postmaster General’s action in tendering three-cent mail

for transportation by air is to prevent useful employment

of parts of these very considerable investments. Thus,

contrary to the contentions of the Postmaster General, more

1 302 U.S. 464, 82 L. Ed. 374, 58 S. Ct. 300 (1938).

295 U.S. App. D.C. —, 225 F. 2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied,

— U.S. — (Nov. 7, 1955).

339 Srar. 425 (1916), 39 U.S.C.A. §§ 524 et seq.

439 Srar. 429 (1916), 39 U.S.C.A. § 541.

539 Srat. 427 (1916), 39 U.S.C.A. § 538.

39 Srar. 428 (1916), 39 U.S.C.A. § 539.

40

is at stake than a simple statutory privilege of doing busi-

ness with the Government. The interest of the plaintiff

railroads is not a mere expectancy of continued patronage.

It is a present interest stemming from substantial invest-

ments in cars and equipment. Such an interest may merit

legal consideration even when the investment is made freely

and with knowledge of a possible change of status that

would impair its use.’ If so, it is sufficient here, for the

railroads did not acquire these facilities as merely useful

or needed in obtaining Government business; they acquired

the equipment because they were commanded to do so by

law.

Nor can the contested action of the Postmaster General be

viewed only as creating competition for the railroads. In

the first place the air carriers and the railroads do not bid

for the mail as free competitors. They transport it as

agents of the United States, * subject to minute regulation

by the Postmaster General. Furthermore, the Postmaster

General did not simply finance or create new competition;

he explicitly discontinued the use of certain railroad equip-

ment. For example, in the record before us is a letter

in which the Postal Transportation Service at San Fran-

cisco advised the Southern Pacific Company that certain

apartments in various trains would be discontinued. This

is a direct act which is part and parcel of the experimental

program for transportation of three-cent mail by air. If

the program is invalid for want of statutory authority the

plaintiff railroads have been injured by a direct illegal

7 See, ¢.g., Standard Airlines v. Civil Aeronauties Board, 85 U.S. App.

D.C. 29, 177 F. 2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ; Civil Aeronauties Board v. Ameri-

ean Air Transport, 91 U.S. App. D.C. 318, 201 F. 2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1952)

(certified to Supreme Court), certificate dismissed, 344 U.S. 4, 97 L. Ed. 4,

73 8. Ct. 2 (1952), appeal decided, 91 U.S. App. D.C. 323, 201 F. 2d 194

(D.C. Cir. 1952).

8 Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. United States, 225 U.S. 640, 56 L. Ed

1236, 32 S. Ct. 702 (1912).

41

act. The situations presented in cases like Alabama Power

Co. v. Ickes, supra, were wholly different, and such cases do

not apply. We think the plaintiff railroads have standing

in court to challenge the alleged illegal act.

We come, then, to the question whether the Postmaster

General has authority to conduct the experimental car-

riage of three-cent mail by air. His general authority to

arrange for mail transportation stems from a statute

which provides: ‘‘The Postmaster General shall provide

for carrying the mail on all post roads established by

law, as often as he, having due regard to productiveness

and other circumstances, may think proper.’’® By a later

enactment ‘‘air routes’’ were added to the definition of

“post roads established by law’’."° More specific are the

provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act." That Act re-

quires the Postmaster General to tender mail to air car-

riers holding a certificate authorizing the transportation

of mail by aircraft according to the needs of the Postal

Service, and requires the carriers to transport such mail.

It also provides that rates of compensation to air carriers

for carrying the mail be fixed by the Civil Aeronautics

Board.”

The position of the plaintiff railroads is quite simple.

They say the foregoing provisions relate to so-called ‘‘air

mail’’ and to no other mail. Another statute establishes

the rate of postage on ‘‘domestic air mail’’ at six cents

an ounce,” and ‘‘domestic air mail’’ is defined in the stat-

ute as ‘‘all mailable matter being transported as mail by

air within the continental United States’’.* The rail-

® Rev. Strat. 3965, 39 U.S.C.A. § 483.

1052 Srar. 1027 (1938), 39 U.S.C.A. § 481.

1152 Srat. 977 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C.A. § 401 et seq.

12 52 Strat. 998 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C.A. § 486.

18 62 Strat. 1261 (1948), 39 U.S.C.A. § 463a.

1460 Srar. 1062 (1946), 39 U.S.C.A. § 462a.

42

roads therefore argue that ‘‘all mailable matter being

transported as mail by air’’ must bear postage at the six-

cent rate. These postage-rate provisions, say the rail-

roads, are clear, without ambiguity, and must be given

the effect their words require. They are in accord, say

the railroads, with the distinction between ordinary sur-

face mail and air mail which has consistently been recog-

nized by legislative and executive authorities prior to the

inauguration of the present experimental service.

In support of his authority the Postmaster General

urges a number of propositions. He points to his gen-

eral authority to provide for the carriage of mail on all

post roads, including air routes, and to the provisions of the

Civil Aeronautics Act to which we have referred. More

specifically, he urges contemporaneous legislative approval

of the experimental program manifested in committee re-

ports * and the 1954 Post Office Appropriation Act.’® Fin-

ally he cites an administrative distinction between air mail,

as a special service receiving expedited handling and atten-

tion, and ordinary three-cent mail, which receives no spe-

cial handling whether or not carried by air under this ex-

periment. He claims support in a formal opinion of the

Comptroller General" supporting the experimental pro-

gram so long as this distinction is maintained.

The principal problem is whether the statutes fixing

an air-mail postage rate and defining ‘‘domestiec air mail’

prohibit carriage by air of mail not bearing the special

air-mail rate of postage. The railroads rely heavily upon

the statutory definition of ‘‘domestic air mail’’. The com-

plete section containing the definition is as follows:

15 E.g., S. Rev. No. 1286, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).

1668 Srar. 144.

17 Letter of Aug. 12, 1953—B-116331—appearing in this record at page

288 and printed in the joint appendix at page 68,

_—

43

‘*As used in this Act, ‘domestic air mail’ shall em-

brace all mailable matter being transported as mail

by air within the continental United States, within

any Territory or possession of the United States,

within any geographical area which is a protectorate

of the United States, or between any of the aforesaid:

Provided, That with respect to mail transported under

authority of section 1 of the Act of October 14, 1940

(54 Srat. 1175; 39 U.S.C., 1940 edition, 488a), the

postage rate of 5 cents for each ounce or fraction of

an ounce shall be applicable only to mail of the first

class, and for all other classes the rates shall be as

prescribed by that Act.’’

The railroads reason, as we have said, that ‘‘all mailable

matter being transported as mail by air’’ is ‘‘air mail’’

and the special postage is required to be paid on all mat-

ter thus transported. They conclude from those pre-

mises that mail not bearing the special postage cannot be

transported by air. But we think the argument over-

looks an important factor. Congress had, prior to the

above-quoted definition, already defined ‘‘air mail’’ as be-

ing mail on which special air-mail postage has been pre-

paid. Under that definition ‘‘air mail’’ is not such matter

as the Post Office transports by air but is matter upon

which the sender has affixed special postage; the nature of

the mail as air mail is fixed by the sender, not by the Postal

Service. If that view is correct, the statutory definition of

“domestic air mail’? above quoted does not preclude the

Post Office from transporting by air matter other than ‘‘air

mail’’. It must, generally speaking, transport by air matter

to which the special postage has been affixed, but it not re-

quired to demand the special postage for all matter which it

transports by air.

An interesting problem in statutory construction is posed

44

by the railroads’ argument in this respect. The several

steps are long and complicated, and we have relegated the

recital to an Appendix to this opinion. Our conclusion from

the legislative history is that Congress in 1946 meant to

use the words ‘‘air mail’’ in the sense it had already given

those words and by adding ‘‘domestic’’ it intended merely

to add a geographical description extending the continental

postage rate to carriage of mail to the territories, posses-

sions and protectorates of the United States. This is the

plain, commonsense view. The only contrary consideration

is that in 1946 Congress did not in words carry forward the

1925 and 1934 definitions but left them hanging without

any practical application. In the absence of clear indication

of a Congressional intent to discard the established defini-

tion, we think the view urged by the railroads is untenable.

Moreover, to accord ‘‘domestie air mail’’ the meaning

urged by the railroads would give rise to serious statu-

tory conflicts. Before 1946, for example, several statutes

had been enacted expressly authorizing the Postmaster

General to contract, in certain situations, for the carriage

of ‘‘any or all classes of mail’’ by aircraft. One statute ™

authorized such contracts in emergencies caused by flood,

fire, or calamitous visitation; another” granted similar

authority to provide for air transportation over other-

wise inaccessible or impracticable routes. If the subse-

quent definition of ‘‘domestie air mail’’ required all mail

carried by air to bear air-mail postage, authority to con-

tract for ‘‘any or all classes of mail’’ under these prior

statutes was thereby terminated. Under that view of the

definition the Postmaster General, whatever the emergency

or the terrain, could contract only for mail bearing the

special postage, since any mail carried by air under these

18 52 Srat. 997 (1938), 49 U.S.C.A. § 485(k).

1952 Stat. 219 (1938), as amended, 39 U.S.C.A. § 470.

| —,

45

contracts would be ‘‘domestic air mail’’ and would reqgune

the added postage. Cae eS hee oe ee

tion to nullify these prior statutes.

Other considerations support the foregoing view. ‘The

obvious purpose of imposing the higher rate of postu.

for ‘‘air mail’’ was to insure revenue propertionute tw

higher costs. Real air-mail service, for which the |tieiwr

rate is charged, involves many priorities, and they ame

costly. The carriers must transport this mail om am im

perative priority basis. Nothing in the record smegest

that the mere means of transportation, air as compared

to rail, would justify the surcharge. Indeed. «» far a»

the record indicates, the variation in cost betweem cur

riage by rail and carriage by air on a non-privrity,. space~

available basis is not substantial. We think the «peed

surcharge for ‘‘domestie air mail”’ implies « special serv

ice. The Senate Committee Report of 1946” reettwed tie

disparity between the three-cent surface rate and the them

eight-cent air rate, called that disparity a **penaity’~. ami

indicated the purpose of the five-cent-rate statute a» fiai+

lows:

‘*Therefore, H. R. 5560 [which became the pestuwee

rate statute] proposes to remove the penalty and pur

these two seivices, surface and air, on approximutel:

equal footing—the mailer to take his chowe im accord-

ance with the importance of his communicatiuns * * *"~

(Emphasis supplied. )

Under the present experimental program a persem mui

ing an article with three cents postage does not reeeime

any special service ‘‘in accordance with the importance of

his commumnications’’. Indeed, while his mail mar be cur-

ried by an air carrier, it may receive slower servive ‘ium

7° S. Rer. No. 1834, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.

46

if carried by rail, since such mail is handled by the air

carriers on a basis of space when, as and if available.

Statutes relating specifically to the authority of the Post-

master General to provide for mail transportation are

consistent with our conclusion. As we have noted, the

Postmaster General is authorized to arrange for the trans-

portation of mail on all post roads established by law,

including air routes. Standing alone this general authori-

zation might not be persuasive,” but the Civil Aeronautics

Act, in requiring the Postmaster General to tender ‘‘ mail’’*

to air carriers, does not limit that term to ‘‘air mail’’; it

provides generally that he shall tender ‘‘mail’’ to ‘‘the ex-

tent required by the Postal Service’’.

Quite important, so far as this specific program is con-

cerned, is the fact that Congress has been fully cognizant

of its inauguration and in the appropriation for the Post

Office Department in 1954 inserted a proviso requiring

reports to include ‘‘the total cost of the eliminated and

replacement service for airline, truck, and railroad trans-

portation.’’* The plaintiff railroads urge that this is not

sufficient to manifest ratification and approval by the Con-

gress and claim the cases cited by the Postmaster General

on the point ™ are distinguishable. But we are unable to

find any prohibition of the present experimental program,

while we do find statutory provisions broad enough to en-

compass it within their terms. Under these circumstances

21 Beach v. United States, 226 U.S. 243, 257, 57 L. Ed. 205, 33 S. CL

20 (1912).

22 “Mail” is defined in the Act as “United States mail and foreign-transit

mail.” 52 Sratr. 979 (1938), 49 U.S.C.A. §401(23). Thus in thi« statute

the term “mail” has no special limitations.

23 68 Srar. 148.

24 Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354, 85 L. Ed. 1399, 61 S. Ct. 979 (1941):

Fleming v. Mohawk Co., 331 U.S. 111, 91 L. Ed. 1375, 67 S. Ct. 1129

(1947); Wells v. Nickles, 104 U.S. 444, 26 L. Fd. 825 (1881); Swayne

& Hoyt, Lid. v. United States, 300 U.S. 297, 81 L. Ed. 659, 57 S. Ct. 478

(1937).

47

we think the indications of implied legislative approval

are entitled to weight. In sum we conclude that the ex-

perimental program for carrying ordinary first-class mail

by air is within the statutory authority of the Postmaster

General and is authorized by law.

The judgment of the District Court will be vacated and

the case remanded with instructions to grant defendant

Postmaster General’s motion for summary judgment.

Judqment vacated and case remanded.

Bastiax, Crncvurr Juvor, concurring in the result: I agree

with the holding of the court that the Postmaster General

has the authority to conduct experimental carriage of three-

cent mail by air. I have doubts, however, as to the stand-

ing of the railroads to sue.

Aprpespix

This Appendix is a study of the definition of “air mail”

in connection with the prescription of postage rates.

In 1925 Congress enacted a short statute, 43 Star. 805,

five one-sentence sections, titled ‘‘Air Mail Act’’. That

statute defined ‘‘air mail’’ thus: ‘‘That when used in this

Act the term ‘air mail’ means first-class mail prepaid at

the rates of postage herein prescribed."’ The rate was

prescribed at ten cents an ounce. In the United States

Code (1926) the ‘‘air mail’’ definition was codified as Sec-

tion 462 of Title 39. It remains there today, with a change

we shall mention in a moment. The postage rate provision

was codified as Section 463 of the same Title. '

1 In 1928 the rate was changed to 5 cents. 45 Stat. 504. In 1926, 44

Srar. 692, 1928, 45 Strat. 504, and 1930, 46 Strat. 259, the section of the

1925 Act relating to the contracting authority of the Postmaster General

was amended and other sections added. In 1934, 48 Star. 933, that see-

tion of the 1925 Act and the added sections were repealed. Thow changes

are immateria! bere.

r LOOP LO OLLT ONO LGILELV, SPIO AMAL

48

In 1934 Congress, without expressly repealing either the

‘‘air mail’’ definition or the postage rate section of the

1925 Act, enacted another definition of ‘‘air mail’’ and

another postage rate provision. The new definition was

substantially the same as the old. It read, See. 2(b)(1),

48 Srat. 933:

‘*(b) When used in this Act—

‘*(1) The term ‘air mail’ means mail of any class

prepaid at the rate of postage prescribed in subsee-

tion (a) of this section.’’

The latter subsection was the postage rate provision. The

codifiers (1940 edition) handled this Congressional action

in mixed fashion. They treated the new postage provi-

sion as superseding the old provision and thus placed it

as Section 463. But they included both definitions of

‘‘air mail’’, leaving the old as Section 462 and adding the

new as Section 469. Moreover they made both definitions

applicable to the postage rate section, Section 463; trans-

lating the statutory language they made each definition

read ‘‘When used in sections 463 [ete.]’’

In the Civil Aeronauties Act, 52 Srar. 1029 (1938), Con-

gress repealed most of the provisions of the 1934 Act re-

lating to air mail but left the rate and definition see-

tions intact. In the Revenue Act of 1943, 58 Srar. 69,

the postage rate was increased two cents. Thus in 1946

the rate on air mail stood at eight cents. The committees

of the Congress were of opinion that the disparity be-

tween this ‘‘premium air-mail rate’’ and the surface rate

of three cents was too great. §S. Rep. No. 1834, 79th

Cong., 2d Sess. (1946). Also, a problem had arisen as to

the rate to territories and possessions of the United

States. The Senate Committee discussed these problems

in its report. In doing so it used the term ‘‘air mail”

without definition, as though it were a known term, dis-

cussed the postage rate problem, and recommended an

extension of the continental rate to the territories, etc.;

but nowhere did it mention any intent to cireumscribe or

change the then existing powers of the Postmaster Gen-

eral. Thereupon Congress enacted another short statute,

60 Strat. 1062 (1946), three one-sentence sections, which

prescribed the rate on domestic air mail at five cents

(changed to six cents by a 1948 Act, 62 Srar. 1261) and

defined domestic air mail as we have quoted it in the text

of this opinion. But the draftsmen of this 1946 statute

did not include a provision fitting the new provisions

into existing law or making the new act amendatory of or

supplementary to the old; they left the new provisions as

a separate and independent piece of legislation.

The codifiers (1946 edition) at first treated the new

postage section (fixing the rate on ‘‘domestie air mail’’)

as superseding the old, putting it in as Section 463.2 They

left both of the definitions of ‘‘air mail’’ in the Code as

they had theretofore been, Sections 462 and 469, and left

both referring to the postage section, Section 463. They

inserted the new definition of ‘‘domestice air mail’’ as a

new section, Section 462a. Thus it is clear that as of that

time, so far as the United States Code was concerned, the

definition of ‘‘air mail’’ applied to the use of those two

words in the phrase ‘‘domestic air mail’’. As we have al-

ready said, we think that was correct.

In 1948 Congress changed the law respecting post cards

sent by air, setting that rate at four cents. 62 Srar. 1261.

On all other matter Congress prescribed a six-cent rate.

When the codifiers put this statute in the Code (Supp.

II to 1946 Code), they did not treat it as superseding the

old postage rate section, Section 463; they added it as a

2In their explanatory comments the codifiers said the new provision

“amended” the old.

50

new section, Section 463a, and dropped Section 463 out

of the Code. But they did not make a corresponding change

in the definitions of ‘‘air mail’’. So Section 462 is made

to apply to Sections 461 (the Short Title section), 462 (the

definition itself), and 465 (having to do with rules and

regulations). And the other definition, Section 469, is made

to apply to Section 463 (which is not in the Code at all) and

Section 469f (which relates to claims on account of annulled

contracts). So the Code makes it appear that neither

definition of ‘‘air mail’’ applies to the postage rate provi-

sion. Moreover the codifiers made the ‘‘air mail’’ definition

in Section 462 read as meaning mail prepaid at the rates

‘*prescribed in sections 461, 462 and 465 of this title.’’ No

postage rates are prescribed in any of those sections. And

they made the definition in Section 469 read as meaning

mail prepaid at the rate ‘‘ prescribed in section 463 of this

title.’’ As we have pointed out, there was no Section 463

left in the Title. We find nothing in any statute or in any

legislative history which justifies this change, if it is in-

tended to be a change, in the statutes made in the course

of codification.

The essence of the contention of the railroads on this

point is that when Congress defined ‘‘domestic air mail”

in 1946 it did not mean to use the term ‘‘air mail’’ as the

term was already defined by statute but meant to redefine

that term as well as to add the word ‘‘domestic’’. Noth-

ing in the legislative history, so far as we can find, jus-

tifies that view. Our view on the point is as we have stated

it in the text of this opinion.

51

APPENDIX C

Before Edgerton, Chief Judge, and Prettyman and Bastian,

Circuit Judges

JUDGMENT

These appeals came on to be heard on the record from the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia,

and were argued by counsel.

On consideration whereof, It is ordered and adjudged by

this Court that the judgment of the said District Court ap-

pealed from in these cases be, and the same is hereby,

vacated, and these cases be, and the same are hereby, re-

manded to the said District Court with instructions to grant

defendant Postmaster General’s motion for summary judg-

ment.

Dated: December 12, 1955.

Per Circuit Judge Prettyman.

Separate opinion by Circuit Judge Bastian concurring in

the result.

(6969-0)

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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