Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Summerfield
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED |STATES2 ? 1956
OCTOBER TERM, 1955 HAROLD B. WILEY, Clerk
No. 720
THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAIL-
WAY COMPANY, GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY
COMPANY, NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COM-
PANY, SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY, AND
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,
Petiti
- etitioners,
ARTHUR E. SUMMERFIELD, Postmaster GENERAL OF
THE Unitep SratTEs,
Respondent
—
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.
Starr THOMAS, J. Canter Fort,
Of Counsel for the Atchison,
fntsedien hh hig Oe
Company. FRANOIS M. SHE,
T. J. Suarrery, Puiup F. Weiss,
Of Counsel for Great Northern [Lawrence J. Larro,
Railway Company. 734 Fifteenth Street, N.W.,
M. L. Countryman, Jr., Washington 5, D. C.,
Ear. F. Regva, Attorneys for Petitioners.
Of Counsel for Northern Pacific
Railway Company.
Sranrizip B. JoHnson,
Roszrt J. McLaan,
Of Counsel for Southern Pacific
Company.
F. J. Manu,
Of Counsel for Union Pacific
Railroad Company.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Opinions Below .........-.----- sc ececcecereccteeeeeenseeees
Jasiofidiion ............. Wi Poe 2 eee Bowes Cab ge ke rere
Question Presented ...........-.0. 00 eee eee e cee eeeeteeeeneces
i OD gcc cca ccencececdscbeccannsvceseressccens
iateteent of Che ORGS 2.55... c nc ccc ccs rccncessvsevesescovere
Reasons for Granting the Writ... 6... 6-0 eee e eee eee
1. The Court of Appeals has decided an important question of
federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by
ES ENE POE PELE en FET eT PTET
2. The decision of the Court of Appeals is erroneous .......
a, The welownnt GetUME..... . nce ccsiccvcccesccess
b. The legislative history ..........- 6... eee eeecuce,
e. The prior air-mail lerislation..................-.
d. The subsequent air-mail legislation .............
e. Administrative construction of the air-mail statutes .
f. The priorities allegedly accorded air-mail
g. The Congress has not ratified the operation in ques-
ua a pice be Shoah ERE Shakes) Cpe eekseees
CITATIONS
Cases:
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. et al v. Summerfield, 128
F. Supp. 266 ........0- cece eee c cece cece sseeeesserecenes
Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Chicago River & Indiana R. Co., 170
F.2d 654, 658 (C.A. 7)....--0 2-02 c eee eee e eee tern eeeeeee
Beach v. United States, 226 U.S. 243... 0.06. e eee eeee
Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327, 337... «0... eee eee eres
Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354....... 006-0 e ccc eee ee eeenes
Crawford v. Burke, 195 U.S. 176, 190... ... 0. . eee eee ee evens
Employees v. Westinghouse Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 444............
Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Corp., 315 U.S. 126, CLR yaweee ke
Fleming v. Mohawk Co., 331 U.S. 111....-..---- 00ers e eens
Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 260..........-..-.. 000,
Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 456-457............
Muncie Gear Co. v. Outboard Co., 315 U.S. 759, 766............
Bchriber Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 305 U.S. 47, 50............
Scientific Mfg. Co. v. Walker, 40 F. Supp. 465 (M.D. Pa)......
Sturges v. Crowinshield, 4 Wheat. 122, ERS Cis oie f10 2's date
United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 561..................
United States v. Yuginovitch, 256 U.S. 450...........--.6. ss.
—6969-0
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2SRkRBVE RKSRoSSeoon
BRSemaabSBaSKSEER wo
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INDEX
Statutes:
Stat. 805, 39 U.S.C. 462
Stat. 259 .
Stat. 933, 39 U.S.C. 469
Stat. 744 ey
Stat. 979, ;
U.S.C. 401(23)
U.S.C. 402 ..
SEERREEEEEE
HP SSSSSSRERRRERRSVSTSSSERLSTSTSEEE
°
ca
esses?
eseeoces
373, 83rd Cong.,
574, 73rd Cong.,
1834, 79th Cong., 2nd
416, 83rd Cong., 1st
563, 8lst Cong., 1st
911, 75th Cong.,
Page
2,10, 14,15
2,14
2, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17,18
19
2, 15, 22
15
15
15, 16, 17
2,7
2, 20
.. 2,9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 21, 25
. 2,9, 10
2, 22
2, 23
mo DBR RR ewe eens B
INDEX
Hearings:
Hearings on H.R. 9738 before House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess.
Hearings on S. 3760 before Senate Committee on Commerce, 75th
Cong., 3rd Sess.
Hearings on Post Office Dept. Appropriations for fiscal 1956 before
Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations, 84th
Cong., Ist Sess. _.
Hearings on Post Office Dept. Appropriations for fiseal 1956 before
Subcommittee of Senate Committee on a 84th
Cong., Ist Sess. .
Hearings on H.R. 5560 before Senate Committee on Post Offices
and Post Roads, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess.
Hearings on H.R. 9500 before House Committee on Post Offices
and Post Roads, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess.
Miscellaneous:
C.F.R. 34.88(b)(2) (1949 ed.)
C.F.R. 34.89(a) (1949 ed.)
2
37
\R. 5234, 75th Cong.
R. 7273, 75th Cong.
No. A- 74912, 15 Comp. Gen. 1025
Surface Mail by Air Exemptions, Doc. 6882, 6905, 6940 (decided
May 2, 1955)
Post Office Department Press Release No. 229, dated October
6, 1955
US. Official Postal Guide, dated July, 1953
5, 6
13
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1955
No.
THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAIL-
WAY COMPANY, GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY
COMPANY, NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COM-
PANY, SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY, AND
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,
Petitioners,
res,
ARTHUR E. SUMMERFIELD, Postmaster Gexenat or
Tue Unxirep States,
Respondent
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.
Petitioners pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review
the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, entered in the above-entitled case on De-
cember 12, 1955.
Opinions Below
The opinion of the Court of Appeals, unreported at this
time, is set forth in Appendix B to this petition. The opin-
ion of the District Court granting petitioners’ motion for
2
summary judgment, reported at 128 F. Supp. 266, may be
found at pages 2-15 of the Joint Appendix. The opinion
of the District Court denying petitioners’ motion for a pre-
liminary injunction, unreported, may be found at pages
70-71 of the Joint Appendix.
Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
1254(1). The judgment of the Court of Appeals, set forth
in Appendix C, was dated and entered on December 12,
1955. A petition for rehearing and, in the alternative, for
rehearing en banc was denied in orders dated January 27,
1956.
Question Presented
Is the Postmaster General, in transporting by air first-
class mail bearing only three-cents postage, acting beyond
the scope of his authority and in violation of the postal
statutes which require that ‘‘all mailable matter being
transported as mail by air’’ bear postage at the rate of **6
cents for each ounce or fraction thereof ?’’
Statutes Involved
The pertinent statutory provisions are set forth in Ap-
pendix A to this petition. They include: 43 Stat. 805; 46
Stat. 259; 48 Stat. 933; 52 Stat. 973 et seq., 49 U.S.C. 401
et seq. (1952 ed.) ; 54 Stat. 899, 49 U.S.C. preceding section
1 (1952 ed.) ; 54 Stat. 1175, 39 U.S.C. 488a (1952 ed.); @
Stat. 1062, 39 U.S.C. 462a (1952 ed.); 6? Stat. 1261, 39
U.S.C. 463a (1952 ed.) ; 62 Stat. 1097, 39 U.S.C. 475 (1952
ed.) ; 63 Stat. 680, 39 U.S.C. 470 (1952 ed.).
Statement of the Case
Petitioners are common carriers by railroad operating
primarily in the western part of the United States. They
are engaged in the transportation of the mail. The laws
an .
relating to the railway postal service, 3% TS. w22a79
(1952 ed.), compel them to aecept any mail tendered ‘pr the
Postmaster General and to provide ail facilities amé serv-
ices necessary for its safe and expeditions mevemenn. In
consequence of these obligations imposed apem ‘tem, jeti-
tioners have invested large amounts in essential) Sacilmes
for the mail service. For example, one of the petitivmers.
the Southern Pacific Company, has invested 2200000 m
such facilities. (J.A. 22.)
For many years, the great buik of ordinary dirstcines
mail has been transported between post offices lx mull 4c
the same time, air transportation has beem used REISE
for the transportation of air mail. with the Seen of
a few situations where, for one reason or anotlier.. «urtuce
transportation is inadequate or unavailable amd the Oen-
gress has specifically authorized air transpertation of «eréi-
nary mail. Commeneing in early Oetober of 92. hewever.
respondent, without obtaining statutory authority: Sum the
Congress, instituted what he has described as am eermrmeD-
tal operation in the transportation of first-class mail or air
between several large metropolitan centers im the amaern
and southeastern parts of the United States. (J_&. a&50)
This so-called experimental program has continued new Ser
over two years and has been progressively expamdied o» em-
brace transportation of first-class mail by air iwoween
numerous cities in other sections of the countrs. (J_& 3H
91.) Under the conditions prescribed tiv tie Phostmumster
General for the operation of the experimental) praccum.
the air carriers enter the program on @ volamtury ness and
need to accept the mail for transportation onir i ther hae
available space remaining after satisfving other coufic de
mands. (J.A. 52-53.) But, in faet, there ix newer » lack of
space. (See pp. 26-27, infra.)
On October 6, 1954, respondent filed « petitiom with the
Civil Aeronautics Board requesting the Board t» establish
4
a rate for the transportation of first-class mail by air car-
riers on a space-available basis between numerous points
in the western part of the United States served by peti-
tioners. (J.A. 51-52.) A temporary rate, subject to re-
troactive adjustment upon determination of the proper
permanent rate, was set by the Board and the experimental
program on the West Coast was instituted on November 22,
1954. (J.A. 52.) The program continues today under the
temporary rate.
Petitioners, on November 20, 1954, filed a complaint in
the District Court for the District of Columbia, requesting
a declaratory judgment that respondent is without author-
ity to transport first-class mail by air and preliminary and
permanent injunctions enjoining the institution or con-
tinuance of the west-coast experimental program. The ju-
risdiction of the District Court was rested upon 28 U.S.C.
1339, 1331, and 1332(a)(1) (1952 ed.), and upon 11 D. C.
Code 306, in each case supplemented by 28 U.S.C. 2201
(1952 ed.) and section 10 of the Administrative Procedure
Act, 60 Stat. 243, 5 U.S.C. 1009 (1952 ed.).
A preliminary injunction was denied by the District
Court, and both sides moved for summary judgment on the
basis of the pleadings and affidavits on file. The District
Court found and declared that it is beyond the scope of re-
spondent’s authority to arrange for the transportation by
air of any mailable matter that does not bear air-mail post-
age, except for experimental purposes for a period not ‘‘un-
duly prolonged.’’ That court also found that petitioners
have standing to sue, but failed to show that they were ir-
reparably injured ‘‘at the moment’’ as a result of the op-
erations complained of. Accordingly, the District Court
granted petitioners’ motion for summary judgment and en-
tered a declaratory judgment, denied respondent’s motion
for summary judgment, and denied petitioners’ request for
a permanent injunction. (J.A. 1-2.) Both petitioners and
respondent appealed from this order. The Court of Ap-
peals concluded that petitioners have standing to bring this
suit, but that resporident has authority to arrange for air
transportation of ordinary first-class mail. Consequently,
the Court of Appeals ordered that the judgment of the Dis-
trict Court be vacated and the case remanded with instrue-
tions to grant respondent's motion for summary judgment.
Judge Bastian concurred only in the result.
Reasons for Granting the Writ
1. The Court of Appeals has decided an important ques-
tion of federal law which has not been, but should be, set-
tled by this Court. This case presents a novel question con-
cerning the interpretation of federal statutes having great
importance to the transportation industry, the Federal
Government, and the general public. The decision will have
far-reaching consequences affecting the financial well-being
of large segments of the transportation industry and the
operation of the postal system.
The present relatively-limited experimental programs for
the transportation of three-cent mail by air have resulted
in substantial revenue losses to the railroads with resultant
gains to the airlines. Aceording to testimony given in Feb-
ruary of 1955 by the Postmaster General, approximately
four million pieces of first-class mail were being trans-
ported by air daily at that time, and about $2,000,000 was
paid to the airlines in 1954 alone for the transportation of
such mail.' The loss in mail revenues to petitioners from
the services already discontinued as a result of the in-
auguration of the west-coast program amounts to more than
' Hearings on Post Office Department Appropriations for fiseal 1956
before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, S4th
Cong., Ist Sess. pp. 51, 73. During the four-week period following the
inauguration of the west-coast program, a total of 1,555,508 pounds of
first-class mail was transported by air between the west-coast cities involved.
Id., at p. 160,
6
$850,000 annually (J.A. 24, 32, 35, 36, 39), and the revenue
loss to all the railroads affected by these experimental pro-
grams is, of course, much larger.
Furthermore, under the opinion of the Court of Appeals,
there is nothing to prevent the Postmaster General from
henceforth transporting all first-class mail, and, indeed, all
other classes of mail, by air on a permanent basis. The rail-
roads, therefore, are faced with the threat of a potential
loss of some substantial part of revenues amounting to
more than $300,000,000 a year.? And, the railroads are also
threatened with the loss of a substantial part of their huge
investment in facilities for the transportation of mail.
The continued operation of these experimental programs
has, moreover, given rise to a practical problem of consid-
erable significance to the railroads. They remain obligated
to maintain in stand-by readiness all the facilities and
services that may be required to move the first-class mail
now being carried by the airlines, should either the Post-
master General or the airlines decide that, for any reason,
the present arrangements are unsatisfactory. On the other
hand, so long as it remains completely uncertain what per-
centage of the mail is to be diverted to the airlines and
what, if any, limitations must be observed in that connec-
tion, it is impossible to justify making the investments
necessary to maintain and replace the facilities required of
the railroads for the transportation of the mail.
The great bulk of mail transported by rail is carried
in passenger trains. (J.A. 22, 39.) As this Court is
well aware, passenger-train service has operated under
increasingly severe economic handicaps. The maintenance
of an adequate system for the transportation of pas-
2 See, e.g., the railway mail pay estimates submitted to the Appropria-
tions subcommittees for fiscal 1956. Hearings on Post Office Department
Appropriations for fiscal 1956 before the Subcommittee of the House Com-
mittee on Appropriations, 84th Cong., Ist Sess., p. 161; Hearings on Post
Office Department Appropriations for fiscal 1956 before the Subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 84th Cong., Ist Sess., p. 62,
7
sengers by rail is one of the most vexing problems fac-
ing the nation’s transportation industry, and is of great
importance not only to the citizens that utilize that service,
but also to the national defense. Rail service is extensively
utilized for the movements of troops and the passenger-
train service has been among our most vital assets in times
of grave national emergencies. The material reduction in
passenger-train revenues resulting from a shift of three-
cent mail transportation to the airlines must ultimately
result in the discontinuance of many passenger trains now
in operation. (J.A. 22-23, 25, 33, 41.)
The consequence, if we are right on the merits, will be
that the Postmaster General, disregarding the instructions
of the Congress and with an eye only to the postal service,
will have done serious damage to the fundamental national
transportation policy of the Congress.
Implicit in the entire scheme of postal legislation is a
recognition that the postal service is more than a busi-
ness providing the public with a means for the delivery
of its letters and packages. The maintenance of a postal
service represents, also, a governmental function and
the Congress has often required that this function
be conducted so as to serve governmental purposes un-
related to the most efficient and rapid delivery of mail
at the lowest possible cost. Thus, the belief of the Congress
that all means of transportation must be maintained in a
healthy, well-functioning condition is expressed in the
National Transportation Policy of ‘developing, coordinat-
ing, and preserving a national transportation system by
water, highway, and rail, as well as other means, adequate
to meet the needs of the commerce of the United States,
of the Postal Service, and of the national defense.’’ 54
Stat. 899, 49 U.S.C. preceding section 1 (1952 ed.). The use
of mail pay has always been recognized by the Congress as
an important means of achieving this objective.
>
A decision that permits the Postmaster General in his
discretion to arrange for the transportation of mail with-
out giving adequate consideration to the ends that the
Congress has sought to achieve in both postal and trans-
portation legislation is obviously of great significance and
deserves scrutiny by this Court.
We do not claim that the decision of the Court of Appeals
on the merits conflicts with a decision of any other court.
But, as we show in the next section, that court departed
radically from the accepted cannons of statutory construc-
tion prescribed by this Court in many decisions. Moreover,
this is not a situation in which this Court can wait for a
conflict to develop, with the assurance that it will develop
if the question is really important and well-justified differ-
ences of view are possible. The decision in this case will
in all probability be the final word on the construction of
the statutes under consideration, as the matter cannot be
raised in any other circuit. The Postmaster General,
against whom suit must be brought, resides in the District
of Columbia, and venue in a civil action wherein jurisdic-
tion is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may
be laid ‘‘only in the judicial district where all defendants
reside.’’ 28 U.S.C. 1391(b) (1952 ed.) ; Scientific Mfg. Co.
v. Walker, 40 F. Supp. 465 (M.D. Pa.). Therefore, this im-
portant question of federal law which has not been, but
which should be, settled by this Covrt must be settled in this
ease, if at all. See Muncie Gear Co. v. Outboard Co., 315
US. 759, 766; Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Corp., 315 U.S. 126,
128; Schriber Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 305 U.S. 47, 50.
Review by this Court under these circumstances is
especially indicated since, as we show in the next section, the
decision of the Court of Appeals is plainly erroneous and
frustrates a long-standing Congressional policy of main-
taining a substantial postage-rate differential between
8
9
mail transported by air and mail transported on the
surface.
2. The decision of the Court of Appeals is erroneous.
The position of petitioners on the merits, summarily stated,
is as follows: The plain language of the relevant statutes,
the legislative history of those statutes, the entire course of
air-mail legislation, and the settled administrative con-
struction of that legislation prior to the inauguration of
the programs under attack make a uniform showing. They
establish that the consistent Congressional policy has been,
and is, to limit air transportation of mail to mail bearing
the premium air-mail postage, with the exception of a few
specific situations, expressly provided for by statute, where
surface transportation is inadequate or impractical.
Despite the refusal of the Court of Appeals to accord
the relevant statutes their literal meaning, because, in its
view, the literal meaning was contrary to the Congres-
sional intent, its opinion ignores most of the pertinent
legislative history of those statutes and fails to relate them
to other postal legislation and the course of development
of air-mail legislation. It is necessary to deal with those
matters at some length in this petition because the opinion
below gives little or no aid in placing the issues in their
relevant context.
a. The relevant statutes. The Congress in the Act of
August 14, 1946, 60 Stat. 1062, provided that ‘‘ ‘domestic
air mail’ shall embrace all mailable matter being trans-
ported as mail by air within the continental United States,
within any Territory or possession of the United States,
within any geographical area which is a protectorate of the
United States, or between any of the aforesaid.’’ 39 U.S.C.
462a (1952 ed.). The same statute, in a section carried into
the Code as 39 U.S.C. 463a (1952 ed.), provided that ‘‘the
rate of postage on all domestic air mail as defined in sec-
tion 462a of this title shall . . . be 6 cents for each ounce
10
or fraction thereof.’’* (Emphasis supplied.) The statu-
tory language is unambiguous and its meaning is plain—any
mail transported by air must bear the air-mail postage of
six cents per ounce. This Court has held that unambiguous
statutory language is to be given its ordinary, literal mean-
ing, unless there is a strong showing that a literal construe-
tion would be contrary to the intent of the Congress.
Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U. S. 244, 260; Sturges v.
Crowishield, 4 Wheat. 122, 202-203; see Employees v.
Westinghouse Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 444. And, as we show
below, the evidence is overwhelming that the language
chosen by the Congress reflects exactly the intent of the
Congress.
b. The legislative history. The Court of Appeals did not
deny that the Act of August 14, 1946 on its face bars air
transportation of first-class mail. The court nevertheless
refused to give the statute its literal meaning on the ground
that such was not the intent of the Congress. In reaching
this conclusion, the court relied almost entirely on prior
definitions of ‘‘air mail’’ in the Air Mail Acts of 1925
and 1934. In the Air Mail Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 805,
‘fair mail’? was defined as ‘‘first-class mail prepaid at
the rates of postage herein prescribed.’’ In the Air
Mail Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 933, ‘‘air mail’’ was defined
as ‘‘mail of any class prepaid at the rate of postage pre-
scribed in subsection (a) of this section.’’ (Both statutes
prescribed premium postage for ‘‘air mail.’’) Relying
on a reading of this language isolated from its context,
legislative history, and practical construction, the court
below concluded that the distinguishing characteristic of
air mail is not that “the Post Office transports [it] by air,”
but that ‘‘the sender has affixed [to it] special postage.’’
(In short, the purchase price rather than the character of
3 The 1946 Act provided for a postage rate of five cents per ounce. This
was subsequently increased to six cents. 62 Stat. 1261.
11
service becomes the critical distinction between air mail
and ordinary mail.) Hence, the argument proceeds, if we
understand it correctly, as air mail is not distinguished
from ordinary mail because it moves by air but because
it carries six-cents postage, there is no bar to moving
ordinary mail by air under these earlier definitions. ‘If
that view is correct,’’ the court continued, ‘‘the statu-
tory definition of ‘domestic air mail’ [in the 1946 Act]
does not preclude the Post Office from transporting by air
matter other than ‘air mail.’ It must, generally speak-
ing, transport by air matter to which the special post-
age has been affixed, but it is not required to demand the
special postage for all matter which it transports by air.’’ ‘
The court thus read out of the 1946 definition of ‘‘domestic
air mail’’ the words ‘‘all mailable matter being transported
as mail by air,’’ justifying its disregard of the plain words
of the Act because the legislative history does not ‘‘men-
tion any intent to cireumscribe or change the then exist-
ing powers of the Postmaster General’’ with regard to the
transportation of mail by air and in ‘‘the absence of clear
indication of a Congressional intent to discard the estab-
lished definition, we think the view urged by the railroads
is untenable.’’ ®
This is the first time to our knowledge that a court has
taken the position that where the plain language of a stat-
ute conflicts with an earlier statute, the subsequent enact-
ment is to be ignored unless it can be affirmatively shown
from the legislative history that the Congress intended what
~ 4See Appendix B, p. 43, infra.
5 See Appendiz B, pp. 49, 44, infra. The Court of Appeals correctly
concluded from the legislative history that the Congress in the 1946 Act
intended to reduce the disparity between the “premium air-mail rate” then
in effect and the “surface rate” and to extend the continental air-mail rate
to the territories. But to hold that these were the sole purposes of the Act
is to deny the words “all mailable matter being transported as mail by air”
any effect whatsoever. Certainly, this language is not a “geographical
description” and has nothing to do with the relationship between air-mail
and surface-mail postage rates.
12
it said. The rule prescribed by this Court is that while re-
peals by implication are not favored, the later statute will
be given effect when there is a clear inconsistency with an
earlier act. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 324 U.S. 439,
456-457; United States v. Yuginovitch, 256 U.S. 450. Al-
though a change in terminology will not be held to show a
change in the Congressional intent when there is ‘‘more
persuasive evidence”’ in the legislative history that a change
was not intended, United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554,
561, in the absence of such evidence it will be presumed that
a change was intended. Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327, 337;
Crawford v. Burke, 195 U.S. 176, 190.
In any event, the failure of the legislative history to indi-
cate affirmatively that the law was being changed is readily
explainable by the fact that no change was involved—the
law has always been, except in limited circumstances under
express statutory provisions, that only air mail can be
transported by air. The reports and hearings on the 1946
Act show conclusively that the Congress, in considering
and enacting that statute, was of the view that under the
then-existing law ‘‘air mail’’ included all mail transported
by air and that mail not bearing air-mail postage could be
transported only by surface means. Thus, in S. Rept. No.
1834, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., at p. 2, it is stated that:
‘‘The experience of the postal service indicates that
the disparity between the surface rate for first-class
mail of 3 cents per ounce and the premium air-mail
rate of 8 cents per ounce is too great for matter other
than that of high time value. Furthermore, evidence
was introduced at the hearings which indicates that a
penalty has been placed upon the use of air mail by
* The various definitions are not inconsistent. If the prior definitions
of “air mail” are read into the definition of “domestic air mail”, as sug-
gested by the Court of Appeals (Appendix B, p. 49, infra), the sense
of the 1946 Act would not be changed. It would read: “first-class mail
or mail of any class] prepaid at the rates of postage herein prescribed
shall embrace all mailable matter being transported as mail by air.”
13
the 8-cent rate which is all out of proportion as between
postage rate and postal cost.
‘‘Cost-ascertainment computations indicate that air
mail at a 5-cent rate would return a slightly higher net
profit per pound than does ordinary first-class mail at
the surface rate of 3 cents. Therefore, H. R. 5560 pro-
poses to remove the penalty and put these two services,
surface and air, on approximately equal footing—the
mailer to take his choice in accordance with the im-
portance of his communications, without being de-
terred by an excessive air-mail postage rate.
**. . . The 5-cent rate proposed by H. R. 5560
would restore the privilege [of using air mail]. . .,
and at the same time high-speed service will be afforded
to those patrons who must forego its use as long as the
differential between surface and air service remains as
3 to 8 cents,’’ (Emphasis supplied.) 7
That the 1946 Act in defining ‘‘domestic air mail’’ to
include ‘‘all mailable matter being transported as mail by
air’? merely made explicit what had theretofore been
clearly implicit, and that, as the Congress assumed in enact-
ing the 1946 law, the Postmaster General has never had a
general authority to transport all classes of mail by air, is
also clear from the statutory context, legislative history,
and settled administrative construction of the prior defini-
tions of ‘‘air mail,’’ and from the entire course of air-mail
legislation. This material, which was ignored in the opin-
ion of the Court of Appeals, is diseussed in the following
sections.
ec. The prior air-mail legislation. Respondent, of course,
must do more than show that the Congress has not pro-
hibited the transportation of first-class mail by air. He must
14
also establish that the Congress has affirmatively author-
ized such transportation. Beach v. United States, 226 U. S.
243. The Air Mail Act of 1925, the first general statute
providing for private transportation of mail by air, em-
powered the Postmaster General to contract ‘*for the trans-
portation of air mail by aircraft’’ and also ‘*for the trans-
portation by aircraft of first-class mail other than air mail.’’
The legislative history of the Act reveals that it was under-
stood that ordinary first-class mail would be carried only
when there was insufficient air mail to make up a capacity
load. See 66 Cong. Rec. 751. A 1930 amendment, 46 Stat.
259, retained the definition of ‘‘air mail’’ in the 1925 Act,
but expressly restricted air transportation of first-class
mail to that necessary to utilize space contracted for that
could not be used for air mail. °
The Air Mail Act of 1934 provided only for ‘‘the trans-
portation of air mail by airplane,’’ and thus eliminated
the limited prior authority of the Postmaster General to
transport first-class mail by air. The intentional repeal of
this prior authorization denotes that the Congress intended
by the Air Mail Act of 1934 to restrict air transportation of
mail to air mail, * as defined in the Act, and respondent ad-
mitted before the Court of Appeals that this was the effect
of the statute.** The Comptroller General has also ruled
that the 1934 Act did not permit air transportation of first-
class mail. No. A-74912, 15 Comp. Gen. 1025.
~S When, in 1930, revision of the 1925 Act was under consideration, the
Postmaster General testified that it was necessary to retain a provision
authorizing air transportation of non-air mail in order to permit any
utilization of this exeess space. Hearings on H.R. 9500 before House
Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 12-17.
® The committee reports on the 1934 Act also indicate that it was in-
tended to provide only for transportation of air mail. 8. Rept. No. 574,
73rd Cong., 2d Sess.; H. Rept. No. 1428, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess.; H. Rept.
No. 1754, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. (Conference Report).
1 At page 40 of his main brief filed with the Court of Appeals, in foot-
note 29, it is stated that: “. . . from 1934 to 1938 Alaska was the only
area where the Postmaster General coald contract for the transportation
of all classes of mail by air.”
15
Hence, the definitions of ‘‘air mail’’ enacted by the Con-
gress in the 1925 and 1934 Acts, when viewed in the light
of their statutory context, legislative history, and settled
administrative construction, lend no support to the conclu-
sion of the court below that the Postmaster General could
transport all classes of mail by air prior to the Act of August
14, 1946. Rather, their origin in statutes that admittedly
limited air transportation of mail to air mail except, in the
ease of the 1925 Act, where the use of first-class mail was
necessary to fill excess space contracted for, confirms pe-
titioners’ view that the Congress has never authorized the
Postmaster General to transport ordinary mail by air ex-
cept in limited circumstances where expressly authorized.
Respondent contended before the Court of Appeals that
authority for the transportation of three-cent mail by air
is given by the provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938 ** amending the post roads statute (39 U.S.C. 481-483
(1952 ed.)) to inelude ‘‘air routes,’’ authorizing the Post-
r ster General to tender mail ‘o certificated air carriers,
and defining ‘‘mail*’’ as used in the Act to include ‘‘ United
States mail and foreign-transit mail,’’ without express limi-
tation to air mail. Here again, however, the contention ig-
nores the statutory context and legislative history of the
Act, and is rested on language much more ambiguous than
that found in the Act of August 14, 1946 which the Court of
Appeals refused to give its ordinary meaning.
The Civil Aeronauties Act was primarily intended as a
broad and comprehensive charter governing federal regu-
lation of air transportation. It is natural, therefore,
"52 Stat. 973 et seq., 49 U.S.C. 401 et seq. (1952 ed.). Although its
opinion is not entirely clear on this point, the Court of Appeals appar-
ently did not rest its conelusion that the Postmaster General has authority
to transport first-class mail by air on these provisions, but only regarded
them as being “consistent” with its conclusion. See Appendix B, p. 46,
infra.
12 See the declaration of policy, 52 Stat. 980, 49 U.S.C. 402 (1952 ed.).
16
that in placing air carriers on a common-carrier basis and
requiring them to transport mail tendered by the Post-
master General, the draftsmen of the statute defined ‘‘mail’’
for purposes of the Civil Aeronautics Act in the broadest
terms. That Act was expected to remain substantially un-
changed for the foreseeable future, and the provisions of
the postal statutes, Title 39 of the Code, regulating the
kinds of mail that the Postmaster General could transport
by air very possibly would be varied substantially through-
out the years to come as they had been in the past. By
broadly defining ‘‘mail’’ for purposes of the Act, the Con-
gress could assure that whatever the extent of the authority
of the Postmaster General to arrange for the transportation
of mail by air under the postal statutes at any particular
time, the airlines could, under the Civil Aeronautics Act, be
compelled to transport such mail. It is clear, both from the
context of the Act and from its legislative history, that the
Congress intended to do no more than this; the Postmaster
General’s authority was to remain limited to arranging for
air transportation of mail bearing air-mail postage, as had
been the case since 1934.
While the Civil Aeronautics Act repealed the provisions
of the Air Mail Act of 1934 authorizing the Postmaster
General to contract for air transportation of air mail and
substituted a common-carrier obligation of certificated air
lines to move mail tendered by the Postmaster General,
section 1107(k) of the Civil Aeronautics Act excepted from
repeal sections 2(a) and 2(b)(1) of the earlier Act. See-
tion 2(a) fixed the air-mail postage rate and section 2(b)
(1) contained the definition of ‘‘air mail.’’ Thus, the
draftsmen of the Civil Aeronautics Act carefully left in
effect the key provisions of the 1934 Act that established
a special air-mail service to which alone air transportation
was, under that Act, available. Moreover, in section 405(k)
of the Civil Aeronautics Act, 49 U.S.C. 485(k) (1952 ed.),
17
the Congress expressly empowered the Postmaster Genera
to contract ‘‘for the transportation by aireradt of omy
or all classes of mail to or from loenlities affeensi™ er
calamitous visitations. (Emphasis supplied) Thus use
of the language ‘‘any or all classes of mail!” a+ umder re
spondent’s theory explainable only in terms ef megieent
drafting. If, as respondent contends, the Comeres+ teak
pains to define ‘‘mail”’ so as to include amy or ail) chaswes
of mail, with reference to the Postmaster Generail’+ o-
thority to provide air transportation for mui, them =
would be expected to have used the defined term catiner
than spelling out ‘‘any or all classes of madi!” im sectem
405(k). If on the other hand, as we contend, seetem 42)
is intended only to obligate the airlines te meee «uch aml
‘as the Postmaster General, under authemty «@f Ghe
postal laws, tenders them, then the use of “amy er all
classes of mail’’ in section 405(k) is readily expiumatiile ne
authorizing the Postmaster General, in emerzemes coeeum-
stances, to arrange, as he would not otherwise le auntinemued
to arrange, for air movement of ‘any or all classes ff muall™.
The legislative history of the Act likewise demumstmates
that the Congress did not intend to broadem the Pieetumster
General’s authority with respect to the Meimedis of musi) that
he could arrange to transport by air. Tw off the ‘tills
that preceded the one finally enacted as the (imi Sere
nauties Act (H.R. 5234, 75th Cong, and S. 2. Tatth Come.)
defined ‘‘mail’’ as mail prepaid at the airmail) pester
rate. Clearly, those bills were not intended % remere
the restriction in the Air Mail Act of 190% aeums the
transportation by air of non-air mail, as cespemdent
conceded before the Court of Appenis, = FAR. 223# was
13 At page 30 of his main brief filed with the Court of Spmemits. ‘ther -ctaed
bills are referred to with the statement that “the: restrrettom ‘ar mui!”
18
amended and reintroduced as H.R. 7273, 75th Cong. The
latter bill dropped the definition of ‘‘mail’’ but expressly
left in effect the similar definition of ‘‘air mail’’ contained
in the Air Mail Act of 1934. That this bill was intended to
authorize air transportation only of air mail is plain from
the House Report (No. 911, 75th Cong., Ist Sess.) where it
is stated, at p. 18, that: ‘‘Rates for the carriage of air mail
would be fixed by the Commission.’’ (Emphasis supplied.)
Various objections to the bills already introduced caused
the President to appoint an Interdepartmental Committee
on Civil Aviation to consider the matter. The Interdepart-
mental Committee drafted a bill, introduced as H.R. 9738,
75th Cong., that was virtually identical to the Civil Aero-
nautics Act, including the definition of ‘‘mail.’’ A repre-
sentative of the Interdepartmental Committee in pointing
out the 19 ‘‘major differences in policy’’ between H.R. 9738
and the previous bills did not indicate in any way that H.R.
9738 was intended to broaden the provisions of the earlier
bills to permit transportation by air of all classes of mail. ss
On the contrary, he used the terms ‘‘mail’’ and ‘‘air mail’’
interchangeably in discussing the provisions relating to the
transportation of mail in H.R. 9738 and in a companion
bill, S. 3760, 75th Cong. * We have not discovered any ref-
erence in the legislative history of the Civil Aeronautics
Act to an intention to change the policy expressed in the
1934 Act of requiring that all mail transported by air bear
the air-mail postage rate. This can hardly be accidental
in view of the importance of the matter and the thorough-
ness of the consideration given by the Congress to that
legislation.
Both the Congress and the Postmaster General, shortly
4 Hearings on H.R. 9738 before House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong., 34 Sess., pp. 37-46.
15 hid; Hearings on 8. 3760 before the Senate Committee on Commerce,
75th Cong., 3d Sess., pp. 1-4.
19
after the enactment of the Civil Aeronauties Act, were
clearly of the view that that Act did not give the Post-
master General authority to transport all classes of mail
by air. The Civil Aeronautics Act had repealed the Act of
August 24, 1935, 49 Stat. 744, which had given the Post-
master General authority to contract for the transportation
by air of all classes of mail in Alaska. In 1940, the Post-
master General submitted to the Congress a request for
enactment of a bill permitting the transportation by air of
all classes of mail in Alaska, since the repeal of the earlier
Act had:
**. . . left the Department without specific authority
to continue the transportation of all classes of mail by
aircraft in Alaska and legislation is regarded as very
necessary to permit of the continued transportation of
all classes of mail by aircraft in the Territory without
conflict with the Civil Aeronauties Act of 1938.°" H.
Rept. No. 2736, 76 Cong., 3rd Sess., p. 3.
Congressional debate on this bill made clear that both
the Post Office Department and the Congress were of the
view that only air mail could be tendered to air carriers
certificated under the Civil Aeronautics Act."* The Con-
©Mr. Dimond:
“When the Civil Aeronautics Act with respect to air mail was passed
recently, one provision of the Act said that the existing contracts for the
earriage of all classes of mail in Alaska would be continued in effect until
the Civil Aeronauties Authority should apply the Act to Alaska by issuing
certificates of public convenience and necessity and prescribing rates of
compensation. Up to the present moment no such certificate has heen issued
for any of the routes carrying all classes of mail by air.
“The Civil Aeronauties Authority now desires to put the act into effect
in Alaska, and if that ix done all existing mail contract« for carriage of
mail by air will he cancelled. Under the Civil Arronautics Act it ix possible
to carry air mail only, as is said by the Post Office Department; therefore
the Post Office Department would in that event be required to carry other
elasses of mail by dog teams or horses, at a much greater cost to the Gov-
ernment.
“The purpose of this bill is to permit the continuance of the carriage of
20
gress thereupon enacted a law, 54 Stat. 1175, 39 U.S.C. 488a
(1952 ed.), substantially in the terms proposed by the Post-
master General, providing that, when required by the Post-
master General, air carriers certificated under the Civil
Aeronautics Act to engage in the transportation of mail in
the Territory of Alaska ‘‘shall . . . transport, in addition
to mail on which [air-mail] postage shall have been paid
. . any other classes of mail bearing the appropriate
postage for its respective class, and the Postmaster Gen-
eral is authorized to require such transportation.’’ (Em-
phasis supplied.)
The Court of Appeals did not attempt to explain why
this specific statutory authorization was necessary if
the Postmaster General has a broad, discretionary au-
thority to transport by air any class of mail whether or not
it bears air-mail postage, and, indeed, there is no satisfac-
tory explanation other than that the Congress has always
considered air transportation to be limited to air mail ex-
cept when otherwise provided by specific statutory lan-
guage.
The Court of Appeals did express concern that ‘‘to accord
‘domestic air mail’ the meaning urged by the railroads
would give rise to serious statutory conflicts’’ with the spe-
all classes of mail in Alaska by air under the Civil Aeronauties Act just
the same as is the case at the present time, and it will put the full control
in the hands of the Civil Aeronauties Authority. . . .”
Mr. Martin of Massachusetts:
“It is not really necessary to have this legislation. This compels them
to transport mail by air, whereas it would be optional otherwise?”
Mr. Dimond:
“No it would not be optional. In the opinion of the Solicitor of the Post
Office Department, as I understand, if the Civil Aeronauties Authority puts
the Civil Aeronautics Act completely in effect in Alaska, it would no longer
be possible to carry all classes of mail by air and it would be necessary to
go back to the old and more costly method of earrying all except air mail
on the ground by dog teams or on horseback or in some other kindred
fashion.” 86 Cong. Rec. 9680. (Emphasis supplied.)
eo
21
cial statutes permitting the Postmaster General to trans-
port by air ‘‘any or all classes of mail’’ in certain limited
situations, in that to’construe the Act of August 14, 1946
as requiring that all mail transported by air bear air-mail
postage would ‘‘nullify these prior statutes.’’ Appendix B,
at pp. 44-45, infra. But, this ignores the general rule of
statutory construction that ‘‘where there are two statutes,
the earlier special and the later general, the special controls
the general, and the fact that one is special and the other
is general creates a presumption that the special is to be
considered as remaining an exception to the general. The
general will not be understood as repealing the special,
unless a repeal is expressly named, or unless the provisions
of the general are manifestly inconsistent with those of the
special. Rogers v. United States, 185 U. S. 83... .” Bal-
timore € O. R. Co. v. Chicago River & Indiana R. Co., 170
F.2d 654, 658 (C.A. 7)."7 It seems to us that the Court of
Appeals might much more appropriately have been con-
cerned with the question of why the Congress bothered to
enact these special statutes if the Postmaster General has
a broad, discretionary authority to transport all classes of
mail by air under the provisions of the Civil Aeronautics
Act.
d. The subsequent air-mail legislation. The events lead-
ing up to the enactment of legislation authorizing an air
parcel-post service illustrate that both tie Post Office De-
partment and the Congress, after the passage of the Act of
August 14, 1946, understood that the Department did not
have a general authority to transport non-air mail by air,
even on a space-available basis. In 1948, some of the pay-
ments to air carriers for mail transportation were based
17 Moreover, once it is recognized that the Congress has always accepted
the principle that non-air mail can be carried by air only when expressly
authorized and that the 1946 Act merely reaffirmed this principle in
explicit terms, the apparent conflict disappears entirely.
22
on minimum load guarantees, millions of ton-miles of which
were not being used because of insufficient air-mail volume.
The Postmaster General did not fill this extra space with
first-class mail or ordinary parcel post since he considered
that this would be beyond his statutory authority. The
Congress shared this view, as is evident from the following
comments in H. Rept. No. 2163, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2:
‘‘The Civil Aeronautics Board has recently been es-
tablishing rates upon the volume of mail. They have
accomplished this by setting minimum load require-
ments upon which the Post Office Department pays the
ton-mile rate established for the particular carrier.
These minimum load requirements have been revised
consistently upward till now they are at the point
where the Post Office is paying for a large amount of
space which they cannot use under present laws and
conditions. The establishment of this service [parcel
post] will create an additional volume of mail which
will utilize this space at no extra cost to the Post Office
Department.’’ (Emphasis supplied.)
The Congress, therefore, enacted the Air Parcel Post Act,
62 Stat. 1097, 39 U.S.C. 475 (1952 ed.), establishing a pre-
mium ‘‘rate of postage on mailable matter exceeding eight
ounces in weight, but not weighing more than seventy pounds
nor measuring more than one hundred inches in length and
girth combined, when carried by air.’’ (Emphasis supplied.)
The same understanding by the Postmaster General and
by the Congress was shown as recently as 1949. The Air
Star Route Act, 52 Stat. 219, enacted by the same Congress
that enacted the Civil Aeronautics Act, had authorized the
Postmaster General to award contracts ‘‘for the transpor-
tation of any or all classes of mail by airplane upon star
routes not over two hundred airplane-miles in length”’
where necessary because of the inadequacy or imprac-
23
ticability of surface transportation. In 1949, the Post-
master General requested the Congress to remove the re-
striction limiting to 200 miles or less the length of such air
star routes, since:
‘“‘The certification of air routes under provisions of
the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, as amended, is not
justified in most of the areas herein considered because,
when restricted to air mail bearing the airmail postage
rate, the volume would not be sufficient to warrant the
high cost of conventional certified service. On the
other hand, if the service were obtained for all classes
of mail at a competitive contract rate, the cost might
be reasonable and fully warranted.”’ H. Rept. No. 563,
81st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3.
Consequently, the Congress amended the Act to remove
the restriction and permit the Postmaster General to
“award contracts for the transportation by aircraft
upon star routes of any or all classes of mail (includ-
ing but not limited to air mail and air parcel post)’’ where
surface transportation is impracticable or inadequate. (Em-
phasis supplied.) 63 Stat. 680, 39 U.S.C. 470 (1952 ed.).
e. Administrative construction of the air-mail statutes.
Until the inauguration of the recent experimental programs
for the transportation of three-cent mail by air, the con-
sistent view of the Post Office Department had been that
only air mail could be transported by air except in the spe-
cial situations covered by statute. We have already noted
repeated instances in which the Department advanced this
restriction as grounds for the enactment of legislation au-
thorizing air transportation of all classes of mail, as the
Alaska and Air Star Route Acts, or of particular classes
of mail not bearing the normal air-mail postage, as the Air
Parcel Post Act.
The Department’s regulations and its Postal Guide, be-
24
fore the institution of these experimental operations, also
indicated that only air mail could be transported by air
under the general authority of the Department. ‘‘ Domestic
air mail’’ was defined in the regulations in precisely the
statutory language as ‘‘all mailable matter being trans-
ported as mail by air,’’ 39 C.F.R. 34.89(a) (1949 ed.), and
it was provided that the ‘‘rate of 6 cents an ounce
.. will apply to all domestic air mail.’’ 39 C.F.R.
34.88(b)(2) (1949 ed.). The U.S. Official Postal Guide,
Part I, dated July 1953, under Chapter III entitled ‘‘ Domes-
tic Mail Matter,’’ carried the following Article 12:
‘612. Air Mail and air parcel post rates.—The rates
of postage in this article apply to mail transported by
air in the domestic mails. (See arts. 2 and 3 of this
chapter).
(a) Letters end packages, not exceeding 8 ounces
are chargeable with postage at the rate of 6 cents an
ounce or fraction of an ounce. Air post and postal
cards are acceptable at 4 cents each.
(b) Air Parcel Post. Parcels exceeding 8 ounces,
but not exceeding 70 pounds, which may include any
class of mail matter intended for air transportation,
are subject to the rates shown in the following sched-
ule, according to zone location and weight .. .’’
(Emphasis supplied.)
f. The priorities allegedly accorded air-mail. The Court
of Appeals, in support of its views as to the authority of
the Postmaster General to transport three-cent mail by air,
suggested that the distinguishing feature of a ‘‘real air-
mail service’’ for which air-mail postage is to be charged is
that it ‘‘involves many priorities’’ and that ‘‘the carriers
must transport this mail on an imperative priority basis.’’
Appendix B, p. 45, infra, The court reasoned that since
the three-cent mail is tendered to the air lines on a space-
available basis, such mail does not receive a ‘‘ real air-mail
service’’ justifying the higher air-mail postage charge. *
Respondent, in the court below, advanced a similar con-
tention and referred to priorities allegedly accorded air
mail in handling and distribution in the post offices, at ter-
minals and transfer points, and in transportation.
25
The Court of Appeals advanced those ‘‘considerations”’
only as a ‘‘support’’ for its conclusions already reached,
and did not suggest that, standing alone, they would provide
an alternative ground for its decision. The frailty of this
support becomes clear once the nature of the legislation
respecting air mail is considered. From the beginning of
the service to date the legislative provisions respecting
air mail have been confined basically to a definition of air
mail, a prescription of air-mail postages rates, and author-
ity to contract for or require on a common-carrier basis
the air movement of such mail. Prior to the 1946 Act, air
mail was defined as first-class mail, or as mail of any class,
prepaid at the premium air-mail rate. In the 1946 Act, the
definition became all mailable matter transported as mail by
air and it was prescribed that such mail should carry the
premium rate.
It cannot reasonably be denied that by these provisions
the Congress intended to establish an air-mail service.
That service was intended to be entirely distinct from the
%* The Court of Appeals stated that “so far as the record indicates, the
variation in eost between carriage by rail and carriage by air on a non-
priority, space-available basis is not substantial.” It should be pointed
out that permanent rates for the transportation of three-cent mail by air
under the west-coast program in question here have not yet been fixed
by the Civil Aeronautics Board. The mail is now being flown under
temporary rates subject to retroactive adjustment when the proper
permanent rates are determined, so that at this time the cost of air trans-
portation is uncertain. Petitioners believe that it will eventually exceed
the cost of rail transportation by a considerable margin.
26
service provided for first-class mail. Respondent conceded
as much in the courts below. Presumably, respondent also
would not contest the proposition that the Congress was
not practicing a fraud on the American people. When it
exacted a double price for air-mail service, it intended to
give in return something reasonably worth double the price
of ordinary first-class mail. But while respondent conceded
that these statutory provisions obligate him to provide an
air-mail service distinct from a..1 considerably better than
that accorded in the first-class mail service, he asserts that
this distinction does not lie in the air movement of air mail
as distinguished from surface movement of other classes of
mail.
What respondent says is that in providing for air mail the
Congress intended to establish a distinct service, but the
distinction intended is some difference in the priorities ac-
corded the two classes of mail while handled on the ground.
In the affidavits filed on behalf of respondent in this pro-
ceeding, the only substantial priority claimed to be ac-
corded an air mail letter that is not also received by an
ordinary first-class letter transported by air between the
same points is that the air carrier must accept the air
mail letter while it need accept the first-class letter only
if space is available on the flight after satisfying other
demands. ”
In point of fact, it appears that this co-called priority is
largely illusory, since the air carriers always have more
than enough space available. Thus, Member Gurney of the
1® The affidavit of Postmaster General Summerfield mentions only the
fact that the air carrier may reject first-class mail if space is not avail-
able. (J.A. 46.) The affidavit of Assistant Postmaster General Seidle
does refer to certain differences in the handling of the mails by post office
personnel, but on analysis these differences amount in substance to little
more than recognition of the possibility that the three-cent mail may be
rejected by the air carrier if space is not available. (J.A. 53-55.)
27
Civil Aeronautics Board, dissenting in Surface Mail by
Air Exceptions, Docket Nos. 6882, 6905, and 6940 (decided
May 2, 1955), stated: ‘‘. . . that so far as the Board is
aware, there has never been a smgle pound of surface mail
refused for lack of space by the certificated carriers.’’ (Em-
phasis in the original.) And, in a recent press release, the
Post Office Department announced that all mail between
many of the major cities served by the experimental pro-
grams is transported by air. ”
It seems clear that the possibilities that space will not be
available are sufficiently remote and any other priorities
accorded air mail are so inconsequential as completely to
negative any suggestion that such are the differences in-
tended by the Congress to justify the double postage rate
imposed on air mail. But even if today those distinctions
were significant, there is nothing in the statutes to prevent
the Postmaster General from tomorrow giving three-cent
mail the same handling on the ground as is given air mail.
There is no reference to such priorities in the entire thirty
years of legislation relating to air mail, either in the terms
of any statute or, insofar as we could find, in the legislative
history of any statute. *
That the Congress considered air transportation to be
the distinctive characteristic of air mail justifying the
premium postage rate charged therefor, rather than pri-
orities in handling on the ground, is obvious from its use
of the descriptive adjective ‘‘air.’’ The provisions in the
20 Post Office Department Press Release No. 229, dated October 6, 1955.
21 While the postal regulations direct that air mail is to reeeive expe-
ditious treatment, neither those regulations nor the Postal Guide ever
provided, until this controversy arose, any basis for an assertion that such
expeditious handling is the critical factor distinguishing air mail from other
classes of mail. See pp. 23-24, supra.
28
postal statutes relating to ‘‘special delivery’’ and ‘‘special
handling’’ of mail reveal that the Congress knows how to
provide for, and label, mail that is to receive priorities in
handling on the ground for which an extra charge is made,
when it so desires. See 39 U.S.C. 164-169a, 246f, 276d,
292a(f) (1952 ed.). If air transportation is not limited to air
mail, then the Congress in providing for air mail has enabled
the Postmaster General to collect a double charge from an
unsuspecting public for a service that the Congress did not
require be essentially different from that which a letter
would receive at the ordinary postage rate. It seems clear
that a decision attributing such an intention to the Congress
should be reviewed by this Court.
It is apparent that respondent’s present experimental
programs have already confused the distinction between air
mail and first-class mail, and that, under the opinion of the
court below, he may erase altogether any differences be-
tween the two services. It is inconceivable to us that the
Congress ever intended to entrust to the Postmaster Gen-
eral this power virtually to destroy a mail service for
which it has long expressly provided by statute, especially
in view of the frequently expressed Congressional concern
with maintaining and increasing revenues from air mail
and with eliminating the postal deficit. *
g. The Congress has not ratified the operation in ques-
tion. We will touch quickly on the Congressional ratifica-
tion argument advanced by respondent since it is referred
to in the opinion of the Court of Appeals. Essentially, this
argument is that Congressional approval and ratification
of the experimental programs should be inferred from ref-
erences to the programs in various committee reports and
22 See, e. g., H. Rept. No. 416, 83rd Cong., lst Sess., pp. 20-21; S. Rept.
No. 373, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., p. 4; H. Rept. No. 2619, 83rd Cong., Ist
Sess., p. 1; H. Rept. No. 1252, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 4-5; H. Rept.
No. 2358, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4; 8. Rept. No. 1834, 79th Cong., 2d Sess,
29
hearings and from a one-sentence proviso in an appropria-
tions act, 68 Stat. 148, requiring the Postmaster General to
report the total cost of ‘‘the eliminated and replacement
service for airline, truck and railroad transportation.’’
The Court of Appeals did not conclude that these limited
activities constituted a Congressional ratification of the
respondent’s experimental programs, and could not prop-
erly have done so, since such incidental activities in no wise
comprise the express recognition and approval of adminis-
trative action that has been found to amount to Congres-
sional ratification of such action in cases like Fleming v.
Mohawk Co., 331 U. S. 111, and Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U. 8S.
354.
But, the court below did state that ‘‘the indications of im-
plied legislative approval are entitled to weight.’’ Appen-
dix B, p. 47, infra. In this, the court is clearly in error. The
Congress has either ratified this experimental program or it
has not done so. Both lower courts proper!y found that
it had not done so. If there had been ratification that would
be the end of the matter. As there has not been ratification,
no help can properly be derived from the facts upon which
respondent urged that ratification could be found, just as
no effect can be given a bill that is considered but not en-
acted by the Congress.
Conclusion
This is a test case presenting a novel question of fed-
eral statutory construction having great importance to the
transportation industry in general and to the public, as
well as to the litigants. The decision in this case will, in
all probability, be the final word on the authority of the
Postmaster General to transport all classes of mail by air
under the existing statutory provisions. The opinion of
the Court of Appeals is demonstrably erroneous, and the
30
matter is one that should be finally, and correctly, settled
by this Court. Accordingly, this petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Srarr Tuomas, J. Caner Fort,
Of Counsel for the Atchison,
iti nan hae Se
way Company. Fraxois M. Sea,
T. J. Suarrery, Pauip F. Wersn,
Of Counsel for Great Northern Lawnexce J. Larro,
Railway Company. 734 Fifteenth Street, N.W.,
M. L. Countryman, Jr., Washington 5, D. C.,
Earn F. Regva, Attorneys for Petitioners.
Of Counsel for Northern Pacific
Railway Company.
Sranrieip B. Jounxson,
Rosert J. MoLzax,
Of Counsel for Southern Pacific
Company.
F. J. Mesa,
Of Counsel for Union Pacific
Railroad Company.
31
APPENDIX A
Sratutes Lyvotvep
Air Mail Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 406:
See. 2. That when used in this Act the term “ar
mail’’ means first-class mail prepaid at the comes of
postage herein prescribed.
Sec. 3. That the rates of postage om air maal siuill
not be less than 10 cents for each ounce or fractiom
thereof.
Sec. 4. That the Postmaster General is aunhumzed
to contract with any individual, firm, or corperstium
for the transportation of air mail by aircraft jwoweem
such points as he may designate at a rate nut to «sued
four-fifths of the revenues derived from sacit air musiL
and to further contract for the transpertatiom tr ai-
craft of first-class mail other than air mail at #2 mame
not to exceed four-fifths of the revenues derived Sram
such first-class mail.
Act of April 29, 1930, 46 Stat. 259:
* * * The Postmaster General is antlormzed w
award contracts for the transportation of air mull
aircraft between such points as he may desizmace ww
the lowest responsible bidder at fixed rates per mile
for definite weight spaces, one cubic fowt of +pmue in
ing computed as the equivalent of nine pounds off aor
mail, such rates not to exceed $1.25 per mile: Pronniieii.
That where the air mail moving between the desumaned
points does not exceed twenty-five enbic feet ar Tw
hundred and twenty-five pounds, per trip the Phe-
master General may award to the lowest respemsibile
bidder, who has owned and operated am air transper-
tation service on a fixed daily schedule over « distumere
32
of not less than two hundred and fifty miles and for
a period of not less than six months prior to the ad-
vertisement for bids, a contract at a rate not to exceed
40 cents per mile for a weight space of tventy-five
cubic feet, or two hundred twenty-five pounds. When-
ever sufficient air mail is not available, first-class mail
matter may be added to make up the maximum load
specified in such contract.
Air Mail Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 933:
Sec. 2 (a) Effective July 1, 1934, the rate of postage
on air mail shall be 6 cents for each ounce or frac-
tion thereof.
(b) When used in this Act—
(1) The term ‘air mail’ means mail of any class
prepaid at the rate of postage prescribed in subsection
(a) of this section.
Sec. 3 (a) The Postmaster General is authorized to
award contracts for the transportation of air mail by
airplane between such points as he may designate, and
for initial periods of not exceeding one year, to the
lowest responsible bidders tendering sufficient guar-
anty for faithful performance in accordance with the
terms of the advertisement at fixed rates per airplane
Yalan
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973 et seq. (49
U.S.C. 401 et seq.):
Section 1. As used in this Act, unless the context
otherwise requires—
33
(23) ‘Mail’ means United States mail and foreign-
transit mail.
Sec. 2. In the exercise and performance of its pow-
ers and duties under this Act, the Authority shall con-
sider the following, among other things, as being in
the public interest, and in accordance with the public
convenience and necessity —
(a) The encouragement and development of an air-
transportation system properly adapted to the present
and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce
of the United States, the Postal Service, and of the
national defense;
(b) The regulation of air transportation in such
manner as to recognize and preserve the inherent ad-
vantages of, assure the highest degree of safety in,
and foster sound economic conditions in, such trans-
portation, and to improve the relations between, and
coordinate transportation by, air carriers:
(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and ef-
ficient service by air carriers at reasonable charges,
without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or
advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive prac-
tices ;
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure
the sound development of an air-transportation system
properly adapted to the needs of the foreign and do-
mestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal
Service, and of the national defense:
(e) The regulation of air commerce in such manner
as to best promote its development and safety; and
(f) The encouragement and development of civil
aeronautics.
=
Sec. 405.
(g) From and after the issuance of any certificate
authorizing the transportation of mail by aircraft, the
Postmaster General shal] tender mail to the holder
thereof, to the extent required by the Postal Service,
for transportation between the points named in such
certificate for the transportation of mail, and such mail
shall be transported by the air carrier holding such cer-
tificate in accordance with such rules, regulations, and
requirements as may be promulgated by the Postmas-
ter General under this section.
(k) In the event of emergency caused by flood, fire,
or other calamitous visitation, the Postmaster General _
is authorized to contract, without advertising, for the
transportation by aircraft of any or all classes of mail
to or from localities affected by such calamity, where
available facilities of persons authorized to transport
mail to or from such localities are inadequate to meet
the requirements of the Postal Service during such
emergency. Such contracts may be only for such peri-
ods as may be necessitated, for the maintenance of
mail service, by the inadequacy of such other facili-
ties. No operation pursuant to any such contract, for
such period, shall be air transportation within the pur-
view of this Act. Payment of compensation for serv-
ice performed under such contracts shall be made, at
rates provided in such contracts, from appropriations
for the transportation of mail by the means normally
used for transporting the mail transported under such
contracts.
o * * ‘ oe o *
35
Sec. 1107.
(a) Section 3964 of the Revised Statutes is hereby
amended by adding ‘‘and all air routes’’, after the
words ‘‘or parts of railroads.’’
(k) Sections 2(b)(2) and (3), 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11,
12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, and so much
of section 8 as reads . . ., of the Act of June 12, 1934,
as amended (48 Stat. 933); . . . and all other Acts or
parts of Acts inconsistent with any provision of this
Act are hereby repealed.
Transportation Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 899 (49 U.S.C. pre-
ceding section 1):
It is hereby declared to be the national transporta-
tion policy of the Congress to provide for fair and im-
partial regulation of all modes of transportation sub-
ject to the provisions of this Act, so administered as to
recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of
each; to promote safe, adequate, economical, and effi-
cient service and foster sound economic conditions in
transportation and among the several carriers; to en-
courage the establishment and maintenance of reason-
able charges for transportation services, without un-
just discriminations, undue preferences or advan-
tages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices ; to
cooperate with the several States and the duly author-
ized officials thereof; and to encourage fair wages and
equitable working conditions ;—all to the end of devel-
oping, coordinating, and preserving a national trans-
portation system by water, highway, and rail, as well
as other means, adequate to meet the needs of the com-
merce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and
36
of the national defense. All of the provisions of this
Act shall be administered and enforced with a view to
carrying out the above declaration of policy.
Act of October 14, 1940, 54 Stat. 1175 (39 U.S.C. 488a):
* * * whenever required by the Postmaster General,
any air carrier authorized by the Civil Aeronautics
Authority under title IV of the Civil Aeronautics Act
of 1938 to engage in the transportation of mail in the
Territory of Alaska shall, within the limits of such
authorization, transport, in addition to mail on which
postage shall have been paid at the rate provided by
the Act of June 12, 1934 (48 Stat. 933), as amended,
any other classes of mail bearing the appropriate
postage for its respective class, and the Postmaster
General is authorized to require such transportation.
Act of August 14, 1946, 60 Stat. 1062 (39 U.S.C. 462a):
Sec. 2. As used in this Act, ‘‘domestic air mail’’
shall embrace all mailable matter being transported as
mail by air within the continental United States,
within any Territory or possession of the United
States, within any geographical area which is a pro-
tectorate of the United States, or between any of the
aforesaid: * * *
Postal Rate Revision and Federal Employees Salary Act
of 1948, 62 Stat. 1261 (39 U.S.C. 463a):
Sec. 201. The rate of postage on all domestic air
mail as defined in Public Law 730, Seventy-ninth Con-
gress, shall, except in the case of postal cards and pri-
vate mailing or post cards, be 6 cents for each ounce
or fraction thereof. The rate of postage on postal
cards and private mailing or post cards .. ., when
sent by air mail, shall be 4 cents each.
37
Air Parcel Post Act, 62 Stat. 1097 (39 U.S.C. 475):
* * © the rate of postage on mailable matter exceed-
ing eight ounces in weight, but not weighing more than
seventy pounds nor measuring more than one hun-
dred inches in length and girth combined, when car-
ried by air and including other transportation to and
from air mail routes, shall, except as otherwise herein
provided, be determined on the basis of the eight postal
zones established for fourth-class matter, as follows:
Air Star Route Act, as amended, 63 Stat. 680 (39 U.S.C.
470):
Sec. 6(a). Whenever he shall find it to be in the
public interest, because of the nature of the terrain,
or the impracticability or inadequacy of surface trans-
portation, and where the cost thereof is reasonably
compatible with the service to be provided, the Post-
master General may award contracts for the transpor-
tation by aircraft upon star routes of any or all classes
of mail (including but not limited to air mail and air
parcel post), payment for such service to be made from
the appropriation for inland transportation by star
routes: * * *
APPENDIX B
Before Epcertox, Chief Judge, and Pretryman and
Bastian, Circuit Judges.
Prettyman, Circuit Judge: This is an action brought
in the District Court by certain railroads for declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief against the Postmaster Gen-
eral. It was alleged in the complaint that the Postal Serv-
ice has conducted an experimental operation in the trans-
38
portation of first-class (three-cent) mail by air between
designated localities since early October, 1953; and that
on October 6, 1954, the Postmaster General filed a petition
with the Civil Aeronautics Board asking the Board to
establish a rate of compensation for such transportation
between additional localities, some or all of which are
served by one or more of the plaintiff railroads. The
railroads asserted that the proposed service is unlawful,
void, and beyond the statutory authority of the Postmaster
General. The Postmaster General answered. Both sides
moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted
summary judgment to the plaintiff railroads. It held that
the Postmaster General has the right to experiment in
the transportation of mail but that prolonged experimental
dispatch of three-cent mail by air is not within his statutory
authority. At the same time, the court denied the rail-
roads’ motion for a permanent injunction, on the ground
that irreparable injury had not been shown. The Post-
master General appealed, and the railroads then appealed
from those parts of the court’s order which sustained the
power to experiment provided the operation were not un-
duly prolonged, and from that part of the order denying
the permanent injunction.
The West Coast experiment is the fourth such operation
to be instituted. The plan is to tender to air carriers for
transportation ordinary first-class mail when, as and if
empty space is available on a flight after all other traffic,
including mail bearing the special air-mail postage, is ac-
commodated. Ordinary mail thus transported is not to re-
ceive expedited handling, transportation or distribution.
The object of the experiments, the Postmaster General says,
is to gain experience from which it can be determined
whether improvements and economies might be achieved
by this method.
We are met first with the contention of the Postmaster
39
General that the plaintiff railroads have no standing to
sue, that is, that they have no right to initiate judicial
inquiry into the legality of his action. He argues the
statutes bestow on the railroads only a right to reason-
able compensation for services actually performed; they
give the railroads no right to perform these services ;
but the lawsuit seeks to protect a right to perform. Fur-
ther, the Postmaster General says the plaintiffs have no
common-law right to contest his action, since they are
merely competitors of the airlines within the rule laid
down in such cases as Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes* and
Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay.?
The carriage of mail by the railroads is governed by
statute.* All railroad common carriers are required to
carry such mail as may be offered for transportation by
the Postmaster General, * and they are required to furnish
all necessary facilities for carrying and handling the mail
while it is in their custody, furnishing cars, station space,
and rooms for handling storage and transfer.° They must
carry the mail on the trains and in the manner the Postmas-
ter General prescribes. °
The statute imposes substantial obligations on the plain-
tiff railroads. Under its terms they have been compelled
to make substantial investments in special equipment for
handling and carrying the mails. A necessary effect of the
Postmaster General’s action in tendering three-cent mail
for transportation by air is to prevent useful employment
of parts of these very considerable investments. Thus,
contrary to the contentions of the Postmaster General, more
1 302 U.S. 464, 82 L. Ed. 374, 58 S. Ct. 300 (1938).
295 U.S. App. D.C. —, 225 F. 2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
— U.S. — (Nov. 7, 1955).
339 Srar. 425 (1916), 39 U.S.C.A. §§ 524 et seq.
439 Srar. 429 (1916), 39 U.S.C.A. § 541.
539 Srat. 427 (1916), 39 U.S.C.A. § 538.
39 Srar. 428 (1916), 39 U.S.C.A. § 539.
40
is at stake than a simple statutory privilege of doing busi-
ness with the Government. The interest of the plaintiff
railroads is not a mere expectancy of continued patronage.
It is a present interest stemming from substantial invest-
ments in cars and equipment. Such an interest may merit
legal consideration even when the investment is made freely
and with knowledge of a possible change of status that
would impair its use.’ If so, it is sufficient here, for the
railroads did not acquire these facilities as merely useful
or needed in obtaining Government business; they acquired
the equipment because they were commanded to do so by
law.
Nor can the contested action of the Postmaster General be
viewed only as creating competition for the railroads. In
the first place the air carriers and the railroads do not bid
for the mail as free competitors. They transport it as
agents of the United States, * subject to minute regulation
by the Postmaster General. Furthermore, the Postmaster
General did not simply finance or create new competition;
he explicitly discontinued the use of certain railroad equip-
ment. For example, in the record before us is a letter
in which the Postal Transportation Service at San Fran-
cisco advised the Southern Pacific Company that certain
apartments in various trains would be discontinued. This
is a direct act which is part and parcel of the experimental
program for transportation of three-cent mail by air. If
the program is invalid for want of statutory authority the
plaintiff railroads have been injured by a direct illegal
7 See, ¢.g., Standard Airlines v. Civil Aeronauties Board, 85 U.S. App.
D.C. 29, 177 F. 2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ; Civil Aeronauties Board v. Ameri-
ean Air Transport, 91 U.S. App. D.C. 318, 201 F. 2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1952)
(certified to Supreme Court), certificate dismissed, 344 U.S. 4, 97 L. Ed. 4,
73 8. Ct. 2 (1952), appeal decided, 91 U.S. App. D.C. 323, 201 F. 2d 194
(D.C. Cir. 1952).
8 Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. United States, 225 U.S. 640, 56 L. Ed
1236, 32 S. Ct. 702 (1912).
41
act. The situations presented in cases like Alabama Power
Co. v. Ickes, supra, were wholly different, and such cases do
not apply. We think the plaintiff railroads have standing
in court to challenge the alleged illegal act.
We come, then, to the question whether the Postmaster
General has authority to conduct the experimental car-
riage of three-cent mail by air. His general authority to
arrange for mail transportation stems from a statute
which provides: ‘‘The Postmaster General shall provide
for carrying the mail on all post roads established by
law, as often as he, having due regard to productiveness
and other circumstances, may think proper.’’® By a later
enactment ‘‘air routes’’ were added to the definition of
“post roads established by law’’."° More specific are the
provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act." That Act re-
quires the Postmaster General to tender mail to air car-
riers holding a certificate authorizing the transportation
of mail by aircraft according to the needs of the Postal
Service, and requires the carriers to transport such mail.
It also provides that rates of compensation to air carriers
for carrying the mail be fixed by the Civil Aeronautics
Board.”
The position of the plaintiff railroads is quite simple.
They say the foregoing provisions relate to so-called ‘‘air
mail’’ and to no other mail. Another statute establishes
the rate of postage on ‘‘domestic air mail’’ at six cents
an ounce,” and ‘‘domestic air mail’’ is defined in the stat-
ute as ‘‘all mailable matter being transported as mail by
air within the continental United States’’.* The rail-
® Rev. Strat. 3965, 39 U.S.C.A. § 483.
1052 Srar. 1027 (1938), 39 U.S.C.A. § 481.
1152 Srat. 977 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C.A. § 401 et seq.
12 52 Strat. 998 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C.A. § 486.
18 62 Strat. 1261 (1948), 39 U.S.C.A. § 463a.
1460 Srar. 1062 (1946), 39 U.S.C.A. § 462a.
42
roads therefore argue that ‘‘all mailable matter being
transported as mail by air’’ must bear postage at the six-
cent rate. These postage-rate provisions, say the rail-
roads, are clear, without ambiguity, and must be given
the effect their words require. They are in accord, say
the railroads, with the distinction between ordinary sur-
face mail and air mail which has consistently been recog-
nized by legislative and executive authorities prior to the
inauguration of the present experimental service.
In support of his authority the Postmaster General
urges a number of propositions. He points to his gen-
eral authority to provide for the carriage of mail on all
post roads, including air routes, and to the provisions of the
Civil Aeronautics Act to which we have referred. More
specifically, he urges contemporaneous legislative approval
of the experimental program manifested in committee re-
ports * and the 1954 Post Office Appropriation Act.’® Fin-
ally he cites an administrative distinction between air mail,
as a special service receiving expedited handling and atten-
tion, and ordinary three-cent mail, which receives no spe-
cial handling whether or not carried by air under this ex-
periment. He claims support in a formal opinion of the
Comptroller General" supporting the experimental pro-
gram so long as this distinction is maintained.
The principal problem is whether the statutes fixing
an air-mail postage rate and defining ‘‘domestiec air mail’
prohibit carriage by air of mail not bearing the special
air-mail rate of postage. The railroads rely heavily upon
the statutory definition of ‘‘domestic air mail’’. The com-
plete section containing the definition is as follows:
15 E.g., S. Rev. No. 1286, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
1668 Srar. 144.
17 Letter of Aug. 12, 1953—B-116331—appearing in this record at page
288 and printed in the joint appendix at page 68,
_—
43
‘*As used in this Act, ‘domestic air mail’ shall em-
brace all mailable matter being transported as mail
by air within the continental United States, within
any Territory or possession of the United States,
within any geographical area which is a protectorate
of the United States, or between any of the aforesaid:
Provided, That with respect to mail transported under
authority of section 1 of the Act of October 14, 1940
(54 Srat. 1175; 39 U.S.C., 1940 edition, 488a), the
postage rate of 5 cents for each ounce or fraction of
an ounce shall be applicable only to mail of the first
class, and for all other classes the rates shall be as
prescribed by that Act.’’
The railroads reason, as we have said, that ‘‘all mailable
matter being transported as mail by air’’ is ‘‘air mail’’
and the special postage is required to be paid on all mat-
ter thus transported. They conclude from those pre-
mises that mail not bearing the special postage cannot be
transported by air. But we think the argument over-
looks an important factor. Congress had, prior to the
above-quoted definition, already defined ‘‘air mail’’ as be-
ing mail on which special air-mail postage has been pre-
paid. Under that definition ‘‘air mail’’ is not such matter
as the Post Office transports by air but is matter upon
which the sender has affixed special postage; the nature of
the mail as air mail is fixed by the sender, not by the Postal
Service. If that view is correct, the statutory definition of
“domestic air mail’? above quoted does not preclude the
Post Office from transporting by air matter other than ‘‘air
mail’’. It must, generally speaking, transport by air matter
to which the special postage has been affixed, but it not re-
quired to demand the special postage for all matter which it
transports by air.
An interesting problem in statutory construction is posed
44
by the railroads’ argument in this respect. The several
steps are long and complicated, and we have relegated the
recital to an Appendix to this opinion. Our conclusion from
the legislative history is that Congress in 1946 meant to
use the words ‘‘air mail’’ in the sense it had already given
those words and by adding ‘‘domestic’’ it intended merely
to add a geographical description extending the continental
postage rate to carriage of mail to the territories, posses-
sions and protectorates of the United States. This is the
plain, commonsense view. The only contrary consideration
is that in 1946 Congress did not in words carry forward the
1925 and 1934 definitions but left them hanging without
any practical application. In the absence of clear indication
of a Congressional intent to discard the established defini-
tion, we think the view urged by the railroads is untenable.
Moreover, to accord ‘‘domestie air mail’’ the meaning
urged by the railroads would give rise to serious statu-
tory conflicts. Before 1946, for example, several statutes
had been enacted expressly authorizing the Postmaster
General to contract, in certain situations, for the carriage
of ‘‘any or all classes of mail’’ by aircraft. One statute ™
authorized such contracts in emergencies caused by flood,
fire, or calamitous visitation; another” granted similar
authority to provide for air transportation over other-
wise inaccessible or impracticable routes. If the subse-
quent definition of ‘‘domestie air mail’’ required all mail
carried by air to bear air-mail postage, authority to con-
tract for ‘‘any or all classes of mail’’ under these prior
statutes was thereby terminated. Under that view of the
definition the Postmaster General, whatever the emergency
or the terrain, could contract only for mail bearing the
special postage, since any mail carried by air under these
18 52 Srat. 997 (1938), 49 U.S.C.A. § 485(k).
1952 Stat. 219 (1938), as amended, 39 U.S.C.A. § 470.
| —,
45
contracts would be ‘‘domestic air mail’’ and would reqgune
the added postage. Cae eS hee oe ee
tion to nullify these prior statutes.
Other considerations support the foregoing view. ‘The
obvious purpose of imposing the higher rate of postu.
for ‘‘air mail’’ was to insure revenue propertionute tw
higher costs. Real air-mail service, for which the |tieiwr
rate is charged, involves many priorities, and they ame
costly. The carriers must transport this mail om am im
perative priority basis. Nothing in the record smegest
that the mere means of transportation, air as compared
to rail, would justify the surcharge. Indeed. «» far a»
the record indicates, the variation in cost betweem cur
riage by rail and carriage by air on a non-privrity,. space~
available basis is not substantial. We think the «peed
surcharge for ‘‘domestie air mail”’ implies « special serv
ice. The Senate Committee Report of 1946” reettwed tie
disparity between the three-cent surface rate and the them
eight-cent air rate, called that disparity a **penaity’~. ami
indicated the purpose of the five-cent-rate statute a» fiai+
lows:
‘*Therefore, H. R. 5560 [which became the pestuwee
rate statute] proposes to remove the penalty and pur
these two seivices, surface and air, on approximutel:
equal footing—the mailer to take his chowe im accord-
ance with the importance of his communicatiuns * * *"~
(Emphasis supplied. )
Under the present experimental program a persem mui
ing an article with three cents postage does not reeeime
any special service ‘‘in accordance with the importance of
his commumnications’’. Indeed, while his mail mar be cur-
ried by an air carrier, it may receive slower servive ‘ium
7° S. Rer. No. 1834, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
46
if carried by rail, since such mail is handled by the air
carriers on a basis of space when, as and if available.
Statutes relating specifically to the authority of the Post-
master General to provide for mail transportation are
consistent with our conclusion. As we have noted, the
Postmaster General is authorized to arrange for the trans-
portation of mail on all post roads established by law,
including air routes. Standing alone this general authori-
zation might not be persuasive,” but the Civil Aeronautics
Act, in requiring the Postmaster General to tender ‘‘ mail’’*
to air carriers, does not limit that term to ‘‘air mail’’; it
provides generally that he shall tender ‘‘mail’’ to ‘‘the ex-
tent required by the Postal Service’’.
Quite important, so far as this specific program is con-
cerned, is the fact that Congress has been fully cognizant
of its inauguration and in the appropriation for the Post
Office Department in 1954 inserted a proviso requiring
reports to include ‘‘the total cost of the eliminated and
replacement service for airline, truck, and railroad trans-
portation.’’* The plaintiff railroads urge that this is not
sufficient to manifest ratification and approval by the Con-
gress and claim the cases cited by the Postmaster General
on the point ™ are distinguishable. But we are unable to
find any prohibition of the present experimental program,
while we do find statutory provisions broad enough to en-
compass it within their terms. Under these circumstances
21 Beach v. United States, 226 U.S. 243, 257, 57 L. Ed. 205, 33 S. CL
20 (1912).
22 “Mail” is defined in the Act as “United States mail and foreign-transit
mail.” 52 Sratr. 979 (1938), 49 U.S.C.A. §401(23). Thus in thi« statute
the term “mail” has no special limitations.
23 68 Srar. 148.
24 Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354, 85 L. Ed. 1399, 61 S. Ct. 979 (1941):
Fleming v. Mohawk Co., 331 U.S. 111, 91 L. Ed. 1375, 67 S. Ct. 1129
(1947); Wells v. Nickles, 104 U.S. 444, 26 L. Fd. 825 (1881); Swayne
& Hoyt, Lid. v. United States, 300 U.S. 297, 81 L. Ed. 659, 57 S. Ct. 478
(1937).
47
we think the indications of implied legislative approval
are entitled to weight. In sum we conclude that the ex-
perimental program for carrying ordinary first-class mail
by air is within the statutory authority of the Postmaster
General and is authorized by law.
The judgment of the District Court will be vacated and
the case remanded with instructions to grant defendant
Postmaster General’s motion for summary judgment.
Judqment vacated and case remanded.
Bastiax, Crncvurr Juvor, concurring in the result: I agree
with the holding of the court that the Postmaster General
has the authority to conduct experimental carriage of three-
cent mail by air. I have doubts, however, as to the stand-
ing of the railroads to sue.
Aprpespix
This Appendix is a study of the definition of “air mail”
in connection with the prescription of postage rates.
In 1925 Congress enacted a short statute, 43 Star. 805,
five one-sentence sections, titled ‘‘Air Mail Act’’. That
statute defined ‘‘air mail’’ thus: ‘‘That when used in this
Act the term ‘air mail’ means first-class mail prepaid at
the rates of postage herein prescribed."’ The rate was
prescribed at ten cents an ounce. In the United States
Code (1926) the ‘‘air mail’’ definition was codified as Sec-
tion 462 of Title 39. It remains there today, with a change
we shall mention in a moment. The postage rate provision
was codified as Section 463 of the same Title. '
1 In 1928 the rate was changed to 5 cents. 45 Stat. 504. In 1926, 44
Srar. 692, 1928, 45 Strat. 504, and 1930, 46 Strat. 259, the section of the
1925 Act relating to the contracting authority of the Postmaster General
was amended and other sections added. In 1934, 48 Star. 933, that see-
tion of the 1925 Act and the added sections were repealed. Thow changes
are immateria! bere.
r LOOP LO OLLT ONO LGILELV, SPIO AMAL
48
In 1934 Congress, without expressly repealing either the
‘‘air mail’’ definition or the postage rate section of the
1925 Act, enacted another definition of ‘‘air mail’’ and
another postage rate provision. The new definition was
substantially the same as the old. It read, See. 2(b)(1),
48 Srat. 933:
‘*(b) When used in this Act—
‘*(1) The term ‘air mail’ means mail of any class
prepaid at the rate of postage prescribed in subsee-
tion (a) of this section.’’
The latter subsection was the postage rate provision. The
codifiers (1940 edition) handled this Congressional action
in mixed fashion. They treated the new postage provi-
sion as superseding the old provision and thus placed it
as Section 463. But they included both definitions of
‘‘air mail’’, leaving the old as Section 462 and adding the
new as Section 469. Moreover they made both definitions
applicable to the postage rate section, Section 463; trans-
lating the statutory language they made each definition
read ‘‘When used in sections 463 [ete.]’’
In the Civil Aeronauties Act, 52 Srar. 1029 (1938), Con-
gress repealed most of the provisions of the 1934 Act re-
lating to air mail but left the rate and definition see-
tions intact. In the Revenue Act of 1943, 58 Srar. 69,
the postage rate was increased two cents. Thus in 1946
the rate on air mail stood at eight cents. The committees
of the Congress were of opinion that the disparity be-
tween this ‘‘premium air-mail rate’’ and the surface rate
of three cents was too great. §S. Rep. No. 1834, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1946). Also, a problem had arisen as to
the rate to territories and possessions of the United
States. The Senate Committee discussed these problems
in its report. In doing so it used the term ‘‘air mail”
without definition, as though it were a known term, dis-
cussed the postage rate problem, and recommended an
extension of the continental rate to the territories, etc.;
but nowhere did it mention any intent to cireumscribe or
change the then existing powers of the Postmaster Gen-
eral. Thereupon Congress enacted another short statute,
60 Strat. 1062 (1946), three one-sentence sections, which
prescribed the rate on domestic air mail at five cents
(changed to six cents by a 1948 Act, 62 Srar. 1261) and
defined domestic air mail as we have quoted it in the text
of this opinion. But the draftsmen of this 1946 statute
did not include a provision fitting the new provisions
into existing law or making the new act amendatory of or
supplementary to the old; they left the new provisions as
a separate and independent piece of legislation.
The codifiers (1946 edition) at first treated the new
postage section (fixing the rate on ‘‘domestie air mail’’)
as superseding the old, putting it in as Section 463.2 They
left both of the definitions of ‘‘air mail’’ in the Code as
they had theretofore been, Sections 462 and 469, and left
both referring to the postage section, Section 463. They
inserted the new definition of ‘‘domestice air mail’’ as a
new section, Section 462a. Thus it is clear that as of that
time, so far as the United States Code was concerned, the
definition of ‘‘air mail’’ applied to the use of those two
words in the phrase ‘‘domestic air mail’’. As we have al-
ready said, we think that was correct.
In 1948 Congress changed the law respecting post cards
sent by air, setting that rate at four cents. 62 Srar. 1261.
On all other matter Congress prescribed a six-cent rate.
When the codifiers put this statute in the Code (Supp.
II to 1946 Code), they did not treat it as superseding the
old postage rate section, Section 463; they added it as a
2In their explanatory comments the codifiers said the new provision
“amended” the old.
50
new section, Section 463a, and dropped Section 463 out
of the Code. But they did not make a corresponding change
in the definitions of ‘‘air mail’’. So Section 462 is made
to apply to Sections 461 (the Short Title section), 462 (the
definition itself), and 465 (having to do with rules and
regulations). And the other definition, Section 469, is made
to apply to Section 463 (which is not in the Code at all) and
Section 469f (which relates to claims on account of annulled
contracts). So the Code makes it appear that neither
definition of ‘‘air mail’’ applies to the postage rate provi-
sion. Moreover the codifiers made the ‘‘air mail’’ definition
in Section 462 read as meaning mail prepaid at the rates
‘*prescribed in sections 461, 462 and 465 of this title.’’ No
postage rates are prescribed in any of those sections. And
they made the definition in Section 469 read as meaning
mail prepaid at the rate ‘‘ prescribed in section 463 of this
title.’’ As we have pointed out, there was no Section 463
left in the Title. We find nothing in any statute or in any
legislative history which justifies this change, if it is in-
tended to be a change, in the statutes made in the course
of codification.
The essence of the contention of the railroads on this
point is that when Congress defined ‘‘domestic air mail”
in 1946 it did not mean to use the term ‘‘air mail’’ as the
term was already defined by statute but meant to redefine
that term as well as to add the word ‘‘domestic’’. Noth-
ing in the legislative history, so far as we can find, jus-
tifies that view. Our view on the point is as we have stated
it in the text of this opinion.
51
APPENDIX C
Before Edgerton, Chief Judge, and Prettyman and Bastian,
Circuit Judges
JUDGMENT
These appeals came on to be heard on the record from the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
and were argued by counsel.
On consideration whereof, It is ordered and adjudged by
this Court that the judgment of the said District Court ap-
pealed from in these cases be, and the same is hereby,
vacated, and these cases be, and the same are hereby, re-
manded to the said District Court with instructions to grant
defendant Postmaster General’s motion for summary judg-
ment.
Dated: December 12, 1955.
Per Circuit Judge Prettyman.
Separate opinion by Circuit Judge Bastian concurring in
the result.
(6969-0)
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.