Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Preferred Insurance v. United States

Supreme Court brief1955

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JUL L1 1855

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United 8. WALEY, C

October Tagmy 55,

PREFERRED INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, MICHIGAN

SURETY COMPANY, a corporation, MID-STATES INSURANCE

COMPANY, a corporation, and THE MERCANTILE INSURANCE

COMPANY OF AMERICA, a corporation,

Petitioners,

US.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

FIDELITY-PHENIX FIRE INSUPANCE CO.,

Petit-oner,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

ALBERT G. WHIPPLE,

Petitioner,

US.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

GEORGE STROPECK, ci

Petitioner,

US.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY,

Petitioner,

US.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

ST. LOUIS FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Petitioner,

us.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

Petition for Writs of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

WILLIAM H. LEVIT,

210 West Seventh Street,

Los Angeles 14, California,

Attorney for Petitioners.

ALFRED W. NEWMAN,

BERT T. CRESSWELL,

_ HANS A. KRUGER,

_ GEORGE W. MURPHY,

Of Couns,

SUBJECT INDEX

PAGE

Op:nions below 2

Jurisdictional statement 2

Questions presented ...... 2

Statutes and Regulations involved. 3

Statement of the case 3

Reasons and argument for issuance of writ 6

I,

The questions involved are of such importance they should be

settled by this Court. 6

II.

Service incident property damage claims of military personnel

are covered by the Tort Claims Act; the rule of Feres v.

United States as to personal injury claims is not applicable

to property damage claims...... 7

A. The opinion of the Court of Appeals... 000002000... aS

B. The holding of the Feres case 8

C. The statutory treatment of and administrative con-

struction with respect to service incident property dam-

atje claims ; the enactment of the Tort Claims Act.......... 11

1. The Military Personnel Claims Act of May 29,

1945 . 11

2. The General Claims Acts preceding the Tort

Claims Act 12

a. The Gunfire Act of August 24, 1912.00.00. 12

b. The Small Tort Claims Act of December 28,

1922 13

c. The Military Claims Act of July 3, 1943.0... 14

PAGE

3. The Federal Tort Claims Act OE TB scveereirriceons 16

4. The Tort Claims Act covers service incident

property damage claims; Feres v. United States

is not to the contrary 18

III.

The property damage claims here involved were not service

incident 25

A. The test applied by the Courts of Appeals to prop-

erty damage claims was improper and contrary to the

rule of the Feres and Brooks cases 25

B. The administrative allowance of the uninsured claims

under the Military Personnel Claims Act is not here

controlling 28

Conclusion 29

Appendices :

Appendix A. Opinion of the Court of Appeals and Judg-

ments App. p. 1

Appendix B. Opinions of Judge Advocates General....App. p. 17

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

CasEs PAGE

Billings v. Truesdell 321 U. S. 542. 21

Brooks v. United States, 337 U. S. 49. 3, 6, 7, 25

Brown v. United States, 99 Fed. Supp. 685 25

Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15 >

Employers’ Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 167 F. 2d 655.......... 21

Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135............ 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 17, 19

20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 28, 29

Fidelity-Phenix Fire Insurance Co. v. United States, 111 Fed.

Supp. 899 2

Fleming v. Mohawk Co., 331 U. S. 111 21

Herring v. United States, 98 Fed. Supp. 69.......2..-..ceecesceseseeee 25

Lund v. United States, 104 Fed. Supp. 756. 26

Samson v. United States, 79 Fed. Supp. 406. 19, 25

United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338 U. S. 366....

3 Fy Shy Oe

United States v. Brown, 348 U. S. 110.00... 7, 19, 22, 23, 29

United States v. Gilman, 347 U. S. 507 7

United States v. Jackson, 280 U. S. 183 21

United States v. Spelar, 338 U. S. 217 7

United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U. S. 543. 7, 20

Zoula v. United States, 217 F. 2d 81 23

MISCELLANEOUS

1 Bulletins, Judge Advocate General of the Army, p. 331.......... 13

2 Bulletins, Judge Advocate General of the Army, pp. 274-275 26

4 Bulletins, Judge Advocate General of the Army, p. 62.......... 26

4 Bulletins, Judge Advocate General of the Army, p. 287......16, 26

5 Bulletins, Judge Advocate General of the Army, p. 68............ 16

Digest of Opinions, Judge Advocate General of the Army,

1912-1940, Sec. 709, p. 449 13

PAGE

Digest of Opinions, Judge Advocate General of the Army,

1912-1940, Sec. 713, p. 456 13

1 Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocate General of the

Army, Claims, Sec. 94.3, pp. 65-66. 26

1 Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocate General ot the

Armed Forces, Claims, Sec. 95.5, p. 70 17

1 Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocate General of the

Armed Forces, Claims, Sec. 95.7, p. 71-....-------------sesersesenseseneens 17

2 Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocate General of the

Armed Forces, Claims, Sec. 93.9, p. 63 17

2 Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocate General of the

Army, Claims, Sec. 94.1, p. tet 26

House Report No. 237 15

RULES

Rules of the United States Supreme Court, Rule 19(1) (b)........ 7

Rules of the United States Supreme Court, Rule 23(5)...........-..- 3

STATUTES

32 Code of Federal Regulations, Regulation 536.22 18

32 Code of Federal Regulations, Regulations 836.92-836.95........ 11

Federal Torts Claims Act (60 Stat. 842, amended by 62 Stat.

933, 982-4, 63 Stat. 62, 101, 106-7, 444)

Federal Tort Claims Act, Sec. 424(a) (60 Stat. 846)................--- 17

Federal Tort Claims Act, Sec. 1346(b) 16

Federal Tort Claims Act, Sec. 2672 16

Military Claims Act of July 3, 1943, Sec. 1 14

Military Claims Act of 1945 (59 Stat. 662) . 14

Military Claims Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 332) ‘aah a

Military Personnel Claims Act a pe Se 14, 15

v.

PAGE

Military Personnel Claims Act of 3-3-49 (9 Stat. 415); of 3-3-

63 (12 Stat. 743); of 3-3-85 (23 Stat. 350); of 7-9-18 (40

Stat. 880) 5 of 3-4-21 (41 Stat. 1436); of 5-29-45 (59 Stat.

225) il

United States Code Annotated, Title 28, Sec. 1254(1)................ 2

United States Code Annotated, Title 28, Sec. 1346 ................ 3,

United States Code Annotated, Title 28, Secs. 2671-2680........ 3,

United States Code Annotated, Title 31, Sec. 223(b).............. 9, 17

United States Code Annotated, Title 31, Sec. 322(c) on... 4, 11

United States Code Annotated, Title 31, Sec. 223(d)................ 14

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1955.

PREFERRED INSURANCE CoMPANY, a corporation; MicHI-

GAN Surety ComMpaNy, a corporation; Mrip-StatTes —

INSURANCE CoMPANY, a corporation; and THE Mer-

CANTILE INSURANCE CoMPANY OF AMERICA, a Corpora-

tion,

Petitioners,

US.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

Anp Five CONSOLIDATED CASES.

Petition for Writs of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

To the Honorable Earl Warren, Chief Justice of the

United States, and to the Honorable Associate Jus-

tices of the Supreme Court of the United States:

Petitioners Preferred Insurance Company, Michigan

Surety Company, Mid-States Insurance Company, The

Mercantile Insurance Company of America, Fidelity-

Phenix Fire Insurance Company of New York, Albert

G. Whipple, George Stropeck, Government Employees In-

surance Company and St. Louis Fire & Marine Insurance

Company, respectfully petition that writs of certiorari

eile

issue to review the judgments of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, entered in the above

cases on May 9, 1955.

OPINIONS BELOW.

The opinion of the Court of Appeals’ has not. yet been

reported. The opinion of the District Court is reported at

111 Fed. Supp. 899, sub nom. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Insur-

ance Co. v. United States [R. 22-37]?

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT.

The judgments of the Court of Appeals were entered

May 9, 1955. No rehearings were requested, nor has any

order been made extending the time within which to peti-

tion for certiorari.

Jurisdiction of this Court to review the judgments of

the Court of Appeals is conferred by 28 USCA sec.

1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.

1. Are service incident property damage claims of

military personnel within the coverage of the Federal Tort

Claims Act?

2. In view of the completely different statutory history

and treatment of service incident property damage and

eel

Hereafter referred to as Opinion and reproduced in Appendix

“A,” pp. 1-13. Page references herein to the Opinion will be to

Appendix “A.”

2The Record references herein are to the Transcript of Record

before the Court of Appeals which has been filed with this Court

pursuant to Rule 21.

a

personal injury claims, is the rule of Feres v. U. S.,

340 U. S. 135, that service incident personal injury

claims are not covered by the Tort Claims Act, appli-

cable to such property damage claims?

3. Is it contrary to Brooks v. U. S., 337 U. S. 49,

and Feres v. U. S., supra, to hold that damage to property

of military personnel negligently caused by the govern-

ment, must be held to be service incident where, at the

time of damage, the property is located in a government

facility that the soldier is making use of voluntarily for

his own convenience and not pursuant to any military

orders or while on a military mission?

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED.

These suits involve the Federal Tort Claims Act (60

Stat. 842, amended by 62 Stat. 933, 982-4, 63 Stat. 62,

101, 106-7, 444; now 28 USCA secs. 1346, 2671-2680),

which act, for the sake of clarity and continuity, will be

referred to in more detail hereinafter.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The consolidated cases* arose out of the crash of a

B-29 Air Force plane at Fairfield-Suisun Air Force Base,

California, on August 5, 1950, as a result of the alleged

(a e

8These six cases involving identical questions were consolidated

for hearing both in the District Court and the Court of Appeals.

The plaintiffs and appellants in each of the six cases have joined

in this single petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 23, (5) of

the Rules of this Court.

ae

negligence of the government personnel in charge. The

resulting explosion and fire damaged a number of house

trailers owned and occupied by Air Force personnel as-

signed to the Base, and their families, which trailers were

parked in a trailer park located on the Base. The use of

the trailer park by the personnel was vuluntary and for

their convenience, and not under the compulsion of any

military orders; they could have lived off the Base had

they preferred. They paid rental to the government for

the trailer space occupied, and drew the regular quarters

allowance paid to personnel not furnished government

quarters. The trailer owners had no duties with respect

to the plane that crashed. At the time of the crash, they

were variously located, some on and some off duty, in the

trailer park, at other places on the Base, in neighboring

communities, and at other military installations in the

United States and overseas [R. 3-9, 12-17].

Petitioners, the insurers of the various trailers, paid the

respective owners the amounts of the losses, which pay-

ments totaled $68,340.57. The owners had other unin-

sured property that was damaged and for which they

made claim and were reimbursed by the government under

the Military Personnel Claims Act, 31 USCA, sec. 222(c).

Ti + claims of the insurers were not compensable under

ee

‘The Opinion inadvertently refers to the total amount of the

losses as $49,661. This latter figure represents the amount in-

volved in the Preferred Insurance Co. case.

a

that Act, as the Regulations under the Act exclude sub-

rogated claims’ [R. 6-7, 15, 18-20].

Petitioners then brought these suits in the District

Court under the Tort Claims Act (28 USCA, secs. 1346,

2671, et seq.) to recover the amounts of their respective

loss payments by virtue of their rights of subrogation

(See United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338

U. S. 366).

The District Court dismissed the suits on the ground

that the Military Personnel Claims Act was the exclusive

remedy of military personnel for service incident property

damage, and therefore such claims were not covered by

the Tort Claims Act. The Court of Appeals affirmed on

the ground that the rule of the Feres case with respect to

service incident personal injury claims was applicable to

property damage claims and because it found these claims

to be service incident.°

'The said Act and Regulations also contain many other restric-

tions and exclusions that apply directly to the claims of military

personnel, as will be noted infra.

*While these cases involve subrogated claims, the Opinion makes

clear that it necessarily and directly applies to all military personnel

(and not merely their insurers) and denies them the right to make

claim under the Tort Claims Act for service incident property

damage.

ain

REASONS AND ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF

WRIT.

I

The Questions Involved Are of Such Importance They

Should Be Settled by This Court.

The decision of the Court of Appeals denies to military

personnel the right to make claim under the Tort Claims

Act for service incident property damage, and leaves such

personnel with only the restricted coverage provided by the

Military Personnel Claims Act for such claims. As au-

thority, the Opinion relies entirely on Feres v. U. S.,

supra, which dealt only with service incident personal

injury claims. In reaching its decision, the Court of Ap-

peals has ignored and refused to consider the completely

different statutory background and treatment of, and ad-

ministrative construction with respect to, service incident

property damage and personal injury claims, which it is

felt establish that service incident property damage claims

are covered by the Tort Claims Act, and that the Feres

decision is inapplicable thereto.

Also, it is felt that the rule announced by the decision

as to whether property damage is service incident is in

conflict with the rule of the Feres and Brooks cases, and

improperly and substantially restricts the property damage

claim rights of military personnel.

While these questions are here raised by insurance com-

pany subrogees, there can be no question but that the

decision directly affects and applies to military personnel.

Because these cases involve important questions of in-

terpretation and coverage of the Tort Claims Act that

have not been decided by this @ourt and that substantially

—

me

affect the property damage ciaim rights of all members

of the armed forces, and involve the application of the

Feres and Brooks cases to these issues, it is submitted

that these questions should be settled by this Court (Re-

vised Rules, S. Ct. U. S., Rule 19, (1) (b))."

II.

Service Incident Property Damage Claims of Military

Personnel Are Covered by the Tort Claims Act;

the Rule of Feres v. United States as to Personal

Injury Claims Is Not Applicable to Property Dam-

age Claims.

A. The Opinion of the Court of Appeals.

The Opinion notes that the Feres case dealt only with

service incident personal injury claims, but concludes that

the considerations that led to the Feres decision are

equally applicable to service incident property damage

claims. In reaching this conclusion the Opinion notes

(pp. 6-7) the stress placed in the Feres opinion on the

comprehensive system of benefits that Congress had pro-

vided over the years to take care of service incident per-

sonal injury claims. The Opinion then attempts to analo-

'This Court has granted certiorari in the following cases involv-

ing the construction and interpretation of the Tort Claims Act,

because of the importance of the question involved, or to determine

the proper application of its previous decisions to the question at

issue: Brooks v. U. S., 337 U. S. 49 (coverage of non-service in-

cident personal injury claim of soldier) ; U. S. v. Spelar, 338 U. S.

217 (coverage of claim arising at airbase in Newfoundland) ; U. S.

v. Aetna Cas. & S. Co., 338 U. S. 366 (coverage of claim of

subrogee) ; U. S. v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U. S. 543 (impleading

U. S. as a third party defendant) ; Dalehite v. U. S., 346 U. S. 15

(liability of government for discretionary acts); U. S. v. Gilman,

347 U. S. 507 (right of U. S. to recover indemnity from em-

ployee); U. S. v. Brown, 348 U. S. 110 (coverage of claim for

injury sustained by veteran in Veterans Hospital).

ee

gize this personal injury system of benefits to the Military

Personnel Claims Act of 1945, which provides certain

claim benefits to soldiers for service incident property

damage. In this connection, the Opinion states that this

latter Act is “more liberal, adequate and satisfactory than

any of its predecessor acts” (p. 7); that a Congressional

Report preceding the passage of the Act referred to it as

a “single” statute for the settlement of such claims (p. 7,

footnote 1); and that.this Act provides “a simple, certain

and uniform method of compensation for service incident

property damage” (p. 9). Having thus satisfied itself

that the analogy between the treatment of personal injury

and property damage claims is complete, the Opinion con-

cludes that the “rationale” of Feres is applicable here,

and that service incident property damage claims are not

cavered by the Tort Claims Act (p. 9).

B. The Holding of the Feres Case.

Because the Opinion is based entirely on its conclusion

that the “rationale” of Feres is valid here, it is important

to first examine Feres and the problem of statutory con-

struction there involved.

In reaching its conclusion in that case that Congress

did not intend the Tort Claims Act to cover service in-

cident persanal injury claims, this Court considered it

important to note the pre-Tort Claims Act treatment of

such claims. This disclosed that over the years Congress

had provided a comprehensive and liberal system of simple,

certain and uniform benefits applicable to all soldiers and

all service incident injuries, and with remedies provided

for the enforcement thereof; further, it was noted that

no federal law had ever recognized such claims, but on the

contrary the claims statutes applicable to civilians gener-

aalins

ally, excluded service incident personal injury claims of

military personnel.®

That the foregoing played a heavy part in the conclu-

sion reached is evidenced by the following excerpts from

the Feres opinion :*

“This Act, however, should be construed to fit, so

far as will comport with its words, into the entire

statutory system of remedies against the Government

to make a workable, consistent and equitable whole”

(p. 139).

“The primary purpose of the Act was to extend

a remedy to those who had been without; if it in-

cidentally benefited those already well provided for,

it appears to have been unintentional. Congress was

suffering from no plague of private bills on behalf

of military and naval personnel, because a compre-

hensive system of relief had been authorized for

them and their dependants by statute” (p. 140).

“We know of no American law which ever has

permitted a soldier to recover for negligence, against

either his superior officers or the government he is

serving” (p. 141).

“We find no parallel liability before and we think

no new one has been created by this Act. Its effect

is to waive immunity from recognized causes of ac-

snk for example, Military Claims Act of 1943, 31 USCA, sec.

(b).

In Dalehite v. U. S., 346 U. S. 15, 31-32, footnote 25, this Court

characterized the basis of its decision in the Feres case as follows:

“The existence of a uniform compensation system for in-

juries to those ing to the armed services led us to con-

clude that Congress not intended to depart from this sys-

~ and allow recovery by a tort action dependent on state

-_—

_

tion and was not to visit the Government with novel

and unprecedented liabilities” (p. 142).

“No Federal law recognizes a recovery such as

claimants seek. The Military Personnel Claims Act,

31 USCA sec. 223(b), FCA title 31, sec. 223(b)

(Now superseded by 28 USCA sec. 2672 [The Tort

Claims Act]) permitted recovery in some circum-

stances, but it specifically excluded claims of military

personnel ‘incident to their service.”°

“This court, in deciding claims for wrongs incident

to service under the Tort Claims Act, cannot escape

attributing some bearing upon it to enactments by

Congress which provided systems of simple, certain

and uniform compensation for injuries or death of

those in armed services. * * * If Congress had

contemplated that this Tort Act would be held to

apply in cases of this kind, it is difficult to see why

it should have omitted any provision to adjust these

two types of remedies to each other. The absence

of any such adjustment is persuasive that there was

no awareness that the Act might be interpreted to

permit recovery for injuries incident to military ser-

vice” (p. 144).

“The compensation system, which normally re-

quires no litigation, is not negligible or niggardly

* * *” (p. 145).

The reference to the Military Personnel Claims Act was inad-

vertent, as the citation is to the Military Claims Act, supra, to

which the Court was obviously referring. Likewise, the reference

to claims excluded by that act must be deemed to be to personal

injury claims, with which the Court was concerned, and not to

property damage claims. As will be pointed out hereafter, service

incident property damage claims were covered under the Military

Claims Act.

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C. The Statutory Treatment of and Administrative Con-

struction With Respect to Service Incident Property

Damage Claims; the Enactment of the Tort Claims Act.

1. Tue Mititrary Personnet Craims Act or May

29, 1945 (59 Stat. 225; now, as amended, 31 USCA,

sec. 222(c)).

Since 1849, Military Personnel Claims Acts have been

available to military personnel with respect to service

incident property damage claims." While each of these

acts has been broader than its predecessor, basically, each

was (and is) simply an act of grace reposing complete

discretion in the administrative department concerned to

allow or reject any claim in whole or in part (subject to

the exclusions and restrictions in the Act and Regula-

tions); and no remedy is provided in the event of a

rejected or reduced claim.

These exclusions and restrictions are numerous and

broad. The 1945 Act (31 USCA, sec. 222(c)) ex-

cludes coverage for property (as to kind or amount) that

is not considered to be reasonable, useful, necessary, or

proper under the attendant circumstances, or where the

loss occurs at quarters occupied by the claimant which are

not assigned to him or otherwise provided in kind by the

Government; and since 1952, no claim may be made in

excess of $2500.00. The Regulations adopted by the

Secretary of Defense pursuant to the Act (32 C. F. R.

836.92-836.95) further exclude recovery for loss or dam-

age to motor vehicles (except in special circumstances

which may be presented for “consideration”), expensive

Mili Personnel Claims Acts of 3/3/49 (9 Stat. + id (40

3/3/63 (12 Stat. 743); of 3/3/85 (23 Stat. 350); of 7 as

Stat. 880) ; of 3/4/21 (41 Stat. 1436) ; of 5/29/45 (59 Gee:

31 US sec. 222(c)).

= on

articles, unnecessary property, jewelry, money (except

limited amounts deposited for safekeeping), clothing being

worn, transportation and baggage losses not conform-

ing to government requirements as to weight, etc., and

losses which have been recovered or are recoverable from

an insurer.”

It is apparent that this Act and the restricted benefits

provided by it are in no sense analogous to the personal

injury statutes and benefits considered in the Feres case.

2. THe GENERAL CLaims Acts PRECEDING THE Tort

Craims Act.

Since 1912, with the exception of the 1943-45 period,

Congress has provided that service incident property dam-

age claims of military personnel were covered under the

claim statutes applicable to civilians generally, and were

not restricted to the limited benefits of the Military Per-

sonnel Claims Act.

a. The Gunfire Act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat. 586).

This was the first general claims act covering property

damage claims incident to noncombat activities of the

Army. It authorized the Secretary of War to consider

12The restricted coverage provided by this Act is illustrated by

the instant record. The sample claim attached to the Stipulation of

Facts [R. 18-20] shows that the soldier involved claimed he had

sustained a total property loss of $4857.49, of which $3200.00 was

covered by insurance and $1657.49 was uninsured. The insured

portion was not part of the claim because of the exclusion of in-

sured claims. The uninsured claim of $1657.49 was only allowed

in the sum of $852.25. Several of the trailers were damaged in

excess of $2500.00 [R. 7], and since 1952, no claim in excess of

that amount could be allowed, even if uninsured. And motor

vehicle damage could be allowed only because this occurrence was

classed as a public disaster [R. 36].

ee ae

and adjust “all claims” for damage to private property

not in excess of $1000 resulting from noncombat activ-

ities of the Army, with provision for Congress to appro-

priate the funds to pay allowed claims.

The Judge Advocate General of the Army ruled that

this act covered service incident property damage claims

of military personnel,“* and Congress appropriated the

funds over the years to pay such claims.

b. The Small Tort Claims Act of December 28, 1922

(42 Stat. 1066).

This was the first general tort claims act. It author-

ized department heads to consider and adjust “any claim”

for negligent damage to “privately owned property” up

to $1000 caused by the negligence of government em-

ployees. Allowed claims were certified to Congress for

payment; and claims over $1000 required a special Con-

gressional bill in order to be paid.

Again, the Judge Advocate General of the Army ruled

that this act covered service incident property damage

claims of military personnel,’* and Congress appropriated

the funds over the years to pay such claims.

Digest of Opinions, Judge Advocate General of the Army,

1912-1940, p. 449, sec. 709. For the convenience of the Court,

Judge Advocate General opinions referred to in this Petition are

Teproduced in Appendix “B” hereto. This particular opinion will

be found at para. 1, p. 17, App. “B.”

“Digest of Opinions, Judge Advocate General of the Army,

1912-40, p. 456, sec. 713.

(For this opinion, see para. 2(a), p. 18, App. “B”.)

1Bull. JAG 331. The reference is to Bulletins, Judge Advocate

General of the Army.)

(For this opinion, see para. 2(b), p. 18, App. “B”.)

elite

c. The Military Claims Act of July 3, 1943 (57 Stat.

372; now, as amended, 31 USCA, sec. 223(b)).

This Act, when enacted, authorized the Secretary of

War to consider and pay “any claim” for personal injury

or property damage (negligent or non-negligent), subject

to Regulations prescribed by him, caused by military

personnel and arising out of noncombat activities of the

War Department” not exceeding $500" in amount, with

provision for claims’ over that amount to be reported by

the Secretary of War to Congress for its consideration.

Section 1 excluded from its coverage “claims for dam-

age to or loss or destruction of property of military per-

sonnel or civilian employees of the War Department or of

the Army, or for personal injury or death of such per-

sons, if such damage, loss, destruction, injury or death

occurs incident to their service.”

Since this Act covered both negligence and non-negli-

gence claims against the Army, section 4 provided that the

Small Tort Claims Act of 1922, supra, was thereafter

inapplicable to the War Department, and that the Gunfire

Act of 1912, supra, was repealed.

As a result, service incident property damage claims

were thereafter (until 1945) covered only under the Mil-

itary Personnel Claims Act.

In 1945, Congress amended the Military Claims Act of

1943 so as to provide for the inclusion thereunder of

service incident property damage claims of military per-

sonnel. This amendment was contained in section 4 of the

15Jn 1945 (59 Stat. 662) this act was extended to include the

Navy Department. (See 31 USCA, sec. 223(d)).

16Jy 1946, this amount was increased to $1000 (60 Stat. 332).

—15—

Military Personnel Claims Act of 1945, supra, which pro-

vided as follows:

“Sec. 4. That portion of section 1 of the Act of

July 3, 1943 (Military Claims Act) reading as fol-

lows: ‘The provisions of this Act shall not be appli-

cable * * * to claims for damage to or loss or

destruction of property of military personnel or civil-

ian employees of the War Department or of the

Army, or for personal injury or death of such per-

sons, if such damage, loss, destruction, injury or

death occurs incident to their service’ is hereby

amended * * * to read as follows: ‘The provi-

sions of this Act shall not be applicable * * * to

claims for personal injury or death of military per-

sonnel or civilian employees of the War Department

or of the Army if such injury or death occurs inci-

dent to their service.’

11In footnote (1) of its Opinion (pp. 7-8), the Court of Appeals

quotes at length from House and Senate Reports on the 1945 Mili-

tary Personnel Claims Act which contain language indicating that

said Act was intended to provide a “single” remedy for service in-

cident property damage claims, This language appears to have been

responsible for the erroneous conclusion of the District Judge that

the Military Personnel Claims Act was the exclusive remedy for

such claims. By including this reference in its Opinion and by

other statements contained therein, it appears that the Court of

Appeals fell into the same error. In this connection it should be

noted that to House Report 237 (quoted in said footnote (1)),

there were attached letters from the Judge Advocate General and

the Secretary of War.(who apparently drafted the 1945 Act) in

which they point out that the 1945 amendment (sec. 4, supra) was

intended to restore to military personnel, service incident property

damage claim rights that had been taken away by the 1943 Military

Claims Act (and which deprivation had resulted in damage to troop

morale), by amending the Military Claims Act of 1943 so that it

would thereafter cover such claims. In any event, the 1945 amend-

ment itself is unambiguous and does so provide, and the inadvertent

use of the word “single” in said Reports can be of no significance.

piel

Thereafter, the Judge Advocate General of the Army

ruled that the Military Claims Act of 1943 covered serv-

ice incident property damage claims,’* and such claims

were paid by funds appropriated by the Congress.

(3) Tue Feperat Tort Crarms Act or 1946 (60 Stat.

842, amended by 62 Stat. 933, 982-4, 63 Stat. 62,

101, 106-7, 444; now 28 USCA secs. 1346, 2671-

2680).

In 1946, the same (79th) Congress that enacted the

Military Personnel Claims Act of 1945, enacted the Fed-

eral Tort Claims Act. Section 2672 of the Act provides

for administrative settlement of claims not exceeding

$1,000:

“Sec. 2672. The head of each federal agency may

consider, ascertain, adjust, determine, and settle any

claim for money damages of $1,000 or less against

the United States * * * for injury or loss of

property or personal injury or death caused by the

negligent or wrongful act or omission of any em-

ployee of the Government while acting within the

scope of his office or employment, under circumstances

where the United States, if a private person, would

be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law

of the place where the act or omission occurred. * * *”

Section 1346(b) of the Act provides that suit may be

brought against the Government in the District Court on

all such claims, whether for more or less than $1,000.

184 Bull. JAG 287.

(For this opinion, see para. 3(a), p. 19, App. “B”.)

5 Bull. JAG 68.

(For this opinion, see para. 3(b), p. 20, App. “B”.)

cesiliiies

Section 424(a)" of the Act provided that all statutes

which authorized the administrative adjustment of claims

for property damage and personal injury due to the negli-

gence of government employees “are hereby repealed in

respect of claims cognizable” under the Act, and the Mili-

tary Claims Act of 1943 was specifically mentioned as

one of the statutes so repealed pro tanto. The net effect

of this repeal was to leave the latter act in force as to

non-negligence claims, and to transfer negligence claims

(both under and over $1,000) previously cognizable under

that act to the Tort Claims Act.”

Since the passage of the Tort Claims Act, the Judge

Advocates General of the services have ruled that service

incident property damage claims of military personnel are

covered under the Tort Claims Act as well as the other.

two acts.” And Congress has undoubtedly appropriated

the funds for payment of such claims.

The reference is to 60 Stat. 846, as this section of the Act has

never been codified.

°To this effect, see Historical Note entitled “Repeals” following

31 USCA, sec. 223(b) (Military Claims Act of 1943).

This repeal of the Military Claims Act by the Tort Claims Act

was noted by this Court in the Feres case (p. 144):

“The Military * * * Claims Act * * * (now super-

seded by 28 U.S.C.A. sec. 2672) * * *”

211 Dig. Ops., Claims, sec. 95.7, p. 71. (The reference is to

ao “§ Opinions of the Judge Advocates General of the Armed

orces.

(For this opinion, see para. 4(a), pp. 20-21, App. “B”.)

1 Dig. Ops., Claims, sec. 95.5, p. 70.

(For this opinion, see para. 4(b), pp. 21-23, App. “B”.)

2. Dig. Ops., Claims, sec. 93.9, p. 63.

(For this opinion, see para. 4(c), pp. 23-24, App. “B”.)

on

(4) Tue Tort Craims Act Covers Service INCIDENT

Property Damace Cxiaims; Ferss v. U. S. Is Nor

TO THE CONTRARY.

In light of the foregoing, it is submitted that the only

reasonable conclusion is that in enacting the Tort Claims

Act, Congress imtended that service incident property

damage claims were to be covered thereunder.

Property damage claims of military personnel, both

service incident and non-service incident, and negligent

and non-negligent, arising out of noncombat activities of

the Air Force, were covered by the Military Claims Act

of 1943 prior to enactment of the Tort Claims Act.”

That act provided for administrative handling of claims

not in excess of $1,000, and for a Congressional bill if

over $1,000. The Military Claims Act was superseded

(as to negligence claims) by the Tort Claims Act. The

two statutes contain almost identical language as to claims

covered: “any claim against the United States * * *

for damage to or loss or destruction of property” (Mili-

tary Claims Act); “any claim against the United States

for myury or loss of property” (Tort Claims Act). The

superseding of the Military Claims Act by the Tort Claims

Act was in general language and it would be a strained

construction to hold that what Congress meant thereby

was that all negligence claims covered by the Military

Claims Act, except service incident property damage

claims of military personnel, were transferred to the Tort

22The claims here sued upon would have been so covered, since

they arose out of allegedly negligent noncombat activities of the

Air Force, and claims of subrogees were not excluded from cov-

erage under the Military Claims Act (32 C. F. R. 536.22).

canine

Claims Act.” And this conclusion finds confirmation in

the long standing Congressional policy that accorded mili-

tary personnel the same claim rights as civilians with re-

spect to such claims.

In the Feres case, with respect to service incident per-

sonal injury claims, this Court made the following sig-

nificant statements, some of which were quoted in U. S.

v. Brown, supra, 348 U. S. 110:

“We know of no American law which ever has per-

mitted a soldier to recover for negligence, against

either his superior officers or the government he is

serving (p. 141). * * * We find no parallel

liability before and we think no new one has been

created by this Act. Its effect is to waive immunity

from recognized causes of action and was not to visit

the Government with novel and unprecedented lia-

bilities (p. 142). * * * No federal law recog-

nizes a recovery such as claimants seek. The Mili-

tary * * * Claims Act, 31 USCA sec. 223(b)

* ¥* * (now superseded by 28 USCA sec. 2672),

permitted recovery in some circumstances, but it spe-

cifically excluded claims of military personnel ‘inci-

dent to their service’ (p. 144).”

While this language correctly describes the situation

with respect to service incident personal injuries, it is ap-

parent that precisely the opposite situation exists with

respect to service incident property damage claims. The

very Military Claims Act of 1943 referred to in the Feres

**For a case analyzing this superseding of the Military Claims

Act by the Tort Claims Act in an analogous situation and holding

that latter “must therefore be construed in the light of the law

which it supplanted”, see Samson v. U. S. (S. D., N. Y.), 79 Fed.

Supp. 406. ;

—20—

case (and prior federal claims statutes) covered service

incident property damage claims of military personnel.

So that as to such claims, in the language of Feres, there

was a “federal law (which) recognizes a recovery such

as claimants seek”; therefore, to hold that the Tort Claims

Act covers such claims is “not to visit the Government

with novel and unprecedented liabilities.”

The foregoing finds confirmation in this Court’s analy-

sis of the Tort Claims Act in U. S. v. Yellow Cab Co.,

340 U. S. 543, 548-9, where this Court stated:

“The words ‘any claim against the United States

_ . . om account of personal injury’ (emphasis sup-

plied) are broad words in common usage. They are

not words of art. * * *

This Act does not subject the Government to a

previously unrecognized type of obligation. Through

hundreds of private relief acts, each Congress for

many years has recognized the Government’s obliga-

tion to pay claims on account of damage to or loss

of property or on account of personal injury or death

caused by negligent or wrongful acts of employees of

the Government. This Act merely substitutes the

District Courts for Congress as the agency to de-

termine the validity and amount of the claims. It

suggests no reason for reading into it fine distinctions

between various types of such claims.”

In light of the admimistrative and Congressional bill cov-

erage of service incident property damage claims by the

Military Claims Act, to hold that such claims are covered

by the Tort Claims Act “does not subject the Govern-

ment to a previously unrecognized type of obligation.”

Moreover, the administrative construction under the

Tort Claims Act and under the claims statutes it super-

—

seded that service incident property damage claims were

covered thereunder, coupled with Congressional confirma-

tion and ratification of such construction by appropria-

tion of funds for payment of such claims, is entitled to

the greatest weight in determining the Congressional in-

tent with respect to this issue. To this effect, see:

Fleming v. Mohawk Co., 331 U. S. 111, 116;

U. S. v. Jackson, 280 U. S. 183, 193;

Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U. S. 542, 552-3;

U. S. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., supra, 338 U. S.

366, 376-7;

Employers’ Fire Ins. Co. v. U. S. (C. A. 9), 167

F. 2d 655, 657.

The Court of Appeals in its disposition of this case has

simply refused to consider or discuss this important prob-

lem of statutory construction and background, although

the same was fully presented in petitioners’ briefs. In this

connection, the Opinion does no more than cite the prior

claims statutes, and then summarily dismiss them as im-

material because they did not contain a suit provision, and

hence created no “liability” on the government (Op. pp.

8-9).

But, for the reasons heretofore noted, this cannot be

an adequate or tenable treatment of this issue. The cov-

erage of service incident property damage claims by the

administrative and Congressional bill provisions of the

Military Claims Act and prior acts was a recognition of

“a recovery such as claimants seek” and of the Govern-

ment’s “obligation” to pay such claims. Since it was con-

sidered material that these prior claims statutes excluded

service incident personal injury claims, as pointed out

in the Feres case supra, (p. 144), such statutes may not

wna

now be dismissed as immaterial where it is shown they

covered service incident property damage claims simply

because they did not permit suit. Moreover, no one could

sue the government for negligence before adoption of the

Tort Claims Act; therefore, the absence of a previous

right to sue cannot be relevant to a determination of

whether a particular group of claimants are covered under

the Act. For example, in determining whether subrogees

were intended to be covered by the Act, it has been held

material that their claims had been held to be covered

under these same prior claims statutes (See U. S. v.

Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., supra, 338 U. S. 366, 376-377).

We are aware that in Feres, this Court was influenced

in part by its conclusion that suits for service incident

personal injury claims might have an adverse effect on

military discipline, having in mind the relation of the

soldier to his superiors (U. S. v. Brown, 348 U. S. 110).

But this ground of the decision cannot be isolated from

the problem of statutory construction and statutory back-

ground that was there presented. In Feres, this court did

not purport to substitute its judgment for that of Con-

gress as to whether soldiers should be permitted to sue the

government for service incident personal injuries; its

only purpose was to arrive at the Congressional intent. As

has been noted, in arriving at such intent an analysis of

the pre-Tort Claims Act treatment of such claims was

necessarily of prime significance. In the light of such

statutory background, to have there held that the Tort

Claims Act covered such personal injury claims would

have ‘been to attribute to Congress a completely unex-

nein

pressed intent to provide an entirely new and additional

remedy, in a situation where there was no need therefor.

Moreover, the Feres decision resulted in no restriction

whatsoever of existing service incident personal injury

claim benefits.

But it is a far cry from this situation to hold, as the

Court of Appeals does, that soldiers are to now be re-

stricted to the iimited benefits of the Military Personnel

Claims Act for service incident property damage,™* and

deprived of claim rights that have been accorded them

under the Tort Claims Act, because that Court concluded

that the benefits provided by the Military Personnel Claims

Act are sufficient and because such a conclusion may avoid

“serious disruption of military mission” (Op. p. 9).

It is submitted that to apply Feres to property damage

claims is a distortion of the holding in that case that here

results in a substantial restriction of the claim rights of

**A similar conclusion was reached by the Court of Appeals for

the Fifth Circuit in Zoula v. U. S., 217 F. 2d 81. In that

case, it was held that service incident property damage claims

were excluded from coverage under the Tort Claims Act upon

the following grounds (1) a citation of the District Court Opinion

herein, (2) an approval and adoption of the argument of the gov-

ernment (made on appeal in both the Zoula case and the instant

cases) that “the complete and comprehensive system of administra-

tive compensation” provided by the Military Personnel Claims Act

“precludes resort by members of the armed services to the Tort

ims Act for a | property damage”; and (3) a strong intima-

tion that the Feres case really overruled the Brooks case wherein

it had been held that non-service incident personal injury claims

of military personnel were covered by the Tort Clairns Act. But

in U. S. v. Brown, supra, 348 U. S. 110, this Court held directly

contrary to points (2) and (3) and it would therefore that

the Zoula case is entitled to no weight. However, it adds to the

confusion surrounding the problem involved here, which should be

cleared up by this Court.

266

military, persennel,,, and: substitutes:.a.. judicial: opinion: of:

what.the law.should. be in.place.of what: Congress ‘has said.

it should be. Congress, in the exercise: of - its. powers,:

and no doubt because. of the many different factors. in-

volved, has seen fit over the years to treat service incident

personal injury and property damage claims in a completely

different. manner, and-it:is: not 'the :province of any court

to.interfere-.with..such-:policy.

Moreover; aetual- experience: has shown that, while-per-

miitting .claimis:for-service -incident personal injury claims:

under the:-Tort-Claims Act might: well: pose:serious prob--

lems with respect to.military discipline, this. has not proven.

to be so .with respect to service incident property damage.

claims, no doubt because of the different factors involved..

From 1946 to at least 1953 (when the District Judge an-

nounced his decision herein); the Tort Claims Act, as

noted:above;:has: been construed :to«inchide ‘service incident

property s damage:. claims,:, and this: period. included: the:

Korean.conflict.. And there has. been:.no indication from.

any source that such coverage had any adverse effect on.

military discipline or efficiency; on the contrary, were

soldiérsto. go uncompensated” for~ service incidént * prop-

erty, -damage::losses.resulting;: from:the-negligence: of thes

government;.an-adverse “efféct “on “morale could “be antici-:

pated :(see: Footnote 1}: Op. pp7+8).

—25s--

ITI,

The: Property’ Damage’ Claims: Hére Involved Were’

NotService: Incident:

A: The’Tést-Applied*by the Court of Appeals to Property

Damage: Claims’ Was: Improper’ and’ Contrary to~ the:

Ruté:of! the: Feres ‘and: Brooks Cases.’

The Opinion holds that damage to property must be

held to be service incident where, at the time of damage,

the property is located on a military base solely, because .

of the military service of the owner, and where. the .dam-

age results from.some military operation (Op. pp, 12-13),

It is..submitted.that .this test. is::contrary. to: a» proper-

application.-of ‘the: rule of. the: Feres and..Brooks:cases to

property damage losses; contrary to. administrative -con+-

struction,. and .results:in unjustly restricting: clain» rights:

of military personnel.for property damage icsses::

Inthe Feres case; this Court ‘held ‘that the Brook} ‘case’

announced the rulé-that ‘where'a soldier was injured while:

on’ furlough or léave, “tindéer’*compulsionm*of no ordérs’or~

duty and on no military~ mission,” ‘his’ injury’ was’ not’

service .incident; and was covered under: the:Tort :Cldizns

Act.

**It has been held that in determining whether a personal_in-

jury is service incident as regards the Tort Claims the -de-

ining factor ‘is the-status of the ‘soldier at the time ‘of ‘the-in-

jury, not the locale or source of the injury (¢.g. whether on~

ee or while: using) a government: facility, while «off

uty):

Brown v.U. S. (S.D., W. Va.), 99 Fed.. Supp, 685.-(sailor

on liberty pass killed while «swimming: in= pool on >navy.

base, held, not service incident) ;

Samson-v. U.'S: (S. D., N. Y.),. supra, 79 -Fed. Supp. 406

(soldier, off oor. injured while riding as a passenger

incarmty ‘bus: on ‘the base, held; not ‘service: incident) ;

Herring v. U. S. (Colo.), 98 Fed. Supp. 69.

x

Consistent with the foregoing, the Judge Advocates

General of the services have ruled as to property damage

claims of military personnel presented under these various

claim statutes, including the Tort Claims Act, that where

property of a soldier is damaged while located in a govern-

ment facility on a base, the damage is not incident to

service where the facility is being used by the soldier vol-

untarily for his own convenience, and not pursuant to

military orders. For example, the following losses were

held to be not incident to service: Army officer’s car

parked in a base parking lot where it was struck by an

Army truck”; soldier, off duty, was driving his car

on a base road, when it was struck by an Army truck”;

Air Force personnel sent clothes to Air Force laundry

where clothes were lost*; airman went swimming in base

pool and checked his watch in Air Force checkroom where

it was lost.” On the other hand, where an Army officer

was driving his car off the base, on a change of station

pursuant to orders authorizing travel by private convey-

ance, and the car was struck by an Army truck, the

damage was held to be incident to service.”

Likewise consistent with the foregoing is Lund v.

U. S. (Mass.) 104 Fed. Supp. 756 (cited in the

Opinion with disapproval, p. 13) where recovery was per-

262 Bull JAG, 274-275. (For this opinion, see para. 5(a), pp.

24-25, App. “B”).

274 Bull. JAG, 62. (For this opinion, see para. 5(b), p. 25,

App. “B”).

281 Dig. Ops., Claims, sec. 94.3, pp. 65-66. (For this opinion, see

para. 5/c), pp. 25-27, App. a it

2 Dig. Ops., Claims, sec. 94.1, p. 64. (For this opinion, see

para. 5(d), pp. 27-28, App. “B”).

“B") Bull. JAG, 287. (For this opinion, see para. 5(e), p. 29, App.

se

mitted under the Tort Claims Act for damage to a naval

officer’s automobile caused by a naval plane, while the

car was voluntarily parked in a base parking lot.

It is submitted that the foregoing establish that the

correct rule as to property damage is that such damage

is not incident to service, where, at the time of damage,

the property is located in a government facility which the

soldier is making use of voluntarily for his own conven-

ience, and not pursuant to any military orders or while

on a military mission.

The rule announced by the Opinion would result in

making any property damage loss occurring on a base inci-

dent to service, since a soldier’s property would always

be “located on a military base solely by virtue of the active

military service of the owner” and the entire area of

every military base is “absolutely subject to military con-

trol and discipline.” (Op. pp. 12-13.)

The right of a soldier to recover under the Tort Claims

Act for property damaged by the negligence of the gov-

ernment should not be made to depend upon the wholly

fortuitous circumstance of whether his property happens

to be on or off the base at the moment of damage. For

example, under the rule announced by the Opinion, if a

soldier voluntarily parked his car in a base parking

lot and an Army truck negligently ran into it, the soldier

must go uncompensated for the damage;” whereas, if

the car were parked a few feet away but outside the base

limits, and the same accident occurred, the soldier could

make claim for the damage under the Tort Claims Act.

*tAccording to the Opinion, he could not claim under the Tort

Claims Act since the loss would be service incident; and, as noted

above, motor vehicle damage such as this is excluded from cover-

age under the Military Personnel Claims Act.

oiilitiee

It is submitted that both claims (and the claims in the

instant cases) should be held to be not service incident,

since the use of the parking lot (here, the trailer park)

was voluntary and for the convenience of the personnel,

and not pursuant to any military orders or in connection

with any military mission.

B. The Administrative Allowance of the Uninsured Claims

Under the Military Personnel Claims Act Is Not Here

Controlling.

The Opinion holds that the administrative allowance of

the uninsured claims of the soldiers under the Military

Personnel Claims Act is conclusive that the damage was

service incident, for the purpose of these suits brought

under the Tort Claims Act, because the same accident and

personnel were involved; and because the Military Person-

nel Claims Act provides that any “administrative deter-

mination” thereunder is final and conclusive for all pur-

poses; and also because in the Feres case this Court an-

nounced “the principle of the exclusive character of fed-

eral plans for compensation.” (Op. pp. 10-12.)

None of these grounds are tenable because—

(1) The two statutes are completely independent and

an administrative determination under the Military Per-

sonnel Claims Act cannot serve to deprive the District

Court of the power to exercise its independent judgment

as to whether these claims are, in fact, service incident;

furthermore, at the time of such administrative determin-

ation the insurance companies were the owners of the

subrogated claims, and to deprive them of any right to be

heard with respect to this issue would be in violation of

the most elemental concept of due process.

(2) The Military Personnel Claims Act merely pro-

vides that the “settlement” (and not the administrative

—29—

determination of service incidence, as stated in the Opin-

ion) is final and conclusive.

(3) The “principle of the exclusive character of fed-

eral plans for compensation,” while applicable to some

types of compensation statutes, is not here applicable in

view of the express provision by Congress that the

Military Personnel Claims Act was not the exclusive

remedy for service incident property damage claims. (And

see U. S. v. Brown, supra, 348 U. S. 110.)

Conclusion.

The questions of construction and coverage of the Tort

Claims Act involved in these cases are of manifest im-

portance. The Feres case dealt with a materially differ-

ent problem, and to apply the rule of that case to property

damage claims unquestionably results in a substantial

restriction of claim rights of military personnel. It is

respectfully submitted that the resolving of these questions

is of such importance that it should receive the considera-

tion and decision of this Court. The petition for writs

of certiorari should be granted.

Los Angeles, California.

July 8, 1955.

Respectfully submitted,

Witiiam H. Levit,

Attorney for Petitioners.

ALFRED W. NEWMAN,

Rosert T. CRESSWELL,

Hans A. KrvuGeEr,

Grorce W. Murpry,

Of Counsel,

APPENDIX A.

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit.

4 United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Preferred Insurance Company, a Corporation; Michi-

gan Surety Company, a Corporation; Midstates Insur-

ance Company, a Corporation; and The Mercantile In-

surance Company of America, a Corporation, appellants,

vs. United States of America, appellee. No. 13,889.*

May 9, 1955.

Appeal from the United States District Court, North-

ern District of California, Southern Division.

Before: Heaty and Bong, Circuit Judges, and Botonr,

District Judge.

Botpt, District Judge.

q Appellee’s motion to dismiss Appellants’ complaints for

- lack of jurisdiction was heard and considered on the al-

' legations of the complaints, an affidavit supporting the

motion and a written stipulation of facts. The motion

was granted and these appeals are from the judgments

of dismissal.

At 10:00 p.m. on August 5, 1950, an Air Force B-29

_ airplane crashed at the Fairfield-Suisun Air Force Base

_ in California a few seconds after takeoff. The plane ex-

_ ploded near a trailer park on the Base extensively dam-

_ aging 17 trailers and property therein owned and used

for residence by enlisted men and officers in active duty

_ status and assigned to the Base at the time. Appellant

_ insurers in the several cases consolidated on this appeal,

*Consolidated on appeal with Nos. 14001 to 14005, inclusive.

eile

pursuant to the terms of insurance policies issued to the

owners of the trailers, paid them a total of $49,661 for

the damage to the trailers. The insureds had no un-

insured losses with respect to the fully insured trailers;

however, other property damage was suffered by the in-

sureds as a result of the same crash for which claims

were submitted to the Air Force under the Military Per-

sonnel Claims Act of 1945, 31 U.S.C. 222c and paid, ex-

cept for the property covered by insurance as provided by

regulations under the Act.

The complaints, praying recovery against the United

States in the amount referred to and asserting jurisdic-

tion in the federal district court under the Federal Tort

Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, alleged that the crash re-

sulted from negligent maintenance and operation of the

plane and that by payment of the insurance policy claims

the insurers became subrogated to the rights of their re-

spective insureds to the extent of the payments.

The stipulation of facts shows: The trailers were the

private property of the servicemen and the government

had no interest therein. There were not sufficient public

quarters on the Base to house the personnel assigned to

the Base and in the surrounding area there was a criti-

cal housing shortage. The owners of the trailers were

free to live off the Base and could leave it on the same

basis as other personnel, but for the convenience and

accommodation of personnel and for the :mutual benefit

of personnel and the Air Force the trailer park on the

Base was establishe?. The trailer park was not rey:iired

in the operation of the Base, no one was required to use

it and those who did so made voluntary application at

their discretion for permission to park their trailers there-

in. Personnel using the park were required to pay rental

anes

to the government for the space assigned and also to pay

for ultilities furnished. The servicemen using the trailer

park were entitled to and drew regular quarters allow-

ance paid to personnel not furnished government quar-

ters and who lived off the Base. The owners of the dam-

aged trailers had no duties whatever with respect to the

maintenance, servicing, loading, operation, dispatch or

control of the plane which crashed. At the time of the

crash the owners of the trailers, while in active duty

status and assigned to the Base, were variously located

both on and off duty in the trailer park, at other places

on the Base, in neighboring communities and at other

military installations in the United States and overseas.

The stipulation further shows: Detailed procedures

controlling the operation and maintenance of the trailer

park within the confines of the Base were prescribed in

a Base regulation. Only Air Force persornel and their

families assigned to the Base were allowed to use the

trailer park facilities. Specific assignments and termi-

nation of trailer space were made by the Base billeting

officer. Assignment of trailer park space automatically

terminated when the Base ceased to be the permanent

station of the individual concerned. The trailer park

was operated as a nonprofit activity, with occupants

charged a monthly fee determined by the billeting officer

and a council of park occupants appointed by the Base

commander. Repairs and removal of government prop-

erty could be made by Air Force installation personnel

only. The trailer park area was under military protec-

tion and subject to the jurisdiction of military police.

Each of the damaged trailers had been permanently placed

in position by jacks or other means for the duration ot

the owner’s permanent assignment to the Base,

—4—

In the District Court opinion, 111 Fed. Sup. 899, .it

was held that the property damage sustained by appellants’

insureds was incident to their military service within the

meaning of the Military Personnel Claims Act; that claim

under .said Act .is the exclusive remedy of a ‘serviceman

for service incident property damage; and that -neither

servicemen -nor their insurers by subrogation have-a:right

of action under the Federal Tort ‘Claims Act for property

damage so sustained, The two general questions pre-

sented on this appeal are: (1) Can one in active mili-

tary duty status maintain a claim against the United

States under the Tort Claims Act for property damage

accurring incident to military service? (2) ‘Was the

property damage for which subrogation recovery is

sought in the present cases incident to the service of

appellants’ insureds?

In Brooks v. U. S.,.337 U. S. 49 (1949) the Supreme

Court held that a serviceman injured while on leave and

away from his duty station by the negligent operation

of an army truck driven by a civilian employee could

maintain an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act.

Thereafter in Feres v. U. S., 340 U.S. 135 (1950) the

Court held:

“We conclude that the Government is not liable un-

der the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to

servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in

the course of activity incident to service.” p. 146.

In Johansen y. U. S., 343 U. S. 427, 440 (1952) the

“This Court accepted the principle of the exclusive

character of federal plans for compensation in Feres

v. United States, 340 U. S. 135. Seeking so to apply

the Tort Claims Act to soldiers on active duty as |

~

‘to make a workable, consistent and equitable whole.’

p. 139, we gave weight to the character of the fed-

eral ‘systems of simple, certain, and uniform com-

pensation for injuries or death of those in armed

services.’” p. 144.

Recently both Feres and Brooks have been approved

in U. S. v. Brown, 348 U. S. 110, 112 (Dec. 1954) :

“The Feres decision did not disapprove of the Brooks

case. It merely distinguished it, holding that the

Tort Claims Act does not cover ‘injuries to service-

men where the injuries arise out of or are in the

course of activity incident to service. 340 U. S.

135, 146. The peculiar and special relationship of

the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the main-

tenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme

results that might obtain if suits under the Tort

Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given

or negligent acts committed in the course of mili-

tary duty, led the Court to read that Act as exclud-

ing claims of that character. . . . We adhere

also to the line drawn in the Feres case between in-

juries that did and injuries that did not arise out

of or in the course of military duty.”

Since the rule of Feres denying action under the Tort

Act for service incident personal injuries has been so

emphatically reaffirmed, whether the same rule applies

to service incident property damage claims will depend

on whether or not the rationale of the Feres decision is

valid as to such claims.

The Feres opinion, after pointing out considerations

persuasive of liability under the language of the Tort

Act, the inadequacy of legislative history and the un-

/

—

certainty or confusion created by the legislation, stated:

“Under these circumstances, no conclusion can be above

challenge, but if we misinterpret the Act, at least Con-

gress possesses a ready remedy.” p. 138. The decision

was unanimous and in the more than four years since it

was rendered Congress has not amended the Tort Claims

Act. Accordingly, the opinion must be accepted as dis-

pelling any doubt as to congressional intent in the adop-

tion of the Act. The four general considerations cited

in the opinion as supporting the decision are indicated

by the following quotations:

(1) “This Act, however, should be construed to

fit, so far as will comport with its words, ito the

entire statutory system of remedies against the Gov-

ernment to make a workable, consistent and equi-

table whole.” p. 139.

(2) “The primary purpose of the Act was to

extend a remedy to those who had been without; if

it incidentally benefited those already well provided

for, it appears to have been unintentional. Congress

was suffering from no plague of private bills on the

behalf of military and naval personnel, because a

comprehensive system of relief had been authorized

for them and their dependents by statute.” p. 140.

(3) “One obvious shortcoming im these claims

is that plaintiffs can point to no liability of a ‘private

individual even remotely analogous to that which

they are asserting against the United States. We

know of no American law which ever has permitted

a soldier to recover for negligence, against either

his superior officers or the Government he is serv-

ing.” p. 141,

sini

(4) “This Court, in deciding claims for wrongs

incident to service under the Tort Claims Act, can-

not escape attributing some beariig upon it to en-

actments by Congress which provide systems of sim-

ple, certain, and uniform compensation for injuries

or death of those in armed services.” p. 144.

Each of these considerations is as applicable to property

damage incident to service as to personal injury incident

to service.

The Military Personnel Claims Act of 1945, 59 Stat.

225, is a part of the statutory system of remedies against

the government adopted by Congress. The Act provides

a remedy for personal property loss or damage by service

personnel sustained incident to their service, which is con-

siderably more liberal, adequate and satisfactory than any

of its predecessor acts over a period of many years."

1The House and Senate Committees on Claims, reporting favor-

ably on the bill which became the Act, stated:

“The purpose of the proposed legislation is to provide a single,

clear, definite, and workable statute for the settlement of claims of

military personnel and civilian employees of the War Department

or of the Army for the loss of their personal property incurred

while in the service and to repeal certain statutes which have been

found to be obsolete or unworkable and not appropriate to present

conditions.” (H. Rept. 237, 79th Cong., Ist Sess., p. 1; S. Rept.

ns Fey Cong., Ist Sess., p. 2; see 91 Cong. Rec. 1540, 3990,

As noted by the court below, the 1945 Act completed the original

plan for consolidation into three separate statutes of all of the

statutory settlement provisions affecting the Armed Forces. H.

Rept. 237, 79th Cong., Ist Sess., p. 3; S. Rept. 276, 79th Cong.,

Ist Sess., p. 3. The first two statutes, the Foreign Claims Act

(57 Stat. 666) and the Military Claims Act (57 Stat. 374), were

enacted in 1943. In referring to these two statutes and the need

for enacting H. Rept. 2068 as the third and final statute, Secretary

of War Patterson pointed out (H. Rept. 237, 79th Cong., Ist Sess.,

p. 4):

“By the passage of the act of April 22, 1943 (57 Stat. 66),

commonly referred to as the Foreign Claims Act, the Congress

silent

While the legislation preceding the Military Personnel

Claims Act provided compensation for service incident

property damage, not any of the previous acts created a

right of action in the serviceman or liability on the gov-

ernment even for damage caused by negligence of a gov-

ernment agent or employee.? Payment of claims under

made available to the War Department a thoroughly satisfactory

and workable basis for the settlement of claims for damages

caused by our armed forces in foreign countries.

“The next forward step came with the passage of the act of

July 3, 1943, which consolidated all then existing statutory pro-

visions for the administrative settlement of claims other than claims

under the Foreign Claims Act and claims of War Department and

2Fhe Military Personnel Claims Act of March 3, 1885, 23 Stat.

Tort Claims Act of December 28, 1922,

The Military Claims Act of July 3, 1943, 57

vnliin

all of the property claim acts has been a matter not of

right but of grace resting in administrative discretion.

None of the acts provided for judicial review of findings

or action on claims. There never has been and is not now

any act of Congress, unless it be the Tort Claims Act,

authorizing a serviceman in active duty status to sue the

government for service incident property damage, how-

ever inflicted.

As appears from the allowance and payment of claims

under the Military Personnel Claims Act by appellants’

insureds in these very cases, Congress has provided a

simple, certain and uniform method of compensation for

service incident property damage. This system avoids

the serious disruption of military mission and discipline

that well might follow civil litigation based on such claims.

We consider every essential element on which the Feres

rule was based fully applicable to service incident property

damage claims and therefore hold that Congress did not

intend a serviceman in active duty status to have a right

of action against the government under the Tort Claims

Act for property damage occurring incident to his mili-

tary service.

An insurer may sue under the Tort Claims Act upon

a claim to which it has become subrogated by payment of

a claim to an insured who would have been able to bring

such action. U. S. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338

U. S. 366. However, “one who rests on subrogation

stands in the place of one whose ciaim he has paid” and

“it is elementary that one cannot acquire by subrogation

what another whose rights he claims did not have.” U. S.

v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U. S. 234, 242. In the light

of these principles we now consider whether the damage

to the trailers of appellants’ insureds under the particu-

—10—

lar circumstances of these cases was sustained incident

to the military service of the insured.

Under the Military Personnel Claims Act, 59 Stat. 225,

the Secretary of the Air Force and those officers desig-

nated by him for the purpose are authorized to “consider,

_ . . determine, . . . and pay any claim not in ex-

cess of '$2;500 against the United States, . . . of mili-

tary personnel . . . when . . . the property [is]

determined to be reasonable, useful, necessary, or proper

under the attendant circumstances, . . . for damage

to or loss, . . . of personal property occurring inci-

dent to their service, . . . Provided, That the damage

to or loss, . . . of property . . . shall not have

occurred at quarters occupied by the claimant within the

continental United States (excluding Alaska) which are

not assigned to him or otherwise provided in kind by the

Government.” There is no definition of “incident to serv-

ice” in the Act or in the Air Force regulations authorized

by the Act but the regulations list a variety of examples

of allowable and nonallowable claims. 32 C. F. R.

836.92-3.

The allowance and payment of the claims made under

such Act by appellants’ insureds for damage to personal

property, other than the trailers, sustained in the same

trailer park and as a result of the same airplane crash,

must be presumed to have been based on an administra-

tive determination that the property damage occurred

“incident to service” since such is a requirement of the

Act and regulations for allowable claims. The Act does

’ not provide for judicial review of administrative action

on claims; but even if it did, administrative findings of

fact would have to be accepted by a court unless arbi-

trary, capricious or without evidentiary support. U, S.

2

é

_——

oe See

v. Babcock, 350 U. S. 328; Dismuke v. U. S., 297 U. S.

167; Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288.

Inasmuch as the damage to the personal property for

which claim was made under the Military Personnel Claims

Act and the damage to the trailers for which claim is

made under the Tort Claims Act in these cases was sus-

tained by the same military personnel in the same acci-

dent, at the same time and place, and under identical con-

ditions, there would be no factual or legal basis for hold-

ing the one service incident and the other not, unless

the term “incident to service” has a different meaning

under the Tort Claims Act than it has under the Mili-

tary Personnel Claims Act. This is without regard either

to the effect of the language in the Military Personnel

Claims Act making the administrative determination “final

and conclusive for all purposes, notwithstanding any other

provision of law to the contrary” or to “the principle

of the exclusive character of federal plans for compen-

sation in Feres v. United States” as stated in Johansen

and which has been applied by the Seventh Circuit in

Sasse v. U. S., 201 F. 2d 871, and by the District of

Columbia Court of Appeals in Lewis v. U. S., 190 F.

2d 22, to the Federal Employees Compensation Act in re-

lation to claims asserted under the Tort Claims Act. Feres

bars action under the Tort Claims Act for injuries “aris-

ing out of or incident to service”; the Military Personnel

Claims Act authorizes claims for damage to property

“occurring incident to service.” It may be that “arising

out of” has a broader meaning than “incident to” al-

though both appear to be different ways of saying the

same thing. In any event, there is no logical basis or

practical reason under the facts of the instant cases for

holding that damage to the trailers could have been non-

service incident while the simultaneous damage to the

Se

other property of the same servicemen under identical cir-

cumstances was incident to their service.

Entirely aside from the filing of the claims by appel-

lants’ insureds under the Military Personnel Claims Act

and the action taken thereon, the allegations of the com-

plaints and the stipulated facts clearly show that the dam-

age to the trailers of the servicemen arose out of and

was in the course of activity incident to their military

service.

At the time of the damage the trailer owners were all

in active military duty status as distinguished from

civilian or inactive military status. The trailers were per-

manently set up on land inside the Base in spaces speci-

fically assigned by the Base billeting officer in an area

absolutely subject to military control and discipline. The

trailers were authorized to occupy the assigned spaces

solely by virtue of the active military status of their own-

ers. The fact that a serviceman be on furlough or leave

may be material to whether his personal injuries be serv-

ice incident or not according to where he is and what he

is doing at the time of injury. In itself furlough or leave

has no bearing on whether a serviceman’s property be

damaged incident to his military service. In the present

cases, whether the owners of the trailers were on fur-

lough or not is unimportant since the trailers were on the

military base at the place of damage only because the

owners were in active military duty status. The dam-

age to the trailers resulted directly from the flight of an

Air Force airplane operated in the course of military

service. The crash of an airplane immediately following

takeoff from an Air Force base certainly has a real and

substantial relationship to the military service of any serv-

iceman assigned to such base whether or not he has any

par”

direct part in the maintenance or operation of the par-

ticular plane. If, as in these particular cases, at the time

of damage the personal property of a serviceman is lo-

cated on a military base solely by virtue of the active

military service of the owner, and the damage results

directly from operations in military service, we hold that

the damage does arise out of and occurs in the course of

activity incident to the military service of the owner.

Lund v. U. S., 104 Fed. Supp. 756 (D. C. Mass. 1952)

is the only cited case involving property damage which on

essential facts similar but not identical to those of the

present cases is to the contrary of our holdings herein.

The opinion in that case acknowledges the difficulty of the

problem which it disposes of in a few sentences and with-

out persuasive analysis.

The judgments are affirmed.

(Endorsed): Opinicn. Filed May 9, 1955. Paul P.

O’Brien, Clerk.

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Preferred Insurance Company, a Corporation; Michi-

gan Surety Company, a Corporation; Midstates Insurance

Company, a Corporation; and The Mercantile Insurance

Company of America, a Corporation, appellants, vs.

United States of America, appellee. No. 13,889.

JUDGMENT.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of California, Southern Division.

This cause .carse on to be heard on the Transcript of.

the Record froin the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Califormia, Southern Division, and

was duly submitted.

sandiiiain

On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and

adjudged by this Court, that the Judgment of the said

District Court in this cause be, and hereby is affirmed.

(Endorsed): Judgment. Filed and Entered: May

9, 1955. Paul P. O’Brien, Clerk.

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Fidelity-Phoenix Fire Insurance Company of New

York, appellant, vs. United States of America, appellee.

No. 14,001.

JUDGMENT.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of California, Southern Division.

This cause came on to be heard on the Transcript of

the Record from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of California, Southern Division, and

was duly submitted.

On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and

adjudged by this Court, that the Judgment of the said

District Court in this cause be, and hereby is affirmed.

(Endorsed): Judgment. Filed and Entered: May 9,

1955. Paul P. O’Brien, Clerk.

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Albert G. Whipple, appellant, vs. United States of

America, appellee. No. 14,002.

, JUDGMENT.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of California, Southern Division,

ee We

This cause came on to be heard on the Transcript of the

Record from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of California, Southern Division, and

was duly submitted.

On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and

adjudged by this Court, that the Judgment of the said

District Court in this cause be, and hereby is affirmed.

(Endorsed): Judgment. Filed and Entered: May 9

1955. Paul P. O’Brien, Clerk.

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Gearge Stropeck, appellant, vs. United States of Amer-

ica, appellee. No. 14,003.

JUDGMENT.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of California, Southern Division.

This cause came on to be heard on the Transcript of

the Record from the United States District Court for

the Northern District of California, Southern Division,

and was duly submitted.

On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and

adjudged by this Court, that the Judgment of the said

District Court in this cause be, and hereby is affirmed.

(Endorsed): Judgment. Filed and Entered: May 9,

1955. Paul P. O’Brien, Clerk.

= ss

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Government Employees Insurance Company, appellant, ©

vs. United States of America, appellee. No. 14,004.

JUDGMENT.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the —

Northern District of California, Southern Division. 4

This cause came on to be heard on the Transcript of —

the Record“from the United States District Court for —

the Northern District of California, Southern Division, —

and was duly submitted.

On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and :

adjudged by this Court, that the Judgment of the said ”

District Court in this cause be, and hereby is affirmed.

‘Endorsed): Judgment. Filed and Entered: May 9, ’

1955. Paul P. O’Brien, Clerk.

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. '

St. Louis Fire & Marine Insurance Company, appellant,

vs. United States of America, appellee. No. 14,005.

JUDGMENT.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the q

Northern District of California, Southern Division.

This cause came on to be heard on the Transcript of —

the Record from the United States District Court for —

the Northern District of California, Southern Division, —

and was duly submitted.

On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and ~

adjudged by this Court, that the Judgment of the said q

District Court in this cause be, and nereby is affirmed.

(Endorsed): Judgment. Filed and Entered: May 9,

1955. Paul P. O’Brien, Clerk. :

LT

APPENDIX B.

(Opinions of Judge Advocates General (JAG) ).

1. Opinion of JAG re Gunfire Act of 1912.

In Digest of Opinions, Judge Advocate General of the

Army, 1912-1940, Sec. 709, page 449 (Opinion No. 18-

463, 8/31/14), it appeared that an army officer occupied

. government quarters at West Point, and that heavy ar-

tillery practice caused a china closet in his quarters to fall,

thus breaking his china and glassware valued at $620.

The loss was held to be “in ‘the service” under the Mili-

tary Personnel Claims Act of 1885, but within one of the

exclusions ‘thereof, since the articles were of an \expen-

' sive nature. The Judge Advocate General ruled that the

- claim was, however, covered under the Gunfire Act of

1912, supra:

“Held, That from ‘the unusually expensive char-

atter of the articles destroyed, they ‘could ‘not be

considered such as the Secretary of War should

determine ‘to be reasonable, useful, and necessary

for the officer in service while in quarters, within

the meaning of the act of March 3, 1885 (23 Stat.

350) but that the claim might be adjusted and re-

ported to Congress for appropriation’ under the

provisions of the act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat.

586), as a loss of private property not exceeding

$1,000 in walwe occasioned by heavy gunfire and

target practice of troops, the act of applying to losses

1Since the opinion was written in 1914 and ‘the Digest was not

4 published until 1940, it may be assumed that over the years Con-

» gtess appropriated the money for payment of this and similar

- claims,

ain

of private property of officers residing upon mili-

tary reservations as well as to losses of the property

of civilians.”

2. Opinion of JAG re Small Tort Claims Act of 1922.

(a) “If the loss of private property of an officer

while in storage is due to the negligence of any off-

cer or enlisted man, though not payable under the

act of March 4, 1921 (Military Personnel Claims

Act of 1921) (41 Stat. 1436), under the Comptrol-

ler’s rulings, the amount may be certified to Con-

gress under the act of December 28, 1922 (42 Stat.

1066).” 332.32, May 21, 1926, Digest of Opinions,

Judge Advocate General of the Army, 1912-40, p.

456, Sec. 713.

(b) “Claim for loss of baggage. Claimant, an

Army officer, was ordered from a station in the con-

tinental United States to one in the Canal Zone.

After the effective date of his orders and after his

compliance with them the baggage in question was

purchased by third parties as a wedding present for

claimant and shipped to him by Army transport.

It was lost in transit. Claim disallowed. Held:

Baggage purchased after the effective date of change

of station orders may not be included in the au-

thorized change of station allowance of baggage

and its loss in transit is not reimbursable under the

act of Mar. 4, 1921, as implemented by AR 35-7100.

However, if such a loss is due to the negligence of

Government employees, relief may be had under

the act of Dec. 28, 1922, as implemented by AR

35-7070.” SPJGD, 1942/5773, Nov. 25, 1942, 1

Bull) JAG 331.

2The reference is to Bulletins, Judge Advocate General of the

enti

— on

3. Opinions of JAG re Military Claims Act of 1943, as

Amended by the Military Personnel Claims Act of

1945.

(a) “Hereafter follow the first decisions under

the new regulations (A. R. 25-100, 29 May, 1945),

interpreting the act of 29 May, 1945. Any decision

on claims of military personnel or civilian employees

which has heretofore appeared in the Digests or Bul-

letins should be carefully examined as :» its applica-

bility under the new statute and regulations before

it may safely be regarded as authoritative. SPJGD/

D-39091, 31 July, 1945.

“Scope.—Claim for damage to automobile. Claim-

ant, an Army officer, while traveling in his automo-

bile pursuant to temporary duty orders, suffered

property damage as the result of the negligence of

an Army truck driver acting within the scope of

his employment. The claim had been disapproved

for the sole reason that the damage occurred incident

to claimant’s service, and, therefore, could not be

favorably considered under the provisions of the

act of 3 July, 1943 (57 Stat. 372). The claim was

considered under the provisions of the act of 3 July,

1943, as amended by sec. 4 of the Military Per-

sonnel Claims Act of 1945 (approved 29 May,

1945), and was allowed. Held: The Military Per-

sonnel Claims Act of 1945 has repealed the prohibi-

tion contained in the act of 3 July, 1943, against the

payment of claims of military personnel and civilian

employees of the War Department or the Army for

damage to or loss or destruction of property occur-

ing incident to their service * * * The claim,

being in all other respects within the provisions of

the act of 3 July, 1943, is now payable.” SPJGD/

D-36478, 31 July, 1945, 4 Bull. JAG 287,

4.

a

(b) “Secs. 1, 2, act of 3 July, 1943 (57 Stat. 372);

Sec. 4, act of 29 May, 1945 (Pub. Law 67, 79th

Cong. 59 Stat. 225); 31 U. S. C. 223b, 223c.

“Scope of act.—Claim for loss of property deliv-

ered to an Army hospital. Claimant deposited with

proper military authorities in the hospital French

francs worth $321.20 * * * He was given a

receipt, but the property was never returned to

him * * * The claim was filed under AR 25-100

(Military Personnel Claims Act), but was considered

under the provisions of AR 25-25 (Military Claims

Act), since, in the absence of special circumstances

not shown in this case, money claims under AR 25-100

will be limited to $100 or one month’s pay, which-

ever is greater. Claim approved for $321.20. Held:

The delivery of the French francs to authorized mili-

tary personnel constituted a bailment to the Govern-

ment. The claim is therefore payable without regard

as to the cause of the loss. The limitation of $100

or one month’s pay as applied to claims under AR

25-100 is not controlling in claims settled under

PR SR Bie eat SPJGD/D-186805, 2 Feb-

ruary, 1946; SPJGD/D-202385, 4 April, 1946, 5

Bull. JAG 68.

Opinions of JAG re Tort Clams Act.

In reading the following opinions, it should be noted

that AFR refers to Air Force Regulations, AFR 112-3

dealing with claims under the Military Claims Act of 1943,

AFR 112-4 dealing with claims under the Tort Claims

Act,

and AFR 112-7 dealing with claims under the Mili-

tary Personnel Claims Act of 1945.

(a) “Although par. 3(b)(5), AFR 112-7, pro-

vides for reimbursement for currency only in specific

and limited circumstances, in proper cases such claims

— fase

ee

may be approved under any of the categories enu-

merated in par. 3 of this regulation, except when a

determination is made that they are barred by par.

5a, or involve transportation losses (par 3b (2)).

Money last (stolen) while traveling under orders is

not considered reimbursable in view of EO 10053

and AFR 75-30 (5 Bull. JAG 98). Prior to the

enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act certain

claims for money losses were considered cognizable

under the Act of July 3, 1943, when not payable

under the Military Personnel Claims Act (par. 15),

but since then such claims may be cognizable under

either act, depending upon the factual situation in-

volved. For example, a claim for money deposited

at an Army hospital was presented by a soldier

patient but since the amount involved exceeded the

amount determined to be reasonable under the regu-

lation, payment was made under the Act of July 3,

1943 (5 Bull. JAG 68). Accordingly, there is a

marked distinction between the items of property for

which payment may be made under AFR 112-3,

AFR 112-4 and AFR 112-7, inasmuch as the Mili-

tary Personnel Claims Act and AFR 112-7 limits the

type and kind of property claims that may be pre-

sented thereunder (par. 3, AFR 112-7), whereas no

such restrictions are now contained in either of the

other acts (par. 15, AFR 112-3; par. 15, AFR

112-4).” Op. JAGAF 1952/18, 11/19/51, 1 Dig.

Ops., Sec. 95.7 (Claims), p. 71.

(b) “Sec. 95.5 Motor vehicles.

The claimant was assigned government quarters in

a building on an air base and was authorized to park

x

his car in a basement garage below. A fire of ‘un-

known’ origin broke out in the basement of this

building. As a result, the claimant’s automobile was

destroyed to such an extent that it would have to be

sold for salvage and a set of golf clubs and a golf

bag stored in the car were damaged to such an extent

that they were of no further use to the claimant.

In addition, clothing located in the claimant’s quar-

ters above the garage were damaged by smoke, neces-

sitating dry cleaning. HELD: The claim for the

loss of the automobile and golf equipment is cogniz-

able but not payable under AFR 112-3 and the Act

of July 3, 1943 (57 Stat. 372; 31 U. S. C. 223b),

for the reason that the property was not bailed to

the government at the time of the loss. While claim-

ant was permitted to park his car in the garage, it

was for his own convenience and at his own risk,

except for loss or damage caused by the negligent or

wrongful act or omission of employees of the Gov-

ernment while acting within the scope of their em-

ployment (38 Am. Jur. 767). But no evidence of

tort liability was adduced (28 U. S. C. 2672 (Tort

Claims Act)) and such a loss was not incident to

‘noncombat activities’ within the meaning of AFR

112-3, par. 4e (7 Bull. JAG 193). Moreover, that

part of the claim covering the automobile and the

golf equipment which was in the automobile at the

time of the fire, is not payable under the Military

Personnel Claims Act of 1945 (31 U. S. C. 222c)

and AFR 112-7, as the property was not destroyed

‘at quarters’ or while in government ‘custody’ (par.

3b(1), AFR 112-7). Furthermore, claims for motor

vehicles are ordinarily not paid under such Act and

claimant’s loss does not fall within the exception pro-

fo

vided (par. 3b(4) and 4g, AFR 112-7). However,

that part of the claim for the cost of dry cleaning

of claimant’s clothing is approved, in accordance

with the provisions of the Military Personnel Claims

Act of 1945 and AFR 112-7, par. 3b(1), even

though the cost for such dry cleaning is not sub-

stantiated by a receipted bill, as the claim appears

credible.” Op. JAGAF 1951/100, 26 July 1951, 1

Dig. Ops., Sec. 95.5, p. 70 (Claims).

(c) “Sec. 93.9. Fire, flood, or other serious occur-

rence.

The claimant occupied assigned quarters at an

Air Force Base in the Canal Zone. The wooden

wall cabinet in the kitchen of his quarters suddenly

fell away from the wall, thereby breaking the china

and glassware stored in the cabinet, as well as arti-

cles on the drainboard beneath the cabinet. The

facts showed that the cabinet had been anchored to

the wall with four nails near its base when installed

several years before; however, inspections during use

had not revealed any defects. Moreover, the over-

loading of the cabinet appears to have been a con-

tributing factor in the accident. Held: Claim for

the loss of personal property is disapproved because

the property was not damaged or destroyed by ‘fire,

flood, hurricane or other serious occurrence’ while

located in assigned quarters (par. 3b(1), AFR

112-7, 15 February 1950). In this connection, the

occurrence that caused the damage is not the type of

incident that is considered to be a serious occurrence

because it has been construed to mean an occurrence

similar in character to those specifically mentioned,

j.e., typhoon, cloudburst, earthquake, explosion, etc.

fe. Saw

(7 Bull. JAG 89). Furthermore, although the Mili-

tary Personnel Claims Act of 1945, as amended, and

AFR 112-7, no longer limits recovery to rigid cate-

gories of claims enumerated therein, and any claim

falling within the general statutory provisions there-

of, not specifically excluded by statute or regulation,

may be submitted for consideration and in proper

cases approved for payment, this claim does not ap-

pear to be the type of ‘meritorious’ claim that falls

within the spirit of the statute (par. 3a, AFR 112-7),

because recovery is predicated solely on the negligent

or wrongful act or omission of government em-

ployees. Accordingly, in the continental United

States and its territorial possessions, including the

Canal Zone, the Federal Tort Claims Act and AFR

112-4 are preemptive in such circumstances (28 U.

S. C. 2671-80). However, in either event, the over-

loading of the cabinet would constitute negligence and

thus preclude payment of the claim (par. 7, AFR

112-4 and par. 4L, AFR 112-7).” Op. JAGAF

1952/83, 12 September 1949, 2 Dig. Ops., Sec. 93.9,

p. 63 (Claims).

5. Opinions of JAG as to whether property damage is

(a) “Act of 3 July 1943 (Military Claims Act).

+ * * ” + ~ ~

“Claim for damage to a privately owned car

of an Army officer. Claimant's car was properly

parked on an Army parking lot provided for officers

of the station complement. It was struck in the rear

by an unidentified vehicle which left traces of olive

drab paint and an indentation of the same measure:

ments as the bumper on Army vehicles. Claim

onlin

allowed. Held: It may be inferred, from the nature

of the damage and the fact that few persons other

than military personnel and civilian employees are

permitted to enter a military reservation during the

present emergency, that claimant’s car was damaged

by a person operating an Army vehicle within the

scope of his employment. The damage in the pres-

ent case may not be considered incident to the claim-

ant’s service, and therefore recovery is not barred

by Sec. 1 of the act.” SPJGD 1943/D-8458, 21 July

1943. (2 Bull. JAG, 274-5)*

(b) “Claim for damage to an automobile. A

Government vehicle in an access road on an Army

post had stopped to discharge passengers. Claimant,

a soldier not on duty, drove his privately-owned car

up behind the Army truck and stopped at an improper

parking place to permit a passenger to alight. The

Army driver backed out of the access road and struck

claimant’s car. Claim approved. Held: The sole

cause of the damage was the negligence of the Army

driver in backing without keeping a proper lookout

to assure himself that the movement could be made

in safety. Claimant’s stopping his vehicle did not

constitute negligence, and the property damage was

not incident to claimant’s service.” SPJGD/D-43824,

20 November 1944. (4 Bull. JAG, 62.)

(c) “An officer turned over his laundry, including

two Air Force type shirts, to an air base laundry

within the United States for laundering. Upon

picking up his laundry he discovered that the two

shirts had not been returned, and in their place he

had received two shirts belonging to another. These

8This claim arose during the 1943-5 period when service incident

damage claims were excluded from coverage under the

ilitary Claims Act of 1943.

—26—

shirts were returned to the laundry, which activity

was unable to locate the officer’s shirts, or adjust the

loss pursuant to USAF laundry regulations which,

in such cases, authorizes only repair or replacement

from overages (AFR 148-1, par. i7b).

“HELD THAT:

—the claim is not cognizable or payable under the

Military Personnel Claims Act of 1945, as amended

(59 Stat. 225; 31 USC 222c) and AFR 112-7, inas-

much as such losses have historically been considered

as not incident to a claimant’s service, because laun-

dry regulations provide that the use of such an Air

Force “proprietary” facility is a courtesy to officers

and other individuals (including airmen, in cases in-

volving non-Government clothing) who are author-

ized to avail themselves of the privileges thereof

(AFR 148-1, par. 17b (2){d)).

* * * * * * ok *

“__the claim would be cognizable under the provi-

sions of 28 USC 2671-80 and AFR 112-4, if the loss

of the property was caused by the negligent or wrong-

ful act or omission of any employee of the Air Force

while acting within the scope of his office or employ-

ment and was not merely lost due to 4 fire of “un-

known” causes, an “act of God,” a criminal act, etc.

(28 USC 2672; AFR 112-4; 6 Am. Jur., Bailments

$185; 7 Bull JAG 8; 2 Dig JAGAF 557). How-

ever, this claim would not be cognizable under AFR

112-3 if it is found from the evidence that the claim

is cognizable under 28 USC 2671-80, in view of the

partial repeal of the Act of 3 July 1943 (31 USC

223b) by the Federal Tort Claims Act (par. 3b AFR

112-3). But, in foreign countries the Act of July

3, 1943 would be applicable, in such circumstances.

Accordingly, if the investigation disclosed that the

=. a

claimant’s shirts were negligently delivered to another

individual. (Bailments, 185; 7 Bull. JAG 88; 2 Dig.

JAGAF 557). However, this by USAF personnel,

as alleged and could not be recovered, the claim would

be payable pursuant to the provisions of 28 USC

2671-80 and AFR 112-4, except for the laundry serv-

ice charge paid for cleaning the shirts, as this is not

a proper element of damages (AFR 112-2, par. 6b).

“__the above opinion applies equally as well to all

USAF activity cases of a similar nature, whether the

individual claimant be an officer, airman or civilian.

If it is the former, an airman’s claim should be ad-

judicated on the same basis as an officer’s or civilian’s

claim and the negligent or wrongful act or omission

of an employee of the Air Force while acting within

the scope of his office or employment, must be shown

before the claim may properly be approved for pay-

ment under applicable statutes and regulations (AFR

112-3; AFR 112-4; AFR 148-1).” Op. JAGAF

1951/97. 30 July 1951. 1 Dig. Ops., Claims sec.

94.3, pp. 65-6.

(d) “An airman delivered his wristwatch and

several other valuables to a Japanese civilian attend-

ant in the checkroom at an Air Force Base swimming

pool in occupied Japan and was issued identification

receipts therefor. The checkroom was operated as

an adjunct to the pool and was authorized by the

commanding officer through Special Services. The

Japanese attendants were employees of the Air Force

but due to the fact that Japan was an occupied coun-

try they were paid by the Japanese government. A

sign indicated that valuables would be received for

checking and it was customary for patrons to check

their valuables but no charge was made therefor.

When the airman returned for his property about

four hours later the watch could not be located

walks

nor its loss accounted for. Held: This claim is not

cognizable under the Military Personnel Claims Act

of 1945 (59 Stat. 225; 31 USC 222c), as amended,

and AFR 112-7, inasmuch as the loss was not inci-

dent to the airman’s service because he was using

the facility for his convenience and pleasure while off

duty (3 Dig. JAGAF, par. 21). However, the claim

is cognizable under the Act of 3 July 1943, as

amended (57 Stat. 372; 31 USC 223b), and AFR

112-3. Accordingly, the fact that the Japanese at-

tendants were paid by the Japanese government is not

controlling since volunteer workers, and others, have

been construed to be Air Force employees within the

meaning of this regulation, even though serving

without compensation. Hence, such persons are not

in the same category as nonappropriated fund em-

ployees, such as those engaged in exchange service

activities. Thus a bailment to the Air Force resulted

when the airman delivered his watch to the check-

room employees authorized to receive valuables. No

negligence of the claimant or assumption of risk by

him was involved. Therefore, since the loss occurred

in a foreign country, the claim is payable under the

provisions of AFR 112-3 because the loss was

caused by Air Force employees, which acting within

the scope of their employment, inasmuch as the fail-

ure to return or account for the loss of the bailed

property on demand established a prima facie case of

liability or presumption of negligence under the law

of bailments, which was not rebutted by the Air

Force (6 Am. Jur. Bailments §§208, 209, 222).

[Note: This opinion supersedes the opinion reported

as Op. JAGAF 1950/72, 7 June 1950, 2 Dig. JAGAF,

par. 285.]” Op. JAGAF 1953/8. 4 February 1952.

(2 Dig. Ops., Claims, sec. 94.1, p. 64.)

—29-—

(e) “Claim for damage to automobile. Claimant,

an Army officer, while traveling in his automobile

pursuant to temporary duty orders, suffered property

damage as the result of the negligence of an Army

truck driver acting within the scope of his employ-

ment. The claim had been disapproved for the sole

reason that the damage occurred incident to claim-

ant’s service, and, therefore, could not be favorably

considered under the provisions of the Act of 3 July,

1943 (57 Stat. 372). The claim was considered

under the provisions of the act of 3 July, 1943, as

amended by sec. 4 of the Military Personnel Claims

Act of 1945 (approved 29 May, 1945), and was

allowed. Held: The Military Personnel Claims Act

of 1945 has repealed the prohibition contained in

the Act of 3 July, 1943 against the payment of claims

of military personnel and civilian employees of the

War Department or the Army for damage to or loss

or destruction of property occurring incident to their

service * * *. The claim, being in all other respects

within the provisions of the Act of 3 July, 1943, is

now payable.”* SPJGD/D-36478, 31 July, 1945, 4

Bull. JAG 287.

eS

‘The claim was not payable under the Military Personnel Claims

Act because of the exclusion of motor vehicle damage therein.

.

INDEX

Page

Opinions below ...........eeee eee e cece eee ee ee eeees 1

ee eddaknetebaues Seeuewanteeveces 2

Question presented ...... 62... ese e cere eee eee ee eeees 2

Mintethen WVORVEd .. oon. cs ccc ccsccsevesencccesencs 2

Ns aang bu aidie soso pwnd hae bs whee SESERSS 5

— Argument ..... 1... cece eee eee eee eee e eee eee eeees 9

© Conclusion ...... 6... sseeeeeeeeee sees tener eneeeees 17

CITATIONS

Cases:

Allen v. D. D. Skousen Const. Co., 55 N. Mex. 1... 12

Archer v. United States, 217 F. 2d 548, certiorari

denied, 348 U.S. 953... ...... 6. cee cece eee eee 14

Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354... 2.2.6.6 eeee 15

Brooks v. United States, 337 US. 49...........- 9,10, 13

Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135......... 9, 10, 11, 13

Fleming v. Mohawk Co., 331 US. 111.......-.--- 15

Great Lakes Corp. v. S.S. Co., 301 US. 646....... 16

Grimley, In re, 187 US. 147........+00 02 e seen 14

Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Cardillo,

112 F. 2d 11, certiorari denied, 310 U.S. 649.... 12

Jefferson v. United States, 178 F. 2d 518, affirmed

sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135... 11,14

Lund v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 756.........- 14

Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19.........-....++++- 14

3 National Garment Co. v. New York, C. & St. L. R.

Coo, 178 F. 2d BB... .. 2.2 e eee eee eee ee ee 16

O’Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Mazon, 340 U.S. 504... 12

P. Dougherty Co. v. United States, 207 F. 2d 626,

certiorari denied, 347 U.S. 912............-.++-- 14

Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Erie Transportation Co., 117

—) GRP aeeet rr erry wey ree erg ore 16

Ritzman v. Trent and the United States, 125 F.

Supp. 664 ... 00... cece cece cece eee eeeeeees 14

United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110........... 9, 10,13

(1)

I

Cases—Continued

Wallis v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 673

Wilson Cypress Co. v. Miller, 157 Fla. 459

Zoula v. United States, 217 F. 2d 81

Statutes:

Act of July 3, 1952, 66 Stat. 321

Act of August 1, 1953, 67 Stat. 317

Military Personnel Claims Act of 1945 (59 Stat.

Be a A pet nud oriiveis eed

National Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 495, 501,

503; 5 U.S.C. 626)

28 U.S.C. 1346(b)

Miscellaneous:

32 C.F.R. 836.93 (i) and (j)

18 Comp. Gen. 203 (1938)

HLR. 404, 82d Cong., 2d sess. ...----++++eeeeees

S. Rept. 1691, 82d Cong., 2d sess., p. 3

Juthe Supreme Court of the Wited States

OctoBeR TERM, 1955

No. 222

PREFERRED INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation,

Micuican Surety Company, a corporation, Mip-

Srates INSURANCE CoMPANY, a corporation, and

THE MERCANTILE INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMER-

ICA, a corporation, PETITIONERS

Vv.

Untrep StatTes oF AMERICA

AND Frve ConsoLIpATED CASES

ON PETITION FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH

CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the District Court for the North-

ern District of California is reported at 111 F.

Supp. 899 (R. 22-37), sub nom. Fidelity-Phemx

Fire Insurance Co. v. United States. The opinion

of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (R.

(1)

2

49-58) is reprinted as Appendix A to the Petition

and is not yet reported.

JURISDICTION

The judgments of the court of appeals were en-

tered on May 9, 1955 (R. 59-64). The petition for

writs of certiorari was filed on July 11, 1955. The

jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28

U.S.C. 1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Tort Claims Act authorizes recov-

ery for property damage sustained by a member of

the armed forces incident to his service as the re-

sult of the alleged negligence of other military

personnel and accordingly furnishes a basis for an

insurer’s claim based on subrogation.

STATUTES INVOLVED

1. Section 1346(b) of Title 28 U.S.C. (part of

the Federal Tort Claims Act) provides:

Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of

this title, the district courts, together with the

District Court for the Territory of Alaska, the

United States District Court for the District

of the Canal Zone and the District Court of the

Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdic-

tion of civil actions on claims against the

United States, for money damages, accruing

on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or

loss of property, or personal injury or death

caused by the negligent or wrongful act or

omission of any employee of the Government

while acting within the scope of his office or

employment, under circumstances where the

3

United States, if a private person, would be

liable to the claimant in accordance with the

law of the place where the act or omission

occurred.

2. The Military Personnel Claims Act of 1945

provides in pertinent part (59 Stat. 225) :*

Sec. 1. The Secretary of War, and such

other officer or officers as he may designate

for such purposes and under such regulations

as he may prescribe, are hereby authorized to

consider, ascertain, adjust, determine, settle,

and pay any claim against the United States,

including claims not heretofore satisfied aris-

ing on or after December 7, 1939, of military

personnel and civilian employees of the War

Department or of the Army, when such claim

is substantiated, and the property determined

1 The Military Personnel Claims Act was amended, subse-

quent to the crash which gave rise to the instant claims, on

July 3, 1952 (66 Stat. 321) and on August 1, 1953 (67 Stat.

317). The first amendment expressly extended the Act to

Air Force personnel claims. The 1953 amendment enlarged

the time for filing of certain claims. _.

At the time of the crash and before the 1952 amendment

making the Military Personnel Claims Act expressly ap-

plicable to claims by Air Force personnel, the functions of

the War Department with respect to Air Force persunnel

claims under the Military Personnel Claims Act had been

transferred to the Secretary of the Air Force by the National

Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 495, 501, 503; 5 U.S.C. 626).

That Act changed the title of the Secretary of War to Sec-

retary of the Army and created the Department of the Air

Force and its head, the Secretary of the Air Force. It also

provided for the transfer of appropriate functions from the

Secretary of the Army to the Secretary of the Air Force (61

Stat. 503).

4

to be reasonable, useful, necessary, or proper

under the attendant circumstances, in such

manner as the Secretary of War may by regu-

lation prescribe, for damage to or loss, destruc-

tion, capture, or abandonment of personal

property occurring incident to their service,

or to replace such personal property in kind:

Provided, That the damage to or loss, destruc-

tion, capture, or abandonment of property

shall not have been caused in whole or in part

by any negligence or wrongful act on the part

of the claimant, his agent, or employee, and

shall not have occurred at quarters occupied

by the claimant within continental United

States (excluding Alaska) which are not as-

signed to him or otherwise provided in kind

by the Government. No claim shall be settled

under this Act unless presented in writing

within one year after the accident or incident

out of which such claim arises shall have

occurred: Provided, That if such accident or

incident occurs in time of war, or if war inter-

venes within two years after its occurrence,

any claim may, on good cause shown, be pre-

sented within one year after peace is estab-

lished. Any such settlement made by the Sec-

retary of War, or his designee, under the au-

thority of this Act and such regulations as he

may prescribe hereunder, shall be final and

conclusive for all purposes, notwithstanding

any other provision of law to the contrary.

Sro, 2. Such appropriations as may be re-

5

quired for the settlement of claims under the

provisions of this Act are hereby authorized.

Appropriations available to the War Depart-

ment for the settlement of claims under the

provisions of the Act of March 3, 1885 (23

Stat. 350), as amended, shall be available for

the settlement of claims under the provisions

of this Act.

Src. 3. Sections 3483-3488 of the Revised

Statutes (31 U.S.C. 209-214), and the Act of

March 3, 1885 (23 Stat. 350), as amended by

the Act of July 9, 1918 (40 Stat. 880), and by

the Act of March 4, 1921 (41 Stat. 1436; 31

U.S.C. 218-222), and by section 6 of the Act

of July 3, 1943 (57 Stat. 374; 31 U.S.C. 222a,

222b), are hereby repealed.

STATEMENT

Petitioners filed these six suits under the Fed-

eral Tort Claims Act to recoup the proceeds of

property damage policies paid by them to certain

insured servicemen whose house trailers had been

damaged by the crash of a military plane at an

Air Force base.

On August 5, 1950, an Air Force B-29 crashed

at the Fairfield-Suisun Air Force Base in Cali-

fornia a few seconds after take-off (R. 49). The

plane exploded near the base’s trailer park, con-

taining 48 trailers owned and occupied by service-

men in active duty status and assigned to the base

at the time (R. 20, 49). The trailers and house-

6

hold and personal belongings: in. them suffered

considerable damage.

Petitioners are the insurers of the various trail-

ers (Pet. 4). In accord with the terms of insur-

ance policies issued by them to the trailer owners,

petitioners paid the servicemen a total of $68,-

340.57 for damage to the trailers (R. 5-6; Pet. 4).

Administrative claims for damage to the property

belonging to the militery personnel were also filed

with the Air Force by the servicemen under the

Military Personnel Claims Act, supra, pp. 3-5, and

were paid by the Air Force to the servicemen ‘‘ex-

cept for that property covered by insurance, as

provided by regulations under such statute’’ (R.

9, 15, 50).

The insurers’ complaints, filed under the Fed-

eral Tort Claims Act, alleged that the crash re-

sulted from negligent maintenance and operation

of the Air Force plane (R. 5). The complaints

further asserted that, by payment of the proceeds

of the policies to the servicemen, the insurers had

become ‘‘subrogated to the rights of their respec-

tive insureds” against the United States to that

extent (R. 6).

The United States moved to dismiss (R. 10). In

a supporting affidavit the Government showed that

the insurers’ claims were for property losses of

‘‘military personnel in the United States Air

Forces stationed at [Fairfield-Suisun] Base in the

discharge of military functions, and that all of

these-men were on active duty, and duly assigned

to military functions, at and about the time of the

7

said erash’’ (R. 11, 49). The affidavit also showed

that all of the property in question “‘was located

on and within the said Base in an area duly as-

signed by competent military authority as an area

for trailers in which the men slept between hours

of work and that the area was under military pro-

tection’’ (R. 11).

The following additional facts with respect to

the operation of the base trailer park were stipu-

lated :

The detailed procedure controlling the operation

and maintenance of the trailer park within the

confines of the base were prescribed in a base regu-

lation (R. 13, 51). Only Air Force personnel and

their families assigned to the base were allowed to

use the trailer park facilities (R. 51). Specific

assignments and termination of trailer space were

made by the base billetting officer (R. 51). Assign-

ment of trailer park space automatically termin-

ated when the base ceased to be the permanent sta-

tion of the individual concerned (R. 17, 51). Like

the rest of the Air Force base, the trailer park

area was under military protection and subject

to the jurisdiction of military police (R. 51).

While the military personnel living at the base

trailer park were not required to live on the base,

there was a critical housing shortage in the sur-

rounding area (R. 50). The trailer park accord-

ingly had been set aside within the base for the con-

venience and accommodation of military personnel

and for the mutual benefit of the personnel and the

Air Force (R. 16, 50).

8

The district court, upon consideration of the

foregoing facts, ruled that the property damage

sustained by the Air Force personnel was incident

to their service, that their exclusive remedy was

under the Military Personnel Claims Act, and that

neither they nor their insurers could maintain

suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (R. 22-

37). The Government’s motions to dismiss were

accordingly granted and the claims dismissed (R.

38; Pet 5).

The court of appeals affirmed (R. 49-58; Pet.

Appendix A). It held that the insured servicemen

were themselves barred from bringing an action

for service-incident property damage under the

Tort Claims Act on the grounds (1) that ‘‘there

never has been and is not now any act of Congress

* * * authorizing a serviceman in active duty

status to sue the government for service incident

property damage, however inflicted’’ and (2) that

the servicemati’s sole remedy on such a claim is

the administrative relief provided by the Military

Personnel Claims Act (R. 55). Limiting the

servicemen to this administrative remedy, the

court emphasized, ‘‘avoids the serious disruption

of military mission and discipline that well might

follow civil litigation based on such claims” (R.

55). Since the insured servicemen themselves

could not bring suit under the Federal Tort Claims

Act, the instant actions based on subrogation,

being completely derivative in nature, were like-

wise held barred (R. 56, 58).

9

ARGUMENT

In order to establish the validity of their subro-

gation claims, petitioners must sustain the position

that recovery may be had against the United

States under the Federal Tort Claims Act on

claims of members of the armed forces arising in-

cident to their service. But this Court has already

considered and rejected that precise contention as

applied to personal injuries.* Since the record

plainly establishes that the servicemen’s claims

here involved were in fact incident to their mili-

tary service and since both courts below correctly

applied the rationale of the decisions of this Court

in denying recovery, there is, we submit, no war-

rant for further review of these cases.

1. It was implied in Brooks v. United States, 337

U.S. 49, 50, 52, that service-incident claims result-

ing, for example, from ‘‘a defective jeep,’’ are not

actionable under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The

next case of Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135,

left nothing to implication. The Court squarely

held that the claims of military personnel there

involved were not within the coverage of the Act

because the claims arose as an incident of military

service. This holding was reiterated seven months

ago in United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112,

113, where the Court expressly noted its adherence

to the line drawn in the Feres case as to claims

2 Feres v. United States, 340 US. 135; United States v.

ge 348 US. 110; and Brooks v. United States, 337

8. 49.

10

which ‘arise out of or are in the course of activity

incident to service.”’

It is true that in both Brooks and Brown, un-

like Feres, it was concluded that causes of action

had been stated under the Tort Claims Act. But

Brooks and Brown, as those two opinions carefully

demonstrate, involved claims not incident to the

claimants’ military service. 337 U.S. 49, 52; 348

U.S. 110, 112. In the instant case, the facts leave

no room for doubt that the claim, like that in

Feres, is service-incident in nature and hence

barred under the Act. This is clearly borne out by

a comparison of the facts in the Brown and Brooks

eases, on one hand, with those in Feres and the

irstant cases, on the other.

In Brown, a veteran sued the United States for

the alleged negligence of another civilian at a

Veterans Administration hospital. Brown’s claim

arose, the Court noted, not while ‘‘he was subject to

military discipline’ but ‘‘after his discharge, while

he enjoyed a civilian status.” 348 U.S. 110, 112.

Similarly in Brooks, the plaintiff soldiers were rid-

ing in their privately owned automobile on a public

highway when they were struck by a government

vehicle driven by a civilian employee. They were

not then on any business even remotely connected

with their military service; nor were they on the

highway, where they were hit, because of their being

soldiers. 337 U.S. 49, 52.

The claims in Feres, on the other hand, show that

they arose not only incident to military service but

as a direct result thereof. Feres actually involved

11

three separate cases, those of Feres, Griggs, and

Jefferson, 340 U.S. 135, footnote. Feres, after com-

pleting his military duty for the day, burned to

death while sleeping in his quarters on the post.

Negligence was asserted on the part of other mili-

tary personnel in maintaining a defective heating

plant in the quarters. The Griggs and Jefferson

cases arose as malpractice actions by the plaintiff

soldiers for alleged negligence on the part of Army

surgeons at Army hospitals. In all three cases,

it is obvious that the claims were incident to and

had occurred because of the servicemen’s military

service—Feres was in his quarters on the post be-

cause he was in the service; Griggs and Jefferson

were operated on by Army doctors on Army op-

erating tables in an Army hospital because they

were in the military service.

Similarly in the instant cases, as the findings of

both lower courts make clear, the claims for ‘‘dam-

age to the trailers of the servicemen arose out of

and was in the course of activity incident to their

military service’’ (R. 26,57). It was only because

the servicemen, whose trailers were destroyed, were

members of the Air Force on active military duty

status assigned to Fairfield-Suisun Air Force Base

that they were allowed to make use of the trailer

park facilities at the base (R. 50, 57-58). As ob-

served by the court below, ‘‘The trailers were au-

thorized to occupy the assigned spaces solely by

virtue of the active military status of their owners’’

(R. 57). The trailer park area was ‘‘absolutely

subject to military control and discipline’’ and ‘‘at

12

the time of the damage the trailer owners were all

in active military duty status as distinguished

from civilan or inactive military status’? (R. 57).

Obviously, in view of the regular heavy air traffic

at any Air Force base, the servicemen’s use of the

trailer park surrounded them with the precise con-

ditions out of which the instant claim arose. It

follows, as the court below emphasized, that ‘‘the

erash of an airplane immediately following takeoff

from an Air Force base certainly has a real and

substantial relationship to the military service of

any serviceman assigned to such base”’ (R. 58).

Since it was ‘‘solely by virtue of [the servicemen’s]

active military status’’ that their personal prop-

erty was placed in the ‘‘zone of special danger,”’

both courts below, we submit, correctly concluded

that the instant claims arose incident to military

service and hence were not cognizable under the

Federal Tort Claims Act. See O’Leary v. Brown-

Pacific-Mazon, 340 U.S. 504, 506-507; Hartford

Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Cardillo, 112 F. 2d 11,

14 (0.A. D.C.), certiorari denied, 310 U.S. 649;

Allen v. D. D. Skousen Const. Co., 55 N. Mex. 1;

Wilson Cypress Co. v. Miller, 157 Fla. 459.

The correctness of that conclusion is still further

confirmed, as the opinion below shows, by adminis-

trative payment under the Military Personnel

Claims Act for the servicemen’s non-insured

losses (R. 56). These payments by the Air Force

‘‘must,’’ as stated by the court below, ‘‘be pre-

sumed to have been based on an administrative de-

termination that the property damage occurred

13

‘incident to service’ since such is a requirement of

the [Military Personnel Claims] Act and regula-

tions for allowable claims.’’ (R. 56.)

2. Petitioners’ contention is that the Feres rule

of governmental non-liability for service-incident

claims applies only where damages are sought for

personal injuries rather than for property dam-

ages (Pet. 7-10). But this Court’s decisions in

Feres, as well as in Brown and Brooks, show very

plainly that governmental immunity from service-

incident claims does not turn on any such fine dis-

tinction as to the particular element of damages for

which recovery is sought. On the contrary, the de-

cisions rested on broad considerations of the

“special relationship of the soldier to his supe-

riors’’ and to the Government, of the ‘‘effects of

the maintenance of such suits on [military] disci-

pline,’’ and of the ‘‘sharp break in tradition”’ if a

soldier were allowed to recover for the negligence

of another soldier. United States v. Brown, 348

U.S. 110, 112, 113; Feres v. United States, 340 U.S.

135, 141. And the court below, in an opinion which

carefully demonstrates that ‘‘each of these consid-

erations is as applicable to property damage inci-

dent to service as to personal injury incident to

service’ (R. 52, 53, 54-55), correctly excluded the

service-incident property damage claims from the

Tort Claims Act.*

SIt is clear, for example, that allowing soldiers access to

the courts under the Federal Tort Claims Act for claims

arising ineident to their military service would in large part

shift the military’s traditional right to self-regulation from

14

There is no conflict of decisions as to the applica-

bility of the Feres rule to service-incident property

damage. Indeed, the only other court of appeals

decision in point holds squarely, as did the court

below, that service-incident property damage

claims are not actionable under the Federal Tort

Claims Act. Zoula v. United States, 217 F. 2d 81,

84-85 (C.A. 5). Accord: Ritzman v. Trent and the

United States, 125 F. Supp. 664, 666-667 (E. D. N.

C.); Wallis v. United States, 126 F. Supp, 673,

674 (E.D.N.C.).*

3. Petitioners’ claims based on subrogation must

fail for a still further reason. The Military Per-

sonnel Claims Act, supra, pp. 3-5, authorizes pay-

ment of claims of ‘‘military personnel’’ and has

been interpreted in administrative regulations to

the military establishment to the civilian courts. Those

courts would then “be required to pass upon the propriety

of military decisions and actions and essential military dis-

cipline would be impaired by subjecting the command to the

public criticism and rebuke of [the soldiers].” Jefferson v.

United States, 178 F. 2d 518, 520 (C.A. 4), affirmed sub

nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135; see In re Grimley,

137 US. 147, 153; Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19, 30; P.

Dougherty Co. v. United States, 207 F. 2d 626, 684 (C.A. 3),

certiorari denied, 347 U.S. 912; Archer v. United States, 217

F. 2d 548, 551-552 (C.A. 9), certiorari denied, 348 U.S. 953.

It is equally clear that this “serious disruption of military

mission and discipline” would, as held below (R. 55), be

caused by civil litigation based on service-incident property

damage claims to the same extent as it would be caused by

such litigation based on service-incident personal injury

claims.

*Lund v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 756 (D. Mass.),

the only decision to the contrary, has never been followed

and was expressly disapproved in the decisions below in the

instant cases (R. 34, 58) and in the Wallis decision.

©

15

be limited to claims filed by servicemen on their

own behalf and to exclude from its coverage ‘‘losses

of insurers and other subrogees’’ and ‘‘losses * * *

recovered or * * * recoverable from an insurer.”’

32 C.F.R. 836.93(i) and (j).° The limitation in

these regulations obviously means that the United

States agrees to make payment under the Military

5 The legislative history of the 1952 amendment to the

Military Personnel Claims Act of 1945 demonstrates full

Congressional awareness and approval of the administrative

interpretation barring insurers from the benefits of the Mili-

tary Personnel Claims Act. This interpretation was placed

squarely before Congress when H. R. 404, 82d Cong., 2d

sess., later enacted as the 1952 amendment was being con-

sidered. A copy of the administrative regulations setting

forth this administrative interpretation of the Military Per-

sonnel Act appears in full in S. Rept. 1691, 82d Cong., 2d

sess., p. 3, and specifically includes among the “claims not

payable”:

i. Losses of subrogees——Losses of insurers and other

subrogees.

j. Losses recoverable from insurer.—Losses, or any

portion thereof, which have been recovered or are re-

coverable from an insurer.

. Notwithstanding the fact that its attention was specifically

directed to the administrative ban against payment of claims

to insurers, Congress in no way modified that limitation. In-

stead, the 1952 amendment eliminated an entirely unrelated

limitation concerning property damage claims on behalf of

servicemen who died prior to the property damage loss. Apart

from all other considerations, Congressional enactment of

H. R. 404 into the 1952.amendment with full awareness that

insurers’ claims had regularly been rejected administratively

but without any modification of that administrative inter-

pretation, constitutes, we submit, an acceptance and ratifica-

tion by Congress of the administrative interpretation bar-

ring insurance claims under the Military Personnel Claims —

Act. See Fleming v. Mohawk Co., 331 U.S. 111; Brooks v.

Dewar, 313 US. 354.

16

Personnel Claims Act to servicemen only on condi-

tion that the United States is to have the full bene-

fit of any insurance effected on the property by

servicemen with their private insurers. We sub-

surers’ inability to maintain the present Tort

Claims Act suits against the Untied States.

Ever since Phoenia Ins. Co. v. Erie Transporta-

tion Co., 117 U.S. 312, 321, 325, it has been recog-

nized that such a condition is fully effective as

against the insurer. All other cases are in accord

in holding that an insurer’s claim to subrogation

rights cannot be recognized where the owner and

carrier agree that the earrier shall have the benefit

of any insurance effected by the owner. Great

Lakes Corp. v. S. S. C9. 301 U.S. 646, 654; Na-

tional Garment Co. V. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co.,

173 F. 2d 32, 37 (C.A. 8); see 18 Comp. Gen. 203

(1938). The reasoning of the cited authorities

fully applies here and compels the conclusion that

the condition in the Military Personnel Claims Act

regulations giving the United States the benefit of

insurance taken out by servicemen, prevents recog-

nition of petitioners’ claims.

17

CONCLUSION

The decision below is clearly correct and is sup-

ported on an alternative basis which is independ-

ently dispositive of petitioners’ claims. There is

no conflict. It is respectfully submitted that the

petition for writs of certiorari should be denied.

Srmon E. Sosevorr,

Solicitor General.

Gro. S. LEonarp,

Acting Assistant Attorney General.

Pau A. SWEENEY,

Morton HOLLANDER,

Attorneys.

Aveust, 1955.

ee) a at ee A ee

TT U. S. GOVERNWENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1985 353976 ise

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

CasEs PAGE

Ritzman v. Trent and Unite’ States, 125 Fed. Supp. 664........1, 2

United States v. Aetrs Cas. & Surety Co., 338 U. S. 366........ 3

Wallis v. United States, 126 Fed. Supp. 673 1

Zoula v. United States, 217 F. 2d 81 1

STATUTE

Military Personnel Claims Act of 1945, Sec. 4 2

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1955

No. 222,

PREFERRED INSURANCE CoMPANY, a corporation, MIcHI-

GAN SURETY CoMPANyY, a corporation, Mrp-StTaTes

INSURANCE CoMPANY, a corporation, and THe MEeEr-

CANTILE INSURANCE CoMPANY CF AMERICA, a corpo-

ration,

Petitioners,

VS.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

Anp Five CoNnsoLipDATED CASEs.

On Petition for Writs of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

PETITIONERS’ REPLY BRIEF.

The Government (Brief in Opposition, p. 14) seeks to

bolster the decision of the Court of Appeals herein by

citing Zoula v. United States’ (C. A. 5), 217 F. 2d 81,

and two decisions by the same District Judge (Ritsman

v. Trent and United States, 125 Fed. Supp. 664 and

Wallis v. United States, 126 Fed. Supp. 673).

'The Zoula case was discussed in Footnote 24, p. 23 of the

Petition herein.

as

These decisions, as to the point here involved, do no

more than cite with approval the decision of the District

Judge herein and adopt his erroneous conclvsion that

service incident property damage claims are not covered

by the Tort Claims Act because the Military Px eonnel

Claims Act of 1945 was intended as the “single” remedy

for such claims (see, for example, Ritzman v. Trent,

supra, 125 Fed. Supp. 665, 667).

Nothing is clearer in this case than that such conclusion

of the District Judge herein was completely erroneous.

As pointed out in our Petition (pp. 14-15), Section 4 of

the Military Personnel Claims Act of 1945 itself speci-

fically provided that it was not the exclusive or “single”

remedy for service incident property damage claims. The

Government apparently reasons that because this basic

error of the District Judge has been approved bys the

Court of Appeals herein and by the Court of Appeals for

the Fifth Circuit and by the District Judge for the Eastern

District of North Carolina, that such repeated approba-

tion has the result of converting an obvious error into a

sound conclusion. It is apparent that unless this Court

grants this Petition, the erroneous reasoning and conclu-

sion that permeates all these cases will be perpetuated.

The Government raises a point (Brief in Opposition,

pp. 14-16) not referred to by the Court of Appeals, viz.,

that the exclusion of subrogated claims from the coverage

of the Military Personnel Claims Act constitutes a bar

to the claims here in suit. But this cannot be tenable since

the claims here sued upon are brought under the Tort

Claims Act and not under the Military Personnel Claims

Act, and it has been held by this Court that subrogated

claims are covered by the Tort Claims Act (United States

sikeadies

v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 338 U. S. 366). Since

service incident property damage claims are not restricted

to the coverage of the Military Personnel Claims Act,

it is apparent that the right to assert such a claim mus*

be determined by the statute under which the claim is

brought.

The Opinion of the Court of Appeals herein does not

consider the important problem of statutory construction

involved here. In its Brief in Opposition herein, the

Government has seen fit to completely ignore the questions

raised by the Petition (Pet. pp. 7-24). It is submitted

that to ignore these questions cannot ¢vnstitute a satis-

factory or adequate disposition thereof.

We feel confident that this Court will not permit mili-

tary personnel to be deprived of the substantial claim

rights involved here, without according this problem the

full and careful consideration to which it is entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

WIiiaM H. Levit,

Attorney for Petitioners.

ALFRED W. NEwMAN,

Rospert T. CRESSWELL,

Hans A. KRrucer,

GrorceE W. Murpary,

Of Counsel.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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