Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Cobra Manufacturing Co. v. Coffman
Supreme Court brief1955
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SUBJECT INDEX
PAGE
Introductory statement 1
Opinion and decision of the Court of Appeals 5
Concise statement of the grounds on which the jurisdiction of
this court is invoked 5
The questions presented for review 7
A concise statement of the case 8
Proceedings after entry of judgment 10
Reasons for granting certiorari 16
Summary of argument 21
L
There is a fundamental and constitutional distinction between
the jurisdiction of the federal appellate courts to review find-
ings made by the trial judge under Rule 52(a) of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and the jurisdiction of the reviewing
court under the California Constitution, and under Sections
644, 645 and 719, Code of Civil Procedure, all of which are
in pari materia. . 21
II.
Under the Constitution of the State of California the trier of
the facts is a constitutional finder of the facts, and his determi-
nation (if supported by substantial evidence) is conclusive
and binding upon the reviewing court, and the reviewing court
has no jurisdiction to annul said findings 23
PAGE
IIL
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that proof beyond a reason-
able doubt is required in supplemental proceedings (which are
civil in nature) introduces in the field of civil justice a revolu-
tionary and dangerous concept. 24
IV.
The good faith of Coffman’s denial of his indebtedness to the
judgment debtor presents a factual question. The determi-
nation of the trier of the facts that Coffman’s denial of his
indebtedness was not made in good faith is binding and con-
clusive on the reviewing court under the California Constitu-
tion and under the California procedural law... 25
V.
Under the California law, Coffman held the property of the
judgment debtor in trust for the petitioner. The ruling of
the Court of Appeals that Coffman was a garnishee instead of
a trustee, and that the denial of his indebtedness was not a
sham, is in‘conflict with the California law 28
Appendices :
Appendix I. Opinion of the United States Court of Ap-
peals . App. p. 1
Appendix II. Pertinent California Code Sections........App. p. 11
Appendix III. Pertinent California Cases....................App. p. 19
Appendix IV: Comment on Decisions Cited in Footnote 12
of the Court's Opinion, at Page 6. App. p. 23
iti,
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
CasEs PAGE
Bjornsen v. Alasea S.S. Co., 193 F. 2d 4.3 22
Boyd, Ex parte, 105 U. S. 647, 26 L. Ed. 1200 2
Capital Co. v. Fox, 85 F. 2d 97, 106 A. L. R. 376. 2
Carpentier v. Montgomery, 13 Wall. 480 19
24
2
Cooper v. Spring Valley Water Co., 16 Cal. App. 17.........--.------+
De Foe v. Town of Rutherfordton, 122 F. 2d 342
Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 61 S. Ct. 176, 311 U. S. 169,
85 L. Ed. 109. 2
Finch v. Finch, 12 Cal. App. 274. 26
Fisk v. Commissioner of Int. Revenue, 203 F. 2d _ oe
Hanson v. Cheynske, 180 Cal. 275 3%
27
22
Herrlich v. Kaufmann, 99 Cal. 271
Home Indemnity of New York v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 167
F. 2d 919.
Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U. S. 232, 64 S. Ct. 1015, 88 L. Ed.
1246 2
Keering v. Wishnefsky, 52 Fed. Supp. 625; aff'd, 142 F. 24 1005 2
Miller y. Commissioner of Int. Revenue, 183 F. 2d 246............. 22
National Labor Relations Board v. Columbian Stamping Co.,
306 U. S. 292, 59 S. Ct. 501 22
Nixon v. Goodwin, 3 Cal. App. 358. 30
Pacific Portland Cement Co. v. Food Machinery, 178 F. 2d 541 22
Parker v. Page, 38 Cal. 522. 25, 31
People v. Guitierrez, 35 Cal. 2d 721, 221 P. 2d 22. .20
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 60 S. Ct. 238, 84 L. Ed. 28....6, 30
Purdy v. Johnson, 174 Cal. 521 29
Rupley v. Johnson, 120 Cal. App. 2d 548 3
Saracco Tank etc. v. Platz, 65 Cal. App. 2d 306. 18, 29
Schram v. Carlucci, 41 Fed. Supp. 36 4
Schram v. Spivack, 68 Fed. Supp. 451 2
Title Insurance Co. v. Cal. Dev. Co., 171 Cal. 173 30
United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364, 68 S. Cr. SS5......... 22
Williams v. Flinn and Treacy, 61 Cal. App. 352, 214 Pac. 1024.. 18
iv.
RULEs ' PAGE
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52 20
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a).........-..-.--.--- 18, 19, 21
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 69. 1, 2, 19
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 70% 20, 22
Revised Rules of the United States Supreme Court, Rule 23... 5
STATUTES
Bankruptcy Act, Chap. 11 8
California Civil Code, Sec. 2229 3, 29
California Civil Code, Sec. 2236 , 29
California Civil Code, Sec. 2237. 3
California Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 644 2, 23
California Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 645 2, 23
California Code of Civil Procedure, Secs. 714-720........................ 2
California Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 715 3, 10
California Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 719. 31
California Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 2061 (5) 25
California Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 2103 25
California Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 4-a. 20
California Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 4-b. 20
California Corporations Code, Sec. 824 3, 29
California Corporations Code, Sec. 825 3, 29
29
30
30
25
5
California Corporations Code, Sec. 2232
California Corporations Code, Secs. 4600-4619.
California Corporations Code, Sec. 4607.
California Practice Act (old), Sec. 244.
United States Code Annotated, Title 28, Sec. 1254(1)
Oe eeereewcceeree
TEXTBOOKS
62 American Law Reports, p. 1449.
1 Perry on Trusts and Trustees (7th Ed.), par. 433, p. 721
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1954.
DED. scaiiaininnte
Copra MANUFACTURING Company, a California corpora-
tion,
Petitioner,
US.
Harry J. COFFMAN,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI.
To the Honorable Chief Justice Earl Warren, and the
Honorable Associate Justices of the Supreme Court
of the United States:
Introductory Statement.
This is a supplemental proceeding, civil in nature, under
Rule 69 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in aid of
judgment and execution obtained in the bankruptcy matter
hereinafter referred to by petitioner Cobra Manufactur-
ing Company (appellee below, called herein Cobra) against
the Aircraft Engineering Company, a California corpora-
tion (appellant—below, called herein Aircraft).
nai
As expressly provided in Rule 69 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, and as declared in the authorities
cited in the footnote below’
The California State law is made the controlling rule
on both the substantive and procedural rights of the par-
ties in supplemental proceedings.
The California procedural law is rooted in its Consti-
tution, under which as judicially adjudicated by the appel-
late courts of the State of California, including the Su-
preme Court of the State of California, the trier of the
facts is the constitutional trier of the facts, and his fac-
tual determination (if based on substantial evidence under
the preponderance evidence rule) is conclusive upon the
reviewing court; and the reviewing court lacks jurisdic-
tional power to disturb or_to modify such factual deter-
mination and to substitute in its place its own factual
findings, albeit the reviewing court may be firmly con-
vinced that a mistake has been made by the trier of the
facts.
The precise and appropriate procedure in supplemental
proceedings is governed by Sections 714 to 720, inclusive,
of the California Code of Civil Procedure, and Sections
644 and 645 of the California Code of Civil Procedure.
1Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U. S. 232, 64 S. Ct. 1015, 88 L.
Ed. 1246; De Foe v. Town of. Rutherfordton (C. C. A. 4), 122 F.
2d 342; Schrem.v..Corlucci (D.C. Mich.}), 41 Fed. Supp. 36;
Keering v. Wishnefsky (N. Y.), 52 Fed. Supp. 625, affirmed in
142 F. 2d 1005; Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 61 S. Ct. 176,
311 U.S, 169, 85 L. Ed. 109; Capital Co. vw. Fox, 85 F. 2d 97,
106 A. L. R. 376; Ex parte Boyd, 105 U. S. 647, 26 L. Ed. 1200;
Schram v. Spock, 68 Fed: Supp. 451.
as
The aforesaid Code sections were all enacted in 1872, and
are in pari materia. (They are set out in Appendix II.)?
Under said code sections as judicially construed by the
California law, factual findings made by a master or
referee under a general order of reference are conclusive
upon the reviewing court; and the referee’s determination,
if adopted by the trial judge, constitutes 4 special jury
verdict which the reviewing court is without jurisdictional
power to disturb or reject, if such is based on substantial
evidence under the preponderance evidence rule.
The applicable California substantive law is based on
Sections 824 and 825 of the California Corporations Code,
and Sections 2229, 2236 and 2237 of California Civil
Code (same are set out in the appendix II). Under the
California substantive law based on said Code sections,
respondent Coffman (appellant below), who was the
majority stockholder and director, and president of the
judgment debtor, held the property of the judgment debtor
in trust for petitioner Cobra.
Respondent Coffman was duly served with process
as required by Section 715 of the California Code of
Civil Procedure. In this supplemental proceeding he
was called upon to account for the disappearance and
disposition of the property of the judgment debtor in the
2In Rupley v. Johnson, 120 Cal. App. 2d 548, at page 553, the
Court said: “The rule is well established that all of the statutory
provisions in all of the codes must be read together and harmonized
if possible. In re Porterfield, 28 Cal. 2d 91, at page 100 (168 P.
2d 706, 167 A.L.R. 675): ‘It is a well-recognized rule that for
purposes of statutory construction the codes are to be regarded as
blending into each other and constituting but a single statute. (Cit-
ing cases.)”
inci
latter part of 1945, when the judgment debtor ceased
its wartime operations in which it was hitherto engaged.
The undisputed value of its assets at that time was in
excess of $20,000.00.
Hearings in this supplemental proceeding continued for
over one year, and respondent Coffman was at all times
represented by counsel. A full hearing was had on the
merits before a special master appointed by the United
States District Judge by an order of general reference,
which directed the special master to make findings of
fact and conclusions of law, and no objection to this trial
procedure was voiced by Coffman.
Upon the conclusion of the hearings the special master
submitted two reports to the United States District Judge,
in which he factually found and determined (a) that the
assets of the judgment debtor of the value in excess of
$20,000.00 were wrongfully converted by respondent Coff-
man for his own individual use and benefit, when the
judgment debtor ceased its operations in 1945, (b) that
he also withdrew from the treasury of the judgment deb-
tor the sum of $9,240.46, and (c) that the bookkeeping
entries in the books of the judgment debtor reflecting an
indebtedness from the judgment debtor to Coffman in-
dividually as repayment for his loans and advances to the
judgment debtor lacked verity and integrity. The master’s
two reports were approved and adopted by the United
States District Judge, who entered an order directing
Coffman to pay the judgment obtained by the petitioner
against the judgment debtor. On appeal by Coffman to
the Court of Appeals, the order of the District Judge was
reversed without directions.
a
Petitioners respectfully petition for review of the re-
versal by certiorari and for the reinstatement of the order
of the District Judge. In the order prescribed by Rule
23 of the revised rules of this court, effective July 1,
1954, petitioner represents as follows:
Opinion and Decision of the Court of Appeals.
The opinion and decision of the Court of Appeals is
reported officially in 214 F. 2d 489; and same is appended
to this petition (Appendix I).
Concise Statement of the Grounds on Which the
Jurisdiction of This Court Is Invoked.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals was rendered on
June 28, 1954, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
pursuant thereto, was entered on the same day, June 28,
1954. [Certified typewritten record at page 284.] The
petitioner’s petition for rehearing was filed in due time,
and it was denied by the Court of Appeals on September
1, 1954. [Certified typewritten transcript at page 293.]
“Mithout ds? opinion.Fhe jurisdiction of the Court to re- Le
view the judgment of the Court of Appeals by certiorari
is conferred by Section 1254(1), Title 28, United States
Code Annotated. The jurisdiction of this Court is also
invoked under Rule 19 of the revised rules of this Court
effective July 1, 1954. It is petitioner’s position that the
opinion and decision of the Court of Appeals is erroneous
in the following fundamental respects:
(a) It is in irreconcilable conflict with the procedural
law of the State of California, under which factual find-
ings made by a master or referee under a general order of
reference are conclusive upon the reviewing court; and the
reviewing court lacks jurisdictional power to have his
vin
factual determination set aside or annulled or modified,
if it is based on substantial evidence under the prepon-
derance evidence rule.
(b) It is also in conflict with the California substantive
law under which a majority stockholder, director and
officer of an insolvent corporation holds its assets in trust
for the benefit of its creditors under the trust fund doc-
trine; that under no circumstances can Coffman claim
any right, title or interest in the corporate assets of the
judgment debtor adversely to the judgment debtor or its
creditors; that under no circumstances can Coffman as-
sert an offset for repayment of his loans to the judgment
debtor, assuming that such loans were in fact made.
(c) It is also in conflict with the decisions of this
court to the same effect rendered by this Court both prior
and subsequent to the decision in Pepper v. Litton, 308
U. S. 295, 60 S. Ct. 238, 84 L. Ed. 28.
(d) It is also in irreconcilable conflict with the funda-
mental law of the State of California, the Court of Ap-
peals ruling that it was incumbent on the petitioner to
establish Coffman’s wrongful conversion of the trust
assets beyond a reasonable doubt, in face of the fact that
a supplemental proceeding is civil in nature, and not a
criminal prosecution.
(e) It is also in irreconcilable conflict with the Cali-
fornia constitutional and procedural law, since the opinion
of the Court of Appeals impliedly indicates that the juris-
diction of a referee or master sitting in a supplementary
proceeding is akin or similar to the summary jurisdiction
possessed by Federal referees in bankruptcy matters.
(f) It is also in irreconcilable conflict with the funda-
mental constitutional and procedural law of the State of
ssallean
California, which commands the reviewing court to make
an evaluation of the record in order to determine whether
there was substantial evidence to support the factual find-
ings made by the master or the trial judge.*
The Questions Presented for Review.
1. Did the Court of Appeals have jurisdictional power
to annul and reject the factual findings made by the mas-
ter and the trial judge (albeit their factual findings were
supported by substantial evidence) in face of the consti-
tutional and procedural law of the State of California,
which denies the reviewing court such jurisdiction?
2. Did the Court of Appeals commit fundamental
error in ruling that it was incumbent upon the petitioner
to prove Coffman’s wrongful conversion of the assets of
the judgment debtor held by him in trust for the benefit
of the judgment creditor, beyond a reasonable doubt, as
required in criminal prosecutions ?
3. Did the Court of Appeals commit fundamental
error in ruling in effect that Coffman (who was the ma-
jority stockholder, director and president of the judgment
debtor) could with impunity convert to his own use and
benefit the property and assets of the insolvent judgment
debtor in face of the California substantive law that he
had no legal right to do so under any circumstances?
4. Did the Court of Appeals commit fundamental
error in ruling in effect that respondent Coffman had the
right to assert an offset against the property and assets
ne
3In its opinion the Court of Appeals made the statement: “we
do not express nor do we intimate any other conclusion as to the
effect of the evidence.” (Italics supplied.)
a
of the judgment debtor in repayment of his alleged loans
and advances to the judgment debtor, in face of the Cali-
fornia substantive law that such was a clear violation of
his trust duties?
5. Did the Court of Appeals commit fundamental
error in ruling in effect that the jurisdiction of a referee
or master sitting in a supplementary proceeding is akin
or similar to the summary jurisdiction possessed by fed-
eral referees in bankruptcy matters, in face of the con-
stitutional and procedural California law that factual
findings made by a referee or master under a general
order of reference is a “special jury verdict” which is
conclusive upon the reviewing court, and that the review-
ing court has no jurisdictional power to set them aside
if they are based on substantial evidence under the pre-
ponderance evidence rule?
A Concise Statement of the Case.
The controversy between Cobra and the respondent
Coffman arises out of the bankruptcy matter initiated by
Cobra by filing a petition under Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, which resulted in a judgment in favor of
Cobra against the judgment debtor Aircraft in the sum
of $6,254.25. The pertinent prejudgment proceedings in
the bankruptcy matter were as follows:
1, The petition of Cobra for arrangement under Chap-
ter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act was filed in March, 1946;
and the matter was referred to one of the referees in bank-
ruptcy of the District Court for the Southern District
of California, Central Division.
2. Aircraft. claiming to be a creditor, filed in said
bankruptcy matter a verified proof of its claim against
selec
Cobra in the sum of $1,868.16. A counter-claim and off-
set against its claim was filed by Cobra in the bankruptcy
matter [R. p. 5] under Section 68 of the Bankruptcy Act.
3. A hearing was had before the referee on the merits
of their respective claims, to which no objection was
interposed, either by the judgment debtor or respondent
Coffman. At the conclusion of the hearing on the merits
the referee made findings of fact and conclusions of law
and signed an order reading as follows [R. p. 11]:
“It is Hereby Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed
that California Aircraft Engineering Co. has no claim
against the above-entitled estate and that their claim
should be disallowed.
“Tt is Further Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed
that California Aircraft Engineering Co. is indebted
to Cobra Manufacturing Corporation for the sum of
Six Thousand Two Hundred Fifty-four and 25/100
Dollars ($6,254.25).”
The referee’s order was affirmed by the District Judge,
which was entered in the civil docket of the United States
District Court in Book 46 of Judgments at page 696.
[R. p. 4.] The judgment was not appealed from or set
aside, and it became final and was unsatisfied.
4. On July 6, 1950, an execution was issued by the
United States District Court against the judgment deb-
tor [R. pp. 25-26], and it was returned unsatisfied by
the United States Marshal on September 12, 1950.
aniline
Proceedings After Entry of Judgment.
Based on the affidavit of the judgment creditor made
pursuant to Section 715 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure, an order was made by the District Judge who
rendered the aforesaid judgment directing the judgment
debtor and respondent Coffman to submit to an examina-
tion relating to and to account for the disposition and
disappearance of the property of the judgment debtor.
Under an order of general reference the Honorable How-
ard V. Calverley, the United States Commissioner of the
Federal District Court, was appointed special master to
conduct this supplemental proceeding and to make findings
of fact and conclusions of law. This order was duly served
on the judgment debtor and respondent Coffman in accord
with the procedure prescribed by Section 715 of the Cal-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure. Thereafter several hear-
ings were had at which respondent Coffman was at all
times represented by counsel. The hearings lasted for
about a year, and were concluded on June 28, 195%. [R.
p. 48.]
On October 16, 1951, the special master filed his first
report, in which he made the following factual findings:
(a) That Coffman was the cortrolling stockholder,
director and president of the judgment debtor.
(b) That between May 1, 1945 to and including June
30, 1948, Coffman misappropriated for his own use and
benefit the assets of the judgment debtor in fraud of the
judgment creditor.
(c) That Coffman did thereby cause the financial ina-
bility of the judgment debtor to pay the aforesaid judg-
ment.
—1]1—
(d) That Coffman was indebted to the judgment debtor
in the sum of $9,240.46, and that Coffman’s denial of his
indebtedness was made in bad faith.
This report was excepted to by Coffman, and on Coff-
man’s application, a stipulated order of reference was made
and was made and entered by the District Judge to the
master for a factual finding and conclusions of law bear-
ing on the validity and factual integrity of the bookkeep-
ing entries in the books of judgment debtor in regard to
Coffman’s alleged offset against the judgment debtor.
[R. pp. 65-66. ]
Pursuant to this stipulated order of reference the master
made a supplemental factual finding and a conclusion of
law. In his supplemental report the master made the fac-
tual finding that the bookkeeping entries in the books of
the judgment debtor lacked verity and integrity and were
not entitled to credence. [R. p. 81.] The supplemental
report was excepted to by Coffman on the sole ground that
the master’s subsidiary findings therein set forth were not
supported by the evidence. [R. p. 96.]
On August 22, 1952, Coffman filed a motion before the
District Judge for leave to re-argue his objections to the
master’s supplemental report. The motion was based
on the sole ground that the factual findings of the master
were not sustained by the evidence, and that for this sole
reason the master was divested of jurisdiction to hear the
matter. [R. pp. 103-104.]
On October 27, 1952, an order was signed and filed by
the District Judge adopting and approving the master’s
original and supplemental reports and overruling Coff-
man’s exceptions thereto. [R. p. 123.]
— y
The master’s original and supplemental reports [R.
pp. 47, 80] make an elaborate and comprehensive analy-
sis of the evidence; and briefly stated, they are to this
effect :
1. That Coffman was the dominant and controlling
stockholder, as well as the President of the judgment
debtor, and has been such since January 17, 1945; that
Coffman had promoted the formation and organization
of the judgment debtor, and he was at all times in the
exclusive charge and management of the business and as-
sets of the judgment debtor. The finding was supported
by the exhibits in evidence. [Creditor’s Exs. 9, 14, 13,
1, 7.]. These exhibits are referred to and commented on
by the master at pages 83 and 84 of the record. (We are
advised by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals that the
exhibits were forwarded by him to this court, and we
assume that they are before this court.)
In this connection it may be of interest to note that
Coffman’s unsupported assertion before the master that
he was not the majority stockholder, director and president
of the judgment debtor, but that a person bearing the
name of “Brown” was the one who was in charge of the
Aircraft assets and business, was found by the master
and the trial judge to be a fiction. [R. pp. 85-86.] The
opinion of the Court of Appeals indicates that the Court
of Appeals also did not give credence to Coffman’s
“Brown” story, and the fact that Coffman was the domi-
nant controlling stockholder, as well as the president, and
that Coffman occuplied a fiduciary relationship to Cobra,
stands undisputed. (214 F. 2d 490.)
2. That Aircraft was organized in 1943 to engage in
war work, namely in the assembly of aircraft parts; that
esis
at the end of World War II the Aircraft’s contracts with
the Government were all cancelled, and Aircraft ceased
business operations with the exception of “cleaning up”;
that at that time Aircraft had a net worth of $20,190.51
[Creditor’s Ex. 2]; that Coffman did not have money of
his own, and that, upon the cessation of business by Air-
craft, Coffman opened a bank account in his own name do-
ing business as Nash-Wilshire; that in connection with
his individual business, Coffman expended approximately
$6,123.76, at least part of which Coffman admitted be-
longed to the judgment debtor. [R. pp. 87-89.]
3. That beginning with May 1, 1945 to and including
June 30, 1948, Coffman also withdrew from the funds
Stk Siena. APNE OE RO
[R. p. 89.]
4. That Coffman had no funds of his own with which
to operate his individually owned business, and he there-
upon turned to the assets of the judgment debtor, and he
used its assets to establish himself in the personally owned
automobile sales agency called Nash-Wilshire. [R. p. 90.]
(Emphasis supplied.)
5. That the bookkeeping entries in the books of the
judgment debtor which reflected an indebtedness from the
judgment debtor to Coffman individually, lacked integrity ;
that the account relied on by Coffman contained many
payroll entries in 1946, a long time after the judgment
debtor ceased active business operations, and that this
account also contained an entry concerning “Bldg. Arts
Center” which had no connection with the judgment
debtor’s business. The account also contained numerous
other entries which had no relation to the business affairs
of the judgment debtor,
me
The master stated at page 92 of the record as follows:
“The master could not in good conscience place
reliance on the account submitted by Coffman as an
off-set. This view is further substantiated by the
testimony of Albert Boris Silverman, public account-
ant, (Transcript, Vol. 2, page 22), to the effect that
the records of the Aircraft Company show that the
Aircraft Company had been paying Coffman’s bills
as submitted by him to it.”
ee. ee
At pages 92 and 93 the master made the further state-
ment:
“Assuming that the items contained in Exhibit B
are legitimate items, the master is of the opinion that
under the decision of Pepper vs. Litton, supra, and
other cases cited, Coffman, as president, director, and
dominant stockholder of the Aircraft Company, may
not claim an off-set against property held by him in
trust and which he had misappropriated. To permit
him to do so would be to allow Coffman to place
himself in the position of a preferred creditor of the
Aircraft Company, a practice specifically condemned
in the cases cited.”
At pages 90-91 the master made the further statement:
“This theory is expounded in Pepper vs. Litton,
308 U. S. 295, 60 S. Ct. 238, 84 L. Ed. 281, and is
recognized in the following additional cases (citing
cases). Also, in appropriating the assets of this
corporation, Coffman did so in violation of Section
824 of the Corporations Code of California, which
prohibits the distribution of the assets of a corpora-
tion except as authorized in the Code. This diversion
of assets may also be considered an unauthorized and
- unlawful payment of dividends in violation of Section
1500 of said Code, which provides for the funds
out of which dividends may be paid.”
="
We respectfully point out that not a word of evidence
was adduced by Coffman tending to sustain the factual
integrity of his asserted offset against the judgment
debtor. The record will be searched in vain for any evi-
dence tending to refute the factual finding of the master
and of the trial judge that the bookkeeping entries bearing
on Coffman’s offset, were fictitious.
The record shows further [pp. 233-235] that Coffman
was interrogated on the subject of his financial resources;
that Coffman was subpoenaed to produce his records, but
he failed to produce them [R. p. 229]; that Coffman. testi-
fied that he did not know whether he had a bank account
of his own, but he had always “presumed” that he had a
bank account in 1945; and that he did not remember
whether he had any money in his bank account—whether
$100.00, or $1,000.00, or as high as $15,000.00. [R. pp.
235, 226.]
We respectfully submit that the master and the trial
judge were correct in concluding that Coffman’s denial
of his indebtedness to the judgment debtor was not made
in good faith. [R. p. 53.]
We respectfully submit further that the concluding
statement in the opinion of the Court of Appeals reading
, Sane we do not express nor do we intimate any other
conclusion as to the effect of the evidence.” (emphasis
supplied) clearly indicates that the Court of Appeals
did not make an evaluation of the record. It seems that
such evaluation absent, the Court was not justified as a
matter of law to conclude that Coffman's claim was not
fantastic or @ sham.
eeililiisie
Reasons for Granting Certiorari.
' At the outset we respectfully point out the following
undisputed facts:
That the hearings before the special master lasted for
about one year (from August 10, 1950, to and includ-
ing June 28, 1951); and Coffman was represented dur-
ing said numerous hearings by counsel, who at no time
voiced any objection to the jurisdiction of the special
master to make a determination of the factual matters
referred to him by the District Judge.
That at these hearings a complete record was made
on every conceivable factual and legal issue, and Coff-
man testified in respect to all of his dealings with the
judgment debtor, including his dealings bearing on the
factual and legal validity of his claimed offset against the
judgment debtor.
That at no time did Coffman or his counsel object to
this procedure before the special master.
That the record is devoid of a showing on the part of
Coffman that the record was not complete, or that he did
not have his day in court. On the contrary, the record
conclusively shows that the issues involving his dealings
with the judgment debtor, and his asserted equities, were
all presented to the special master for adjudication, and
the judgment creditor and Coffman both adduced evidence
in support of their respective contentions.
That the conversion of the property of the judgment
debtor by appellant Coffman in excess of $20,000.00 was
established conclusively by the documentary evidence, and
also by his sworn admissions made in his answer in the
Superior Court action referred to at page 88 of the
—
record. (Supplemental Report of Master, beginning at
pages 87 of the Record.)
That it was expressly stipulated by appellant in open
court that the factual validity of his offset should be
adjudicated by the special master which stipulation was
made freely and voluntarily.
It is self-evident that Coffman had his day in court
and that he had a fair trial in consonance with the basic
tests and standards emplacent in the concept of “a classic
plenary hearing.” There is no reason for a second trial
in view of the fact that the record herein is complete and
there is no reason why Coffman should seek te delay his
day of judgment by super-technical objections.
With all due respect to the Honorable Court of Ap-
peals, we are constrained to make the statement that the
decision of the Court of Appeals is premised on legalistic
formalism.
It bears repeating and emphasis that the opinion of the
Court of Appeals
(a) Impinges upon the judicial functions of the trier
of the facts who, under the California Constitution, is
the constitutional finder of facts, and whose factual find-
ings are conclusive on the reviewing court.
(b) Adjudicates that proof beyond a reasonable doubt
is required in a supplemental proceeding, which is a civil
proceeding.
(c) Rules in effect that a majority stockholder, direc-
tor and president of an insolvent corporate debtor stands
in the shoes of an innocent third party garnishee; and
that he is not a trustee, this being in direct conflict with
cxliinn
(d) Rules impliedly that a majority stockholder, direc-
tor and president of an insolvent corporate debtor may
with impunity use the funds and property of the insolvent
corporate debtor in payment of, or as security for, ad-
vances or loans made by him to the judgment debtor
without the consent of, or notice to, the creditors, in
violation of the trust fund doctrine, and in violation of
his trust duties under the California Civil Code. (See
Williams v. Flinn and Treacy, 61 Cal. App. 352, 214 Pac.
1024; Saracco Tank etc. v. Platz, 65 Cal. App. 2d 306.)
(e) Rules unequivocally that a majority stockholder,
director and president of an insolvent corporate judgment
debtor may make mere assertions that he has a claim
against the judgment debtor, and that the trier of the
facts must accept such assertions as proof in face of the
evidence that such assertions are devoid of factual and
legal merit.
(f) In effect it encourages and permits a fraudulent
majority stockholder, director and president of an in-
solvent judgment corporate debtor to delay his day of
judgment by his making mere assertions that he has an
offset against the judgment debtor, without proof to
support such assertions.
We respectfully submit that the question presented
subsidiary issues:
(1) The first subsidiary issue involves the construc-
tion of Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure as applied to supplemental proceedings in aid of
Federal judgments and executions. The question presented
by this issue is as follows:
cet
(a) Does the Federal reviewing court have power
and jurisdiction to annul and vacate factual findings
made by the trier of the facts in a supplemental pro-
ceeding, if the reviewing court is of the view that
the findings of the trier of the facts were clearly
erroneous within the meaning of Federal Rule 52(a)?
(b) Or, does the Federal reviewing court lack
such jurisdiction and power, inasmuch (as pointed
out in the introductory statement of this petition)
Federal Rule 69 expressly provides that the State
procedural law, and not the Federal procedural law,
is controlling in supplemental proceedings.
This issue therefore involves a question of federal pro-
cedural law to be applied in supplemental proceedings.
We respectfully submit that this question has not as yet
been decided, and we believe that this question should be
decided by this court for the benefit of the Bar.
2 The second subsidiary issue centers on the power
of the Federal reviewing court to annul and vacate find-
ings made by the trier of the facts in a supplemental pro-
ceeding. It is our position that under the California pro-
cedural law the findings of a referee under a general
order of reference constitutes a special jury verdict. The
problem to be resolved by this court is whether the annul-
ment by the Disteies Court of Appealsof the findings
of the trier of the facts can be reconciled with the deci-
sion of this Court in the early case of Carpentier v. Mont-
gomery, 13 Wall. 480, wherein this Court declared that
the United States Constitution recognized the division of
civil jurisprudence into cases at law and in equity, and
that it is beyond the power of Congress to make any
serious changes in that classification. (It will be noted
—20—
that the procedure under Rule 52 of the Federal Rules
is based on former equity Rule 7014.)
3. The third subsidiary issue centers on the proposi-
tion whether the annulment and vacation of the findings
of the trier of the facts can be justified under the Cali-
fornia Constitution. (Art. VI, Sec. 4a and 4b.) In
construing this constitutional provision the California
Supreme Court stated in People v. Gustierrez, 35 Cal. 2d
721, 727, 221 P. 2d 22, that a jury verdict cannot be
set aside unless the record clearly shows that upon no
hypothesis whatsoever is there substantial evidence to
support the jury verdict. (As heretofore stated, the
finding of the referee is a special verdict. )
We respectfully submit that the questions presented
by the record herein pose special and important reasons
to warrant the issuance of the writ of certiorari prayed
for atid for an order by this Court of reinstating the or-
der of the trial judge in this proceeding. We do earnestly
urge that the opinion of the Court of Appeals is not only
in conflict with the California procedural law and with
the California substantive law, but it is also in conflict
with the decisions of this court referred to in the master’s
supplemental report at page 91 of the record. In our
judgment the opinion of the Court of Appeals also clearly
presents a departure from the accepted and judicial course
of judicial proceedings, which calls for an exercise of
this Court’s power of supervision.
a
Summary of Argument.
Being of the view that extended excerpts from the
California decisions bearing on the questions presented
by this petition may serve best to clarify and fortify our
position stated in the forepart of this petition, we deem
1 advisable to set out such pertinent excerpts in the ap-
pendix. Accordingly, same are set out in appendix II.
Our contentions in support of our position, concisely
stated, are as follows:
I.
There Is a Fundamental and Constitutional Distinction
Between the Jurisdiction of the Federal Appellate
Courts to Review Findings Made by the Trial
Judge Under Rule 52(a) of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and the Jurisdiction of the Reviewing
Court Under the California Constitution, and
Under Sections 644, 645 and 719, Code of Civil
Procedure, All of Which Are in Pari Materia.
Under Rule 52(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
the jurisdiction of the federal appellate court to annul, or
not to accept the findings of a trial judge or of special
masters is not proscribed by any statutory or constitu-
tional limitation; rule 52(a) is based on the practice in
equity that had prevailed prior to the present rules of
civil procedure, and the findings of the trial court were
never conclusive upon the federal appellate courts. While
the findings of the trial court had great weight, the
federal appellate court was not prohibited from setting
them aside if it was left with a definite and firm convic-
tion that a mistake has been committed by the trial judge.
millet
In Grace Brothers:v. Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue, 173 F. 2d 170 (9th Cir.), the Court stated at page
174 as follows:
“It was intended, in all actions tried upon the facts
without a jury, to make applicable the then prevail-
"ing equity practice. Since judicial review of findings
. of trial courts does not have the statutory or consti-
tutional limitation. [on judicial review] of findings by
administrative agencies or by a jury, this Court may
“ peverse findings of fact by a trial court where ‘clearly
erroneous.’ The practice in equity prior to the
present Rules of Civil Procedure was that the find-
ings of a trial court, when dependent upon oral tes-
timony where the candor and credibility of the wit-
nesses would best be judged, had great weight with
the appellate court. The findings were never con-
clusive, however. A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’
when although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed.” (Citing a United States Supreme
Court decision.) (Emphasis supplied.)
“This interpretation is not a new departure. It
merely stresses, as courts of appeal ( including this
court), have done before, that findings are to be given
the effect which they formerly had in equity.” (Cit-
ing Equity Rule 7034, and cases.)
side heinrich tne Goi alien ctied in the foot-
note below.‘
‘National Labor R. Board v. Columbian Co., 26 U.
S. 292, 59'S. Ct. 501, 505; Miller v. Commissioner 0 Int. Revenue,
183 F. 2d. A661 United States v. Gypsum Co., 333.U. S. 364, 395,
68 S. Ct. 525; Byjornsen v. Alasea S.S. Co., 193 F. 2d 433; Pac.
Portiand Cement Co. v. Food Machinery, 178 F. 24 541; ‘Home
son raheic of New York v. Standard Acc. Ins. £% 167 F. 2d 919,
v. Commissioner of Int. Revenue, 203 F. 2d 358.
—23—
II.
Under the Constitution of the State of California the
Trier of the Facts Is a Constitutional Finder of
the Facts, and His Determination (if Supported
by Substantial Evidence) Is Conclusive and Bind-
ing Upon the Reviewing Court, and the Review-
ing Court Has No Jurisdiction to Annul Said
Findi
Under Sections 644 and 645 of the California Code of
Civil Procedure the factual findings of the referee under
the general order of reference had the effect of a special
jury verdict which the reviewing court has no constitu-
tional power to set aside. The issue of the verity and in-
tegrity of books and records is a factual question to be
determined by the referee in the exercise of his sound
discretion and his determination (if supported by sub-
stantial evidence) is conclusive on the reviewing court.
We respectfully submit that the findings of the special
master epitomized in his two reports, which were adopted
by the District Judge, were all supported by substantial
evidence, and that the reviewing court had no constitu-
tional power to reject said testimony or to disregard any
legitimate inferences which were drawn by the trier of
the facts from the evidence before him.
We respectfully submit that Coffman’s testimony was
rejected by the master as lacking integrity and credence,
and his determination, which was adopted by the trial
judge, is conclusive on the reviewing court.
The California authorities in support of this conten-
tion are set forth in appendix II.
—24—
188 &
The Ruling of the Court of Appeais That Proof Be-
yond a Reasonable Doubt Is Required in Supple-
mental Proceedings (Which Are Civil in Nature)
Introduces in the Field of Civil Justice a Revolu-
tionary and Dangerous Concept.
This novel doctrine enunciated by the Court of Appeals
in its opinion is clearly in conflict with the California law,
and is also in conflict with the fundamental law of this
land.
In Cooper v. Spring Valley Water Co., 16 Cal. App.
17, the Court declared, at pages 21 and 22, as follows:
“Tn civil cases the affirmative must be proved, and
when the evidence is contradictory, the decision must
be made according to preponderance of the evidence
..2 (C.C. P., sec. 2061, subd. 5.) In other words
‘the result should follow the preponderance of the
evidence.’ (2 Wharton on Criminal Evidence, 1246),
and this rule applies to all civil cases alike, even
though the theory of the case involves, as it does here,
an accusation of felony. (Citing cases.) This was
declared to be so by our Supreme Court as early as
the case of Ford v. Chambers, 19 Cal. 143.)
* * * * * * * *
“Tt is the generally accepted doctrine in other
jurisdictions that in civil cases, where a criminal act
is directly pleaded or only incidentally involved, such
criminal act may be established by a preponderance
of evidence, (Citing cases.)
“ ‘Tt may be safely asserted that there is no rule of
law sanctioned by the weight of authority which re-
quires the plaintiff in acivil action, even though the
result thereof imputes a crime, to prove his case with
the same certainty that is required in a criminal
prosecution.’ (Citing cases.)”
wile
Section 2061(5), C.-C. P., expressly states that a deci-
sion of the trier of the facts must be according to the pre-
ponderance of the evidence; and Section 2103, C. C. P.
expressly provides that a decision of a referee appointed
by the trial judge must likewise be according to the pre-
ponderance of the evidence.
The preponderance evidence rule equally applies to civil
proceedings involving conversions of assets by a trustee,
and it is sufficient to prove the conversion only by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, and not beyond a reasonable
doubt. (62 A. L. R., 1449.)
IV.
The Good Faith of Coffman’s Denial of His Indebted-
ness to the Judgment Debtor Presents a Factual
Question. The Determination of the Trier of the
Facts That Coffman’s Denial of His Indebtedness
Was Not Made in Good Faith Is Binding and
Conclusive on the Reviewing Court Under the
California Constitution and Under the California
_ Procedural Law.
The leading case of Parker v. Page, 38 Cal 522,
involves a supplemental proceeding under Section 244 of
the Old California Practice Act, the predecessor of the
present California Code of Civil Procedure. At page
525 of this opinion the Supreme Court stated as follows:
« Counsel for the garnishee insist that, un-
der Section 244, when it is alleged that the garnishee
is indebted to the judgment debtor, or has in his
hands property belonging to him, if the fact is de-
nied, the only order which the Court can properly
make is one authorizing the judgment creditor to in-
- stitute an action against the garnishee, in order to
adjudicate the disputed fact in a proceeding having
~~
all the necessary parties before the Court. This ts
undoubtedly true, if the denial be made in good fatth.
The obvious purpose of Section 244 was to entitle
the garnishee, who in good faith, denied that he had
any property of the judgment debtor, or was in any
wise indebted to him, to the benefit of a trial in a
regular action with the proper parties, and before a
jury in a proper case. . . . It may be that the
referee deemed the testimony of the garnishee on this
point so evasive as to discredit it; and when it is
evident that the garnishee is acting in bad faith m
denying his indebtedness to the judgment debtor, and
makes the denial only in form and for purposes of
vexation and delay, the referee may TREAT IT AS
FRAUDULENT, AND DISREGARD IT. The denial of the
debt or the adverse claim to the property, contem-
plated in Section 244, is a claim or denial in good
faith, and not a mere fraudulent sham, resorted to
for purposes of delay. To permit a fraudulent gar-
nishee for the mere purpose of delay, and who, evi-
dently, is acting in bad faith, to avail himself of
Section 244, in order to drive the judgment creditor
to an action against him, would be to pervert the
true purpose of that section, and make it a shield for
fraud, instead of an instrument of justice.” (Em-
phasis ours. ) |
In Finch v. Finch, 12 Cal. App. 274, the Court said at
page 279 as follows:
“It will not: be controverted, we think, that the
court below was not bound by appellant’s denial of
the debt if the undisputed facts showed that the debt
really existed at the time of the service of the said
writ of execution. The mere demal by the garnishee
of the indebtedness which the other averments and ad-
. missions of the parties,show to be an erroneous con-
clusion from the whole transaction certainly should
—~27—
pot be deemed sufficient to divest the court of juris-
diction to make the order provided for im said section
719.” (Italics supplied.)
In Herrlich v. Kaufmann, 99 Cal. 271, the Court after
discussing the historical background, the equitable features
of supplemental proceedings at great length and after con-
cluding that any property which can be reached in equsty
may be now reached in a supplemental proceeding, declared
at pages 274 and 275 as follows:
“The Code of Civil Procedure of this state, from
section 716 to section 721, specifically provides how
a judgment creditor may proceed against a debtor of
his judgment debtor. . Those sections provide (in
brief) that after the issuing of an execution, upon
a showing by affidavit or otherwise that a person
is indebted to the judgment debtor in an amount ex-
ceeding $50, the judge may order such person to
appear and answer concerning such alleged indebted-
ness; if he admits the indebtedness he may be ordered
to apply the amount thereof to the satisfaction of
the judgment; if he denies any indebtedness, and
the denial seems after a hearing to be Bona Fide,
the court or judge may authorize the judgment credi-
‘tor to institute a suit against such person to recover
such alleged debt.” (Italics ours.)
The rule requiring proof by clear and convincing evi-
dence frequently used by the California courts in some
typical cases is only a rule of evidence which is directed
to the trial judge; and under the California law the
decision of the trial judge, if supported by the preponder-
ance of the evidence, meets this rule, and it is conclusive on
the reviewing court.
ii" aan’ Chablis goo, Sith. pesmi, dane
issue under the California law and the decision of the,
wile
trier of the facts that Coffman’s denial of his indebted-
ness was made in bad faith is not reviewable on appeal, and
the reviewing court had no jurisdiction to have this
finding annulled.
The recent California cases on this issue are set out
in Appendix 3.
We respectfully submit that the ruling of the Court of
Appeals that it had the power to reject the findings of
the trial judge and to make its own findings in place
thereof is clearly in conflict with the California con-
stitutional procedural law.
V.
Under the California Law, Coffman Held the Property
of the Judgment Debtor in Trust for the Peti-
. tioner. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals That
Coffman Was a Garnishee Instead of a Trustee,
and That the Denial of His Indebtedness Was Not
a Sham, Is in Conflict With the California Law.
We respectfully submit that the record conclusively
shows Coffman’s conversion of the property and assets
of the judgment debtor in excess of $20,000.00. Same
constituted an indebtedness which can be reached in a
supplemental proceeding. Coffman, being the majority
stockholder, director, and president of the insolvent judg-
ment debtor, held said property in trust for the benefit
of the judgment creditor. Coffman had no legal right
to convert said assets for his own individual use. Being
a trustee, Coffman could not set up a claim to the trust
property adverse to the judgment debtor, and under no
circumstances could he deny title to the property in the
judgment debtor. Being trustee, Coffman could not use
the trust property in payment of his advances and loans
allegedly ‘made by ‘him’ personally to the judgment debtor.
—29—
The California code sections covering this subject are
Sections 824 and 825 of the California Corporations Code,
and Sections 2229, 2232, 2236 and 2237 of the Civil
Code of the State of California. They are set out in
Appendix IT.
The California law which is in agreement with the
uniform law on this subject is well stated in Perry on
Trusts and Trustees. (Vol. 1; 7th Ed., Par. 433, at p.
721.) The learned author states that under no circum-
stances can a trustee set up a claim to trust property ad-
versely to the cestui que trust, and that under no circum-
stances could a trustee deny the title of the beneficiary.
In Purdy v. Johnson, 174 Cal. 521, the California Su-
preme Court ruled that a trustee cannot use trust property
to secure repayment of advances made by him personally,
since such course of procedure, if permitted, would be in
violation of his trust duties under the applicable code
In Saracco Tank Welding Co. v. Platz, 65 Cal. App.
2d 506, the California Court stated as follows:
- “When a corporation becomes insolvent its assets
are held in trust for the benefit of the stockholders
and creditors. In 15A Fletcher’s Cyc. of Corp.,
perm. ed. (1938), section 7369, at page 59, it is
said:
_ “*The theory of the trust fund doctrine is that
all of the assets of a corporation, immediately on its
becoming insolvent, become a trust fund for the
benefit of all of its creditors.” * * *
“ . . The transfer was made without notice to
the plaintiff. The original corporation never there-
after transacted business. That transaction was a
clear breach of trust and rendered the directors liable
—30—
. for the loss thereby sustained to plaintiff. The trans-
fer amounted to a voluntary dissolution of the Nevada
corporation, without providing for the payment of
all of its debts. It resulted in a preference of existing
creditors. Section 40la of the Civil Code provides
that a distribution of assets to the stockholders on
dissolution of the corporation may be made only
‘after determining that all of the known debts and
liabilities . . . have been paid or adequately pro-
vided for.’ This was not done. The directors are
therefore liable for plaintiff's claim.” (Emphasis
supplied. )
‘See, also, the authorities referred to by the master in
his Supplemental Report, which included the authorities
set forth in the footnote below.°
See, also, Sections 4600 to 4619 of the California
Corporations Code, which govern dissolution of corpora-
tions, and Section 4607 of the Corporations Code which
requires that the distribution of the corporate assets be had
under the supervision of the Court. Sections 4608 to
4619 also prescribe the procedure for filing of claims by
creditors against the corporation, and for the determina-
tion by the Court.
Under the provisions of the Corporations Code of the
State of California, Coffman was charged with the duty
to have the judgment debtor corporation dissolved, and to
pay its debts and to distribute its assets in 1945, when
the judgment debtor ceased business operations. It is
well settled under the California law, as stated in the above
5Nixon v. Goodwin, 3 Cal. App. 358; Title Insurance Co. v. Cal.
Dev, Co., 171 Cal. 173; Henson v. Cheynske, 180 Cal. 275, 285;
ESR 9; Taney SE,
—3i—
code sections of the Corporations Code, that im the absence
of such dissolution Coffman's misappropriation of the
assets of the judgment debtor was illegal
Such a course of procedure, however, was not followed
by Coffman; and that instead he used the assets of the
debtor in connection with his own individual
business. It is therefore clear, as a matter of law, that
Coffman cannot claim title to the property which be
held in trust, and that he had no legal or moral right t
use the funds of the judgment debtor for his own use and
benefit as found by the trier of the facts.
It therefore follows as a matter of law that Coffman's
denial of his indebtedness was, as stated by the Cab
fornia Supreme Court, in the Parker case, supra, & mere
fraudulent sham, resorted to for the purpose of delay,
and “to drive the judgment creditor to am action agaimet
him would be to pervert the true purpose” of the remedy
given to a judgment creditor in a supplemental proceeding
under Section 719 of the Code of Civil Procedure “aad
make it a shield for fraud instead of an instrament of
justice.”
The opinion of the Honorable Court of Appeals clearty
indicates that the Court of Appeals failed to follow
through and te apply the California law. This we respect
fully submit was due (a) first to the fact (as the opinion
of the Court expressly states) that the Court of Agpenis
failed to make an evaluation of the record and (6) &
the further fact that the Court erroneously aseumed that
Coffman stood in the shoes of an innocent Gret party
garnishee, and that he was not & truster as prowkied by
the Corporations Code of the State of California and by
the Civil Code sections set forth is Appendix Il.
—32—
We further respectfully submit that the California
authorities relied on by the Court of Appeals (cited in
footnote 12 in the Court’s opinion) have not the remotest
applicability to the present record. Said authorities are
commented on in Appendix IV. It suffices to point
out at this time that none of the cases cited therein and
relied upon by the Court of Appeals involved the status
of a majority stockholder, president and director of an
insolvent corporation, who held the assets of the insolvent
corporate debtor in trust for its creditors.
It is clear that the thesis of the Court’s opinion was not
based on the California law.
Wherefore, petitioner respectfully submits that this pe-
tition presents very important and grave questions, as
stated in the forepart of this petition. Petitioner therefore
prays for a writ of certiorari, directed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, and for the rein-
statement of the order made by the trial judge in this sup-
plemental proceeding, which we respectfully submit was
correct.
Respectfully submitted,
Mitton B. Sarrer,
Attorney for Petitioner.
Exwest R. Utiey, and
Josern BrckKENSTEIN,
Of Counsel.
APPENDIX I.
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Harry J. Coffman, appellant, vs. Cobra Manufacturing
Company, appellee.
No. 13,672. June 28, 1954.
Appeal from the United States District Court, Southern
District of California, Central Division.
Before: Stephens and Fee, Circuit Judges, and James
M. Carter, District Judge.
STEPHENS, Circuit Judge
As will hereinafter more particularly appear, Harry J.
Coffman is here appealing from a judgment of the district
court in a supplementary proceeding’ ordering that he pay
to the Cobra Manufacturing Company the sum of
$6,254.25, together with interest at the rate of six per cent.
per year from November 5, 1947, and costs. The order
is based upon the findings of a special master that Cc ff-
man owed more than the above stated amount to Aircraft
Engineering Company against which Cobra holds an
unsatisfied judgment in the stated amount.
In March, 1946, Cobra filed a petition for an arrange-
ment under Chapter XI* of the Bankruptcy Act. Aircraft
filed a proof of claim’ against Cobra in the sum of
$1,868.16. Such claim was denied by the bankrupt who
tRule 69 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Title 28, U. S.
C. A. ‘ay
*Title 11, U. S. C. A., §701 ef seg. $301 et seg. of the Bank-
ruptcy Act.
*Title 11, U. S. C. A., $93; §57 of the Bankruptcy Act.
pee
also filed a counterclaim and set-off against Aircraft for
$6,254.25.
The referee in bankruptcy conducted a summary hear-
ing on the claim and counterclaim. No objection to the
proceeding was interposed. At the conclusion of the hear-
ing the referee made findings of fact and conclusions of
law denying Aircraft’s claim entirely and entering an order.
awarding Cobra $6;254.25 on its set-off and counterclaim.
The order of the referee, signed May 20, 1947, was taken
to the district judge on a petition for review* and the judge
caused judgment to be entered on November 5, 1947,
affirming the referee’s findings, conclusions, and order.
No appeal was taken therefrom.
The Chapter XI arrangement was completed successfully
on September 14, 1948, and all of the assets remaining
after complete payments in accord with the arrangement,
including the judgment against Aircraft, were returned to
Cobra. Thus, Cobra had an unsatisfied judgment against
Aircraft. Cobra took out execution on the judgment
against Aircraft, entirely free from the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, and it was returned unsatisfied. Whereupon,
Cobra instituted supplementary proceedings under Rule
69 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district
court ordered Coffman (and others) to appear for exami-
nation and a special master was appointed to take testi-
mony telating to the discovery ‘of assets of Aircraft, in-
clusive of such assets as were held by Coffman, and to
report his findings of fact. and conclusions of law to the
‘Title 11, U. S. C, A, $108; $68 of the Bankruptcy Act.
"Title 11, U.S.C. A., 867(c); $39(¢) of the Bankruptcy Act.
saielilis
The special master found that Coffman is now and was
at the time the debt owed to Cobra arose, the dominant
and controlling stockholder, as well as the president, of
Aircraft; that Coffman occupied a fiduciary relationship
to Cobra, a creditor of Aircraft; that Coffman appropri-
ated funds of Aircraft in the amount of $9,240.46 to his
own use and benefit and such an appropriation was wrong-
ful, in breach of trust and directly caused Aircraft’s in-
ability to pay the judgment to Cobra; that although
Coffman denies that he owes Aircraft $9,240.16, the denial
is not in good faith.
Thereafter the district court re-referred the matter to
the special master to determine Coffman’s claim that he
was not indebted to Aircraft since Aircraft owed him
$12,207.39 which must be set-off against the $9,240.46
which he allegedly owed Aircraft. The special master
found that Coffman’s claim “lacks integrity” and held
that Aircraft does not owe Coffman $12,207.39, or any
other sutn.
The district court caused a judgment and order to be
entered adopting the report of the special master and
overruling objections thereto. Coffman appealed.
Coffman first collaterally attacks the judgment which
Cobra obtained against Aircraft in the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. He argues that a condition precedent to any
supplementary proceeding in aid of a judgment is a valid
and enforceable judgment, and that the judgment from
which the instant action springs was totally null and void
since it was outside the summary jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy court wherein it was entertained.
The summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court is
in general limited to proceedings in bankruptcy where the
eal
property is actually or constructively in the possession and
control of the court.° Where the trustee claims property
which: is held adversely and is outside of the court’s
possession, the trustee may institute and maintain action
thereon in summary proceedings in the bankruptcy court
only if the adverse party consents thereto. Otherwise, a
plenary action is necessary.”
Acquiescence in or failure to make a timely objection
to the court’s summary proceedings may constitute consent®
and the right to plenary proceedings may be considered
waived.’ Congress in enacting Section 23(b) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act” has made the consent of an adverse party
defendant in a suit by a trustee in bankruptcy to recover
property which is outside the bankruptcy conrt’s posses-
sion in effect an additional ground for federal jurisdiction.
*Murphy v. Tidlaen Co: 1909, 211 U. S. 562; Cline v. Kaplan,
1944, 323 U. S. 97, 98; Thompson v. Magnolia Co., 1940, 309 U. S.
478, 481; 2 Celie on Bankruptcy, §23.02 et seq.; 5A: Remington
on Bankruptcy, §
fre pnd oe 323 U. S. 7, B; 2° Collier on ‘Bank-
ruptcy; $23.12.
*In B. F. Avery & Sons Co. v. Davis, 5 Cir: 1951, 192 F. 2d
255, it was held that a creditor who had filed a proof of claim had
not impliedly consented to sunmnary adjadication of the trustee's
claim for recovery of a preference. Contra: In re Nathan, S. D
Cal., 1951, 98 F. Supp. 686. See discussion in 2 Collier on Bank-
ruptcy, §23.08[6].
*Cline v. Kaplan, 1944, 323 U.S. 97, 99; In re Hopkins, 2 Gr.,
1916, 229 F. 378; cf. §2(a)(7) of Neg 1952. Amendment to the
rent ie Title 11, U. S.C. A., 811(a)(7), and its "effect
upon Cline i Tehama Roepe Ach Co. v. Comingor,
1902, 184.U. S. 18, 26.
WTitle 11, U. S. C, A., §46(b).
11Shumacher v. Beeler, 1934, 293 U. S. 367; Williams v. Austrian,
1947, 331. U. S. 642, 652. We
idle
But only when acquiescence or consent (a question of
fact) appears can the court go forward to a judgment,
and since the court did go forward in this case it must
be conclusively presumed that all things necessary to
support the judgment are present. All intendments are
presumed in favor of the judgment. Coffman here is
collaterally attacking a judgment of a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction exercising its power within its subject
matter jurisdiction. This can only be done by showing a
fatal defect on the face of the judgment roll, which is
not claimed here.
The question whether the entry of the District Court
of November 5, 1947, was in form or intention a judg-
ment is not here determined.
Tue Proceepincs AFTER TERMINATION OF BANK-
RUPTCY PROCEEDINGS.
Cobra’s execution on its judgment against Aircraft
having been returned unsatisfied, Cobra instituted supple-
mentary proceedings in the district court, entirely distinct
from the bankruptcy proceedings, to discover Aircraft’s
assets and levy thereon. Rule 69(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure provides that:
«“* %* * The procedure on execution in proceed-
ings supplementary to and in aid of a judgment, and
in proceedings on and in aid of execution shall be
in accordance with the practice and procedure of a
state in which the district court is held, existing at
the time the remedy is sought. except that any statute
of the United States governs to the extent that it
is applicable. * * *” zs
—H—
\ The applicable provisions for supplementary proceedings
in California, the state in which the instant proceedings
were held, are fotind in the California Code of Civil
Procedure [C. C. P.] at Sections 714 through 723.
Section 717C. C. P. permits a judge to. order any
Ghseon. wiles 4e.,showm,tmn-orocl.of aldavit.or otherwhe,
to be indebted to the judgment debtor in an amount ex-
ceeding $50.00, to appear before the judge or a referee
appointed by him to atiswer concerning the debt. ‘Under
the provisions of Section 719 C. C. P., “[t]he judge or
referee may order ahy property of the judgment debtor,
not ‘€xempt from execution, in the hands of such debtor,
or any other person, or due to the judgmént debtor, to
be applied toward the satisfaction of the judgment; but
no such order can. be made as to money or property in
the hands of any other person or claimed to be due from
him to the judgment debtor, if such person claims an
interest in the property adverse to the judgment debtor
or denies the debt.” In the latter two circumstances the
judgment creditor may bring a general action ‘against
the adverse claimant, and pending the commencement and
prosecuition to judgment of such ‘an’action, the judge or
referee can forbid the adverse claimant from in any. way
disposing of his interest or debt. Section 720, C. C. P.
-. Coffman. denied and continues to deny any indebtedness
to Aircraft, the judgment debtor, which would be subject to
garnishment. ‘While ‘admitting that he owes Aircraft $9,-
240.46, Coffman contends that his debt to Airtraft ‘is more
than set-off by the sum of $12,207.39 which Aircraft owes
—Jom
him. He therefore contends that under the terms of the
referred to sections of the California Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, he is not subject to the summary treatment of a
supplementary proceeding. He objected thereto before
the special master in the supplementary proceeding, again
before the district judge, and he continues, here to object
in this direct appeal from a judgment rendered against
him in a proceeding in which he was a party.
The special master found that Coffman’s claim of a
set-off was a mere bookkeeping entry which “lacks integ-
rity.” He concluded therefrom that Coffman’s denial of
indebtedness was in bad faith and was no bar to the
supplementary proceeding.
Cobra contends that Coffman’s denial of the debt is in
bad faith, and that since the special master so held, a
summary proceeding was sufficient. Cobra relies on the
case of Parker v. Page, 1869, 38 Cal. 522, wherein the
Supreme Court of California held: “The denial of the
debt or the adverse claim to property, contemplated in
Section [719], is a claim or denial in good faith, and not
a mere fraudulent sham, resorted to for purposes of delay.
To ‘permit a fraudulent garnishee for the mere purpose
of delay, and who, evidently, is acting in bad faith, to
avail himself of Section [719], in order to drive the
judgment creditor to an action against him, would be to
pervert the true purpose of that section, and make it a
shield for fraud, instead of an instrument of justice,”
[at p. 527.] |
2 7
The. situation in» Parker v. Page, swpra, involved a
garnishee who held a fund in which he claimed no personal
interest, but who denied that the judgment debtor had any
interest in the find either. The garnishee claimed only
that he sought to protect himself from any personal
liability to the cestwi que trust for any misapplication of
the fund. None of later California cases pay more than
mere lip service to this Parker v.\Page doctrine.”
While in some circumstances it may be that the bare
denial by the third party that he is indebted to the judg-
ment debtor or that he has possession of property belong-
ing to the:-judgment débtor inay not ‘be sufficient to defeat
the summary procedure provided by §719 C. C..P., a
reasonable prima facie claim to such effect will defeat: it.
If we give the “good faith” principle the wide play con-
tended for by Cobra, then whether Coffman can be exam-
ined under the provisions of §719, C. C. P. depends upon
whether the trier of fact. is impressed: favorably or. un-
favorably as to the sincerity of Coffman’s claims. It
seems to us that it must appear beyond a reasonable doubt
that Coffman’s contentions are so unbelievable, fantastic,
or so palpably. inconsistent that they can but be held to be
eae ae Coffman’s. right to a classical
“es
42 Hartman v. a OE A ETON
1881, $ 9 Cal. 405, 414; Deering v. Richardson-Kimball Co., 1895,
Sir ies acer
in_V. 151 P.-2d
840" BABS 11 Cal Jur. ecuttons ,
18Finch v. Finch, 1909, 12 Cal. hee ox 107 P. 594;
vaniliibiies
plenary hearing can be deneid him. We hold that Coff-
man’s claim does not justify such a determination. We
think the California cases are in accord. Of course, we
do not express nor do we intimate any other conclusion
as to the effect of the evidence.
We conclude that the summary supplementary proceed-
ing was erroneous and that the error requires reversal
of the judgment.
Reversed.
(Endorsed:) Opinion. Filed Jun. 28, 1954. Paul P.
O’Brien, Clerk.
Orpver DrrectinGc FILinc oF OPINION AND FILING AND
RECORDING OF JUDGMENT.
Orperep that the typewritten opinion this day rendered
by this Court in above cause be forthwith filed by the
clerk and that a judgment be filed and recorded in the
minutes of this court in accordance with the opinion ren-
dered.
14See footnote 12, supra.
axfi==
Section 715 of the California Cade of Ciel Procediere
provides that “After the iseming of am execution sqeinet
property and upon pronf by afficterit of 2 party w other
wise to the satisfachom of a page of fhe comet (Gat any
judgment debtor has property which he ammestiy -efeses
to apply toward the satefacton of the paiqgirent. aah
judge may by an order require the jocigment detear
appear, at a specified time and place. before curl snl
or referee appoented by hum ‘o anewer comerrcumg “he came
(This section was enacted in 1872)
Section 717 xf the Calrfornas ( orte of (onl Powers
reads as follows —
“After the tening Gr cetere of ao coetutien aque
property of the fxigment Getter or of any Gee of Me
several deheoes on the tame netyrmene eee rpen res ow
affetavit or other wine ot he catiefertem of fe cetge
thet amy peopom ow cor perature Inne Property 9 mue® Mamie
ee ee
fifty delters (950). the jetge emp. oe ae ort omnis
such person oF corporation, or any e@ieer qe qeeter
thereof, te appear at 0 eperited Geme amet pies Sefer
humor a referee appeinrerd Sy fem seed anwar comeers
ing the came” (Emphasis capplied) (Tite wae ate
enacted in 1872.)
Section 719 of the Cade of Chel Preeetiere conte oe
follows
The pale on cwferee ene) center ey promeety of othe
ed pred det oe et er ammye fooon eeererem ao Re fare
of wach debtor of amy other perv © fine 6 Ge sly
meres dedi © Oe agp coward Re acmiae em te
—}3—
judgment ; but no such order can be made as to money or
property in the hands of any other person or claimed to
be due from him to the judgment debtor, if such person
claims an interest im the property adverse to the judgment
debtor or denies the debt. (Emphasis supplied.) (Enacted
1872.)”
Section 720 of the California Code of Civil Procedure
reads as follows:
“If it appears that a person or corporation, alleged to
have property of the judgment debtor, or to be indebted
to him, claims an interest in the property adverse to him,
or denies the deit, the judgment creditor may maintain
an action against such person or corporation for the
recovery of such interest or debt; and the judge or referee
may by order forbid a transfer or other disposition of
such interest or debt, until an action can be commenced
and prosecuted to judgment. Such order may be modified
or wacated by the judge or referee granting the same,
or the court in which the action is brought, at any time,
upon such terms as may be just. (Emphasis supplied.)
(Enacted in 1872.)”
Section 644 of the California Code of Civil Procedure
reads as follows:
“The finding of the referee or commissioner upon the
whole issue must stand as the finding of the court, and
upon filing of the finding with the clerk of the court, or
with the judge where there is no clerk, judgment may be
entered thereon in the same manner as if the action had
been tried by the court. (Enacted 1872.)”
_—,
—I3}—
Section 645 of the California Code of Civil Procedure
reads as follows:
“The findings of the referee or commissioner may be
excepted to and reviewed in like manner as if made by
the court. When the reference is to report the facts, the
finding reported has the effect of @ special verdict. (Em-
phasis supplied.) (Enacted 1872.)”
Section 824 of the California Corporations Code reads.
as follows:
“Except as provided in this division, the directors of
a corporation shall not authorize or ratify the purchase
by it of its shares, or declare or pay dividends, or author-
ise or ratify the withdrawal or distribution of any part
of its assets among its shareholders.” (Emphasis sup-
plied.)
Section 825 of the California Corporations Code reads
as follows:
“In case of any wilful or negligent violation of Section
824, the directors in office at the time of the violation,
except those who have caused their dissent from the
unlawful action to be entered on the minutes of the meet-
ing at which the action was authorized, and those who
were not present at the time the board acted, ore jointly
and severally liable to the corporation or to its receiver,
liquidator, or trustee in bankruptcy, for the benefit of the
creditors of the corporation or any of them and of the
shareholders and owners of shares at the time of the
violation, for its debts and liabilities existing at the time
of the violation and for the full amount of any loss sus-
tained by such holders and owners of shares, other than
shares upon which any such payment or distribution was
————————_—————
—j4—
made, to the amount of the unlawful dividends, purchase
price, withdrawal, or other distribution.”
Section 2229 of the California Civil Code reads as fol-
lows: “A trustee may not use or deal with the trust
property for his own profit, or for any other purpose
unconnected with the trust, in any manner.”
Section 2232 of the California Civil Code reads as fol-
lows: “No trustee, so long as he remains in the trust,
may undertake another trust adverse in its nature to the
lynne a a ie
out the consent-of the latter.” ~
Section 2236 of the California Civil Code prohibits the
trustee to mingle the trust property with his own. |
Section 2237 of the California Civil Code provides that
a trustee who uses and disposes of the trust property may
be required to account to the beneficiary.
In Cherry v. Hayden, 100 Cal. App. 2d 416, the Appel-
late Court declared at page 419, that the'trier of the facts
is the constitutional finder of the facts. ~
The constitutional prohibition to annul findings of the
trier of facts (if same are supported by substantial evi-
dence) is cogently expounded in the learned opinion of
Judge Shenk in the leading case of Tupman. v. Haber-
kern, 208 Cal. 256. At pages 262 and 263 of the opinion,
the California Supreme Court declared as follows:
(1), Prior to:the adoption of section 444 of Article VI
of the Constitution, in 1914, section 434 of the same ar-
ticle, in: 1926; and section 956a of the Code of Civil
Procedure, in 1927 (Stats. 1927, p. 583), it was firmly
established that an appellate tribunal in this state possesses
om
none of the functions of a jury, and that the sole province
of the court on appeal was to review ‘the action of the
trial court, correct its errors, and thus pass upon questions
of law only. This was the established rule of common
law; Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U. S.. 364
[57 L. Ed. 879, 33 S, Ct. Rep. 523, see, also, Rose’s. U.
S. Notes}.); In. Bauder v: Tyrell, 59 Cal. 99, it was said:
“The trial court: decides as to the facts, the court of re-
view. (in this state) as to questions of law only * * *
it is founded in the essential distinction between the trial
and the appellate court, and grows out of considerations
of jurisdiction; that it is the province of the trial court
to decide questions of fact and of the appellate court to
decide questions of law; that this court can rightfully set
aside a finding for want of evidence only where there ts
no evidence to support it, or where the supporting evidence
isso slight 0s to show abuse of discretion”, —
supplied.) . pire
- Even in criminal cases (where proof beyond a reason-
able doubt is required) the constitution of California ex-
pressly states that the reviewing court has jurisdiction
“on questions of law alone.” -scieepianouienbiesiieoncgetits
and 4b.)
In People v. Gutierrez, 35 Cal. 2d 721, 727 [221 P. 2d
22], the California Supreme Court said: _
“After couvicion ail intendments “are in favor ‘of the
judgment and a verdict will not be set aside unless. the
record clearly shows that spon no hypothesis whatsoever
is there sufficient substantial evidence to support it.” —
phasis supplied.) :
—16—
In Estate of Bristol, 23. Cal. 2d 221, the California
Supreme Court stated at pages 223 and 224, as follows:
''“The'rule as to our province is: “In reviewing the evi-
dence’. . . all conflicts must be resolved in favor of
the respondent, and all legitimate and reasonable infer-
ences indulged in to ‘uphold the verdict if possible. It
is an elementary . . . principle of law, that when a
verdict is attacked as being unsupported, the power of
the appellate court begins and ends with a determination
as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contra-
dicted or uncontradicted, which will support the conclusion
reached by the jury. When two or more inferences can
be reasonably deduced from the facts, the reviewing court
ts without power to substitute its deductions for those
of the trial court.” (Italics added.) The rule quoted is
as applicable in reviewing the finding of a judge as it is
when considering a jury’s verdict. * * * Appellate
courts, therefore, if there be any reasonable doubt as to
the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a finding, should
resolve that doubt in favor of the finding.” (See also
authorities cited in the footnote below. )*
Under Sec. 644, C. C. P.,. the finding of the referee or
commissioner must stand as the finding of the Court, and
under Sec. 645, C. C. P., the finding of the referee has
the effect of a special jury verdict. (Williams v. Flinn &
Treacy, 61 Cal. App. 352, 214 Pac. 1024.)
*Bernicker v. Bernicker, 30 Cal. 2d 439, at pp. 443-445; Kelly v.
Bank of America, 112.Cal. App. 2d. 388; Potter v.. Pacific Coal &
Lhbr. Co., 37 Cal. 2d 592, at pp. 597-598; Estate of Teel, 25 Cal.
2d 520; Lauder v. Wright Investment Co., 126 A. C. A. 167, at
pp. 170-171.
on te
In Rosati v. Heimann, 126 A. C. A. 50 (decided June
16, 1954), an order of reference was made by the State
Superior Court to determine the amount of indebtedness
due from the defendant to the plaintiff. In passing upon
the legal effect of the evidence under the “Uniform Busi-
ness Records as Evidence Act” (C. C. P., Secs. 1953e-
1953h), Judge Moore, speaking for the unanimous court,
declared as follows:
“Whether a book of accounts meets the requirements
of the law either as to the proximity of the entries to the —
date of the transaction or as to the accuracy of the entries, :
is a question to be determined by the trial court in the
exercise of a sound discretion.” (Emphasis added.)
The factual findings of the referee there were ap-
proved by the Superior Judge, and the appellate court
ruled that said findings were conclusive upon the review-
ing court.
Section 19 of Article VI of the Constitution of Cali-
fornia provides:
“The court may instruct the jury regarding the law
applicable to the facts of the case, and may make such
comment on the evidence and the testimony and credibility
of any witness as in its opinion is necessary for the
proper determination of the case. The court shall inform
the jury in all cases that the jurors are the exclusive
judges of all questions of fact submitted to them and of
the credibility of the witnesses.” (Emphasis added.)
It is the recognized and traditional rule that an issue
of fact becomes an issue of law only where the evidence
is such that only one conclusion can be reached by reason-
able minds. In other words, if the evidence is such that
eile
reasonable minds might differ as to the conclusion to be
reached; the issue is one of fact and not law, and an
appellate court 1s bound by the determination of the trier
of facts.
Sections 719 and 644 and 645 of the California Code
of Civil Procedure were all enacted in the same year
(in 1872). They are all im pari materia and the deter-
mination of the trier of the facts has the effect of a special
jury verdict, which is conclusive and binding on the re-
viewing court under the California Constitution. The de-
cision in the garnishment Hartman case (the first case
referred to in footnote 12 of the opinion) was handed
down about fourteen years before the enactment of Sec-
tions 719, 644 and 645 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure.
=
APPENDIX III.
In re Jost, 117 Cal. App. 2d 379, involved a naturaliza-
tion proceeding in which the application for naturaliza-
tion was opposed by the government on the ground that
the applicant was guilty of bad faith in that he had
previously claimed an exemption from military service on
the ground that he was a conscientious objector. The
question of his bad faith was the crucial issue in the case.
The court declared that the burden of proof was upon
the government to prove the bad faith of the applicant
by “clear and convincing evidence,” and “clear, explicit,
unequivocal evidence, so clear as to leave no substantial
doubt, and sufficiently strong to command the unhesitat-
ing assent of every reasonable min ”” The court ruled
that this rule was directed to the trial judge, and in
passing on the effect of substantial evidence under this
rule, the court declared, at pages 387 and 388, as fol-
lows: .
“No citation of authority should be necessary to demon-
strate our position in respect to such a finding. (3) This
court’s. duty, on appeal, begins and ends with the in-
quiry whether the trial court had before it evidence upon
which an unprejudiced mind might reasonably have reached
the same conclusion which was reached. * * * (4)
When the evidence is conflicting, it will be presumed
that the court found every fact necessary to support its
order that the evidence would justify. (5) So far as
the court has passed upon the weight of the evidence or
credibility of witnesses, its implied findings are conelu-
sive even when based upon conflicting affidavits, and
where the conflict is not sharp but only such as to create
an uncertainty in the mind of the judge. (Hyde v. Boyle,
——
105 Cal. 102 (38 Pac.'643); Kern Valley Bank v. Koehn,
10 Cal, App. 679 (103 Pac. 173).)
In LaJolla Casa de Manana v. Hopkins, 98 Cal. App.
2d 339° (219 P. 2d 871), this court said:
-*& witness may be contradicted by the facts he states
as completely as by direct adverse testimony, and there
may be so many omissions in his account of particular
transactions or of his own conduct as to discredit his
whole story. His manner of testifying may give rise
to doubts of his sincerity and create the impression
that he is giving a wrong coloring to material facts . . .
Where conflicting inferences may be drawn from testi-
mony, this court is bound by the findings of the trial
court as conclusively as in other cases of conflict.’
“(6) If the finding of fact is based upon a reasonable
inference it is not within the power of an appellate court
to set it aside any more than it is within its power to set
aside any other finding supported by any legal evidence.
An appellate court cannot review a finding because in its
judgment the inference adduced by the trial court is im-
probable or more unlikely to be true than the opposite one.
Such a finding is as completely a finding based upon good
and ‘sufficient evidence as any other finding of fact.”
(Petition for hearing in the Supreme Court was denied.)
In Wilcox v. Salomone, 118 Cal. App. 2d 704 at page
710, the Court stated. as follows: .
“T1] It is presumed that a deed absolute on its face
is what it purports to be. (17 Cal. Jur., Mortgages,
§§56 and 57, and cases cited therein.) [2] However,
it is a well settled rule that a deed absolute in form may
be:shawn to have been intended as.a mortgage, and that.
such a deed’is a mortgage if intended as security for the
pein aes aren ——
— ,
performance of an obligation. (17 Cal. Jur., Mortgages,
841; Civ. Code, §2924.) [3, 4] The burden of proving
that a deed absolute is a mortgage rests upon the party
who alleges it, and the evidence must be clear, satisfac-
tory and convincing; unequivocal and indisputable. (17
Cal. Jur., Mortgages, §§58, 59.) [5] Whether the evi-
dence to show that a deed was intended as a mortgage is
clear and convincing is a question for the trial court, whose
determination on conflicting evidence is not reviewable on
appeal.” (Emphasis supplied. )
In Thomasset v. Thomasset, reported in 122 A. C. A.
(Dec. 1953), 148 at page 155, the Court said:
[4] There are expressions in the decision to the ef-
fect that the separate character of property acquired after
marriage is to be established by “clear and convincing
evidence,” “clear and decisive proof;’ “clear and satis-
factory proof.” (Citing cases.) These expressions state
a rule of evidence directed to the trial court; and if that
court finds that the evidence meets the rule, a reviewing
court must accept that determination as conclusive if there
is substantial evidence to support it. (Citing cases. )
The decision of the trier of fact must be according to
the preponderance of evidence. (C. C. P., Secs. 2061(5),
2103.) [5] Whether the evidence adduced to overcome
the presumption of community property is sufficient for
the purpose is a question of fact for the trial court. (Cit-
ing cases. )
In Perske v. Perske, 125 A. C. A. 946 at page 952 (de-
cided June 9, 1954), the Court states:
“Appellant urges that, under this evidence, the trial
court was bound by the doctor’s and her testimony, inas-
much as such testimony was uncontradicted, and was
—22—
without power to disregard it. [4] Of course, a trial
court cannot arbitrarily disregard -uncontradicted testi-
mony. [lc] But where, as here, the trial court (by
with appellant’s funds) has necessarily found that the
so-called uncontradicted evidence was false, an appellate
court will not interfere if there is any basis at all to
support the trial court * * * The trial judge is the
arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses. A witness
may be contradicted by the facts he states as completely
as by direct adverse testimony, and there may be so many
omissions in his account of particular transactions or of
his own conduct as to discredit his whole story. His man-
ner of testifying may give rise to doubts of his sincerity
and create the impression that he is giving a wrong color-
ing to material facts. (Citing cases.)” (Emphasis sup-
plied.)
aor i Seg ae RS RR AN ALE
Cal. App. 2d 567, at p. 573; LaJolla etc.
. 2d 339, at pp. 345-346, 219 P. 2d 871;
Cal. App, 2d , at pp. 27-28, 260 P. 2d
. App: 24 46S, ‘at’ pp: 466-7, 261
—23—
APPENDIX IV.
Comment on decisions cited in footnote 12 of the Court's
opinion, at page 6:
The Wolfjen v. Dolton case, 24 Cal. 2d 878, has not
the remotest kinship to the factual situation presented by
the present record. It did not involve a supplemental pro-
ceeding, and it did not concern the construction of either
Section 719 or of 720, C. C. P. Nor did it involve the
constitutional question whether the findings of the trial
court were conclusive and binding upon the reviewing
court. It was an action in equity, instituted by the judg-
ment-creditor against directors of the debtor corporation,
praying for judgment declaring that the defendants were
holding moneys for the use and benefit of the corpora-
tion. Upon conclusion of the plaintiff's case, a judgment
of nonsuit was granted and the case reached the Supreme
Court on an appeal from this judgment. The prima facie
case established by the plaintiff’s proofs was as follows :
(1) That the defendants had borrowed from a bank
substantial sums of money and with the money so bor-
rowed, and other funds, they organized the debtor corpo-
ration, of which they subsequently became its directors.
(2) That upon its incorporation the debtor corporation
and the defendants entered into a valid and binding con-
tract providing that the loans made by the defendants
should be repaid by the debtor corporation “out of the
first net earnings” (emphasis by the Court).
(3) That notwithstanding the fact that the debtor cor-
poration had at no time earned any income (p. 882), the
defendants withdrew funds from the debtor corporation
in repayment of the loans advanced to the debtor corpo-
i
ration prior to its incorporation in vidlation of said writ-
ten contract.
(4) That a demand was made by the judgment-<rediter
upon the defendants that suit be instituted by the corpo
ration for the recovery of said funds, which demand was
not complied with by the defendants.
Upon the conclusion of plaintiff's proofs, the defendants
made a motion for a nonauit, basing their comtention on
the ground that plaintiff had an adequate remedy at ew
inasmuch as plaintiff's remedy was confined to a supple
mental proceeding.
In reversing the judgment of soneuit, the Supreme
Court ruled as follows:
(1) That the remedy provided by « supplemental pro
ceeding was not exclusive of any other remedy which may
be available to a judgment-creditor.
(2) That the judgment creditor was act precheded from
resorting to an action in equity inasmuch as bie remedy
under a supplemental proceeding was sot acderpaste
(3) That plaintiff made out a prime facw cose and had
established a clear breach of contract om the part of the
defendants, since the contract provided that Ge leace
made by the defendants were to be repel cat of the
first net earnings and sot cut of the property or aesete
of the judgment-debtor.
(4) That the lower court had ao legal right grant
a judgment of nonswit for the reasem that the plmcntil® Muact
established a pruma facw case
(S$) That the defendants shoukt have been compeilet
chew
to present such evidence as they mugte heawe a thew de
fense to the breach of sant comtract om ew part
— =
Be parte Mellin, 99 Cob GR, Genie or Geeener
proeeerhmg sad an sgplicacem ter Gaeterge epee 6 on
of Rabens corpun be Ge case opmditews af 6 <argererten
Net Sind ¢ petition a Ge are Saget (rt a tee
the corgerscen adage en aectantery aantmee cemier
the prowuneme of am Ret of he Sqpaimemers seeevtlind Sow
aot coampliod oth Wy Re pecitiener yom We eters
comme) 0tR Ne cmeatonr ¢ Remand et tee wae mim Or
CO ed
shell wet Se etinetgaed grlibe of <omemmmne of mere ot
why Ne owht wet Gere eer Re eater Re enete
id
perihcmee femme ‘Par We Ned wry mene + hese etme
ing Re orgereeicm ceeant Nar We Net <finesned cece
ee aed
aperion Cimrt Wend ae vercaniioniemn fe Segre ee
crac Re therm amg ageing ememmwenent 6 ome
Ws Den eg peewee eet We eerncemet rm
pmcny emnioee te eae silos ceed tetas ee my ce
—2—
effects as trustee for the estate of the insolvent debtor.
. . .” (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court further held that the petitioner was not an
offeer of the court and not a party to the proceedings in
insolvency, and that he claimed the property in his pos-
session adverse to all the world. The Court further held
that the petitioner had good title to the property, though
it may hawe been obtained by fraudulent and corrupt prac-
tiees between him and his grantor, “except creditors and
subsequent purchasers of the grantor.” (At p. 413.)
Without further burdening the Court with excerpts
from this case, it is sufficient to point out (a) that Coff-
man was not a garnishee; (b) that Coffman was a trustee
who could not assert any tithe against the judgment-credi-
tor, and had no interest adverse to the insolvent corpora-
tion; and (c) that the proofs in the instant proceeding
revealed, ar @ matter of low, that the property was the
property of the judgment-<deltor, which Coffman held in
trust for the judgment-creditor.
Lewis +. Chamberlain (108 Cal. 525, 41 Pac. 413) also
involved the relationship between a judgment-debtor and a
third party garnishee. In this case the garnishee (the
wife of the jedgment-<dettor) Gled a written and verified
anewer specifically denying that the property in her
possession was the property of the judgment-deltor, and
specifically asserting under cath that the property was
her own property. No euch verified answer was filed
by Coffeen: and the record shows beyond dispute, and
at @ matter of lew, that the property was the property
of the rmdgament debtow amd that \ offmam heid rad prop-
erty wm trust for the padgment-<reditor.
—-27--
Deering v. Richardson-Kimbal Co. (109 Cal. 73, 41
Pac. 801) also involved a relationship between the judg-
ment-debtor and an innocent garnishee. It also involved
claims of other persons who claimed liens upon the money
in the possession of the garnishee bank. The trial judge
expressly found that there was no pretense of bad faith
om the part of the bank (p. 83). In the case at bar, as
against the judgment-debtor was made in bad faith.
Clearly, Coffman's position is not analogous to the posi-
tion of the bank, who was an innocent party. The fact
that the garnishee bank was acting in good faith, was an
undisputed fact. It was further wadenied that the claims
of the other parties who claimed liens upon the money in
the possession of the bank were made in good faith.
The early case of Hartman v. Olvera, 51 Cal. 501, in-
volves the legal relationship existing between a judgment-
debtor and a third party garnishee, and it does not in-
volve or touch upon the legal and equitable relationship
existing between an insolvent corporate judgment-debtor
and its majority stockholders, officers and directors (like
in the case at bar). Furthermore, it should be noted:
(a) That this case was decided prior to the adoption
of Sections 644 and 645 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which were enacted in 1872. Under said sections the
finding of a referee under a general order of reference
has the effect of a special jury verdict, and such determina-
tion cannot be constitutionally disturbed by the reviewing
court.
(b) That the constitutional limitation imposed by the
California constitution on the power of the reviewing
a
court to disturb findings of trial judges or of referees
under orders of general reference, was not discussed in the
> *«
(c) Under Section 644 of the Code of Civil Procedure
the finding of the referee or commissioner must stand as
the findings of the Court, and upon filing of the finding
with the clerk of the court, judgment may be entered
thereon in the same manner as if the action had been
tried by the Court. Said section, as previously pointed
out, was enacted in 1872, about fourteen years subsequent
to the decision in Hartman v. Olvera, supra. Section 645
was likewise enacted about fourteen years after the deci-
sion in Hartman v. Olvera, supra; and Section 719, C. C.
P., were also enacted in 1872.
TOPICAL INDEX
PAGE
Judgment of the Court of Appeals 3
Dissenting opinion of Judge Carter on Cobra’s petition for re-
hearing 3
Additional California citations 6
Additional questions presented and reasons for granting cer-
tiorari 8
Conclusion 10
Appendices :
Appendix “A.” Judgment App. p. 1
Appendix “B.” Dissenting opinion on petition for rehear-
ing . App. p. 2
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
Cases PAGE
Buffmum v. Barceloux Company, 289 U. S. 227, 53 S. Ct. 539... 8
Finch v. Finch, 12 Cal. App. 274. 10
Nixon v. Goodwin, 3 Cal. App. 358. 6
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 60 S. Ct. 238. 8
Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co., 37 Cal. 2d 592, 234 P.
2d 16
Sanford y. Sanford, 139 U. S. 642, 11 S. Ct. 666..
Stuard v. Larson, 298 Fed. 223
Title Ins. Co. v. California Dev. Co., 171 Cal. 173
Van Sweringen Company, In re, 119 F. 2d 231
Ruizs
Rules of the United States Supreme Court, Rule OCS Peiciteniei: &
TEXTBOOKS
Lewin on Trusts (13th Ed.), pp. 11, 191
Maitland’s Equity (2d Ed.), pp. 43, 80, 83
1 Perry on Trusts and Trustees (6th Ed.), Sec. 13, p. 1.
1 Perry on Trusts and Trustees (6th Ed.), Sec. 206, p. 355...
1 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence (2d Ed.), Sec. 155... ie
2 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence (3rd Ed.), Sec. 956......... “i
3 Reed on Statute of Frauds (1st Ed.), Sec. 595, p. 61
2 Restatement of Law of Trusts, p. 1249
26 Ruling Case Law, p. 1232
Waterman, Specific Performance (ist Ed.), Sec. 251, p. 341...
Se eee ee mee oeeee
oN © & WD
eemenncescce
aanmnnannwnu nan wm
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1954
No. 380
Cosra MANUFACTURING COMPANY, a California corpora-
tion,
Petitioner,
Harry J. CoFFMAN,
Respondent.
Snel
SUPPLEMENT TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI.
————
To the Honorable Chief Justice Earl Warren, and the
Honorable Associate Justices of the Supreme Court
of the United States:
This supplement to the pending Petition for Writ of
Certiorari is predicated on the certified typewritten sup-
plemental transcript of the record, and on the dissenting
opinion of District Judge Carter therein included, which
were transmitted to this court on October 14, 1954, four-
teen days after the instant petition for certiorari had been
duly filed and docketed. We respectfully submit that the
potent and illuminating dissenting opinion of Judge
Carter, hereinafter referred to, cogently demonstrates
that the reversal by the Court of Appeals of the factual
dit
findings and of the order of the trial judge raises ques-
tions both fundamental and far-reaching in the adminis-
tration of Federal civil justice in the field of the trust
and corporation law, The specific questions raised con-
cern the subject of the fiduciary obligations and duties
imposed on a dominant stockholder and executive officer
and director of an insolvent judgment debtor towards its
creditors under the trust fund doctrine. We therefore
respectfully petition this Honorable Court for leave to
supplement. the pending petition for certiorari with the
hereinafter stated additional allegations and grounds,
which in the light of the supplemental transcript were not
adequately stated in the original petition. |
At the outset and at expense of repetition we wish to
reemphasize that the opinion of the Court of Appeals
(reported in 214 Fed. (2d Series), beginning at p. 489
and appended to the petition for certiorari as Appendix 1)
clearly reveals that the Court of Appeals did not make an
appraisal of the factual situation established by the record,
in compliance with the California constitutional and pro-
cedural law which imposes a duty on the reviewing court
to study and analyze the record “for the purpose of de-
termining whether or not there is any evidence of a
substantial character which reasonably supports the judg-
ment of the trial court.”
1By stipulation of counsel for the petitioner and the respondent
ete neces ba the time for filing of the respon-
to the petition for certiorari was extended
to November 29, 1954. 1954. We were advised by the respondents’ coun-
3 eden Pacific Coast Lumber Co., 37 Cal. 2d 592, 598, 234 P.
oie Te
Judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was ordered to
be recorded in the minutes of the Court of Appeals to be
in accordance with the aforesaid opinion. It is appended
hereto as Appendix A.°
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Carter on Cobra’s
Petition for Rehearing.
The dissenting opinion of Judge Carter transmitted to
this court as part of the supplemental record was filed in
the Court of Appeals on October 12, 1954, and is ap-
pended hereto as Appendix B. It has not been as yet
published in the official reports.
Judge Carter’s opinion on Cobra’s petition for rehear-
ing in the Court of Appeals reveals that he (unlike the
majority of the court) made a careful analysis of the
record in consonnance with the mandate of the California
Constitution. In his opinion, Judge Carter stated, inter
alia, as follows:
(1) That the opinion of the Coiart of Appeals
“presents a grave miscarriage of justice and permits
Coffman to profit by his own wrong” and to permit
Coffman to assert his offset “perverts all sense of
justice and equity.”
(2) “The Master has succinctly stated in his sup-
plemental report ‘that under the decision of Pepper v.
Litton (308 U. S. 295) Coffman . . . may not
ssl
claim the setoff against the property held by him in
_ trust, and which he had misappropriated. To permit
him to do so would be to allow Coffman to pla
himself in the position of a preferred creditor ot
(3) “The Master was right as rain. When Coff-
‘sappropriated the sum of $9,240.46 of
the funds of Aircraft as found by the Master, he
then became an involuntary trustee holding that
money in trust for the creditors of Aircraft, includ-
ing Cobra. To permit him to setoff against these
sense of justice or equity. He makes himself, by
his own act, a preferred creditor of Aircraft. He
takes advantage of his wrong in appropriating Air-
craft’s funds to have them in his possession and thus
attempt to effect his claimed setoff.”
(4) That under the California law Coffman may
not legally use his purported setoff either in a sum-
mary or plenary proceeding, since:
“(a) He obtained the $9,240.46 wrongfully
and was an involuntary trustee of the money and
liable therefor ;
(b) His receipt of the money was im violation
of the corporation law of California which made
him a trustee of the funds and liable therefor;
(c) Any attempt to set off the $12,000. pur-
portedly due from Aircraft would be permitting
him to profit by his own wrong, namely effect-
ing a setoff solely because he had wrongful pos-
session of the $9,240.46;
sali
(d) Any attempted setoff of the $12,000
would be permitting him to prefer himself to
an earlier creditor ;
(e) Setoff must be mutual and there is no
mutuality here since one obligation is that of an
involuntary trustee, the other of any (sic) in-
dividual ;
(£) Though setoff in California is self execut-
ing, the claims do not compensate in the ab-
sence of mutuality;
(g) §719 C. C. P. provides a remedy within
the jurisdiction of the Master and the district
court whether Coffman holds property for Air-
craft or owes money to Aircraft.” (Italics by
the Court.)
And
“Since the district court and Master exercised
jurisdiction under §719 C. C. P., and since Coff-
man may not legally set-off his individual claim
of $12,000 against his trustee obligation, the court
was in error in reversing the judgment of the
district court and the rehearing should have been
granted and our prior decision set aside.”
We respectfully submit that the opinion of Judge Carter
states the well-established California law. It is also in
accord with the well-established fundamental proposition
that a trustee may not take advantage of his own wrong.‘
*Maitland’s Equity (2d Ed.), p. 80; Maitland’s ity (2d Ed.),
43, 83; Lewin on Trusts (13th Ed.), 191, 11; 1 on
rusts and Trustees (6th Ed.), 10, Sec. 13; 26 Ruling Case
Ss
In 1 Pomeroy Equity jartaprudenee (det Fd Sector
18S. the author says @ citing mary cases
respectfully invite the attention of the court t @e © afb
fornm leading case of Verve e (onto ai Sop
The corert caf at page: I) amet et ce follows
“The vale & hat @ Grete of ce eet? ce
poration cammet rereree % Simeel any orefersnre or
eivemtage ower offer creviter: om ihe omer of te
dete (Remmey © Tiley, 107 Col (Pe O))
"Mer would cart ¢ treme Ger comme omer Re pee
wee of Seetion B45) of he (hed (are ohers 6
dobtce may pay me creditor am weteremrs w nnther
may give te ome crediter weurty fr fe
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state of @ heme fede gorensher amd the relationship that
evtete tetrewre an ordinary pudgment debtor and creditor
th te leer Gat he majority opine of the court bs in
Great cilieee wt Ge Californie lew co this pivoul
pevere
Adéteoma, Quetone Preaented and Reasons for
Gremting Certiorart.
We reepectfelly pray leave of thts Honorable Court
to eres errder thee beedimg the following eckiitional
crams
(1) ‘Tit the begiied bolting of the Court of Ap
peek thet (Coffeen stces! a the shore of a garniher
mened of terumg 0 trenter @ shee @ comfact with the
Gees of Oe coertt & Poppe © Lites, ceed
edge (arte: opm amd oo Befemem 5 fer cious
Comtesse, OU S 27.05 CO Ae.
le Perper © Latee, SEU S OS @S CO. IM,
M+ pesmtaew Cnemgies stated the femeiammrmta! law to
te Get 6 Grerter @ 6 Gbertery and wo @ 6 Gomenant
ont comtreiieg eecbbeieer, end thet the powers
or peme: reet
(2) The qpieiee of Ge Court of Appeals & the
cum ot ber @ chee & conflict wath the Grete of
Ge © ent G@ Crom
te Deed © Lareee, 298 Ped 22), Ge Court of Ap
goede for Gee BR Cree eteted ae follows on pagre 277.
still:
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Conclusion.
Petitioner respectfully submits that the opinion of the
Court of Appeals, written by Circuit Judge Stephens,
when read in the light of the factual situation and the
fundamental trust and corporation law carefully evaluated
and analyzed by Judge Carter in his dissenting opinion,
conclusively demonstrates a gross miscarriage of civil
justice both under the Federal law and the law of the
State of California. As stated by Judge Carter, the
opinion “perverts all sense of justice and equity.” Also,
as stated by the California Appellate Court in Finch v.
Finch, 12 Cal. App. 274 at 279:
“It will not be controverted, we think, that the
court below was not bound by appellant's denial of
the debt if the undisputed facts showed that the debt
really existed at the time of the service of the said
writ of execution. The mere denial by the garnishee
of the indebtedness which the other averments and
admissions of the parties show to be an erroneous
conclusion from the whole transaction certainly
should not be deemed sufficient to divest the court of
jurisdiction to make the order provided for in said
section 719.” (Italics supplied.)
The instant controversy, we respectfully submit, is not
a private controversy between the respondent, the fraudu-
lent trustee, amd Cobra, the cestui que trust. In our
judgment, the opinion of the Court of Appeals constitutes
a revolutionary and unprecedented reversal of the funda-
mental law established by the California Constitution
and decisions and that it is also in conflict with the deci-
sions of this Honorable Court and of the Courts of
Appeals of other circuits.
—]1—
In effect the opinion of the majority of the Court of
Appeals herein declares as follows:
1. That the Court of Appeals is not bound by the
California Constitution under which the trier of the facts
is the constitutional finder of facts, whose factual findings
are conclusive on the reviewing court if same are sup-
ported by a fair preponderance of the evidence.
2. That it is not bound by the California law which
imposes a duty on the reviewing court to make an evalua-
tion of the record in order to determine whether the
evidence reasonably supported the judgment of the trial
court.
3. That a dominant stockholder and an executive
officer and director of an insolvent corporate debtor does
not hold the debtor’s property im trust for its creditors,
but that he stands in the shoes of a bona fide garnishee,
and that as such he is liberated from the sanctions im-
posed on him by the California trust and corporation law.
4. That the burden of proof is not cast on the fraudu-
lent dominant stockholder or executive officer and director
to account for his conversion of the trust property.
5. That in a supplemental proceeding, which is a pro-
ceeding of a civil nature, the burden of proof is cast on
the cestui que trust to establish beyond a reasonable doubt
that the claim of the dominant stockholder and executive
officer and director of an insolvent corporation against
the trust property in his wrongful possession is not fan-
tastic or palpably inconsistent; and also that his mere
assertion of a claim against the trust property ousts the
trier of the facts of jurisdiction to pass upon the factizal
validity of such an assertion.
‘ect cs
We respectfully submit that these are grave and im- ©
portant questions in the administration of civil justice in
aid of the enforceability of a federal judgment rendered
in a bankruptcy matter. Also that the opinion of the
majority of the Court of Appeals herein presents a case
of a clear departure from the accepted and usual course
of judicial proceedings as to call for the exercise of this
court’s power of supervision. .
We respectfully submit that the petitioner is entitled
to an order of this court vacating the decision of the
Court of Appeals and directing reinstatement of the
order of the trial District Judge.
Respectfully submitted,
Mitton B. SAFIEr,
Attorney for Petitioner.
Ernest R. UT ey, and
Josera B. BECKENSTEIN,
Of Counsel for Petitioner.
Appendix “A.”
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Harry J. Coffman, Appellant, vs: Cobra Manufactur-
ing Company, Appellee. No. 13,672.
JUDGMENT.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California, Central Division.
This Cause came on to be heard on the Transcript
of the Record from the United States District Court for
the Southern District of California, Central Division,
and was duly submitted.
On Consideration Whereof, It is now here ordered and
adjudged by this Court, that the order of the said Dis-
trict Court in this Cause be, and hereby is reversed, with
costs in favor of the Appellant and against the Appellee.
It Is Further Ordered and adjudged by this Court
that the Appellant recover against the Appellee for his
costs herein expended and have execution therefor.
(Endorsed) Judgment. Filed and entered June 28,
1954. Paul P. O’Brien, Clerk.
pS ees
Appendix “B.”
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Harry J. Coffman, Appellant, vs. Cobra Manufactur-
ing Company, Appellee. No. 13,672, Oct. 12, 1954.
DISSENTING OPINION ON PETITION FOR REHEARING.
Carter, James M., District Judge.
We originally concurred in Judge Stephens’ opinion
holding that under California law [Secs. 717, 719, 720
Code of Civil Procedure] Coffman was entitled to the
benefit of a plenary action to determine his claimed set-off
against the moneys found due by the Master from Coff-
man to Aircraft, arising from Coffman’s misappropria-
tions.
If Coffman may legally press this claim of set-off, we
are still in accord with the decision that Coffman is en-
titled to a plenary proceeding in which to assert the set-
off.
But after the petition for rehearing was filed we again
examined the whole case and we are convinced that Coff-
man should not be permitted anywhere, in summary or
plenary proceedings, to pursue his alleged set-off. Since
there was ample evidence to support the Master’s findings
of Coffman’s appropriations from Aircraft, and his debt
to Aircraft arising therefrom, this was properly deter-
mined in the summary proceedings under Sec. 719 C. C. P.
and the judgment of the trial court should have been
affirmed.
We regret we were unable to convince our colleagues
_ of the validity of this position. It is only because the
/ case, as now decided, (and to which we heretofore gave
elas
our approval) represents a grave miscarriage of justice
and permits Coffman to profit by his own wrong, we feel
called upon to state our present position on the courts’
denial of the petition for rehearing.
The facts as found by the Master and as supported by
the evidence, show that since May 7, 1945, Cobra had
been a creditor of Aircraft. The indebtedness was based
on book account entries from May 7, 1945 to and includ-
ing April 16, 1946, then aggregating $6,254.25. The
referee on May 20, 1947, found $6,254.25 was due Cobra
from Aircraft. The decision was affirmed on November
5, 1947, on petition for review to the district court. Judg-
ment in this amount was entered in favor of Cobra against
Aircraft on November 5, 1947 in the records of the
clerk’s office. .
In October 1945 Aircraft ceased doing war work and
all contracts were cancelled. Thereafter it did nothing
but “cleaning up.” At the time Aircraft ceased active
work it had a net worth of $20,190.51. Coffman was
the dominant and controlling stockholder of Aircraft as
well as its president, and had been such since January
17, 1945. Since that date and until 1949, he had been
the person in charge of the affairs of Aircraft.
Within a matter of days after October 31, 1945, when
Aircraft had a net worth of $20,190.51, Coffman began
doing business as Nash Wilshire, an auto sales agency.
On November 25, 1945, he opened a bank account under
the name of Harry J. Coffman, doing business as Nash
Wilshire. Having no funds of his own Coffman turned
to the assets of Aircraft which he controlled and used
these assets to establish himself in the Nash Wilshire ven-
ture.
coulis
From time to time Coffman drew money from Air-
craft’s funds. He maintained books, including a ledger
with one account listing his indebtedness to Aircraft and
a separate account with Aircraft entitled “Nash Wil-
shire” purportedly showing moneys due him from Air-
craft. The first account gradually increased in amounts
due Aircraft, reflecting moneys of Aircraft, utilized by
Coffman. By May 31, 1947, the month the referee made
his order in favor of Cobra against Aircraft, Coffman
owed Aircraft $9,082.36 but the amount allegedly due
Coffman on the Nash Wilshire account had been built up
to $9,259.42. .
By Coffman’s own computations, as late as September
30, 1946, he was indebted to Aircraft in the sum of
$9,669.94 over and above his claimed offset. Thereafter
by his same computation his indebtedness to Aircraft
was cut down by the Nash Wilshire offsets until finally
on June 30, 1948 his debt to Aircraft was completely
extinguished and Aircrift owed him $2966.93.
Thus, the effective period of Coffman’s claimed set-off
was between September 30, 1946 and June 30, 1948.
Cobra had been a creditor since May 7, 1945 and its total
claim had fully accrued on April 16, 1946. Thus, Coff-
man’s claimed set-off to his admitted debt to Aircraft all
accrued after the debt from Aircraft to Cobra had be-
come due.
The Master found and the evidence shows that Coffman
appropriated at least $9240.46 of the property of Air-
craft to his own use as shown by his account on the books
of Aircraft, which account is unchallenged and undenied.
He operated Nash Wilshire from November 1945 to
' September 1949 when he sold the business. Nash Wil-
ili
shire had a net worth varying from $62,000 to $72,000
during 1947 and in excess of $46,000 on November 30,
1948.
Although Coffman concedes there is due to Aircraft
from him the sum of $9240.46, he characterizes the mat-
ter as “loans and advances.” He also contends that
Aircraft is indebted to him in the sum of $12,207.39
on the Nash Wilshire account and that this amount
should be offset against the $9240.46 item, with the
final result that he is not indebted to Aircraft but Air-
craft is indebted to him in the sum of the difference,
to-wit, $2966.93.
Conceding for discussion that $12,207.39 is due Coff-
man from Aircraft on the Nash Wilshire account, we
inquire first, whether Coffman may legally make this
setoff. If Coffman is entitled to this setoff, then the
decision of this court should stand and under §§719 and
720 C. C. P.* Coffman should have the benefit of a
plenary action. If he is not entitled to setoff the $12,-
207.39 against the admitted debt of $9240.46, then we
never reach the question involving interpretation of these
sections, since he admittedly owed $9240.46 to Aircraft
and §719 C. C. P. and the supplemental proceedings had
pursuant thereto were proper.”
The Master has succinctly stated in his supplemental
report “that under the decision of Pepper v. Litton [308
"The substance of Sections 719 and 720, Code of Civil Procedure
appear in the court's opinion.
rie Cli sy fe where the
The ap
and dorecting
it, ty We wee eh 6 peered! contin of Sere
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saemyt ee Mee Wee ire en
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son v. Lyders [1934] 139 C. A. 303, 306. The debt due
to Coffman from Aircraft belonged to Coffman in his
individual capacity. The debt due to Aircraft from Coff-
man was a trustee obligation.
We have unduly labored a simple problem. Coffman
may not legally use his purported setoff, assuming it is
valid and legally due from Aircraft since:
(1) He obtained the $9240.46 wrongfully and was an
involuntary trustee of the money and liable therefor;
(2) His receipt of the money was in violation of the
corporation law of California which made him a trustee
of the funds and liable therefor;
(3) Any attempt to set off the $12,000 purportedly
due from Aircraft would be permitting him to profit by
his own wrong, namely effecting a setoff solely because
he had wrongful possession of the $9240.46;
(4) Any attempted setoff of the $12,000 would be per-
mitting him to prefer himself to an earlier creditor;
(5) Setoff must be mutual and there is no mutuality
here since one obligation is that of an involuntary trustee,
the other of any individual;
(6) Though setoff in California is self executing, the
claims do not compensate in the absence of mutuality;
(7) §719 C. C. P. provides a remedy within the juris-
diction of the Master and the district court whether Coff-
man holds property for Aircraft or owes money to Air-
craft.
=] j—
Since the district court and Master exercised jurisdic-
tion under §719 C. C. P., and since Coffman may not
legally set-off his individual claim of $12,000 against
his trustee obligation, the court was in error in reversing
the judgment of the district court and the rehearing should
have been granted and our prior decision set aside.
(Endorsed:) Dissenting Opinion on Denial of Petition
for Rehearing. Filed Oct. 12, 1954.
Paul P. O’Brien, Clerk.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.