Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Cobra Manufacturing Co. v. Coffman

Supreme Court brief1955

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SUBJECT INDEX

PAGE

Introductory statement 1

Opinion and decision of the Court of Appeals 5

Concise statement of the grounds on which the jurisdiction of

this court is invoked 5

The questions presented for review 7

A concise statement of the case 8

Proceedings after entry of judgment 10

Reasons for granting certiorari 16

Summary of argument 21

L

There is a fundamental and constitutional distinction between

the jurisdiction of the federal appellate courts to review find-

ings made by the trial judge under Rule 52(a) of Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, and the jurisdiction of the reviewing

court under the California Constitution, and under Sections

644, 645 and 719, Code of Civil Procedure, all of which are

in pari materia. . 21

II.

Under the Constitution of the State of California the trier of

the facts is a constitutional finder of the facts, and his determi-

nation (if supported by substantial evidence) is conclusive

and binding upon the reviewing court, and the reviewing court

has no jurisdiction to annul said findings 23

PAGE

IIL

The ruling of the Court of Appeals that proof beyond a reason-

able doubt is required in supplemental proceedings (which are

civil in nature) introduces in the field of civil justice a revolu-

tionary and dangerous concept. 24

IV.

The good faith of Coffman’s denial of his indebtedness to the

judgment debtor presents a factual question. The determi-

nation of the trier of the facts that Coffman’s denial of his

indebtedness was not made in good faith is binding and con-

clusive on the reviewing court under the California Constitu-

tion and under the California procedural law... 25

V.

Under the California law, Coffman held the property of the

judgment debtor in trust for the petitioner. The ruling of

the Court of Appeals that Coffman was a garnishee instead of

a trustee, and that the denial of his indebtedness was not a

sham, is in‘conflict with the California law 28

Appendices :

Appendix I. Opinion of the United States Court of Ap-

peals . App. p. 1

Appendix II. Pertinent California Code Sections........App. p. 11

Appendix III. Pertinent California Cases....................App. p. 19

Appendix IV: Comment on Decisions Cited in Footnote 12

of the Court's Opinion, at Page 6. App. p. 23

iti,

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

CasEs PAGE

Bjornsen v. Alasea S.S. Co., 193 F. 2d 4.3 22

Boyd, Ex parte, 105 U. S. 647, 26 L. Ed. 1200 2

Capital Co. v. Fox, 85 F. 2d 97, 106 A. L. R. 376. 2

Carpentier v. Montgomery, 13 Wall. 480 19

24

2

Cooper v. Spring Valley Water Co., 16 Cal. App. 17.........--.------+

De Foe v. Town of Rutherfordton, 122 F. 2d 342

Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 61 S. Ct. 176, 311 U. S. 169,

85 L. Ed. 109. 2

Finch v. Finch, 12 Cal. App. 274. 26

Fisk v. Commissioner of Int. Revenue, 203 F. 2d _ oe

Hanson v. Cheynske, 180 Cal. 275 3%

27

22

Herrlich v. Kaufmann, 99 Cal. 271

Home Indemnity of New York v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 167

F. 2d 919.

Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U. S. 232, 64 S. Ct. 1015, 88 L. Ed.

1246 2

Keering v. Wishnefsky, 52 Fed. Supp. 625; aff'd, 142 F. 24 1005 2

Miller y. Commissioner of Int. Revenue, 183 F. 2d 246............. 22

National Labor Relations Board v. Columbian Stamping Co.,

306 U. S. 292, 59 S. Ct. 501 22

Nixon v. Goodwin, 3 Cal. App. 358. 30

Pacific Portland Cement Co. v. Food Machinery, 178 F. 2d 541 22

Parker v. Page, 38 Cal. 522. 25, 31

People v. Guitierrez, 35 Cal. 2d 721, 221 P. 2d 22. .20

Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 60 S. Ct. 238, 84 L. Ed. 28....6, 30

Purdy v. Johnson, 174 Cal. 521 29

Rupley v. Johnson, 120 Cal. App. 2d 548 3

Saracco Tank etc. v. Platz, 65 Cal. App. 2d 306. 18, 29

Schram v. Carlucci, 41 Fed. Supp. 36 4

Schram v. Spivack, 68 Fed. Supp. 451 2

Title Insurance Co. v. Cal. Dev. Co., 171 Cal. 173 30

United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364, 68 S. Cr. SS5......... 22

Williams v. Flinn and Treacy, 61 Cal. App. 352, 214 Pac. 1024.. 18

iv.

RULEs ' PAGE

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52 20

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a).........-..-.--.--- 18, 19, 21

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 69. 1, 2, 19

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 70% 20, 22

Revised Rules of the United States Supreme Court, Rule 23... 5

STATUTES

Bankruptcy Act, Chap. 11 8

California Civil Code, Sec. 2229 3, 29

California Civil Code, Sec. 2236 , 29

California Civil Code, Sec. 2237. 3

California Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 644 2, 23

California Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 645 2, 23

California Code of Civil Procedure, Secs. 714-720........................ 2

California Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 715 3, 10

California Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 719. 31

California Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 2061 (5) 25

California Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 2103 25

California Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 4-a. 20

California Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 4-b. 20

California Corporations Code, Sec. 824 3, 29

California Corporations Code, Sec. 825 3, 29

29

30

30

25

5

California Corporations Code, Sec. 2232

California Corporations Code, Secs. 4600-4619.

California Corporations Code, Sec. 4607.

California Practice Act (old), Sec. 244.

United States Code Annotated, Title 28, Sec. 1254(1)

Oe eeereewcceeree

TEXTBOOKS

62 American Law Reports, p. 1449.

1 Perry on Trusts and Trustees (7th Ed.), par. 433, p. 721

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1954.

DED. scaiiaininnte

Copra MANUFACTURING Company, a California corpora-

tion,

Petitioner,

US.

Harry J. COFFMAN,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

To the Honorable Chief Justice Earl Warren, and the

Honorable Associate Justices of the Supreme Court

of the United States:

Introductory Statement.

This is a supplemental proceeding, civil in nature, under

Rule 69 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in aid of

judgment and execution obtained in the bankruptcy matter

hereinafter referred to by petitioner Cobra Manufactur-

ing Company (appellee below, called herein Cobra) against

the Aircraft Engineering Company, a California corpora-

tion (appellant—below, called herein Aircraft).

nai

As expressly provided in Rule 69 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, and as declared in the authorities

cited in the footnote below’

The California State law is made the controlling rule

on both the substantive and procedural rights of the par-

ties in supplemental proceedings.

The California procedural law is rooted in its Consti-

tution, under which as judicially adjudicated by the appel-

late courts of the State of California, including the Su-

preme Court of the State of California, the trier of the

facts is the constitutional trier of the facts, and his fac-

tual determination (if based on substantial evidence under

the preponderance evidence rule) is conclusive upon the

reviewing court; and the reviewing court lacks jurisdic-

tional power to disturb or_to modify such factual deter-

mination and to substitute in its place its own factual

findings, albeit the reviewing court may be firmly con-

vinced that a mistake has been made by the trier of the

facts.

The precise and appropriate procedure in supplemental

proceedings is governed by Sections 714 to 720, inclusive,

of the California Code of Civil Procedure, and Sections

644 and 645 of the California Code of Civil Procedure.

1Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U. S. 232, 64 S. Ct. 1015, 88 L.

Ed. 1246; De Foe v. Town of. Rutherfordton (C. C. A. 4), 122 F.

2d 342; Schrem.v..Corlucci (D.C. Mich.}), 41 Fed. Supp. 36;

Keering v. Wishnefsky (N. Y.), 52 Fed. Supp. 625, affirmed in

142 F. 2d 1005; Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 61 S. Ct. 176,

311 U.S, 169, 85 L. Ed. 109; Capital Co. vw. Fox, 85 F. 2d 97,

106 A. L. R. 376; Ex parte Boyd, 105 U. S. 647, 26 L. Ed. 1200;

Schram v. Spock, 68 Fed: Supp. 451.

as

The aforesaid Code sections were all enacted in 1872, and

are in pari materia. (They are set out in Appendix II.)?

Under said code sections as judicially construed by the

California law, factual findings made by a master or

referee under a general order of reference are conclusive

upon the reviewing court; and the referee’s determination,

if adopted by the trial judge, constitutes 4 special jury

verdict which the reviewing court is without jurisdictional

power to disturb or reject, if such is based on substantial

evidence under the preponderance evidence rule.

The applicable California substantive law is based on

Sections 824 and 825 of the California Corporations Code,

and Sections 2229, 2236 and 2237 of California Civil

Code (same are set out in the appendix II). Under the

California substantive law based on said Code sections,

respondent Coffman (appellant below), who was the

majority stockholder and director, and president of the

judgment debtor, held the property of the judgment debtor

in trust for petitioner Cobra.

Respondent Coffman was duly served with process

as required by Section 715 of the California Code of

Civil Procedure. In this supplemental proceeding he

was called upon to account for the disappearance and

disposition of the property of the judgment debtor in the

2In Rupley v. Johnson, 120 Cal. App. 2d 548, at page 553, the

Court said: “The rule is well established that all of the statutory

provisions in all of the codes must be read together and harmonized

if possible. In re Porterfield, 28 Cal. 2d 91, at page 100 (168 P.

2d 706, 167 A.L.R. 675): ‘It is a well-recognized rule that for

purposes of statutory construction the codes are to be regarded as

blending into each other and constituting but a single statute. (Cit-

ing cases.)”

inci

latter part of 1945, when the judgment debtor ceased

its wartime operations in which it was hitherto engaged.

The undisputed value of its assets at that time was in

excess of $20,000.00.

Hearings in this supplemental proceeding continued for

over one year, and respondent Coffman was at all times

represented by counsel. A full hearing was had on the

merits before a special master appointed by the United

States District Judge by an order of general reference,

which directed the special master to make findings of

fact and conclusions of law, and no objection to this trial

procedure was voiced by Coffman.

Upon the conclusion of the hearings the special master

submitted two reports to the United States District Judge,

in which he factually found and determined (a) that the

assets of the judgment debtor of the value in excess of

$20,000.00 were wrongfully converted by respondent Coff-

man for his own individual use and benefit, when the

judgment debtor ceased its operations in 1945, (b) that

he also withdrew from the treasury of the judgment deb-

tor the sum of $9,240.46, and (c) that the bookkeeping

entries in the books of the judgment debtor reflecting an

indebtedness from the judgment debtor to Coffman in-

dividually as repayment for his loans and advances to the

judgment debtor lacked verity and integrity. The master’s

two reports were approved and adopted by the United

States District Judge, who entered an order directing

Coffman to pay the judgment obtained by the petitioner

against the judgment debtor. On appeal by Coffman to

the Court of Appeals, the order of the District Judge was

reversed without directions.

a

Petitioners respectfully petition for review of the re-

versal by certiorari and for the reinstatement of the order

of the District Judge. In the order prescribed by Rule

23 of the revised rules of this court, effective July 1,

1954, petitioner represents as follows:

Opinion and Decision of the Court of Appeals.

The opinion and decision of the Court of Appeals is

reported officially in 214 F. 2d 489; and same is appended

to this petition (Appendix I).

Concise Statement of the Grounds on Which the

Jurisdiction of This Court Is Invoked.

The opinion of the Court of Appeals was rendered on

June 28, 1954, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals,

pursuant thereto, was entered on the same day, June 28,

1954. [Certified typewritten record at page 284.] The

petitioner’s petition for rehearing was filed in due time,

and it was denied by the Court of Appeals on September

1, 1954. [Certified typewritten transcript at page 293.]

“Mithout ds? opinion.Fhe jurisdiction of the Court to re- Le

view the judgment of the Court of Appeals by certiorari

is conferred by Section 1254(1), Title 28, United States

Code Annotated. The jurisdiction of this Court is also

invoked under Rule 19 of the revised rules of this Court

effective July 1, 1954. It is petitioner’s position that the

opinion and decision of the Court of Appeals is erroneous

in the following fundamental respects:

(a) It is in irreconcilable conflict with the procedural

law of the State of California, under which factual find-

ings made by a master or referee under a general order of

reference are conclusive upon the reviewing court; and the

reviewing court lacks jurisdictional power to have his

vin

factual determination set aside or annulled or modified,

if it is based on substantial evidence under the prepon-

derance evidence rule.

(b) It is also in conflict with the California substantive

law under which a majority stockholder, director and

officer of an insolvent corporation holds its assets in trust

for the benefit of its creditors under the trust fund doc-

trine; that under no circumstances can Coffman claim

any right, title or interest in the corporate assets of the

judgment debtor adversely to the judgment debtor or its

creditors; that under no circumstances can Coffman as-

sert an offset for repayment of his loans to the judgment

debtor, assuming that such loans were in fact made.

(c) It is also in conflict with the decisions of this

court to the same effect rendered by this Court both prior

and subsequent to the decision in Pepper v. Litton, 308

U. S. 295, 60 S. Ct. 238, 84 L. Ed. 28.

(d) It is also in irreconcilable conflict with the funda-

mental law of the State of California, the Court of Ap-

peals ruling that it was incumbent on the petitioner to

establish Coffman’s wrongful conversion of the trust

assets beyond a reasonable doubt, in face of the fact that

a supplemental proceeding is civil in nature, and not a

criminal prosecution.

(e) It is also in irreconcilable conflict with the Cali-

fornia constitutional and procedural law, since the opinion

of the Court of Appeals impliedly indicates that the juris-

diction of a referee or master sitting in a supplementary

proceeding is akin or similar to the summary jurisdiction

possessed by Federal referees in bankruptcy matters.

(f) It is also in irreconcilable conflict with the funda-

mental constitutional and procedural law of the State of

ssallean

California, which commands the reviewing court to make

an evaluation of the record in order to determine whether

there was substantial evidence to support the factual find-

ings made by the master or the trial judge.*

The Questions Presented for Review.

1. Did the Court of Appeals have jurisdictional power

to annul and reject the factual findings made by the mas-

ter and the trial judge (albeit their factual findings were

supported by substantial evidence) in face of the consti-

tutional and procedural law of the State of California,

which denies the reviewing court such jurisdiction?

2. Did the Court of Appeals commit fundamental

error in ruling that it was incumbent upon the petitioner

to prove Coffman’s wrongful conversion of the assets of

the judgment debtor held by him in trust for the benefit

of the judgment creditor, beyond a reasonable doubt, as

required in criminal prosecutions ?

3. Did the Court of Appeals commit fundamental

error in ruling in effect that Coffman (who was the ma-

jority stockholder, director and president of the judgment

debtor) could with impunity convert to his own use and

benefit the property and assets of the insolvent judgment

debtor in face of the California substantive law that he

had no legal right to do so under any circumstances?

4. Did the Court of Appeals commit fundamental

error in ruling in effect that respondent Coffman had the

right to assert an offset against the property and assets

ne

3In its opinion the Court of Appeals made the statement: “we

do not express nor do we intimate any other conclusion as to the

effect of the evidence.” (Italics supplied.)

a

of the judgment debtor in repayment of his alleged loans

and advances to the judgment debtor, in face of the Cali-

fornia substantive law that such was a clear violation of

his trust duties?

5. Did the Court of Appeals commit fundamental

error in ruling in effect that the jurisdiction of a referee

or master sitting in a supplementary proceeding is akin

or similar to the summary jurisdiction possessed by fed-

eral referees in bankruptcy matters, in face of the con-

stitutional and procedural California law that factual

findings made by a referee or master under a general

order of reference is a “special jury verdict” which is

conclusive upon the reviewing court, and that the review-

ing court has no jurisdictional power to set them aside

if they are based on substantial evidence under the pre-

ponderance evidence rule?

A Concise Statement of the Case.

The controversy between Cobra and the respondent

Coffman arises out of the bankruptcy matter initiated by

Cobra by filing a petition under Chapter 11 of the Bank-

ruptcy Act, which resulted in a judgment in favor of

Cobra against the judgment debtor Aircraft in the sum

of $6,254.25. The pertinent prejudgment proceedings in

the bankruptcy matter were as follows:

1, The petition of Cobra for arrangement under Chap-

ter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act was filed in March, 1946;

and the matter was referred to one of the referees in bank-

ruptcy of the District Court for the Southern District

of California, Central Division.

2. Aircraft. claiming to be a creditor, filed in said

bankruptcy matter a verified proof of its claim against

selec

Cobra in the sum of $1,868.16. A counter-claim and off-

set against its claim was filed by Cobra in the bankruptcy

matter [R. p. 5] under Section 68 of the Bankruptcy Act.

3. A hearing was had before the referee on the merits

of their respective claims, to which no objection was

interposed, either by the judgment debtor or respondent

Coffman. At the conclusion of the hearing on the merits

the referee made findings of fact and conclusions of law

and signed an order reading as follows [R. p. 11]:

“It is Hereby Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed

that California Aircraft Engineering Co. has no claim

against the above-entitled estate and that their claim

should be disallowed.

“Tt is Further Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed

that California Aircraft Engineering Co. is indebted

to Cobra Manufacturing Corporation for the sum of

Six Thousand Two Hundred Fifty-four and 25/100

Dollars ($6,254.25).”

The referee’s order was affirmed by the District Judge,

which was entered in the civil docket of the United States

District Court in Book 46 of Judgments at page 696.

[R. p. 4.] The judgment was not appealed from or set

aside, and it became final and was unsatisfied.

4. On July 6, 1950, an execution was issued by the

United States District Court against the judgment deb-

tor [R. pp. 25-26], and it was returned unsatisfied by

the United States Marshal on September 12, 1950.

aniline

Proceedings After Entry of Judgment.

Based on the affidavit of the judgment creditor made

pursuant to Section 715 of the California Code of Civil

Procedure, an order was made by the District Judge who

rendered the aforesaid judgment directing the judgment

debtor and respondent Coffman to submit to an examina-

tion relating to and to account for the disposition and

disappearance of the property of the judgment debtor.

Under an order of general reference the Honorable How-

ard V. Calverley, the United States Commissioner of the

Federal District Court, was appointed special master to

conduct this supplemental proceeding and to make findings

of fact and conclusions of law. This order was duly served

on the judgment debtor and respondent Coffman in accord

with the procedure prescribed by Section 715 of the Cal-

fornia Code of Civil Procedure. Thereafter several hear-

ings were had at which respondent Coffman was at all

times represented by counsel. The hearings lasted for

about a year, and were concluded on June 28, 195%. [R.

p. 48.]

On October 16, 1951, the special master filed his first

report, in which he made the following factual findings:

(a) That Coffman was the cortrolling stockholder,

director and president of the judgment debtor.

(b) That between May 1, 1945 to and including June

30, 1948, Coffman misappropriated for his own use and

benefit the assets of the judgment debtor in fraud of the

judgment creditor.

(c) That Coffman did thereby cause the financial ina-

bility of the judgment debtor to pay the aforesaid judg-

ment.

—1]1—

(d) That Coffman was indebted to the judgment debtor

in the sum of $9,240.46, and that Coffman’s denial of his

indebtedness was made in bad faith.

This report was excepted to by Coffman, and on Coff-

man’s application, a stipulated order of reference was made

and was made and entered by the District Judge to the

master for a factual finding and conclusions of law bear-

ing on the validity and factual integrity of the bookkeep-

ing entries in the books of judgment debtor in regard to

Coffman’s alleged offset against the judgment debtor.

[R. pp. 65-66. ]

Pursuant to this stipulated order of reference the master

made a supplemental factual finding and a conclusion of

law. In his supplemental report the master made the fac-

tual finding that the bookkeeping entries in the books of

the judgment debtor lacked verity and integrity and were

not entitled to credence. [R. p. 81.] The supplemental

report was excepted to by Coffman on the sole ground that

the master’s subsidiary findings therein set forth were not

supported by the evidence. [R. p. 96.]

On August 22, 1952, Coffman filed a motion before the

District Judge for leave to re-argue his objections to the

master’s supplemental report. The motion was based

on the sole ground that the factual findings of the master

were not sustained by the evidence, and that for this sole

reason the master was divested of jurisdiction to hear the

matter. [R. pp. 103-104.]

On October 27, 1952, an order was signed and filed by

the District Judge adopting and approving the master’s

original and supplemental reports and overruling Coff-

man’s exceptions thereto. [R. p. 123.]

— y

The master’s original and supplemental reports [R.

pp. 47, 80] make an elaborate and comprehensive analy-

sis of the evidence; and briefly stated, they are to this

effect :

1. That Coffman was the dominant and controlling

stockholder, as well as the President of the judgment

debtor, and has been such since January 17, 1945; that

Coffman had promoted the formation and organization

of the judgment debtor, and he was at all times in the

exclusive charge and management of the business and as-

sets of the judgment debtor. The finding was supported

by the exhibits in evidence. [Creditor’s Exs. 9, 14, 13,

1, 7.]. These exhibits are referred to and commented on

by the master at pages 83 and 84 of the record. (We are

advised by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals that the

exhibits were forwarded by him to this court, and we

assume that they are before this court.)

In this connection it may be of interest to note that

Coffman’s unsupported assertion before the master that

he was not the majority stockholder, director and president

of the judgment debtor, but that a person bearing the

name of “Brown” was the one who was in charge of the

Aircraft assets and business, was found by the master

and the trial judge to be a fiction. [R. pp. 85-86.] The

opinion of the Court of Appeals indicates that the Court

of Appeals also did not give credence to Coffman’s

“Brown” story, and the fact that Coffman was the domi-

nant controlling stockholder, as well as the president, and

that Coffman occuplied a fiduciary relationship to Cobra,

stands undisputed. (214 F. 2d 490.)

2. That Aircraft was organized in 1943 to engage in

war work, namely in the assembly of aircraft parts; that

esis

at the end of World War II the Aircraft’s contracts with

the Government were all cancelled, and Aircraft ceased

business operations with the exception of “cleaning up”;

that at that time Aircraft had a net worth of $20,190.51

[Creditor’s Ex. 2]; that Coffman did not have money of

his own, and that, upon the cessation of business by Air-

craft, Coffman opened a bank account in his own name do-

ing business as Nash-Wilshire; that in connection with

his individual business, Coffman expended approximately

$6,123.76, at least part of which Coffman admitted be-

longed to the judgment debtor. [R. pp. 87-89.]

3. That beginning with May 1, 1945 to and including

June 30, 1948, Coffman also withdrew from the funds

Stk Siena. APNE OE RO

[R. p. 89.]

4. That Coffman had no funds of his own with which

to operate his individually owned business, and he there-

upon turned to the assets of the judgment debtor, and he

used its assets to establish himself in the personally owned

automobile sales agency called Nash-Wilshire. [R. p. 90.]

(Emphasis supplied.)

5. That the bookkeeping entries in the books of the

judgment debtor which reflected an indebtedness from the

judgment debtor to Coffman individually, lacked integrity ;

that the account relied on by Coffman contained many

payroll entries in 1946, a long time after the judgment

debtor ceased active business operations, and that this

account also contained an entry concerning “Bldg. Arts

Center” which had no connection with the judgment

debtor’s business. The account also contained numerous

other entries which had no relation to the business affairs

of the judgment debtor,

me

The master stated at page 92 of the record as follows:

“The master could not in good conscience place

reliance on the account submitted by Coffman as an

off-set. This view is further substantiated by the

testimony of Albert Boris Silverman, public account-

ant, (Transcript, Vol. 2, page 22), to the effect that

the records of the Aircraft Company show that the

Aircraft Company had been paying Coffman’s bills

as submitted by him to it.”

ee. ee

At pages 92 and 93 the master made the further state-

ment:

“Assuming that the items contained in Exhibit B

are legitimate items, the master is of the opinion that

under the decision of Pepper vs. Litton, supra, and

other cases cited, Coffman, as president, director, and

dominant stockholder of the Aircraft Company, may

not claim an off-set against property held by him in

trust and which he had misappropriated. To permit

him to do so would be to allow Coffman to place

himself in the position of a preferred creditor of the

Aircraft Company, a practice specifically condemned

in the cases cited.”

At pages 90-91 the master made the further statement:

“This theory is expounded in Pepper vs. Litton,

308 U. S. 295, 60 S. Ct. 238, 84 L. Ed. 281, and is

recognized in the following additional cases (citing

cases). Also, in appropriating the assets of this

corporation, Coffman did so in violation of Section

824 of the Corporations Code of California, which

prohibits the distribution of the assets of a corpora-

tion except as authorized in the Code. This diversion

of assets may also be considered an unauthorized and

- unlawful payment of dividends in violation of Section

1500 of said Code, which provides for the funds

out of which dividends may be paid.”

="

We respectfully point out that not a word of evidence

was adduced by Coffman tending to sustain the factual

integrity of his asserted offset against the judgment

debtor. The record will be searched in vain for any evi-

dence tending to refute the factual finding of the master

and of the trial judge that the bookkeeping entries bearing

on Coffman’s offset, were fictitious.

The record shows further [pp. 233-235] that Coffman

was interrogated on the subject of his financial resources;

that Coffman was subpoenaed to produce his records, but

he failed to produce them [R. p. 229]; that Coffman. testi-

fied that he did not know whether he had a bank account

of his own, but he had always “presumed” that he had a

bank account in 1945; and that he did not remember

whether he had any money in his bank account—whether

$100.00, or $1,000.00, or as high as $15,000.00. [R. pp.

235, 226.]

We respectfully submit that the master and the trial

judge were correct in concluding that Coffman’s denial

of his indebtedness to the judgment debtor was not made

in good faith. [R. p. 53.]

We respectfully submit further that the concluding

statement in the opinion of the Court of Appeals reading

, Sane we do not express nor do we intimate any other

conclusion as to the effect of the evidence.” (emphasis

supplied) clearly indicates that the Court of Appeals

did not make an evaluation of the record. It seems that

such evaluation absent, the Court was not justified as a

matter of law to conclude that Coffman's claim was not

fantastic or @ sham.

eeililiisie

Reasons for Granting Certiorari.

' At the outset we respectfully point out the following

undisputed facts:

That the hearings before the special master lasted for

about one year (from August 10, 1950, to and includ-

ing June 28, 1951); and Coffman was represented dur-

ing said numerous hearings by counsel, who at no time

voiced any objection to the jurisdiction of the special

master to make a determination of the factual matters

referred to him by the District Judge.

That at these hearings a complete record was made

on every conceivable factual and legal issue, and Coff-

man testified in respect to all of his dealings with the

judgment debtor, including his dealings bearing on the

factual and legal validity of his claimed offset against the

judgment debtor.

That at no time did Coffman or his counsel object to

this procedure before the special master.

That the record is devoid of a showing on the part of

Coffman that the record was not complete, or that he did

not have his day in court. On the contrary, the record

conclusively shows that the issues involving his dealings

with the judgment debtor, and his asserted equities, were

all presented to the special master for adjudication, and

the judgment creditor and Coffman both adduced evidence

in support of their respective contentions.

That the conversion of the property of the judgment

debtor by appellant Coffman in excess of $20,000.00 was

established conclusively by the documentary evidence, and

also by his sworn admissions made in his answer in the

Superior Court action referred to at page 88 of the

—

record. (Supplemental Report of Master, beginning at

pages 87 of the Record.)

That it was expressly stipulated by appellant in open

court that the factual validity of his offset should be

adjudicated by the special master which stipulation was

made freely and voluntarily.

It is self-evident that Coffman had his day in court

and that he had a fair trial in consonance with the basic

tests and standards emplacent in the concept of “a classic

plenary hearing.” There is no reason for a second trial

in view of the fact that the record herein is complete and

there is no reason why Coffman should seek te delay his

day of judgment by super-technical objections.

With all due respect to the Honorable Court of Ap-

peals, we are constrained to make the statement that the

decision of the Court of Appeals is premised on legalistic

formalism.

It bears repeating and emphasis that the opinion of the

Court of Appeals

(a) Impinges upon the judicial functions of the trier

of the facts who, under the California Constitution, is

the constitutional finder of facts, and whose factual find-

ings are conclusive on the reviewing court.

(b) Adjudicates that proof beyond a reasonable doubt

is required in a supplemental proceeding, which is a civil

proceeding.

(c) Rules in effect that a majority stockholder, direc-

tor and president of an insolvent corporate debtor stands

in the shoes of an innocent third party garnishee; and

that he is not a trustee, this being in direct conflict with

cxliinn

(d) Rules impliedly that a majority stockholder, direc-

tor and president of an insolvent corporate debtor may

with impunity use the funds and property of the insolvent

corporate debtor in payment of, or as security for, ad-

vances or loans made by him to the judgment debtor

without the consent of, or notice to, the creditors, in

violation of the trust fund doctrine, and in violation of

his trust duties under the California Civil Code. (See

Williams v. Flinn and Treacy, 61 Cal. App. 352, 214 Pac.

1024; Saracco Tank etc. v. Platz, 65 Cal. App. 2d 306.)

(e) Rules unequivocally that a majority stockholder,

director and president of an insolvent corporate judgment

debtor may make mere assertions that he has a claim

against the judgment debtor, and that the trier of the

facts must accept such assertions as proof in face of the

evidence that such assertions are devoid of factual and

legal merit.

(f) In effect it encourages and permits a fraudulent

majority stockholder, director and president of an in-

solvent judgment corporate debtor to delay his day of

judgment by his making mere assertions that he has an

offset against the judgment debtor, without proof to

support such assertions.

We respectfully submit that the question presented

subsidiary issues:

(1) The first subsidiary issue involves the construc-

tion of Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-

dure as applied to supplemental proceedings in aid of

Federal judgments and executions. The question presented

by this issue is as follows:

cet

(a) Does the Federal reviewing court have power

and jurisdiction to annul and vacate factual findings

made by the trier of the facts in a supplemental pro-

ceeding, if the reviewing court is of the view that

the findings of the trier of the facts were clearly

erroneous within the meaning of Federal Rule 52(a)?

(b) Or, does the Federal reviewing court lack

such jurisdiction and power, inasmuch (as pointed

out in the introductory statement of this petition)

Federal Rule 69 expressly provides that the State

procedural law, and not the Federal procedural law,

is controlling in supplemental proceedings.

This issue therefore involves a question of federal pro-

cedural law to be applied in supplemental proceedings.

We respectfully submit that this question has not as yet

been decided, and we believe that this question should be

decided by this court for the benefit of the Bar.

2 The second subsidiary issue centers on the power

of the Federal reviewing court to annul and vacate find-

ings made by the trier of the facts in a supplemental pro-

ceeding. It is our position that under the California pro-

cedural law the findings of a referee under a general

order of reference constitutes a special jury verdict. The

problem to be resolved by this court is whether the annul-

ment by the Disteies Court of Appealsof the findings

of the trier of the facts can be reconciled with the deci-

sion of this Court in the early case of Carpentier v. Mont-

gomery, 13 Wall. 480, wherein this Court declared that

the United States Constitution recognized the division of

civil jurisprudence into cases at law and in equity, and

that it is beyond the power of Congress to make any

serious changes in that classification. (It will be noted

—20—

that the procedure under Rule 52 of the Federal Rules

is based on former equity Rule 7014.)

3. The third subsidiary issue centers on the proposi-

tion whether the annulment and vacation of the findings

of the trier of the facts can be justified under the Cali-

fornia Constitution. (Art. VI, Sec. 4a and 4b.) In

construing this constitutional provision the California

Supreme Court stated in People v. Gustierrez, 35 Cal. 2d

721, 727, 221 P. 2d 22, that a jury verdict cannot be

set aside unless the record clearly shows that upon no

hypothesis whatsoever is there substantial evidence to

support the jury verdict. (As heretofore stated, the

finding of the referee is a special verdict. )

We respectfully submit that the questions presented

by the record herein pose special and important reasons

to warrant the issuance of the writ of certiorari prayed

for atid for an order by this Court of reinstating the or-

der of the trial judge in this proceeding. We do earnestly

urge that the opinion of the Court of Appeals is not only

in conflict with the California procedural law and with

the California substantive law, but it is also in conflict

with the decisions of this court referred to in the master’s

supplemental report at page 91 of the record. In our

judgment the opinion of the Court of Appeals also clearly

presents a departure from the accepted and judicial course

of judicial proceedings, which calls for an exercise of

this Court’s power of supervision.

a

Summary of Argument.

Being of the view that extended excerpts from the

California decisions bearing on the questions presented

by this petition may serve best to clarify and fortify our

position stated in the forepart of this petition, we deem

1 advisable to set out such pertinent excerpts in the ap-

pendix. Accordingly, same are set out in appendix II.

Our contentions in support of our position, concisely

stated, are as follows:

I.

There Is a Fundamental and Constitutional Distinction

Between the Jurisdiction of the Federal Appellate

Courts to Review Findings Made by the Trial

Judge Under Rule 52(a) of Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, and the Jurisdiction of the Reviewing

Court Under the California Constitution, and

Under Sections 644, 645 and 719, Code of Civil

Procedure, All of Which Are in Pari Materia.

Under Rule 52(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure,

the jurisdiction of the federal appellate court to annul, or

not to accept the findings of a trial judge or of special

masters is not proscribed by any statutory or constitu-

tional limitation; rule 52(a) is based on the practice in

equity that had prevailed prior to the present rules of

civil procedure, and the findings of the trial court were

never conclusive upon the federal appellate courts. While

the findings of the trial court had great weight, the

federal appellate court was not prohibited from setting

them aside if it was left with a definite and firm convic-

tion that a mistake has been committed by the trial judge.

millet

In Grace Brothers:v. Commissioner of Internal Rev-

enue, 173 F. 2d 170 (9th Cir.), the Court stated at page

174 as follows:

“It was intended, in all actions tried upon the facts

without a jury, to make applicable the then prevail-

"ing equity practice. Since judicial review of findings

. of trial courts does not have the statutory or consti-

tutional limitation. [on judicial review] of findings by

administrative agencies or by a jury, this Court may

“ peverse findings of fact by a trial court where ‘clearly

erroneous.’ The practice in equity prior to the

present Rules of Civil Procedure was that the find-

ings of a trial court, when dependent upon oral tes-

timony where the candor and credibility of the wit-

nesses would best be judged, had great weight with

the appellate court. The findings were never con-

clusive, however. A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’

when although there is evidence to support it, the

reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with

the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has

been committed.” (Citing a United States Supreme

Court decision.) (Emphasis supplied.)

“This interpretation is not a new departure. It

merely stresses, as courts of appeal ( including this

court), have done before, that findings are to be given

the effect which they formerly had in equity.” (Cit-

ing Equity Rule 7034, and cases.)

side heinrich tne Goi alien ctied in the foot-

note below.‘

‘National Labor R. Board v. Columbian Co., 26 U.

S. 292, 59'S. Ct. 501, 505; Miller v. Commissioner 0 Int. Revenue,

183 F. 2d. A661 United States v. Gypsum Co., 333.U. S. 364, 395,

68 S. Ct. 525; Byjornsen v. Alasea S.S. Co., 193 F. 2d 433; Pac.

Portiand Cement Co. v. Food Machinery, 178 F. 24 541; ‘Home

son raheic of New York v. Standard Acc. Ins. £% 167 F. 2d 919,

v. Commissioner of Int. Revenue, 203 F. 2d 358.

—23—

II.

Under the Constitution of the State of California the

Trier of the Facts Is a Constitutional Finder of

the Facts, and His Determination (if Supported

by Substantial Evidence) Is Conclusive and Bind-

ing Upon the Reviewing Court, and the Review-

ing Court Has No Jurisdiction to Annul Said

Findi

Under Sections 644 and 645 of the California Code of

Civil Procedure the factual findings of the referee under

the general order of reference had the effect of a special

jury verdict which the reviewing court has no constitu-

tional power to set aside. The issue of the verity and in-

tegrity of books and records is a factual question to be

determined by the referee in the exercise of his sound

discretion and his determination (if supported by sub-

stantial evidence) is conclusive on the reviewing court.

We respectfully submit that the findings of the special

master epitomized in his two reports, which were adopted

by the District Judge, were all supported by substantial

evidence, and that the reviewing court had no constitu-

tional power to reject said testimony or to disregard any

legitimate inferences which were drawn by the trier of

the facts from the evidence before him.

We respectfully submit that Coffman’s testimony was

rejected by the master as lacking integrity and credence,

and his determination, which was adopted by the trial

judge, is conclusive on the reviewing court.

The California authorities in support of this conten-

tion are set forth in appendix II.

—24—

188 &

The Ruling of the Court of Appeais That Proof Be-

yond a Reasonable Doubt Is Required in Supple-

mental Proceedings (Which Are Civil in Nature)

Introduces in the Field of Civil Justice a Revolu-

tionary and Dangerous Concept.

This novel doctrine enunciated by the Court of Appeals

in its opinion is clearly in conflict with the California law,

and is also in conflict with the fundamental law of this

land.

In Cooper v. Spring Valley Water Co., 16 Cal. App.

17, the Court declared, at pages 21 and 22, as follows:

“Tn civil cases the affirmative must be proved, and

when the evidence is contradictory, the decision must

be made according to preponderance of the evidence

..2 (C.C. P., sec. 2061, subd. 5.) In other words

‘the result should follow the preponderance of the

evidence.’ (2 Wharton on Criminal Evidence, 1246),

and this rule applies to all civil cases alike, even

though the theory of the case involves, as it does here,

an accusation of felony. (Citing cases.) This was

declared to be so by our Supreme Court as early as

the case of Ford v. Chambers, 19 Cal. 143.)

* * * * * * * *

“Tt is the generally accepted doctrine in other

jurisdictions that in civil cases, where a criminal act

is directly pleaded or only incidentally involved, such

criminal act may be established by a preponderance

of evidence, (Citing cases.)

“ ‘Tt may be safely asserted that there is no rule of

law sanctioned by the weight of authority which re-

quires the plaintiff in acivil action, even though the

result thereof imputes a crime, to prove his case with

the same certainty that is required in a criminal

prosecution.’ (Citing cases.)”

wile

Section 2061(5), C.-C. P., expressly states that a deci-

sion of the trier of the facts must be according to the pre-

ponderance of the evidence; and Section 2103, C. C. P.

expressly provides that a decision of a referee appointed

by the trial judge must likewise be according to the pre-

ponderance of the evidence.

The preponderance evidence rule equally applies to civil

proceedings involving conversions of assets by a trustee,

and it is sufficient to prove the conversion only by a pre-

ponderance of the evidence, and not beyond a reasonable

doubt. (62 A. L. R., 1449.)

IV.

The Good Faith of Coffman’s Denial of His Indebted-

ness to the Judgment Debtor Presents a Factual

Question. The Determination of the Trier of the

Facts That Coffman’s Denial of His Indebtedness

Was Not Made in Good Faith Is Binding and

Conclusive on the Reviewing Court Under the

California Constitution and Under the California

_ Procedural Law.

The leading case of Parker v. Page, 38 Cal 522,

involves a supplemental proceeding under Section 244 of

the Old California Practice Act, the predecessor of the

present California Code of Civil Procedure. At page

525 of this opinion the Supreme Court stated as follows:

« Counsel for the garnishee insist that, un-

der Section 244, when it is alleged that the garnishee

is indebted to the judgment debtor, or has in his

hands property belonging to him, if the fact is de-

nied, the only order which the Court can properly

make is one authorizing the judgment creditor to in-

- stitute an action against the garnishee, in order to

adjudicate the disputed fact in a proceeding having

~~

all the necessary parties before the Court. This ts

undoubtedly true, if the denial be made in good fatth.

The obvious purpose of Section 244 was to entitle

the garnishee, who in good faith, denied that he had

any property of the judgment debtor, or was in any

wise indebted to him, to the benefit of a trial in a

regular action with the proper parties, and before a

jury in a proper case. . . . It may be that the

referee deemed the testimony of the garnishee on this

point so evasive as to discredit it; and when it is

evident that the garnishee is acting in bad faith m

denying his indebtedness to the judgment debtor, and

makes the denial only in form and for purposes of

vexation and delay, the referee may TREAT IT AS

FRAUDULENT, AND DISREGARD IT. The denial of the

debt or the adverse claim to the property, contem-

plated in Section 244, is a claim or denial in good

faith, and not a mere fraudulent sham, resorted to

for purposes of delay. To permit a fraudulent gar-

nishee for the mere purpose of delay, and who, evi-

dently, is acting in bad faith, to avail himself of

Section 244, in order to drive the judgment creditor

to an action against him, would be to pervert the

true purpose of that section, and make it a shield for

fraud, instead of an instrument of justice.” (Em-

phasis ours. ) |

In Finch v. Finch, 12 Cal. App. 274, the Court said at

page 279 as follows:

“It will not: be controverted, we think, that the

court below was not bound by appellant’s denial of

the debt if the undisputed facts showed that the debt

really existed at the time of the service of the said

writ of execution. The mere demal by the garnishee

of the indebtedness which the other averments and ad-

. missions of the parties,show to be an erroneous con-

clusion from the whole transaction certainly should

—~27—

pot be deemed sufficient to divest the court of juris-

diction to make the order provided for im said section

719.” (Italics supplied.)

In Herrlich v. Kaufmann, 99 Cal. 271, the Court after

discussing the historical background, the equitable features

of supplemental proceedings at great length and after con-

cluding that any property which can be reached in equsty

may be now reached in a supplemental proceeding, declared

at pages 274 and 275 as follows:

“The Code of Civil Procedure of this state, from

section 716 to section 721, specifically provides how

a judgment creditor may proceed against a debtor of

his judgment debtor. . Those sections provide (in

brief) that after the issuing of an execution, upon

a showing by affidavit or otherwise that a person

is indebted to the judgment debtor in an amount ex-

ceeding $50, the judge may order such person to

appear and answer concerning such alleged indebted-

ness; if he admits the indebtedness he may be ordered

to apply the amount thereof to the satisfaction of

the judgment; if he denies any indebtedness, and

the denial seems after a hearing to be Bona Fide,

the court or judge may authorize the judgment credi-

‘tor to institute a suit against such person to recover

such alleged debt.” (Italics ours.)

The rule requiring proof by clear and convincing evi-

dence frequently used by the California courts in some

typical cases is only a rule of evidence which is directed

to the trial judge; and under the California law the

decision of the trial judge, if supported by the preponder-

ance of the evidence, meets this rule, and it is conclusive on

the reviewing court.

ii" aan’ Chablis goo, Sith. pesmi, dane

issue under the California law and the decision of the,

wile

trier of the facts that Coffman’s denial of his indebted-

ness was made in bad faith is not reviewable on appeal, and

the reviewing court had no jurisdiction to have this

finding annulled.

The recent California cases on this issue are set out

in Appendix 3.

We respectfully submit that the ruling of the Court of

Appeals that it had the power to reject the findings of

the trial judge and to make its own findings in place

thereof is clearly in conflict with the California con-

stitutional procedural law.

V.

Under the California Law, Coffman Held the Property

of the Judgment Debtor in Trust for the Peti-

. tioner. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals That

Coffman Was a Garnishee Instead of a Trustee,

and That the Denial of His Indebtedness Was Not

a Sham, Is in Conflict With the California Law.

We respectfully submit that the record conclusively

shows Coffman’s conversion of the property and assets

of the judgment debtor in excess of $20,000.00. Same

constituted an indebtedness which can be reached in a

supplemental proceeding. Coffman, being the majority

stockholder, director, and president of the insolvent judg-

ment debtor, held said property in trust for the benefit

of the judgment creditor. Coffman had no legal right

to convert said assets for his own individual use. Being

a trustee, Coffman could not set up a claim to the trust

property adverse to the judgment debtor, and under no

circumstances could he deny title to the property in the

judgment debtor. Being trustee, Coffman could not use

the trust property in payment of his advances and loans

allegedly ‘made by ‘him’ personally to the judgment debtor.

—29—

The California code sections covering this subject are

Sections 824 and 825 of the California Corporations Code,

and Sections 2229, 2232, 2236 and 2237 of the Civil

Code of the State of California. They are set out in

Appendix IT.

The California law which is in agreement with the

uniform law on this subject is well stated in Perry on

Trusts and Trustees. (Vol. 1; 7th Ed., Par. 433, at p.

721.) The learned author states that under no circum-

stances can a trustee set up a claim to trust property ad-

versely to the cestui que trust, and that under no circum-

stances could a trustee deny the title of the beneficiary.

In Purdy v. Johnson, 174 Cal. 521, the California Su-

preme Court ruled that a trustee cannot use trust property

to secure repayment of advances made by him personally,

since such course of procedure, if permitted, would be in

violation of his trust duties under the applicable code

In Saracco Tank Welding Co. v. Platz, 65 Cal. App.

2d 506, the California Court stated as follows:

- “When a corporation becomes insolvent its assets

are held in trust for the benefit of the stockholders

and creditors. In 15A Fletcher’s Cyc. of Corp.,

perm. ed. (1938), section 7369, at page 59, it is

said:

_ “*The theory of the trust fund doctrine is that

all of the assets of a corporation, immediately on its

becoming insolvent, become a trust fund for the

benefit of all of its creditors.” * * *

“ . . The transfer was made without notice to

the plaintiff. The original corporation never there-

after transacted business. That transaction was a

clear breach of trust and rendered the directors liable

—30—

. for the loss thereby sustained to plaintiff. The trans-

fer amounted to a voluntary dissolution of the Nevada

corporation, without providing for the payment of

all of its debts. It resulted in a preference of existing

creditors. Section 40la of the Civil Code provides

that a distribution of assets to the stockholders on

dissolution of the corporation may be made only

‘after determining that all of the known debts and

liabilities . . . have been paid or adequately pro-

vided for.’ This was not done. The directors are

therefore liable for plaintiff's claim.” (Emphasis

supplied. )

‘See, also, the authorities referred to by the master in

his Supplemental Report, which included the authorities

set forth in the footnote below.°

See, also, Sections 4600 to 4619 of the California

Corporations Code, which govern dissolution of corpora-

tions, and Section 4607 of the Corporations Code which

requires that the distribution of the corporate assets be had

under the supervision of the Court. Sections 4608 to

4619 also prescribe the procedure for filing of claims by

creditors against the corporation, and for the determina-

tion by the Court.

Under the provisions of the Corporations Code of the

State of California, Coffman was charged with the duty

to have the judgment debtor corporation dissolved, and to

pay its debts and to distribute its assets in 1945, when

the judgment debtor ceased business operations. It is

well settled under the California law, as stated in the above

5Nixon v. Goodwin, 3 Cal. App. 358; Title Insurance Co. v. Cal.

Dev, Co., 171 Cal. 173; Henson v. Cheynske, 180 Cal. 275, 285;

ESR 9; Taney SE,

—3i—

code sections of the Corporations Code, that im the absence

of such dissolution Coffman's misappropriation of the

assets of the judgment debtor was illegal

Such a course of procedure, however, was not followed

by Coffman; and that instead he used the assets of the

debtor in connection with his own individual

business. It is therefore clear, as a matter of law, that

Coffman cannot claim title to the property which be

held in trust, and that he had no legal or moral right t

use the funds of the judgment debtor for his own use and

benefit as found by the trier of the facts.

It therefore follows as a matter of law that Coffman's

denial of his indebtedness was, as stated by the Cab

fornia Supreme Court, in the Parker case, supra, & mere

fraudulent sham, resorted to for the purpose of delay,

and “to drive the judgment creditor to am action agaimet

him would be to pervert the true purpose” of the remedy

given to a judgment creditor in a supplemental proceeding

under Section 719 of the Code of Civil Procedure “aad

make it a shield for fraud instead of an instrament of

justice.”

The opinion of the Honorable Court of Appeals clearty

indicates that the Court of Appeals failed to follow

through and te apply the California law. This we respect

fully submit was due (a) first to the fact (as the opinion

of the Court expressly states) that the Court of Agpenis

failed to make an evaluation of the record and (6) &

the further fact that the Court erroneously aseumed that

Coffman stood in the shoes of an innocent Gret party

garnishee, and that he was not & truster as prowkied by

the Corporations Code of the State of California and by

the Civil Code sections set forth is Appendix Il.

—32—

We further respectfully submit that the California

authorities relied on by the Court of Appeals (cited in

footnote 12 in the Court’s opinion) have not the remotest

applicability to the present record. Said authorities are

commented on in Appendix IV. It suffices to point

out at this time that none of the cases cited therein and

relied upon by the Court of Appeals involved the status

of a majority stockholder, president and director of an

insolvent corporation, who held the assets of the insolvent

corporate debtor in trust for its creditors.

It is clear that the thesis of the Court’s opinion was not

based on the California law.

Wherefore, petitioner respectfully submits that this pe-

tition presents very important and grave questions, as

stated in the forepart of this petition. Petitioner therefore

prays for a writ of certiorari, directed to the United States

Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, and for the rein-

statement of the order made by the trial judge in this sup-

plemental proceeding, which we respectfully submit was

correct.

Respectfully submitted,

Mitton B. Sarrer,

Attorney for Petitioner.

Exwest R. Utiey, and

Josern BrckKENSTEIN,

Of Counsel.

APPENDIX I.

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Harry J. Coffman, appellant, vs. Cobra Manufacturing

Company, appellee.

No. 13,672. June 28, 1954.

Appeal from the United States District Court, Southern

District of California, Central Division.

Before: Stephens and Fee, Circuit Judges, and James

M. Carter, District Judge.

STEPHENS, Circuit Judge

As will hereinafter more particularly appear, Harry J.

Coffman is here appealing from a judgment of the district

court in a supplementary proceeding’ ordering that he pay

to the Cobra Manufacturing Company the sum of

$6,254.25, together with interest at the rate of six per cent.

per year from November 5, 1947, and costs. The order

is based upon the findings of a special master that Cc ff-

man owed more than the above stated amount to Aircraft

Engineering Company against which Cobra holds an

unsatisfied judgment in the stated amount.

In March, 1946, Cobra filed a petition for an arrange-

ment under Chapter XI* of the Bankruptcy Act. Aircraft

filed a proof of claim’ against Cobra in the sum of

$1,868.16. Such claim was denied by the bankrupt who

tRule 69 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Title 28, U. S.

C. A. ‘ay

*Title 11, U. S. C. A., §701 ef seg. $301 et seg. of the Bank-

ruptcy Act.

*Title 11, U. S. C. A., $93; §57 of the Bankruptcy Act.

pee

also filed a counterclaim and set-off against Aircraft for

$6,254.25.

The referee in bankruptcy conducted a summary hear-

ing on the claim and counterclaim. No objection to the

proceeding was interposed. At the conclusion of the hear-

ing the referee made findings of fact and conclusions of

law denying Aircraft’s claim entirely and entering an order.

awarding Cobra $6;254.25 on its set-off and counterclaim.

The order of the referee, signed May 20, 1947, was taken

to the district judge on a petition for review* and the judge

caused judgment to be entered on November 5, 1947,

affirming the referee’s findings, conclusions, and order.

No appeal was taken therefrom.

The Chapter XI arrangement was completed successfully

on September 14, 1948, and all of the assets remaining

after complete payments in accord with the arrangement,

including the judgment against Aircraft, were returned to

Cobra. Thus, Cobra had an unsatisfied judgment against

Aircraft. Cobra took out execution on the judgment

against Aircraft, entirely free from the bankruptcy pro-

ceedings, and it was returned unsatisfied. Whereupon,

Cobra instituted supplementary proceedings under Rule

69 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district

court ordered Coffman (and others) to appear for exami-

nation and a special master was appointed to take testi-

mony telating to the discovery ‘of assets of Aircraft, in-

clusive of such assets as were held by Coffman, and to

report his findings of fact. and conclusions of law to the

‘Title 11, U. S. C, A, $108; $68 of the Bankruptcy Act.

"Title 11, U.S.C. A., 867(c); $39(¢) of the Bankruptcy Act.

saielilis

The special master found that Coffman is now and was

at the time the debt owed to Cobra arose, the dominant

and controlling stockholder, as well as the president, of

Aircraft; that Coffman occupied a fiduciary relationship

to Cobra, a creditor of Aircraft; that Coffman appropri-

ated funds of Aircraft in the amount of $9,240.46 to his

own use and benefit and such an appropriation was wrong-

ful, in breach of trust and directly caused Aircraft’s in-

ability to pay the judgment to Cobra; that although

Coffman denies that he owes Aircraft $9,240.16, the denial

is not in good faith.

Thereafter the district court re-referred the matter to

the special master to determine Coffman’s claim that he

was not indebted to Aircraft since Aircraft owed him

$12,207.39 which must be set-off against the $9,240.46

which he allegedly owed Aircraft. The special master

found that Coffman’s claim “lacks integrity” and held

that Aircraft does not owe Coffman $12,207.39, or any

other sutn.

The district court caused a judgment and order to be

entered adopting the report of the special master and

overruling objections thereto. Coffman appealed.

Coffman first collaterally attacks the judgment which

Cobra obtained against Aircraft in the bankruptcy pro-

ceedings. He argues that a condition precedent to any

supplementary proceeding in aid of a judgment is a valid

and enforceable judgment, and that the judgment from

which the instant action springs was totally null and void

since it was outside the summary jurisdiction of the bank-

ruptcy court wherein it was entertained.

The summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court is

in general limited to proceedings in bankruptcy where the

eal

property is actually or constructively in the possession and

control of the court.° Where the trustee claims property

which: is held adversely and is outside of the court’s

possession, the trustee may institute and maintain action

thereon in summary proceedings in the bankruptcy court

only if the adverse party consents thereto. Otherwise, a

plenary action is necessary.”

Acquiescence in or failure to make a timely objection

to the court’s summary proceedings may constitute consent®

and the right to plenary proceedings may be considered

waived.’ Congress in enacting Section 23(b) of the Bank-

ruptcy Act” has made the consent of an adverse party

defendant in a suit by a trustee in bankruptcy to recover

property which is outside the bankruptcy conrt’s posses-

sion in effect an additional ground for federal jurisdiction.

*Murphy v. Tidlaen Co: 1909, 211 U. S. 562; Cline v. Kaplan,

1944, 323 U. S. 97, 98; Thompson v. Magnolia Co., 1940, 309 U. S.

478, 481; 2 Celie on Bankruptcy, §23.02 et seq.; 5A: Remington

on Bankruptcy, §

fre pnd oe 323 U. S. 7, B; 2° Collier on ‘Bank-

ruptcy; $23.12.

*In B. F. Avery & Sons Co. v. Davis, 5 Cir: 1951, 192 F. 2d

255, it was held that a creditor who had filed a proof of claim had

not impliedly consented to sunmnary adjadication of the trustee's

claim for recovery of a preference. Contra: In re Nathan, S. D

Cal., 1951, 98 F. Supp. 686. See discussion in 2 Collier on Bank-

ruptcy, §23.08[6].

*Cline v. Kaplan, 1944, 323 U.S. 97, 99; In re Hopkins, 2 Gr.,

1916, 229 F. 378; cf. §2(a)(7) of Neg 1952. Amendment to the

rent ie Title 11, U. S.C. A., 811(a)(7), and its "effect

upon Cline i Tehama Roepe Ach Co. v. Comingor,

1902, 184.U. S. 18, 26.

WTitle 11, U. S. C, A., §46(b).

11Shumacher v. Beeler, 1934, 293 U. S. 367; Williams v. Austrian,

1947, 331. U. S. 642, 652. We

idle

But only when acquiescence or consent (a question of

fact) appears can the court go forward to a judgment,

and since the court did go forward in this case it must

be conclusively presumed that all things necessary to

support the judgment are present. All intendments are

presumed in favor of the judgment. Coffman here is

collaterally attacking a judgment of a court of compe-

tent jurisdiction exercising its power within its subject

matter jurisdiction. This can only be done by showing a

fatal defect on the face of the judgment roll, which is

not claimed here.

The question whether the entry of the District Court

of November 5, 1947, was in form or intention a judg-

ment is not here determined.

Tue Proceepincs AFTER TERMINATION OF BANK-

RUPTCY PROCEEDINGS.

Cobra’s execution on its judgment against Aircraft

having been returned unsatisfied, Cobra instituted supple-

mentary proceedings in the district court, entirely distinct

from the bankruptcy proceedings, to discover Aircraft’s

assets and levy thereon. Rule 69(a) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure provides that:

«“* %* * The procedure on execution in proceed-

ings supplementary to and in aid of a judgment, and

in proceedings on and in aid of execution shall be

in accordance with the practice and procedure of a

state in which the district court is held, existing at

the time the remedy is sought. except that any statute

of the United States governs to the extent that it

is applicable. * * *” zs

—H—

\ The applicable provisions for supplementary proceedings

in California, the state in which the instant proceedings

were held, are fotind in the California Code of Civil

Procedure [C. C. P.] at Sections 714 through 723.

Section 717C. C. P. permits a judge to. order any

Ghseon. wiles 4e.,showm,tmn-orocl.of aldavit.or otherwhe,

to be indebted to the judgment debtor in an amount ex-

ceeding $50.00, to appear before the judge or a referee

appointed by him to atiswer concerning the debt. ‘Under

the provisions of Section 719 C. C. P., “[t]he judge or

referee may order ahy property of the judgment debtor,

not ‘€xempt from execution, in the hands of such debtor,

or any other person, or due to the judgmént debtor, to

be applied toward the satisfaction of the judgment; but

no such order can. be made as to money or property in

the hands of any other person or claimed to be due from

him to the judgment debtor, if such person claims an

interest in the property adverse to the judgment debtor

or denies the debt.” In the latter two circumstances the

judgment creditor may bring a general action ‘against

the adverse claimant, and pending the commencement and

prosecuition to judgment of such ‘an’action, the judge or

referee can forbid the adverse claimant from in any. way

disposing of his interest or debt. Section 720, C. C. P.

-. Coffman. denied and continues to deny any indebtedness

to Aircraft, the judgment debtor, which would be subject to

garnishment. ‘While ‘admitting that he owes Aircraft $9,-

240.46, Coffman contends that his debt to Airtraft ‘is more

than set-off by the sum of $12,207.39 which Aircraft owes

—Jom

him. He therefore contends that under the terms of the

referred to sections of the California Code of Civil Pro-

cedure, he is not subject to the summary treatment of a

supplementary proceeding. He objected thereto before

the special master in the supplementary proceeding, again

before the district judge, and he continues, here to object

in this direct appeal from a judgment rendered against

him in a proceeding in which he was a party.

The special master found that Coffman’s claim of a

set-off was a mere bookkeeping entry which “lacks integ-

rity.” He concluded therefrom that Coffman’s denial of

indebtedness was in bad faith and was no bar to the

supplementary proceeding.

Cobra contends that Coffman’s denial of the debt is in

bad faith, and that since the special master so held, a

summary proceeding was sufficient. Cobra relies on the

case of Parker v. Page, 1869, 38 Cal. 522, wherein the

Supreme Court of California held: “The denial of the

debt or the adverse claim to property, contemplated in

Section [719], is a claim or denial in good faith, and not

a mere fraudulent sham, resorted to for purposes of delay.

To ‘permit a fraudulent garnishee for the mere purpose

of delay, and who, evidently, is acting in bad faith, to

avail himself of Section [719], in order to drive the

judgment creditor to an action against him, would be to

pervert the true purpose of that section, and make it a

shield for fraud, instead of an instrument of justice,”

[at p. 527.] |

2 7

The. situation in» Parker v. Page, swpra, involved a

garnishee who held a fund in which he claimed no personal

interest, but who denied that the judgment debtor had any

interest in the find either. The garnishee claimed only

that he sought to protect himself from any personal

liability to the cestwi que trust for any misapplication of

the fund. None of later California cases pay more than

mere lip service to this Parker v.\Page doctrine.”

While in some circumstances it may be that the bare

denial by the third party that he is indebted to the judg-

ment debtor or that he has possession of property belong-

ing to the:-judgment débtor inay not ‘be sufficient to defeat

the summary procedure provided by §719 C. C..P., a

reasonable prima facie claim to such effect will defeat: it.

If we give the “good faith” principle the wide play con-

tended for by Cobra, then whether Coffman can be exam-

ined under the provisions of §719, C. C. P. depends upon

whether the trier of fact. is impressed: favorably or. un-

favorably as to the sincerity of Coffman’s claims. It

seems to us that it must appear beyond a reasonable doubt

that Coffman’s contentions are so unbelievable, fantastic,

or so palpably. inconsistent that they can but be held to be

eae ae Coffman’s. right to a classical

“es

42 Hartman v. a OE A ETON

1881, $ 9 Cal. 405, 414; Deering v. Richardson-Kimball Co., 1895,

Sir ies acer

in_V. 151 P.-2d

840" BABS 11 Cal Jur. ecuttons ,

18Finch v. Finch, 1909, 12 Cal. hee ox 107 P. 594;

vaniliibiies

plenary hearing can be deneid him. We hold that Coff-

man’s claim does not justify such a determination. We

think the California cases are in accord. Of course, we

do not express nor do we intimate any other conclusion

as to the effect of the evidence.

We conclude that the summary supplementary proceed-

ing was erroneous and that the error requires reversal

of the judgment.

Reversed.

(Endorsed:) Opinion. Filed Jun. 28, 1954. Paul P.

O’Brien, Clerk.

Orpver DrrectinGc FILinc oF OPINION AND FILING AND

RECORDING OF JUDGMENT.

Orperep that the typewritten opinion this day rendered

by this Court in above cause be forthwith filed by the

clerk and that a judgment be filed and recorded in the

minutes of this court in accordance with the opinion ren-

dered.

14See footnote 12, supra.

axfi==

Section 715 of the California Cade of Ciel Procediere

provides that “After the iseming of am execution sqeinet

property and upon pronf by afficterit of 2 party w other

wise to the satisfachom of a page of fhe comet (Gat any

judgment debtor has property which he ammestiy -efeses

to apply toward the satefacton of the paiqgirent. aah

judge may by an order require the jocigment detear

appear, at a specified time and place. before curl snl

or referee appoented by hum ‘o anewer comerrcumg “he came

(This section was enacted in 1872)

Section 717 xf the Calrfornas ( orte of (onl Powers

reads as follows —

“After the tening Gr cetere of ao coetutien aque

property of the fxigment Getter or of any Gee of Me

several deheoes on the tame netyrmene eee rpen res ow

affetavit or other wine ot he catiefertem of fe cetge

thet amy peopom ow cor perature Inne Property 9 mue® Mamie

ee ee

fifty delters (950). the jetge emp. oe ae ort omnis

such person oF corporation, or any e@ieer qe qeeter

thereof, te appear at 0 eperited Geme amet pies Sefer

humor a referee appeinrerd Sy fem seed anwar comeers

ing the came” (Emphasis capplied) (Tite wae ate

enacted in 1872.)

Section 719 of the Cade of Chel Preeetiere conte oe

follows

The pale on cwferee ene) center ey promeety of othe

ed pred det oe et er ammye fooon eeererem ao Re fare

of wach debtor of amy other perv © fine 6 Ge sly

meres dedi © Oe agp coward Re acmiae em te

—}3—

judgment ; but no such order can be made as to money or

property in the hands of any other person or claimed to

be due from him to the judgment debtor, if such person

claims an interest im the property adverse to the judgment

debtor or denies the debt. (Emphasis supplied.) (Enacted

1872.)”

Section 720 of the California Code of Civil Procedure

reads as follows:

“If it appears that a person or corporation, alleged to

have property of the judgment debtor, or to be indebted

to him, claims an interest in the property adverse to him,

or denies the deit, the judgment creditor may maintain

an action against such person or corporation for the

recovery of such interest or debt; and the judge or referee

may by order forbid a transfer or other disposition of

such interest or debt, until an action can be commenced

and prosecuted to judgment. Such order may be modified

or wacated by the judge or referee granting the same,

or the court in which the action is brought, at any time,

upon such terms as may be just. (Emphasis supplied.)

(Enacted in 1872.)”

Section 644 of the California Code of Civil Procedure

reads as follows:

“The finding of the referee or commissioner upon the

whole issue must stand as the finding of the court, and

upon filing of the finding with the clerk of the court, or

with the judge where there is no clerk, judgment may be

entered thereon in the same manner as if the action had

been tried by the court. (Enacted 1872.)”

_—,

—I3}—

Section 645 of the California Code of Civil Procedure

reads as follows:

“The findings of the referee or commissioner may be

excepted to and reviewed in like manner as if made by

the court. When the reference is to report the facts, the

finding reported has the effect of @ special verdict. (Em-

phasis supplied.) (Enacted 1872.)”

Section 824 of the California Corporations Code reads.

as follows:

“Except as provided in this division, the directors of

a corporation shall not authorize or ratify the purchase

by it of its shares, or declare or pay dividends, or author-

ise or ratify the withdrawal or distribution of any part

of its assets among its shareholders.” (Emphasis sup-

plied.)

Section 825 of the California Corporations Code reads

as follows:

“In case of any wilful or negligent violation of Section

824, the directors in office at the time of the violation,

except those who have caused their dissent from the

unlawful action to be entered on the minutes of the meet-

ing at which the action was authorized, and those who

were not present at the time the board acted, ore jointly

and severally liable to the corporation or to its receiver,

liquidator, or trustee in bankruptcy, for the benefit of the

creditors of the corporation or any of them and of the

shareholders and owners of shares at the time of the

violation, for its debts and liabilities existing at the time

of the violation and for the full amount of any loss sus-

tained by such holders and owners of shares, other than

shares upon which any such payment or distribution was

————————_—————

—j4—

made, to the amount of the unlawful dividends, purchase

price, withdrawal, or other distribution.”

Section 2229 of the California Civil Code reads as fol-

lows: “A trustee may not use or deal with the trust

property for his own profit, or for any other purpose

unconnected with the trust, in any manner.”

Section 2232 of the California Civil Code reads as fol-

lows: “No trustee, so long as he remains in the trust,

may undertake another trust adverse in its nature to the

lynne a a ie

out the consent-of the latter.” ~

Section 2236 of the California Civil Code prohibits the

trustee to mingle the trust property with his own. |

Section 2237 of the California Civil Code provides that

a trustee who uses and disposes of the trust property may

be required to account to the beneficiary.

In Cherry v. Hayden, 100 Cal. App. 2d 416, the Appel-

late Court declared at page 419, that the'trier of the facts

is the constitutional finder of the facts. ~

The constitutional prohibition to annul findings of the

trier of facts (if same are supported by substantial evi-

dence) is cogently expounded in the learned opinion of

Judge Shenk in the leading case of Tupman. v. Haber-

kern, 208 Cal. 256. At pages 262 and 263 of the opinion,

the California Supreme Court declared as follows:

(1), Prior to:the adoption of section 444 of Article VI

of the Constitution, in 1914, section 434 of the same ar-

ticle, in: 1926; and section 956a of the Code of Civil

Procedure, in 1927 (Stats. 1927, p. 583), it was firmly

established that an appellate tribunal in this state possesses

om

none of the functions of a jury, and that the sole province

of the court on appeal was to review ‘the action of the

trial court, correct its errors, and thus pass upon questions

of law only. This was the established rule of common

law; Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U. S.. 364

[57 L. Ed. 879, 33 S, Ct. Rep. 523, see, also, Rose’s. U.

S. Notes}.); In. Bauder v: Tyrell, 59 Cal. 99, it was said:

“The trial court: decides as to the facts, the court of re-

view. (in this state) as to questions of law only * * *

it is founded in the essential distinction between the trial

and the appellate court, and grows out of considerations

of jurisdiction; that it is the province of the trial court

to decide questions of fact and of the appellate court to

decide questions of law; that this court can rightfully set

aside a finding for want of evidence only where there ts

no evidence to support it, or where the supporting evidence

isso slight 0s to show abuse of discretion”, —

supplied.) . pire

- Even in criminal cases (where proof beyond a reason-

able doubt is required) the constitution of California ex-

pressly states that the reviewing court has jurisdiction

“on questions of law alone.” -scieepianouienbiesiieoncgetits

and 4b.)

In People v. Gutierrez, 35 Cal. 2d 721, 727 [221 P. 2d

22], the California Supreme Court said: _

“After couvicion ail intendments “are in favor ‘of the

judgment and a verdict will not be set aside unless. the

record clearly shows that spon no hypothesis whatsoever

is there sufficient substantial evidence to support it.” —

phasis supplied.) :

—16—

In Estate of Bristol, 23. Cal. 2d 221, the California

Supreme Court stated at pages 223 and 224, as follows:

''“The'rule as to our province is: “In reviewing the evi-

dence’. . . all conflicts must be resolved in favor of

the respondent, and all legitimate and reasonable infer-

ences indulged in to ‘uphold the verdict if possible. It

is an elementary . . . principle of law, that when a

verdict is attacked as being unsupported, the power of

the appellate court begins and ends with a determination

as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contra-

dicted or uncontradicted, which will support the conclusion

reached by the jury. When two or more inferences can

be reasonably deduced from the facts, the reviewing court

ts without power to substitute its deductions for those

of the trial court.” (Italics added.) The rule quoted is

as applicable in reviewing the finding of a judge as it is

when considering a jury’s verdict. * * * Appellate

courts, therefore, if there be any reasonable doubt as to

the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a finding, should

resolve that doubt in favor of the finding.” (See also

authorities cited in the footnote below. )*

Under Sec. 644, C. C. P.,. the finding of the referee or

commissioner must stand as the finding of the Court, and

under Sec. 645, C. C. P., the finding of the referee has

the effect of a special jury verdict. (Williams v. Flinn &

Treacy, 61 Cal. App. 352, 214 Pac. 1024.)

*Bernicker v. Bernicker, 30 Cal. 2d 439, at pp. 443-445; Kelly v.

Bank of America, 112.Cal. App. 2d. 388; Potter v.. Pacific Coal &

Lhbr. Co., 37 Cal. 2d 592, at pp. 597-598; Estate of Teel, 25 Cal.

2d 520; Lauder v. Wright Investment Co., 126 A. C. A. 167, at

pp. 170-171.

on te

In Rosati v. Heimann, 126 A. C. A. 50 (decided June

16, 1954), an order of reference was made by the State

Superior Court to determine the amount of indebtedness

due from the defendant to the plaintiff. In passing upon

the legal effect of the evidence under the “Uniform Busi-

ness Records as Evidence Act” (C. C. P., Secs. 1953e-

1953h), Judge Moore, speaking for the unanimous court,

declared as follows:

“Whether a book of accounts meets the requirements

of the law either as to the proximity of the entries to the —

date of the transaction or as to the accuracy of the entries, :

is a question to be determined by the trial court in the

exercise of a sound discretion.” (Emphasis added.)

The factual findings of the referee there were ap-

proved by the Superior Judge, and the appellate court

ruled that said findings were conclusive upon the review-

ing court.

Section 19 of Article VI of the Constitution of Cali-

fornia provides:

“The court may instruct the jury regarding the law

applicable to the facts of the case, and may make such

comment on the evidence and the testimony and credibility

of any witness as in its opinion is necessary for the

proper determination of the case. The court shall inform

the jury in all cases that the jurors are the exclusive

judges of all questions of fact submitted to them and of

the credibility of the witnesses.” (Emphasis added.)

It is the recognized and traditional rule that an issue

of fact becomes an issue of law only where the evidence

is such that only one conclusion can be reached by reason-

able minds. In other words, if the evidence is such that

eile

reasonable minds might differ as to the conclusion to be

reached; the issue is one of fact and not law, and an

appellate court 1s bound by the determination of the trier

of facts.

Sections 719 and 644 and 645 of the California Code

of Civil Procedure were all enacted in the same year

(in 1872). They are all im pari materia and the deter-

mination of the trier of the facts has the effect of a special

jury verdict, which is conclusive and binding on the re-

viewing court under the California Constitution. The de-

cision in the garnishment Hartman case (the first case

referred to in footnote 12 of the opinion) was handed

down about fourteen years before the enactment of Sec-

tions 719, 644 and 645 of the California Code of Civil

Procedure.

=

APPENDIX III.

In re Jost, 117 Cal. App. 2d 379, involved a naturaliza-

tion proceeding in which the application for naturaliza-

tion was opposed by the government on the ground that

the applicant was guilty of bad faith in that he had

previously claimed an exemption from military service on

the ground that he was a conscientious objector. The

question of his bad faith was the crucial issue in the case.

The court declared that the burden of proof was upon

the government to prove the bad faith of the applicant

by “clear and convincing evidence,” and “clear, explicit,

unequivocal evidence, so clear as to leave no substantial

doubt, and sufficiently strong to command the unhesitat-

ing assent of every reasonable min ”” The court ruled

that this rule was directed to the trial judge, and in

passing on the effect of substantial evidence under this

rule, the court declared, at pages 387 and 388, as fol-

lows: .

“No citation of authority should be necessary to demon-

strate our position in respect to such a finding. (3) This

court’s. duty, on appeal, begins and ends with the in-

quiry whether the trial court had before it evidence upon

which an unprejudiced mind might reasonably have reached

the same conclusion which was reached. * * * (4)

When the evidence is conflicting, it will be presumed

that the court found every fact necessary to support its

order that the evidence would justify. (5) So far as

the court has passed upon the weight of the evidence or

credibility of witnesses, its implied findings are conelu-

sive even when based upon conflicting affidavits, and

where the conflict is not sharp but only such as to create

an uncertainty in the mind of the judge. (Hyde v. Boyle,

——

105 Cal. 102 (38 Pac.'643); Kern Valley Bank v. Koehn,

10 Cal, App. 679 (103 Pac. 173).)

In LaJolla Casa de Manana v. Hopkins, 98 Cal. App.

2d 339° (219 P. 2d 871), this court said:

-*& witness may be contradicted by the facts he states

as completely as by direct adverse testimony, and there

may be so many omissions in his account of particular

transactions or of his own conduct as to discredit his

whole story. His manner of testifying may give rise

to doubts of his sincerity and create the impression

that he is giving a wrong coloring to material facts . . .

Where conflicting inferences may be drawn from testi-

mony, this court is bound by the findings of the trial

court as conclusively as in other cases of conflict.’

“(6) If the finding of fact is based upon a reasonable

inference it is not within the power of an appellate court

to set it aside any more than it is within its power to set

aside any other finding supported by any legal evidence.

An appellate court cannot review a finding because in its

judgment the inference adduced by the trial court is im-

probable or more unlikely to be true than the opposite one.

Such a finding is as completely a finding based upon good

and ‘sufficient evidence as any other finding of fact.”

(Petition for hearing in the Supreme Court was denied.)

In Wilcox v. Salomone, 118 Cal. App. 2d 704 at page

710, the Court stated. as follows: .

“T1] It is presumed that a deed absolute on its face

is what it purports to be. (17 Cal. Jur., Mortgages,

§§56 and 57, and cases cited therein.) [2] However,

it is a well settled rule that a deed absolute in form may

be:shawn to have been intended as.a mortgage, and that.

such a deed’is a mortgage if intended as security for the

pein aes aren ——

— ,

performance of an obligation. (17 Cal. Jur., Mortgages,

841; Civ. Code, §2924.) [3, 4] The burden of proving

that a deed absolute is a mortgage rests upon the party

who alleges it, and the evidence must be clear, satisfac-

tory and convincing; unequivocal and indisputable. (17

Cal. Jur., Mortgages, §§58, 59.) [5] Whether the evi-

dence to show that a deed was intended as a mortgage is

clear and convincing is a question for the trial court, whose

determination on conflicting evidence is not reviewable on

appeal.” (Emphasis supplied. )

In Thomasset v. Thomasset, reported in 122 A. C. A.

(Dec. 1953), 148 at page 155, the Court said:

[4] There are expressions in the decision to the ef-

fect that the separate character of property acquired after

marriage is to be established by “clear and convincing

evidence,” “clear and decisive proof;’ “clear and satis-

factory proof.” (Citing cases.) These expressions state

a rule of evidence directed to the trial court; and if that

court finds that the evidence meets the rule, a reviewing

court must accept that determination as conclusive if there

is substantial evidence to support it. (Citing cases. )

The decision of the trier of fact must be according to

the preponderance of evidence. (C. C. P., Secs. 2061(5),

2103.) [5] Whether the evidence adduced to overcome

the presumption of community property is sufficient for

the purpose is a question of fact for the trial court. (Cit-

ing cases. )

In Perske v. Perske, 125 A. C. A. 946 at page 952 (de-

cided June 9, 1954), the Court states:

“Appellant urges that, under this evidence, the trial

court was bound by the doctor’s and her testimony, inas-

much as such testimony was uncontradicted, and was

—22—

without power to disregard it. [4] Of course, a trial

court cannot arbitrarily disregard -uncontradicted testi-

mony. [lc] But where, as here, the trial court (by

with appellant’s funds) has necessarily found that the

so-called uncontradicted evidence was false, an appellate

court will not interfere if there is any basis at all to

support the trial court * * * The trial judge is the

arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses. A witness

may be contradicted by the facts he states as completely

as by direct adverse testimony, and there may be so many

omissions in his account of particular transactions or of

his own conduct as to discredit his whole story. His man-

ner of testifying may give rise to doubts of his sincerity

and create the impression that he is giving a wrong color-

ing to material facts. (Citing cases.)” (Emphasis sup-

plied.)

aor i Seg ae RS RR AN ALE

Cal. App. 2d 567, at p. 573; LaJolla etc.

. 2d 339, at pp. 345-346, 219 P. 2d 871;

Cal. App, 2d , at pp. 27-28, 260 P. 2d

. App: 24 46S, ‘at’ pp: 466-7, 261

—23—

APPENDIX IV.

Comment on decisions cited in footnote 12 of the Court's

opinion, at page 6:

The Wolfjen v. Dolton case, 24 Cal. 2d 878, has not

the remotest kinship to the factual situation presented by

the present record. It did not involve a supplemental pro-

ceeding, and it did not concern the construction of either

Section 719 or of 720, C. C. P. Nor did it involve the

constitutional question whether the findings of the trial

court were conclusive and binding upon the reviewing

court. It was an action in equity, instituted by the judg-

ment-creditor against directors of the debtor corporation,

praying for judgment declaring that the defendants were

holding moneys for the use and benefit of the corpora-

tion. Upon conclusion of the plaintiff's case, a judgment

of nonsuit was granted and the case reached the Supreme

Court on an appeal from this judgment. The prima facie

case established by the plaintiff’s proofs was as follows :

(1) That the defendants had borrowed from a bank

substantial sums of money and with the money so bor-

rowed, and other funds, they organized the debtor corpo-

ration, of which they subsequently became its directors.

(2) That upon its incorporation the debtor corporation

and the defendants entered into a valid and binding con-

tract providing that the loans made by the defendants

should be repaid by the debtor corporation “out of the

first net earnings” (emphasis by the Court).

(3) That notwithstanding the fact that the debtor cor-

poration had at no time earned any income (p. 882), the

defendants withdrew funds from the debtor corporation

in repayment of the loans advanced to the debtor corpo-

i

ration prior to its incorporation in vidlation of said writ-

ten contract.

(4) That a demand was made by the judgment-<rediter

upon the defendants that suit be instituted by the corpo

ration for the recovery of said funds, which demand was

not complied with by the defendants.

Upon the conclusion of plaintiff's proofs, the defendants

made a motion for a nonauit, basing their comtention on

the ground that plaintiff had an adequate remedy at ew

inasmuch as plaintiff's remedy was confined to a supple

mental proceeding.

In reversing the judgment of soneuit, the Supreme

Court ruled as follows:

(1) That the remedy provided by « supplemental pro

ceeding was not exclusive of any other remedy which may

be available to a judgment-creditor.

(2) That the judgment creditor was act precheded from

resorting to an action in equity inasmuch as bie remedy

under a supplemental proceeding was sot acderpaste

(3) That plaintiff made out a prime facw cose and had

established a clear breach of contract om the part of the

defendants, since the contract provided that Ge leace

made by the defendants were to be repel cat of the

first net earnings and sot cut of the property or aesete

of the judgment-debtor.

(4) That the lower court had ao legal right grant

a judgment of nonswit for the reasem that the plmcntil® Muact

established a pruma facw case

(S$) That the defendants shoukt have been compeilet

chew

to present such evidence as they mugte heawe a thew de

fense to the breach of sant comtract om ew part

— =

Be parte Mellin, 99 Cob GR, Genie or Geeener

proeeerhmg sad an sgplicacem ter Gaeterge epee 6 on

of Rabens corpun be Ge case opmditews af 6 <argererten

Net Sind ¢ petition a Ge are Saget (rt a tee

the corgerscen adage en aectantery aantmee cemier

the prowuneme of am Ret of he Sqpaimemers seeevtlind Sow

aot coampliod oth Wy Re pecitiener yom We eters

comme) 0tR Ne cmeatonr ¢ Remand et tee wae mim Or

CO ed

shell wet Se etinetgaed grlibe of <omemmmne of mere ot

why Ne owht wet Gere eer Re eater Re enete

id

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ing Re orgereeicm ceeant Nar We Net <finesned cece

ee aed

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crac Re therm amg ageing ememmwenent 6 ome

Ws Den eg peewee eet We eerncemet rm

pmcny emnioee te eae silos ceed tetas ee my ce

—2—

effects as trustee for the estate of the insolvent debtor.

. . .” (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court further held that the petitioner was not an

offeer of the court and not a party to the proceedings in

insolvency, and that he claimed the property in his pos-

session adverse to all the world. The Court further held

that the petitioner had good title to the property, though

it may hawe been obtained by fraudulent and corrupt prac-

tiees between him and his grantor, “except creditors and

subsequent purchasers of the grantor.” (At p. 413.)

Without further burdening the Court with excerpts

from this case, it is sufficient to point out (a) that Coff-

man was not a garnishee; (b) that Coffman was a trustee

who could not assert any tithe against the judgment-credi-

tor, and had no interest adverse to the insolvent corpora-

tion; and (c) that the proofs in the instant proceeding

revealed, ar @ matter of low, that the property was the

property of the judgment-<deltor, which Coffman held in

trust for the judgment-creditor.

Lewis +. Chamberlain (108 Cal. 525, 41 Pac. 413) also

involved the relationship between a judgment-debtor and a

third party garnishee. In this case the garnishee (the

wife of the jedgment-<dettor) Gled a written and verified

anewer specifically denying that the property in her

possession was the property of the judgment-deltor, and

specifically asserting under cath that the property was

her own property. No euch verified answer was filed

by Coffeen: and the record shows beyond dispute, and

at @ matter of lew, that the property was the property

of the rmdgament debtow amd that \ offmam heid rad prop-

erty wm trust for the padgment-<reditor.

—-27--

Deering v. Richardson-Kimbal Co. (109 Cal. 73, 41

Pac. 801) also involved a relationship between the judg-

ment-debtor and an innocent garnishee. It also involved

claims of other persons who claimed liens upon the money

in the possession of the garnishee bank. The trial judge

expressly found that there was no pretense of bad faith

om the part of the bank (p. 83). In the case at bar, as

against the judgment-debtor was made in bad faith.

Clearly, Coffman's position is not analogous to the posi-

tion of the bank, who was an innocent party. The fact

that the garnishee bank was acting in good faith, was an

undisputed fact. It was further wadenied that the claims

of the other parties who claimed liens upon the money in

the possession of the bank were made in good faith.

The early case of Hartman v. Olvera, 51 Cal. 501, in-

volves the legal relationship existing between a judgment-

debtor and a third party garnishee, and it does not in-

volve or touch upon the legal and equitable relationship

existing between an insolvent corporate judgment-debtor

and its majority stockholders, officers and directors (like

in the case at bar). Furthermore, it should be noted:

(a) That this case was decided prior to the adoption

of Sections 644 and 645 of the Code of Civil Procedure,

which were enacted in 1872. Under said sections the

finding of a referee under a general order of reference

has the effect of a special jury verdict, and such determina-

tion cannot be constitutionally disturbed by the reviewing

court.

(b) That the constitutional limitation imposed by the

California constitution on the power of the reviewing

a

court to disturb findings of trial judges or of referees

under orders of general reference, was not discussed in the

> *«

(c) Under Section 644 of the Code of Civil Procedure

the finding of the referee or commissioner must stand as

the findings of the Court, and upon filing of the finding

with the clerk of the court, judgment may be entered

thereon in the same manner as if the action had been

tried by the Court. Said section, as previously pointed

out, was enacted in 1872, about fourteen years subsequent

to the decision in Hartman v. Olvera, supra. Section 645

was likewise enacted about fourteen years after the deci-

sion in Hartman v. Olvera, supra; and Section 719, C. C.

P., were also enacted in 1872.

TOPICAL INDEX

PAGE

Judgment of the Court of Appeals 3

Dissenting opinion of Judge Carter on Cobra’s petition for re-

hearing 3

Additional California citations 6

Additional questions presented and reasons for granting cer-

tiorari 8

Conclusion 10

Appendices :

Appendix “A.” Judgment App. p. 1

Appendix “B.” Dissenting opinion on petition for rehear-

ing . App. p. 2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases PAGE

Buffmum v. Barceloux Company, 289 U. S. 227, 53 S. Ct. 539... 8

Finch v. Finch, 12 Cal. App. 274. 10

Nixon v. Goodwin, 3 Cal. App. 358. 6

Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 60 S. Ct. 238. 8

Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co., 37 Cal. 2d 592, 234 P.

2d 16

Sanford y. Sanford, 139 U. S. 642, 11 S. Ct. 666..

Stuard v. Larson, 298 Fed. 223

Title Ins. Co. v. California Dev. Co., 171 Cal. 173

Van Sweringen Company, In re, 119 F. 2d 231

Ruizs

Rules of the United States Supreme Court, Rule OCS Peiciteniei: &

TEXTBOOKS

Lewin on Trusts (13th Ed.), pp. 11, 191

Maitland’s Equity (2d Ed.), pp. 43, 80, 83

1 Perry on Trusts and Trustees (6th Ed.), Sec. 13, p. 1.

1 Perry on Trusts and Trustees (6th Ed.), Sec. 206, p. 355...

1 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence (2d Ed.), Sec. 155... ie

2 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence (3rd Ed.), Sec. 956......... “i

3 Reed on Statute of Frauds (1st Ed.), Sec. 595, p. 61

2 Restatement of Law of Trusts, p. 1249

26 Ruling Case Law, p. 1232

Waterman, Specific Performance (ist Ed.), Sec. 251, p. 341...

Se eee ee mee oeeee

oN © & WD

eemenncescce

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1954

No. 380

Cosra MANUFACTURING COMPANY, a California corpora-

tion,

Petitioner,

Harry J. CoFFMAN,

Respondent.

Snel

SUPPLEMENT TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF

CERTIORARI.

————

To the Honorable Chief Justice Earl Warren, and the

Honorable Associate Justices of the Supreme Court

of the United States:

This supplement to the pending Petition for Writ of

Certiorari is predicated on the certified typewritten sup-

plemental transcript of the record, and on the dissenting

opinion of District Judge Carter therein included, which

were transmitted to this court on October 14, 1954, four-

teen days after the instant petition for certiorari had been

duly filed and docketed. We respectfully submit that the

potent and illuminating dissenting opinion of Judge

Carter, hereinafter referred to, cogently demonstrates

that the reversal by the Court of Appeals of the factual

dit

findings and of the order of the trial judge raises ques-

tions both fundamental and far-reaching in the adminis-

tration of Federal civil justice in the field of the trust

and corporation law, The specific questions raised con-

cern the subject of the fiduciary obligations and duties

imposed on a dominant stockholder and executive officer

and director of an insolvent judgment debtor towards its

creditors under the trust fund doctrine. We therefore

respectfully petition this Honorable Court for leave to

supplement. the pending petition for certiorari with the

hereinafter stated additional allegations and grounds,

which in the light of the supplemental transcript were not

adequately stated in the original petition. |

At the outset and at expense of repetition we wish to

reemphasize that the opinion of the Court of Appeals

(reported in 214 Fed. (2d Series), beginning at p. 489

and appended to the petition for certiorari as Appendix 1)

clearly reveals that the Court of Appeals did not make an

appraisal of the factual situation established by the record,

in compliance with the California constitutional and pro-

cedural law which imposes a duty on the reviewing court

to study and analyze the record “for the purpose of de-

termining whether or not there is any evidence of a

substantial character which reasonably supports the judg-

ment of the trial court.”

1By stipulation of counsel for the petitioner and the respondent

ete neces ba the time for filing of the respon-

to the petition for certiorari was extended

to November 29, 1954. 1954. We were advised by the respondents’ coun-

3 eden Pacific Coast Lumber Co., 37 Cal. 2d 592, 598, 234 P.

oie Te

Judgment of the Court of Appeals.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was ordered to

be recorded in the minutes of the Court of Appeals to be

in accordance with the aforesaid opinion. It is appended

hereto as Appendix A.°

Dissenting Opinion of Judge Carter on Cobra’s

Petition for Rehearing.

The dissenting opinion of Judge Carter transmitted to

this court as part of the supplemental record was filed in

the Court of Appeals on October 12, 1954, and is ap-

pended hereto as Appendix B. It has not been as yet

published in the official reports.

Judge Carter’s opinion on Cobra’s petition for rehear-

ing in the Court of Appeals reveals that he (unlike the

majority of the court) made a careful analysis of the

record in consonnance with the mandate of the California

Constitution. In his opinion, Judge Carter stated, inter

alia, as follows:

(1) That the opinion of the Coiart of Appeals

“presents a grave miscarriage of justice and permits

Coffman to profit by his own wrong” and to permit

Coffman to assert his offset “perverts all sense of

justice and equity.”

(2) “The Master has succinctly stated in his sup-

plemental report ‘that under the decision of Pepper v.

Litton (308 U. S. 295) Coffman . . . may not

ssl

claim the setoff against the property held by him in

_ trust, and which he had misappropriated. To permit

him to do so would be to allow Coffman to pla

himself in the position of a preferred creditor ot

(3) “The Master was right as rain. When Coff-

‘sappropriated the sum of $9,240.46 of

the funds of Aircraft as found by the Master, he

then became an involuntary trustee holding that

money in trust for the creditors of Aircraft, includ-

ing Cobra. To permit him to setoff against these

sense of justice or equity. He makes himself, by

his own act, a preferred creditor of Aircraft. He

takes advantage of his wrong in appropriating Air-

craft’s funds to have them in his possession and thus

attempt to effect his claimed setoff.”

(4) That under the California law Coffman may

not legally use his purported setoff either in a sum-

mary or plenary proceeding, since:

“(a) He obtained the $9,240.46 wrongfully

and was an involuntary trustee of the money and

liable therefor ;

(b) His receipt of the money was im violation

of the corporation law of California which made

him a trustee of the funds and liable therefor;

(c) Any attempt to set off the $12,000. pur-

portedly due from Aircraft would be permitting

him to profit by his own wrong, namely effect-

ing a setoff solely because he had wrongful pos-

session of the $9,240.46;

sali

(d) Any attempted setoff of the $12,000

would be permitting him to prefer himself to

an earlier creditor ;

(e) Setoff must be mutual and there is no

mutuality here since one obligation is that of an

involuntary trustee, the other of any (sic) in-

dividual ;

(£) Though setoff in California is self execut-

ing, the claims do not compensate in the ab-

sence of mutuality;

(g) §719 C. C. P. provides a remedy within

the jurisdiction of the Master and the district

court whether Coffman holds property for Air-

craft or owes money to Aircraft.” (Italics by

the Court.)

And

“Since the district court and Master exercised

jurisdiction under §719 C. C. P., and since Coff-

man may not legally set-off his individual claim

of $12,000 against his trustee obligation, the court

was in error in reversing the judgment of the

district court and the rehearing should have been

granted and our prior decision set aside.”

We respectfully submit that the opinion of Judge Carter

states the well-established California law. It is also in

accord with the well-established fundamental proposition

that a trustee may not take advantage of his own wrong.‘

*Maitland’s Equity (2d Ed.), p. 80; Maitland’s ity (2d Ed.),

43, 83; Lewin on Trusts (13th Ed.), 191, 11; 1 on

rusts and Trustees (6th Ed.), 10, Sec. 13; 26 Ruling Case

Ss

In 1 Pomeroy Equity jartaprudenee (det Fd Sector

18S. the author says @ citing mary cases

respectfully invite the attention of the court t @e © afb

fornm leading case of Verve e (onto ai Sop

The corert caf at page: I) amet et ce follows

“The vale & hat @ Grete of ce eet? ce

poration cammet rereree % Simeel any orefersnre or

eivemtage ower offer creviter: om ihe omer of te

dete (Remmey © Tiley, 107 Col (Pe O))

"Mer would cart ¢ treme Ger comme omer Re pee

wee of Seetion B45) of he (hed (are ohers 6

dobtce may pay me creditor am weteremrs w nnther

may give te ome crediter weurty fr fe

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state of @ heme fede gorensher amd the relationship that

evtete tetrewre an ordinary pudgment debtor and creditor

th te leer Gat he majority opine of the court bs in

Great cilieee wt Ge Californie lew co this pivoul

pevere

Adéteoma, Quetone Preaented and Reasons for

Gremting Certiorart.

We reepectfelly pray leave of thts Honorable Court

to eres errder thee beedimg the following eckiitional

crams

(1) ‘Tit the begiied bolting of the Court of Ap

peek thet (Coffeen stces! a the shore of a garniher

mened of terumg 0 trenter @ shee @ comfact with the

Gees of Oe coertt & Poppe © Lites, ceed

edge (arte: opm amd oo Befemem 5 fer cious

Comtesse, OU S 27.05 CO Ae.

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te Get 6 Grerter @ 6 Gbertery and wo @ 6 Gomenant

ont comtreiieg eecbbeieer, end thet the powers

or peme: reet

(2) The qpieiee of Ge Court of Appeals & the

cum ot ber @ chee & conflict wath the Grete of

Ge © ent G@ Crom

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goede for Gee BR Cree eteted ae follows on pagre 277.

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Conclusion.

Petitioner respectfully submits that the opinion of the

Court of Appeals, written by Circuit Judge Stephens,

when read in the light of the factual situation and the

fundamental trust and corporation law carefully evaluated

and analyzed by Judge Carter in his dissenting opinion,

conclusively demonstrates a gross miscarriage of civil

justice both under the Federal law and the law of the

State of California. As stated by Judge Carter, the

opinion “perverts all sense of justice and equity.” Also,

as stated by the California Appellate Court in Finch v.

Finch, 12 Cal. App. 274 at 279:

“It will not be controverted, we think, that the

court below was not bound by appellant's denial of

the debt if the undisputed facts showed that the debt

really existed at the time of the service of the said

writ of execution. The mere denial by the garnishee

of the indebtedness which the other averments and

admissions of the parties show to be an erroneous

conclusion from the whole transaction certainly

should not be deemed sufficient to divest the court of

jurisdiction to make the order provided for in said

section 719.” (Italics supplied.)

The instant controversy, we respectfully submit, is not

a private controversy between the respondent, the fraudu-

lent trustee, amd Cobra, the cestui que trust. In our

judgment, the opinion of the Court of Appeals constitutes

a revolutionary and unprecedented reversal of the funda-

mental law established by the California Constitution

and decisions and that it is also in conflict with the deci-

sions of this Honorable Court and of the Courts of

Appeals of other circuits.

—]1—

In effect the opinion of the majority of the Court of

Appeals herein declares as follows:

1. That the Court of Appeals is not bound by the

California Constitution under which the trier of the facts

is the constitutional finder of facts, whose factual findings

are conclusive on the reviewing court if same are sup-

ported by a fair preponderance of the evidence.

2. That it is not bound by the California law which

imposes a duty on the reviewing court to make an evalua-

tion of the record in order to determine whether the

evidence reasonably supported the judgment of the trial

court.

3. That a dominant stockholder and an executive

officer and director of an insolvent corporate debtor does

not hold the debtor’s property im trust for its creditors,

but that he stands in the shoes of a bona fide garnishee,

and that as such he is liberated from the sanctions im-

posed on him by the California trust and corporation law.

4. That the burden of proof is not cast on the fraudu-

lent dominant stockholder or executive officer and director

to account for his conversion of the trust property.

5. That in a supplemental proceeding, which is a pro-

ceeding of a civil nature, the burden of proof is cast on

the cestui que trust to establish beyond a reasonable doubt

that the claim of the dominant stockholder and executive

officer and director of an insolvent corporation against

the trust property in his wrongful possession is not fan-

tastic or palpably inconsistent; and also that his mere

assertion of a claim against the trust property ousts the

trier of the facts of jurisdiction to pass upon the factizal

validity of such an assertion.

‘ect cs

We respectfully submit that these are grave and im- ©

portant questions in the administration of civil justice in

aid of the enforceability of a federal judgment rendered

in a bankruptcy matter. Also that the opinion of the

majority of the Court of Appeals herein presents a case

of a clear departure from the accepted and usual course

of judicial proceedings as to call for the exercise of this

court’s power of supervision. .

We respectfully submit that the petitioner is entitled

to an order of this court vacating the decision of the

Court of Appeals and directing reinstatement of the

order of the trial District Judge.

Respectfully submitted,

Mitton B. SAFIEr,

Attorney for Petitioner.

Ernest R. UT ey, and

Josera B. BECKENSTEIN,

Of Counsel for Petitioner.

Appendix “A.”

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Harry J. Coffman, Appellant, vs: Cobra Manufactur-

ing Company, Appellee. No. 13,672.

JUDGMENT.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of California, Central Division.

This Cause came on to be heard on the Transcript

of the Record from the United States District Court for

the Southern District of California, Central Division,

and was duly submitted.

On Consideration Whereof, It is now here ordered and

adjudged by this Court, that the order of the said Dis-

trict Court in this Cause be, and hereby is reversed, with

costs in favor of the Appellant and against the Appellee.

It Is Further Ordered and adjudged by this Court

that the Appellant recover against the Appellee for his

costs herein expended and have execution therefor.

(Endorsed) Judgment. Filed and entered June 28,

1954. Paul P. O’Brien, Clerk.

pS ees

Appendix “B.”

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Harry J. Coffman, Appellant, vs. Cobra Manufactur-

ing Company, Appellee. No. 13,672, Oct. 12, 1954.

DISSENTING OPINION ON PETITION FOR REHEARING.

Carter, James M., District Judge.

We originally concurred in Judge Stephens’ opinion

holding that under California law [Secs. 717, 719, 720

Code of Civil Procedure] Coffman was entitled to the

benefit of a plenary action to determine his claimed set-off

against the moneys found due by the Master from Coff-

man to Aircraft, arising from Coffman’s misappropria-

tions.

If Coffman may legally press this claim of set-off, we

are still in accord with the decision that Coffman is en-

titled to a plenary proceeding in which to assert the set-

off.

But after the petition for rehearing was filed we again

examined the whole case and we are convinced that Coff-

man should not be permitted anywhere, in summary or

plenary proceedings, to pursue his alleged set-off. Since

there was ample evidence to support the Master’s findings

of Coffman’s appropriations from Aircraft, and his debt

to Aircraft arising therefrom, this was properly deter-

mined in the summary proceedings under Sec. 719 C. C. P.

and the judgment of the trial court should have been

affirmed.

We regret we were unable to convince our colleagues

_ of the validity of this position. It is only because the

/ case, as now decided, (and to which we heretofore gave

elas

our approval) represents a grave miscarriage of justice

and permits Coffman to profit by his own wrong, we feel

called upon to state our present position on the courts’

denial of the petition for rehearing.

The facts as found by the Master and as supported by

the evidence, show that since May 7, 1945, Cobra had

been a creditor of Aircraft. The indebtedness was based

on book account entries from May 7, 1945 to and includ-

ing April 16, 1946, then aggregating $6,254.25. The

referee on May 20, 1947, found $6,254.25 was due Cobra

from Aircraft. The decision was affirmed on November

5, 1947, on petition for review to the district court. Judg-

ment in this amount was entered in favor of Cobra against

Aircraft on November 5, 1947 in the records of the

clerk’s office. .

In October 1945 Aircraft ceased doing war work and

all contracts were cancelled. Thereafter it did nothing

but “cleaning up.” At the time Aircraft ceased active

work it had a net worth of $20,190.51. Coffman was

the dominant and controlling stockholder of Aircraft as

well as its president, and had been such since January

17, 1945. Since that date and until 1949, he had been

the person in charge of the affairs of Aircraft.

Within a matter of days after October 31, 1945, when

Aircraft had a net worth of $20,190.51, Coffman began

doing business as Nash Wilshire, an auto sales agency.

On November 25, 1945, he opened a bank account under

the name of Harry J. Coffman, doing business as Nash

Wilshire. Having no funds of his own Coffman turned

to the assets of Aircraft which he controlled and used

these assets to establish himself in the Nash Wilshire ven-

ture.

coulis

From time to time Coffman drew money from Air-

craft’s funds. He maintained books, including a ledger

with one account listing his indebtedness to Aircraft and

a separate account with Aircraft entitled “Nash Wil-

shire” purportedly showing moneys due him from Air-

craft. The first account gradually increased in amounts

due Aircraft, reflecting moneys of Aircraft, utilized by

Coffman. By May 31, 1947, the month the referee made

his order in favor of Cobra against Aircraft, Coffman

owed Aircraft $9,082.36 but the amount allegedly due

Coffman on the Nash Wilshire account had been built up

to $9,259.42. .

By Coffman’s own computations, as late as September

30, 1946, he was indebted to Aircraft in the sum of

$9,669.94 over and above his claimed offset. Thereafter

by his same computation his indebtedness to Aircraft

was cut down by the Nash Wilshire offsets until finally

on June 30, 1948 his debt to Aircraft was completely

extinguished and Aircrift owed him $2966.93.

Thus, the effective period of Coffman’s claimed set-off

was between September 30, 1946 and June 30, 1948.

Cobra had been a creditor since May 7, 1945 and its total

claim had fully accrued on April 16, 1946. Thus, Coff-

man’s claimed set-off to his admitted debt to Aircraft all

accrued after the debt from Aircraft to Cobra had be-

come due.

The Master found and the evidence shows that Coffman

appropriated at least $9240.46 of the property of Air-

craft to his own use as shown by his account on the books

of Aircraft, which account is unchallenged and undenied.

He operated Nash Wilshire from November 1945 to

' September 1949 when he sold the business. Nash Wil-

ili

shire had a net worth varying from $62,000 to $72,000

during 1947 and in excess of $46,000 on November 30,

1948.

Although Coffman concedes there is due to Aircraft

from him the sum of $9240.46, he characterizes the mat-

ter as “loans and advances.” He also contends that

Aircraft is indebted to him in the sum of $12,207.39

on the Nash Wilshire account and that this amount

should be offset against the $9240.46 item, with the

final result that he is not indebted to Aircraft but Air-

craft is indebted to him in the sum of the difference,

to-wit, $2966.93.

Conceding for discussion that $12,207.39 is due Coff-

man from Aircraft on the Nash Wilshire account, we

inquire first, whether Coffman may legally make this

setoff. If Coffman is entitled to this setoff, then the

decision of this court should stand and under §§719 and

720 C. C. P.* Coffman should have the benefit of a

plenary action. If he is not entitled to setoff the $12,-

207.39 against the admitted debt of $9240.46, then we

never reach the question involving interpretation of these

sections, since he admittedly owed $9240.46 to Aircraft

and §719 C. C. P. and the supplemental proceedings had

pursuant thereto were proper.”

The Master has succinctly stated in his supplemental

report “that under the decision of Pepper v. Litton [308

"The substance of Sections 719 and 720, Code of Civil Procedure

appear in the court's opinion.

rie Cli sy fe where the

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son v. Lyders [1934] 139 C. A. 303, 306. The debt due

to Coffman from Aircraft belonged to Coffman in his

individual capacity. The debt due to Aircraft from Coff-

man was a trustee obligation.

We have unduly labored a simple problem. Coffman

may not legally use his purported setoff, assuming it is

valid and legally due from Aircraft since:

(1) He obtained the $9240.46 wrongfully and was an

involuntary trustee of the money and liable therefor;

(2) His receipt of the money was in violation of the

corporation law of California which made him a trustee

of the funds and liable therefor;

(3) Any attempt to set off the $12,000 purportedly

due from Aircraft would be permitting him to profit by

his own wrong, namely effecting a setoff solely because

he had wrongful possession of the $9240.46;

(4) Any attempted setoff of the $12,000 would be per-

mitting him to prefer himself to an earlier creditor;

(5) Setoff must be mutual and there is no mutuality

here since one obligation is that of an involuntary trustee,

the other of any individual;

(6) Though setoff in California is self executing, the

claims do not compensate in the absence of mutuality;

(7) §719 C. C. P. provides a remedy within the juris-

diction of the Master and the district court whether Coff-

man holds property for Aircraft or owes money to Air-

craft.

=] j—

Since the district court and Master exercised jurisdic-

tion under §719 C. C. P., and since Coffman may not

legally set-off his individual claim of $12,000 against

his trustee obligation, the court was in error in reversing

the judgment of the district court and the rehearing should

have been granted and our prior decision set aside.

(Endorsed:) Dissenting Opinion on Denial of Petition

for Rehearing. Filed Oct. 12, 1954.

Paul P. O’Brien, Clerk.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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