Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Seltenreich v. Town of Fairbanks

Supreme Court brief1954

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- U

In the Supreme Cp

FILED

AUG 9 1954

§

HAROLD B. WILLEY, Clerk

OF THE

United States,

OcToBER TERM, 1954

‘No. 271

FRED SELTENREICH and HAWLEY EvANs,

a partnership, d/b/a Fairbanks Air

Service, JEss BacHNER, W. C.

MitTcHELL and Davi B. PHILLIPs,

a co-partnership, d/b/a Fairbanks

Aircraft Service,

Petitioners,

vs. :

THE Town oF FatRBANKs, and Fatr-

BANKS ScHoo.t District, an Inde-

pendent School District Corporation,

Respondents.

4

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.

Hvsert A. GILBERT,

524 Third Avenue, Fairbanks, Alaska,

Attorney for Petitioner.

Gerorce B. McN ass, JR.,

P. O. Box 682, Fairbanks, Alaska,

Ropert A. PaRRIsH,

P. O. Box 646, Fairbanks, Alaska,

Of Counsel.

Subject Index

Page

Opinions and orders below ..............cceececcuceccece. 2

ths semana spas TEE TEE EP OE PETE EN Laer aaa Lo ah 3

Questions presented for review ............cecccuccucecce, 3

Constitutional provisions, statutes and Federal Rules of Civil

WUMNGNS CII ois cick dude seonivcles cebek us 4

ROE OE II nis ig sheen sini Senna ns Skea ks 4

Basis of federal jurisdiction in court of first instance... .. .. 7

PEI ss i ka neensin nha ab wk des La 7

Question Number One.

Did the district court for the district of Alaska, fourth di-

vision, and the court of appeals for the ninth circuit de-

cide a question which was not open on hearing of motion

for interlocutory injunction and prejudice the position of

petitioners on final hearing? ............ccccccceccecce, 9

Question Number Two.

Did the decisions, while going beyond the question of a prima

facie showing made for the purpose of obtaining an inter-

locutory injunction, proceed upon assumptions of fact not

sustained by the evidences which petitioners could have

negatived by proof adduced at final hearing? ............ 18

Question Number Three.

Has there been a fair compliance with Rule 52(a) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?...................... 27

‘* Question Number Four.

Should said decisions be allowed to stand, would petitioners

be deprived of property and property rights without due

process of law?

Table of Authorities Cited

Cases Pages

American Cutting Alloys v. General Electric Company, 135

rs SN Gee ee eae ae bake cap bees ice 20

Anderson et al v. Souza, 232 P 274 ........... eee eee eee 24

Antonick et al v. Chamberlain et al, 1947 US Av R518.... 24

Batcheller v. Commonwealth, 1930 US Av R1............ 24

Brooks et al v. Peterson et al, 31 So (2d) 472............. 24

Brown v. Quinland, Inc., 18.F (2d) 228.................. 27

Crew et al v. Gallagher, 1948 U S Av R 167.............. 24

Cuyahoga River Power Company v. City of Akron, 240 US

DTA Gin chcus eel, ce aeebcebedaes s04bbensee ected ee 25

Delta Air Corp. et al v. Kersey et al, 20 SE (2d) 245...... 24

Fine v. Paramount Pictures, 171 F (2d) 571.............. 20

First Presbyterian Church of Santa Barbara, California v.

CE Ms cic cv cnaebenceescedeaessese 20

Hagar v. Reclamation District, 110 U S 516............... 30

Hartford-Empire Co. v. Shawkee Mfg. Co., 147 F (2d) 532 28

Hayde et al v. Somerset Air Service, Inc., et al, 1948 US

RD Nick eS Ga dards Ua RR dpe kak nce eG ne 0.46% 0 86 UKE 24

Jordan v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, 77

ee es eu Nee kedaececenceeene 20

Kersey v. City of Atlanta, 20S E (2d) 245............... 24

Kuntz v. Warner Flying Service, 43 N W (2d) 475........ 24

Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Company, 309 U S

SEs cdkseha iar Chae teehee iste wie cis sices vceee vec 27, 29

Oechsle et al v. Ruhl, 54 Atlantic (2d) 462............... 24

Rhodes v. Biacitelli, 1948 U S Av R 534...... doiiinie't:nh dignianas 24

Schilling et al v. Schweitzer-Cummings Co., 142 F (2d) 82 27

Smith v. New England Aircraft Company, 170 N E 385.... 24

Swetland v. Curtis Airports Corp., 55 F (2d) 201, 88 ALR

a a

TaBLE oF AUTHORITIES CrreD iii

Pages

Thrasher v. Atlanta, 173 S E 817,99 AL R158........... 24

Vanderslice v. Shawn, 11 Atlantic (2d) 87................ 24

Warren Township School District v. Detroit, 14 N W (2d)

WE: NARs chines cbcE cheered TaEUl oxeiss Josbeae Siwkas 24

Statutes

Alaska Compiled Laws, Annotated, 1949, Title 16, Article I,

Section 35, Subdivision 20 ...............cccccsceccces 4, 25

Session Laws of Alaska, 1951, Chapter 61................. 4, 25

United States Code, Title 28, Section 1254(1)............. 3

United States Code, Title 48, Section 101 ................. 7

Contitutions

Constitution of the United States:

NNN ap NE OP obi ba os Sec de O8 vc ve au cons 3, 4, 25

MI OE BB. os cide cv idencsdcsceccccas 3,4

Rules

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

Re END A hdd b uk vate hr aKcucda eb bch newes bas 4,19

RE SUMED. ibaa van 000-55 Rk eARWNRE Riese v.00 cba’ 4, 6, 27

Texts

1 Barron and Holtzoff, Section 243..................e000- 19

arama Times, Be TB sooo ic vivcvicn ca cdcdeascsochs 30

renee eeeeeersereeeeeeneeeaceneeceSeAeaeS

In the Supreme Court

OF THE

Ruited States

FRED SELTENREICH and HAWLEY Evans, |

a partnership, d/b/a Fairbanks Air |

Service, JEss BacHNerR, W. C.

MITCHELL and Davin B. PHILIPs,

a co-partnership, d/b/a Fairbanks

Aircraft Service,

Petttioners, ¢

vs.

THE Town or FarrsBanks, and Fair-

BANKs ScHoot District, an Inde-

pendent School District Corporation,

Respondents.

—

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.

ee

2

To the Honorable Earl Warren, Chief Justice of the

Umted States, and to the Honorable Associate

Justices of the Supreme Court of the United

States:

The above named Petitioners respectfully pray that

a writ of certiorari be issued to review the judgment

of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit, entered in the above entitled cause, affirming

the judgment of the District Court for the District of

Alaska, Fourth Judicial Division, number 13,357, and

the order of said Court of Appeals denying Petition-

ers’ Petition for Rehearing.

OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW.

On the 4th day of March, 1952, the District Court

for the District of Alaska, Fourth Division, entered

an order denying Plaintiffs-Petiticners’ Motion for

Interlocutory Injunction, said judgment being based

upon a written opinion of even date therewith which

is reported in Volume 103 of Federal Supplement at

page 319.

On the 10th day of March, 1954, judgment was en-

tered by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

affirming the judgment of the trial court, said judg-

ment being based upon an opinion of even date there-

with which is reported in Volume 211 of Federal Re-

porter, Second Series, at page 83.

A Petition for Rehearing was denied on the 30th

day of April, 1954.

3

On the 27th day of July, 1954, an order was en-

tered by the Honorable Hugo L. Black, Associate

Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,

extending the time in which to file Petition for Writ

of Certiorari to and including the 10th day of August,

1954,

Copies of said judgments, opinions and orders are

appended hereto.

JURISDICTION.

Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Article

I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the United States,

the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit in construing statutory enactment of the Ter-

ritory of Alaska having impaired the obligation of

contracts, and the 5th and 14th Amendments to the

Constitution of the United States, Petitioners having

been deprived of property and property rights with-

out due process of law.

The statutory provision conferring jurisdiction on

this Court is Title 28, Section 1254 (1), United States

Code.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.

1. Did the District Court for the District of Alaska

Fourth. Division, and the Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit decide a question which was not open

on hearing of Motion for Interlocutory Injunction

and prejudice the position of Petitioners on final

hearing ?

4

2. Did the decisions, while going beyond the ques-

tion of a prima facie showing made for the purpose

of obtaining an interlocutory injunction, proceed

upon assumptions of fact not sustained by the evi-

dence which petitioners could have negatived by proof

adduced at final hearing?

3. Has there been a fair compliance with Rule

52 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?

4, Should said decisions be allowed to stand, would

petitioners be deprived of property and property

rights without due process of law?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND FED-

ERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE INVOLVED.

Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the

United States; Amendments 5 and 14 to the Consti-

tution of the United States; Title 16, Article I, Sec-

tion 35, Sub-division 20 of Alaska Compiled Laws

Annotated, 1949; Chapter 61, Session Laws of Alaska,

1951; and Rules 7 (a), 8 (c) and 52 (a) of the Fed-

eral Rules of Civil Procedure.

STATEMENT OF CASE.

On the 12th day of October, 1951, petitioners and

others filed a complaint in the District Court for the

District of Alaska, Fourth Division, seeking to en- —

join and restrain the City of Fairbanks, Alaska, from _

| — ee

5

disposing of, closing, interfering with or interrupting

the use of the Fairbanks Municipal Airport, said air-

port, by resolution of the Common Council of said

City, having been designated as Weeks Field.

On the same date a Motion for Interlocutory In-

junction was filed and an order was entered by the

Court requiring that Defendant Town of Fairbanks

appear at the hour of 4:00 o’clock P. M. on the 15th

day of October, 1951, to show cause why said inter-

locutory injunction should not issue.

On motion of the Fairbanks School District an or-

der was entered on October 13, 1951, allowing said

School District to intervene. An answer was filed by

said intervenor on the 16th day of October, 1951.

An answer was filed by Defendant Town of Fair-

banks on October 16, 1951.

On October 16, 1951, arguments were heard on Pe-

titioners’ Motion for Interlocutory Injunction and

the Court took the matter under advisement.

Three days later, and on the 19th day of October,

1951, Petitioners filed an additional Motion for Tem-

porary Restraining Order, based upon an affidavit,

this time requesting an order restraining an over-

zealous city from erecting a power line across the

Weeks Field runway. The construction of said power

‘line would have, and did, effectively close said air-

field. —

The Court’s order:

“Denied this 19th day of October, 1951, as no

cause of action for a restraining order is shown

6

and also privi motion for an injunction in this

cause is pending awaiting the filing of briefs in

this cause.’’

s/ Harry E. Pratt

District Judge

The happening sought to be prevented by the in-

terlocutory injunction was effectively accomplished

by the erection of the power line across the runway.

On the 9th day of November, 1951, Defendant Town

of Fairbanks filed an amended answer.

The Court kept the matter under advisement. Time,

and more time passed until the 4th day of March,

1952, 140 days later, when the Court in a written

opinion passed on the motion for interlocutory in-

junction and denied same.

The Court did not make its findings of fact and

enter its conclusions of law in regard to whether or

not a sufficient showing had been made to entitle Pe-

titioners to an interlocutory injunction pending final

hearing as provided by Rule 52 (a) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure but proceeded to determine

the case as if on final hearing.

Appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit, which Court disregarded the conten-

tions of all parties and proceeded to determine the

case upon its merits, and in so doing, decided a ques-

tion which was not open and before the Court.

The judgment of the District Court was affirmed.

There is presently pending in the Court of first

instance a complaint seeking equitable relief. By the

7

actions heretofore undertaken by the Courts of trial

and appellate jurisdiction, the action has already been

decided upon its merits, without first having given

Petitioners their day in Court. As a consequence

thereof, Petitioners have been deprived of property

and property rights without due process of law.

BASIS OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION

IN COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE.

Title 48, Section 101, United States Code, provides,

in part, as follows:

“There is established a District Court for the

District of Alaska, with the jurisdiction of Dis-

trict Courts of the United States and with gen-

eral jurisdiction in civil, criminal, equity and

admiralty causes; * * *,’’

ARGUMENT.

Plaintiffs’ complaint stated a cause of action. In-

tervenor Fairbanks School District filed an answer

and Defendant Town of Fairbanks filed an answer

and amended answer. All of said answers admitted

and denied portions of the allegations contained in

Plaintiffs’ complaint and contained several affirma-

tive defenses. The cause was at issue,

At the time of the filing of their complaint Plain-

tiffs moved for an interlocutory injunction pending

the trial of the action. The Court took the matter

under advisement.

—,

8

Due to the fact that the rights and property of

Plaintiffs were in danger of irreparable injury because

of the planned construction of a power line across the

runway of the airport, Plaintiffs asked for a tempor-

ary restraining order to prevent the Town of Fair-

banks from constructing said power line pending the

decision of the Court on the temporary injunction

then before it. The trial Court arbitrarily and with

an uncommon abuse of its judicial discretion denied

the motion for the restraining order.

The power line was constructed, thereby effectively

closing the airport. This was the very thing that Pe-

titioners sought to prevent by their Petition for In-

terlocutory Injunction which the Court, at that time,

had under advisement.

In an outstanding demonstration of disregard for

the principles upon which the systems of American

and English jurisprudence are founded and with a

callous exhibition of judicial oppression, the trial

Court held the motion for interlocutory injunction

under advisement for a period of 140 days, during

which time Plaintiffs were allowed to wither on the

vine, their businesses to be irreparably damaged and

their means of livelihood taken from them.

At the end of the ruinous 140 days the Court,.not

content with merely denying the motion for interlocu-

tory injunction which was the only question open to

it at the time, in a written opinion and in complete

disregard of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

decided the case on its merits.

>

9

An orderly presentation of the questions before this

Court requires that they be considered in the se-

quence set forth above.

QUESTION NUMBER ONE.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA,

POURTH DIVISION, AND THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE NINTH CIROUIT DECIDE A QUESTION WHICH WAS

NOT OPEN ON HEARING OF MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY

INJUNCTION AND PREJUDICE THE POSITION OF PETI-

TIONERS ON FINAL HEARING?

An examination of the written opinion of the Dis-

trict Court reveals that the following questions were

resolved :

1, Where deed executed in 1922, by trustee for

townsite of Fairbanks, Alaska, in favor of Town,

provided that land conveyed was to be held in trust

for park and recreational purposes and that if any

portion was used for other purpose title would revert

to grantor, and thereafter federal government recog-

nized fact that deed was either void or voidable and

made exchange of deeds whereby United States

through subsequent townsite trustee deeded said tracts

to town without any limitation or retriction whatso-

ever as to use tracts. were to be put, and although

town used tracts conveyed. for airport purposes, it

specifically retained control of airport and made rules

requiring doing of certain acts by those using airport,

including payment of rent for hangar and other

facilitiessm~peyment of landing fees, etc., the tract

was never dedicated to public use as an airport.

10

2. Where deed conveying to town of Fairbanks,

Alaska, tract of land of 5.28 acres contained no limita-

tion as to use of ground conveyed thereby, and did not

provide that reversion of title should take place if

land were used for any particular purpose, deed could

not act as a dedication of property for any particular

purpose.

3. Under laws of Alaska, when a deed describes

land by metes and bounds and makes an erroneous

statement as to acreage involved, deed conveys land

as described by metes and bounds and in disregard

of alleged acreage.

4. Where grantors deeded to Territory of Alaska

a piece of land described by metes and bounds alleged

to contain 60.5 acres, and grantors thereafter executed

form of deed which was merely a statement that their

deed contained 62 acres, instead of recited 60.5 acres,

that they wanted to give excess over 60 acres to town

of Fairbanks when a more correct description of

excess was ascertained, and Territory of Alaska con-

veyed identical land to Town by means of description

identical with that of deed, statement on part of

grantor was immaterial, as Town received all of

tract alleged to contain 60.5 acres and also two acres

exceeding the 60.5 acres.

5. Where grantors deeded realty to Territory of

Alaska without limitation to use Territory was to put

land conveyed, fact that grantors in subsequent deed

recited that their former deeds to Territory was in-

tended to convey ground for airfield purposes, was

-

11

insufficient to constitute proof of making dedication

of property for public use as an airfield.

6. Where ordinance of Town of Fairbanks estab-

lishing municipal airport provided for setting apart

as much of the ‘‘park reserve’’ as necessary for use

of landing field, but provided nothing in ordinance

should be construed to divest town of its title to lands

embraced within park reserve, nor as a surrender

by Town of its right to manage park reserve as public

park, and provided for an airport commission and for

termination of leases and that buildings located on

leased land should become the property of City if

not removed within 30 days after termination of lease,

such provisions negatived any intention on part of

town to dedicate land mentioned as ‘‘park reserve’’

to public use as airport.

7. Ordinance of Town of Fairbanks, Alaska,

promulgating regulations for operation of municipal

airport providing that only aircraft and airmen li-

censed by Civil Aeronautics Authority of the United

States could operate on or over airport, except student

fliers or public aircraft, providing that persons using

airport for commercial aviation or other commercial

or private purpose should first secure permit from

city clerk and pay fees and charges prescribed, and

that any one violating ordinance shall be subject to

fine and/or imprisonment and suspension from use

of airport not to exceed 30 days made it clear that

town did not and had not relinquished ownership

and control of airport and the right to use same as

source of income and to administer such use to full

12

extent of powers given to it in regard to other prop-

erty of municipality.

8. Where Common Council of Town of Fairbanks,

Alaska, passed resolution that town was not finan-

cially able to continue maintenance of municipal air-

port, that construction and operation of new airport

approximately two miles from city, which was avail-

able for public use and by all aircraft carrying

freight and passengers to and from city, was larger,

better constructed and safer and ample to serve all

needs of city and general public, that municipal air-

port was no longer being used, except by small one-

engined airplanes and that buildings in close prox-

imity rendered municipal airport to longer safe, and

the land embraced in airport was needed for housing

and recreational purposes and municipal airport

would be ordered closed, resolution furnished cumula-

tive evidence of fact that town did not intend to con-

- vey tracts used for municipal airport to use of public.

9. Where property of the Town of Fairbanks,

Alaska, used for purpose of municipal airport re-

mained property of city, not subject to any public

trust, city had full power to pass ordinance order-

ing the closing of the airport under statutory pro-

visions, to prohibit conduct endangering public peace,

public health, or public safety, and the owner of the

property had the right to prohibit the use of its prop-

erty for landing and take-offs of airplanes inasmuch

as that was greatly endangering public safety.

10. Where no answer or denial of any sort was

filed by plaintiffs to intervenor’s first affirmative

= cn

13

defense, it would be assumed that Plaintiffs intended

to and did admit the matters set forth in such defense.

11. Execution by Town of Fairbanks, Alaska, of

deed of property, formerly used for municipal airport

to independent school district, implied finding on part

of common council of town that in its judgment land

deeded was no longer required for municipal purpose,

and as realty had never been acquired or held for any

public use or devoted thereto, no ratification of sale

and execution of deed was required by statute.

12. Where realty owned by Town of Fairbanks,

Alaska, used for municipal airport purposes was

never dedicated by town to such use, if common coun-

cil failed to make finding that in their judgment

premises were no longer needed for municipal pur-

poses, or that in their judgment it was advantageous

to city to donate premises to school district, such

failure on part of council would not inure to benefit

of Plaintiffs or assist them in making out any sort

of case for obtaining preliminary injunction to re-

strain abandonment of municipal airport by town.

13. Where description of land in propositions of

ballot of special election of February 21, 1950, in

Town of Fairbanks, Alaska, were so vague and in-

definite as not to give voters knowledge of land re-

ferred to, propositions were invalid and did not fur-

nish ratification by voters of any ordinance or other

sale of realty.

14. Where propositions submitted on ballots of

special election of February 21, 1950, held in Town

14

of Fairbanks, Alaska, for purpose of obtaining rati-

fication by voters of sale of real estate contain suffi-

cient description of land, but did not show that

common council passed ordinance setting forth terms

of proposed sale and consideration therefor, and that

council in their best judgment determined premises

were no longer required for municipal purposes,

proposition was invalid and did not furnish ratifica-

tion by voters of any ordinance or other sale of real

estate.

15. A common law dedication requires a definite

intention on the part of grantor to dedicate designated

land to public use.

16. A common law dedication requires that an in-

tention on part of grantor to dedicate designated land

to public use be shown clearly and unequivocally.

17. Where deeds by which realty was conveyed to

town of Fairbanks, Alaska, contained no limitation

requiring land to be used for an airfield and contained

no clauses stating that if land conveyed were used

for any purpose other than airport purposes, it

would revert to grantor, plaintiff’s right to restrain

use by town of property for other than airport pur-

poses and to restrain closing down of airport could

not be based on an express dedication, as none existed,

and in absence of elements of common law dedication,

could not be based on such a dedication.

18. Under statute providing that common council,

in order to make available sites for operation thereon

of new industry, which will benefit civic welfare of

-—

municipality, may sell, lease or dispose thereof on

such terms or conditions as may be deemed advanta-

geous to civic welfare of municipality, to such persons

or corporations as will agree to install, maintain and

operate thereupon such new ‘“‘industry’’ and such

sites, shall not be deemed to be ‘‘property”’ acquired,

owned or held for any public use or devoted thereto,

housing authority is within meaning of quoted word.

15

19. Under statute providing that common council,

in order to make available sites for operation thereon

of new industries which will benefit civic welfare of

municipality, may sell, lease or dispose of on such

terms or conditions as may be deemed advantageous

to civic welfare of municipality to such persons or

corporations as will agree to install, maintain and

operate thereon such new industry and such sites, shall

not be deemed to be property acquired, owned or

held for any public use or devoted thereto, common

council of Fairbanks, Alaska, could sell, lease, or

otherwise dispose of land previously devoted to air-

port purposes, by making such lands available as sites

for new housing industry by complying with terms

of statute.

20. Where deed executed by grantor to town of

Fairbanks, Alaska,. recited as a part of consideration

that grantor should have continuous, free and un-

interrupted right-of-way to and from municipal air-

port to one of the lots, and grantor alone signed deed,

recital that grantor was to have right-of-way con-

stituted self-serving declaration which was not binding

on town, and grantor’s rights under deed were a

16

mere license which would terminate on death of either

party, and was not transferable or descendable.

21. An easement requires both a dominant and a

servient tenement.

22. An easement must rest upon a grant thereof,

it cannot exist by parol.

23. A plaintiff must have a clear right to the is-

suance of a preliminary injunction.

24. Where plaintiffs failed to establish that realty

owned by municipality was dedicated to public use

as an airport, and evidence showed that independent

school district had built a school house costing $600,000

on airport property after closing of airport, and that

if plaintiffs’ application for preliminary injunction

to restrain closing of the airport was granted grounds

could not be used by reason of danger of injuring

and killing some of the 450 school children if planes

were permitted to land and take off from field, and

there was no showing by plaintiffs of any damage

for any specific amount if preliminary injunction

were denied and defendant town alleged as affirmative

defense that plaintiffs were indebted to defendant for

use of airport and plaintiffs made no showing whatso-

ever that defendant or intervenor school district were

unable to respond in damages to any extent that was

probable in action, plaintiffs’ application for prelimi-

nary injunction would be denied.

The only question properly before the Court and

open to decision was whether or not sufficient showing

had been made to entitle Plaintiffs to an interlocutory

——

injunction. From the above items, numbered 1 to 24,

inclusive, it is abundantly obvious that more than one

question was resolved. It is also abundantly obvious

that the running commentary and observations of the

Court on the aileged ‘‘facts’” or ‘‘assumptions of

fact,’”” most of which are misleading or erroneous

and which could have been negatived by plaintiffs by

proof adduced upon final hearing, are highly preju-

dicial to petitioners on final hearing.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was a

bit more restrained in its determination, finding only

the following:

1. Under statute authorizing municipalities to sell,

lease or otherwise dispose of property when in judg-

ment of city council same should no longer be re-

quired for municipal purposes, council has power to

determine that property ceases to be needed for public

use, without necessity of ratification by voters, and

not necessarily coincidental with sale of or other

disposal of property.

17

2. An airport operated under normal conditions

and with adequate supervision and controls is not

a ‘“‘nuisance per se.”’

3. Where airport was little used, a better airport

having been made available by government, and new

school building had been constructed nearby with

result that continued use of field endangered children

and other persons, Fairbanks council properly closed

the airport and enacted ordinance prohibiting use

thereof, and operators of aircraft service who did

a

18

not own airport were not entitled to eee ray against

such action. we

Can it be said that the Court of ‘Seplile for the

Ninth Circuit did not decide questions not open and

to the prejudice of the position of Petitioners?

QUESTION NUMBER TWO.

DID THE DECISIONS, WHILE GOING BEYOND THE QUESTION

OF A PRIMA FACIE SHOWING MADE FOR THE PURPOSE

OF OBTAINING AN INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTION, PRO-

CEED UPON ASSUMPTIONS OF FACT NOT SUSTAINED BY

THE EVIDENCE WHICH PETITIONERS COULD HAVE NEG-

ATIVED BY PROOF ADDUCED AT FINAL HEARING?

Perhaps the outstanding contribution of the trial

Court to the reported law of this country is the

following:

‘Where no answer or denial of any sort was filed

by plaintiffs to intervenor’s first affirmative de-

fense, it would be assumed that plaintiffs intended

to and did admit the matters set forth in such

defense.”’

- Based upon the foregoing gem of judicial reasoning

and wisdom, the trial Court proceeded to assume as

fact all of the allegations contained in the various

affirmative defenses set forth as parts of the answers

of defendant Town of Fairbanks and intervenor Fair-

banks School District—even the affirmative defenses

set forth as a part of the answer of defendant Town

| eee Lelie eeseeere ee

19

of Fairbanks filed on November 9, 1952, after the

matter had been taken under advisement.

That the effect thereby given to Rules 7 (a) and 8

(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is con-

trary to all accepted interpretations is beyond

question.

“The concept that it is the function of the

pleadings to create issues of fact is as true under

the rule (Rule 7) as under the former practice

but even after the pleadings are closed, the issues

to be determined may be modified, enlarged or

narrowed before trial.

While the pleadings are not closed until answer

has been filed, there is no place in modern pro-

cedure for useless or frivolous pleadings. Ordi-

narily the complaint and answer are all that are

necessary.

A reply is required to a counterclaim, but not

| to any other allegations of the answer containing

the counterclaim, and is the final pleading re-

quired or permitted.

An answer must be filed to a cross-claim and a

third party answer to a third party complaint.

In brief the rule permits only necessary plead-

ings.

No reply is required to an answer which does

not assert a counterclaim.

Affirmative defenses included in the answer do

not necessitate a reply nor is a reply permitted

to such answer unless the Court orders a reply.

Some real reason or necessity must be shown in

order to justify the Court in requiring a reply to

an answer.’’ 1 Barron and Holtzoff, Section 243.

20 .

See also:

Fine v. Paramount Pictures, 171 F (2d) 571;

Jordan v. Hartford ‘Accident and Indemnity

Company, 77 Fed. Supp. 817;

American Cutting Alloys v. General Electric

Company, 135 F (2d) 502;

First Presbyterian Church of Santa Barbara,

California v. Rabbitt, 118 F (2d) 732.

The matters above set forth, which were assumed

to be fact by the Court, were used as a basis for not

only denying the interlocutory injunction prayed for

but for deciding the case upon its merits.

By adding insult to injury, the Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit in its opinion asswmed to find as

follows:

‘“‘The school building itself is said to extend

into the airport runway.”’

Such a finding is sufficient to remind one of a

choice piece of malicious gossip which is added to

and made more vicious by each purveyor.

Were these assumptions sustained by the evidence?

Could they have been negatived by proof adduced at

final hearing? Let us consider.

Intervenor admits in paragraph III of its first af-

firmative defense (which the Court assumed to be

fact) that the Schooi District undertook to construct

and operate the school with full knowledge of the

exi of the municipal airport. The deed to the

property upon which the school building is situate

contains the following reservation:

21

“‘The Grantor (Town of Fairbanks) reserves,

as long as Weeks Field shall be operated as a

municipal airport and for six (6) months there-

after, the right to the uninterrupted use of all

the land lying northerly of a line 110 feet south-

erly and parallel to the landing field light line

used in connection with the operation of Weeks

Field as an airport, said line being more par-

ticularly shown upon the plat referred to above

and made a part hereof. The Grantor reserves

the right to lease any of the lands hereinabove

reserved for airport or similar purposes, for a

like period.’’

With such knowledge and after accepting such res-

ervation, intervenor complains of irreparable damages

to be sustained due to the continued use of the air-

port facilities. Intervenor complains that it (through

its Board of Directors) has resolved to keep the new

school closed until the airport is closed; that if it

does so it will suffer actual damages in the amount

of $134,800.00, the loss of the use of a $660,000.00

school building and with a demagogic and wholly

unnecessary and unjustified conclusion, states the

following :

‘That the loss of human resources can not be

estimated in dollars and cents. That no amount of

money can compensate for the loss of educational

opportunity to the school children by reason of

the closure of Denali School; that two years of

makeshift schoolroom and classroom usage scat-

tered around the Town of Fairbanks will exact

a toll in child health that can never be remedied

and cannot be measured in dollars and cents. For

22

the plaintiffs to inflict such conditions upon help-

less children for purely commercial gain is neither

just nor equitable.”’

Equitable? More about equities!

‘‘That Intervenor is informed and believes that

the following named Plaintiffs are indebted to

the City of Fairbanks for the use of Weeks Field

airport in the past, and that such indebtedness is

in the amount:stated opposite the names of each

plaintiff and is and remains unpaid :

- Northern Consolidated Airlines ——.. $5,500.00

Fairbanks Air Service 565.00

Alaska Flying School 480.00

That by reason thereof, the plaintiffs so in-

debted to the City of Fairbanks are not entitled

to the equitable relief which they here seek, be-

cause of the equitable maxim that he who comes

into equity must come with clean hands.”

Equitable? Perhaps this Court is familiar with the

doctrine of equitable estoppel.

After a running commentary upon the lack of merit

of Plaintiffs’ action, the trial Court made the follow-

ing observation :

‘“‘In Paragraph XI of Plaintiffs’ Amended

Complaint it is stated: ‘That each of the Plain-

tiffs herein is engaged in the aircraft or allied

business at or adjacent to Weeks: Field; are

property owners adjacent to Weeks Field and

ve vested property interests therein.’

\ ‘Phe Defendant and Intervenor have denied the

- matters set forth in Paragraph XI above men-

| cence aan

23

tioned. Other than the Gillam easement no evi-

dence of any sort was introduced by the Plain-

tiffs to substantiate any of the allegations in

said Paragraph XI. As the burden of proof is

on Plaintiffs to prove the allegations of their

amended complaint by a preponderance of the

evidence in the case, and the plaintiffs having

failed entirely to do so, it becomes apparent .. .”’

This was an allegation of fact made by Petitioners

which was denied by Defendant and Intervenor. Cer-

tainly this was a fact at issue in the action which

was subject to proof to be adduced at final hearing.

The trial Court made an assumption of fact based

upon the denial of Defendant and Intervenor. Such

assumption was highly prejudicial to Petitioners and

was one which could have been negatived by proof.

It might well be noted that the answers of Defend-

ant and Intervenor were filed on the 16th day of

October, 1951, the date upon which the matter was

taken under advisement by the Court. The amended

answer of Defendant was filed on November 9, 1951.

Could Petitioners be penalized for something they

were doubly precluded from doing—by law and by

time ?

The trial Court made an assumption of fact to the

effect that Weeks Field constituted a nuisance, said

assumption being based upon the allegations contained

in the affirmative defenses contained in the answers

of Defendant and Intervenor. An airport is not a

Ruisance per se. See: Thrasher v. City of Atlanta,

=a

24

176 SE 817; ‘Anderson et al v. Souza, 232 P 274;

Swetland v. Curtis Airports Corp., 55 F (2d) 201,

83 A L R 319; Kuntz v. Werner Flying Service, 43

NW (2d) 475; Brooks et al v. Peterson et al, 31 So.

(2d) 472; Thrasher v. ‘Atlanta, 173 SE 817,99 ALR

158; Delta Air Corp. et al v. Kersey et al, 20 SE (2d)

245; Kersey v. City of Atlanta, 20 SE (2d) 246;

Hayde et al v. Somerset Air Service, Inc., et al, 1948

U S Av R 601; ‘Antonick et al v. Chamberlain et al,

1947 U S Av R 518; Batcheller v. Commonwealth,

1930 U S Av R1; Smith v. New England ‘Aircraft

Company, 170 NE 385; Warren Township School

District v. Detroit, 14 NW (2d) 134; Crew et al v.

Gallagher, 1948 U S Av R 167; Rhodes v. Biacitelli,

1948 U S Av R 534; Ocechsle et al v. Ruhl, 54 Atlantic

(2d) 462; Vanderslice v. Shawn, 11 Atlantic (2d) 87.

Since an airport is not a nuisance per se it must,

if a nuisance at all, be a nuisance in fact. A determi-

nation of this fact is a judicial function, a determina-

tion which must be made after all the facts are before

the Court and all interested parties have had an

opportunity to be heard, and not upon a mere assump-

tion of fact taken from controverted issues upon which

the parties have not been heard.

The foregoing assumptions of fact by the trial Court,

and numerous others, were not sustained by competent

evidence. They were premature findings based upon

the affirmative defenses contained in the answers of

defendant and intervenor which were entitled to no

more weight than the allegations contained in Peti-

tioners’ complaint.

agen

25

Being premature and subject to being negatived by

proof upon final hearing, such asswmptions of fact

are most prejudicial to the rights of Petitioners.

By making the asswmption of fact contained in its

opinion, which were taken from the answers and af-

firmative defenses filed by Defendant and Intervenor

and not supported by evidence, the Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit felt constrained to interpret

Title 16 Article 1, Section 35, Subdivision 20 of Alaska

Compiled Laws, Annotated, 1949 and the amendment

thereto contained in Chapter 61, Session Laws of

Alaska, 1951.

By making these premature and unjustified assump-

tions and basing its opinion thereon, the Court has run

squarely afoul Section 10 of Article 1 of the Consti-

tution of the United States.

It is alleged in Petitioners’ complaint and denied

in the answers of Defendant and Intervenor that con-

tractual rights are involved. Whether or not such

contractual rights and property rights exist is a mat-

ter to be determined upon final hearing by competent

evidence, not by allegation and denial.

To interpret the statute in such a way as to allow

any municipality created by statute to, by ordinance,

impair the obligation of contract, is a clear violation

of Petitioners’ constitutional rights.

It is well settled that action by a municipality comes

within the purview of said section. See: Cuyahoga

River Power Company v. City of ‘Akron, 240 U 8S

462.

—

The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit, based upon a question which was not before

the Court and open to decision, would necessarily,

should it appear upon final hearing that contractual

rights were involved, be in violation of said section 10.

Its consideration in general is amply dem astrated

by the finding that ‘‘the school building itself is said

to extend into the airport runway’’, said finding be-

ing so clearly negatived by the facts presented as to

preclude discussion.

These questions, and others, decided by the Courts

below and based therein upon assumptions of fact

which were not sustained by competent evidence,

when such questions were not before either Court,

most certainly prejudice the rights of Petitioners.

Had the Courts below confined themselves to the

one and only issue presented, all of these assumptions

would have disappeared or have been negatived by

proof adduced upon final hearing.

| ageemraneringes

27

QUESTION NUMBER THREE.

HAS THERE BEEN A FAIR COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 52 (a)

OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE?

Rule 52 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-

cedure is, in part, as follows:

“‘(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts

without a jury or with an advisory jury, the Court

shall find the facts specially and state separately

its conclusions of law thereon and direct the en-

try of the appropriate judgment; and in granting

or refusing interlocutory injunctions the Court

shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and

conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of

its action. * * *,”

It is well settled that where interlocutory injunction

is denied without findings of fact or conclusions of

law as required by the above stated Rule, the judg-

ment will be reversed and the case remanded. See:

Brown v. Quinland, Inc., 18 F (2d) 228; Mayo v.

Lakeland Highlands Canning Company, 309 US 310.

Findings of fact should be pertinent to the issue

and supported by the evidence. In Schilling et al v.

Schweitzer-Cummings Co., 142 F (2d) 82, the Court

stated :

“‘The ultimate test as to the adequacy of find-

ings will always be whether they are sufficiently

comprehensive and pertinent to the issues to pro-

vide a basis for decision, and whether they are

supported by the evidence, To the extent that

they are, in addition, non-argumentative in form,

free from conclusions of law and from the re-

dundancy so frequently found in pleadings, they

will be more useful to all concerned.”

28

While we hold no argument with the fact that such

required findings of fact and conclusions of law may

be included in and made a part of a written or memo-

randum opinion, we do insist that the trial Court

speaks only through its findings and judgment. The

opinion must, of necessity, be based upon its findings

and the findings must be confined to the question or

questions open and be supported by competent evi-

dence.

Since only one question, viz, whether or not sufii-

cient showing had been made to entitle Petitioners

to an interlocutory injunction pending final hearing,

was open to the Court, facts relative to that question,

and that question alone, should have been found. Any

variation therefrom would not constitute a fair com-

pliance with the Rule.

In Hartford-Empire Co. v. Shawkee Mfg. Co., 147

F (2d) 532, the Court stated:

‘*Findings of facts are not to be made in vacuo

but only in connection with an issue of fact which

is before the Court for adjudication and after the

evidence bearing upon that issue has been re-

ceived and considered by the fact finder. For us

to direct the District Court, in advance of its

having heard the plaintiff’s defense to the de-

fendant’s counterclaims, to make the fact find-

ings which they seek would be to compel the

Court to prejudge crucial fact questions in the

ease, a procedure which is abhorrent to the con-

eepts of fairness involved in due process of law.

Moreover, it might well be discovered after the

hearing that the findings so made without knowl-

edge of the issues in the solution of which they

29

were to be employed had been framed in such a

way as to be quite inappropriate to meet the fact

issues actually presented to the Court for deter-

mination.”’

Consider the situation in the present case in the

light of the above quoted well reasoned opinion. Cer-

tainly the entire procedure had in the Courts below

was abhorrent to the concepts of fairness involved in

due process of law.

“It is of highest importance to a proper review

of the action of a Court in granting or refusing

a preliminary injunction that there should be a

fair compliance with Rule 52 (a) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.’’, Mayo v. Lakeland

Highlands Canning Co., supra.

It can not by any stretch of the imagination be

concluded that there was a fair compliance with the

Rule. The errors, unjustified findings and assumptions

of the trial Court led the Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit into committing grievous error.

QUESTION NUMBER FOUR.

SHOULD SAID DECISIONS BE ALLOWED TO STAND, WOULD

PETITIONERS BE DEPRIVED OF PROPERTY AND PROP-

ERTY RIGHTS WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW?

What is due process of law depends on the circum-

stances. It varies with the subject matter and the

necessities of the situation.

Chancellor Kent, 2 Com. 13, adopts this mode of

construing the phrase:

t

30

‘‘The better and larger definition of due proc-

ess of law is that it means law in its regular

course of administration through courts of jus-

tice.”’

In Hagar v. Reclamation District, 110 US 516, this

Court stated the following:

“By due process of law is meant one, which

following the forms of law, is appropriate to the

case, and just to the parties affected. It must be

pursued in the ordinary mode prescribed by law;

it must be adapted to the end to be attained; and

whenever necessary to the protection of the par-

ties, it must give them an opportunity to be heard

respecting the justice of the judgment sought.

The clause in question means, therefore, that

there can be no proceeding against life, liberty or

property which may result in the deprivation of

either, without the observance of those general

rules established in our system of jurisprudence

for the security of private rights.’

Under those requirements, could it be due process

of law for a Court to entertain a motion for an inter-

locutory injunction and to arbitrarily refuse to pro-

tect the rights of Petitioners even while the motion

was pending and while the Court had the matter

under advisement; to hold the motion under advise-

ment for a period of 140 days while Petitioners were

being irreparably damaged; to deny the motion for

interlocutory injunction upon assumptions of fact

clearly forbidden by the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-

cedure; to, while making and proceeding under said

ze

4

- |

31

unjustified assumptions of fact, proceed to consider

questions which were not open to the Court upon the

hearings; to, while considering those questions, pro-

ceed to decide the case upon its merits and to base

its decision upon controverted issues which could be

negatived by evidence adduced at final hearing; to

leave petitioners with a pending equity action which,

in effect, has already been disposed of on a motion

for interlocutory injunction; to, in effect, deny pe-

titioners their day in. Court.

We think not. Should the decisions of the District

Court for the District of ‘Alaska, Fourth Division,

be allowed to stand, Petitioners will be deprived of

property and property rights without due process of

law.

CONCLUSION.

Petitioners have been required, in this Court and in

the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in view

of the action of the trial Court to argue matters of

procedure and its effect upon their constitutional

rights. Had the trial Court confined itself to the issues

presented, the whole matter would very likely have

been disposed of long ago, Since the trial Court es-

sayed to assume facts from controverted issues which

could have been negatived by proof on final hearing,

_ Petitioners have been deprived of their day in Court;

have been deprived of property and property rights

_ without due process of law.

32

For the above stated reasons, the Petition for Wa if

of Certiorari should be granted. a

Dated, Fairbanks, Alaska,

July 30, 1954.

Respectfully submitted,

Husert A. GIBErt,

Attorney for Petitioner.

GrorcE B. McN Bp, JR.,

Rosert A. PARRIsH,

Of Counsel.

(Appendix Follows.)

Index to Appendix

Page

Order of District Court for District of Alaska, Fourth

Division, denying motion for Interlocutory Injunction... 1

2. Opinion of District Court for District of Alaska, Fourth

Division, reported in 103 Fed. Supp. at page 319...... 3

3. Judgment of Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit affirm-

ing judgment of trial court................ceeceeeeees 45

4. Opinion of Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-

ported in 211 F (2d) at page 83..................00.. 46

5. Order by Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit denying

Petitioners’ Petition for Rehearing.................... 53

6. Order extending time in which to file Petition for Writ

PP eee TTT e TEPC TE TT eee ere e 54

7. Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the United

NR Si bs Shas KAN Fp CUM EAR OK TES SoA OKO 55

8. The 5th Amendment to the Constitution of the United

NS ON ea hh sane Gk 6 ees bk ae bn eG) BET ee TE 55

9. The 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United

NN Ss SGa5 ee ls BS ECE in et btn Vee 55

10. Chapter 61, Session Laws of Alaska, 1951.............. 56

11. Rule 7(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure...... 58

12. Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure...... 59

18. Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. .... 59

Appendix

In the District Court for the District of Alaska

Fourth Division

No. 6926

Fred Seltenreich, et al,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

The Town of Fairbanks, >

Defendant,

Fairbanks School District,

Intervenor.

ORDER

Whereas, the above-named plaintiffs filed a motion

herein upon the 12th day of October, 1951, asking for

a preliminary injunction in the above-mentioned

cause; and

Whereas, argument was had upon the motion and

the same was duly submitted by the parties upon

Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, defendant’s answer,

intervenor’s answer, and three affidavits; and

Whereas, it appears to the Court from the matters

set forth in its opinion in this case of even date here-

_ with that said motion for a preliminary injunction

should be denied;

2

It is therefore ordered and adjudged that said mo-

tion be and the same hereby is denied.

Dated at Fairbanks, Alaska, this 4th day of March,

1952.

8/ Harry E. Pratt

District Judge

Entered in Court Journal March 4, 1952.

(Endorsed): Filed March 4, 1952.

agama

3

In the District Court for the District of Alaska

Fourth Division

No. 6926

Fred Seltenreich and Hawley Evans,

a partnership doing business as

Fairbanks Air Service, Jess Bach-

ner, W. C. Mitchell and David B.

Phillips, a co-partnership doing

business as Fairbanks Aircraft

Service, 4

Plaintiffs,

vs.

The Town of Fairbanks and Fair-

banks School District, an independ-

ent School District Corporation,

Defendants.

OPINION

Robert A. Parrish and George B. McNabb, of Fair-

banks, Alaska, attorneys for plaintiffs;

Julien A. Hurley and Mike A. Stepovich, of Fair-

banks, Alaska, attorneys for defendants; |

Maurice T. Johnson, of Fairbanks, Alaska, attor-

ney for intervenor.

This cause came on for hearing on plaintiffs’ mo-

tion filed herein on the twelfth day of October, 1951,

for a temporary injunction restraining the Town of

a

Fairbanks, Alaska, from abandoning the business of

conducting a municipal airport.

The plaintiffs alleged that the land included within

said municipal airport, which is generally known as

‘*Weeks Field’’, had been dedicated to the use of the

public as an airport and devoted to such use for many

years, as shown by the exhibits.

The defendant and intervenor maintain that said

airport has never been dedicated to a public use or

devoted thereto; that the Federal Government has

completed an international airport two miles from the

Town of Fairbanks which is available to plaintiffs;

that the town is losing money in operating said air-

port and can not afford to do so; that plaintiffs are

indebted to defendant, for airport services, as follows

to-wit:

Northern Consolidated Airlines ....$5,500

Fairbanks Air Service 0. 565

Alaska Flying School 480

Total $6,545

The motion was argued and submitted upon plain-

tiff’s amended complaint, defendant’s answer, inter-

venor’s answer, and the affidavits of L. F. Joy, James

C. Ryan, and E. A. Tonseth.

Briefs were submitted by counsel for all parties.

Wherever “exhibits” are herein mentioned, the

reference will be to the exhibits attached to plaintiffs’

ded complaint, unless the contrary is specifically _

stated ; “SLA” will be used to designate the Sessi

Laws of Alaska; the Town of Fairbanks, will be re-

ferred to as the “‘town’’ or the “city’’; ‘A, J.’? will

mean American Jurisprudence; and ‘‘McQuillin’’ will

mean MeQuillin or Municipal Corporations, 3rd Edi-

tion.

See. I

Dedicated to Public Use.

(a) The following quotations are from Volume 11

of MeQuillin

‘Accordingly a dedication of land is generally de-

fined as its devotion to a public use by an unequivocal

act of the owner of the fees, manifesting an intention

that it shall be accepted and used presently or in the

future. The intention of the owner to dedicate and

acceptance thereof by the public are the essential

elements of a complete dedication.’’ S. 33.02, pages

579-580.

“In other words, the mere fact that private prop-

erty is used by the public is not necessarily incon-

sistent with the absence of an intent to dedicate it to

the public * * *. If the user by the public does not

exclude the owner’s private rights, such user will

ordinarily be regarded as merely permissive.’’ Pages

“The intent of the dedicator is the foundation and

life of all dedications, and the intent must be clearly

‘ and unequivocally manifested.” Page 669, S. 33.36..

~ “The burden of proof to establish a dedication is

on the party asserting it. Dedication is not presumed

nor does a presumption of an intent to dedi¢ate arise

unless it is clearly shown by the owner’s acts and

declarations, or by a line of conduct the only reason-

able explanation of which is that a dedication was in-

tended.’’ Pages 671-2.

‘“‘It is variously stated that the evidence to establish

a dedication must be clear and conclusive; must be

clear and convincing; must be clear and unequivocal;

must tend to substantiate a clear intention to dedi-

cate, or must be sttict, cogent and convincing.’’ Page

674,

‘* * * it is elementary that an acceptance, either

by public user or formal act, is necessary * * *. Ac-

cordingly, the general rule is that to complete a com-

mon-law dedication, acceptance is required. Pages

682-5, S. 33.43.

‘‘The general rule is that proof of acceptance by

the public must be unequivocal, clear and satisfactory,

and inconsistent with any other construction.’’ Pages

727 and 728, 8. 33.54.

The following quotations are from 16 A, J.:

“Dedication is the intentional appropriation of

land by the owner to some public use.”’ 16 A. J., page

348, S. 2.

**In all cases, the burden of proof is on the party

asserting a dedication.’’ Page 417, S. 75.

_ &* * * The essence of a dedication to public uses

is that it shall be for the use of the public at large

* * * and if from the nature of the user it must be

confined. to a few individuals, such as use of land for

piling wood, the idea of dedication is negatived

ema

7

* * * and a grant by the owner of a private right

of way over his land to buyers of different parcels

of the same to furnish them with convenient access

to the street is no pomenen to public use.’’ Page

359, S. 15.

“‘The intention of the owner to set apart lands or

property for the use of the public is the foundation

and life of every dedication. * * * This intention is

essential whether an express or an implied dedica-

tion is relied on. * * * In order to constitute a dedi-

cation by parol, there must be some acts proved evinc-

ing a clear intention to dedicate the property to public

use. In any case the intention must clearly appear

and the acts and declarations of the owner relied on

to establish it must be convincing and unequivocal

* * *. Likewise, the intention must be to make a per-

petual dedication.’’ Pages 361-2, S. 17.

Proprietary Jse

(b) The following quotations are from 37 A. J.:

‘*Every municipal corporation has a two-fold char-

acter, * * * one is political, governmental, legislative,

or public, while the other is variously designated

as private, proprietary, municipal, or ministerial

* * * In its governmental or public character, the

corporation is made, by the state, one of its instru-

ments * * *, But in its proprietary or private char-

acter, the theory is that the powers are supposed not

to be conferred primarily * * * from consideration

connected with the government of the state at large,

but for the private advantage of the compact com-

—

8

munity which is incorporated * * *; and as to such

powers * * * the corporation is frequently regarded

as having the rights and obligations of a private,

rather than of a public corporation. * * * The dis-

tinction between acts in the performance of a govern-

mental function and those in * * * a proprietary

function is that in the case of the former, the munic-

ipal corporation is executing the legislative mandate

with respect to a public duty generally, while in the

other, it is exercising its private rights as a corporate

body * * * even though the public may derive a com-

mon benefit therefrom. * * * All functions of a munic-

ipal corporation not governmental are said to be

municipal.’’ Page 727, S. 114.

Walla Walla v. Water Company, 172 US page

1;

Linne v. Bredes (Wn.), 86 Pac. 858.

In Seafeld v. Port of Astoria, 16 Pac. 2d, page

943 (Ore.) it is stated as set forth in the syllabus:

‘‘Term ‘governmental functions’ should be limited

to duties imposed by states on municipal corporation,

which latter must perform at peril, and other func-

tions of municipal corporation are strictly ‘munici-

pal’.”” ;

‘*Property held by municipal corporation in pro-

prietary capacity ordinarily may be alienated with-

out consent of Legislature.”

_ In Arkansas Valley, etc. v. Morgan et al, 229 SW

2d page 134 it is held as stated in the syllabus:

“ A city entering into contracts involving, not

government of its citizens, but only convenience,

pepo lage

9

pleasure and profit of city and its people, acts in

‘proprietary capacity’.’’

“Powers granted municipality for private advan-

tages must be regarded as exercised by municipality

as private corporation, though public may also derive

benefit therefrom.”’

‘“‘A municipal corporation, in its purely business,

as distinguished from governmental, relations, is

governed by the same rules and held to same standard

of just dealing prescribed by law for private indi-

viduals or corporations and is clothed with same full

measure of authority over its property.”

In City of Hazard v. Duff (Ky.), 154 SW 2d, page

29(8) it is stated:

“* * * but the courts in general, and those of this

state in particular, are committed to the rule that a

municipality engaged in maintaining and operating a

waterworks does so in the exercise of a proprietary

or private character as distinguished from a govern-

mental character.”’

In Dix et al v. Port of Orford et al (Ore.), 282

Pac. page 110 (2-4) it.is stated:

“As a general rule, the power of a municipality to

convey property is equal to its power to acquire it.

At common law a municipal corporation, unless re-

strained by its charter, could dispose of property

in the same manner as private individuals. 19 R. C. L.

772. In the instant case, we do not think that the

property acquired through purchase was dedicated to

_ 4 public use. True, it inured to the benefit of the pub-

10

lic, but the port was engaged in this commercial enter-

prise for profit as a toll was charged any shipper who

used the wharf or docking facilities. It was not open

to indiscriminate use by the public. In the mainte-

nance and operation of this property, the port was

acting in a proprietary capacity. * * * It held title

to property which had been acquired for strictly cor-

porate uses. * * * It is not a case of holding title

to property in trust where there has been a dedication

to a public use. * * * In our opinion the lower court

erred in concluding that the port was exercising a

governmental function in the maintainance and oper-

ation of this dock and wharf.”’

“In operating a public utility in a private or pro-

prietary capacity, the municipality possesses the same

rights and powers with reference to its management

and control that a private owner possesses.”’

12 McQuillin page 682;

Dolan v. Louisville Water Co., 174 SW 2d 425.

Property which is not appropriated or devoted to

a public use may be disposed of by a city without

special statutory authority.

Southeastern Greyhound Lines, Ine. v. City of

Lexington, 186 SW 2d 203,

-In the operation of a public utility, it is generally

held that a municipal corporation acts in a proprie-

tary, rather than a governmental, capacity.

\ 87 A. J. p. 729;

» 12 MeQuillin 3rd Ed. p. 678;

18 McQuillin, p, 114 8S. 53.100.

_

rt

“‘Generally, a public purpose has for its objective

the promotion of the public health, safety, morals,

general welfare, security, prosperity, and contentment

of all of the inhabitants or residents within the munic-

ipal corporation * * *,’’

37 A. J. page 734.

‘The general rule * * * is that property held in a

governmental capacity, i.e., for a public use, cannot

be sold without legislative authority * * * but it is

otherwise as a property held in a private capacity

and not devoted to any special public use.”’

10 McQuillin, page 72;

12 McQuillin, page 678.

‘“* * * All property of the municipal corporation

of a private nature may be sold.”’

10 MeQuillin, page 74.

‘All property held by the city in fee simple, with-

out limitation on restriction as to its alienation, may

be disposed of by the city at any time before it is

dedicated to a public use. In other words, the city

has the right to sell or dispose of property, real or

personal, to which it has the absolute title * * * in

substantially the same manner as an individual unless

restrained by statute or charter * * *.’’

10 MecQuillin, page 75.

““* * * Land bought for a public purpose, if not

actually so used, cannot be said to be affected by a

publie trust, and hence may be sold.’’

10 MecQuillin, page 76;

Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Lexington,

186 SW 2d 202;

12

Kings County Insurance Co. v. Stevenr, 5 NE

353 ;

People v. State Tax Commission, 202 NYS 310;

City National Bank of Kiowa, 230 Pac. 894;

Seafeldt v. Port of Astoria, 16 Pac. 2d 945;

Haesloop v. Charleston, 115 SE 600;

Williamsburg v. Lyell, 112 SE 668;

Head-Lipscomb-McCormick Co. v. Bristol, 105

SE 500; .

Konrad v. Rogers, 36 NW 261.

‘So where land is donated to a village without any

restrictions it may sell such lands.’’

Jenkins v. Hanson, 112 NW 216.

‘It frequently has been reiterated that a munici-

pality functions in a corporate or proprietary capac-

ity in the operation and maintenance of public

utilities * * * consequently municipal ownership of

public utilities * * * must of necessity carry with it

the same duty, responsibility and liability on account

of negligence * * *.’’

18 McQuillin, page 414 S. 43.100;

37 ‘A. J. 729 N.1. (101).

7 Sec. IT

What the Exhibits Show

(a) “Exhibit A is a deed executed July 1, 1922, by

George A. Parks as trustee for the townsite of Fair-

banks, Alaska, party of the first part, in favor of

13

the Town of Fairbanks, Alaska, Inc., party of ‘the

second part. The deed conveys Tracts G, H, I, and J

of said townsite but provides that the land conveyed

is to be held in trust for park and recreational pur-

poses and that if any portion of said land is used

for other purposes the title thereto will revert to the

grantor. The townsite mentions section 11 of the Act

of Congress approved March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. 1095-

99) and the regulations thereunder as his authority.

26 Stat. page 1099 states:

“Sec. 11. That * * * lands in Alaska may be entered

for townsite purposes * * * by such trustee * * *

as may be named by the Secretary of the Interior

for that purpose, such entries to be made under the

provisions of section 2387 R. S. US * * * and the

Secretary of the Interior shall provide by regulation

for the proper execution of the trust in favor of the

inhabitants of the townsite * * * according to the

spirit and intent of said section * * *,’?

Sec. 2387 R. S. US provides:

“Whenever any public lands have been settled upon

as a town-site * * * it is lawful, in case such town be

incorporated, for the corporate authorities thereof

*** to enter at the proper land-office * * * the land

so settled * * * in trust for the several use and benefit

of the occupants thereof * * *; the execution of which

trust * * * to be conducted under such regulations

as may be prescribed by the legislative authority of

the State or Territory in which the same may be

situated.”’

14

The regulations of the Secretary of the Interior,

pursuant to the laws above mentioned, appear in 45

Land Decisions of the Department of the Interior

at page 242 and are as follows, with reference to the

present inquiry:

“The following regulations are prescribed in ac-

cordance with said act’’ (Sec. 11, Act of March 3,

1891 aforesaid) :

“1. ‘Tf the land is unsurveyed the occupants must,

by application * * * obtain a survey of the exterior

lines * * *. There must be excluded from the tract

to be surveyed and entered for the town site any lands

set aside by the district court under section 31 of

the act of June 6, 1900 (31 Stat. 321, 332), for use

as jail and courthouse sites, also all lands needed

for Government purposes or use, together with any

existing valid claim initiated under Russian rule.”’

«# * * 3. The trustee will file his * * * notice of

intention to make proof * * * and proof must be made

showing occupancy of the tract * * * and that the

town site does not contain any land occupied by the

United States for school or other purposes or land

occupied under any existing valid claim initiated

under Russian rule.”

“«“# * * 6. Lands possessed by Indian or native

Alaskan occupants shall not be assessed nor conveyed

by the trustee.’’

“«* *\* 11, After deeds have been issued to the

Parties entitled thereto the trustee will publish notice |

15

that he will sell * * * all lots and tracts remaining

unoccupied and unclaimed at the date of the trustee’s

entry * * *. The notice of public sale will be published

* * * and copies thereof posted * * * Each lot must

be sold at a fair price * * *. Lots remaining unsold

at the close of the public sale in an unincorporated

town may again be offered at a fair price if a suffi-

cient demand appears therefor.’’

“12. Immediately after the public sale the trustee

will make * * * his final report * * *. If the town is

incorporated such remaining proceeds may be turned

over to the municipality for use and benefit thereof.

After the public sale and upon proof of the incor-

poration of the town, all lots then remaining unsold

will be deeded to the municipality, and all munici-

pal public reserves will, by a separate deed, be con-

veyed to the municipality in trust for the publie

purposes for which they were reserved.’’

Section 31 of the Act of June 6, 1900, above men-

tioned in paragraph 1 of the regulations aforesaid is

found in 81 Stat. p. 332. Its provisions as relating

to the present inquiry are as follows:

““* * * Any part or portion of the siikpabaibteliild

public domain of the United States, embracing not

‘more than four thousand square feet * * * may be

set aside by order of the court as a jail site

Sorte PE certified copy of which order of the court

shall be transmitted to the Commissioner of the Gen-

eral Land Office * * * and thereafter the ground des-

eribed shall be reserved from sale or other disposition

ce & 8 19

Bi

16

Exhibit B is a copy of a deed issued by the Town

of Fairbanks, Alaska, Inc., to the United States of

America on January 11, 1950, quit-claiming as to said

Tracts G, H, I, and J.

Exhibit C is a deed dated February 9, 1950, from

the United States to present Trustee of the Town

of Fairbanks, Alaska, Inc., conveying said tracts to

the present townsite trustee of Fairbanks, Alaska,

and reciting that the provision in the deed of Parks,

trustee, requiring said tracts to be used for parks

and recreational purposes was unauthorized under

the regulations authorizing the issuance of the deed

(Regulation July 19, 1916, 45 L. D., par. 12, page

244). Exhibit C does not contain any limitations on

the use of said tracts.

Exhibit D is a deed of date February 9, 1950, be-

tween the present trustee for the townsite and the

Town of Fairbanks, Alaska, Inc. It conveys said

tracts to the Town of Fairbanks, Alaska, Inc. without

any limitation as to their use.

“In Paragraph ITI of plaintiffs’ amended complaint

it is alleged that the defendant did acquire, in 1922,

the property described in Exhibits A, B, C, and D, as

more particularly shown on map Exhibit E.

Whether the Parks’ deed (Exhibit A) was void

or invalid, it could not operate as a dedication for

an airport of the tracts of land therein mentioned,

for the reason that it expressly limited the use of.

the said tracts for the purpose of parks and recrea-—

tion. It made no attempt to operate as an express

EE

17

dedication for airport purposes. The Town of Fair-

banks, no doubt believing that it was limited to the

use of said tracts for parks and recreational purposes,

never accepted said Parks’ deed as any dedication

for airport purposes or otherwise. Neither did the

Town of Fairbanks ever accept the limitation of the

Parks’ deed for parks and recreation. The town did

use said tracts for airport purposes but it was in a

proprietary capacity. At all times the Town of Fair-

banks specifically retained control of the airport and

made the rules requiring the doing of certain things

by those using the airport including the payment

of rent for hangar and other facilities and the pay-

ment of landing fees, and so forth.

The Parks’ deed was neither void nor voidable,

as to the limitation of use for parks and recreational

purposes. The Federal Government recognized that

fact and made an exchange of deeds in 1950 whereby

the United States through the present townsite trustee

for Fairbanks deeded said tracts to the Town of Fair-

banks without any limitation or restriction whatso-

ever as to the use said tracts were to be put. It was

a clear and unequivocal act showing that there was

no intention on the part of the Federal Government

to limit the use of said tracts. In fact, there would

have been no statutory authorization for the Fed-

eral Government to make a limitation on the use

that said tracts were to be put. The City of Fair-

hanks, in 1950, became the owner in fee simple with-

out. limitation as to use of said tracts. Said deed of

February 9, 1950, from the townsite trustee to the

18

City of Fairbanks, Inc., gave the city the right to

use said tracts without any restriction as to use.

It seems very clear, therefore, that the airport as

constituted by the tracts mentioned in paragraph IIT

of said amended complaint has never been dedicated to

the public use of the airport.

(b) In paragraph IV of »laintiffs’ amended com-

plaint it is alleged that the defendant acquired prop-

erty from Paul and Stacia Rickert for airport pur-

poses, according to Exhibits F, H, 1, and J, as shown

on Exhibit E, a map.

Exhibit F is a copy of a deed between Paul J. Rick-

ert and Stacia T. Rickert, parties of the first part,

and the Town of Fairbanks, Alaska, party of the sec-

ond part. The deed sells, conveys, and confirms unto

the party of the second part a tract of land of 5.28

acres.

Nowhere in the deed is there any limitation as to

the use of the ground conveyed thereby. There is a

paragraph of warranty on the part of the grantors and

there is a statement that the deed is ‘‘for and in con-

sideration of the sum of One Dollar, lawful money

of the United States of America, and other good and

valuable consideration, to them in hand paid by the

party of the second part, the receipt of all which is

hereby acknowledged.”

The deed (Exhibit G) did not contain any provision

to theeffect that the land therein mentioned should be

soit for any particular purpose, nor did it attempt to.

provide that a revision should take place of the title

q

ey

J

y

19

if the land were used for any particular purpose. The

deed was executed August 10, 1927. The minutes of

the council meeting of the Town of Fairbanks on Au-

gust 23, 1927, recite:

‘‘A deed from Stacia and Paul Rickert giving

the city for airport purposes, 5.28 acres of land

from their homestead was read and it was moved

** * that the gift be accepted, Carried.”

The deed does not limit the use of the land con-

veyed to any purpose and does not provide for a re-

verter in case the land is used for any unauthorized

purpose. The deed is a fee simple deed and negatives

that the Rickerts had any intention of limiting the use

of the land. It certainly could not act as a dedication

as none of the elements of a dedication exist in regard

to this deed.

Exhibit H is a copy of a deed dated September 11,

1929, wherein Jaul J. Rickert and Stacia T. Rickert,

as parties of the first part, deed to the Territory of

Alaska, as party of the second part, for and in con-

sideration of the sum of One Dollar, ‘‘the receipt

whereof is hereby acknowledged,’’ a described piece of

land alleged to contain 60.5 acres. There is no limita-

tion whatsoever as to the use the Territory of Alaska

is to put said land conveyed.

siauiiie alleiel deiedaniie dint Staats

statement on the part of Paul and Stacia Rickert

that their deed to the Territory of Alaska (Exhibit H)

contains 62 acres instead of the recited 60.5 acres

and that they wanted to give the excess over 60 acres

to the Town of Fairbanks when a more correct de-

scription of said excess is ascertained. In said Exhibit

I it is stated that Exhibit H was ‘‘intended to convey

60 acres of ground for airfield purposes * * *”’ There

was no limitation in Exhibit H that the property was

to be used for airfield purposes by the Territory of

Alaska or anyone else. The deed, Exhibit I], describes

the property conveyed by metes and bounds and ends

the description by saying it contains 60.5 acres. Under

the laws of Alaska, when a deed describes the land by

metes and bounds and makes an erroneous state-

ment as to the acreage involved, the deed conveys the

land as described by metes and bounds and in disre-

gard of the alleged acreage.

(58-7-3(1) Alaska Compiled Laws Annotated.)

Inasmuch as the Territory of Alaska, by deed of

June 23, 1945, Exhibit J, conveyed the identical land

mentioned in Exhibits H and I to the Town of Fair-

banks by means of a description identical with that

of Exhibit H is immaterial, as the town got all of the

tract alleged to contain 60.5 acres and also the two

acres exceeding the 60.5 acres.

The fact that Paul and Stacia Rickert in their deed

(Exhibit I) to recite that their former deed (Exhibit

H) to the Territory of Alaska was intended to convey

ground for airfield purposes is insufficient to consti-

tute proof of the making of a dedication of the prop-

erty mentioned in Exhibit H for the public use of

said land as a airfield. The deed transferred a fee

simple title without limitations and that would control

2

over the surplus allegation by way of recital in Ex-

hibit H.

Exhibit J is a copy of a deed of date June 23, 1945,

wherein the Territory of Alaska deeded to the Town

of Fairbanks, Alaska, the property described in Ex-

hibit H by means of a description which is the same

as that contained in Exhibit H. There is no mention

of the last-mentioned deed of the land being used for

any particular purpose.

Consequently it seems clear that the exhibits men-

tioned in said paragraph IV of plaintiffs’ amended

complaint (Exhibits F, H, I, and J) do not contain

any dedication of any land for a public use and de-

voted thereto.

(c) In paragraph V of plaintiffs’ amended com-

plaint it is stated that Paul and Stacia Rickert did

convey to the defendant (as shown by Exhibit G) 5.28

acres by gift for airfield purposes.

Exhibit G is a copy of the minutes of a regular meet-

ing of the City Council of Fairbanks on August 23,

1927. It states among other things:

‘“‘Mr. Thompson read a telegram from Gen. Steese

to Hawley Sterling stating that $1,000.00 more would

be necessary to complete the work on the airport,

$500.00 from the City and $500.00 from the Territory.

Moved by Kubon seconded by Kennedy that an addi-

tional $500.00 be appropriated from City funds for

this purpose. Carried. A deed from Stacia and Paul

Rickert giving the City for airport purposes 5.28 acres

of land from their homestead was read, and it was

21

22

moved by Kennedy seconded by Gilcher that the gift

be accepted. Carried. * * *”’

It is believed that the above minutes do not show

that the city or the Territory actually paid the $500

authorized to be paid. Even if the Territory did actu-

ally pay the $500, the Territory of Alaska, and not the

plaintiffs in this case, would be the party to complain

about the abandonment of the airport. Further, the

fact that when the Rickerts executed their deed in

favor of the city for 5.28 acres, they made no such lim-

itation. That negatives that they desired to limit the

use of the land to the purposes of an airport. The deed

is an absolute conveyance without any limitation of

use. There is no provision for a reverter in case the

property is used for purposes other than an airport.

It is believed the deeds of Mr. and Mrs. Rickert

(Exhibit F conveying 5.28 acres to defendant and

Exhibit H conveying 60.5 acres to the Territory) being

without limitation show the intention of the grantors

and it controls over their recital in Exhibit I that they

had intended, in executing said Exhibits F and H,

to limit the use of said lands to airport purposes. =

(d) In paragraph VIII the plaintiffs allege that

defendant did acquire for airport purposes 370 acres

of real property as evidenced by Exhibits Q and R.

_ Exhibit Q is Resolution No, 21 of the Town Couneil

of Fairbanks, Alaska, submitted and passed on the

9th day.of January, 1950, The following portions wis ;

ecard cenicineniets eee

‘2

‘Resolution No. 21”’

‘Whereas, the City of Fairbanks did purchase ap-

proximately 370 acres of land, being portions of the

Rickert and Day Homesteads, for airport purposes;

and

‘“Whereas, the airport known as Weeks Field will

be abandoned during the year 1950; and

‘“Whereas, the city proposes to subdivide the land

purchased for airport purposes, together with Tracts

‘G’, “H’, ‘I’ and ‘J’ that was deeded to the City by

Trustee Deed so as to encourage housing develop-

ment in the City of Fairbanks; * * *

‘Now, therefore, be it resolved * * * that the Mayor

be and he hereby is authorized to exchange deeds with

the U. S. Government in order to obtain an unre-

stricted deed to Tracks ‘G’, ‘H’, ‘I’ and ‘J’.”’

‘The vote:

“‘Ayes: Anderson, Pata Fenton, Hetnts; ani

Van Scoy.

‘‘Nay: None.’’

Exhibit R is practically the same as Exhibit Q ex-

cept in that it authorizes an ae of deeds vine

W. George Moore. :

The plaintiffs seem to believe that if the ‘Town of

Fairbanks purchased any land with the intention of

using it as ‘an airport they were forthwith : estopped

from ever using it for anything élse or ab

airport business altogether.

It is believed that this theory is incorrect.

(e) Exhibit N is an ordinance of the Town of Fair-

banks, Alaska, passed upon the 21st day of July, 1931.

It establishes ‘‘for the use of the City of Fairbanks,

Alaska, its inhabitants, and of visiting aircraft * * *

municipal airport * * *; that said airport shall be

available for use by public, private and commercial

aireraft.’’ As much of the ‘‘Park Reserve’’ as may

be necessary for use as a landing field is set aside but

it is provided that nothing in that ordinance shall be

construed as a surrender by the town of its right to

regulate and manage the ‘‘Park Reserve”’ as a public

park. An Airport Commission was provided for, with

authority to promulgate rules and regulations, which

shall be in effect until the same shall be altered,

amended, or repealed by the Common Council. Any

regulation so altered by the Common Council shall not

be thereafter subject to any sense by said Airport

Commission.

A portion of the ‘‘Park Reserve’’ (which is in Tract

J) was reserved for the purpose of leasing to those en-

gaged in ‘‘commercial,” public, or private opera-

tion of aircraft. The Mayor was given authority to

lease portions of land in said airport, Subparagraph

(b) of Section 6 of Exhibit N provides:

.. “The rental charge for the leased area shall be Ten

Dollars per fifty front feet paralleling any runway,

or fraction, thereat, per year, payable annually in ad-

vance.”

| ggmeeneaes

25

Subparagraph (c) of said exhibit makes provision

for the lessor terminating leases.

Subparagraph (e) of said Section 6 of said Exhibit

N provides that buildings erected on leased land shall

_ become the property of the city if not removed within

30 days after the termination of such lease.

From the above, it is clear that the Common Council

of the Town of Fairbanks was creating, by said or-

dinance, an airport which was definitely the property

of and under the control of the Town of Fairbanks.

Its requirement of rental for using parts of the air-

port for buildings at a rental therein set forth neg-

atives any intention on the part of the town to dedicate

the land mentioned as ‘‘Park Reserve’’ to the public.

The ordinance in effect required anyone who wanted

to use the airport to atorn to the Town of Fairbanks,

Alaska, as their landlord and pay rent and abide by

the rules and regulations promulgated by the Airport

Commission or the Common Council of the Town of

Fairbanks, Alaska.

(f) Exhibit P is a copy of an Ordinance of the

Town of Fairbanks, Alaska, of date August 4, 1940. It

promulgates regulations. Section 1 provides that only

aircraft and airmen licensed by the Civil Aeronautics

Authority of the United States shall-operate on or

over the Fairbanks airport (except student fliers or

public aircraft). Section 4 ° provides that persons

using the airport for commercial aviation or other

commercial or private purposes shall first secure a per-

mit from the City Clerk and pay the fees and charges

prescribed. Section 35 provides that anyone violating —

the provisions of the ordinance (Exhibit P) shall be

subject to a fine and/or imprisonment and suspension

from the use of the airport for not to exceed 30 days.

This ordinance again makes it clear that. the Town

of Fairbanks, Alaska, did not and had not relinquished

ownership and control of said airport and the right to

use the same as a source of income and to administer

such use to the full extent of the powers given it in

regard to other property of the municipality.

(g) Exhibit I is a copy of a Resolution of the

Common Council of the Town of Fairbanks, Alaska.

Among its previsions are the following:

““Whereas, most of the owners of aircraft now using

the municipal airport at Fairbanks, Alaska, commonly

known as ‘Weeks Field,’ have failed and refused to

pay to the City of Fairbanks the money now due and

owing from said owners to the City of Fairbanks for

the use of said airport, and the City of Fairbanks is

not financially able to continue the maintenance of said

municipal airport or to employ the proper persons to

manage and control the same, and,

‘“Whereas, a new airport, commonly known as the

‘International Airport,’ has been constructed by the

Federal Government approximately two miles from

the City of Fairbanks and is now available for the —

public use and by all aircraft carrying freight and

to and from the City of Fairbanks and isa —

much larger, better constructed airport and is under

the control of the Civil Aeronautics Administration —

‘27

and ample to serve all of the needs of the City of Fair-

banks and the general public for a public airport, and,

“Whereas, the ‘Weeks Field’ airport is no longer

being used and has not been used since April 17, 1951,

by airplanes of a gross weight of over 12,500 pounds,

and is now being used by only-a small number of one-

engine airplanes, and,

‘Whereas, new buildings, including residences and

a new school building, have been built in close prox-

imity to said “Weeks Field’ airport and as a result

thereof the said ‘Weeks Field’ airport is no longer

safe and the use thereof endangers not only the lives

of those who use the airport but the lives of those

living in the vicinity of said airport and the children

who will attend said school, and .

‘Whereas, it is no longer necessary or convenient

to longer continue the use of said ‘Weeks Field’ air-

port for the general welfare or benefit of the general

public and the condition of said airport is unfit for the

landing aireraft, and,

‘*Whereas, the land embraced in said “Weeks Field’

is now needed for housing and recreational purposes

and can no longer be safely used as an airport; :

“‘Now, therefore, it is hereby ordered by and on

behalf of the Common Council of the City of Fair-

banks, Alaska, that the said municipal airport com-

monly known as ‘Weeks Field’ be, and the same is

hereby closed for use as an airport and the use of the

same on and after the 15th day of October, 1951, either

Pte:

3

for the landing or taking off of airplanes is hereby pro-

hibited.

‘‘ Adopted this 17th day of September, 1951.

‘“‘ROBERT HOOPES,

‘Mayor

(City of Fairbanks Seal)

** Attest :

“EK. A. TONSETH,

‘Municipal Clerk.”’

This furnishes cumulative evidence of the fact that

the Town of Fairbanks did not intend to convey said

tracts to the use of the public.

(h) Exhibit S is a copy of Ordinance No. 527

passed by the Common Council of the Town of Fair-

banks, Alaska, upon the 17th day of September, 1951.

It provides that it shall be unlawful for anyone to

land an airplane or to take off with an airplane from

the land known as Weeks Field after the 15th day

of October, 1951.

(i) Paragraphs XV A and XV B of plaintiffs’

amended complaint allege that Resolution No. 51 (Ex-

hibit O) is in violation of the Constitution of the

United States, in that it deprives the plaintiffs of the

property without due process of law. It is believed

that the matters herein set forth show that no dedica-

tion was ever made for the Fairbanks airport; that all

of the property of the city hereinbefore mentioned re-

ye private property of the city, not subject to

blic trust, and that the city had full power to

pass the ordinance, Exhibit 0, under the provisions of

29

Section 16-1-35 eleventh ACLA 1949 “‘to prohibit * * *

conduct endangering the public peace, public health,

or public safety.’’ The town, being the owner of the

property heretofore mentioned, had a right to prohibit

the use of its property for landing and take-offs of

airplanes inasmuch as that was greatly endangering

the public safety.

As the mere intention to use said homesteads for air-

port purposes is a far ery from a dedication of the

land to the public for airport purposes, it is believed

that Exhibit Q in no way proves any of the issues

of this case, even though it be considered that said

town at one time intended to use said Day and Rickert

homesteads for airport purposes.

The other recitals of the resolution show that no-

tice was given on the 9th day of January, 1950, that

Weeks Field would be abandoned during the year of

1950, thus giving ample opportunity to plaintiffs to

avail themselves of the airport facilities of the Inter-

national Airport or elsewhere.

Said Resolution No. 21 also authorizes an exchange

of deeds with the United States in @rder to obtain

an unrestricted deed to Tracts G, H, I, and K as au-

thorized by Chapter 7, SLA 1931 (16-1-35, 20th Sub-

division, page 196° ACLA °49). That such an ex-

change of deeds was advantageous to the town, in the

judgment of the Common Council, appears by vert.

eation from the terms of the resolution. Fe

Exhibit R is Resolution No. 22 of the said Town ’

Council. It is practically the same as Resolution No.

21, except that it authorizes an exchange of deeds with

W. George Moore.

Sec. ITT

Denali Purchase

(a) In intervenor’s first affirmative defense it is

set forth that it ‘‘has acquired from the City of Fair-

banks the following described property by deed made

and executed on the 9th day of June, 1950, and re-

corded on the 21st day of June, 1

No answer or denial of any sort was filed by the

plaintiffs to the intervenor’s first affirmative defense.

Consequently it is believed that the plaintiffs intended

to and did admit the matters set forth in said first af-

firmative defense of intervenor.

That the deed was duly and legally authorized and

executed by the Town of Fairbanks to the intervenor

is necessarily admitted by failure to answer said first

affirmative defense. Such admission is consistent with

plaintiffs’ map, Exhibit E, which shows the ground in

controversy in this suit to be entirely within the bound-

aries of the Town of Fairbanks except on the south

side. In other words, the Weeks Field shown by said

map goes no farther west than to the westerly bound-

ary of the town.

‘The plaintiffs’ position hiendis entirely upon

whether or not'a dedication was made of the property —

constituting Weeks Field. Inasmuch as such a dedi-

cation is not sustained by the evidence in this case but —

31

is negatived it would be immaterial, as far as the

plaintiffs are concerned, what the position of the in-

tervenor is in regard to said Denali School premises.

The execution of the deed to the intervenor im-

plies a finding on the part of the Common Council of

Fairbanks, Alaska, that in its judgment the land

deeded is no longer required for municipal purposes.

Such a finding and such a deed were authorized by the

first clause of Chapter 7 SLA 1931, which became the

first paragraph of Section 16-1-35, 20th Subdivision,

ACLA 1949. No ratification of said sale of the Denali

School lands and the execution of the deed is required

by said first clause of Chapter 7 SLA 1931 as to land

which had not been acquired or held for any public

use or devoted thereto, such as the land within the

Denali School premises.

(b) If the Common Council of Fairbanks failed to

make the finding mentioned in the first clause of said

Chapter 7 SLA 1931 that in their Judgment the Denali

premises were no longer required for municipal pur-

poses or, as authorized by the second clause of said

Chapter 7, that in their judgment it was advantageous

to the city to donate said Denali premises to said school

district, such failure on the part. of the City. Council

would not inure to the benefit of the plaintiffs or assist

ae

inary injunction.

The above stated with due sitaasdeentlins of the fact

that said Chapter 7 SLA 1931 and Chapter 27 SLA

1945 constitute a part (along with a number of amend-

ments) of Chapter 61 SLA 1951, which became 6f-

fective 90 days after the passage thereof, which was

upon the 22nd day of March, 1951.

(c) In paragraph IX of plaintiffs’ amended com-

plaint it is stated that Weeks Field, by dedication and

user, has become public property, as evidenced by Ex-

hibits G, N,; O, P, Q, and R. It is believed that said

exhibits last mentioned, as well as all other exhibits

in the ease, fail to show any dedication of said Weeks

Field for a public purpose, but in fact definitely show

that it was the intention of the owner thereof to make

no such dedication.

While the intervenor and no doubt other persons

(excluding the present plaintiffs) have a right to pro-

cure the findings of the City Council mentioned above

relative to said Denali School premises, such right

does not in any way assist the plaintiffs in making

out their case.

Sec. IV

Intervenor’s Exhibit B

(Ballot of Special Election of February 21, 1950)

. . (a) The deseriptions of land in Propositions Nos.

_3;4, 5, 6,7, and 8 of said ballot (Exhibit B) are so

vague and indefinite as not to give the voters a knowl-

edge of the land referred to. a 3 furnishes a

good, example. It asks the voter: ‘‘Shall the City of

airbanks sell and convey to the Fairview Develop-

ment.

ion a parcel of land containing approx-

imately 12 acres and located partially in the original

townsite of Fairbanks and partially immediately south —

a

of the south boundary of the original plat of the town-

site of Fairbanks * * *,’’

Propositions Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, therefore, are

invalid and do not furnish a ratification by the voters

of any ordinance or other sale of real estate as men-

tioned in the fourth clause of Chapter 7 SLA 1931;

Section 16-1-35 page 196 ACLA 1949, Such ratifica-

tion is, however, not necessary under the first and

second clauses of said Chapter 7 SLA 1931.

Proposition No. 9 has a sufficient description of the

land to be sold but is defective in the following par-

ticulars, to-wit:

(1) That there is no showing that the Common

Council of Fairbanks passed an ordinance setting

forth the terms of the proposed sale and the consider-

ation thereof ;

(2) That said Common Council in their best judg-

ment considered that said premises were no longer re-

quired for municipal purposes.

There having been no written grant to the public of

the land involved in the municipal airport in this case,

the only manner in which said lands could be held in

trust for the public, in this case, would be if the facts

complied with the -common law to what constitutes

a dedication to the public use.

A common law dedication, as mentioned before, re-

quires a definite intention on the part of the grantor

to dedicate designated land to the public use. There

- was certainly no such intention shown in this case.

34

A common law dedication further requires that such

an intention exists and be shown clearly and unequivo-

cally. Certainly no such matter was shown in this case.

Most of Weeks Field lies within the boundaries of

the original Town of Fairbanks, Alaska, in Tracts |

G, H, I, and J, which were tied up by a limitation for

use only as a public park and for recreational pur-

poses from 1912 until 1950. The Town of Fairbanks

was very careful in all of its ordinances to show that

it was reserving all rights with reference to said tracts.

At no time before or after execution of the deed to

said tracts without limitation as to the use thereof, did

the Town of Fairbanks express any intention to dedi-

cate said tracts to the general public.

(b) Necessity of Reverter Clause in Deed:

In Wright v. Morgan, 191 US p. 55, it was held that

where the statute provided ‘“‘that reservations may

be made for parks and other public purposes’’ in pat-

ents it probably meant no more than to explain the

- motive for a sale under the circumstances at the min-

imum price; that the deed was a conveyance of title

with no restrictions upon its use, nor right of re-

entry for condition broken; that in view of the strong

disinclination of the courts to annex conditions or

restrictions in the absence of a clear expression of

such intent, it would seem to be the duty of the Court

to hold that no such condition or restriction is in-

- Ti Sharp v. Guthrie (Okla.) 145 Pac. 164, a patent

contained the following: ‘‘to have and to hold and =

maintain the same for the sole and separate use, bene-

fit and purpose of a public park for public uses and

no other.”” On rehearing in 152 Pac. p. 403, the Court

held that the City took a fee-simple title, free from

any trust or condition, and with power of alienation.

In Ward v. Klamath County (Ore.) 218 Pac. 927,

it was held that where the deed provided that a Court

House should be built upon the land, but did not pro-

vide for a reverter, it gave an indefeasible title.

In 19 A.J., page 527, Sec. 65, it is stated:

“It is a well-settled rule that conditions tending to

destroy estates, such as conditions subsequent, are not

favored in law. They are strictly construed. Accord-

ingly, no provision will be interpreted to create such a

condition if the language will bear any other reason-

able interpretation, or unless the language, used un-

equivocally, indicates an intention upon the part of

the grantor or devisor to that effect and plainly ad-

mits of such construction.”’

To the same effect are the cases of Toole v. Christ

Church (Texas 740), 141 SW 2d 720, et al., v. City of

Houston (Texas ’46), 196 SW 2d 553; Board of Edu-

eation v. Brophy (N. J. 1919), 106 ATL 32, and Briggs

v. Grand Rapids (Michigan 1932) 245 NW 5565.

(c) In this case it is clear that there was, in the

deeds given to the Town of Fairbanks, no limitation

requiring the land to be used for an airfield. Likewise

in said deeds there was no clause stating that if the

land conveyed were used for any purpose other than

airport purposes it would revert to the grantor.

Plaintiffs’ rights cannot be based upon an express —

dedication, as none existed. Plaintiffs’ rights could

be perfected by a common law dedication, but the evi-

dence in this case fails to show any of the elements of

a common law dedication and, in fact, definitely shows

the lack of such a dedication.

Sec. V

Housing Industry

Chapter 27 SLA 1945, which constitute the second

paragraph in Section 16-1-35 page 197 ACLA 1949,

provides :

«* * * That the Common Council in order to make

available sites for the * * * operation thereon of new

industries which will benefit the civil welfare of the

municipality * * * may sell, lease, or dispose thereof

upon such terms or conditions as may be deemed ad-

vantageous to the civic welfare of the community, to

such persons * * * or corporations as will agree to in-

stall, maintain and operate thereupon such new in-

dustry *.* * and such sites * * * shall not be deemed

to be ‘property acquired, owned or held for any public

use or. devoted thereto’ as used herein.”’

‘“‘Industry’’ is defined as follows: |

‘The result of operations whereby man changes and

makes fit for his use materials which were unservice-

— a natural state.’’

\ 43 0.5.8, page 40, note 6.

37

“Trade is defined as commercial enterprises and in-

dustries as that branch of trade employing capital and

labor.”’

People Ex Rel. Padula v. Hughes, 16 NE 2d

922-24.

‘“‘Any department or branch of art, occupation or

business ; especially one which employs much labor and

capital and is a distinct branch of trade; as the sugar

industry.’’

State Ex Rel. K. C. Power and Light Company

v. Smith, 111 SW 2, 515;

Dressen v. Department of Labor, etc. 66 Pac.

2d 869 (the oyster industry).

The housing industry which sprang up during

World War II is an industry using untold millions of

dollars of capital and enormous numbers of men and

women employees. It seems to be included in the defi-

nitions of industry above mentioned. It is believed,

therefore, that under Chapter 27 SLA 1945 (which

became the second paragraph of Section 16-1-35 page

197 SLA 1949, and later the second paragraph of

Chapter 61 SLA 1951 with the exception that the

word “‘property’’ was erroneously spelled “‘property’’

in the next to the last line on page 158 Chapter 61

SLA 1951) the Common Council of Fairbanks, Alaska,

has authority to sell, lease, or dispose of available sites

upon such terms as may be deemed by it advantageous

to the civic welfare of the municipality, to such per-

sons as will agree to install, maintain, and operate

thereon such new industries. It is believed that the

38

housing propositions mentioned in Propositions 3 to 9,

inclusive, on said official ballot would constitute new

industries which would benefit the civic welfare of

the municipality of Fairbanks, Alaska. There is no

requirement in said Chapter 27 for a ratification by

the voters of the action of the Common Council as to

such sites. The chapter specially provides that such

sites ‘‘shall not be deemed to be property acquired,

owned, or held for any public use or devoted thereto.”

Thus, under said Chapter 27 the Common Council of

Fairbanks, Alaska, could sell, lease, or otherwise dis-

post of the lands mentioned in Propositions 3 to 9, in-

clusive of said official ballot by making such land

available as sites for new housing industries. Under the

terms of said chapter it would be necessary for the

Common Council of Fairbanks to find that the sale of

such sites would benefit the civic welfare of the mu-

nicipality and that the terms of such sale or sales were

deemed by the Common Council to be advantageous

to the civic welfare of the municipality. An agreement

on the part of the grantees in the deed, or lease, to in-

stall; maintain and operate such industries on such

sites would likewise be necessary to comply with said

ehapter.

Perhaps the Common Council of the Town of Fair-

banks and the grantees of new industries have already

done all that is required of them under said Chapter

27. However, there is no direct showing of compliance

_ with said Chapter 27 made in the pleadings or affi-

davits upon which this application for a temporary

injunction is based. Under said Chapter 27 it is im-

material whether the property in any site mentioned

therein was held for a public use or otherwise, as the

chapter specifically states that the sites shall not be

deemed to be ‘‘property acquired, owned, or held for

any public use or devoted thereto.’’

Said Chapter 27 SLA 1945 plays no part with the

rights of the plaintiffs in this case, inasmuch as they

have no rights in said airport, as no dedication thereof

for a public use was ever made.

As is shown by an analysis above set forth with ref-

‘erence to said Chapter 27 SLA 1945, the Common

Council of Fairbanks has not made any of the find-

ings which are required in order to sell the mu-

nicipal property of the Town of Fairbanks, Alaska,

or the propositions set forth in Intervenor’s Exhibit

B or the Denali School premises. The fact that the in-

tervenor and perhaps others have a right to get some

of such findings from the City Council does not assist

the plaintiffs in making out their case.

Sec. VI

Gillam Easement

(a) Presumably to show a special interest in the

subject matter of this action, the plaintiffs allege that

one Harold Gillam as party of the first part executed

a deed on August 17, 1940, in favor of the Town of

Fairbanks, Alaska, grantee (Exhibit M), conveying

Lots 1 and 2 of the Rickert Homestead. The plain-

tiffs claim that Mr. Gillam was the owner of an ease-

ment or right-of-way between Lot 3 of said Rickert

Ss 40

Homestead and Weeks Field. The deed which was ex-

ecuted by Harold Gillam to the Town recites a con-

sideration to him in hand paid and further alleges:

‘‘and a further consideration that said party of the

first part shall have a continuous, free, and unob-

structed right-of-way to and from the Fairbanks Mu-

nicipal Airport to Lot 3.’’ Mr. Gillam alone signed

the deed. The recital that he is to have that right-of-

way constitutes a self-serving declaration which would

not be binding upon the Town of Fairbanks and would

not constitute any note or memorandum signed by the

party to be bound, to wit, the Town of Fairbanks,

‘‘An easement must rest upon a grant thereof; it

can not exist by parol.’’

17 A.J. 936 par. 18.

‘‘Generally, when an easement is created by ex-

press grant, words of inheritance are necessary to

_make it a perpetual interest. This is said to be the

rule also as to easements by reservation * * * Thus,

it has been held that the word ‘heirs’ is necessary to

create an easement in fee by way of reservation, but

not to create it by way of exception if the grantor

ity cone agin adm erlorl attripert deol hee

bi rar) reves aah ie.

—_—_—_—*__

41

Gillam’s rights were a mere license, and such license

terminates upon the death of either party and is not

transferable or descendible.

17 A.J..p. 926, par. 5 and p. 927 N. 9.

Paragraph VI of plaintiffs’ amended complaint al-

leges that Gillam, in executing the deed, retained a

right-of-way and that the plaintiffs Northern Con-

solidated Airlines and Fred Seltenreich and others

are successors and assigns of said Gillam. The inter-

venor has denied all of the allegations of said para-

graph VI. An examination of the deed shows that

Gillam did not in any possible way retain or except or

reservo a right-of-way from the operation of the deed.

The only thing we have about a right-of-way is

Gillam’s own statement appearing in the deed which

he, himself, was executing.

As Gillam had nothing more than a license which

was unassignable and which could not be inherited,

said alleged right-of-way was a mere license which

became of no effect when assigned to the plaintiffs. —

The question of said easement is immaterial, inas-

much as plaintiffs’ case depended upon there being a

dedication of Weeks Field and as the evidence shows

no such dedication to have existed. ste Ree 3

(by “In Paragraph XI of plaintiffs’ piisnld allie

plaint it is stated: ‘‘That.each of the plaintiffs herein

_is engaged in the aircraft or an allied business:at or

adjacent to Weeks Field; are property owners ad-

- agitate —_ eS ee

42

The defendant and intervenor have denied the mat-

ters set forth in said paragraph XI above mentioned.

Other than as to the alleged Gillam easement no evi-

dence of any sort was introduced by the plaintiffs to

substantiate any of the allegations in said paragraph

XI. As the burden of proof is upon the plaintiffs to

prove the allegations of their amended complaint

by a preponderance of the evidence in the case, and

the plaintiffs having failed entirely so to do, it be-

comes apparent that even if Weeks Field had been

properly dedicated to a public use the plaintiffs could

not have prevailed herein in their application for a

preliminary injunction because of failure to show any

special damage by reason of the action of defendant

and/or. intervenor.

McCormick v. Chicago Yacht Club, 163 NE 418;

60 A.L.R. 770;

| 16 A.J. p. 414 S. 67.

(ce) The evidence (and by this I mean the plead-

ings and affidavits upon which this cause was sub-

mitted) shows that the intervenor has built a school-

house costing $660,000 upon said Weeks Field and

that if a preliminary injunction were granted in this

ease the intervenor would be unable to use said school

by reason of the danger of injuring and killing some

of the 450 school children if planes were permitted to

land and take off from Weeks Field; that intervenor

would simply have to close down the school house and

rent quart in basements, churches, and other places

our ‘town at a cost of $134,800 during the probable.

time before final judgment herein. This matter was

eS

set forth by affidavit and by intervenor in its first af-

firmative defense, and no denial of the same was made

by plaintiffs.

There is no showing by the plaintiffs of any damage.

to them in any specific amount if the. preliminary in~

junction be denied. There are general statements of

irreparable loss, etc., in paragraph XVI of the

amended complaint. Paragraph XVI of said amended

complaint is denied by the defendant and intervenor

and no showing of loss was made by plaintiffs other

than the allegations above mentioned in said para-

graph XVI. It thus appears that the loss which would

be incurred by the intervenor from the allowance of «

preliminary injunction would be many times greater

than that which would be suffered by the plaintiffs,

which would furnish a sufficient ground for denying

the preliminary injunction.

(d) As the decisions of the Supreme Court show

that plaintiff must have a clear right to the issuance

of a preliminary injunction, it appears that no such

injunction should be issued in this case.

Ohio Oil Company v. Conway, 278 U.S. 813;

Harrisville v. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 US:

334;

Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Gay! Co., 309

U.S. 310. ——

(e) It is alleged in defendant’s third further and

affirmative defense set forth in the answer and in in-

tervenor’s third affirmative defense to plaintiffs’

amended complaint that the plaintiffs are indebted to

44

the defendant for the use of Weeks Airport in the

part in the following sums:

Northern Consolidated Airlines $5,500

Fairbanks Air Service $ 565

Alaska Flying School $ 480

The allegations of said indebtedness are not denied

by plaintiffs. ,

‘While said indebtedness might throw some light on

the financial standing of said plaintiffs it would not

seem that said indebtedness should constitute a bar

in. this equitable suit under the maxim that he who

seeks equity must do equity and must come into the

court with clean hands.

Plaintiffs have made no showing whatsoever that

the defendant or, the intervenor is unable to respond

in damages to any extent that is probable in this ac-

tion.

From the above, matters it appears that plaintiffs’

application for a preliminary injunction, as mentioned

above, should be denied.

simone yeteete Aes, fis Hh day of March, .

/s/ Harry E. Pratt,

i. & ; District Judge

(aiboaiea:) “Filed March 4, 1952.

‘ Pe ee ee } at 3 $ ¢

bye ¥ 5 ae Bee, a Sete wrt »

ot PPLE Ss (e Bereter o She} 4 + tery ela Gergen

, Feet

AA

45

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

No. 13,357

Fred Seltenreich, et al.,

Appellants,

vs.

The Town of Fairbanks and Fairbanks

School District, an independent

School District Corporation,

Appellees.

~~

JUDGMENT.

Appeal from the District Court for the District of

Alaska, Fourth Division.

This cause came on to be heard on the Transcript

of the Record from the District Court for the District

of Alaska, Fourth Division, and was duly submitted.

On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered

and adjudged by this Court, that the judgment of the

said District Court in this cause be, and seeactuee

46

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

Fred Seltenreich and Hawley Evans,

a partnership doing business as Fair-

banks Air Service, Jess Bachner, W.

C. Mitchell and David B. Phillips, a

eopartnership doing business as Fair-

banks Aircraft Service, No. 13,357

oe Appellants, Mar. 10, 1954

The Town of Fairbanks and Fairbanks

School District, an independent

School District Corporation,

Appellees.

Oppeal from the District Court for the Territory

of Alaska, Fourth Division

Before: Denman, Chief Judge.

ve Healy and Pope, Circuit Judges.

This is an appeal from an order of the District Court

of Alaska denying appellants’ motion for an inter-

loeutory injunction enjoining the Town of Fairbanks

from closing Weeks Field, an airport owned and form-

erly operated by the Town. The motion is subsidiary

toa len suit seeking permanent injunctive relief.

A are severally engaged in aircraft s

or ss cipubatinn ct x teedstng sotiool Tae piled a 7

prior to its closing were using the field in these enter-

prises. They, or some of them, appear to own adjacent —

>————EEEEEEEEs

47

property, and one of them claims to be the owner of a

right of way over lots giving access to the field.

It appears from the showings for and against the

motion that beginning with the year 1922 the Town

acquired by purchase or otherwise various tracts of the

land which serve to make up Weeks Field. Several

parcels were acquired by deed from the Territory

from private owners, which deeds apparently con-

tained no restrictions. The bulk of the area was trans-

ferred to the Town by the United States, or rather

by the Townsite Trustee, its agent. These latter

transfers directed that the tracts be held by the Town

in trust ‘‘for park and recreational purposes,’’ and

provided for reversion should they be otherwise used.

Subsequently it appears to have been determined that

the Townsite Trustee was without authority to impose

restrictions of this character; and in order to dispense

with them the Town deeded the tracts to the United

States which in turn conveyed them back to the Town-

site Trustee with instructions to grant the same ‘‘omit-

ting the reversionary clause.’’ Accordingly in 1950 the

Town obtained the lands unconditionally.

In 1950 the corporate limits of Fairbanks were ex-

tended to embrace Weeks Field. About this time an

extensive airport, constructed by the Federal govern-

ment some two miles from the Town, was completed

and became available for general public use. It ap-

pears that the Civil Aeronautics Administration trans-

ferred its functions to the latter field, ceasing super-

vision over the Weeks airport runway and discon-

_ tinuing its operation of the control tower there. The

48

Fairbanks School District, an organization indepent-

ent of the Town, acquired from the latter a parcel of

land on the municipal airport and proceeded to build

a school there, accommodating ultimately 750 pupils.

The school building itself is said to extend into the air-

port runway. These several developments and other

considerations induced a determination on the part

of the city council of Fairbanks to close Weeks Field

and abandon its use as an airport.

_ Appellants’ counsel frame the question for our

decision in this fashion: ‘‘May a municipal corpora-

tion lawfully abandon a public airport?’’ In their

effort to negative that proposition they have supplied

us with a brief of a hundred forty pages citing more

than three hundred cases, none of which is materially

helpful so far as concerns the specific situation before

us. We need not stop to inquire whether appellants

have standing to sue; for present purposes, disregard-

ing the Town’s argument to the contrary, we assume

that they have. Nor is it necessary to explore the broad

field of abstract opinion into which counsel’s labors

have carried them. (Footnote: The briefs—more

especially that of the appellants—discuss the point

whether the Town holds the airport in its proprietary

or in its governmental capacity, appellants adhering to

the latter theory. The question is interesting, but in

the circumstances of this case we regard it as purely

academic.) A sufficient answer to the question as to

the. vali¢ ty of the measures the Town of Fairbanks

aken in the specific situation confronting it may,

we think, be arrived at in fairly brief compass. .__

49

The powers in general of city councils of munici-

palities in the class of Fairbanks are set out in the

Alaska Compiled Laws, Annotated, 1949, Title 16

Article 1, § 35. Subdivision Twentieth of that section

authorizes those bodies ‘‘to acquire by purchase or

otherwise, and to hold real estate and other property

* * * and to sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of such

real estate and other property, * * * including prop-

erty acquired or held for any public use or devoted

thereto, when in the judgment of the city council the

same shall no longer be required for municipal pur-

poses; * * *”’ (Footnote: The power to acquire, main-

tain and operate airports was specifically delegated in

subdivision Fifty (b) of the same Section. However,

this provision ‘was superseded by the Alaska Municipal

Airport Act of February 24, 1949. Ch. 14 SLA 1949,

This Act. authorizes the disposal by municipalities .of

airports and facilities ‘‘in accordance with the laws

of this Territory governing the disposition of other

property of tbe municipality.’’) (Emphasis supplied.)

By legislative amendment approved March 22, 1951,

it was provided that no sale, lease or other disposition

of real property valued at more than $5,000 shall be

valid unless ratified by a majority of the qualified

‘electors of the municipality voting at an election held

for that purpose. Ch. 61 SLA 1951. However, we are

ing to the sale or shes tapenade i

ety bt ater with te auto of the ty conn

_ to determine whether and.when property acquired or

held by municipality for any public use or devoted

50

thereto ceases to be needed for such use. That such

power of judgment is intended to be vested in the city

council seems implicit in the statutory language above

italicized. No ratification by the voters is required

by the statute to confirm that judgment; nor would it

appear to be essential that the exercise of the coun-

cil’s judgment in this respect be coincidental with the

sale or other disposal of the property. (Footnote: It is

significant in this connection to compare the provi-

sions of 1 Alaska Compiled Laws Annotated, 1949, p.

253, relating to the vacation of streets and alleyways.

These provisions authorize the common councils of in-

corporated towns to vacate by ordinance streets and

alleys when required by public interest and conven-

ience. But the statute requires ratification of the

vacating ordinance by the qualified voters of the

Town.)

“The Municipal Airport Act, § 2(7) (a), referred to

in footnote 2, supra, authorizes municipalities to

adopt “such reasonable ordinances, resolutions, rules,

regulations and orders as it shall deem necessary for

the management, government, and use of’’ airport

facilities under its control ‘‘whether situated within or

without the town limits of the municipality. For the

enforcement thereof, the municipality may, by ordi-

nance or resolution, * * * fix penalties, within the

limits preseribed by law, for the violation of munici-

pal ¢ Jinances * * *’? 2

In September 1951 the city council of Fairbanks —

adopted a resolution ordering that ‘the said municipal _

airport comraonly known as ‘Weeks Field’ be, and

51

the same is hereby, closed for use as an airport and

the use of the same on and after the 15th day of

October, 1951, either for the landing or the taking off

of airplanes is hereby prohibited.’”? The resolution

recited at length the circumstances impelling the coun-

cil to take this action. Among the reasons stated were

the inability financially of the Town to continue the

maintenance of the airport or to employ proper per-

sons to manage and control the same; the availability

of the much larger, better constructed and safer air-

port made available by the Government within two

miles of the City; the fact that the governmental air-

port is under the control of the Civil Aeronautics Ad-

ministration and is ample to serve all the needs of the

Town of Fairbanks and the general public for a

public airport that Weeks Field was presently being

-used only by a small number of one-engine airplanes;

that a new school building had been constructed in

close proximity to Weeks Field runway with the result

that the continued use of the field endangered not only

the lives of those using the airport but the lives of.the

children attending the school and of other people liv-

ing in the vicinity; and that the further continuance

of the airport was no longer necessary for the general

ap ag agri i

unfit for the landing of aircraft.

This resolution was followed a few days tate: by

the adoption by the council of an ordinance prohibit-

ing the use of the land owned by the City, commonly

known as Weeks Field, for airport purposes and pro-

hibiting the landing and taking off of aireraft there-

52

from. Violation of the ordinance was declared a mis-

demeanor punishable by fine or by imprisonment for

not to exceed 30 days. Shortly afterwards, and prior

to the closing date specified in the resolution, appel-

lants moved the court for the interlocutory injunction

the denial of which is the subject of this appeal.

Appellants argue with many references to decided

cases that an airport is not a nuisance per se, but at

most is a nuisance in fact; and that the problem as to

whether it is the latter poses a judicial question, hence

one beyond the competence of the city council. Doubt-

less an airport operated under normal conditions and

with adequate supervision and controls is not classifi-

able as per se a nuisance, but it is clear that Weeks

Field had ceased to belong in that category. Under the

conditions described its continued use for the landing

and taking off of planes posed an obvious hazard to

life and limb which the council was not warranted in

ignoring. The prohibition and penalizing of such

operations was an appropriate exercise of the police

power of the municipality. Moreover, it must be re-

membered that the land was the property of the

Town, not of appellants. The council, acting under

authority of law and in the exercise of its considered

judgment, had determined that the use of the property

as an airport was no longer in the public interest,

and had closed it to aviation. Those facts in themselves

yen. Nanos decisive of the case.

"GEndorsed:) Opinion. Filed Mar. 10, 1954. Paul PL

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

Excerpt from Proceedings of Friday, April 30, 1954.

Before: Denman, Chief Judge,

Healy and Pope, Circuit Judges.

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

| REHEARING.

On consideration thereof and by direction of the

Court, IT IS ORDERED that the petition of Appel-

lants filed April 15, 1954, and within time allowed

therefore by rule of Court for a rehearing in the above

cause be, and hereby is denied.

54

Supreme Court of the United States

‘)

Fred Seltenreich and Hawley Evans, a

Partnership doing business as Fair-

banks Air Service, et al.,

Petitioners,

vs.

The Town of Fairbanks School District,

an Independent School District Corpo-

ration.

ORDER EXTENDING TIME TO FILE PETI-

TION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

UPON CONSIDERATION of the application of

counsel for petitioner(s), IT IS ORDERED that the

time for filing petition for writ of certiorari in the

above-entitled cause be, and the same is hereby, ex-

tended to and including August 10th, 1954.

s/ Hugo L. Black

Associate Justice of the Supreme

Court of the United States.

Dated this 27th day of July, 1954.

—

55

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

ART. I—LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

SECTION 10. No State Shall enter into any

Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of

Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of

Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a

Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of At-

tainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obli-

gation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT 5

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or

otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or

indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising

in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in

actual service in time of War or public danger; nor

shall any person be subject for the same offense to be

twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against

himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law; nor shall private property

be taken for public use, without just compensation.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT 14

SECTION 1. All persons born or naturalized in

the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction

thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the

56

State wherein they reside. No State shall make or

enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or

immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall

any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-

erty, without due process of law; nor deny to any per-

son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the

laws.

oo

LAWS OF ALASKA, 1951

CHAPTER 61

AN SOT

Amending Sec. 16-1-85 Twentieth ACLA 1949 per-

taining to acquisition and disposition of property by a

municipal corporation.

BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF

THE TERRITORY OF ALASKA:

Section 1. That Sec. 16-1-35 Twentieth ACLA 1949

is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 16-1-35 Twentieth: (Acquisition and disposition

of property). To acquire by purchase or otherwise,

and to hold real estate and other property, or any

interest therein, and to sell, lease or otherwise dispose

of such real estate and other property, or interest

therein, whether now owned and held or hereafter

acquired, including property acquired or held for any

public use or devoted thereto, when in the judgment

of the city council the same shall no longer be re-

quired. for municipal purposes; to sell, lease or donate

and/or exchange with the United States, the Territory

of Alaska, or any political subdivision thereof, any

57

real estate or other property, or any interest therein,

now owned and held or hereafter acquired, whenever

in the judgment of the city council such action shall

appear advantageous to the city; provided that in the

sale or other disposition of real property or any in-

terest therein now held or hereafter acquired by any

city valued at more than $5,000.00, the city council shall

by ordinance fix and prescribe the terms of said sale,

lease or other disposition of such property, and the

consideration accepted by the city there for when so

fixed by the city by ordinance shall be deemed ade-

quate and final; and provided further, that no ordin-

ance for the sale, lease, exchange or other disposition

of any real property or any interest therein valued at

more than $5,000.00 shall be valid unless ratified by a

majority of the qualified voters voting at a special or

other election at which the question of the ratification

of such ordinance is submitted. Thirty days prior

notice shall be given of any such election and during

said period the city council shall cause to be published

at least once each week in some newspaper published

in the city a notice stating the time of such election,

the place of voting, describing the property so to be

sold, leased, exchanged or otherwise disposed of, giving

a succinct statement of the terms and conditions of the

sale and the consideration thereof, if any, and stating

the title and date of passage of the ordinance for the

sale, lease, exchange or other disposition of said prop-

erty. If no newspaper be published in the city, notice

of said election and the purposes thereof in the man-

ner and form hereinabove stated shall be given by

58

posting such notice or copies thereof in at least six

public places in the city at least thirty days prior to

any such election.

Provided further that the common council, in order

to make available sites for the installation and opera-

tion thereon of new industries which will benefit the

civic welfare of the municipality, may likewise ac-

quire, own and hold such sites, including real property,

either within or without the corporate limits and may

sell, lease or dispose thereof upon such new industry

or industries, and such sites, as well as any right,

equity, claim or title now or hereafter acquired by the

municipality in and to real property sold to it for

delinquent taxes, shall not be deemed to be ‘‘property

acquired, owned or held for any public use or devoted

thereto’’ as used herein.

This Act shall not be held to affect the provisions of

Chapter 32 of the Session Laws of Alaska of 1917

(Sections 16-6-1, 16-6-2 herein.)

Approved March 22, 1951.

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

RULE 7. PLEADINGS ALLOWED; FORM OF

MOTIONS.

(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an

answer; and there shall be a reply to a counterclaim

inated as such; an answer to a cross-claim, if

the.answer contains a cross-claim; a third-party com-

plaint, if leave is given under Rule 14 to summon a

person who was not an original party; and there shall

—

59

be a third-party answer, if a third-party complaint is

served. No other pleading shall be allowed, except that

the court may order a reply to an answer or a third-

party answer.

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

RULE 8. GENERAL RULES OF PLEADINGS.

(c) Affirmative Defenses. In pleadings to a preced-

ing pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively az-

cord and satisfaction, aribitration and award, assump-

tion or risk, contributory negligence, discharge in

bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration,

fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches,

license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of

frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, any other matter

constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.

When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as

a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the

court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the

pleading as if there had been a proper designation.

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

RULE 52. FINDINGS BY THE COURT.

(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts with-

out a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall

find the facts specially and state separately its con-

clusions of law thereon and direct the entry of the

appropriate judgment; and in granting or refusing

interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set

forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law

=

60

which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests

for findings are not necessary for purposes of review.

Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly

erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the oppor-

tunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of

the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent

that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the

findings of the court. If an opinion or memorandum

of decision is filed, it will be sufficient if the findings

of fact and conclusions of law appear therein. Find-

ings of fact and conclusions of any other motion except

as provided in Rule 41 (b).

NOV 9 1954

No. 271

in the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1954

FRED SELTENREICH AND HAWLEY EVANS, A PARTNERSHIP,

D/B/A FAIRBANKS AIR SERVICE, JESS BACHNER, W. C.

MITCHELL AND DAVID B. PHILLIPS, A CO-PARTNERSHIP,

D/B/A FAIRBANKS AIRCRAFT SERVICE,

Petitioners,

V.

THE TOWN OF FAIRBANKS, AND FAIRBANKS SCHOOL DIs-

TRICT, AN INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT CORPORA-

TION,

Respondents.

Brief of Respondents in Opposition

To Petition for Writ of Certiorari

THEODORE I. SEAMON

Woodward Building

Washington, D. C.

Attorney for Respondents

WILLIAM V. BOGGESS

Attorney for Respondent, Town of Fairbanks

213-15 Nerland Building

Fairbanks, Alaska

MAURICE T. JOHNSON

Attorney for Respondent, Fairbanks School District

201 Lathrop Building

Fairbanks, Alaska

Of Counsel

INDEX

Page

SIO OE COMIN Ss 6556508 05s OR Be sh a a eis 1

Pann Wren tera ep r Y Ue riper De APN MINORS OMe REPO G7 5

Bs: TE oe Sa oie eigia wks ia SNPS AEN Sao Rho ReD 5

II. Answer to Petitioner’s Question No. I................. 5

III. Answer to Petitioner’s Question No. II................ 7

IV. Answer to Petitioner’s Question No. III............... 12

V. Answer to Petitioner’s Question No. IV............... 12

oo Sea BEC SATB name PE Mon JE Uhl Baan & fase ent On a aN rat ope 14

AUTHORITIES CITED

CASES:

Group V. Finletter, 108 F. Supp. 827, 328...............e0- 11

Linde Air Products v. Johnson, 77 F. Supp. 656............ 10

South State Street Building Corporation, in re, 140 F. (2d)

DORs Sale. GA. DOR Wee TUR iy soins ivdesd ccthecevesscss 11

Steinberg v. American Bantam Car Company, 76 F. Supp. 426 11

STATUTES:

Alaska Compiled Laws Annotated:

Section 16-1-85, Sub-part 20th

Uniform Rules cf the District Court for the District of Alaska 9

No. 271

dn the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1954

FRED SELTENREICH AND HAWLEY EVANS, A PARTNERSHIP,

D/B/A FAIRBANKS AIR SERVICE, JESS BACHNER, W. C.

MITCHELL AND DAVID B. PHILLIPS, A CO-PARTNERSHIP,

D/B/A FAIRBANKS AIRCRAFT SERVICE,

Petitioners,

Vv.

THE TOWN OF FAIRBANKS, AND FAIRBANKS SCHOOL Dis-

TRICT, AN INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT CORPORA-

TION,

Respondents.

Brief of Respondents in Opposition

To Petition for Writ of Certiorari

STATEMENT OF CASE

On September 17, 1951, the Common Council

of Respondent Town, by Resolution No. 51, adopted

September 17,°1951, ordered the closure of its

municipal airport, effective October 15, 1951. Sub-

sequently, by Ordinance No. 527, passed and

approved September 17, 1951, (R. 50) the Re-

spondent Town made it unlawful for any person,

firm, corporation, co-partnership or association,

2

to land or take off from said municipal airport

after the effective date of closure. On October 12,

1951, Petitioners filed an Amended Complaint

(R. 8-51) in the District Court for the District of

Alaska, Fourth Division, in which they sought to

enjoin the Respondent Town from closing its muni-

cipal airport and from disposing of any of the

property composing that airport.

At the time of the council action, the Territorial

law governing the acquisition and disposition of

property by municipal corporations was spelled out

in Section 16-1-35, Sub-part 20th, Alaska Compiled

Laws, Annotated, 1949, which authorized such cor-

porations of which Respondent Town was one, “to

acquire by purchase or otherwise and to hold real

estate and other property or any interest therein,

and to sell, lease or otherwise dispose of such real

estate and other property or interest therein,

whether now owned and held or hereafter acquired,

including property acquired or held for any public

use or devoted thereto, when in the judgment of the

city council the same shall no longer be required for

municipal purposes * **.” (Set out in full in the

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at pages 56 to 58

of the appendix to that petition. )

As revealed by Petitioners’ Complaint, the theory

upon which they sought relief was that the muni-

cipal airport had become public property by dedica-

tion and use (R. 6), that they had standing to

question the actions of Respondent Town by virtue

of their being property owners adjacent to said

airport (R. 7), and more specifically, that they

were successors in interest to a right-of-way al-

legedly reserved by one Harold Gillam to the muni-

cial airport (R. 5). To show irreparable loss and

injury, Petitioners alleged generally the existence

of contracts with “the Government of the United

States of America, the Territory of Alaska, and

many private individuals” the performance of

which would be prevented or impeded, and that the

exact amount of “their detriment or damage could

not be determined” (R. 8).

Both Respondent Town and Intervenor Respond-

ent, Fairbanks School District, denied the essential

allegations of Petitioners’ complaint as summa-

rized above.

Affirmatively, it was alleged by Respondent

Town in effect that the municipal airport was a

commercial and private enterprise (R. 67) ; that

the Federal Government had constructed a new air-

port two miles from town which could adequately

serve the needs of the Petitioners, the town and the

general public (R. 68) ; that insofar as service to

the public, generally, was concerned, use of said

airport had been abandoned (R. 68); that the

Town was no longer financially able to continue

the operation of said airport, and that its continued

use would endanger “not only those living in the

vicinity of said airport, but the children who at-

tended school in the vicinity of said airport and

those operating planes using same” (R. 68-69),

and that the Petitioner, Fairbanks Air Service, was

primarily engaged in the business of instructing

persons to fly and that Petitioner Fairbanks Air-

craft Service was engaged in the repair business

(R. 69-70).

Respondent School District affirmatively alleged

that it had acquired from the town a portion of the

4

area sought to be kept open by Petitioners and con-

structed thereon a new school at a cost to the tax-

payers of over $660,000 (R. 78, 79, 85) ; that con-

tinued operation of the airport would prevent use

of the new school because of the hazards and dan-

gers to the personal security and welfare of the

children attending that school (R. 82, 83); that

deprivation of use of the new school for a period

of two years would cost the District the sum of

$134,800 (R. 84), and that there would be im-

measurable loss of educational opportunity to the

children of the community by reason of over-

crowded facilities and makeshift classrooms

(R 84).

Respondent School District also alleged affirma-

tively that the Civil Aeronautics Board had ordered

the ..unicipal airport closed to all traffic, and the

present use of that airport was mainly by student

pilots.

On the 19th day of October, 1951, Petitioners

moved for a preliminary injunction without notice,

based upon an affidavit by their attorney that he

had been advised by one of the City Attorneys of

the Town’s intention to construct a power line

across the airport, and otherwise based upon the

verified pleadings as above outlined. This motion

was denied by the District Court on the day pre-

sented (R. 106). From this order, and the further

order of the District Court denying Petitioners’

motion for an injunction pedente lite, filed Oc-

tober 12, 1951 (R. 51, 52), Petitioners appealed

to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Cireuit (R. 149, 150). From the decision of the

Court of Appeals (211 F. (2d) 88), affirming the

5

District Court, Petitioners have applied to this

Court for Writ of Certiorari.’

ARGUMENT

L Introduction

Petitioners do not allege or argue that their case

falls within any of the standards prescribed by

Rule 19, paragraph 1 (b), of this Court for review

by certiorari. It may be assumed, therefore, that

they contend that other urgent and compelling rea-

sons exist for review. The crucial points for deter-

mination by the District Court and the United

States Cou*\"o* Appeals were (1) municipal au-

thority under territorial statutes to abandon an

airport; (2) the construction of deeds to privately

owned land within the territory; and (3) the law

of dedication of municipally owned lands. Tifese

points would seem to be peculiarly adaptable: for

decision by the Territorial District Court and its

final Court of Appeals; and should not invoke the

interest of this Court as an important matter for

federal concern. Nor would the reasons set up in

Petitioners’ Questions Nos. 1 to 4 require different

result.

IL Answer to Petitioners’ Question No. I

With reference to Question No. 1 as presented by

the Petition, it is submitted that the United States

Court of Appeals made no determination of ques-

tions which were not fairly before it on appeal. It

1R. refers to the original Transcript of Record in

the United States Court of Appeals and presumably now

on file in this Court.

found that the Territorial Legislature, by statute,

had vested the council of Respondent Town with

authority “to determine whether and when prop-

erty acquired or held by a municipality for any

public use or devoted thereto ceases to be needed

for such use.” And it found further, in effect, that

there was no abuse of discretion in the making of

that determination under the reasons recited by the

City Council in Resolution No. 51. That the Ap-

pellate Court did rely on the good faith of the

elected representative body of a people, in the

absence of clear and convincing evidence to the con-

trary upon the question of whether or not a tem-

porary injunction should issue, is not startling.

The United States Court of Appeals did nothing

more than find in the light of the entire record that

no sufficient showing for a temporary injunction

was made; and undoubtedly was of the opinion

that the general and unsupported allegations of the

Petitioners’ amended complaint as to vested inter-

ests, contract rights and irreparable injury would

not justify an injunction with such consequences as

might flow therefrom if the findings of the town

council were correctly made. In the light of ex-

perience, that court could not do otherwise. Peti-

tioners had it within their power to submit sup-

porting affidavits, if available, to strengthen their

showing. They apparently chose not to, and now

complain.

If as submitted, the Circuit Court of Appeals

reached a correct decision on the review of the

record, little could be gained by examining the

opinion of the District Court. The Circuit Court

tooka different tack and reached the same result.

7

In fairness to the District Court, it may be observed

that the findings of that Court to which Petitioners

object are, by and large, of a legal nature—the

construction of Territorial Statutes and local deeds.

That Petitioners would object to both the District

Court and United States Court of Appeals con-

struing a Territorial Statute applicable to the case

is an absurd appeal for judicial blindness.

Il. Answer to Petitioner's Question No. II

Counsel for the Petitioners cast aspersions upon

the statement of the District Court that where no

answer or denial of any sort was filed by the Plain-

tiffs to the Intervenor’s first affirmative defense, it

would be assumed that the Plaintiffs intended to

and did admit the matters set forth in such defense.

They make much about this statement being a gem

of judicial reasoning and wisdom without calling

this honorable Court’s attention to the sound statu-

tory and Court Rule authority for making the state-

ment. Under Sections 55-6-52, 55-6-53 and

55-6-54, and also under Section 58-4-2, Alaska

Compiled Laws, Annotated, 1949, the procedure is

set up under which applications for preliminary

injunction may be made upon verified pleadings

and affidavits. Those sections are set out in full

as follows:

“55-6-52. Allowance before judgment: Un-

dertaking. An injunction may be allowed by

the court or judge thereof at any time after

the commencement of the action and before

judgment. Before allowing the same the

court or judge shall require of the plaintiff an

8

undertaking, with one or more sureties, to the

effect that he will pay all costs and disburse-

ments that may be decreed to the defendant,

and such damages, not exceeding an amount

therein specified, as he may sustain by reason

of the injunction if the same be wrongful or

without sufficient cause.

“55-6-53. Filing undertaking and affida-

vits: Service and filing of order. The under-

taking and affidavits, if any, upon which the

injunction is allowed, shall be filed with the

clerk. The order may be served as a summons

and returned to the clerk, with a proof of serv-

ice indorsed thereon, except that the service

shall be made upon the defendant personally.

The order may be filed with the clerk at once,

and shall be deemed to be served upon the de-

fendant from the date of its allowance, if it

appear therefrom that the defendant appeared

before the court or judge at the allowance

thereof.

“55-6-54. Acts which may be enjoined.

When it appears by the complaint that the

plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and

such relief or any part thereof, consists in

restraining the commission or continuance of

some act the commission or continuance of

which during the litigation would produce

injury to the plaintiff; or when it appears by

affidavit that the defendant is doing or threat-

ens or is about to do, or is procuring or suffer-

ing to be done, some act in violation of the

\plaintiff’s rights concerning the subject of the

action, and tending to render the judgment

9

ineffectual; or when it appears by affidavit

that the defendant threatens or is about to re-

move or dispose of his property, or any part

thereof, with intent to delay or defraud his

creditors, an injunction may be allowed to

restrain such act, removal, or disposition.

“58-4-2. When use of affidavits permissible.

An affidavit may be used to prove the service

of a summons, notice, or other paper in an

action or proceeding to obtain a provisional

remedy, the examination of a witness, or a

stay or proceedings, or upon a motion, and in

any other case expressly provided for by law,

except as provided in the next section.”

In effect at the time the instant case was under

consideration by the District Court was Rule No.

4 of the Uniform Rules of the District Court for

the District of Alaska, which reads in full as fol-

lows:

“Upon the hearing of any application for an

interlocutory order, the facts shall be pre-

sented by affidavits or other documentary evi-

dence, unless the court upon application and

cause shown shall permit oral evidence to be

introduced; the affidavits and documentary

evidence in support of the application must be

filed with it, or by leave of the court at the

hearing ; and copies of the application and evi-

dence in its support must be served on the

opposite party at least three days before the

hearing ; the opposing affidavits and documen-

tary evidence shall be served on the applicant

at least one day before the hearing. For cause

10

shown, the court or judge may modify the time

mentioned above or grant an extension of time

to make further showing or defense.”

The above-mentioned local rule does not conflict

with Rule 65, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

Title 28 USCA, because, in the latter-mentioned

Federal Rule, preliminary injunctions may be

granted upon affidavit or by verified complaint.

At no time in this proceeding did the Rules 7

and 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

Title 28 USCA, ever apply because the matter

being heard and before the trial court was only a

motion for preliminary injunction and not a trial

upon the merits; therefore, under our local prac-

tice, it was incumbent on the Plaintiff Petitioners

to answer the affirmative defenses set up in the

Respondents’ answers. Otherwise the Court could

and did take these matters to be admitted so far as

the hearing on the preliminary injunction was con-

cerned.

Certainly no reply would be necessary or is neces-

sary under the new Federal Rules of Civil Proce-

dure to put a case at issue for trial on the merits.

On all matters of an interlocutory nature including

motions for injunctions pendente lite, under the

local rules in force, these matters must be heard

upon affidavits, verified pleadings and counter af-

fidavits.

In support of this position, the Respondents re-

spectfully call the Court’s attention to the case of

Linde Air Products Co. vs. Johnson, 77 F. Supp.

656, wherein the Court said at page 658: “It

11

should be pointed out that the allegations of plain-

tiff’s complaint are not traversed. They stand ad-

mitted on this motion. (Motion for temporary

injunction. )”

In Group vs. Finletter, 108 F. Supp. 327, the

Court said on page 328: “Defendant has filed no

counter affidavit, and therefore for the purposes of

the motion before the Court, (for temporary in-

junction) the allegations in the affidavit of the

plaintiff must be considered true. Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, Rule 9 (d) 28 USCA.”

We believe it abundantly clear under the au-

thorities that there was no abuse of discretion on

the part of the trial court or the Circuit Court of

Appeals below. In this connection, we respectfully

call the Court’s attention to the case of South State

Street Bldg. Corporation, 140 F. (2d) 368; cert.

den. 822 U. S. 761, wherein the court said: “It

requires no citation of authorities to sustain the

proposition that the granting or refusal of a tem-

porary injunction lies within the discretion of the

trial court and is reviewable here only for an abuse

of that discretion. The denial of a motion for a

temporary injunction, based upon a verified com-

plaint alone, was certainly no abuse of discretion,

where the complaint did not state a cause of action

or any facts showing irreparable injury” (at page

366).

In Steinberg vs. American Bantam Car Com-

pany, 76 F. Supp. 426, the court said: “It is a rule,

subject to few exceptions, that a preliminary in-

junction should not be awarded on ex parte affi-

davits, unless in a clear case” (at page 430).

12

IV. Answer to Petitioners’ Question No. II

Examination of the opinion of the District Court

reveals that the District Judge made a careful

analysis of all the exhibits which were attached to

the pleadings of the several parties, and, upon basis

of those exhibits determined that there was not suf-

ficient evidence to justify a temporary injunction

based upon Petitioners’ controverted allegations

that the Respondent Town’s municipal airport had

been devoted or dedicated to a public use. This

would appear to constitute fair compliance with

Rule 52 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-

dure, 28 USCA.

But even were it otherwise, it is difficult to un-

derstand how the United States Court of Appeals

has been misled into committing “grievous error’

(Petition, page 29). That Court held that the

council of the Respondent Town could, under Terri-

torial Law, abandon or close its municipal airport

regardless of whether or not it was dedicated or

devoted to a public use. If Petitioners were truly

concerned about the Appellate Court being misled

by the District Court’s failure to comply with Rule

52 (a), that failure should have been called to the

Circuit Court’s attention. It was not. No assign-

ment of error was made on appeal, nor was such

error alleged or argued, orally or by brief, before

the Appellate Court.

V. Answer to Petitioners’ Question No. IV

Petitioners maintain that they will be deprived

of property and property rights without due proc-

ess\of law, should the “decisions cf the District

Court of the District of Alaska and the United

13

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit be

allowed to stand.”

In their complaint (Paragraph XI, R. 6, Para-

graph XIV, R. 8) they have alleged that they were

“property owners adjacent to Weeks Field (the

municipal airport in question) and have vested

property interests therein” and that they were

“performing contracts with the Government of

the United States of America, the Territory of

Alaska, and many private individuals * * * .” It

is to be noted that although the Petitioners docu-

mented their complaint in detail by exhibits with

reference to the acquisition by the Respondent

Town of the land comprising said airport, they

failed to append any deeds or supporting affidavits

to show title to property adjacent to said airport,

or any of the many contracts which they allegedly

were performing. This Court may draw its own

inferences as to Petitioners’ particularity in one

ease and their generality in the other. This Court

may also consider whether or not the lower courts

were, in substance, correct in denying a motion for

preliminary injunction predicated on such general

allegations in face of the weight to be attached to

the findings of Respondent Town’s council and the

specific allegations of the Respondent Intervenor’s

answer.

It is also difficult to perceive how Petitioners

have been damaged by any untoward delay of the

District Court in ruling on their motion for pre-

liminary injunction. Had that Court ultimately

sustained their motion, and the condition of the air-

port so changed so as to make its use impossible,

there would be damage. Such was not the case.

14

Furthermore, the record does not show any attempt

by the Petitioners to set the case for trial. It was at

issue. Nor does the record show any attempt by

the Petitioners to expedite the hearing on their

appeal to the court below. It is to be noted in this

respect that the appeal was argued orally before

the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit,

on February 23, 1954, almost two years after the

action of the District Court complained of. If Pe-

titioners have indeed been injured, such injury may

very well be the product of their own lack of dili-

gence. Petitioners are still entitled “to their day

in court” if they so elect.

The other points raised in Petitioners’ Question

No. IV have been treated elsewhere herein.

CONCLUSION

For lack of a substantial Federal question and

for the reasons heretofore set out, it is respectfully

submitted that the petition for writ of certiorari

filed herein should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

THEODORE I. SEAMON

Attorney for Respondents

WILLIAM V. BoGGEss

MAURICE T. JOHNSON

Of Counsel

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Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Seltenreich v. Town of Fairbanks · 348 U.S. 887 | Frix