Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Co. v. Johnson

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77 SEP 23 1954

HAROLD B. WHLEY, Cle

Supreme Court of the United States

No. 360

LOUISIANA & ARKANSAS RAILWAY COMPANY,

Petitioner and Appellant Below,

MACK HENRY JOHNSON,

Respondent and Appellee Below.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.

M. TRUMAN WOODWARD, IR.,

1122 Whitney Building,

New Orleans, Louisiana,

Attorney for Louisiana &

Arkansas Railway Company,

Petitioner and Appellant

Below.

JOSEPH R. BROWN,

ELIZABETH R. HAAK,

MILLING, SAAL, SAUNDERS,

BENSON & WOODWARD,

Of Counsel,

INDEX

PAGE

Petition for Writ of Certiorari 1

I. Citation of Opinions Below 1

II. Statement of Jurisdiction 2

III. Questions Presented 2

IV. The Statutes Involved 3

V. Statement of the Case and Reasons Relied on for

Allowance of Writ 3

A. Improper Admission of Hearsay Evidence... 3

B. Exclusion of Plaintiff’s Work Record. 5

C. Admission of Repetitive Hearsay by

Physicians 7

Conclusion 8

Appendix A 9

Appendix B 17

TABLE OF CASES CITED

Altmayer v. Travelers Protective Ass’n of America,

119 F. 2d 1005, 1008 7

Boston and Albany R. R. Co. v. O’Reilly, 158 U.S.

334, 39 L. Ed. 1006 7

Cardwell v. U. S., 186 F. 2d 382, 386 (CCA 5) 7

Carver v. United States, 160 U.S. 553, 40 L. Ed. 532 8

Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Garwood, 167 F. 2d 848

(CCA 8) 7

Cliquot's Champagne, 70 U.S. 114, 3 Wall. 114, 18

L. Ed. 116 6

Cucullu v. Hernandez, 103 U.S. 104, 26 L. Ed. 322— 4

Deery v. Cray, 5 Wall. 795, 18 L. Ed. 653 7

Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 708, 57

L. Ed. 820, 1035 4

Flannagan v. Provident L. & A. Ins. Co., 22 F. 2d

/ v 7

=

ii

TABLE OF CASES CITED—(Continued)

PAGE

Gilmer v. Higley, 110 U.S. 47, 28 L. Ed. 62 7

Gomila, et al v. United States, 146 F. 2d 372 (CCA

5) 4

Hill v. A. J. Canfield Co., 157 F. 2d 849 (CCA 7) — 4

Home Ins. Co. v. Weide, 78 U.S. 438, 11 Wall. 438,

20 L. Ed. 197 6

Hunter v. United States, 62 F. 2d 217 4

Johnson v. Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Company,

214 F. 2d 290 (CCA 5) 9

Mason v. United States, 63 F. 2d 791 4

Moscahlades, et al v. Montagnio, 172 N.Y.S. 332 4

National Bank of the Metropolis v. Kennedy, 84 U.S.

19, 17 Wall. 19, 21 L. Ed. 554 6

Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 426, 23 L. Ed. 286 8

Petroleum Carrier Corp. v. Snyder, 161 F. 2d. 323,

(CCA 5) 4

Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 470, 77 L.

..... 4

Reading Co. v. Larkin, 114 F. 2d 416 (CCA 3) 4,5

Reliance Life Insurance Co. v. Burgess, 112 F. 2d,

234, 241, cert. den.; 311 U.S. 699, 85 L. Ed. 453 4

Sacramento Suburban Fruit Lands Co. v. Parker

(CCA 9) 36 F. 2d 926 4

Sparf v. U. S., 156 U.S. 51, 39 L. Ed. 343, * 8

Union Oil Co. of California v. Hunt, 111 F. 2d 269,

278 (CCA 9) 6

Williams v. United States, 93 F. 2d 685

TABLE OF STATUTES CITED

Act of April 22, 1908, as amended, 35 Stat. 65 et

seq.; U.S. Code Title 45, Secs. 51-59 3

Federal Employers Liability Act 3

28 U. S. C. Sec. 1254 (1)

—

iii

TABLE OF TEXT BOOKS CITED

Annotation, 130 A. L. R. 978 7

26 Tulane Law Review 375 7

30 Virginia Law Review 87, 90 5

7

4

VI Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd ed., Sec. 1722

VI Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd ed., Secs. 1714, 1715,

1788, 1789

Supreme Court of the United States

No.

LOUISIANA & ARKANSAS RAILWAY COMPANY,

Petitioner and Appellant Below,

versus

MACK HENRY JOHNSON,

Respondent and Appellee Below.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.

To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associates Justices

of the Supreme Court of the United States:

Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Company, petitioner,

prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judg-

ment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit, entered in the above entitled case on June 30,

1954.

1

CITATION OF OPINIONS BELOW

There is no report of an opinion of the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana in

this matter.

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit’ is reported in 214 F. 2d 290.

1 Appendix A.

my 7

II.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

(i) The decree sought to be reviewed was entered

June 30, 1954.

(ii) Application for rehearing was filed July 20,

-1954, and denied July 30, 1954. An order to stay the

mandate for sixty days from July 29, 1954, was entered

August 6, 1954.

(iii) The statutory provision that confers on this

court jurisdiction to review the decree in question, by

writ of certiorari, is 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1254 (1).

III.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the trial court should permit plaintiff

to testify to what he was told an hour and a half prior

to the accident in question by a party since deceased

(being the only testimony on the subject) to justify and

explain his violation of railroad operating rules, which

if enforced, would have averted the head-on collision of

two passenger trains, in which he was allegedly injured.

2. Whether a trial court may properly exclude the

record of plaintiff’s service over a period of thirty years,

showing frequent reprimands and four dismissals for

cause, which petitioner sought to introduce in refutation

of plaintiffs contention that he was a good employee,

dismissed without cause, and in support of medical testi-

mony that consideration of a pre-traumatic personality

was of great importance in determining the existence and

extent of the traumatic neurosis allegedly suffered by

plaintiff.

Yr

3

3. Whether a number of physicians should be per-

mitted to repeat on the witness stand what plaintiff told

them about the aceident itself.

IV.

THE STATUTES INVOLVED

This case was based upon Act of April 22, 1908, as

amended, 35 Stat. 65 et seq.; U.S. Code Title 45, Secs.

51-59.

V.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND REASONS

RELIED ON FOR ALLOWANCE OF WRIT

A.

Improper Admission of Hearsay Evidence

The accident in question occurred as a result of the

violation of operating rules by one or more of appellant’s

employees on the northbound train involved in the col-

lision. Petitioner contends that the accident would not

have occurred had plaintiff obeyed the applicable rule.“

Plaintiff was permitted to testify over petitioner’s ob-

jection* that the conductor had told him an hour and a

half previously,“ that the trainmaster, in violation of the

2 Federal Employers in on which

3 The northbound train on which plain was the rear Let gee

was required by the time table to take a siding so n

the track ten minutes before 3 train was dn Rule 90

Foaling that if the Engineer and Conductor do not ai dag of the

466, 469, all of which is summarized in the second paragraph of 2

opinion an at th the eo Court herein (Appendix A).

saint EPP; 418 to 418 Conversation occurred at Essen just after the

stopped at 5:26 A.M. . „

ool wander te p. 61). The accident occurred at 7:02 A.M. Tr. p. 120.

—

rules, was operating the train by use of the train radio

in the locomotive, and that because of this conversation

he did not take steps to stop the train pursuant to the

rules, which would have averted the collision. The con-

ductor had been killed in the same accident in which

plaintiff was allegedly injured.“

The Appellate Court held the hearsay evidence of

which petitioner complains, to be admissible as a verbal

act. Mr. Justice Minton, in considering a similar ques-

tion took the contrary view.“

This Court denied certiorari in a case which repro-

bated as prejudicial error the admission of hearsay evi-

dence not within one of the recognized and established

exceptions and held that the basis for the exclusion of

hearsay lies in the fact that it is not subject to the fear

of perjury or the tests ordinarily applied to the ascer-

tainment of truth by cross-examination, which is essential

to the administration of justice.“

The Appellate Court, in deciding the case at bar,

relied on a text, not appropriate, and two cases.“ In

the first of the cases the evidence was admitted under

a specific statute, and was therefore not applicable,

6 Request for admission No. 21, and answer, Tr. pp. 36, 59. See

also Tr. 11 314.

7 Hill v. A. J. Canfield Co., 157 F. 2d 849 (CCA 7).

8 Reliance Life Insurance Co. v. Burgess, 112 F. 2d 234, cert. den.;

311 U.S. 699, 85 L. Ed. 453.

Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 708, 57 L. Ed. 820, 1035;

Cucullu v. Hernandez, 103 U.S. 104, 26 L. Ed. 322. See also Gomila, et

al v United States, 146 F. 2d 372 (CCA 5); Quercia v. United States,

289 U.S. 466, 470, 77 L. Ed. 1321, 1325; Hunter v. United States, 62 F.

2d 217; Sacramento Suburban Fruit Lands Co. v. Parker (CCA 9) 36

F. 2d 926; Mason v. United States, 63 F. 2d 791; Williams v. United

States, 93 F. 2d 685; Moscahlades, et al v. Montagnio, 172 N.Y.S. 332.

10 VI Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed., Secs. 1714, 1715, 1788, 1789;

Petroleum Carrier Corp. v. Snyder, (CCA 5) 161 F. 2d 325; Reading Co.

v. Larkin, (CCA 8) 114 F. 2d 416.

11 Petroleum Carrier Corp. v. Snyder, (CCA 5) 161 F. 2d 325.

—

5

and in the second! it was said that: “The qualifications

which render the incidence of a litigated act admissible

are ‘that they are part of the immediate preparations

for or emanations of such act * * * In any event,

the rule as applied by the Appellate Court has been re-

jected by this Court.“

B.

Exclusion of Plaintiff’s Work Record

Plaintiff, aged 63 at the time of the accident, claimed

that he suffered physical injury and a traumatic neurosis,

which he claims resulted in a loss of potency. The ortho-

pedists, including his own, testified that his injuries,

orthopedically, were minute.“ Defendant sought to in-

troduce plaintiff’s work record,“ and when it was ex-

cluded, entered an offer of proof.“ This evidence was

improperly excluded because:

(a) As plaintiff’s leading psychiatrist ad-

mitted,” a predisposition to nervousness has a

part in the traumatic neurosis, and a person with

a pre-existing nervous condition is much more

likely to suffer such a neurosis. In determining

the existence of a traumatic neurosis, it is neces-

sary to take into account the pre-traumatic per-

sonality."

(b) Petitioner was unable to satisfactorily

meet and answer the impression that plaintiff

endeavored to, and apparently succeeded in con-

veying to the jury, that he was an able, efficient,

loyal employee, steadfast in his devotion to duty.

Such work record was not only important to

12 Reading Co. v. Larkin, (CCA 3) 114 F. 2d 416.

13 See Note 9 supra.

14 Tr. pp. 278, 237, 892.

5 age ot to 479 and 571 to 576, 9 herein as Appendix B.

r. p

17 Tr. p. 524.

18 30 Va. Law Review 87, 90.

6

show plaintiff’s pre-traumatic personality but also

to refute the false impression that was created

in the minds of the jury as to the efficiency and

capabilities of this man. It shows that he was

reprimanded or given demerits for responsibility

in connection with accidents on ten occasions prior

to the accident in question. He was dismissed

from service for cause and re-employed four times

before the accident in question. On the last

occasion his dismissal from service was for vio-

lation of Rule G“, which, as was shown by the

offer of proof,“ was the rule which prohibited

the use of intoxicating liquors on duty.

The magnitude of the award could only have

resulted from a misconception by the jury of the

extent of plaintiff's alleged injuries. We respect-

fully submit that the exclusion of this important

evidence, which was properly admissible in view

of the contention of plaintiff that he had suffered

a traumatic neurosis and was improperly dis-

charged without cause” after thirty years of con-

tinuous service, was a grievous blow to peti-

tioner, and grossly improper.

This Court has said that courts should be

careful in the administration of the law of evi-

dence not to shut out the truth; that facts

proved by way of circumstantial evidence may be

explained by the defense;* and that if evidence

conduces in any reasonable degree to establish the

improbability of the fact in controversy, it should

go to the jury.”

19 Tr. p. 575.

20 P. Ex. 26, Tr. pp. 403, 404, 428.

21 Tr. p. 403.

22 Cliquot’s Champagne, 70 U.S. 114, 3 Wall. 114, 18 L. Ed. 116.

23 National Bank of the Metropolis v. Kennedy, 84 U.S. 19, 17 Wall.

19, 21 L. Ed. 554.

24 Home Ins. Co. v. Weide, 78 U.S. 438, 11 Wall. 438, 20 L. Ed. 197.

35. Also: Union Oil Co. of California v. Hunt, 111 F. 2d 269, 278 (C. C. A.

7

C.

Admission of Repetitive Hearsay By Physicians

Appellant objected”* to the court permitting several

of the doctors who testified, to recite the history?“ that

plaintiff repeated to them, including certain facts in

connection with the accident, not connected with his

physical condition. As undesirable as this practice is,

when done by one physician, the error is compounded by

the constant repetition. It would be difficult indeed for

a juror to be able to differentiate between fact and un-

supported statements which were constantly reiterated

by responsible individuals, who in fact were only repeat-

ing what plaintiff told them. As Dr. Connelly said,”

the stories told by plaintiff to each of these doctors had

a parrot-like similarity, and we respectfully submit that

a constant repetition of a statement creates a tendency

on the part of the hearer to believe it to be true. In this

instance and under these circumstances, we believe that

it was material error for the court to have permitted

these eminent members of the medical profession to re-

peatedly recite plaintiff’s story.

This Court, in an identical case, said that it should

appear beyond a doubt that the error complained of did

not and could not prejudice the rights of the party ob-

jecting.* The reception of such testimony has been

repeatedly reprobated by the courts.” The Appellate

25 Tr. pp. 202, 203.

26 Tr. pp. 203, 212, 213, 225, 506, 766, 767.

27 Tr. p. 685.

5 and Albany R. R. Co. v. OReilly, 158 U.S. 334, 39 L. Ed.

29 Deery v. Cray, 72 U.S. 5 Wall. 795, 18 L. Ed. 653; Gilmer v.

Higley, 110 U.S. 47, 28 L. Ed. 62; Flannagan v. Provident L. & A. Ins.

Co., 22 F. 2d 136 (C.C.A. 4, 1927); Altmayer v. Travelers Protective

Ass’n of America, 119 F. 2d 1005, 1008; Cardwell v. U. S., 186 F. 2d 382,

386 (C. C. A. 5) Annotation 130 A.L.R. 978; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v.

Garwood, 167 F. 2d 848 (C. C. A. 8); VI Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd ed.

Sec. 1722; 26 Tulane Law Review 375.

8

Court in its opinion, said that the testimony was not

objected to on the ground that it was hearsay. The ob-

jection read as follows:

“We would like to note an objection to the

doctor reading into the record each time what the

plaintiff told him.”

The word hearsay was not used, but to object to a

recitation of what plaintiff told the witness can be noth-

ing but an objection to hearsay. This Court decided in

an identical case that the objection to hearsay was im-

plicit in the one made.“

We therefore respectfully submit that the rule ap-

plied by the Appellate Court was incorrect, and the rea-

son given therefor erroneous.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner respectfully submits that the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in the

respects above mentioned, has so far sanctioned a de-

parture by the trial court from the accepted and usual

course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise

of this Court’s power of supervision.

Respectfully submitted,

M. TRUMAN WOODWARD, JR.,

Attorney for Louisiana &

Arkansas Railway Company,

Petitioner.

JOSEPH R. BROWN,

ELIZABETH R. HAAK,

MILLING, SAAL, SAUNDERS,

BENSON & WOODWARD,

Of Counsel.

30 Sparf v. U. S., 156 U.S. 51, 39 L. Ed. 343, 345. See also Carver

v. United States, 160 U.S. 553, 40 L. Ed. 532; Nudd v. Burrows, 91

U.S. 426, 23 L. Ed. 286.

9

APPENDIX A

In The

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For The Fifth Circuit

No. 14970

LOUISIANA & ARKANSAS RAILWAY COMPANY,

Appellant,

versus

MACK HENRY JOHNSON,

Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Louisiana.

(June 30, 1954.)

Before HUTCHESON, Chief Judge, RIVES, Circuit

Judge, and DAWKINS, District Judge.

RIVES, Circuit Judge: In an action under the Fed-

eral Employer’s Liability Act,’ appellee recovered a judg-

ment on a jury’s verdict in the amount of $28,000.00 for

personal injuries suffered in a collision between two of

the appellant’s trains at a point 1.67 miles north of

Lettsworth, Louisiana, on August 10, 1951. Appellee was

the rear brakeman on a troop train running northward

when it collided head on with a streamlined passenger

train traveling southward. The trainmaster who was

riding on the northbound train and the other four mem-

bers of the crew of that train and eight other persons

145 U.S.C.A. 51-59.

10

were killed and 69 injured in the collision. Appellee was

riding on the rear platform of the last car and jumped

just before the impact.

Under the rules of the railroad, the northbound train

should have taken a siding so that it would clear the

time of the southbound train by at least 10 minutes. The

rules further provided that, if the train did not take

such siding, the conductor would take immediate action

to stop the train, and the firemen, brakemen and other

members of the crew would also be held responsible for

failure to take immediate action to stop the train. The

last siding that the northbound train could have taken

so as to clear the time of the southbound train by as

much as 10 minutes was at Batchelor, Louisiana, ap-

proximately 6.9 miles south of Lettsworth. There was

also a switch track at Lettsworth onto which the train

might have been moved in time to avoid the accident,

but not in time to clear the full 10 minutes pursuant to

the rules.

Appellee contended that the collision occurred as a

result of the negligence of the trainmaster who was rid-

ing on the engine of the northbound train and, accord-

ing to appellee, had taken over its operations; and, if not

from the sole negligence of the trainmaster, then as a

result also of the concurring negligence of the engineer

and conductor of the northbound train. Appellant as-

serted as a defense that the appellee was guilty of negli-

gence which was the sole cause of the collision, or in the

alternative in diminution of damages that the appellee

was guilty of contributory negligence. The appellant also

denied that the injuries received by the appellee were

serious and claimed that his only injury was a sprained

ankle.

11

On this appeal the appellant complains of the refusal

of one of its requested instructions to the jury, that a

part of the charge to the jury was erroneous, that the

court made erroneous rulings on the evidence, permitted

improper argument by appellee's counsel, made erroneous

statements prejudicial to the appellee, and in general did

not conduct the trial with the air of impartiality to

which every litigant is entitled.

The instruction refused read as follows:

Where a trainman has a personal duty to

perform under the operating rules of the defend-

ant railroad and fails in that duty, as a result of

which he is injured, he is not entitled to recover

under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act, not-

withstanding the fact that it was also the duty

of other members of the crew to watch for an ap-

proaching train with which his train collided, and

that their negligence may have contributed in a

proximate way to the injury of the plaintiff.”

As requiring the giving of this instruction, appel-

lant cites the cases of Unadilla Ry. Co. v. Caldine, 278

U.S. 189, and Southern Ry. Co. v. Youngblood, 286 U.S.

313, to which we may add the case of Davis v. Kennedy,

266 U.S. 147. All of these cases were decided before

the 1989 amendment to the Federal Employer’s Liability

Act, now brought forward as 45 U.S.C.A. 54, did away

with the defense of assumption of risk. At that time,

the so-called “primary duty rule” was applied to the

conductor in Unadilla Ry. Co. v. Caldine, supra, and

Southern Ry. Co. v. Youngblood, supra, and to the engi-

neer in Davis v. Kennedy, supra. Following the enact-

ment of the 1939 amendment, the Supreme Court held

that “every vestige of the doctrine of assumption of risk

was obliterated from the law” and that the “primary

12

duty rule” in Unadilla Ry. Co. v. Caldine, supra, and

Davis v. Kennedy, supra, had been “swept into discard”.

Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 58,

63, 64. Since that decision, in cases arising under the

Federal Employer’s Liability Act, even the engineer has

been held not barred by the “primary duty rule“, At-

lantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Mangum, 34 So. 2d 848;

Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Anderson, 38 S.E. 2d 610,

see also Keith v. Wheeling & L.E. Ry. Co., 6th Cir., 160

F. 2d 654, 657. We hold, therefore, that there was no

error on the part of the district court in refusing to give

the appellant’s requested charge, nor in the part of its

oral charge on the same subject; but that, to the con-

trary, the court probably charged the jury more favor-

ably to the appellant than it was entitled in submitting

to the jury the issue of whether the appellee’s negligence

was the sole proximate cause of the accident.

We have carefully examined the record in this case,

and, while it may be that the learned district judge at

times showed some impatience or irritation with the

claim of a total defense which did not exist in point of

law, we are further impressed with his fairness, and we

cannot sustain the appellant’s contention that its case

was prejudiced by any claimed unfair manner in which

the trial was conducted. No objection was taken to any

of the remarks complained of and we have no further

occasion to consider such remarks. Dowell, Inc. v. Jowers,

5th Cir., 182 F. 2d 576, 579.

The appellee testified that as the northbound train

was going around the curve on which the collision oc-

cured, he was leaning out looking forward on the train

for possible “hot boxes” when he noticed the southbound

train and the imminence of the collision. Someone had

13

applied the emergency brakes before he could do so. Ac-

cordingly, he jumped, did a double somersault and hit

the ground. The appellee was between 63 and 64 years

of age. His physical injuries at the time did not seem

serious and did not prevent his performance of his flag-

ging duties nor his getting back to Lettsworth to notify

the dispatcher of the tragic accident. He was, however,

hospitalized after the accident and several reputable psy-

chiatrists testified that he had suffered a severe nervous

shock, a traumatic neurosis, which in their opinion per-

manently and totally disabled him and also rendered him

nervous, depressed and impotent. The claim that the

verdict was for an excessive amount does not present a

question for re-examination here. Atlantic Coast Line

R. Co. v. Burkett, 5th Cir., 192 F. 2d 941, 945, and cases

there cited.

Appellant strenuously insists that the court erred in

permitting the appellee, over the appellant’s objection,

to relate his conversation with the conductor, afterward

killed in the accident, when the northbound train stopped

a few miles south of Baton Rouge. The train was due

to take a siding at Essen, Louisiana, for still another

train of the defendant known as No. 9, which was a

superior train and had the clearance and right-of-way

over the northbound train. Instead, the train passed the

siding at Essen and later stopped, at which time Mr.

B. T. Moore, the trainmaster, used the radio equipment

to contact the appellant’s operator at Baton Rouge and

to order that No. 9, the superior train, remain in the

station until the northbound train had arrived. Over

the appellant’s objection, the appellee was permitted to

testify that he asked the conductor, who was later killed

in the accident, why the northbound train did not stop

at Essen, and was told by the conductor that the train-

14

master was with the engineer at the head of the train,

had a radio and was running the train up there, and

that they knew what they were doing, but the conductor

did not. That conversation, we think, was admissible as

circumstantial evidence going to show the method of

operation of the train on this fatal journey by the train-

master. It was really a verbal act relevant to be con-

sidered in determining the negligence vel non and the

degree thereof on the part of the conductor and also on

the part of the appellee. VI Wigmore on Evidence, 3d.

ed., Sections 1714, 1715, 1788, 1789; Petroleum Carrier

Corp. v. Snyder, 5th Cir., 161 F. 2d 325; Reading Co.

v. Larkin, 3d. Cir., 114 F. 2d 416.

Appellant insists that the district court erred in not

admitting appellee’s work record kept by the appellant

and which showed various infractions of the rules by

the appellee during the course of his employment from

1919 to 1951. The appellant contends that the work

record is material and relevant to the issue of whether

or not the appellee had a pre-existing neurotic condition.

It would, no doubt, have been proper for the skilled phy-

chiatrists to take that word record into consideration in

diagnosing the appellee’s condition and the cause thereof,

but very clearly, we think, the record without explana-

tory evidence would have been of no help to the jury.

The trial, which consumed five days time, probably

would have been extended over several days more in tak-

ing evidence as to each of the particular charges, de-

merits and reprimands shown in this work record. There

was no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in

excluding it.

Appellant urges that the district court erred in per-

mitting several of the doctors who testified to recite the

15

history that appellee repeated to them. The appellant

did not object to such history as given by the first doctor

who testified, but did object to its continued repetition.

Evidence as to what a patient has told a doctor for the

purpose of medical treatment is admissible as an excep-

tion to the hearsay rule. United States v. Calvey, 3d.

Cir., 110 F. 2d 327, 330. Such evidence may not be

admissible if made by a patient to a physician not for

the purpose of treatment but to qualify the physician to

testify as an expert witness. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.

v. Dixon, 5th Cir., 207 F. 2d 899, 903. The testimony

was not, however, objected to on that ground, but the

sole complaint was to the repetition of appellee’s state-

ments, a matter resting, we think, within the sound dis-

cretion of the district judge.

Appellant’s investigation in preparing its defense

included placing the appellee under the surveillance of

a detective, who admitted on cross-examination that he

tried to induce the appellee to drink alcoholic liquors

when the appellee had expressed a preference for soft

drinks. There was also evidence that appellant’s chief

surgeon, at the direction of its vice-president, had repri-

manded its division surgeon for giving the appellee a

statement to the Railroad Retirement Board that he

needed retirement on account of shock and injury to his

ankle. Appellee’s counsel, in arguing the case to the

jury, stated in part: “Now in this case you will note that

the plaintiff was dealing with a very, very resourceful

defendant; a defendant which in many respects would

stop at nothing; a very resourceful defendant.” The

district court overruled appellant’s objection to this argu-

ment. In the part of the argument immediately preced-

ing, counsel for the appellee had commented on the

employment and conduct of the private detective and

16

immediately following he commented on the reprimand

to the doctor. We cannot say, under the circumstances

of this case, that the district court abused its discretion

in overruling the objection to this argument. That was

the only objection made to the argument which is set out

in full in the transcript, and which, as a whole, was a

fair though vigorous presentation of the issues. Finding

no error in the record, the judgment is

AFFIRMED.

APPENDIX B

TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD OF EMPLOYEES

I PR-4166 12-15-19

Name JOHNSON - MACK MARY Social Security No._703-18-2572

! — Birthplace__Wekefield, Louisiana.

rane MAME Ax Location oF DESCRIPTION, — wa

If any relatives in service of this Company

Color Hair?. Mak ce names:

i Identifying Meret les |___

ford

nation

t.rasponsibility for 5

1 injury. to.

Wright

n 4 nspected fin » od oO:

bility in accident, IAA IZ088 co

8

COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER

1 Ä o

APPENDIX B

7-16-84 - J&A Transportation Rules examination - Certificate $66. ;

8-19-36 - Reprimenied for his responsibility in accident, cars knocked over derail, An

Trein #51, 8-1-36. AXL-2556. 1

12- 8-36 - Reprimanded for his responsibility in sceifdent, EAMV crossing gate orcken 6

Sibley by Extre 552 North, November 26, 1936. 4

- Participated in strike of Train, Y,ri and “nginemen.

- Returned to service strike settled.

11-23-36 - Issued Switch Key 75488 in exchange for old key #3866-S.

1-14-37 »“ rating on physical examination.

6-12-37 - 5 demerits for failure to have watch inspected first period January, 195%.

716-38 - Relieved from service for inattention to his duties and passengers, Train fy

Shreveport, 8-15-38, “visiting” with otéer negroes standing around on stati

platform and feiling to comply with instructions of Superintendent to pey

to his work.

7-27-38 - Re-instated.

8-29-38 - 5 for his responsibility in accident, main line switch run thre

N in #4, 8-1-3868, Packton. 3228.

8-23-39 - Relieved from service as Porter on Trains 2-3 and 4-1 account failure to 5

perform duties as train porter; permitted to go back in freight service on

41, Shreveport to filston, and 42, Filston via Minden to Shreveport.

10-10-39 - 5 demerits for failure to have watch inspected second period May, 1959. 8

2-23-40 - Instructed to report to hier surgeon for physical examination before March

1940. a

3-11-40 - Heported for physical re-examination - Given —1 rating account eyes need

checking, teeth need attention and needs re-vaccination. Instructed to

attended to immediately.

4-19-40 - Dismisse@ from service for villetion of “yle d and gbsenting himself from

without permission, April 14, 1940. 2

10-17-40 - he- employed ad Brakeman - “ew Orleans, Louisiane. Issued the following ¢ n

property: IAA switch Key #5881; T&P Switch Key #9606; In Rule cook #1016;

Rule ook #3280. / 3-19-41 Passed Ter Rules Exam. issued Certificate 10.

10- 7-41 - Passed IAA Transportation Department Rules examination - Certificate Nos 40 —

9 9-42 - 5 demerits forfailure to have vatch inspecged during second period April, 1

4- 1-43 Ns demerits for feilure to have watch inspected second period

1942 and 5 demerits for not answering correspogdence.

9- 7-43 - Complaint from White Sydtem of New Orlesns, inc., for balance of §56.44 dus

thea. 5

2-25-45 - 5 Demerits for his responsibility in accident 10: 10 . u., Jamery 4, 108,

NO. 35, Sngine 508, when C&O 11360, empty box, wes sideswiped by 1&NO 543525

43232 at North end of 014 Pass. AX-6996. .

5-25-45 - Issued four large Yrakeman's Suttons ard ‘CS Coach Key, unnumbered.

5-27-45 - Issued IAA Coach Key No. 905 in exchange for coach key turmd in ac

1-15-46 -- Qualified on Transportation Rules,

2 8-47 -_25 Demerits, Responsibility AX-7742, Lobdell, Train #37, 1/21/47.

6-17-48 - 5 Demerits, Watch Inspection Failure, March, 1948.

8-20-51 - Digmiaged, as per Supt. R. Norwood's letter that date, file AI-9251, for

— in commection with headon collision between Extre 5li

and 10. 1 near M 738 north of Letteworth, La., August 10, 1951, while

as rear brakeman on Extra 51A North out of New Orleans August 10, 1951.

U. S. DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

FLED SEP g 1953

Dep. Cen

INDEX

PAGE

1

1

2

2

3

13

28

CITATIONS

Cases:

Lehigh V. r America (CCA

24 15440 K Fed. 900, 902 f : 14

Pope v. Allis, 6 Sup. Ct. 69, 115 U.S. 368, 29 L. Ed. 398 (1885) — 14

White v. Mechanics Securities Corporation, 46 Sup. Ct. 116, 269

U.S. 283, 70 L. Ed. 170 (1925) > 14

Hyman v. Wheeler, 29 Fed. 347 (1886) 14

General Electric Company v. Jonathan Clark & Sons, 108 Fed.

170 e 14

vagsstyrelson v. Dexter & Carpenter, 32 F. (2d

ff cc 2nd 1929) satin 14

1455 v. Edward L. Burton & Co., (CCA 10th 1948) 187 F.

* 286 14

v. Continental American Bank & Trust Company, (D. C.

CD ‘La. 1948) 79 F. Supp. 450 14

Petroleum Carrier Corp. v. Snyder, 5th Cir., 161 F. 2d 3258 17

Reading Co. v. Larkin, 3d. Cir., 114 F. 2d 416 17

Coll v. Easton Transit Co., 180 Pa. 618, 626, 37 A. 89, 90 17

Norwich & New York „ v. John 13 Wall.

(U.S.) 3, 2 1. E („ — 18

Bevard v. Bevard, 103 F. Supp. 533 (D.C. D.C. 1952) 19, 27

United States v. Gruber, 128 F. (2d) 307 (2nd Cir. 1941) — 19, 27

ae ge Pa epee of America v. Goodman & Theise, Inc., 153

F. (2d) 284 (8rd Cir. 1946) 19,

Thompson v. Bowie, 4 Wallace 463, 18 L. Ed. 423, 426 (1867)

Lowisville & Nashville R. Co. v. M’Clish, 115 F. 268, 275 (CCA

6th 1902)

Universal Airline v. Eastern Air Lines, 188 F. (2d) 993 (1951)

Good Holding Co. v. Boswell, 173 F. (2d) 395 (CCA, 5th 1949)

Hubech v. United States, 174 F. (2d) 7 (5th CCA, 1949)

Kaufman v. Kaufman, 164 F. (2d) 519 (D.C. C.A. 1947)

Peters v. Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, 107 F.

(2d) 9 (8rd Cir. 1939)

U. S. v. Calvey, 110 F. 2d 327 (8rd Cir. 1940)

Bartkoski v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R. Co., 172 F. 2d 1007 (8rd

Cir. 1949)

Other citations:

VI Wigmore on Evidence, 3d. ed., Sections 1714, 1715, 1788, 1789

8 Wigmore on Evidence, 2d Ed., Section 1720

&5

Supreme Court of the United States

No. 360

LOUISIANA & ARKANSAS RAILWAY COMPANY,

Petitioner,

versus

MACK HENRY JOHNSON.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

BRIEF FOR MACK HENRY JOHNSON

IN OPPOSITION.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at

214 F. (2d) 290.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered

on June 30, 1954, and application for rehearing was

denied on July 30, 1954. The order to stay the mandate

for sixty days from July 29, 1954, was entered on August

6, 1954. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under

28 U.S.C. Sec. 1254 (1). :

2

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the trial court properly permitted plain-

tiff to testify what he was told by the conductor, an

agent of the defendant railroad while in the scope of his

employment, shortly before the accident as to the method

of operation of the defendant railroad, which method of

operation corroborated by other evidence not objected to

was responsible for the accident in which plaintiff was

injured and where the defendant, in cross-examination of

plaintiff and direct examination of defendant’s own wit-

ness, asked questions concerning the same subject matter.

2. Whether the trial court properly exercised its dis-

cretion in excluding hearsay evidence as to alleged past

acts of plaintiff which acts could not possibly have any

bearing on the question of negligence or any other issue

in this case.

3. Whether the trial court properly permitted evi-

dence by doctors as to symptoms of traumatic neurosis

where the only method of showing traumatic neurosis is

by subjective symptoms and where defendant did not

object to such testimony by the first doctor testifying and

where the objection of defendant was based on repetition

and not hearsay and where defendant asked plaintiff's

doctors on cross-examination and defendant’s doctors on

direct examination to reiterate the subjective symptoms

as told them by plaintiff.

STATUTE INVOLVED

This action is under the Act of April 22, 1908, as

amended, 35 Stat. 65 et seq.; U.S. Code Title 45, Sections

51-59 (Federal Employer’s Liability Act).

STATEMENT

This is an action under the Federal Employers Lia-

bility Act (U. S. C. Title 45, Secs. 51-59) to recover

damages for serious personal injuries suffered by the

respondent, Mack Henry Johnson, as a result of the negli-

gence of the petitioner’s employees, other than the re-

spondent, in a collision between two of the petitioner’s

trains (Extra 51-A North and Southern Belle No. 1) at

Lettsworth, Louisiana on August 10, 1951.

Extra 51-A North, as the name implies, was an

extra train which had no regular schedule and it was

inferior to the Southern Belle No. 1, which was operated

on a regular schedule. (Tr. p. 826)

A chart that was introduced in evidence (Pl. 1, Tr.

p. 79) shows the location of the wreck and the relevant

information as to distances and the curvature of the

roadway near the point of collision. The wreck took place

1.67 miles south of Lettsworth, Louisiana. The Southern

Belle No. 1 had a complete crew, all of whom were

killed, and Extra 51-A North, the train on which the

respondent was riding, aside from having a complete

crew, also had aboard B. T. Moore, the trainmaster. The

trainmaster, and all members of that crew, with the

exception of the respondent, were killed.

In the instant case the petitioner asserted as a de-

fense that the respondent was the sole cause of the col-

lision and, in the alternative, that the respondent was

guilty of contributory negligence, which was the proxi-

mate cause of the collision.

On February 11, 1953, Mrs. Irene Booth Moore, sur-

viving widow of B. T. Moore, the trainmaster who was

—

4

aboard Extra 51-A North at the time of the collision,

filed suit against the petitioner in the United States

District Court for the Western District of Louisiana,

Shreveport Division, Civil Action No. 3995, (Pl. 2, Tr.

pp. 40-D to 40-K), and the petitioner filed its answer on

April 11, 1953 (Pl. 2, Tr. pp. 40-K to 40-0). In the

answer filed by the petitioner in the B. T. Moore case,

it set forth that B. T. Moore was solely responsible

for the collision, in answer to paragraph 8 (Pl. 2, Tr.

pp. 40-F and 40-L). Also, in answer to paragraphs 13

and 14, the petitioner denied that the conductor of Extra

51-A North was at fault (Pl. 2, Tr. pp. 40-G and 40-L).

In answer to paragraph 15 (Pl. 2, Tr. pp. 40-G, 40-H,

40-L, and 40-M), the petitioner admitted “ * * * that

the negligence of Benjamin T. Moore, agent, representa-

tive and official of defendant on said train Extra 51-A

in failing to do what he should have done was the cause

of the accident.” In answer to paragraph 16 (Pl. 2, Tr.

pp. 40-H and 40-M) the petitioner denied that the place

given Moore to work was not reasonably safe and

that the operation of the trains was hazardous, except so

for as the said Moore himself made the place furnished

him an unsafe place and made the operation of the trains

hazardous.” In answer to paragraph 18 (Pl. 2, Tr. pp.

40-H, 40-I, and 40-M), the petitioner admitted that

through its employees it was operating the two trains

referred to in the complaint, and in particular, it admits

that through its agent, representative and official, Ben-

jamin T. Moore, it was in control of Extra 51A;

In paragraph 27 (Pl. 2, Tr. p. 40-N) the petitioner al-

leges “that the collision between the two trains referred

to in the complaint was due solely to the negligence of

Benjamin T. Moore, respondent’s deceased, in failing to

perform his responsibilities and duties to see that the

operating rules and special rules and instructions in the

5

movement of train Extra 51-A North were complied

with. Such duties were his responsibility and only his

responsibility. To perform them was the reason that

Trainmaster Moore was instructed to ride this train.

These duties and responsibilities could not be delegated

by him to members of the crew.” In paragraph 28 (Pl.

2, Tr. p. 40-N) the petitioner plead in the alternative in

the Moore case that if the petitioner was guilty of any

negligence in the operation of Extra 51-A North because

of the actions of any of its employees, he was barred

from recovery on the ground of contributory negligence

of Benjamin T. Moore in failing to perform his duties

as set out in paragraph 27 of its answer; and, alter-

natively, it plead that because of Moore’s contributory

negligence, the damages that could be recovered should

be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence

attributable to Moore.

Thus, in an action in the Federal Court by the widow

of the Trainmaster who was aboard Extra 51-A North

at the time of the collision, the petitioner asserted af-

firmatively that Moore was the sole and only person

responsible for the collision and the answer in that suit

was filed subsequent to the petitioner’s answer in the

instant case wherein it set forth the alleged negligence

of the respondent.

On August 10, 1951, Extra 51-A North departed

from the West Yard, New Orleans, Louisiana, at about

3:15 a.m. (Tr. p. 406) On Board was the trainmaster,

B. T. Moore, (Tr. pp. 303, 304, 404) whom the crew con-

sidered and recognized as the boss. (Tr. p. 411) No

train order was valid unless it bore the initial “B.T.M.”.

(Tr. pp. 308, 304, 828-A) The conductor (Tr. p. 404),

the skipper of the train, the engineer, (Tr. p. 405) the

front brakeman (Tr. p. 405), the fireman, (Tr. p. 405)

and the respondent were aboard. Also aboard was J. W.

Sandifer, (Tr. p. 405) passenger representative of the

petitioner (Tr. p. 291), who reported only to the presi-

dent of the Company. (Tr. pp. 291, 292) In New Orleans

it was decided that since B. T. Moore was going to ride

in the cab with the engineer, (Tr. pp. 294, 295) that

the conductor would ride the rear of the train. (Tr.

p. 294)

Before Extra 51-A North left the West Yard at

New Orleans, B. T. Moore had a conversation with the

telegraph operator. Moore told the operator to tell the

dispatcher to give an order in reference to another train,

not involved in this collision, which order was given.

Moore also called the operator at Simmesport and told

him to have his watch card and things ready so that he

could inspect them. Moore was in possession of the

Simmesport operator’s watch, that had been cleaned, and

he was going to hand it to the operator as the train

passed Simmesport. (Tr. p. 122).

When the Extra 51-A North was a short distance

from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, there was a train owned

and operated by the petitioner, known as No. 9, which

was a superior train and had the clearance and right

of way over Extra 51-A North. (Tr. pp. 296, 297, 298)

Under the rules of the petitioner, Extra 51-A North

should have taken a siding at Essen, Louisiana. (Tr. pp.

297, 298, 299) Instead of taking the siding at Essen,

B. T. Moore passed Essen and later stopped and he then

used the radio equipment and contacted the petitioner’s

operator at Baton Rouge, ordering that No. 9, the su-

perior train, remain in the station unti] Extra 51-A

North had arrived. (Tr. pp. 333, 334)

7

When Extra 51-A North left Baton Rouge and New

Roads, B. T. Moore was aboard and in the cab of the

engine. (Tr. p. 295) Extra 51-A North should have

stopped at Batchelor, Louisiana, and taken a siding be-

cause there was insufficient time under the schedule to

clear the superior train, Southern Belle No. 1 (Tr. pp.

822, 823)

Near Baton Rouge, Mack Johnson wanted to know

why Extra 51-A North did not stop at Essen, and he was

told by the conductor that the trainmaster was

at the head end, with Yates, with a radio and he was

running it up there and he didn’t know what they were

doing. We didn’t have a radio on the hind end. There

wasn’t any radio back there. All in my power was to

do to call the attention of the conductor when he was

with and tell him of these things. He didn’t stop the

train, and I couldn’t take over stopping the train because

I am not a conductor, but I was following the rules; to

take instructions from the conductor, or help in notifying

him any time of these things when he was with me, and

I did it.” (Tr. pp. 414, 415; Rule 107).

Further, the conductor told Mack Johnson that “* * *

the trainmaster was on the head end of the train; and

he didn’t pull the air. The trainmaster was on the head

end running it, with a radio up there, and they knew

what they were doing, and he didn’t pull no cord. I

called his attention to it.” (Tr. pp. 414, 415).

Just before Extra 51-A North arrived at New Roads,

on the back platform, the conductor told Mack Johnson

to “watch the order board at New Roads * * for just

a few minutes * I am going towards the head end.

You watch this end closely and watch the board at

8

Morganza. I am going as far as I can for No. 1, and

you stay back here and watch close; check on the order

board at Morganza.” (Tr. pp. 416, 417).

About the time that the Southern Belle No. 1 was

due out of Alexandria, the telegraph operator for the

petitioner at Alexandria, Louisiana, spoke to the engi-

neer of another train, not involved in the collision, Extra

56-A North, who was then located near Simmesport,

setting forth that the Southern Belle No. 1 was eight

minutes late leaving Alexandria. (Tr. pp. 123, 124, 353,

854). No one knows whether B. T. Moore and Yates,

on Extra 51-A North heard this conversation.

Extra 56-A North reached Bijou at approximately

5:45 A.M. August 10, 1951, (Tr. p. 354) and about 5:50

A.M., the engineer heard someone who identified him-

self as Simmesport call Extra 51-A North. Southern

Belle No. 1 passed right by Extra 56-A North at ap-

proximately 6:25 A.M. The engineer, Jimmy F. Mims,

on Extra 56-A North, waved at Engineer Rainey on

No. 1 and tried by radio to communicate with him but

got no response. Between 6:53, 4, 5 and 7:00 A.M. the

engineer on Extra 56-A North heard an urgent call,

stating “Extra 51-A North; Simmesport calling Extra

51-A North.” Then the engineer heard the call from

Simmesport to Extra 51-A North saying “Yes, sir,” “No,

Sir” or “All right, sir.” (Tr. pp. 353-368).

Near the time of the wreck, as Mack Johnson testi-

fied, “ * * * there was no one back there but me, but

with the instructions from the conductor to stay back

there and watch that hind end, that he was going as far

as he could go for No. 1, and after we got on past Letts-

worth I noticed the time. But they kept going. They

9

all were on the head end somewhere. I know he left

me and told me that's where he was going. He had been

using the radio and I knowed it was complicated. I

figured they knowed what they was doing. I didn’t

have nothing back there to do but try to watch the hind

end as flagman. We were going around that curve,

and I was looking around that curve, and then I saw

this No. 1 coming around there. He was making an

effort to stop. By the time I reached for the chord the

brakes had been applied on and reduced the speed of

the train. I stayed until I seed they were going to

together and I tried to get off the best way I could. By

doing so that is where I injured myself. * * * (r.

pp. 418, 419).

Thus at approximately 7:02 A.M. on August 10,

1951, a collision took place (Tr. p. 418), and as the

petitioner itself alleged in the Moore case, it was solely

and only caused by B. T. Moore. Surely, the jury was

correct in finding that the respondent could have done

nothing to prevent the accident in view of the superior

authority aboard and all of the other circumstances.

As the Extra 51-A North was going around the

fatal curve, the respondent, following his usual instruc-

tions and procedure, was looking for hot-boxes (Tr. p.

418) and noted he saw No. 1 and the terrifying sight

(Tr. p. 419) of the oncoming collision. After doing

everything possible he did a “double summerset” and hit

the ground. (Tr. p. 437)

The respondent was then treated for a very long

period of time by Dr. Henry Leidenheimer, who had

been Division Surgeon for the Louisiana and Arkansas

Railway Company Hospital Association for approxi-

10

mately forty-two years. (Tr. p. 129) Further, the

doctor’s son was the Asst. Division Surgeon. (Pl. 3; Tr.

pp. 131, 182). Paul Sippel served as Vice-President of

the petitioner and as Chairman of the Board of the

Hospital Association. (Tr. p. 130)

The original card, Dr. Leidenheimer’s (Pl. 4, Tr.

p. 140, 967) showed that among other ailments, the re-

spondent suffered from nervous shock. (Tr. pp. 138,

139). Further, he had on many occasions certified that

the respondent was suffering from ailments including

shock and was totally disabled. He did this as late as

January 25, 1953. (Nat. Life 1-26, Tr. p. 127, Pl. 27,

28, Tr. p. 430; Tr. pp. 125-127, 140, 141, 151, 152).

This petitioner's physician was so fearful of his position

that he said that he would not make a statement or

testify as to anything that would hurt the petitioner in

litigation, even though he was under oath. (Pl. 5, Tr. p.

145, Pl. 6, Tr. p. 147, Tr. pp. 156, 157). An insight as

to how Dr. Leidenheimer felt will appear from the follow-

ing two exhibits (Pl. 5, Tr. p. 145, Pl. 6, Tr. p. 147).

Plaintiff 5: (p. 145)

“Shreveport, La., May 23, 1953.

“Dr. Henry Leidenheimer,

Audubon Building,

New Orleans, Louisiana.

“Mr. Sippel contacted me yesterday and

wanted to know why you gave Mack Henry John-

son, Brakeman who was injured in the collision

at Lettsworth, a statement to the railroad Retire-

ment Board that he needs retirement on account

of ‘shock and injury to his ankle.’ Inasmuch as

there is some litigation still pending concerning

this accident, we feel that it is an official ad-

mission of you, as Division Surgeon, to give such

11

a written recommendation and Mr. Sippel asks

that you drop me a line concerning same at your

earliest convenience, in order that we may get the

correct impression of the matter.

“Thanking you for your promptness in at-

tending to this as you did for my request con-

cerning Mr. Mills, (for which I thank you) I am

s/ A. A. Herold, Sr.,

Sincerely,

Chief Surgeon.

AAH:h

ec: Mr. P. Sippel”

Plaintiff 6: (p. 146)

“May 30, 1953.

Dr. A. A. Herold

Shreveport, La.

The communication of recent date received

and carefully perused. It smacks of Nazism

whereby a person is considered guilty on hearsay

evidence of rumor in contrast to the American

way, a man is innocent until proven otherwise.

This tale is fantastic and as for the Railroad

Retirement Board acting on my recommendation

it is hoey, for they wouldn't care a d-

The allegation is so vague, inexplicit and

lacks substantiation that I am impelled to ask,

did Mr. Sippel see such a recommendation over

my signature? I too would like to see this paper.

I must confess that I do not recall every

incident that has occurred in the past three years,

and my railroad correspondence is too volumingus

to maintain a perfect filing system.

As regards ‘official admission’, I have al-

ways been scrupulously careful not to do anything

inimical to best interest of the railroad. In fact

the attorneys for Johnson had requested a state-

ment of his injuries and my answer to them was

12

that I did not regard it as proper to do so. Any

information of such nature must come from the

Chief Surgeon or the Claim Agent.

I was called down before by the Chief Sur-

geon for treating Johnson at the association’s

expense after he was fired, notwithstanding I

had not been notified of his dismissal I still con-

tinued to treat him for, here again, for obvious

reasons it would serve the company best.

If (?) I have inadvertently made such a

recommendation, I am man enough to admit hav-

ing done so, but I must have the proof.

Sincerely,

ec: Mr. Sipple”

Of course, Dr. Leidenheimer could not deny his find-

ings, so the petitioner was in a position where the man

it controlled could not help it, regardless of his desire.

(Tr. pp. 129-177)

The testimony of the physchiatrists and Dr. Manuel

Gardberg (Tr. p. 179 et seq.) is clear in showing the

serious illness of the respondent (Tr. pp. 202, 255, 505).

Dr. Bick, the psychiatrist, chosen by the petitioner, but

later put on the stand by the respondent, substantiated

the respondent’s physicians. (Tr. pp. 202-210) After the

petitioner did not receive its desired result from Dr.

Bick it repudiated him (Tr. pp. 18-B-18-D) and asked

the Court to cause the plaintiff to be examined by an-

other psychiatrist. This psychiatrist disagreed with the

other doctors (Tr. p. 678). From a medical standpoint

the evidence was clear and the jury understood every-

thing.

The petitioner felt it necessary to attempt to im-

peach the testimony of the respondent. This was at-

13

tempted relative to immaterial issues and by the shameful

testimony by Willie Webb (Tr. pp. 770-810) and Dave

Mitchell (Tr. pp. 718-726). A review of this testimony

will serve no purpose since we submit that when this

Honorable Court reads their testimony, it will have the

same reaction as the Jury.

The trial lasted five days and the facts were brought

out clearly. The Jury had full knowledge of every aspect

of the case.

The Jury returned a verdict in the amount of

$28,000 (Tr. p. 78). On appeal to the Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit, the judgment was affirmed (214

F. (2d) 290). Petition for rehearing was thereafter

denied.

ARGUMENT

1.

The petitioner complains that the respondent was

permitted to testify as to what he had been told by the

deceased conductor as to how the train was being oper-

ated by the trainmaster. (Tr. pp. 413, 414).

Petitioner sets forth in its brief that it con-

tends that the accident would not have occurred had re-

spondent obeyed the applicable rule .” (Petitioner’s

Br. p. 8). It should be noted that in the case filed by

Mrs. Irene Booth Moore, widow of B. T. Moore, the train-

master who was aboard: Extra 51-A North, which suit

was filed in the Western District of Louisiana, the Peti-

tioner in its answer affirmatively set forth that the sole

cause of the accident was the conduct of B. T. Moore

(Pl. 2; Tr. pp. 40-G, 40-H, 40-L, 40-M, and 40-N). The

affirmative allegations contained in the petitioner’s an-

14

swer filed in the Western District, subsequent to the

filing of its answer in the instant case, were never

rebutted. In fact the record shows that they were proven.

See Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Allied Machinery Co. of

America (CCA 2nd 1921) 271 Fed. 900, 902; Pope v.

Allis, 6 Sup. Ct. 69, 115 U.S. 363, 29 L. Ed. 393 (1885) ;

White v. Mechanics Securities Corporation, 46 Sup. Ct.

116, 269 U.S. 283, 70 L. Ed. 170 (1925); Hyman v.

Wheeler, 29 Fed. 347 (1886); General Electric Company

v. Jonathan Clark & Sons, 108 Fed. 170 (1901) ; Kingley

Jarnvagsstyrelson v. Dexter & Carpenter, 32 F. (2d)

195 (CCA 2nd 1929) ; Rogers v. Edward L. Burton & Co.,

(CCA 10th 1943) 137 F. (2d) 286; U. S. v. Continental

American Bank & Trust Company, (D.C. W.D. La. 1948)

79 F. Supp. 450.

One of the major arguments of the petitioner in de-

fense of its case in the District, Circuit and now this

Honorable Court is that the respondent did not cause the

train to stop shortly before the accident. The petitioner

contends that the respondent’s alleged action was the

sole cause of the accident. (Tr. p. 14). It was proper

for the respondent to show the circumstances at the time

of and shortly before the accident in order to rebut this

contention. For this reason respondent elicited the testi-

mony concerning conversations had between the respond-

ent and the deceased conductor, Marcotte.

The train on which the appellee was riding was

Extra 51-A North, a troop train going from New Or-

leans, Louisiana, to Shreveport, Louisiana. On board the

train were B. T. Moore, a trainmaster who, as such, was

in charge of all operations of all trains, (Tr. p. 404)

J. W. Sandifer, (Tr. p. 405) the conductor, (Tr. p. 404)

the engineer, (Tr. p. 405), the front brakeman, (Tr. p.

15

405) the flagman, (Tr. p. 405) and the respondent,

Mack Henry Johnson, the rear brakeman.

The respondent proved that B. T. Moore, the train-

master for the petitioner, was riding the engine of the

train on which the respondent was a member of the crew

at the time of his injury. (Tr. pp. 40-E, No. 7, 40-L,

No. 7).

After Extra 51-A North violated the rules in not

taking a siding at Essen, Louisiana, so that Train No.

9, which had the right of way, could go through, (Tr.

p. 407) the respondent inquired of the conductor as to the

reasons and was told:

“Why the train didn’t take the siding at

Essen? Because the conductor said to me, the

trainmaster was on the head end, with Yates,

with a radio and he was running it up there and

he didn’t know what they were doing. We didn’t

have any radio on the hind end. There wasn’t

any radio back there. All in my power was to do

to call the attention of the conductor when he

was with and tell him of these things. He didn’t

stop the train, and I couldn’t take over stopping

the train because I am not a conductor, but I

was following the rules; to take instructions from

the conductor, or help in notifying him any time

of these things when he was with me, and I did

it.” (Tr. p. 414).

According to the operating rules of the railroad,

the personnel aboard the train are to take orders from

the conductor. (Tr. pp. 464, 465). In addition, the train-

master, who is responsible for all train orders, was

aboard the train. In view of the presence of the con-

ductor and the trainmaster, the conversations, which

occurred shortly before the wreck at Lettsworth, become

,

16

extremely important. These conversations which the

petitioner testified to, concern the orders given to him

by the conductor, and, further concern the information

given to the petitioner that the train was being run by

the trainmaster and that the train was proceeding by the

use of the radio. (Tr. pp. 406, 411, 412, 413, 414)

We believe that there are many reasons why peti-

tioner’s contention before this Honorable Court is errone-

ous. The Fifth Circuit Court gave the clearest answer

as follows (214 F. (2d) 290, 292, 293):

“Appellant strenuously insists that the court

erred in permitting the respondent, over the peti-

tioner’s objection, to relate his conversation with

the conductor, afterward killed in the accident,

when the northbound train stopped a few miles

south of Baton Rouge. The train was due to take

a siding at Essen, Louisiana, for still another

train of the petitioner known as No. 9, which was

a superior train and had the clearance and right-

of-way over the northbound train. Instead, the

train passed the siding at Essen and later stopped,

at which time Mr. B. T. Moore, the trainmaster,

used the radio equipment to contact the petitioner’s

operator at Baton Rouge and to order that No. 9,

the superior train, remain in the station until the

northbound train had arrived. Over the peti-

tioner’s objection, the respondent was permitted

to testify that he asked the conductor, who was

later killed in the accident, why the northbound

train did not stop at Essen, and was told by the

conductor that the trainmaster was with the engi-

neer at the head of the train, had a radio and was

running the train up there, and that they knew

what they were doing, but the conductor did not.

That conversation, we think, was admissible as

circumstantial evidence going to show the method

of operation of the train on this fatal cane ans by

the trainmaster. It was really a verbal act rele-

17

vant to be considered in determining a negligence

vel non and the degree thereof on the part of the

conductor and also on the part of the respondent.

VI Wigmore on Evidence, 3d. ed., Sections 1714,

1715, 1788, 1789; Petrolewm Carrier Corp. v.

Snyder, 5th Cir., 161 F. 2d 325; Reading Co. v.

Larkin, 3d. Cir., 114 F. 2d 416.“

Further, we submit that this testimony is admissible

on the ground that it constituted an admission by an

agent of the railroad in the scope of his employment as

to the method of operation of the train by the train-

master, B. T. Moore, and the conductor and for the

further reason that it formed a part of the res gestae.

In the case of Reading Company v. Larkin, 114 F.

2d 416 (8rd Cir. 1940) an analogous situation to the

case at bar was discussed. In this case, the injured

employee testified as to instructions given him by the

conductor on the morning of the accident. The appellant

in that case contended that the Court erred in admitting

this testimony on two grounds: (1) hearsay, and (2)

because the statement made by the Conductor was not

within the scope of his authority and therefore not bind-

ing on the railroad. The Court said on page 419:

“When illustrative of a particular litigated

act, testimony with respect to circumstances which

are the undersigned incidents of the litigated act,

is admissible, although hearsay, as part of the

res gestae. Coll v. Easton Transit Co., 180 Pa.

618, 626, 37 A. 89, 90. The qualifications which

render the incidents of a litigated act admissible

1 The petitioner in its brief at page 4 cites several cases, e.g. Hill

v. A. J. Canfield Co., 157 F. (2d) 849 (C.C.A. 7th). That case, as well

as the other cases concern the question as to whether testimony is ad-

missible solely because the declarant is dead. .

18

are ‘that they are part of the immediate prepara-

tions for or emanations of such act, and are not

promoted by the calculated policy of the actors.’

Coll v. Easton Transit Co., supra. Here the par-

ticular litigated act was the plaintiff’s participa-

tion in the movement forward of commerce in

transit between states. The conductor’s state-

ment with respect to the placing of the empty coal

car in immediate preparation of the movement of

the cargo was, therefore, admissible as a part of

the res gestae.”

In the case of Norwich & New York Transportation

Co. v. John Flint, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 3, 20 L. Ed. 556, 557

(1872) the plaintiff was injured aboard a boat, which

carried a detachment of U. S. Soldiers. Testimony was

allowed by the lower court to the effect that they heard

a sergeant reporting to an officer that the men aboard

the boat were getting out of hand and that the officer

replied that the sergeant mind his orders. Shortly there-

after, the plaintiff was injured by a shot fired by one

of the soldiers. The testimony was offered for the pur-

pose of proving the condition of affairs aboard the boat.

The Court said:

“Tt is hardly necessary for us to enter into

a lengthy discussion on the admissibility of the

testimony in question. The opinion of the circuit

court which has been laid before us, is sufficiently

full on the subject, and need not be repeated. We

have no hesitation in regarding the incident testi-

fied to as part of the res gestae, and as entirely

competent for the purposes for which it was of-

fered. The statements of the sergeant were not

offered in evidence for the purpose of proving

the facts stated by him, but the whole incident

(including those statements) was adduced in evi-

dence for the purpose of showing the manner in

which the officers attended to their duty whilst

the disturbance was going on; the fact that notice

19

of its progress was communicated; the time that

it continued, and the degree of alarm it was cal-

culated to excite in such a person as the sergeant

appeared to be. These were substantially the

purposes for which the evidence was professedly

offered, and for these purposes, as part of the

res gestae, it was clearly competent.”

If this Honorable Court should find that there was

any possible reason for exclusion, then any conceivable

feature of hearsay was cured by the cross-examination

by the petitioner on the same subject of the respondent

himself and by the examination by the petitioner of its

witnesses. (Tr. pp. 626, 627). Bevard v. Bevard, 103 F.

Sup. 533 (D.C. D.C. 1952); United States v. Gruber, 123

F. (2d) 307 (2nd Cir. 1941); and Trouser Corporation

of America v. Goodman & Theise, Inc., 153 F. (2d) 284

(8rd Cir. 1945).

2.

Petitioner complains in its brief that the District

Court acted improperly in excluding the respondent’s

prior work record and attaches as an exhibit the entire

work record of the respondent while in the petitioner’s

employ. Among other defenses raised by the petitioner

in this case, is the contention by the petitioner that the

respondent, Mack Henry Johnson, suffered from neurosis

before the accident which is involved in this litigation

and that the traumatic neurosis which is complained of

here is merely an aggravation of a previously existing

neurosis. The petitioner contends in its brief that the

work record is material and relevant to the issue of

whether or not the respondent had a pre-existing neurotic

condition. That portion of the work record which the

petitioner desired to introduce concerned various repri-

mands and demerits given the respondent, the first of

ee q

20

which was given in 1924 and the last of which was given

in 1949. (Tr. p. 477) Respondent contends that none of

these incidents has any connection with the present acci-

dent and is irrelevant and immaterial on all issues in-

volved in this matter.

There can be no contention by the petitioner that the

previous acts of the respondent are indicative of any

past negligence on the part of the respondent which

would have a bearing on the issues in this case.

In the case of Thompson v. Bowie, 4 Wallace 463, 18

L. Ed. 423, 426 (1867), there was an attempt to show

that the maker of a note had a habit of gambling when

drunk. The purpose of this testimony was to create the

basis for the defense that the money was loaned for the

purpose of a gambling debt and therefore illegal. The

Court excluded this testimony and gave the following

reason :

“All evidence must have relevancy to the ques-

tion in issue, and tend to prove it. If not a link

in the chain of proof, it is not properly receivable.

Could the habit of Thomas F. Bowie to gamble,

when drunk, legally tend to prove that he did

gamble on the day the notes were executed? The

general character and habits of Bowie were not

fit subjects of injury in this suit for any pur-

pose. The rules of law do not require the plain-

tiff to be prepared with proofs to meet such

evidence. That Bowie gambled at other times,

when in liquor, was surely no legal proof that be-

cause he was in liquor on the first day of January,

1857, he gambled with Steer.”

In the case of Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v.

M’Clish, 115 F. 268, 275 (CCA 6th 1902), the Court was

asked to decide whether it could properly receive evidence

as to the deceased’s habit of jumping on trains near the

21

place where the body was found. The Court held, in

excluding this evidence, as follows:

“The learned counsel for plaintiff in error

admit the general rule to be that testimony of-

fered for the purpose of establishing contributory

negligence of the deceased, like other testimony,

must be limited to proving facts existing at the

time of the happening of the injury complained

of. It is contended, however, that when there is

no eyewitness to the occurrence, and the manner

of its happening is to be left to circumstantial

evidence alone, it is competent to show the habit

of the deceased in the respect of doing the thing

which it is claimed he did at the time of receiving

his injury. The argument is, proof of habit to

do the thing in question renders it more likely

that it was done at the time in controversy. There

are not lacking authorities to support this view,

but we think the better rule is that such testi-

mony tends to raise collateral issues, the beget

uncertainty and false inferences from events

which have no bearing upon the real issues. A

man may be careful upon one occasion and care-

less upon another. It is not fair deduction to

say that because the deceased sometimes boarded

trains in motion that, therefore, he was attempt-

ing to board a train when killed. Such testimony,

tending to show contributory negligence, could be

met with other testimony tending to show that

such was not his habit, and the attention of the

jury would be diverted from what happened on

the occasion of the injury to the consideration of

the character and habits of the deceased at other

times. We think the testimony should be con-

fined to the conduct of the deceased in the par-

ticular instances under investigation in the light

of the facts competent to be directly or circum-

stantially proved.”

If counsel for petitioner were permitted to introduce

into evidence the irrelevant and immaterial evidence as

22

to the entire work record, the trial of this matter, which

took five days, would have extended over several more

days, since it then would have been necessary to have

a trial on each one of the particular charges made in

the work record.

There have been numerous cases in which parties

have tried to introduce records which were made by one

of the parties to the accident as evidence of the facts

surrounding the accident or event in dispute. In these

cases the courts have properly held that such testimony

is not admissible in evidence since it is hearsay on top

of hearsay. In the case of Universal Airline v. Eastern

Air Lines, 188 F. (2d) 993 (1951), the court was con-

sidering whether or not a report of the Civil Aeronautics

Board as to the details surrounding an accident was

properly admissible in court as evidence. The court held:

“The reports of ex parte hearings and investi-

gations are generally excluded, not because of

danger of ‘usurpation of the jury’s function’ but

because the evidence is improper and irrelevant,

even if the hearing is before a judge sitting with-

out a jury. Such reports, or testimony concerning

such reports, would be hearsay based on hearsay.

The rights of parties are to be determined by

testimony adduced at the trial according to the

rules of examination and cross-examination.”

See also Good Holding Co. v. Boswell, 173 F. (2d) 395

(CCA, 5th 1949) and Hubsch v. United States, 174 F.

(2d) 7 (5th CCA, 1949).

We submit that the work record which petitioner

sought to introduce in this case is in no different position

than the records described in the cited cases, with the

exception that the work record concerns numerous events.

23

If the record of one event, is not admissible, then, we

submit, a fortiori, the introduction into evidence of the

work record would merely be a cumulation of errors.

Further, in line with this thought, the record of the in-

vestigation by the Interstate Commerce Commission and

its findings and conclusions in reference to the instant

collision could not be referred to or introduced into evi-

dence by the respondent. The fact that Mack Henry

Johnson had been employed by the L & A Railroad con-

stantly since December 15, 1919, should be sufficient in

itself to show that the petitioner considered the respond-

ent an able and conscientious employee. In fact, it is

impossible to conceive of the petitioner keeping an em-

ployee in service, when the public interest is involved,

if it did not have that view.

The petitioner objects to several doctors reciting the

history of the illness as given to them by the respondent.

This recitation included certain facts about the accident.

First it should be pointed out that the petitioner

did not object to the evidence on the ground of hearsay,

„ * * but the sole complaint, was to the repetition of

appellee’s statements, a matter resting, we think, within

the sound discretion of the district judge.” As further

stated by the Fifth Circuit Court, the appellant

did not object to such history as given by the first

doctor who testified, but did object to its continued

repetition * * * .” (214 F. (2d) 290, 293).

eet art eee rent errors

24

It must be noted that the respondent was suffering

from traumatic neurosis (Tr. pp. 255-259, 505-517) and

impotency, (Tr. pp. 255-259, 505-517, 211-217) among

other ailments. In such a case it is indispensible that the

subjective symptoms of which the party complains should

be known by the physician in order for him to give an

opinion. The portion of the history which related to

the train wreck itself had to be known by the doctors

in order for them to understand the basis for the re-

spondent’s traumatic neurosis (Tr. pp. 205, 276, 511). If

such information could not be given to the physician and

later set forth by the physician in court it would be im-

possible for any individual suffering from a traumatic

neurosis to prove his case.

In the case of Kaufman v. Kaufman, 164 F. (2d)

519 D.C. C.A. 1947), the plaintiff asked for an annul-

ment of her marriage on the grounds of impotency on

the part of the husband. The husband was examined

by a psychiatrist who found that he was suffering from

psycho-neurosis. The question before the court was

whether or not the doctor should be allowed to give his

‘opinion as to the matrimonial capacity of the husband

at the time of his examination since the answer to be

given would be based on statements made by the husband

himself. The court said on page 520:

“The courts have long recognized the fact that

impotence is frequently the result of phychogenic

causes. Indeed one medical autherity states that

most cases of impotence seen by urologists are of

the psychic type rather than the result of physical

defects. The same authority says that in some

such cases individuals who have imagined and

convinced themselves that they are impotent may

by the force of such mental conviction be unable

VVV

25

to perform the sexual act although in reality

nothing but their state of mind prevents them

him by the patient. Accordingly it was 1

for Dr. Klein to base his diagnosis as to de-

fendant’s im upon the history and symp-

toms which latter related to him and the trial

justice should have permitted him to answer the

question propounded to him.”

In th. case of Peters v. Mutual Life Insurance Com-

pany of N: # York, 107 F. (2d) 9 (8rd Cir. 1939), a

doctor was allowed to give his opinion as to the cause

The court, in holding that this opinion was not properly

admissible, stated on page 12:

“In the case at bar, the plaintiff-appellant’s

expert balked at basing his opinion on certain

specific and enunmerated symptoms. He then vol-

unteered to and did base it on the medical history

of the case. He was not even asked to give that

history and his entire opinion becomes therefore

clearly inadmissible.”

“Unfortunately for the plaintiff-appellant this

logic does not extend to cover the circumstance of

the principal case. We are not dealing with per-

sonal knowledge of the patient’s symptoms, exami-

nation) alone, but with personal knowledge of

the patient’s statement of those symptoms (his-

tory) as well. Under the adversary system the

failure of a cross-examiner to expose the basis of

a physician’s opinion may imply an acknowledg-

ment that the underlying data or premises are

26

present and warrant it. This assumes, of course,

that there is no other reason for such failure to

cross-examine. It is just here, we think, that the

distinction between medical examination and medi-

cal history exists. As we have seen, the admissi-

bility of the latter depends on a not altogether

clearly defined exception to the hearsay rule. 3

Wigmore on Evidence, 2d Ed., Section 1720. The

cross-examiner’s failure to pry into the expert’s

premises may therefore indicate merely his un-

certainty, an uncertainty whose cure by way of

charge to the jury would result in confusion and

complexity and would defeat Dean Wigmore’s con-

ception of practicality. We might add that the

history of a disease dependent largely on mental

processes is about as far removed from a physi-

cian’s direct physical examination as could be

conceived.”

It is important to note that the doctors, in stating

their opinions as to the type of illness suffered by the

respondent in this case, did not rely solely on the sub-

jective symptoms elicited to them by the respondent. For

example, Doctor John W. Bick, Jr., the psychiatrist who

was chosen by the petitioner to examine the respondent

(Tr. p. 40-A), then repudiated by the petitioner (Tr. pp.

18-B, C, D), but put on the stand by the respondent so

that the jury could get the complete picture (Tr. p. 202),

stated (Tr. p. 208):

“Physically, the patient appears to be a well

developed, well nourished, negro male of sixty-

five. I thought for the most part his conversa-

tion was slow and I had some difficulty in elicit-

ing responses: He walks with a slight limp as

though sparing the right leg. He seems somewhat

depressed, rather disinterested in his surround-

ings, complains mostly of feelings of despondency,

sleep difficulty, headaches, and nightmares.” (Tr.

pp. 203 and 204)

27

The respondent was present in court, testified on

direct and cross-examination. The testimony as to the

history of his illness was substantially the same as he

gave to each of the doctors who examined him. It might

be pointed out that the respondent was subjected to an

examination by five doctors chosen by the petitioner (Tr.

pp. 202, 631, 647, 678, 761) excluding Dr. Leidenheimer

who was under the petitioner’s control and who treated

the respondent for a long period of time and whose diag-

nosis in all written reports confirmed the respondent’s

position. (Tr. pp. 136-142) During the trial the peti-

tioner had the right to cross-examine the respondent as

to any of the facts which he had given to the doctors. -

Under said circumstances, it is inconceivable that the

petitioner can complain as to the history received by the

various doctors, which history was indispensible for them

to know in order for their opinions to be given. The

petitioner must have recognized that in a case of this

sort, the testimony of the doctors as to the case history

is properly admissible and must necessarily be given

since he made no objection to such history given by Dr.

Manuel Gardberg, the first doctor who testified, (Tr. p.

179) and in examining doctors employed by the peti-

tioner and on cross-examination of doctors employed by

respondent he asked them to give the history (Tr. pp.

190, 191, 218, 219, 260, 266, 274, 518, 525, 636, 638,

648, 649, 650, 685, 761, 762, 763) as given by the re-

spondent insofar as they needed to give the history to

form an opinion in this matter. Such testimony is prop-

erly admissible and should be given its proper weight

since counsel for the petitioner asked for the same testi-

mony of the same or previous witnesses. Bevard v.

Bevard, 103 F. Supp. 533 (D.C. D.C. 1952); United

States v. Gruber, 123 F. (2d) 307 (2nd Cir. 1941);

— —

28

Trouser Corporation of America d. Goodman & Theise,

Inc., 153 F. (2d) 284 (8rd Cir. 1946).

It should be pointed out that the respondent was

examined approximately eleven times by Dr. Edward H.

Knight and Dr. Max E. Johnson. Dr. Max E. Johnson,

in his direet testimony, stated that if there was any

chance of feigning illness on the part of the respondent,’

such action would have been discovered during the course

of the eleven interviews. (Tr. p. 515). In addition, the

appellee was sent to Dr. Johnson and Dr. Knight for the

purpose of treatment. (Tr. p. 266) It is a well settled

rule that the history given to a doctor for the purpose of

treatment is properly admissible in court and is an ex-

ception to the hearsay rule. See: U. S. v. Calvey, 110

F. 2d 327 (8rd Cir. 1940); Bartkoski v. Pittsburgh &

Lake Erie R. Co., 172 F. 2d 1007 (8rd Cir. 1949).

In conclusion the respondent submits that the his-

tory as given by the respondent to the doctors was prop-

erly admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. If

it is not an exception to the hearsay rule, respondent

contends that it was still properly admissible on the

grounds that the petitioner did not object to such testi-

mony on the ground that (1) that it constituted hearsay,

and (2) that the appellant asked for the same history

from his own doctors and asked questions in direct and

cross-examination of witnesses in which they would

necessarily have to give portions of the history, thus

waiving any objection which he might have.

CONCLUSION

The judgment below is correct, and there is no con-

flict of decisions. We therefore respectfully submit that

29

the petition for writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT WEINSTEIN,

Attorney for Mack Henry Johnson,

Respondent.

PHILIP D. RITTENBERG,

FRED BRONFIN,

HENRY F. YODER,

ALBERT MINTZ,

RITTENBERG, WEINSTEIN & BRONFIN,

Of Counsel.

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