Brief for the United States — Wolin v. United States

Supreme Court brief1954

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Yuthe Supreme Court of the Winited States

OctToBER TERM, 1954

No. 90

Martin E. Wottn, InpivipuaLtty, Martin E.

Wout, Lrp., anp CHAL STEEL CoRPORATION,

PETITIONERS

Vv.

UniTep States OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH

CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals (R. 147-

151) is reported at 211 F. 2d 770.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was

entered on April 9, 1954 (R. 152), and a petition

for rehearing (R. 152-R. 156) was denied on

April 24, 1954 (R. 157). The petition for a writ

of certiorari was filed on May 24, 1954. The

jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28

U.S. C. 1254 (1). See also Rules 37 (b) (2) and

45 (a), F. R. Crim. P.

(1)

SREY EPL PEP GILT ILE NELLIE A AER CIEE BEEN REEL EE SIG ER LEAL

2

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether, at a trial involving charges of

bribery of a government employee, the testimony

of the employee’s wife, to whom the checks were

made payable, that she paid little attention to the

details of the arrangement with her husband was

so inconsistent with her plea of guilty as to render

the use of her testimony willful misconduct by

the prosecution.

2. Whether the prosecuting attorney, in his

argument to the jury, misstated the evidence given

by a principal government witness in such manner

as to require a new trial.

STATUTES INVOLVED

18 U.S. C. (Supp. V) 201 provides as follows:

Whoever promises, offers, or gives any

money or thing of value, or makes or ten-

ders any check, order, contract, undertak-

ing, obligation, gratuity, or security for

the payment of money or for the delivery

or conveyance of anything of value, to any

officer or employee or person acting for or

on behalf of the United States, or any

department or agency thereof, in any official

function, under or by authority of any

such department or agency or to any officer

or person acting for or on behalf of either

House of Congress, or any committee of

either House, or both Houses thereof, with

intent to influence his decision or action on

any question, matter, cause, or proceeding

which may at any time be pending, or which

3

may by law be brought before him in his

official capacity, or in his place of trust or

profit, or with intent to influence him to

commit or aid in committing, or to collude

in, or allow, any fraud, or make opportu-

nity for the commission of any fraud, on

the United States, or to induce him to do

or omit to do any act in violation of his

lawful duty, shall be fined not more than

three times the amount of such money or

value of such thing or imprisoned not more

than three years, or both.

18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) 281 provides, in relevant

parts, as follows:

Whoever, being * * * or other officer or

employee of the United States or any de-

partment or agency thereof, directly or in-

directly receives or agrees to receive, any

compensation for any services rendered or

to be rendered, either by himself or an-

other, in relation to any proceeding, con-

tract, claim, controversy, charge, accusa-

tion, arrest, or other matter in which the

United States is a party or directly or in-

directly interested, before any department,

agency, court marshal, officer, or any civil,

military, or naval commission, shall be fined

not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not

more than two years, or both; and shall be

incapable of holding any office of honor,

trust, or profit under the United States.

18 U. 8. C. (Supp. V) 371 provides, in relevant

part, as follows:

_—

6

Petitioner talked generally about applications for

licenses and suggested to Bennett tliat it would

be legal for him to sell steel while continuing

his government position. He said that the matter

could be handled by putting Mrs. Bennett on the

payroll and making payments to her. (R. 25-28.)

Shortly thereafter, Bennett told a Mr. Pardeo,

who wished to purchase tin plate, of the type of

material that petitioner had and said that ‘‘if

he could use some of that material I felt that

we could give him a license. Since he was buy-

ing for all Venezuelan trades, that is.”” (R. 29.)

Thereafter, when petitioner called about some

of his applications, he told Bennett that Pardeo

had been to see him and that he was sending

an application through (R. 29). Petitioner again

took Bennett and his wife to dinner and gave

Bennett $500.00 in cash (R. 30). Arrangements

were made to send the license applications to

Bennett’s home in order to make it appear that

Mrs. Bennett was doing the work. (R. 32-33.)

Bennett testified that petitioner ‘‘knew that if

Mr. Pardeo purchased material from him that I

would grant a license”’ (R. 31).

In September 1951, petitioner arranged for the

purchase of a car in Henry Bennett’s name,

partly with Bennett’s money and partly with

money advanced by petitioner, which was said

to be a commission on sales to Pardeo (R. 33-

40). Petitioner drew a check in the sum of

$1,972 to the order of Mrs. Bennett to have a

eC.

7

record of payments, including the money paid

to Bennett in cash (R. 38, 73). Petitioner ex-

plained the amount by stating that he credited

an order that was to be processed after he left

for Europe and said that a subsequent check for

$226 to Mrs. Bennett was a mistake (Tr. 1218-

1220, see R. 105-107).

When petitioner left for Europe in October

1951, he told the Bennetts that Mrs. Halperin

would handle licenses and commissions (R. 44).

Subsequently Bennett promised Mrs. Halperin

that 15 applications for licenses for sales in

Italy and Portugal to be filed by the Chal Steel

Corporation, one of the corporate defendants in

this case, would be in order (R. 46, 50). Ben-

nett approved them all but seven were not

recorded by him in accordance with the normal

routine of the Office of International Trade

(R. 51).

During the third and fourth quarters of 1951,

when substantially all of the petitioner’s license

applications were approved, other exporters’ ap-

plications for sending secondary tin plate to

Italy were being returned without approval

at the rate of 8 returned for every one approved

(Tr. 807-808 ; see also Tr. 1112). Indeed, Bennett

himself told one complaining exporter in Novem-

ber 1951, that tin plate licenses were not being

issued (Tr. 1102).

The testimony of Mrs. Bennett (R. 85-102),

on the basis of which petitioner frames one of his

present contentions, was to the effect that she

804984—54-—-2

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accompanied her husband on the occasions on

which he and petitioner worked out their plans

for the payment of commissions (R. 89), the

sending of applications to the Bennett home (R.

88), and the placing of Mrs. Bennett on peti-

tioner’s payroll (R. 87, 89, 91). She testified

that she was aware of these arrangements al-

though she did not pay too much attention to the

conversations (R. 87, 88), and that she was

present during most of the negotiations for the

purchase by the Bennetts, through petitioner, of

an automobile (R. 92-93). She testified also that

she was not responsible in any way for referring

Pardeo to petitioner (R. 97-98), and that the

so-called commission checks issued in her name,

some of which she had deposited in the bank, were

for her husband (R. 96-97).

After the presentation of evidence on both sides

was complete, the prosecuting attorney stated, in

the early part of his summation to the jury:

My job is to put before you as best I

can all the admissible evidence that can

give you an adequate picture of what hap-

pened and that is what I will try to do.

* * * Now during the argument it is my

job to try to point out to you conclusions,

inferences that you can draw from these

facts, and that is what I intend to do. I

have to rely on my memory in recalling

the evidence. I don’t have a transcript of

the record. Unfortunately I understand

that Judge Arnold and Mr. Boothe [defense

|

; |

SpA TOP eens =

9

counsel] have certain parts of it. If in

recalling evidence to you, ladies and gentle-

men, and believe me, I mean this, I don’t

agree with your recollection of what hap-

pened, take your own. I am not trying

to mislead you. My memory may be bad.

I am trying to remember the evidence as

I reeall it. So if I say something and you

don’t remember it that way, take your own

on it, but believe me, I am not doing it

intentionally. [Tr. 1361.]

In addition, the prosecuting attorney referred

to the fact that Mrs. Bennett had pleaded guilty,

and to the fact that she was unsentenced, and sug-

gested that the fact that she would later have to

appear before the same judge for sentencing was

an incentive for her to testify truthfully (Tr.

1407).

Defense counsel then made their summation

to the jury, which was not reported (R. 103),

following which the Government made rebuttal

argument. This argument contained the state-

ment which is made one of the bases for review

by this Court. It is italicized in context:

Some of the remarks made by Mr. Arnold

and Mr. Boothe, I think principally by Mr.

Arnold, went to the effect that there is

. nothing wrong about entertainment. The

mink coat era is fine. It is all right to take

Government employees out and show them

a good time. If it is done for one purpose.

— tet SAT RENE

Y PETS PAE SPENT

10

Sure. If it is done for another purpose,

no. You folks read the newspapers. You

have seen stories in the newspapers. Let

me put it to you this way: For every Gov-

ernment employee who has done wrong by

taking money, gifts and stuff like that for

doing something in the government, he

doesn’t do it on his own money, doesn’t

come out of the thin air and say, hello, Mr.

Bennett, here I am. You have to have a

Wolin in the background and in the fore-

ground. You can’t have a dishonest Gov-

ernment employee unless you’ve got some-

one giving him the money. It is impossible.

And the only way that the Government

service can be straightened around is not

only to get the Government employees who

do something wrong but to get the people

that give it to them because it takes two to

make that kind of a party. Believe me.

Money doesn’t grow on trees. It is given

for a purpose. So that you have this in-

stance here in front of you. You have

had Mr. Bennett on the stand who has told

you ladies and gentlemen in so many words

in plain and simple English, ‘I took money.

I took money in checks.’”?” Why? Because

I am a licensing officer. Bennett has told

you in plain and simple English, “‘I am

guilty.” Why would he tell you that?

Because he is.

Now who created the situation. Who

gave the wherewithal, who gave the money,

who gave the push? The, man who is on

trial here today. You don’t clean up the

11

Government, you don’t get the Government

employees by going after them alone. You

have to get the source of it, too. So when

the argument is made to you ladies and

gentlemen that entertainment is fine, that

the mink coats and everything is all right,

I say to you again, and your responsible

citizens, come from your walks of life,

spend here a couple of weeks—you spent

all of last week in this case—to clean up a

situation like that, there are two ways. If

you go about both of them you clean it up.

One, you get the Government employee who

isn’t living up to his trust and, No. 2, you

get the party on the outside of the Govern-

ment who doesn’t think enough of the

United States Government to stay away

from its employees with money and checks.

[R. 103-104; italics added. ]

At the close of this rebuttal, defense counsel

objected to the italicized portion of the state-

ment, urging that the ‘‘statement is so serious

and is such a complete departure from the record

that * * * we ought to be allowed at this point

to make a statement to the jury that it is not so

because the jury will not have the record with

them [and] * * * will have to rely on memory

and counsel’s complete misstatement * * *’’ (R.

119-120).

The trial judge said that he thought that the

proper way to handle the matter was to instruct

the jury that it was their recollection rather than

counsel’s statement which counted, and at the

12

very opening of his charge, he did so (R. 120),

stating, inter alia:

You rely upon your own recollection and

if the Court says anything * * * in re-

spect to the evidence that is contrary to

your recollection, you will follow your own

recollection and judgment and the same is

true with reference to what counsel may

have said to you in their recollections of

what this witness or that witness said is

not conclusive upon you at all. * * *’

After the jury had retired and had been out

approximately five hours, they returned to request

a transcript of the evidence. They indicated that

they wanted all the available testimony, but were

particularly interested in the testimony of the

petitioner (R. 134-135). Although all of the

testimony had not been transcribed, what they

were given included the testimony of petitioner

and that of Bennett (R. 135). Later, after the

jury had indicated its inability to reach a verdict,

and after the court had given the so-called “Allen

charge,”’ a verdict of guilty was reached (R. 148).

The petitioner, Martin E. Wolin, individually,

was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment, and

the two corporate defendants, to pay $1,000 fines

? Also, later in the charge, after reviewing the facts that

had been presented, and the issues which were open to the

jury, the court said again:

“* * * Tt does not mean to tell you that in its opinion any

of these facts exist except those that I have enumerated as

being uncontradicted. * * * It is for you to determine

whether or not those facts do exist in this case.” [R. 130.]

13

(R. 143-144). The judgment was unanimously

affirmed by the Court of Appeals (R. 152).

- ARGUMENT

1. Petitioner argues that Mrs. Bennett’s tes-

timony was so clearly inconsistent with her plea

of guilty that the prosecutor’s use of such testi-

mony represents knowing misconduct. The con-

tention is patently frivolous.

Mrs. Bennett’s testimony was not inconsistent

with her plea of guilty. The fact that, as her

testimony suggests, she did not pay detailed at-

tention to the arrangements between petitioner

and her husband (see Pet. p. 12) does not mean

that she claimed to be aware of so little of the

transaction as not to be criminally liable for her

participation therein. She admitted that she

knew that she was participating in an arrange-

ment whereby she would be put on petitioner’s

payroll (R. 87), that petitioner was to send li-

cense applications to her for remailing to the

Department of Commerce (R. 88, 89), and that

she was to be paid at the rate of $5 per ton

(R. 89). She testified further that her husband

had told petitioner he did not think the arrange-

ment would be legal, although petitioner assured

him that it would be (R. 89; see also R. 91).

She testified that petitioner’s applications were

received by mail at her home, and that she either

mailed them to the Office of International Trade

herself or her husband took them personally

14

(R. 90; see also R. 95). She testified that

she received checks from petitioner, purportedly

for commissions, even though she had done noth-

ing to earn them (R. 96-97), and she testified

that petitioner had given her a diamond and ruby

pin (R. 98). Her testimony was thus not a dec-

laration of innocence.

Moreover, Mrs. Bennett’s allegedly ambiguous

status was apparent to the jury. She explicitly

testified that she had pleaded guilty and was

unsentenced (R. 102) and the Government re-

ferred to these facts in its summation (Tr. 1407).

The jury, therefore, was able fully to appraise

her worth as a witness in accordance with the

full instructions to the jury by the court on that

point (see R. 132).

2. Petitioner also argues that this Court should

grant his petition in order to censure the prose-

cutor for having made what petitioner says are

misstatements of crucial evidence during his re-

buttal summation to the jury (Pet. 14-17).

The first objection to review of this point by

this Court is procedural. No report was made

of the summation for the defense, to which the

language complained of is, at least apparently,

a response. A reviewing court cannot, there-

fore, appraise, out of the context necessary to

understand it, a remark of a government attor-

ney made in course of such rebuttal. See e. g.,

Landay v. United States, 108 F. 2d 698, 706

Sead, MA AILS OLR ITAL PE FIER TEM PLETELY BIE Wve AYR PNY eb Sat rs REY hI rts ee Aa ORE te Her pe ne NRRL RS a8 wah

a

15

(C. A. 6), certiorari denied, 309 U. S. 681; Vause

y. United States, 53 F. 2d 346, 354 (C. A. 2), certi-

orari denied, 284 U. 8S. 661.

In any event, there was no misstatement, but

at most a restatement or interpretation of the

witness’s testimony. Bennett’s testimony was

clear to the effect that petitioner constantly

talked with him about approval of license appli-

cations; that petitioner expected Bennett to ap-

prove licenses for shipments to Pardeo (R. 31).

Bennett recognized that his conduct, objectively

viewed, showed favoritism toward petitioner (R.

84). Bennett unqualifiedly stated that he, rather

than Mrs. Bennett as petitioner had testified, took

the money. In the light of all the evidence it

was not unfair to say that Bennett testified that

he took it because he was a licensing officer and,

in effect, that he was guilty.

The statement was not part of a complete

review of the evidence, as petitioner suggests, but

was principally a way of making clear that no

government employee can be involved in a bribe

without there being someone out of government

who is also blameworthy. For the purpose of

setting in context petitioner’s guilt as instigator,

Bennett’s plea to the offense was stated, in per-

haps overly simplified terms, but certainly not in

essential falsehood. In short, examination of the

second and third paragraphs of the rebutia! argu-

ment (R. 103-104), rather than merely the short

excerpt to which petitioner refers, discloses that

ars a a wal A aa £

| pisses

16

petitioner’s request for review on this phase of

the ease is based on a misleading abbreviation

of the record.

Moreover, the trial judge, in response to peti-

tioner’s objections, emphasized to the jury at the

very outset of its charge, that the jury’s own

recollection of the facts was governing (R. 120),

and later explicitly reiterated the charge (R.

130). The importance of Bennett’s part in the

transaction has been stressed from the very begin-

ning of the case by petitioner’s own counsel who

said in his opening statement (Tr. 588) :

We have here a sixty page indictment

in thirteen counts, presented against this

man, and yet from that mass of papers,

there is only one question involved and

that is, Did Wolin pay any compensation

to Twila Bennett to get him business or

did he pay compensation to Bennett to

have him issue licenses? [See also Tr.

593-594. ]

In the face of the centrality of this issue from

the beginning to the end of the case, the jury

must have paid particular attention to the testi-

mony bearing upon it so that they could not

have been misled by the one statement upon which

petitioner relies. This is all the more true in

view of the fact that during the jury’s delibera-

tions, the record was requested (R. 134). Al-

though it was requested for the purpose, particu-

larly, of looking at petitioner’s testimony and

— -

—

17

although all of the record was not furnished, the

Bennett testimony was (R. 135-136), so that, as

to this issue, the jury did not have to rely in

any way on the proseeutor’s recollection.’

*In his petition for certiorari, petitioner makes much of

what he called an additional misrepresentation made by the

prosecution in the Court of Appeals. He refers to the gov-

ernment’s brief in the Court of Appeals and the opinion of

the Court, apparently in reliance on it, that the Government

rebuttal in the trial court was “apparently an attempt to

give the jury the Government’s idea of the total effect of

Bennett’s testimony and the inferences to be drawn there-

from, and thus to answer the argument of counsel for de-

fendants that there was no proof of a guilty principal whom

defendants could have aided and abetted.” [Emphasis

added, see Pet. 15.] Petitioner says no such argument was

made, and attempts to demonstrate that no such argument

could have been made.

We have suggested above that this Court’s certiorari juris-

diction is not a device to resolve arguments about what hap-

pened in the trial court, particularly where defense counsel

apparently elected to keep the real events unrecorded. We

also suggest that, contrary to petitioner’s argument here that

he could not have made an aider and abetter argument in the

trial court because in all the substantive counts petitioner

was indicted as a principal (Pet. 9), there were in fact aider

and abetter charges in the case against petitioner (see counts

1 to 4, Tr. 1-9). Although sustaining the conviction does

not depend on those counts, it is clear that the trial judge

talked about those counts in his charge to the jury (R. 123-

125), and it seems at least plausible that petitioner’s counsel

might have talked about them.

The record reveals, moreover, a further curious fact on this

aspect of the case. The very “misrepresentation” which peti-

tioner says the Court of Appeals accepted was also made in

the District Court. After verdict and judgment, the peti-

tioner made a motion for a new trial in which he relied, in

part, on the alleged misstatements as to Bennett’s testimony

(Tr. 485-500). The Government explained the statement

almost word for word as it did in the Court of Appeals, in a

18

CONCLUSION

It is therefore respectfully submitted that the |

petition for a writ of certiorari be denied.

Simon E. SosBeELorr,

Solicitor General.

WakRkEN Otney ITI,

Assistant Attorney General.

BEATRICE ROSENBERG,

JoHN R. WILKINS,

Attorneys.

JULY 1954.

memorandum filed and argued before the very judge who —

had just tried the case (Tr. 506-543, especially 513-515). —

Petitioner thereafter, and before the motion was ruled on,

filed a supplementary memorandum on other points which

were involved in this motion, but did not challenge the truth —

or the logic of the prosecution representation (Tr. 544-550). —

Later, in the Court of Appeals, the matter was challenged

only by a petition for rehearing in which petitioner conceded

that he had been remiss in not calling the court’s attention

before argument to the alleged misrepresentation in the Gov-

ernment’s brief (R. 155).

U S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING JFFICE: 1984

REALE TNT OF AION A PRN REIS Beg NARS ORS GBATEMP ah TYE RT NRG IAAT SON ance emi creme ate

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