Brief for the Respondents in Opposition — Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad v. Woodrow

Supreme Court brief1954

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SUBJECT INDEX

Page

NE ak Oia a 66 $26 6 ie Gk 6 Sk Oe RM ORR Re De be eo ak 1

NN 5 SS 9G SW igre ta ik Soto. e wes, 6 Be Weel eh ete ie Bee ale 1

SE MOREE se Cw 8-4 s RHC pea ee he eee ewe ween es 2

DEG OE CUO CD i ee Gio wees Chew ew ed as oe b ew bee be 3

NN 355 OE Bok Ce ba bed ae SO RNS ORE RE So wR we Re aCe 3

The Facts as They Relate to the Question Presented......... 3

Statement of Facts to Clarify the Statement Made by Petitioner 6

Chronological Statement of the Evidence................... 6

Summary of Evidence as to Defects in Grates............... 15

Summary of Evidence as to Defects in Shaker Bar........... 16

Summary of Evidence as to Whether Shaker Bar Can Be Pulled

Backward Toward the Tender.................2.cc0000 18

Summary of the Testimony Relating to Plaintiff's Injuries.... 19

Summary of Evidence Relative to Damages................. 30

Calculation of Respondent’s Damages.................0e0000: 31

Gn ieee eae Sig SAUCE ATE aoe VARA Se EEN DEES OOo ab Ea 31

I. Where Later Injuries Are to a Different Part of the Body

and Are Not Shown to Have Any Connection with the In-

juries on Which Plaintiff Bases His Cause of Action, Evi-

‘dence Concerning the Later Injuries Should Be Excluded... 31

II. Striking Testimony Is Not Prejudicial Where the Facts to

Which the Testimony Relates Is Otherwise Established.... 36

NNR oes Sea egw kebabs a ae Gomes «Sine ee ake eee aes 37

AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases:

Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., Inc., 319 U. S. 350, 63 S. Ct. 1062,

Oe oe SS A ROONE oc voi ba a dobbs a bb bow OO bee eR RT RUSS 37

Cannon v. Pratt, 99 U. S. 619, 25 L. Ed. 446................. 36

Carter v. Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay Ry. Co., 338 U. S. 430, 70 S.

eS Be Oe ke ls OO POO Ke oe CR cee SOS oR ee eOESS 37

City of Birmingham v. Carlson, 209 Ala. 428, 96 So. 333........ 31

Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R. Co., 342 U. S. 359, 72 S.

Ct. 312, 96 L. Ed. 398 (1952)..... Ge cw ius Own a eh kee erda cies 37

Drumm-Flato Commission Co. v. Edmisson, 208 U. S. 534, 52 L.

Mee COR SE BO i ie a ecw ease Raw ee « = 88

Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U. S. 253, 259, 64 S. Ct. 548, 88 L. Ed.

708, 321 U. S. 754........ eee NRO Bae phwib ae kig wah ee e aeaenee 3

Hall v. Shenandoah, 167 Iowa 735, 149 N. W. 831.............. $1

Johnson v. City of Troy (N. Y.), 124 App. Div. 29............81, 32

Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U. S. 645, 66 S. Ct. 740, 90 L. Ed. 916

CU946) ccnceceeceees eee ccceceeeeesucees cccusecscccece ST

Page

Lucas v. Brooks, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 436, 21 L. Ed. 779...... wees Oe

Matheson v. United States, 227 U. 8. 540, 57 L. Ed. 631, 33 8. Ct.

BOG seein ka RS CORSA CREA S ONO MRS EO Yiei boas eGo : 28

Metalak v. Rasmussen, 184 Minn. 260, 238 N. W. 478..... <<ea%) ee

M. St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co. v. Moquin, 283 U. S. 520, 51 S. Ct.

G01, 76 UL. Wd. 1848 CAOSL) ov cc cceccecess jackea Re ciesp VOW

National Licorice Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 309 U. 8.

350 (Note 2, p. 357), 60 S. Ct. 569, 84 L. Ed. 799.......... 3

Rhyner v. City of Menasha, 107 Wis. 201, 83 N. W. 303......31, 33

Schmitt v. Emery, 211 Minn. 547, 2 N. W. 2d 413, 189 A. L. R.

1242 wc cceveseees Scr easnesevesecucene seeeccceeeccsccs 88

Steele v. Drummond, 275 U. S. 199, 48 S. Ct. 53, 72 L. Ed. 238.. 3

Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. Ry. Co., 321 U. S. 29, 64 S. Ct. 409, 88

L. Bd. 620 (1944)... . 2c ee erceennes Co ececocesccces 37

Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U. 8. 54, 63 S. Ct. 444,

87 L. Ed. 610 (1943)..........6. cocecseee Prrerr rrr 37

Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 69 S. Ct. 413, 93 L. Ed. 497

CIUDAD) ecevricrccceccvecccccccccesoesene Terre ree 37

Statutes and Textbooks:

U. S. C. A., Title 28, Supreme Court Rules, Rule 38, Subdivision 2 3

5 C. J. S., Appeal and Error, Sec. 1749... ...ceeeeeecessceees 36

In THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1953

No. 580

CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. PAUL AND PACIFIC

RAILROAD COMPANY, a Corporation,

Petitioner,

vs.

WILLIAM J. WOODROW,

Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

GRANTING CERTIORARI

INTRODUCTORY

Respondent will divide his brief in such a way as to make

the subdivisions thereof correspond with those of petitioner's

brief.

JURISDICTION

Respondent admits that this Court has jurisdiction to

grant a Writ of Certiorari in this case, but he contends that

this case is not a proper one for the exercise of such juris-

diction, and that because that is true, the Court should deny

certiorari.

2

QUESTION PRESENTED

Respondent contends, as his statement of the case later

will show, that the record does not raise the question stated

by petitioner, but on the contrary, that the question which

petitioner seeks to raise and which the facts conclusively

established by the evidence in fact raise, is:

Whether it was prejudicial error on the part of the

trial court to strike the testimony of three of defendant’s

witnesses as to the occurence of an accident in which

plaintiff's automobile fell off a bridge and plaintiff sus-

tained a scratch on the forehead in getting out of his

automobile immediately before it went off the bridge,

where plaintiff's action was under the Federal Em-

ployers’ Liability Act to recover damages for injuries in

his lumbosacral region consisting of a ruptured inter-

vertebral disc between the 4th and 5th lumbar vertebrae

and disability arising therefrom; where the defendant at

the trial contended that plaintiff was not injured in any

respect, but notwithstanding such contention, the Court

received evidence offered by defendant consisting of the

testimony of plaintiff and three of defendant’s witnesses

to show the occurrence of the bridge accident and that

plaintiff sustained a scratch of the forehead as a con-

sequence thereof; where the Court on plaintiff's motion

struck from the record the evidence of defendant’s three

witnesses but did not strike plaintiff's evidence relative

to such facts; and where, further, there was no evidence

to show any connection between the scratch on the head

which plaintiff so sustained and the injuries for which he

sought recovery.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Generally.

Respondent confesses that he is not sure as to the scope

of the statement of the facts which he should make. Cer-

tainly, he cannot accept the statement made by petitioner for

the reason that many of the statements made by petitioner

are entirely unsupported by the evidence. Such statements,

together with the comments which petitioner’s counsel make

concerning them, present an entirely inadequate statement of

the facts as the backdrop against which the legal question

presented by the petitioner should be viewed.

The Facts as They Relate to the Question Presented.

We have assumed that the petitioner should state accur-

ately and precisely only those facts which raise the question

which he presents to the Court by his petition for review. We

base this assumption upon the provisions of Rule 38, Sub-

division 2 (U. 8. C. A., Title 28, Supreme Court Rules, Rule

38, Subdivision 2), which so far as here material, provides:

“The petition (for certiorari) shall contain a summary

and short statement * * * of the questions presented

* * * Only the questions specifically brought forward

by the Petition for Writ of Certiorari will be considered.

* @ #))

This Court has repeatedly held that review by certiorari

will be confined to the question stated in the petition as the

one presented to the Court for review.

National Licorice Co. v. National Labor Relations

Board, 309 U.S. 350 (Note 2, p. 357), 60 8S. Ct. 569,

84 L. Ed. 799.

Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U. 8. 253, 259, 64 8. Ct. 548,

88 L. Ed. 708, 321 U. 8. 754. Rehearing denied.

Steele r. Drummond, 275 U. 8. 199, 48 8. Ct. 53, 72 L.

Ed. 238.

4

In the light of that rule, we think that an adequate state-

ment of the facts would be those set forth in the opinion of the

Court below (R. 647-658). Summarized, these facts briefly

are that while plaintiff was employed by defendant as an

engineer, he sustained on November 12, 1949, as the conse-

quence of operating a defective grate shaker bar, lumbosacral

injuries consisting of a ruptured intervertebral disc between

the 4th and 5th lumbar vertebrae and disability arising there-

from (R. 27, f. 3; R. 28, ff. 1-3; R. 30, f. 1; R. 32; R. 33;

R. 100) ; that these injuries totally disabled plaintiff from do-

ing any kind of work (R. 71-73) ; that the bridge accident set

forth in the question above occurred, as petitioner states,

two years and eleven days after the accident in which he

sustained the bodily injuries as defendant’s employee; that

plaintiff did not claim any head injuries as a consequence of

defendant’s negligence on November 12, 1949 (R. 1-7); that

the only injury sustained by plaintiff as a consequence of

the bridge accident was a scratch on the forehead (R. 108)

and that there was no connection shown between the scratch

on the forehead sustained as a consequence of the bridge

accident and the lumbosacral injuries sustained as a con-

sequence of defendant’s negligence on November 12th, 1949

(R. 482; R. 483; R. 658).

While defendant claimed that plaintiff was not injured at

all at the time of trial and was able to resume his work as

a railroad engineer, it nevertheless offered evidence to show

the occurrence of the bridge accident consisting of the testi-

mony of plaintiff (R. 107-113) and of its witnesses, Kemp,

Young and Lippincott (R. 455-484). There was no motion to

strike the testimony of plaintiff concerning the bridge acci-

dent. Plaintiff, however, moved to strike the testimony of

Kemp, Young and Lippincott concerning the bridge accident

(R. 481-482) ; and the trial court struck the evidence of these

three witnesses (R. 482-483). The trial judge, who is now a

5

Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota and one of its

most distinguished citizens, stated as the reason for so strik-

ing the testimony of Kemp, Young and Lippincott (R. 483) :

“The reason I have permitted the testimony is to show

whether, in fact, he was injured, there was any injury

that amounted to testimony as an injury that affected the

person of the plaintiff. I see no testimony here unless it

is followed up by something additional upon which any

fact could be predicated as to injury received of any

consequence, therefore the Court must grant the mo-

tion.”

During the cross examination of plaintiff to elicit testimony

concerning the bridge accident, plaintiff's counsel objected

to such testimony on the grounds that there was no founda-

tion for it, and the Court indicated at that time that some

further foundation would have to be established (R. 108-109),

and during the examination of Witness Young, plaintiff’s

counsel indicated that he would have no objection to such

testimony if it were shown that the injuries sustained in the

bridge accident “aggravated” plaintiffs then condition (R.

457).

Notwithstanding these warnings, defendant offered no

evidence to show any connection between the bridge accident

injuries and the injuries on which plaintiff based recovery.

This, in spite ofthe fact that plaintiff was examined by de-

fendant’s regular physician, Dr. Yoerg, as peitioner states,

about two months after the bridge accident and about five

days before the trial.

Statement of Facts to Clarify the Statement Made By Petitioner.

Petitioner has made so many statements of facts which are

entirely unsupported by the evidence and has so colored and

slanted other facts that we deem it appropriate to set forth

all the facts in order that the Court may have the true factual

picture of the case. This statement shall consist of a chrono-

logical statement of the evidence question with summaries

of such important facts as we deem necessary to present a

true and factual statement of the case.

Chronological Statement of the Evidence.

Plaintiff, a resident of Ottumwa, Iowa, born on. July 28,

1899 (R. 12, ff. 1, 2) brought this action against defendant

to recover for injuries alleged to have been sustained by him

on November 12, 1949 (R. 3, f. 1), while employed by defend-

ant as a locomotive engineer, and while operating engine No.

480, while hauling about 70 cars from Laredo, Missouri, to

Ottumwa, Iowa (R. 3, ff. 1,2; R. 21, f. 3).

Plaintiff reported to work November 12, 1949, at 5:25 A.

M. the day on which he was injured, at the west yard at

Ottumwa, Iowa, where he was to be an engineer on a freight

train going to Laredo, Missouri, a distance of 103 miles, with

Robert J. Boyd as his fireman (R. 15, ff. 1, 2,3).

Plaintiff’s train left Ottumwa about 6:10 A. M. with 10

“loads” (loaded cars) and 16 empty cars pulled by an L-2

type, stoker-fired, coal-burning engine No. 480 (R. 16, ff.

1, 2, 3).

This was a steam engine with the fire box approximately

six feet wide and nine feet long located under the boiler;

the sides of the fire box being the boiler water-ledge, the front

the flue sheet where the flues are fastened on, and the bottom

consists of four sections of grates, each section operated in-

dependent of each other, and there are four lugs, two on the

engineer’s side, and two on the fireman’s side, which are used

7

to operate these grates, and that is done by a shaker bar on

them (R. 17, ff. 1, 2). The shaker bar is about 41% feet long

and the lugs are about six or eight inches high (R. 19, f. 3) ;

the shaker bar has a housing that fits down securely over the

lug which is tapered and if they are in good condition there

is no play in them, and many times it is necessary to tap

them with a coal pick to take the bar off the lug (R. 20, ff.

1, 2).

On leaving Ottumwa with 26 cars and the caboose the

engine carried 200 pounds of steam, the normal amount for

engine No. 480; no trouble was encountered with the engine

on the trip to Laredo, Missouri, as the train was light and

short (R. 20, f:3; R. 21, f. 1).

The engine was cleaned by the roundhouse force at Laredo

and the return trip from Laredo to Ottumwa was started

around 4:30 P. M. with the same engine No. 480 hauling about

70 cars, some being loads and some empties with the steam

gauge of the engine showing 200 pounds of steam (R. 21, ff.

2,3; R. 22, f. 1).

The first stop was made at Osgood, Missouri, 13.6 miles

from Laredo; the next stop was at Newton, Missouri, 13

miles from Osgood, and the third stop was at Powersville,

Missouri, 39 and some tenths miles from Laredo (R. 22, ff. 1,

2,3). Immediately after leaving Laredo the engine started

lagging steam and a mile from Laredo the steam was back

to 180 pounds and, on arrival at Osgood, was down to 140

pounds, whereas the normal amount of steam for this engine

hauling 70 cars should be 200 pounds at all times because

with 140 pounds the engine won’t handle the train, can’t make

speed and the brakes would start to drag and some of the

brakes would start to set (R. 22, f.3; R. 24, ff. 1, 2,3).

On arrival at Osgood, plaintiff, observing this condition,

instructed the fireman to clean the fire; the locomotive fire

box is cleaned by opening the grates and knocking out the

8

clinkers and when the clinkers are removed the grates are

straightened back up, the coal shoved ahead, then you have

practically a new fire. This operation took about 45 minutes.

The reduction in the amount of steam from 200 to 140 pounds

was caused by the engine not steaming because the flues were

leaking, the super heating units were leaking (R. 23, f. 3;

R. 24, ff. 1,2).

After the fireman cleaned the fire at Osgood the train

started for Newton with 180-185 pounds of steam; on reach-

ing Newton it was down to 130 pounds and the fire was dirty

and clinkered and plaintiff again instructed the fireman to

clean the fire at Newton. If the engine was in proper working

condition it wouldn’t be necessary to clean the fire or move

the grates on the trip from Laredo, Missouri, to Ottumwa,

Towa (R. 24, f.3; R. 25, ff. 1, 2).

After the fireman cleaned the fire at Newton, the train -

continued on to Powersville, arriving about seven-forty-fifty

and pulled in on the passing track with the engine headed

east, to let a passenger extra by, at which time the steam was

down to 130 pounds and the fireman said he was tired as it

was hard work cleaning the fire at intervals like he was

doing. Plaintiff told the fireman to go to the ground and

clean the ash pans beneath the engine and that plaintiff

would clean the fire (R. 25, f. 3; R. 26, ff. 1, 2,3; R. 27, ff. 1,

2; R. 146, ff. 1, 2).

Plaintiff cleaned the fire by putting the shaker bar down on

both of the lugs, first on the engineer’s side, opening and

closing the grates, then moved to the fireman's side and

cleaned one grate, having then one more to clean on the fire-

man’s side. While he was cleaning the last one and had the

grates open with the shaker bar pointing west, and if the

grates are in proper condition they work freely and can be

operated with one hand by moving back and forth toward

and away from the boiler head which in this instance would

-—

9

be east and west (R. 27, f. 3; R. 28, ff. 1, 2,3).

Plaintiff placed the shaker bar on the lug in the regular

and usual manner as far as it would go; there was slack in

it and a looseness evidently from wear; it was supposed to

fit tight but it was loose enough so you could jiggle it. With

that section of the grate open, plaintiff knocked all the clink-

ers out, shoved the live coal to the front section and every-

thing was removed from that section and the next job was to

close the grate (R. 28, f. 3; R. 29, ff. 1, 2, 3).

Plaintiff then attempted to pull the shaker bar to close the

grates and fa ing west with his hands on the top part of the

bar, his feet spread on the deck of the engine to brace him-

self, he pulled back on the shaker bar. The rod that connects

the grate lug to the grate, which is a part of the boiler, wasn’t

free, it was caught and there was a spring in it. Plaintiff took

hold atop the bar, got all the slack he could by pushing it in

forward motion and pulled back with all his strength and as

he did so, it came loose with a sudden, violent, unexpected

motion, the shaker bar came off and he was thrown against

the boilerhead hitting the lower part of his back (R. 30, ff.

} 2, 8; R.:31, ff. 1, 2,3).

The shaker bar shonld not come off if in proper working

condition, but the rod of the grate rigging was sprung and

if in proper working condition the grate should close easily,

based on plaintiff's experience in operating grates thousands

of times over a period of 32 or 33 years (R. 32, ff. 1, 2, 3).

That plaintiff, when speaking of the connecting rod being

twisted or bent, was speaking from observation of years of

experience cleaning fires and shaking grates; that he could

tell when one of those rods are sprung when he pulled back

on it; it was not just his opinion, he knew that is what hap-

pened (R. 100, ff. 1, 2, 3). |

Plaintiff, while he was attempting to clean the fire, was

able to see and determine the cause of lack of steam; he

10

could see water running down off the flue sheet in and out

of the ash pan. In his opinion that was the reason the steam

was being reduced, and the reason the fire had to be cleaned

on the different occasions on the trip from Laredo to Ottumwa

(R. 33, ff. 1, 2, 3).

At Powersville, plaintiff informed the dispatcher of the

situation and the 70 cars were taken out of the train at

Powersville and the engine and caboose proceeded to Ottum-

wa (R. 148, f. 1). The reason for setting out the train was

the poor condition of this engine (R. 164, f. 2).

Fireman Boyd did not think the engine was steaming good

enroute from Ottumwa to Laredo (R. 140, f. 3) ; the round-

house men cleaned the fire at Laredo as that is a terminal,

however, on the return trip the occasion for stopping at Os-

good was to clean the fire, as it was all clinkered, and they

didn’t have steam and had to “blow up for steam,” that is,

get the steam built up, so it would not necessitate setting out

the train. Again at Newton a stop was made to blow up for

steam and Boyd had to clean the fire again as the fire was

just a solid clinker (R. 142, ff. 2,3; R. 143, ff. 1, 2,3). On

leaving Newton, plaintiff took the place of fireman Boyd and

fired the engine to Powersville to see if he could get it hot, and

he didn’t have any better luck than Boyd, the fireman (R.

144, ff. 2,3). When Boyd looked at the fire at Powersville

it was pretty well blue, clinkered heavy fire and had to be

cleaned if the engine was going to do anything. Boyd was

“pretty well poohed out” doubling back, cleaning fire (R.

146, ff. 1, 2, 3). At Powersville he filled the boiler full of

water and put coal in with a scoop shovel to help keep it

from clinkering; had the blower on and got the engine hot.

Boyd went to eat and returned 20 minutes later. (R. 147, ff.

1, 2, 3). He found the water level had gone down as the en-

gine was leaking and the fire was cleaned again. Plaintiff

cleaned the fire and Boyd the ash pans, and while doing so,

11

plaintiff hollered to Boyd who came up in the cab and found ©

plaintiff all bent over the seat with the shaker bar in his

hand and he had the fire door open. One section of the grates

didn’t have coal over it and the rest of the fire was low. Boyd

lined up the grates and started building up the fire (R. 148,

f.2; R. 149, ff. 1, 2,3; R. 150, ff. 1,2). The engine was then

hooked onto the caboose and started for Ottumwa and Boyd

had more trouble after that keeping steam up than he did

when they had the train of 70 cars (R. 148, f. 3); that engine

480 had a plugged fire box; that it was leaking (R. 151, ff.

2,3; R. 152, f. 1); that it was unusual to clean the fire box

three times (R. 153, f. 1); that if the shaker bar is in position

it should not come loose (R. 155, f. 1, 2).

Carl A. Simpson, a retired engineer, formerly employed by

defendant for 33 years, operated engine No. 480 out of Laredo

on October 14, 1949 (R. 167, f. 3; R. 168, ff. 1, 2,3; R. 169,

f. 3), and on December 10, 1949, and again on December 15,

1949, and the engine was “leaking, bad flues” (R. 170, ff. 1, 2,

3; R. 171, f. 3), he had trouble for steam, engine leaking

every time he had it (R. 172, f. 3), the flues were leaking and

the grates would lock (R. 173,.f. 3), they would be solid and

you just didn’t move them, and there was only one way to

move them, and that was to knock the fire all out for that

section of the grates and clean it and then get it back; that

the leaks form a honeycomb or scale over the flue sheet and

stops air passage and stops the heat and kills the draft; that

his fireman had trouble with the grates; it took both Simpson

and his fireman to work one particular section of the grates,

and that they should not lock if in proper working order (R.

174, ff. 1, 2,3; R. 175, ff. 1, 2); that after a shaker bar has

been fitted over a grate lug and while shaking a fire, it should

not come off the lug; that they will wear from constant use

(R. 176, ff. 2,3; R. 177, f. 2). :

J. G. Story, a locomotive fireman employed by defendant

12

since December 11, 1926, who had fired hundreds of engines

(R. 184, f. 3; R. 185, ff. 1, 2, 3), testified that ice worked on

engine No. 480 on November 5, 1949, when the engine steamed

hard and they had to clean the fire; the grates were sticking

and hard to break loose and he told engineer Dobratz to re-

port the grates on the engine (R. 187, ff. 1, 2, 3).

Frank Chrisman, in the employ of defendant since 1941

as a locomotive engineer (R. 197, ff. 2, 3), testified that in

October and November of 1949, he operated engine No. 480

(R. 198, ff. 2, 3). He identified Plaintiff’s Exhibits 7, 8, 9,

10, as engine inspection reports prepared by him on engine

No. 480 at the end of runs on which he had operated the en-

gine. Exhibit 7 being dated October 21, 1949; Exhibit 8,

October 28, 1949; Exhibit 9, November 27, 1949, and Exhibit

10, December 1, 1949 (R. 199, ff. 2,3; R. 200, ff. 1,2). Ex-

hibit 7 reported: “Clean fire box and flues. Examine for

leaks. Water running out of pan. Raise up shaker rods, they

lay down on pan.” They connect grates with shaker lever

lug. “Left front sand pipe loose in joint above wheel. Square

valves, engine lame.”

Exhibit 8 reported: “Square valves, engine very lame.

Rods and boxes pounding bad. Take lost motion out of re-

verse gear. Tighten left top guide bolts. Tighten nuts of

left front binder bolts.”

Exhibit 9 reported: “Clean fire box and flues and examine

for leaking, engine steams very poor.” “Mud ring leaking,

right side.” “Left top inside guide bolts broken. Piece broken

out of cross head shoe. Set up left main wedge.” “Packing

nuts on pump pistons leaking. Oil air end of pump.”

Exhibit 10 reported: “Clean fire box and flues and test

out for leaks. Engine steams very poor. Fire cleaned twice

this trip. Packing.nuts on pump leaking.” These reports

were all in the handwriting of Chrisman and reported his

experiences with engine No. 480 on the dates specified (R.

13

202, ff. 2,3; R. 203, ff. 1, 2,3; RB. 204, ff. 1, 2).

William E. Woodrow, Jr., a witness for plaintiff, testified

that he was employed by defendant as an engineer and that

he had worked for over four years as a traveling fireman (R.

522 f. 3; R. 523, ff. 1, 2,3); that it was his duty to super-

vise fireman and instruct in the proper way to operate the

shaker bar and grates on engines of the. L-2 class, the type of

engine No. 480 (R. 525, ff. 1, 2, 3) ; ‘that the shaker bar oper-

ates towards the boiler head and opens the grates wide, also

back toward the tender and open the grates, the distance de-

pending upon the condition of the grate rigging and the

engine deck; that the grates can be opened by operating the

shaker bar toward the tender but not as much (R. 259, f. 1) ;

that the ordinary practice is to shake it back and forth, move

it to the limit both ways (R. 530, ff. 2,3; R. 551, f. 2); that

when the grates don’t move freely or catch in a certain posi-

tion the general cause is a bent rod (R. 533, f. 2); that the

place a bent rod will be caught on is between the fire box and

the top of the ash pan (R. 543, f. 2).

Defendant’s witness, J. L. Brosserd, denied that the grates

could be opened by moving the shaker bar to the forward

position (R. 253, ff. 1,2). Generally they could not, but there

are some engines with grate rods not of proper dimension,

they might tip back and forward some (R. 432, f. 3).

Frank B. Corr, a traveling engineer employed for defend-

ant (R. 440, ff. 1, 2), testified a forward movement of the

shaker bar opened the grates, and a backward movement

closed them (R. 446, ff. 1, 2,3); that if the shaker bar and

grates are in proper condition they should operate easily ;

that the grates can be opened some in the backward position

and if you want to close them you wiggle them back and

forth (R. 450, ff. 1, 2,3; R. 451, f.1).

Monty L. Kemp, a police officer of the Milwaukee road,

testified he saw plaintiff on the evening of November 23, 1951,

14

in a cafe at Ottumwa, Iowa (R. 455, ff. 1, 2,3); that he ap-

peared mussed up (R. 460, f. 3); that Kemp left the cafe

and drove to the Black Hawk River Bridge over the Des

Moines River where there were police officers and a Ply-

mouth sedan upside down below the bridge (R. 463, ff. 1,

2, 3), and damage to the bridge (R. 464, ff. 1, 2,3; R. 465,

ff. 1, 2, 3). This witness did not testify to seeing plaintiff

at the scene or that he had been in the automobile.

Warren J. Young, a police officer for the City of Ottumwa,

Towa, testified as did Kemp that he was at the scene of an

automobile accident at the Black Hawk Bridge (R. 470, f.

3; R. 471, ff. 1, 2, 3); that he found plaintiff’s name in the

car; that he searched for plaintiff but did not find him (R.

475, ff. 1, 2,3; R. 476, ff. 2, 3).

John Lippincott, Deputy Sheriff of Wappello County,

Iowa, testified that he went to plaintiff's home November 24

to serve a paper; that plaintiff had a small bandage on his

forehead, an inch or two (R. 477, ff. 2,3; R. 478, ff. 1, 2,3);

that he was not feeling well enough to go to town (R. 479,

f. 3).

On motion of plaintiff the testimony of Kemp, Young and

Lippincott was stricken for the reason that there was no

testimony that plaintiff had sustained any injury in the acci-

dent (R. 481, f.3; R. 482, f.3; R. 483, f. 1).

Howard T. McLaughlin, employed by defendant in the

claim department for 32 years, saw plaintiff June 6, 1951, and

that plaintiff told him how the accident of November 12, 1949,

occurred (R. 484, f. 1; R. 485, ff. 1, 2,3); that McLaughlin

prepared a statement, but plaintiff did not sign it (R. 492, ff.

1, 2).

Harold J. Barry, employed by defendant as District Ad-

juster since 1944 (R. 494, ff. 2,3), testified regarding the ab-

sence of Dr. Nelson at the trial (R. 496, f. 2).

Plaintiff lives on Rural Route 4, Ottumwa, Towa, on Rock

15

Bluff Road, and coming from town crosses Black Hawk

Bridge where he had an accident November 23, 1951, when his

car skidded and crashed into the bridge railing. Plaintiff

opened the door and got out of the car (R. 106, f. 3; R. 107,

ff. 1, 2,3). Plaintiff received no injuries except a scratch on

his forehead.

Summary of Evidence as to Defects in Grates.

There was testimony that the grate rods were too low and

close to the ash pan (R. 206); that the rods should have

been raised (R. 202); that where, as here, the rods become

“red hot,” they bend easier (R. 543); that the rod on the

grate being shaken by plaintiff was bent and sprung (R. 30,

31, 32); that an experienced operator of the shaker could

tell that the rod was bent and caught by the spring thereof

(R. 30-31; R. 533); that the grates on this engine stuck

(R. 187); that one section of these grates would lock (R.

173) or get stuck (R. 30).

Plaintiff testified that the effect of the rods getting caught

was a sort of recoil or spring action. He testified :

“A, When I pulled on the shaker bar it had com-

pressed this grate rod enough to free it up and it let go

with all this force, acted as a spring.” (R. 121.)

The witness, William Woodrow, Jr., testified :

“Q. And you can’t tell from seeing it whether it is or

not bent?

“A, You could certainly tell from seeing it if you

saw it.

“Q. Isay, from the cab you can’t see it, therefore you

can’t see whether it is or is not bent?

“A. May I answer that?

“Q. I would like to have you answer my question.

“A. The only way I can answer that is in this way:

When you are working and the grates don’t move freely

or catch in a certain position, the general cause of that is

a bent grate rod, and the feeling of a bent grate rod is

16

different than it would be if there was something ahead,

like between the grates; does that answer your ques-

tion, sir?” (R. 535.)

“A. Well, the reason I said that it is often quite pos-

sible with a bent rod to move it back and forth, but if

the rod is put in an extreme position, or in one position,

oftentime it catches and when you pull on that rod, there

is give to it a lot of times is what I meant by being able

to feel; it isn’t like you were pulling against a stone

wall, there is just a little bit of spring; you have all

done that, felt that, when you get a hold of something—”

(R. 535.)

Grates and rods in good repair and condition operate free-

ly without getting stuck (R. 32; R. 174-175; R. 527).

The witnesses on this point were plaintiff, Carl A. Simp-

son, and plaintiff's son who was a traveling fireman for de-

fendant and whose duties were to instruct others in the use

of shakers and grates. All had had extensive experience,

working about locomotives in the defendant’s shop, and were

competent to testify as to these matters and had worked on

engine No. 480, the one involved here (R. 11-13; R. 167-176;

R. 522-525).

Defendant’s only evidence to the contrary was the testi-

mony of defendant’s witness, Brossard, who had no knowl-

edge of engine No. 480 and also certain shop records.

Summary of Evidence as to Defects in Shaker Bar.

Shaker bars become worn from use and vibration of the

locomotive (R. 178); from use as an all-around tool (R. 527-

528); and because that is true are likely to come off while

being used (R. 538-540). Mr. Woodrow, Jr., testified:

“A. Yes, the shaker bar is one of the handiest pieces

of equipment on the engine. It is used to straighten out

switch points. There are gratings on the deck, if you

have some trouble, a lot of times they don’t fit properly,

and they pound against it to get those down; it is used

17

to pry side rods or main rods; whenever it takes some-

thing heavy for a pry, it is used for that purpose.” (R.

528.)

“A. A lot of times this lug, it is hard to get it back

into locking position from either direction, so they take

the body of this shaker bar and they beat against it;

the reason for that is rather simple. This bar weighs, I

would say, between 15 and 20 pounds, and if it is four

or five feet long, you try to stand with one hand and work

that and get your lock in position, it is rather hard to do,

and a lot of times they will take those shaker bars and

pry it or beat on it into a locking position, and a lot of

times when these shaker bars fit tight, get way down on

your lug, you have to take something pretty heavy and

beat it in order to get it loose, and in that process, a lot

of our shaker bars are cracked, and are brazed, so it will

be because this is beaten up and the shaker bar won’t fit

properly, or because this is too big.

“Q. If you do have a crack in the housing that makes

an additional surface to catch, doesn’t it, because it fits

over tightly?

“A. You will have to go a little farther.

“Q. If you are going to make it loose enough to come

off, you have got to be able to get it—if you are going to

get it loose enough so it will come off, you have got to

be able to go right down into the grate lug which is

parallel, is that right, so that you have got a big enough

opening, otherwise, if you have got enough of an opening

so it will catch on the slanting portion of the grate lug,

it is hard to bring it off, whenever you push it down

and place it properly, isn’t that right?

“A. Yes, sir, when it slips off it is because most of

the time, because it won’t fit clear down onto the lug like

it should.

“Q. Because it won’t go all the way down on the lug?

“A. Yes, sir.” (R. 538-540.)

Engine No. 480 had been in service for about 30 years (R.

246-247).

be a possibility of a shaker bar slipping off” the grate lug

Defendant's witness Brosserd testified that “there wouldn’t

18

(R. 237) ; but he also testified only from his knowledge of the

class of engines to which locomotive No. 480 belonged, and

not from personal knowledge of that locomotive (R. 255).

The testimony also was that, if the shaker bar and the

grate lug were in good condition and repair, the shaker would

not come off by operating the grates by means thereof (R. 32;

R. 526-527) ; but do come off if the lug itself is worn or the

shaker bar is damaged (R. 527).

It is undisputed that this particular shaker bar was so

loose that it could be jiggled by mere handling it (R. 29).

Summary of Evidence as to Whether Shaker Bar Can Be Pulled

Backward Toward the Tender.

Plaintiff’s version as to the happening of the accident was

that he pulled the shaker bar back toward the tender then

pulled it toward the boiler, and that while pulling it toward

the boiler, it sprung so as to throw him with great force

against the boiler (R. 30-31). Defendant contended that the

accident could not have happened in that manner for the

reason that the shaker bar could not be pulled back toward

the tender and that the farthest back it would go was in a

perpendicular position (R. 257-258).

The testimony that the grates could be opened by pulling

the shaker bar consisted of that of plaintiff (R. 30-31) and

that of William Woodrow, Jr., who testified :

“Q. Assuming the grates were in good condition, per-

fect condition the way you have described, you say, in the

backward motion you could open the grates one inch;

how far could you open the grates in the forward motion

toward the boiler?

“A. I don’t know in exactly inches, but it will open

enough that the grates will tip at an angle about like

this; it would depend on how wide the grates are.

“Q. They will fully open, and I take it what you

described will be something like a foot. I’m not tying

‘ you down to inches, that is about your opinion, isn’t it?

19

“Mr. Rerat: Let him give his opinion.

“A. No, I would say eight inches, ten inches.

“Q. What?

“A. Eight to ten inches.

“Q. Anyway, it is to the full opening?

“A. Yes, sir.” (R. 546.)

While Mr. Brosserd denied that the grates could be so

opened by a pull of the shaker bar toward the tender, he also

testified :

“Q. Material or not material, I want to get your testi-

mony so we don’t misunderstand each other. Your testi-

mony here is that by a backward position toward the

tender that the grates can’t be opened or manipulated

with the shaker bar in that direction, is that it?

“A. That would depend on how the locking device,

how the deck of the engine is, where the shaker staff

comes through.

“Q. And if they do open in that direction does that

mean that there is something wrong with the mechanics

of that particular part of the boiler?

“A. Well, it would hinder the full opening forward

the way they were intended to be.

“Q. Does that mean there is something defective,

then, about that particular apparatus?

“A. I wouldn’t call it defective. I wouldn’t call it a

desirable condition.” (R. 433.)

Summary of the Testimony Relating to Plaintiff's Injuries.

Plaintiff himself testified that he was thrown against the

boiler with a “very hard impact” (R. 32); that he suffered

great pain therefrom (R. 33) in the small of the back, hips

and legs (R. 34); that he endured such pain on the- return

trip all the way back to Ottumwa (R. 34); that, when he

got back to Ottumwa he told the roundhouse foreman about

his injury and got from him an order to go to the company’s

doctor, Dr. Nelson, of Ottumwa (R. 35); that he then went

home, where his wife took care of him and put hot packs

on his back and where he had a night of pain, sleeplessness—

20

a hard, restless night (R. 35); that the next day (November

13, 1949) he went to Dr. Nelson, the company’s doctor (R.

35), who gave him hypodermic shots and taped his back, and

told him to use hot packs at home and he would be all right

and able to go back to work (R. 36) ; and that thereafter his

wife applied hot packs, but he took no medicine (R. 36).

From November 13, 1949, to December 23, 1949, he worked

“as best he could.” During this time he went to Dr. Nelson

every few days, took the pills prescribed for him by the

doctor (R. 36) and continued to have his wife put on the hot

packs (R. 37); but he was never free of pain in the back and

pains in the legs, which were “terrific” (R. 37). On Decem-

ber 23, 1949, he took his regular run as an engineer from

Ottumwa to Laredo. His condition became acute while he

was at Laredo and as a consequence he was unable to operate

the engine back to Ottumwa. Instead he rode back as a

passenger—in railroad parlance he deadheaded back (R. 38).

As to his condition at that time he testified :

“A. I was in such intense pain I couldn’t sit down, I

couldn’t stand up, I tried to stand up and I tried on my

knees, and it was necessary for me to lay off when I

arrived at Laredo and deadhead home on the passenger.”

Upon plaintiff’s return to Ottumwa, he again consulted Dr.

Nelson, who in the period between December 24, 1949, and

January 18, 1950, made arrangements to send plaintiff to Dr.

Metz, in Chicago, defendant’s head surgeon, for treatment in

Wesley Memorial Hospital in that city, where he remained

for 30 days (R. 38-39). While in the hospital his back pained

him at all times and he was given massage and pills and had a

rectum operation (R. 38-41).

Plaintiff returned home in February, 1950, and continued

to consult Dr. Nelson. He worked as an engineer from Febru-

ary 28, 1950, to August 28, 1950. During this time he sv.ffered

intense pain in his back and legs, walked with difficulty, con-

21

tinued his consultations with Dr. Nelson and his hot pack

treatments at home. He slept on a board as directed by Dr.

Metz of Chicago. After work he went to bed (R. 40-41). In

April, 1950, Dr. Nelson called in Dr. Fox of Ottumwa, who

fitted plaintiff with a heavy brace (R. 41). On August 28,

1950, Dr. Nelson again called in Dr. Fox and they had plain-

tiff put in a hospital in Ottumwa for about a week. While

there, he was put in traction, given electric diathermy and

treatment for skin sores caused by the brace (R. 40-44).

After leaving the hospital in Ottumwa in September, 1950,

plaintiff was again sent to Dr. Metz in Chicago (defendant’s

head surgeon) who treated him again at Wesley Memorial

Hospital in Chicago by means of massage, medication and

sedatives every day. That was the last time he was in a hos-

pital (R. 44-46). He was there for 57 days (R. 215).

After plaintiff left the hospital in December, 1950, he

was continuously under Dr. Nelson’s care until a few days

before the trial in March, 1952. During 1951, Dr. Nelson

called in, besides Dr. Fox, a Dr. Eberle E. Thornton, an ortho-

pedist of Des Moines, Iowa, who fitted plaintiff with another,

but a lighter body brace for which defendant’s claim agent,

Harold J. Barry, paid (R. 46-47). During all the time from

the date of the injury, November 12, 1949, to the time of

trial, plaintiff suffered terrible pain and loss of sleep, which

he described in his testimony, as follows:

“A. Well, the pain in the small of my back feels

just like you were sticking an ice pick in it, and it runs

down my leg, and that is also from laying, and when I

twist or turn, I couldn’t tell you—it is just like you were

getting stabbed in the back; unexpected shock, like rid-

ing an engine, just the normal operation of the engine,

every time you hit a little joint or high joint or flat spot

on one of the wheels, it hits vou in the back like some-

body sticking a knife in you.” (R. 48.)

“A. I don’t sleep well. If I have any activity, then

this pain gets my back. I lay down in bed and relax,

22

maybe after a couple of hours I can go to sleep, but the

first time I turn around, bang, I am awake again; every

time you move, it is there.” (R. 49.)

Prior to his injury, plaintiff had been in good health and

had not been involved in any railroad accident (R. 49).

After the accident plaintiff lost 45 pounds in weight—his

weight decreased from 205 to 160 pounds.

Plaintiff's wife testified that plaintiff had been in good

health prior to his injury (R. 217) and slept well (R. 216) ;

that she “cried” when plaintiff came home during the night

of November 12, 1949, after his injury because he looked so

“terrible’ (R. 213); that she found his back swollen and

sore at that time (R. 213); that she administered hot packs

and heat treatments (R. 214); that plaintiff was attended

by Dr. Nelson, was in the Ottumwa Hospital 20 days (R.

215); worked from February to August, 1950; that he went

to see Dr. Nelson during that time and had home treatments

(R. 215); that he was in the Chicago hospital for 57 days

(R. 215); and that he suffered intense pain and could not

sleep. She testified:

“Q. What has been the situation since he was injured

on November 12, 1949?

A. Well, I used to have a hard time waking him up.

Now I pray for him so he can sleep; he can’t sleep.”

and that he lost 45 pounds in weight.

Dr. Arthur E. Bratrud testified on behalf of plaintiff that

he, the doctor, graduated in 1912 from the University of Min-

nesota College of Medicine (R. 51); that he served an intern-

ship at Ancker Hospital in St. Paul, Minnesota (R. 52);

that he did post-graduate work at Johns Hopkins (R. 52) ;

that he was of the Department of Peripheral Nerve Surgery

in the Reconstruction Hospital; that he was on the staffs

of Asbury and Mt. Sinai Hospitals and free to practice in

others in Minneapolis (R. 52-53); that he was a member of

23

numerous medical societies—naming them (R. 53); and

that he is and had been an assistant professor in surgery at

the University of Minnesota. He personally examined plain-

tiff, studied his medical history, including his prior medical

treatment and the records of the Ottumwa Hospital and X-

rays which he had taken (R. 54-60). His examination showed

plaintiff had muscle spasm in the lumbo-sacral region which

“* * * indicates that it is—there is some deeper in-

jury there below the skin, deep in the muscle or liga-

ments; the ligaments surround the bony structure, and

spasin is nothing more than an effort of nature to hold

those areas at rest so as to give them relief.” (R. 60.)

He also found that there had been a narrowing of the space

between the 4th and 5th vertebrae, the significance of which

was:

“It usually means that there is an injury or a rupture;

I mentioned about this fluid inside of the middle of this

cartilage; it usually means that there is a rupture

of it with destruction of it, and the vertebrae become

more collapsed, begin to draw more closely together.”

(R. 63.)

“Now, if you compare these vertebrae here, it looks as

though there might have been a compression injury,

that is a flattening out of the anterior portion of this

vertebrae, of the body. You can see the distance, the

width of this vertebrae as compared to this one, there

is quite a difference on the anterior margin. And here

again, in the lower part of the spine, if you compare the

distance between the two vertebrae in this area, it ap-

pears as though there is a lessening in this inter-verte-

bral space, 4 and 5.” (R. 64.)

He also described plaintiffs condition as:

“A. Well, I think primarily he has a prolapsed or

injured disc. "

Q. Which one, Doctor, would you say?

A. Lumbar 4 to 5, and I think he has had an aggra-

vation of his arthritic condition, and he probably had a

24

great deal of tearing of the ligaments around the lumbar

sacral junction, and there is apparently some irritation

of the nerves leading to both lower extremities.

Q. Iam sorry but I am trying to get everything you

stated; you mentioned the nerve?

A. There is some irritation or injury to the nerves

leading to the lower extremities.” (R. 67.)

These injuries affected plaintiff's back and legs. He also tes-

tified that as a consequence of such, injuries were permanent

(R. 69); that such injuries permanently disabled plaintiff

from doing his work as a railroad engineer, the kind of work

he had done for 27 years (R. 71-72); and that such injuries

and disability were caused by the accident plaintiff was in on

November 12, 1949 (R. 73).

Ottumwa Hospital Records. These showed that plaintiff

had been treated in the hospital by Dr. Nelson and Dr. Fox

and that Dr. Fox diagnosed his case as one of “retropulsed

dise” with pains in the back and legs (R. 212; R. 318).

The admission diagnosis of plaintiff's case when he was re-

ceived at Ottumwa Hospital was that he had a “retropulsed

disc with unstable lumbo- sacral joint.” (R. 308).

Wesley Memorial Hospital Records. When plaintiff was

received at this hospital, X-rays were taken of his lumbo-

sacral region by a Dr. Barth, which were made part of the

hospital record. Dr. Barth noted thereon (R. 303):

“A. The vertebral bodies and interspaces are of nor-

mal height, except for a narrowed interspace between

the fourth lumbar vertebra and the adjacent transitional

type fifth lumbar vertebra.”

The X-rays which Dr. Barth found which he stated showed

a narrowing between the fourth and fifth vertebrae were

identified by Dr. Householder at page 304 of the record.

The medical testimony on behalf of defendant consisted of

the testimony of three doctors, none of whom had treated

25

plaintiff professionally. Plaintiff had been attended by at

least five doctors employed by defendant, viz. :

Dr. Nelson of Ottumwa

Dr. Fox of Ottumwa

Dr. Thornton of Des Moines

Dr. Metz of Chicago

Dr. Householder of Chicago

He was examined by these five doctors and also by two others,

Dr. Conley of Chicago and Dr. Yoerg of Minneapolis.

Only Drs. Householder, Conley and Yoerg testified as wit-

nesses. Dr. Yoerg was the only doctor who produced his notes

of the examination made by him. Dr. Householder and Dr.

Conley did not produce their notes.

Dr. Householder testified that he graduated in medicine in

1922 and commenced to practice in 1923 (R. 260); that he

was a member of numerous medical societies (R. 261); that

he had been assistant surgeon of defendant since 1927 and

became chief surgeon 34 days before he testified at the trial

(R. 260-261); that on January 18, 1950, he examined plain-

tiff as to his injuries and condition and found that he had

pains in sacroiliac region of the back on both the right and

left sides, over both buttocks and down into the legs (R.

263); that he had an abscess in the rectum (R. 266). He

stated that plaintiff claimed that he had been hurt shaking

grates (of an engine) with a shaker bar (R. 264); but that

plaintiff had said nothing about having been thrown against

the boiler (R. 265), nor about the shaker bar coming loose

(R. 265). He did not testify as to whether he inquired about

the last mentioned matters. He also testified that X-rays

were taken of plaintiff's lower back and that the X-rays

showed no evidence of injury between the fourth and fifth

vertebrae (R. 270-272) or of “unusual narrowing of the inter-

vertebral space between those vertebrae” (R. 273).

26

Again on September 26, 1950, plaintiff was re-admitted

to the hospital (R. 275). Dr. Metz determined whether he

should be so re-admitted (R. 277). The re-admission was

made because of plaintiff’s complaints of back injuries (R.

277-278). X-rays again were taken (R. 278), which showed

no changes (R. 279). He further testified that he had exam-

ined Dr. Bratrud’s X-ray films and that they showed no evi-

- dence of fracture, dislocation or injury in the fourth-fifth

vertebrae region (R. 284-286).

He testified that in his opinion plaintiff had received “no

injury” on November 12, 1949, and that plaintiffs pain and

soreness are associated with degenerative changes (R. 287-

288).

On cross examination he testified that he did not have his

notes with him (R. 290); that he refreshed his recollection

before the trial by “looking” at the hospital record (R. 291) ;

that he could not say whether Dr. Nelson of Ottumwa had

sent plaintiff to Chicago to be treated for back injuries for

the reason that he had not examined the correspondence with

respect to the matter before the trial and did not have the

correspondence with him (R. 292); that he found that

plaintiff had muscle spasm in lumbo-sacral region of the back

(R. 293), but that the X-rays didn’t show any intervertebral

injuries (R. 299). He further testified that Dr. Metz was in

Chicago and not present at the trial (R. 294), and that

plaintiff was hospitalized at Dr. Metz’s suggestion (R. 295-

296). He also testified that X-rays will show bone structure

and injuries, but not injuries to the muscles and ligaments

(R. 299). He testified that some of the symptoms and factors

involved in an intervertebral injury such as plaintiff claimed

to have were pain in the back (R. 301), muscle spasm (R.

300), narrowing of the intervertebral spaces (R. 302). He

found no such narrowing (R. 303). He admitted that the

Ottumwa Hospital record showed that Dr. Nelson and Dr.

27

Fox diagnosed plaintiff's injury as “retropulsed disc” be-

tween the fourth and fifth vertebrae (R. 317) and that the

Wesley Memorial Hospital record made by Dr. Barth, who

took X-rays there, showed a narrowing of the intervertebral

space between the fourth and fifth vertebrae (R. 303-304).

He refrained from explaining the significance of “insecurity

in the lumbosacral joint” found by Dr. Fox (R. 314).

He gave it as his opinion that, if plaintiff had all the evi-

dences of injury to the disc in the intervertebral space be-

tween the fourth and fifth vertebrae claimed by him, plain-

tiff had the injuries which he claimed and that the traction

treatment administered (at the Ottumwa Hospital) was a

recognized treatment for the relief thereof (R. 318-319) ; but

that he was of the opinion that plaintiff had no such injury

(R. 322).

Dr. Conley testified that he had never treated plaintiff

(R. 348), but that he had examined plaintiff in his office in

Chicago (R. 331); that plaintiff complained of pains in

sacroiliac region or lower back (R. 332-334); that X-rays

were taken for him by a Dr. Cannon (R. 342-343) ; that what

an X-ray will disclose depends upon the position of the light

tubes and the manner of reading the X-ray film (R. 337-340) 2

that, if Dr. Cannon’s were read one way, they disclosed a nar-

rowing between the fourth and fifth vertebral and if read in

a different way, they did not do so. His testimony was:

“A. Well, if you call this the fourth and call this the

fifth, that is normal, there is no narrowing. If you call

this the fourth and this the fifth, there appears to be

some narrowing because the X-ray is right over this area

and not centered over this one. It is not taken—the

direct ray is centered right here, and this point in

another film is not entirely straight here. If this hap-

pened to havé been taken from the other side—you are

dealing with bodies with thickness—taken from the

other side, then it would appear wider. We can see on

28

the front of you that there is no narrowing between the

fourth and fifth. This is Defendant’s Exhibit X. Now,

in this particular film, depending upon if we call this the

fifth and this the fourth, there is quite a wide space

here. If we call this the fourth and this the fifth, the

space above does not appear quite as wide as it does

below but if you take a film of this type, between the

fourth and fifth, there is quite a wide space here—this

is the center, is exactly over this particular film and this

is Defendant’s Exhibit Y; this is taken to throw out

quite broader, to include the sacroiliac joints. If you

look at a side view of a large area of these intervertebral

spaces, they are all the same and seem to be quite well

open, there is no particular narrowing.” (R. 338, f. 3;

R. 339, ff. 1, 2.

He gave it as his opinion that there was no evidence that

plaintiff had intervertebral injury between the fourth and

fifth vertebrae (R. 346); that plaintiff was not injured, and

that he could go back to work (R. 348).

On cross examination the doctor stated that, while he

had notes, he did not have them with him (R. 349); that

it was not necessary to do so (R. 349-350); that he had

brought along his X-rays and his memory and that “I care-

| fully reviewed my record before I came here, and that is the

proper (this word later was stricken) procedure” (R. 350) ;

| that (contrary to what Dr. Householder said) traction is not

a recognized procedure for treating dise injuries, but may be

| used for back injuries (R. 352-353); that he looked for

muscle spasm (R. 354-355), but found none (R. 357). He

stated that narrowing of the intervertebral spaces, pain in

back extending down into legs, and muscle spasm are all

factors to be considered in determining the existence of an

intervertebral dise injury (R. 354-355; R. 362-364). He con-

cluded by stating that “I firmly believe” that I know more

about plaintiff's condition as a consequence of his own exam-

ination, which took about one-half hour (R. 348), than Dr.

Sar

29

Nelson did as a consequence of attending and treating plain-

tiff for over two years (R. 364).

Dr. Yoerg testified with the aid of his notes and stated:

“I then inquired as to what he was in the office for,

what it was about. He told me that he had injured his

back in an accident on November 12, 1949, about 7:30 in

the evening, at Powersville, Missouri, said he was help-

ing fireman clean fire, shaking grate, and he had to give

it a hard pull, it suddenly let go and he wrenched his

back, the shaker bar then came off, he said he was thrown

against the boiler head.”

The rest of his notes is a resumé of most of the case history

(R. 370-372). He testified that on Exhibit AA the space be-

tween the fourth and fifth vertebrae appeared “narrower” (R.

373), but that all depends on how the picture was taken and

how it is read (R. 373-374). He found muscle spasm, but

nothing abnormal except back pains (R. 376). His conclu-

sion was that at the time of trial plaintiff could not do the

work of a railroad engineer, but would be able to do so in a

month to six weeks, if he would quit wearing his brace and

have some manipulation (R. 378-379).

On cross examination he testified that he did not treat

plaintiff professionally and saw him only for about 45

minutes (R. 390); that the treatment given by Dr. Nelson

and Dr. Fox could be proper for a disc case (R. 391), but

that he found no disc injury at the time of trial (R. 396) ;

that the records of Wesley Memorial Hospital show a finding

of narrowing of the intervertebral space between the fourth

and fifth vertebrae (R. 397-398) ; that pain in lumbo-sacral

region radiating down into the legs and muscle spasm are

evidences of such intervertebral injury (R. 398).

He testified also that Dr. Bratrud and Dr. Barth saw in

their X-ray films a narrowing between the fourth and fifth

vertebrae (R. 400, 401) but that he was able to determine

30

a stereopticon made by a Dr. Lyons that there was no such

narrowing (R. 407). The stereopticon was not preduced in

court and no demonstration thereof given.

Summary of Evidence Relative to Damages.

Plaintiff's own testimony already stated above was to the

effect that he had a partial physical disability from November

12, 1949, to August, 1950; that thereafter until the time of

trial he was totally disabled; and that he suffered severe and

acute pain both day and night so that he was uncomfortable

and suffered during the daytime and was unable to sleep at

night (R. 48-50). His wife’s testimony was to the same effect.

She was an eye-witness to his suffering and in desperation

and hope prayed that the man she could not awaken when

he was well might be blessed with sleep as relief from his

agony (R. 213-216). Dr. Bratrud testified unqualifiedly that

plaintiff was permanently and totally disabled from working

as a railroad engineer (R. 71-73).

Plaintiff's life expectancy was 19.49 years at. time of trial

(R. 211-212).

His average earnings per month as an engineer were

(R. 84):

bea eee: $474.32 (during time he worked)

BR Socks naisicies 432.20

jek Pah aa a 245.31

31

CALCULATION OF RESPONDENT'S DAMAGES

As shown in the statement of facts just made, plaintiff's

loss of earnings, past and prospeetive, exceeded the verdict

as reduced by the trial court by at least $54,000.00. This

amount consists of the following:

Loss of earnings from February, 1950, to

March, 1952, 19 months at 474.32................ $ 9,002.08

Loss of wages during his expectancy of 19.49

years at an average of 450.00 per month... 105,246.00

IIE psc coals ouspisn cguacnmcdaecenicsaaliola tal $114,248.08

This does not include any allowance for pain and suffering.

We think that the jury would have been justified in award-

ing plaintiff somewhere between $35,000.00 and $70,000.00

as an additional allowance for such damages.

ARGUMENT

L.

Where Later Injuries Are to a Different Part of the Body and Are

Not Shown to Have Any Connection With the Injuries on Which

Plaintiff Bases His Cause of Action, Evidence Concerning the

Later Injuries Should Be Excluded.

City of Birmingham v. Carlson, 209 Ala. 428, 96 So. 333.

Hall v. Shenandoah, 167 Towa 735, 149 N. W. 831.

Johnson v. City of Troy (N. Y.), 124 App. Div. 29.

Rhyner v. City of Menasha, 107 Wis. 201, 83 N. W. 303.

In the case of Birmingham v. Carlson, supra, plaintiff sus-

tained a sprain of the left ankle due to stepping into a depres-

sion in a street and later sustained an injury to the right

ankle. The Court excluded the evidence of injury to the right

ankle upon the ground that there was no testimony to show

any connection between the two injuries. The Alabama Court

said (96 So. 335) :

32

“Dr. Anthony, testifying as a witness for plaintiff, de-

scribed plaintiff’s injury, a sprain of the left ankle, and

his treatment thereof. On cross examination, after the

court had overruled plaintiff's objection to evidence of

trouble with the ‘other ankle,’ this witness described a

trouble on the outer side of plaintiff’s right ankle, which

he saw and treated about six weeks after the injury in

question. He described the trouble on the outer side of

the right ankle as being probably a thrombus or clot, in

a vein which was relieved as soon as the vein was opened

and allowed to bleed a little. He said that this trouble

had nothing whatever to do with the injury to the left

ankle, and said further, in effect, that it did not affect

the right ankle, meaning, as we suppose, and as the jury

may have inferred, that it did not affect the use or

strength of the left ankle, Then on plaintiff’s motion

this evidence as to plaintiff’s right ankle was excluded.

There was in this no error, though plaintiff did not re-

peat the objection which had been overruled. Not only

did the testimony of the witness show that this later

trouble had nothing to do with the accident, but, if de-

fendant would have had the jury find a weakness of the

right ankle which may have contributed to plaintiff’s

injury, the evidence related to a time too remote, and,

if not too remote in point of time, the fact furnished no

excuses for the condition of the street.” (Emphasis sup-

plied. )

In the case of Johnson v. City of Troy, supra, the pertinent

facts appear from the following quotation of the Court (R.

30-31) :

“While the plaintiff's counsel assured the Court when

the evidence objected to was received that he would con-

nect it, and while it was shown that the plaintiff received

an injury to the groin or to the right side of his abdomen

and that there was contusion and inflammation there

which the physician who attended and operated upon

him testified he was reasonably certain was due to the

accident, there was a complete failure of proof to show

that the appendicitis for which the plaintiff was operated

upon was necessarily and directly caused by the injuries

which the plaintiff received.” (Emphasis supplied. )

33

In the case of Rhyner v. City of Menasha, supra, the Wis-

consin Court said (107 Wis. 210-211, 83 N. W. 307) :

“Plaintiff's accident happened in November, 1891.

Dr. Oviatt was permitted to testify that he performed an

operation on plaintiff's leg in the summer of 1893, for

which he charged $100. The record contains no testi-

mony showing any necessary or causal connection be-

tween the injury and the subsequent operation. Unless

so connected, the evidence was improper.” (Emphasis

supplied. )

These authorities are pursuasive that the evidence rela-

tive to the bridge accident was very properly stricken from

the record by the learned trial judge. In view of the fact,

as above set forth, that defendant claimed throughout that

plaintiff was not injured at all and that he was able to resume

his work as a locomotive engineer and of the further fact

that Dr. Yoerg claimed the plaintiff's only trouble was arth-

ritis from which he would recover in a month or two, it seems

to us that petitioner has taken an inconsistent position which

should preclude it from even asserting the contention which

it now makes, On the one hand it claims that plaintiff was

not injured and on the other it claims that he was. injured

solely as the result of the bridge accident. But its claim that

plaintiff was not injured extends according to its evidence

even to the injuries sustained in the bridge accident for the

reason that Dr. Yoerg who examined plaintiff after the bridge

accident testified that plaintiff was not injured at all.

At any rate, it is clear that under the authorities the evi-

dence concerning the scratch on the forehead which plaintiff

sustained in the bridge accident had no connection with the

Inmbo-sacral injuries which plaintiff sustained in the railroad

accident.

In this connection, it is important to bear in mind that

the Witness Kemp testified that he didn’t know anything

about the bridge accident or how it happened (R. 468); that

34

plaintiff's Plymouth sedan was found upside down under the

bridge (R. 464) ; that he saw plaintiff in the Milwaukee Cafe

in Ottumwa within a few minutes after the accident and that

plaintiff was then moving around in said place (R. 456-458).

The Witness Young simply testified to the fact that plaintiff's

automobile was found upside down under the bridge and that

part of the bridge railing had been knocked down (R. 473-76).

Testimony of the Witness Lippincott was that on the day

after the accident, plaintiff had a small bandage on his fore-

head and that plaintiff stated that he did not feel well enough

to go to town (R. 478-480). In short, none of these witnesses

testified that plaintiff was in the car when it went over the

bridge, much less that plaintiff had sustained any injuries as

a consequence thereof. Plaintiff’s statement that he was not

well enough to go to town on the day following the accident

was not shown to relate to any disability caused by the bridge

accident, and therefore, under the authorities cited, was not

admissible.

Plaintiff's own version was that the bridge accident oc-

curred because of the slippery and icy condition of the road

that night; that the car skidded; that the skidding knocked

out part of the railing on the west side of the bridge; that

plaintiff got out of the car just before it went off the bridge.

At that time plaintiff was sober (R. 107-112). Plaintiff’s tes-

timony, in part, is:

“Q. All right, you tell us what happened.

“A. On this particular date I was going home, and

it was a very rough approach onto this bridge, and the

bridge was covered with ice; I was only driving five

or six miles an hour slowed down with the brake, and

the car started to skid, and it crashed into the railing on

the right side, and it bumped along there a little, and

I opened the door and got out—the car practically

came to a stop—I opened the door and got out of the car,

and the car did turn over and fall off the bridge. I was

never into the left hand rail or any place; it just kind

35

of skidded sideways; it was a wooden guard rail, by the

way, knocking that off, and the car skidded—it was only

going a mile or two an hour, a mile I would say—I

opened the door, got out, and the car turned over.

“Q. You got out of the car and let the car go off the

bridge and fall down 12 or 15 feet down below, and turn

upside down?

“A. The car went off five or six feet, I guess, some-

thing like that.

“Q. It is 12 or 15 feet down there?

“A. Regardless of what it is, the car went over the

bridge.

“Q. Did you have any injuries?

“A. Absolutely not, except a scratch on my forehead.

I had a scratch on my forehead as I got out, I bumped

the door and had a scratch on my forehead.” (R. 107-

108.) (Emphasis supplied. )

Plaintiff's testimony that he did not sustain any injuries

in the bridge accident except the scratch on his forehead was

absolutely uncontradicted and undisputed.

It is respectfully submitted that the trial court simply

followed the well-established rules of evidence in striking

the testimony of Kemp, Young and Lippincott because it

was not shown; first, that plaintiff had sustained any in-

juries as the result of the bridge accident, except the scratch

on the forehead; and secondly, because it was not shown that

the scratch on the forehead had anything to do with the in-

juries for which plaintiff sought recovery against the defend-

ant.

36

it.

Striking Testimony Is Not Prejudicial Where the Facts to Which

the Testimony Relates Is Otherwise Established.

It is the rule of this Court, and also of the State Courts,

that exclusion of evidence is not prejudicial where the facts

to which the excluded evidence relates is otherwise estab-

lished by other evidence.

Matheson v. United States, 227 U. 8. 540, 57 L. Ed. 631,

33 8. Ct. 355.

Drumm-Flato Commission Co. v. Edmisson, 208 U. 8.

534, 52 L. Ed. 606, 28 8. Ct. 367.

Lucas v. Brooks, 18 Wall. (U. 8.) 436, 21 L. Ed. 779.

Cannon v. Pratt, 99 U. 8. 619, 25 L. Ed. 446.

Schmitt v. Emery, 211 Minn. 547, 2 N. W. 2d 413, 139

A. L. R. 1242.

Metalak v. Rasmussen, 184 Minn. 260, 288 N. W. 478.

5 C. J. 8., Appeal and Error, Sec. 1749.

In the Matheson case, this Court said (227 U. 8. 543) that:

“The exclusion of testimony as to facts subsequently

proved”

presents no ground for reversal.

While it is true that the testimony of Kemp, Young and

Lippincott relating to the bridge accident was stricken,

there was neither a motion to strike nor an order striking

the testimony of plaintiff, himself, who stated the facts rela-

tive to the bridge accident more fully and adequately than

did defendant’s witnesses. Thus, after the order striking the

testimony of Kemp, Young and Lippincott relating to the

bridge accident, all the facts to which their testimony related

appeared from the testimony of the plaintiff, which was not

stricken. Defendant had the full benefit of this testimony of

plaintiff for the consideration of the jury. Thus, the facts

to which the testimony of Kemp, Young and Lippincott re-

37

lated remained for the consideration of the jury because of

the testimony of plaintiff. The exclusion of the testimony

of the three witnesses named certainly was not prejudicial

for the reasons stated.

CONCLUSION

The Petition for Certiorari raises no substantial question

for consideration of this Court. We not only approve the

rules laid down by this Court in the cases cited by peti-

tioner, viz. :

Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., Inc., 319 U. 8. 350, 63

8. Ct. 1062, 87 L. Ed. 1444 (1943).

Carter v. Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay Ry. Co., 338 U. 8.

430, 70 8S. Ct. 226, 94 L. Ed. 236 (1949).

Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R. Co., 342 U. 8.

359, 72 8. Ct. 312, 96 L. Ed. 398 (1952).

Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U. 8. 645, 66 8. Ct. 740, 90 L. Ed.

916 (1946).

M. St. P. & 8. 8. M. Ry. Co. v. Moquin, 283 U. 8. 520,

51 8. Ct. 501, 75 L. Ed. 1243 (1931).

Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. Ry. Co., 321 U. 8. 29, 64 8. Ct.

409, 88 L. Ed. 520 (1944).

Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U. 8. 54, 63

8. Ct. 444, 87 L. Ed. 610 (1943).

Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U. 8. 53, 69 8. Ct. 413, 93

L. Ed. 497 (1949) ;

but we also think that the rule of these cases should be ex-

tended so as to encompass every case where the evidence

presents any issue of fact. We think that the instant case

does not come within the rule of those cases for the reason

there was no evidentiary connection shown between the in-

juries sustained by plaintiff as the result of defendant’s neg-

ligence and the head-scratch injury sustained by him as a

consequence of the bridge accident.

38

We therefore respectfully submit that the Court should .

deny the Petition for Certiorari. $

ee

Respectfully submitted,

Harry H. Pererson and

EvuGENE A. RERAT,

610 Baker Building,

Minneapolis 2, Minnesota,

Attorneys for Respondent.

In THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1953

No. 580

CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. PAUL AND PACIFIC

RAILROAD COMPANY, a Corporation,

Petitioner,

vs.

WILLIAM J. WOODROW,

Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT

OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF MINNESOTA

INTRODUCTION

Respondent has not only avoided but has concealed and

confused the question presented herein. Accordingly a brief

reply is deemed appropriate to clarify:the single question pre-

sented and to correct the wholly inadequate and misleading

analysis of the problem urged upon the Court by respondent.

bo

THE QUESTION PRESENTED

At the outset of respondent’s brief under the heading

“Question Presented” is a long, involved question based upon

inaccurate and presumed facts and having little or no real

significance herein. One broad question of law is presented

to the Court by the petition—whether the Minnesota Supreme

Court has ignored the strict and repeated pronouncements

of this Court in reference to the litigant’s right to trial by

jury of disputed questions of fact in actions under the Fed-

eral Employers’ Liability Act. Under that Act material

questions of fact are matters for determination by the jury

and not the Court.

The exercise of the Court’s discretion is sought not only

because it is believed that the decision below is erroneous but

also upon the broader ground that an important question of

Federal law is presented ; that the principle involved herein,

namely, the right of a defendant (and not only a plaintiff)

to trial by jury under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act,

is unique and of far-reaching nationa) significance in the

adjudication of the rights and liabilities created by the Fed-

eral Employers’ Liability Act. The petition is further based

upon the ground that the decision of the Minnesota Supreme

Court herein is irreconcilably opposed to the applicable deci-

sions of this Court.

Respondent has in no sense challenged this foundation of

the petition nor has he attempted to distinguish the present

case from the numerous decisions of this Court in which

certiorari has been granted to review the failure of a state

court to recognize the right to a jury determination of all

material questions of fact in actions under the Federal Em-

ployers’ Liability Act. In this sense respondent has ignored

the broad question of law presented herein.

The specific question presented by the evidence is whether

the claimed permanent back injury complained of by plain-

: : 3

tiff at the time of trial was caused, contributed to, or aggra-

vated by an automobile accident at the Black Hawk Bridge

more than two years after plaintiff's alleged railroad acci-

dent. It is petitioner’s sole contention that this is a question

of fact for the exclusive determination of the jury and not

one for the trial court.

It, of course, is not necessary for defendant to show that

plaintiff's condition of injury at the time of trial was solely

the result of the Black Hawk Bridge accident, but it is suffi-

cient if the testimony raises the inference that his disability

is in any part the result of said bridge accident. Defendant

should not be required to respond in damages in any amount

whatsoever for the injuries received by plaintiff in such

bridge accident. The lower court took this question of fact

away from the jury.

RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS

Thirty-one pages of respondent’s 38-page answering brief

are devoted to a discussion of selected portions of the evi-

dence. Part of respondent’s statement is repetitious of that

made by petitioner while respondent has discussed other

facts at length which are not material to the question pre-

sented. Certain other statements are not only misleading but

wholly inaccurate. Those portions of the evidence detri-

mental to respondent’s case have been carefully avoided.

We do not say there was no evidence on which the verdict

for plaintiff was based, but we do say there was substantial

material evidence withdrawn by the Court from the con-

sideration of the jury upon which the jury properly could

have found plaintiff's disability at the time of the trial was

wholly or partially proximately caused by the bridge acci-

dent. w

In addition to other unsupported accusations contained in

respondent’s brief, petitioner is accused of having gone be-

4

yond the scope of the question presented in discussing the

evidence relating to plaintiff’s claimed shaker bar accident.

It is not petitioner’s intention to raise an additional question

by presenting these facts but only to show the legal incon-

sistency between the holding below in reference to the ques-

tion of the alleged shaker bar accident and the holding below

on the question of the bridge accident.

It is the decision of the lower court that it is for the jury

to determine whether the shaker bar accident occurred as

claimed by plaintiff and whether the disabilities found by

plaintiff's doctor at the time of trial were caused by said

shaker bar accident. On the other hand, the lower court held

that it is for the Court to say whether the bridge accident

occurred as claimed by defendant and whether the disabili-

ties found by plaintiff's doctor at the time of trial were

caused or contributed to by the bridge accident. This gross

inconsistency is one of law and can only be shown by relating

the facts surrounding plaintiff's doubtful shaker bar acci-

dent. For instance, in the shaker bar accident, the Court,

without any direct evidence at all, let the jury infer from

circumstances set out by plaintiff that the grate rods, below

the deck of engine, and out of sight of plaintiff (R. 99, 100),

may have been bent, causing the accident.

On the other hand, in the bridge accident where plaintiff's

car knocked out 10 feet of railing on the left side of the bridge

and then crossed to the right side of the bridge and knocked

down 60 or 70 feet of substantial posts and railings, the

Court in substance held as a matter of law that the car was

going two miles an hour as testified to by plaintiff. Cer-

tainly from these facts the jury would be justified in holding

the car was going not at two miles per hour but at a very

rapid rate of speed and that plaintiff must have fallen off

the bridge with his car and, of course, sustained a tremendous

jolt or concussion to his person.

5

Defendant’s Exhibits “E”, “F” and “G” are pictures of

the Black Hawk Bridge after it had been repaired. These

are included in the appendix, infra. The pictures graphically

show the heavy construction of the bridge rail and the dis-

tance from the bridge to the ground.

A further comparison of the evidence in relation to the

two accidents is of significance in that it reveals that the

likelihood of injury from the bridge accident is far greater

than the possibility of injury in the rather insignificant

shaker bar accident. Had the issue of the bridge accident

been submitted to the jury, it would have been of significance

that plaintiff failed to report his alleged railroad accident

and the allegedly defective condition of the grate shaking

equipment to the conductor and members of his train crew

(R. 219-221) ; that plaintiff failed to report the engine defect

on his engine condition report made at the end of his train’s

run (R. 97-99; Exhibit “C”) ; that plaintiff explained to Dr.

Householder in January, 1950, how the accident occurred

and made no reference tothe shaker bar having come loose

nor to his having been thrown against the boiler head (R. 264,

265) ; that in June, 1950, plaintiff again described the acci-

dent to Witness McLaughlin and affirmatively stated that

there was nothing defective about the shaker bar and that

the shaker bar did not come loose (R. 485, 486, 492, 493) ;

and that the physical construction of the grate shaking appa-

ratus was such that plaintiff, as shown by his own son and

by certain defendant witnesses, could not have sustained

injury in the manner described by him at the time of trial

(R. 547, 548, 232, 240, 441, 446). Of additional importance

is the fact that on March 9, 1950, plaintiff wrote a letter to

defendant stating that he had “recovered” from his recent

injury (R. 105). This letter, Defendant’s Exhibit “D”, is

reproduced in the appendix, infra.

a

Respondent has commented on the fact that defendant

called only two of the six doctors who either examined or

treated plaintiff before the bridge accident. Dr. Householder

was called not only because of his high professional qualifi-

cations but because he was in a better position to know plain-

tiff’s physical condition following his alleged railroad acci-

dent than any of the other doctors who attended him, having

treated plaintiff constantly during his two periods of hos-

pitalization from January 18, 1950, to February 10, 1950

(R. 267), and from September 26, 1950, to December, 1950

(R. 275, 295). Respondent’s statement at page 24 of his brief

that none of the doctors called by defendant had ever treated

plaintiff professionally is, therefore, shown by the record

to be false.

Dr. Conley is one of the ost distinguished and outstand-

ing orthopedic surgeons in the United States and the head

of the Orthopedic Surgery Department of the Cook County

Hospital, the largest hospital under one roof in the country

(R. 329). Dr. Conley was called because it was felt that by

virtue of his professional experience and standing he was

better qualified to objectively ascertain and describe plain-

tiff’s back condition than any of the other doctors who had

treated or examined plaintiff after his claimed railroad acci-

dent.

Dr. Yoerg was called because he had examined plaintiff

after the bridge accident and was familiar with plaintiff's

condition at that time.

Certainly no inference unfavorable to defendant may be

drawn from the fact that defendant did not also call Doctors

Nelson, Fox, Thornton or Metz as additional medical wit-

nesses to testify to plaintiff's condition between the time of

the alleged railroad accident and the time of the bridge acci-

dent. Such additional testimony would have been merely

cumulative of that of Doctors Householder and Conley.

sf

It is also important that none of these doctors were resi-

dents of Minnesota. Plaintiff's case having been imported

into the Minnesota courts from Iowa, the defendant was

powerless to compel the attendance of witnesses residing

outside the state who did not wish to voluntarily testify.

Likewise the Minnesota court did not have jurisdiction to

subpoena their presence. The record is clear that defendant,

without success, exerted every possible effort to have Dr.

Nelson’s office records brought to the trial as soon as it de-

veloped they were material (R. 496). The record further

shows that at the time of trial Dr. Nelson was in Arkansas

on vacation (R. 496).

The record is also clear that pre-trial depositions of

numerous witnesses were taken by plaintiff and at plaintiff's

instance in Ottumwa, Iowa (R. 9, 10); that defendant was

given notice of plaintiff’s intention to take the deposition of

Dr. Nelson of Ottumwa at the same time (R. 497-501) ; and

that at the last minute plaintiff's attorney changed his mind

and decided not to take Dr. Nelson’s deposition, even though

Dr. Nelson was present in Ottumwa and available at the time

as were the attorneys for both parties (R. 501). Plaintiff

could also have taken the depositions of Doctors Fox and

Thornton at the same time.

Notice was also given of plaintiff's intention to take the

deposition of Dr. Metz, and the Record Librarian of Wesley

Memorial Hospital on January 18, 1952, at Chicago, Illinois

(R. 10). While the Record Librarian’s deposition was so

taken in Chicago with attorneys for both sides in attendance

(Ex. 5), plaintiff again changed his mind and refrained from

taking Dr. Metz’s deposition although there was ample oppor-

tunity for plaintiff to do so.

It is therefore clear from the evidence that if Doctors

Nelson, Fox, Thornton or Metz could have given the slightest

testimony to support plaintiff's claim of back injury follow-

ing his alleged railroad accident, plaintiff would have ob-

tained that testimony. Plaintiff obviously could find no

doctor familiar with plaintiff’s condition between the time

of the alleged railroad accident and the time of the bridge

accident who would testify that plaintiff had any back injury

or disability resulting from the claimed railroad accident.

Apparently the only doctor plaintiff produced who would

testify that plaintiff had objective symptoms or back injury

was Dr. Bratrud, whose examination and testimony was based

entirely on plaintiff’s condition several months after the

bridge accident. If there is any unfavorable inference to be

drawn from the failure to produce the testimony of Doctors

Nelson, Fox, Thornton and Metz, the inference is unfavorable

to plaintiff and not defendant.

it Is for the Jury to Determine Whether Plaintiff Sustained Back

Injury or Aggravation in the Bridge Accident.

Respondent argues with great vigor that where there is

subsequent injury to a different part of the body from that

upon which plaintiff's cause of action is based, evidence con-

cerning the subsequent injury is not admissible. This may

be the law but it has no application whatsoever to the pres-

ent case. Respondent’s entire argument is based upon the

fallacy that the only injury sustained by plaintiff in the

bridge accident is a “head scratch.” In other words, respond-

ent has assumed, as a matter of law, a fact which is the crux

of the issne presented. For this reason, his argument is not

only meaningless, but frivolous.

In support of his argument, respondent has taken an iso-

lated segment of the evidence consisting of plaintiff's own

version of the bridge accident and plaintiffs own version of

the “head scratch” injuries he claims to have sustained there-

jn and has argued this evidence in the light most favorable

to plaintiff. The conclusion respondent has reached by this

-

type of legal reasoning is not surprising. It is so well settled

as to obviate citation of authority that in determining wheth-

er there is sufficient basis to submit an issue of fact to the

jury, all the relevant evidence as well as the inferences to be

reasonably drawn therefrom must be examined in the light

most favorable to the party asserting the issue. Here the de-

fendant is the party asserting the issue before the Court.

Respondent refuses to examine the evidence in the light

favorable to defendant since to do so is fatal to his position.

If all the evidence is examined, as well as the reasonable

inferences, in the light most favorable to defendant, the evi-

dentiary basis for a jury issue becomes clear. Aside from

the compelling circumstances surrounding the happening of

the bridge accident itself, the pertinent medical testimony

is either overlooked or misstated by respondent, since it, too,

condemns his position.

Nothing can explain away the testimony of Dr. Bratrud,

plaintiff's only medical witness, who testified that AFTER

the bridge accident plaintiff had a prolapsed intervertebral

disc (R. 67), and who further testified that plaintiff had a

long-existing arthritic condition of the back which had been

aggravated (R. 63, 65, 73, 74), and who further testified that

any trauma will always aggravate such arthritic condition

and will always cause pain (R. 66). Dr. Bratrud did not

know plaintiff’s condition before the bridge accident and

could not testify as to whether the back injury which he

tound was a result of the bridge accident 314 months before

his examination or whether it was a result of the alleged

railroad accident 27 months before he had seen plaintiff.

If the jury could not infer a connection between the back

injury described by Dr. Bratrud and the bridge accident, then

it could not infer a connection between the said injury and

the railroad accident, which was far more remote in point

of time than was the bridge accident. The point ignored by

10

respondent is that the injury his own doctor found could

have been caused by either accident, or both. The likelihood

is that the condition found by Dr. Bratrud was caused wholly

or at least in part in the bridge accident. But whatever the

answer to this question is, it is a question of fact within the

exclusive province of the jury.

Respondent has also accused petitioner of now taking an

inconsistent position, because it is stated that defendant

contended at the time of trial that plaintiff was not injured

in any respect. For example, see Respondent’s Brief, page 2,

where it is stated, “* * * Where the defendant at the tria:

contended that plaintiff was not injured in any respect,” and

also see Respondent’s Brief, at page 33, to the same effect.

The record shows respondent’s statements to be untrue. Dr.

Yoerg, defendant’s witness, who, like Dr. Bratrud, had not

examined plaintiff until after the bridge accident, agreed

with Dr. Bratrud that plaintiff was not in shape to resume

work at that time due to his back condition (R. 378). Dr.

Yoerg further testified that after the bridge accident plain-

tiff had muscle spasm in his back (R. 375) and a limitation

of motion (R. 387), and that the muscle spasm is an indica-

tion of an abnormal back condition and may indicate serious

back injury (R. 389). He also testified that a fall or con-

cussion, such as plaintiff must have experienced in the bridge

accident, would aggravate a degenerative arthritic condition

of the back such as plaintiff was suffering from, and that even

stooping down to pick up something might aggravate it (R.

410). :

The reasonable inference to be drawn from the medical

testimony itself is that the disability found by Dr. Bratrud

and Dr. Yoerg was caused by the bridge accident. This is

especially true in view of the testimony of Doctors Honse-

holder and Conley, who did not examine plaintiff after the

bridge accident but who did treat and examine plaintiff fol-

11

lowing his alleged railroad injury. In the opinion of both

Doctors Householder and Conley, plaintiff had absolutely

no objective evidence of back injury after the railroad acci-

dent and before the bridge accident. (Dr. Householder: R.

270-273, 275, 284, 285; Dr. Conley: R. 340, 341, 342, 346).

Plaintiff's subjective complaints of back pain at that time,

which did not relate to the back of the spine (R. 263) nor

to the area of the fourth or fifth vertebra (R. 282) were

ascribed to plaintiff's degenerative arthritic condition (R.

269, 271, 273) and to an acute rectal abscess which was dis-

abling and required immediate surgery (R. 266, 267).

In addition to the medical testimony, other aspects of the

evidence connect plaintiff's condition at the time of trial with

the bridge accident. For example, plaintiff suffered a sub-

stantial loss of weight at about the time of the bridge acci-

dent (R. 115). His weight remained constant for sixteen

months after his alleged railroad accident (R. 343, 344, 407,

408, Ex. 5). Plaintiff also claimed an inability to sleep at

the time of trial because of the condition of his back (R. 216),

but hospital records showed that at various times during the

year following his alleged railroad injury plaintiff “slept

well,” “slept good,” or “slept comfortably” (Ex. 5). It is

also significant that plaintiff continued working after his

alleged railroad accident and worked more regularly and

earned more money than at any time before his alleged rail-

road accident (R. 40, 87, Ex. A). Following the bridge acci-

dent, plaintiff did not and apparently could not work, and

according to his own testimony was under the constant care

of Dr. Nelson (R. 517-520).

12

The Stricken Testimony Was Not Cumulative: its Exclusion With-

drew the Issue From the Jury.

It is apparently respondent’s position that even though it

may have been error to strike the testimony of witnesses

Young, Kemp and Lippincott, there was no prejudice to de-

fendant because the stricken evidence was merely cumula-

tive. Here, again, respondent has not only failed to examine

the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant but re-

fuses to give any weight whatsoever to the testimony favor-

able to defendant.

The record shows plaintiff's own unsupported, interested

testimony as to the happening and results of the Black Hawk

Bridge accident is diametrically opposed to the stricken tes-

timony of the three witnesses for defendant, to-wit, City

Police Officer Young, Deputy Sheriff Lippincott and Railroad

Police Officer Kemp. Without the testimony of defendant’s

witnesses, plaintiff’s version of the manner in which the acci-

dent occurred does not make an issue of fact. It is this dis-

pute in the testimony which gives rise to the jury question

as to what happened on the Black Hawk Bridge and also as

to whether plaintiff received substantial injuries in said acci-

dent. According to plaintiff's version, the bridge was covered

with ice. He started to skid, slowed to one or two miles per

hour and leisurely stepped from the automobile before it

toppled through the railing and fell five or six feet to the

ground below the bridge. Plaintiff claims to have sustained

only a head scratch in getting out of the car (R. 107-108).

Accepting plaintiff's miraculous version alone creates no

issue of fact. From this testimony alone the jury could, of

course, not infer back injury or aggravation in the bridge

accident. :

The stricken testimony of defendant’s witnesses on the

other hand shows an entirely different occurrence—a dry

bridge (R. 469, 474), a car speeding out of control with such

4

18

terrific force as to sheer off ten feet of heavy guard rail on

the left side of the bridge, and then to still have sufficient

momentum to cross the bridge, crash into the guard rail on

the right-hand side and destroy 70 additional feet of railing

before plummeting ten or twelve feet to the ground (R. 465,

467, 474, 475).

Attention is again invited to the pictures of the bridge,

Defendant’s Exhibits “E,” “F” and “G” in the Appendix,

infra.

The stricken testimony further described the position of

plaintiff's demolished automobile after it had gone over the

bridge and overturned (R. 474-476), as well as plaintiff's

physical appearance following the accident, his soiled, mud

and vomit-stained clothing (R. 460-462) (the mud being in-

dicative that plaintiff fell with the car and the vomit indi-

cating the possibility of serious concussion and internal in-

juries), and his own admission to Deputy Sheriff Lippincott

that he was not able to obey an arrest warrant on the follow-

ing day (R. 477-480). :

Without the testimony stricken by the trial court, there

were no facts left in the case available to defendant to argue

this major issue to the jury. The exclusion of the evidence

deprived defendant of the right to a jury trial on this im-

portant and controlling issue of the case.

CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that respondent has wholly

failed to meet and answer the question presented herein.

Respondent has paid lip service to the numerous decisions

of this Court which hold that disputed questions of fact are

for the exclusive determination of the jury rather than the

Court, but he seeks to avoid their application to defendants

and particularly to this “special case.”

On the one hand respondent has implied that there is not

14

a sufficient evidentiary basis to create an issue of fact, but

on the other hand respondent’s 38-page brief is an argument

of these facts and the merits of the evidence favorable to his

theory that the back injury found by Dr. Bratrud at the time

of trial was not caused or contributed to by the bridge acci-

dent. Respondent’s Brief has the flavor of a jury argument

and should be recognized as such.

The point overlooked by respondent as well as the lower

court is that this is a disputed question of fact, and as such

_it is for the sole determination of the jury and not one for

‘the trial court. Therefore, it is again respectfully suggested

that the stricken testimony of Young, Lippincott and Kemp

made at least a clear question of fact as to whether the Black

Hawk accident was a serious one as testified to by them or

merely a trivial one as described by plaintiff alone. We,

therefore, again respectfully request the Court to grant the

Petition for Writ of Certiorari herein.

Respectfully submitted,

A. C. ERDALL,

Attorney for Petitioner.

Of Counsel:

- M. L, Buu,

C. L. TAYLOR,

of Chicago, Illinois.

8. W. Riper, JR.,

G. F. BENNETT,

of Minneapolis, Minnesota.

Taken at Ottumwa, Iowa, Jan. 15th, 1952, about 10 A. M.

Looking West

DEFENDENTS EXHIBIT "E"

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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