Brief for the Respondents in Opposition — Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad v. Woodrow
Supreme Court brief1954
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SUBJECT INDEX
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NE ak Oia a 66 $26 6 ie Gk 6 Sk Oe RM ORR Re De be eo ak 1
NN 5 SS 9G SW igre ta ik Soto. e wes, 6 Be Weel eh ete ie Bee ale 1
SE MOREE se Cw 8-4 s RHC pea ee he eee ewe ween es 2
DEG OE CUO CD i ee Gio wees Chew ew ed as oe b ew bee be 3
NN 355 OE Bok Ce ba bed ae SO RNS ORE RE So wR we Re aCe 3
The Facts as They Relate to the Question Presented......... 3
Statement of Facts to Clarify the Statement Made by Petitioner 6
Chronological Statement of the Evidence................... 6
Summary of Evidence as to Defects in Grates............... 15
Summary of Evidence as to Defects in Shaker Bar........... 16
Summary of Evidence as to Whether Shaker Bar Can Be Pulled
Backward Toward the Tender.................2.cc0000 18
Summary of the Testimony Relating to Plaintiff's Injuries.... 19
Summary of Evidence Relative to Damages................. 30
Calculation of Respondent’s Damages.................0e0000: 31
Gn ieee eae Sig SAUCE ATE aoe VARA Se EEN DEES OOo ab Ea 31
I. Where Later Injuries Are to a Different Part of the Body
and Are Not Shown to Have Any Connection with the In-
juries on Which Plaintiff Bases His Cause of Action, Evi-
‘dence Concerning the Later Injuries Should Be Excluded... 31
II. Striking Testimony Is Not Prejudicial Where the Facts to
Which the Testimony Relates Is Otherwise Established.... 36
NNR oes Sea egw kebabs a ae Gomes «Sine ee ake eee aes 37
AUTHORITIES CITED
Cases:
Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., Inc., 319 U. S. 350, 63 S. Ct. 1062,
Oe oe SS A ROONE oc voi ba a dobbs a bb bow OO bee eR RT RUSS 37
Cannon v. Pratt, 99 U. S. 619, 25 L. Ed. 446................. 36
Carter v. Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay Ry. Co., 338 U. S. 430, 70 S.
eS Be Oe ke ls OO POO Ke oe CR cee SOS oR ee eOESS 37
City of Birmingham v. Carlson, 209 Ala. 428, 96 So. 333........ 31
Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R. Co., 342 U. S. 359, 72 S.
Ct. 312, 96 L. Ed. 398 (1952)..... Ge cw ius Own a eh kee erda cies 37
Drumm-Flato Commission Co. v. Edmisson, 208 U. S. 534, 52 L.
Mee COR SE BO i ie a ecw ease Raw ee « = 88
Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U. S. 253, 259, 64 S. Ct. 548, 88 L. Ed.
708, 321 U. S. 754........ eee NRO Bae phwib ae kig wah ee e aeaenee 3
Hall v. Shenandoah, 167 Iowa 735, 149 N. W. 831.............. $1
Johnson v. City of Troy (N. Y.), 124 App. Div. 29............81, 32
Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U. S. 645, 66 S. Ct. 740, 90 L. Ed. 916
CU946) ccnceceeceees eee ccceceeeeesucees cccusecscccece ST
Page
Lucas v. Brooks, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 436, 21 L. Ed. 779...... wees Oe
Matheson v. United States, 227 U. 8. 540, 57 L. Ed. 631, 33 8. Ct.
BOG seein ka RS CORSA CREA S ONO MRS EO Yiei boas eGo : 28
Metalak v. Rasmussen, 184 Minn. 260, 238 N. W. 478..... <<ea%) ee
M. St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co. v. Moquin, 283 U. S. 520, 51 S. Ct.
G01, 76 UL. Wd. 1848 CAOSL) ov cc cceccecess jackea Re ciesp VOW
National Licorice Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 309 U. 8.
350 (Note 2, p. 357), 60 S. Ct. 569, 84 L. Ed. 799.......... 3
Rhyner v. City of Menasha, 107 Wis. 201, 83 N. W. 303......31, 33
Schmitt v. Emery, 211 Minn. 547, 2 N. W. 2d 413, 189 A. L. R.
1242 wc cceveseees Scr easnesevesecucene seeeccceeeccsccs 88
Steele v. Drummond, 275 U. S. 199, 48 S. Ct. 53, 72 L. Ed. 238.. 3
Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. Ry. Co., 321 U. S. 29, 64 S. Ct. 409, 88
L. Bd. 620 (1944)... . 2c ee erceennes Co ececocesccces 37
Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U. 8. 54, 63 S. Ct. 444,
87 L. Ed. 610 (1943)..........6. cocecseee Prrerr rrr 37
Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 69 S. Ct. 413, 93 L. Ed. 497
CIUDAD) ecevricrccceccvecccccccccesoesene Terre ree 37
Statutes and Textbooks:
U. S. C. A., Title 28, Supreme Court Rules, Rule 38, Subdivision 2 3
5 C. J. S., Appeal and Error, Sec. 1749... ...ceeeeeecessceees 36
In THE
Supreme Court of the Gnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1953
No. 580
CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. PAUL AND PACIFIC
RAILROAD COMPANY, a Corporation,
Petitioner,
vs.
WILLIAM J. WOODROW,
Respondent.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
GRANTING CERTIORARI
INTRODUCTORY
Respondent will divide his brief in such a way as to make
the subdivisions thereof correspond with those of petitioner's
brief.
JURISDICTION
Respondent admits that this Court has jurisdiction to
grant a Writ of Certiorari in this case, but he contends that
this case is not a proper one for the exercise of such juris-
diction, and that because that is true, the Court should deny
certiorari.
2
QUESTION PRESENTED
Respondent contends, as his statement of the case later
will show, that the record does not raise the question stated
by petitioner, but on the contrary, that the question which
petitioner seeks to raise and which the facts conclusively
established by the evidence in fact raise, is:
Whether it was prejudicial error on the part of the
trial court to strike the testimony of three of defendant’s
witnesses as to the occurence of an accident in which
plaintiff's automobile fell off a bridge and plaintiff sus-
tained a scratch on the forehead in getting out of his
automobile immediately before it went off the bridge,
where plaintiff's action was under the Federal Em-
ployers’ Liability Act to recover damages for injuries in
his lumbosacral region consisting of a ruptured inter-
vertebral disc between the 4th and 5th lumbar vertebrae
and disability arising therefrom; where the defendant at
the trial contended that plaintiff was not injured in any
respect, but notwithstanding such contention, the Court
received evidence offered by defendant consisting of the
testimony of plaintiff and three of defendant’s witnesses
to show the occurrence of the bridge accident and that
plaintiff sustained a scratch of the forehead as a con-
sequence thereof; where the Court on plaintiff's motion
struck from the record the evidence of defendant’s three
witnesses but did not strike plaintiff's evidence relative
to such facts; and where, further, there was no evidence
to show any connection between the scratch on the head
which plaintiff so sustained and the injuries for which he
sought recovery.
3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Generally.
Respondent confesses that he is not sure as to the scope
of the statement of the facts which he should make. Cer-
tainly, he cannot accept the statement made by petitioner for
the reason that many of the statements made by petitioner
are entirely unsupported by the evidence. Such statements,
together with the comments which petitioner’s counsel make
concerning them, present an entirely inadequate statement of
the facts as the backdrop against which the legal question
presented by the petitioner should be viewed.
The Facts as They Relate to the Question Presented.
We have assumed that the petitioner should state accur-
ately and precisely only those facts which raise the question
which he presents to the Court by his petition for review. We
base this assumption upon the provisions of Rule 38, Sub-
division 2 (U. 8. C. A., Title 28, Supreme Court Rules, Rule
38, Subdivision 2), which so far as here material, provides:
“The petition (for certiorari) shall contain a summary
and short statement * * * of the questions presented
* * * Only the questions specifically brought forward
by the Petition for Writ of Certiorari will be considered.
* @ #))
This Court has repeatedly held that review by certiorari
will be confined to the question stated in the petition as the
one presented to the Court for review.
National Licorice Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 309 U.S. 350 (Note 2, p. 357), 60 8S. Ct. 569,
84 L. Ed. 799.
Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U. 8. 253, 259, 64 8. Ct. 548,
88 L. Ed. 708, 321 U. 8. 754. Rehearing denied.
Steele r. Drummond, 275 U. 8. 199, 48 8. Ct. 53, 72 L.
Ed. 238.
4
In the light of that rule, we think that an adequate state-
ment of the facts would be those set forth in the opinion of the
Court below (R. 647-658). Summarized, these facts briefly
are that while plaintiff was employed by defendant as an
engineer, he sustained on November 12, 1949, as the conse-
quence of operating a defective grate shaker bar, lumbosacral
injuries consisting of a ruptured intervertebral disc between
the 4th and 5th lumbar vertebrae and disability arising there-
from (R. 27, f. 3; R. 28, ff. 1-3; R. 30, f. 1; R. 32; R. 33;
R. 100) ; that these injuries totally disabled plaintiff from do-
ing any kind of work (R. 71-73) ; that the bridge accident set
forth in the question above occurred, as petitioner states,
two years and eleven days after the accident in which he
sustained the bodily injuries as defendant’s employee; that
plaintiff did not claim any head injuries as a consequence of
defendant’s negligence on November 12, 1949 (R. 1-7); that
the only injury sustained by plaintiff as a consequence of
the bridge accident was a scratch on the forehead (R. 108)
and that there was no connection shown between the scratch
on the forehead sustained as a consequence of the bridge
accident and the lumbosacral injuries sustained as a con-
sequence of defendant’s negligence on November 12th, 1949
(R. 482; R. 483; R. 658).
While defendant claimed that plaintiff was not injured at
all at the time of trial and was able to resume his work as
a railroad engineer, it nevertheless offered evidence to show
the occurrence of the bridge accident consisting of the testi-
mony of plaintiff (R. 107-113) and of its witnesses, Kemp,
Young and Lippincott (R. 455-484). There was no motion to
strike the testimony of plaintiff concerning the bridge acci-
dent. Plaintiff, however, moved to strike the testimony of
Kemp, Young and Lippincott concerning the bridge accident
(R. 481-482) ; and the trial court struck the evidence of these
three witnesses (R. 482-483). The trial judge, who is now a
5
Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota and one of its
most distinguished citizens, stated as the reason for so strik-
ing the testimony of Kemp, Young and Lippincott (R. 483) :
“The reason I have permitted the testimony is to show
whether, in fact, he was injured, there was any injury
that amounted to testimony as an injury that affected the
person of the plaintiff. I see no testimony here unless it
is followed up by something additional upon which any
fact could be predicated as to injury received of any
consequence, therefore the Court must grant the mo-
tion.”
During the cross examination of plaintiff to elicit testimony
concerning the bridge accident, plaintiff's counsel objected
to such testimony on the grounds that there was no founda-
tion for it, and the Court indicated at that time that some
further foundation would have to be established (R. 108-109),
and during the examination of Witness Young, plaintiff’s
counsel indicated that he would have no objection to such
testimony if it were shown that the injuries sustained in the
bridge accident “aggravated” plaintiffs then condition (R.
457).
Notwithstanding these warnings, defendant offered no
evidence to show any connection between the bridge accident
injuries and the injuries on which plaintiff based recovery.
This, in spite ofthe fact that plaintiff was examined by de-
fendant’s regular physician, Dr. Yoerg, as peitioner states,
about two months after the bridge accident and about five
days before the trial.
Statement of Facts to Clarify the Statement Made By Petitioner.
Petitioner has made so many statements of facts which are
entirely unsupported by the evidence and has so colored and
slanted other facts that we deem it appropriate to set forth
all the facts in order that the Court may have the true factual
picture of the case. This statement shall consist of a chrono-
logical statement of the evidence question with summaries
of such important facts as we deem necessary to present a
true and factual statement of the case.
Chronological Statement of the Evidence.
Plaintiff, a resident of Ottumwa, Iowa, born on. July 28,
1899 (R. 12, ff. 1, 2) brought this action against defendant
to recover for injuries alleged to have been sustained by him
on November 12, 1949 (R. 3, f. 1), while employed by defend-
ant as a locomotive engineer, and while operating engine No.
480, while hauling about 70 cars from Laredo, Missouri, to
Ottumwa, Iowa (R. 3, ff. 1,2; R. 21, f. 3).
Plaintiff reported to work November 12, 1949, at 5:25 A.
M. the day on which he was injured, at the west yard at
Ottumwa, Iowa, where he was to be an engineer on a freight
train going to Laredo, Missouri, a distance of 103 miles, with
Robert J. Boyd as his fireman (R. 15, ff. 1, 2,3).
Plaintiff’s train left Ottumwa about 6:10 A. M. with 10
“loads” (loaded cars) and 16 empty cars pulled by an L-2
type, stoker-fired, coal-burning engine No. 480 (R. 16, ff.
1, 2, 3).
This was a steam engine with the fire box approximately
six feet wide and nine feet long located under the boiler;
the sides of the fire box being the boiler water-ledge, the front
the flue sheet where the flues are fastened on, and the bottom
consists of four sections of grates, each section operated in-
dependent of each other, and there are four lugs, two on the
engineer’s side, and two on the fireman’s side, which are used
7
to operate these grates, and that is done by a shaker bar on
them (R. 17, ff. 1, 2). The shaker bar is about 41% feet long
and the lugs are about six or eight inches high (R. 19, f. 3) ;
the shaker bar has a housing that fits down securely over the
lug which is tapered and if they are in good condition there
is no play in them, and many times it is necessary to tap
them with a coal pick to take the bar off the lug (R. 20, ff.
1, 2).
On leaving Ottumwa with 26 cars and the caboose the
engine carried 200 pounds of steam, the normal amount for
engine No. 480; no trouble was encountered with the engine
on the trip to Laredo, Missouri, as the train was light and
short (R. 20, f:3; R. 21, f. 1).
The engine was cleaned by the roundhouse force at Laredo
and the return trip from Laredo to Ottumwa was started
around 4:30 P. M. with the same engine No. 480 hauling about
70 cars, some being loads and some empties with the steam
gauge of the engine showing 200 pounds of steam (R. 21, ff.
2,3; R. 22, f. 1).
The first stop was made at Osgood, Missouri, 13.6 miles
from Laredo; the next stop was at Newton, Missouri, 13
miles from Osgood, and the third stop was at Powersville,
Missouri, 39 and some tenths miles from Laredo (R. 22, ff. 1,
2,3). Immediately after leaving Laredo the engine started
lagging steam and a mile from Laredo the steam was back
to 180 pounds and, on arrival at Osgood, was down to 140
pounds, whereas the normal amount of steam for this engine
hauling 70 cars should be 200 pounds at all times because
with 140 pounds the engine won’t handle the train, can’t make
speed and the brakes would start to drag and some of the
brakes would start to set (R. 22, f.3; R. 24, ff. 1, 2,3).
On arrival at Osgood, plaintiff, observing this condition,
instructed the fireman to clean the fire; the locomotive fire
box is cleaned by opening the grates and knocking out the
8
clinkers and when the clinkers are removed the grates are
straightened back up, the coal shoved ahead, then you have
practically a new fire. This operation took about 45 minutes.
The reduction in the amount of steam from 200 to 140 pounds
was caused by the engine not steaming because the flues were
leaking, the super heating units were leaking (R. 23, f. 3;
R. 24, ff. 1,2).
After the fireman cleaned the fire at Osgood the train
started for Newton with 180-185 pounds of steam; on reach-
ing Newton it was down to 130 pounds and the fire was dirty
and clinkered and plaintiff again instructed the fireman to
clean the fire at Newton. If the engine was in proper working
condition it wouldn’t be necessary to clean the fire or move
the grates on the trip from Laredo, Missouri, to Ottumwa,
Towa (R. 24, f.3; R. 25, ff. 1, 2).
After the fireman cleaned the fire at Newton, the train -
continued on to Powersville, arriving about seven-forty-fifty
and pulled in on the passing track with the engine headed
east, to let a passenger extra by, at which time the steam was
down to 130 pounds and the fireman said he was tired as it
was hard work cleaning the fire at intervals like he was
doing. Plaintiff told the fireman to go to the ground and
clean the ash pans beneath the engine and that plaintiff
would clean the fire (R. 25, f. 3; R. 26, ff. 1, 2,3; R. 27, ff. 1,
2; R. 146, ff. 1, 2).
Plaintiff cleaned the fire by putting the shaker bar down on
both of the lugs, first on the engineer’s side, opening and
closing the grates, then moved to the fireman's side and
cleaned one grate, having then one more to clean on the fire-
man’s side. While he was cleaning the last one and had the
grates open with the shaker bar pointing west, and if the
grates are in proper condition they work freely and can be
operated with one hand by moving back and forth toward
and away from the boiler head which in this instance would
-—
9
be east and west (R. 27, f. 3; R. 28, ff. 1, 2,3).
Plaintiff placed the shaker bar on the lug in the regular
and usual manner as far as it would go; there was slack in
it and a looseness evidently from wear; it was supposed to
fit tight but it was loose enough so you could jiggle it. With
that section of the grate open, plaintiff knocked all the clink-
ers out, shoved the live coal to the front section and every-
thing was removed from that section and the next job was to
close the grate (R. 28, f. 3; R. 29, ff. 1, 2, 3).
Plaintiff then attempted to pull the shaker bar to close the
grates and fa ing west with his hands on the top part of the
bar, his feet spread on the deck of the engine to brace him-
self, he pulled back on the shaker bar. The rod that connects
the grate lug to the grate, which is a part of the boiler, wasn’t
free, it was caught and there was a spring in it. Plaintiff took
hold atop the bar, got all the slack he could by pushing it in
forward motion and pulled back with all his strength and as
he did so, it came loose with a sudden, violent, unexpected
motion, the shaker bar came off and he was thrown against
the boilerhead hitting the lower part of his back (R. 30, ff.
} 2, 8; R.:31, ff. 1, 2,3).
The shaker bar shonld not come off if in proper working
condition, but the rod of the grate rigging was sprung and
if in proper working condition the grate should close easily,
based on plaintiff's experience in operating grates thousands
of times over a period of 32 or 33 years (R. 32, ff. 1, 2, 3).
That plaintiff, when speaking of the connecting rod being
twisted or bent, was speaking from observation of years of
experience cleaning fires and shaking grates; that he could
tell when one of those rods are sprung when he pulled back
on it; it was not just his opinion, he knew that is what hap-
pened (R. 100, ff. 1, 2, 3). |
Plaintiff, while he was attempting to clean the fire, was
able to see and determine the cause of lack of steam; he
10
could see water running down off the flue sheet in and out
of the ash pan. In his opinion that was the reason the steam
was being reduced, and the reason the fire had to be cleaned
on the different occasions on the trip from Laredo to Ottumwa
(R. 33, ff. 1, 2, 3).
At Powersville, plaintiff informed the dispatcher of the
situation and the 70 cars were taken out of the train at
Powersville and the engine and caboose proceeded to Ottum-
wa (R. 148, f. 1). The reason for setting out the train was
the poor condition of this engine (R. 164, f. 2).
Fireman Boyd did not think the engine was steaming good
enroute from Ottumwa to Laredo (R. 140, f. 3) ; the round-
house men cleaned the fire at Laredo as that is a terminal,
however, on the return trip the occasion for stopping at Os-
good was to clean the fire, as it was all clinkered, and they
didn’t have steam and had to “blow up for steam,” that is,
get the steam built up, so it would not necessitate setting out
the train. Again at Newton a stop was made to blow up for
steam and Boyd had to clean the fire again as the fire was
just a solid clinker (R. 142, ff. 2,3; R. 143, ff. 1, 2,3). On
leaving Newton, plaintiff took the place of fireman Boyd and
fired the engine to Powersville to see if he could get it hot, and
he didn’t have any better luck than Boyd, the fireman (R.
144, ff. 2,3). When Boyd looked at the fire at Powersville
it was pretty well blue, clinkered heavy fire and had to be
cleaned if the engine was going to do anything. Boyd was
“pretty well poohed out” doubling back, cleaning fire (R.
146, ff. 1, 2, 3). At Powersville he filled the boiler full of
water and put coal in with a scoop shovel to help keep it
from clinkering; had the blower on and got the engine hot.
Boyd went to eat and returned 20 minutes later. (R. 147, ff.
1, 2, 3). He found the water level had gone down as the en-
gine was leaking and the fire was cleaned again. Plaintiff
cleaned the fire and Boyd the ash pans, and while doing so,
11
plaintiff hollered to Boyd who came up in the cab and found ©
plaintiff all bent over the seat with the shaker bar in his
hand and he had the fire door open. One section of the grates
didn’t have coal over it and the rest of the fire was low. Boyd
lined up the grates and started building up the fire (R. 148,
f.2; R. 149, ff. 1, 2,3; R. 150, ff. 1,2). The engine was then
hooked onto the caboose and started for Ottumwa and Boyd
had more trouble after that keeping steam up than he did
when they had the train of 70 cars (R. 148, f. 3); that engine
480 had a plugged fire box; that it was leaking (R. 151, ff.
2,3; R. 152, f. 1); that it was unusual to clean the fire box
three times (R. 153, f. 1); that if the shaker bar is in position
it should not come loose (R. 155, f. 1, 2).
Carl A. Simpson, a retired engineer, formerly employed by
defendant for 33 years, operated engine No. 480 out of Laredo
on October 14, 1949 (R. 167, f. 3; R. 168, ff. 1, 2,3; R. 169,
f. 3), and on December 10, 1949, and again on December 15,
1949, and the engine was “leaking, bad flues” (R. 170, ff. 1, 2,
3; R. 171, f. 3), he had trouble for steam, engine leaking
every time he had it (R. 172, f. 3), the flues were leaking and
the grates would lock (R. 173,.f. 3), they would be solid and
you just didn’t move them, and there was only one way to
move them, and that was to knock the fire all out for that
section of the grates and clean it and then get it back; that
the leaks form a honeycomb or scale over the flue sheet and
stops air passage and stops the heat and kills the draft; that
his fireman had trouble with the grates; it took both Simpson
and his fireman to work one particular section of the grates,
and that they should not lock if in proper working order (R.
174, ff. 1, 2,3; R. 175, ff. 1, 2); that after a shaker bar has
been fitted over a grate lug and while shaking a fire, it should
not come off the lug; that they will wear from constant use
(R. 176, ff. 2,3; R. 177, f. 2). :
J. G. Story, a locomotive fireman employed by defendant
12
since December 11, 1926, who had fired hundreds of engines
(R. 184, f. 3; R. 185, ff. 1, 2, 3), testified that ice worked on
engine No. 480 on November 5, 1949, when the engine steamed
hard and they had to clean the fire; the grates were sticking
and hard to break loose and he told engineer Dobratz to re-
port the grates on the engine (R. 187, ff. 1, 2, 3).
Frank Chrisman, in the employ of defendant since 1941
as a locomotive engineer (R. 197, ff. 2, 3), testified that in
October and November of 1949, he operated engine No. 480
(R. 198, ff. 2, 3). He identified Plaintiff’s Exhibits 7, 8, 9,
10, as engine inspection reports prepared by him on engine
No. 480 at the end of runs on which he had operated the en-
gine. Exhibit 7 being dated October 21, 1949; Exhibit 8,
October 28, 1949; Exhibit 9, November 27, 1949, and Exhibit
10, December 1, 1949 (R. 199, ff. 2,3; R. 200, ff. 1,2). Ex-
hibit 7 reported: “Clean fire box and flues. Examine for
leaks. Water running out of pan. Raise up shaker rods, they
lay down on pan.” They connect grates with shaker lever
lug. “Left front sand pipe loose in joint above wheel. Square
valves, engine lame.”
Exhibit 8 reported: “Square valves, engine very lame.
Rods and boxes pounding bad. Take lost motion out of re-
verse gear. Tighten left top guide bolts. Tighten nuts of
left front binder bolts.”
Exhibit 9 reported: “Clean fire box and flues and examine
for leaking, engine steams very poor.” “Mud ring leaking,
right side.” “Left top inside guide bolts broken. Piece broken
out of cross head shoe. Set up left main wedge.” “Packing
nuts on pump pistons leaking. Oil air end of pump.”
Exhibit 10 reported: “Clean fire box and flues and test
out for leaks. Engine steams very poor. Fire cleaned twice
this trip. Packing.nuts on pump leaking.” These reports
were all in the handwriting of Chrisman and reported his
experiences with engine No. 480 on the dates specified (R.
13
202, ff. 2,3; R. 203, ff. 1, 2,3; RB. 204, ff. 1, 2).
William E. Woodrow, Jr., a witness for plaintiff, testified
that he was employed by defendant as an engineer and that
he had worked for over four years as a traveling fireman (R.
522 f. 3; R. 523, ff. 1, 2,3); that it was his duty to super-
vise fireman and instruct in the proper way to operate the
shaker bar and grates on engines of the. L-2 class, the type of
engine No. 480 (R. 525, ff. 1, 2, 3) ; ‘that the shaker bar oper-
ates towards the boiler head and opens the grates wide, also
back toward the tender and open the grates, the distance de-
pending upon the condition of the grate rigging and the
engine deck; that the grates can be opened by operating the
shaker bar toward the tender but not as much (R. 259, f. 1) ;
that the ordinary practice is to shake it back and forth, move
it to the limit both ways (R. 530, ff. 2,3; R. 551, f. 2); that
when the grates don’t move freely or catch in a certain posi-
tion the general cause is a bent rod (R. 533, f. 2); that the
place a bent rod will be caught on is between the fire box and
the top of the ash pan (R. 543, f. 2).
Defendant’s witness, J. L. Brosserd, denied that the grates
could be opened by moving the shaker bar to the forward
position (R. 253, ff. 1,2). Generally they could not, but there
are some engines with grate rods not of proper dimension,
they might tip back and forward some (R. 432, f. 3).
Frank B. Corr, a traveling engineer employed for defend-
ant (R. 440, ff. 1, 2), testified a forward movement of the
shaker bar opened the grates, and a backward movement
closed them (R. 446, ff. 1, 2,3); that if the shaker bar and
grates are in proper condition they should operate easily ;
that the grates can be opened some in the backward position
and if you want to close them you wiggle them back and
forth (R. 450, ff. 1, 2,3; R. 451, f.1).
Monty L. Kemp, a police officer of the Milwaukee road,
testified he saw plaintiff on the evening of November 23, 1951,
14
in a cafe at Ottumwa, Iowa (R. 455, ff. 1, 2,3); that he ap-
peared mussed up (R. 460, f. 3); that Kemp left the cafe
and drove to the Black Hawk River Bridge over the Des
Moines River where there were police officers and a Ply-
mouth sedan upside down below the bridge (R. 463, ff. 1,
2, 3), and damage to the bridge (R. 464, ff. 1, 2,3; R. 465,
ff. 1, 2, 3). This witness did not testify to seeing plaintiff
at the scene or that he had been in the automobile.
Warren J. Young, a police officer for the City of Ottumwa,
Towa, testified as did Kemp that he was at the scene of an
automobile accident at the Black Hawk Bridge (R. 470, f.
3; R. 471, ff. 1, 2, 3); that he found plaintiff’s name in the
car; that he searched for plaintiff but did not find him (R.
475, ff. 1, 2,3; R. 476, ff. 2, 3).
John Lippincott, Deputy Sheriff of Wappello County,
Iowa, testified that he went to plaintiff's home November 24
to serve a paper; that plaintiff had a small bandage on his
forehead, an inch or two (R. 477, ff. 2,3; R. 478, ff. 1, 2,3);
that he was not feeling well enough to go to town (R. 479,
f. 3).
On motion of plaintiff the testimony of Kemp, Young and
Lippincott was stricken for the reason that there was no
testimony that plaintiff had sustained any injury in the acci-
dent (R. 481, f.3; R. 482, f.3; R. 483, f. 1).
Howard T. McLaughlin, employed by defendant in the
claim department for 32 years, saw plaintiff June 6, 1951, and
that plaintiff told him how the accident of November 12, 1949,
occurred (R. 484, f. 1; R. 485, ff. 1, 2,3); that McLaughlin
prepared a statement, but plaintiff did not sign it (R. 492, ff.
1, 2).
Harold J. Barry, employed by defendant as District Ad-
juster since 1944 (R. 494, ff. 2,3), testified regarding the ab-
sence of Dr. Nelson at the trial (R. 496, f. 2).
Plaintiff lives on Rural Route 4, Ottumwa, Towa, on Rock
15
Bluff Road, and coming from town crosses Black Hawk
Bridge where he had an accident November 23, 1951, when his
car skidded and crashed into the bridge railing. Plaintiff
opened the door and got out of the car (R. 106, f. 3; R. 107,
ff. 1, 2,3). Plaintiff received no injuries except a scratch on
his forehead.
Summary of Evidence as to Defects in Grates.
There was testimony that the grate rods were too low and
close to the ash pan (R. 206); that the rods should have
been raised (R. 202); that where, as here, the rods become
“red hot,” they bend easier (R. 543); that the rod on the
grate being shaken by plaintiff was bent and sprung (R. 30,
31, 32); that an experienced operator of the shaker could
tell that the rod was bent and caught by the spring thereof
(R. 30-31; R. 533); that the grates on this engine stuck
(R. 187); that one section of these grates would lock (R.
173) or get stuck (R. 30).
Plaintiff testified that the effect of the rods getting caught
was a sort of recoil or spring action. He testified :
“A, When I pulled on the shaker bar it had com-
pressed this grate rod enough to free it up and it let go
with all this force, acted as a spring.” (R. 121.)
The witness, William Woodrow, Jr., testified :
“Q. And you can’t tell from seeing it whether it is or
not bent?
“A, You could certainly tell from seeing it if you
saw it.
“Q. Isay, from the cab you can’t see it, therefore you
can’t see whether it is or is not bent?
“A. May I answer that?
“Q. I would like to have you answer my question.
“A. The only way I can answer that is in this way:
When you are working and the grates don’t move freely
or catch in a certain position, the general cause of that is
a bent grate rod, and the feeling of a bent grate rod is
16
different than it would be if there was something ahead,
like between the grates; does that answer your ques-
tion, sir?” (R. 535.)
“A. Well, the reason I said that it is often quite pos-
sible with a bent rod to move it back and forth, but if
the rod is put in an extreme position, or in one position,
oftentime it catches and when you pull on that rod, there
is give to it a lot of times is what I meant by being able
to feel; it isn’t like you were pulling against a stone
wall, there is just a little bit of spring; you have all
done that, felt that, when you get a hold of something—”
(R. 535.)
Grates and rods in good repair and condition operate free-
ly without getting stuck (R. 32; R. 174-175; R. 527).
The witnesses on this point were plaintiff, Carl A. Simp-
son, and plaintiff's son who was a traveling fireman for de-
fendant and whose duties were to instruct others in the use
of shakers and grates. All had had extensive experience,
working about locomotives in the defendant’s shop, and were
competent to testify as to these matters and had worked on
engine No. 480, the one involved here (R. 11-13; R. 167-176;
R. 522-525).
Defendant’s only evidence to the contrary was the testi-
mony of defendant’s witness, Brossard, who had no knowl-
edge of engine No. 480 and also certain shop records.
Summary of Evidence as to Defects in Shaker Bar.
Shaker bars become worn from use and vibration of the
locomotive (R. 178); from use as an all-around tool (R. 527-
528); and because that is true are likely to come off while
being used (R. 538-540). Mr. Woodrow, Jr., testified:
“A. Yes, the shaker bar is one of the handiest pieces
of equipment on the engine. It is used to straighten out
switch points. There are gratings on the deck, if you
have some trouble, a lot of times they don’t fit properly,
and they pound against it to get those down; it is used
17
to pry side rods or main rods; whenever it takes some-
thing heavy for a pry, it is used for that purpose.” (R.
528.)
“A. A lot of times this lug, it is hard to get it back
into locking position from either direction, so they take
the body of this shaker bar and they beat against it;
the reason for that is rather simple. This bar weighs, I
would say, between 15 and 20 pounds, and if it is four
or five feet long, you try to stand with one hand and work
that and get your lock in position, it is rather hard to do,
and a lot of times they will take those shaker bars and
pry it or beat on it into a locking position, and a lot of
times when these shaker bars fit tight, get way down on
your lug, you have to take something pretty heavy and
beat it in order to get it loose, and in that process, a lot
of our shaker bars are cracked, and are brazed, so it will
be because this is beaten up and the shaker bar won’t fit
properly, or because this is too big.
“Q. If you do have a crack in the housing that makes
an additional surface to catch, doesn’t it, because it fits
over tightly?
“A. You will have to go a little farther.
“Q. If you are going to make it loose enough to come
off, you have got to be able to get it—if you are going to
get it loose enough so it will come off, you have got to
be able to go right down into the grate lug which is
parallel, is that right, so that you have got a big enough
opening, otherwise, if you have got enough of an opening
so it will catch on the slanting portion of the grate lug,
it is hard to bring it off, whenever you push it down
and place it properly, isn’t that right?
“A. Yes, sir, when it slips off it is because most of
the time, because it won’t fit clear down onto the lug like
it should.
“Q. Because it won’t go all the way down on the lug?
“A. Yes, sir.” (R. 538-540.)
Engine No. 480 had been in service for about 30 years (R.
246-247).
be a possibility of a shaker bar slipping off” the grate lug
Defendant's witness Brosserd testified that “there wouldn’t
18
(R. 237) ; but he also testified only from his knowledge of the
class of engines to which locomotive No. 480 belonged, and
not from personal knowledge of that locomotive (R. 255).
The testimony also was that, if the shaker bar and the
grate lug were in good condition and repair, the shaker would
not come off by operating the grates by means thereof (R. 32;
R. 526-527) ; but do come off if the lug itself is worn or the
shaker bar is damaged (R. 527).
It is undisputed that this particular shaker bar was so
loose that it could be jiggled by mere handling it (R. 29).
Summary of Evidence as to Whether Shaker Bar Can Be Pulled
Backward Toward the Tender.
Plaintiff’s version as to the happening of the accident was
that he pulled the shaker bar back toward the tender then
pulled it toward the boiler, and that while pulling it toward
the boiler, it sprung so as to throw him with great force
against the boiler (R. 30-31). Defendant contended that the
accident could not have happened in that manner for the
reason that the shaker bar could not be pulled back toward
the tender and that the farthest back it would go was in a
perpendicular position (R. 257-258).
The testimony that the grates could be opened by pulling
the shaker bar consisted of that of plaintiff (R. 30-31) and
that of William Woodrow, Jr., who testified :
“Q. Assuming the grates were in good condition, per-
fect condition the way you have described, you say, in the
backward motion you could open the grates one inch;
how far could you open the grates in the forward motion
toward the boiler?
“A. I don’t know in exactly inches, but it will open
enough that the grates will tip at an angle about like
this; it would depend on how wide the grates are.
“Q. They will fully open, and I take it what you
described will be something like a foot. I’m not tying
‘ you down to inches, that is about your opinion, isn’t it?
19
“Mr. Rerat: Let him give his opinion.
“A. No, I would say eight inches, ten inches.
“Q. What?
“A. Eight to ten inches.
“Q. Anyway, it is to the full opening?
“A. Yes, sir.” (R. 546.)
While Mr. Brosserd denied that the grates could be so
opened by a pull of the shaker bar toward the tender, he also
testified :
“Q. Material or not material, I want to get your testi-
mony so we don’t misunderstand each other. Your testi-
mony here is that by a backward position toward the
tender that the grates can’t be opened or manipulated
with the shaker bar in that direction, is that it?
“A. That would depend on how the locking device,
how the deck of the engine is, where the shaker staff
comes through.
“Q. And if they do open in that direction does that
mean that there is something wrong with the mechanics
of that particular part of the boiler?
“A. Well, it would hinder the full opening forward
the way they were intended to be.
“Q. Does that mean there is something defective,
then, about that particular apparatus?
“A. I wouldn’t call it defective. I wouldn’t call it a
desirable condition.” (R. 433.)
Summary of the Testimony Relating to Plaintiff's Injuries.
Plaintiff himself testified that he was thrown against the
boiler with a “very hard impact” (R. 32); that he suffered
great pain therefrom (R. 33) in the small of the back, hips
and legs (R. 34); that he endured such pain on the- return
trip all the way back to Ottumwa (R. 34); that, when he
got back to Ottumwa he told the roundhouse foreman about
his injury and got from him an order to go to the company’s
doctor, Dr. Nelson, of Ottumwa (R. 35); that he then went
home, where his wife took care of him and put hot packs
on his back and where he had a night of pain, sleeplessness—
20
a hard, restless night (R. 35); that the next day (November
13, 1949) he went to Dr. Nelson, the company’s doctor (R.
35), who gave him hypodermic shots and taped his back, and
told him to use hot packs at home and he would be all right
and able to go back to work (R. 36) ; and that thereafter his
wife applied hot packs, but he took no medicine (R. 36).
From November 13, 1949, to December 23, 1949, he worked
“as best he could.” During this time he went to Dr. Nelson
every few days, took the pills prescribed for him by the
doctor (R. 36) and continued to have his wife put on the hot
packs (R. 37); but he was never free of pain in the back and
pains in the legs, which were “terrific” (R. 37). On Decem-
ber 23, 1949, he took his regular run as an engineer from
Ottumwa to Laredo. His condition became acute while he
was at Laredo and as a consequence he was unable to operate
the engine back to Ottumwa. Instead he rode back as a
passenger—in railroad parlance he deadheaded back (R. 38).
As to his condition at that time he testified :
“A. I was in such intense pain I couldn’t sit down, I
couldn’t stand up, I tried to stand up and I tried on my
knees, and it was necessary for me to lay off when I
arrived at Laredo and deadhead home on the passenger.”
Upon plaintiff’s return to Ottumwa, he again consulted Dr.
Nelson, who in the period between December 24, 1949, and
January 18, 1950, made arrangements to send plaintiff to Dr.
Metz, in Chicago, defendant’s head surgeon, for treatment in
Wesley Memorial Hospital in that city, where he remained
for 30 days (R. 38-39). While in the hospital his back pained
him at all times and he was given massage and pills and had a
rectum operation (R. 38-41).
Plaintiff returned home in February, 1950, and continued
to consult Dr. Nelson. He worked as an engineer from Febru-
ary 28, 1950, to August 28, 1950. During this time he sv.ffered
intense pain in his back and legs, walked with difficulty, con-
21
tinued his consultations with Dr. Nelson and his hot pack
treatments at home. He slept on a board as directed by Dr.
Metz of Chicago. After work he went to bed (R. 40-41). In
April, 1950, Dr. Nelson called in Dr. Fox of Ottumwa, who
fitted plaintiff with a heavy brace (R. 41). On August 28,
1950, Dr. Nelson again called in Dr. Fox and they had plain-
tiff put in a hospital in Ottumwa for about a week. While
there, he was put in traction, given electric diathermy and
treatment for skin sores caused by the brace (R. 40-44).
After leaving the hospital in Ottumwa in September, 1950,
plaintiff was again sent to Dr. Metz in Chicago (defendant’s
head surgeon) who treated him again at Wesley Memorial
Hospital in Chicago by means of massage, medication and
sedatives every day. That was the last time he was in a hos-
pital (R. 44-46). He was there for 57 days (R. 215).
After plaintiff left the hospital in December, 1950, he
was continuously under Dr. Nelson’s care until a few days
before the trial in March, 1952. During 1951, Dr. Nelson
called in, besides Dr. Fox, a Dr. Eberle E. Thornton, an ortho-
pedist of Des Moines, Iowa, who fitted plaintiff with another,
but a lighter body brace for which defendant’s claim agent,
Harold J. Barry, paid (R. 46-47). During all the time from
the date of the injury, November 12, 1949, to the time of
trial, plaintiff suffered terrible pain and loss of sleep, which
he described in his testimony, as follows:
“A. Well, the pain in the small of my back feels
just like you were sticking an ice pick in it, and it runs
down my leg, and that is also from laying, and when I
twist or turn, I couldn’t tell you—it is just like you were
getting stabbed in the back; unexpected shock, like rid-
ing an engine, just the normal operation of the engine,
every time you hit a little joint or high joint or flat spot
on one of the wheels, it hits vou in the back like some-
body sticking a knife in you.” (R. 48.)
“A. I don’t sleep well. If I have any activity, then
this pain gets my back. I lay down in bed and relax,
22
maybe after a couple of hours I can go to sleep, but the
first time I turn around, bang, I am awake again; every
time you move, it is there.” (R. 49.)
Prior to his injury, plaintiff had been in good health and
had not been involved in any railroad accident (R. 49).
After the accident plaintiff lost 45 pounds in weight—his
weight decreased from 205 to 160 pounds.
Plaintiff's wife testified that plaintiff had been in good
health prior to his injury (R. 217) and slept well (R. 216) ;
that she “cried” when plaintiff came home during the night
of November 12, 1949, after his injury because he looked so
“terrible’ (R. 213); that she found his back swollen and
sore at that time (R. 213); that she administered hot packs
and heat treatments (R. 214); that plaintiff was attended
by Dr. Nelson, was in the Ottumwa Hospital 20 days (R.
215); worked from February to August, 1950; that he went
to see Dr. Nelson during that time and had home treatments
(R. 215); that he was in the Chicago hospital for 57 days
(R. 215); and that he suffered intense pain and could not
sleep. She testified:
“Q. What has been the situation since he was injured
on November 12, 1949?
A. Well, I used to have a hard time waking him up.
Now I pray for him so he can sleep; he can’t sleep.”
and that he lost 45 pounds in weight.
Dr. Arthur E. Bratrud testified on behalf of plaintiff that
he, the doctor, graduated in 1912 from the University of Min-
nesota College of Medicine (R. 51); that he served an intern-
ship at Ancker Hospital in St. Paul, Minnesota (R. 52);
that he did post-graduate work at Johns Hopkins (R. 52) ;
that he was of the Department of Peripheral Nerve Surgery
in the Reconstruction Hospital; that he was on the staffs
of Asbury and Mt. Sinai Hospitals and free to practice in
others in Minneapolis (R. 52-53); that he was a member of
23
numerous medical societies—naming them (R. 53); and
that he is and had been an assistant professor in surgery at
the University of Minnesota. He personally examined plain-
tiff, studied his medical history, including his prior medical
treatment and the records of the Ottumwa Hospital and X-
rays which he had taken (R. 54-60). His examination showed
plaintiff had muscle spasm in the lumbo-sacral region which
“* * * indicates that it is—there is some deeper in-
jury there below the skin, deep in the muscle or liga-
ments; the ligaments surround the bony structure, and
spasin is nothing more than an effort of nature to hold
those areas at rest so as to give them relief.” (R. 60.)
He also found that there had been a narrowing of the space
between the 4th and 5th vertebrae, the significance of which
was:
“It usually means that there is an injury or a rupture;
I mentioned about this fluid inside of the middle of this
cartilage; it usually means that there is a rupture
of it with destruction of it, and the vertebrae become
more collapsed, begin to draw more closely together.”
(R. 63.)
“Now, if you compare these vertebrae here, it looks as
though there might have been a compression injury,
that is a flattening out of the anterior portion of this
vertebrae, of the body. You can see the distance, the
width of this vertebrae as compared to this one, there
is quite a difference on the anterior margin. And here
again, in the lower part of the spine, if you compare the
distance between the two vertebrae in this area, it ap-
pears as though there is a lessening in this inter-verte-
bral space, 4 and 5.” (R. 64.)
He also described plaintiffs condition as:
“A. Well, I think primarily he has a prolapsed or
injured disc. "
Q. Which one, Doctor, would you say?
A. Lumbar 4 to 5, and I think he has had an aggra-
vation of his arthritic condition, and he probably had a
24
great deal of tearing of the ligaments around the lumbar
sacral junction, and there is apparently some irritation
of the nerves leading to both lower extremities.
Q. Iam sorry but I am trying to get everything you
stated; you mentioned the nerve?
A. There is some irritation or injury to the nerves
leading to the lower extremities.” (R. 67.)
These injuries affected plaintiff's back and legs. He also tes-
tified that as a consequence of such, injuries were permanent
(R. 69); that such injuries permanently disabled plaintiff
from doing his work as a railroad engineer, the kind of work
he had done for 27 years (R. 71-72); and that such injuries
and disability were caused by the accident plaintiff was in on
November 12, 1949 (R. 73).
Ottumwa Hospital Records. These showed that plaintiff
had been treated in the hospital by Dr. Nelson and Dr. Fox
and that Dr. Fox diagnosed his case as one of “retropulsed
dise” with pains in the back and legs (R. 212; R. 318).
The admission diagnosis of plaintiff's case when he was re-
ceived at Ottumwa Hospital was that he had a “retropulsed
disc with unstable lumbo- sacral joint.” (R. 308).
Wesley Memorial Hospital Records. When plaintiff was
received at this hospital, X-rays were taken of his lumbo-
sacral region by a Dr. Barth, which were made part of the
hospital record. Dr. Barth noted thereon (R. 303):
“A. The vertebral bodies and interspaces are of nor-
mal height, except for a narrowed interspace between
the fourth lumbar vertebra and the adjacent transitional
type fifth lumbar vertebra.”
The X-rays which Dr. Barth found which he stated showed
a narrowing between the fourth and fifth vertebrae were
identified by Dr. Householder at page 304 of the record.
The medical testimony on behalf of defendant consisted of
the testimony of three doctors, none of whom had treated
25
plaintiff professionally. Plaintiff had been attended by at
least five doctors employed by defendant, viz. :
Dr. Nelson of Ottumwa
Dr. Fox of Ottumwa
Dr. Thornton of Des Moines
Dr. Metz of Chicago
Dr. Householder of Chicago
He was examined by these five doctors and also by two others,
Dr. Conley of Chicago and Dr. Yoerg of Minneapolis.
Only Drs. Householder, Conley and Yoerg testified as wit-
nesses. Dr. Yoerg was the only doctor who produced his notes
of the examination made by him. Dr. Householder and Dr.
Conley did not produce their notes.
Dr. Householder testified that he graduated in medicine in
1922 and commenced to practice in 1923 (R. 260); that he
was a member of numerous medical societies (R. 261); that
he had been assistant surgeon of defendant since 1927 and
became chief surgeon 34 days before he testified at the trial
(R. 260-261); that on January 18, 1950, he examined plain-
tiff as to his injuries and condition and found that he had
pains in sacroiliac region of the back on both the right and
left sides, over both buttocks and down into the legs (R.
263); that he had an abscess in the rectum (R. 266). He
stated that plaintiff claimed that he had been hurt shaking
grates (of an engine) with a shaker bar (R. 264); but that
plaintiff had said nothing about having been thrown against
the boiler (R. 265), nor about the shaker bar coming loose
(R. 265). He did not testify as to whether he inquired about
the last mentioned matters. He also testified that X-rays
were taken of plaintiff's lower back and that the X-rays
showed no evidence of injury between the fourth and fifth
vertebrae (R. 270-272) or of “unusual narrowing of the inter-
vertebral space between those vertebrae” (R. 273).
26
Again on September 26, 1950, plaintiff was re-admitted
to the hospital (R. 275). Dr. Metz determined whether he
should be so re-admitted (R. 277). The re-admission was
made because of plaintiff’s complaints of back injuries (R.
277-278). X-rays again were taken (R. 278), which showed
no changes (R. 279). He further testified that he had exam-
ined Dr. Bratrud’s X-ray films and that they showed no evi-
- dence of fracture, dislocation or injury in the fourth-fifth
vertebrae region (R. 284-286).
He testified that in his opinion plaintiff had received “no
injury” on November 12, 1949, and that plaintiffs pain and
soreness are associated with degenerative changes (R. 287-
288).
On cross examination he testified that he did not have his
notes with him (R. 290); that he refreshed his recollection
before the trial by “looking” at the hospital record (R. 291) ;
that he could not say whether Dr. Nelson of Ottumwa had
sent plaintiff to Chicago to be treated for back injuries for
the reason that he had not examined the correspondence with
respect to the matter before the trial and did not have the
correspondence with him (R. 292); that he found that
plaintiff had muscle spasm in lumbo-sacral region of the back
(R. 293), but that the X-rays didn’t show any intervertebral
injuries (R. 299). He further testified that Dr. Metz was in
Chicago and not present at the trial (R. 294), and that
plaintiff was hospitalized at Dr. Metz’s suggestion (R. 295-
296). He also testified that X-rays will show bone structure
and injuries, but not injuries to the muscles and ligaments
(R. 299). He testified that some of the symptoms and factors
involved in an intervertebral injury such as plaintiff claimed
to have were pain in the back (R. 301), muscle spasm (R.
300), narrowing of the intervertebral spaces (R. 302). He
found no such narrowing (R. 303). He admitted that the
Ottumwa Hospital record showed that Dr. Nelson and Dr.
27
Fox diagnosed plaintiff's injury as “retropulsed disc” be-
tween the fourth and fifth vertebrae (R. 317) and that the
Wesley Memorial Hospital record made by Dr. Barth, who
took X-rays there, showed a narrowing of the intervertebral
space between the fourth and fifth vertebrae (R. 303-304).
He refrained from explaining the significance of “insecurity
in the lumbosacral joint” found by Dr. Fox (R. 314).
He gave it as his opinion that, if plaintiff had all the evi-
dences of injury to the disc in the intervertebral space be-
tween the fourth and fifth vertebrae claimed by him, plain-
tiff had the injuries which he claimed and that the traction
treatment administered (at the Ottumwa Hospital) was a
recognized treatment for the relief thereof (R. 318-319) ; but
that he was of the opinion that plaintiff had no such injury
(R. 322).
Dr. Conley testified that he had never treated plaintiff
(R. 348), but that he had examined plaintiff in his office in
Chicago (R. 331); that plaintiff complained of pains in
sacroiliac region or lower back (R. 332-334); that X-rays
were taken for him by a Dr. Cannon (R. 342-343) ; that what
an X-ray will disclose depends upon the position of the light
tubes and the manner of reading the X-ray film (R. 337-340) 2
that, if Dr. Cannon’s were read one way, they disclosed a nar-
rowing between the fourth and fifth vertebral and if read in
a different way, they did not do so. His testimony was:
“A. Well, if you call this the fourth and call this the
fifth, that is normal, there is no narrowing. If you call
this the fourth and this the fifth, there appears to be
some narrowing because the X-ray is right over this area
and not centered over this one. It is not taken—the
direct ray is centered right here, and this point in
another film is not entirely straight here. If this hap-
pened to havé been taken from the other side—you are
dealing with bodies with thickness—taken from the
other side, then it would appear wider. We can see on
28
the front of you that there is no narrowing between the
fourth and fifth. This is Defendant’s Exhibit X. Now,
in this particular film, depending upon if we call this the
fifth and this the fourth, there is quite a wide space
here. If we call this the fourth and this the fifth, the
space above does not appear quite as wide as it does
below but if you take a film of this type, between the
fourth and fifth, there is quite a wide space here—this
is the center, is exactly over this particular film and this
is Defendant’s Exhibit Y; this is taken to throw out
quite broader, to include the sacroiliac joints. If you
look at a side view of a large area of these intervertebral
spaces, they are all the same and seem to be quite well
open, there is no particular narrowing.” (R. 338, f. 3;
R. 339, ff. 1, 2.
He gave it as his opinion that there was no evidence that
plaintiff had intervertebral injury between the fourth and
fifth vertebrae (R. 346); that plaintiff was not injured, and
that he could go back to work (R. 348).
On cross examination the doctor stated that, while he
had notes, he did not have them with him (R. 349); that
it was not necessary to do so (R. 349-350); that he had
brought along his X-rays and his memory and that “I care-
| fully reviewed my record before I came here, and that is the
proper (this word later was stricken) procedure” (R. 350) ;
| that (contrary to what Dr. Householder said) traction is not
a recognized procedure for treating dise injuries, but may be
| used for back injuries (R. 352-353); that he looked for
muscle spasm (R. 354-355), but found none (R. 357). He
stated that narrowing of the intervertebral spaces, pain in
back extending down into legs, and muscle spasm are all
factors to be considered in determining the existence of an
intervertebral dise injury (R. 354-355; R. 362-364). He con-
cluded by stating that “I firmly believe” that I know more
about plaintiff's condition as a consequence of his own exam-
ination, which took about one-half hour (R. 348), than Dr.
Sar
29
Nelson did as a consequence of attending and treating plain-
tiff for over two years (R. 364).
Dr. Yoerg testified with the aid of his notes and stated:
“I then inquired as to what he was in the office for,
what it was about. He told me that he had injured his
back in an accident on November 12, 1949, about 7:30 in
the evening, at Powersville, Missouri, said he was help-
ing fireman clean fire, shaking grate, and he had to give
it a hard pull, it suddenly let go and he wrenched his
back, the shaker bar then came off, he said he was thrown
against the boiler head.”
The rest of his notes is a resumé of most of the case history
(R. 370-372). He testified that on Exhibit AA the space be-
tween the fourth and fifth vertebrae appeared “narrower” (R.
373), but that all depends on how the picture was taken and
how it is read (R. 373-374). He found muscle spasm, but
nothing abnormal except back pains (R. 376). His conclu-
sion was that at the time of trial plaintiff could not do the
work of a railroad engineer, but would be able to do so in a
month to six weeks, if he would quit wearing his brace and
have some manipulation (R. 378-379).
On cross examination he testified that he did not treat
plaintiff professionally and saw him only for about 45
minutes (R. 390); that the treatment given by Dr. Nelson
and Dr. Fox could be proper for a disc case (R. 391), but
that he found no disc injury at the time of trial (R. 396) ;
that the records of Wesley Memorial Hospital show a finding
of narrowing of the intervertebral space between the fourth
and fifth vertebrae (R. 397-398) ; that pain in lumbo-sacral
region radiating down into the legs and muscle spasm are
evidences of such intervertebral injury (R. 398).
He testified also that Dr. Bratrud and Dr. Barth saw in
their X-ray films a narrowing between the fourth and fifth
vertebrae (R. 400, 401) but that he was able to determine
30
a stereopticon made by a Dr. Lyons that there was no such
narrowing (R. 407). The stereopticon was not preduced in
court and no demonstration thereof given.
Summary of Evidence Relative to Damages.
Plaintiff's own testimony already stated above was to the
effect that he had a partial physical disability from November
12, 1949, to August, 1950; that thereafter until the time of
trial he was totally disabled; and that he suffered severe and
acute pain both day and night so that he was uncomfortable
and suffered during the daytime and was unable to sleep at
night (R. 48-50). His wife’s testimony was to the same effect.
She was an eye-witness to his suffering and in desperation
and hope prayed that the man she could not awaken when
he was well might be blessed with sleep as relief from his
agony (R. 213-216). Dr. Bratrud testified unqualifiedly that
plaintiff was permanently and totally disabled from working
as a railroad engineer (R. 71-73).
Plaintiff's life expectancy was 19.49 years at. time of trial
(R. 211-212).
His average earnings per month as an engineer were
(R. 84):
bea eee: $474.32 (during time he worked)
BR Socks naisicies 432.20
jek Pah aa a 245.31
31
CALCULATION OF RESPONDENT'S DAMAGES
As shown in the statement of facts just made, plaintiff's
loss of earnings, past and prospeetive, exceeded the verdict
as reduced by the trial court by at least $54,000.00. This
amount consists of the following:
Loss of earnings from February, 1950, to
March, 1952, 19 months at 474.32................ $ 9,002.08
Loss of wages during his expectancy of 19.49
years at an average of 450.00 per month... 105,246.00
IIE psc coals ouspisn cguacnmcdaecenicsaaliola tal $114,248.08
This does not include any allowance for pain and suffering.
We think that the jury would have been justified in award-
ing plaintiff somewhere between $35,000.00 and $70,000.00
as an additional allowance for such damages.
ARGUMENT
L.
Where Later Injuries Are to a Different Part of the Body and Are
Not Shown to Have Any Connection With the Injuries on Which
Plaintiff Bases His Cause of Action, Evidence Concerning the
Later Injuries Should Be Excluded.
City of Birmingham v. Carlson, 209 Ala. 428, 96 So. 333.
Hall v. Shenandoah, 167 Towa 735, 149 N. W. 831.
Johnson v. City of Troy (N. Y.), 124 App. Div. 29.
Rhyner v. City of Menasha, 107 Wis. 201, 83 N. W. 303.
In the case of Birmingham v. Carlson, supra, plaintiff sus-
tained a sprain of the left ankle due to stepping into a depres-
sion in a street and later sustained an injury to the right
ankle. The Court excluded the evidence of injury to the right
ankle upon the ground that there was no testimony to show
any connection between the two injuries. The Alabama Court
said (96 So. 335) :
32
“Dr. Anthony, testifying as a witness for plaintiff, de-
scribed plaintiff’s injury, a sprain of the left ankle, and
his treatment thereof. On cross examination, after the
court had overruled plaintiff's objection to evidence of
trouble with the ‘other ankle,’ this witness described a
trouble on the outer side of plaintiff’s right ankle, which
he saw and treated about six weeks after the injury in
question. He described the trouble on the outer side of
the right ankle as being probably a thrombus or clot, in
a vein which was relieved as soon as the vein was opened
and allowed to bleed a little. He said that this trouble
had nothing whatever to do with the injury to the left
ankle, and said further, in effect, that it did not affect
the right ankle, meaning, as we suppose, and as the jury
may have inferred, that it did not affect the use or
strength of the left ankle, Then on plaintiff’s motion
this evidence as to plaintiff’s right ankle was excluded.
There was in this no error, though plaintiff did not re-
peat the objection which had been overruled. Not only
did the testimony of the witness show that this later
trouble had nothing to do with the accident, but, if de-
fendant would have had the jury find a weakness of the
right ankle which may have contributed to plaintiff’s
injury, the evidence related to a time too remote, and,
if not too remote in point of time, the fact furnished no
excuses for the condition of the street.” (Emphasis sup-
plied. )
In the case of Johnson v. City of Troy, supra, the pertinent
facts appear from the following quotation of the Court (R.
30-31) :
“While the plaintiff's counsel assured the Court when
the evidence objected to was received that he would con-
nect it, and while it was shown that the plaintiff received
an injury to the groin or to the right side of his abdomen
and that there was contusion and inflammation there
which the physician who attended and operated upon
him testified he was reasonably certain was due to the
accident, there was a complete failure of proof to show
that the appendicitis for which the plaintiff was operated
upon was necessarily and directly caused by the injuries
which the plaintiff received.” (Emphasis supplied. )
33
In the case of Rhyner v. City of Menasha, supra, the Wis-
consin Court said (107 Wis. 210-211, 83 N. W. 307) :
“Plaintiff's accident happened in November, 1891.
Dr. Oviatt was permitted to testify that he performed an
operation on plaintiff's leg in the summer of 1893, for
which he charged $100. The record contains no testi-
mony showing any necessary or causal connection be-
tween the injury and the subsequent operation. Unless
so connected, the evidence was improper.” (Emphasis
supplied. )
These authorities are pursuasive that the evidence rela-
tive to the bridge accident was very properly stricken from
the record by the learned trial judge. In view of the fact,
as above set forth, that defendant claimed throughout that
plaintiff was not injured at all and that he was able to resume
his work as a locomotive engineer and of the further fact
that Dr. Yoerg claimed the plaintiff's only trouble was arth-
ritis from which he would recover in a month or two, it seems
to us that petitioner has taken an inconsistent position which
should preclude it from even asserting the contention which
it now makes, On the one hand it claims that plaintiff was
not injured and on the other it claims that he was. injured
solely as the result of the bridge accident. But its claim that
plaintiff was not injured extends according to its evidence
even to the injuries sustained in the bridge accident for the
reason that Dr. Yoerg who examined plaintiff after the bridge
accident testified that plaintiff was not injured at all.
At any rate, it is clear that under the authorities the evi-
dence concerning the scratch on the forehead which plaintiff
sustained in the bridge accident had no connection with the
Inmbo-sacral injuries which plaintiff sustained in the railroad
accident.
In this connection, it is important to bear in mind that
the Witness Kemp testified that he didn’t know anything
about the bridge accident or how it happened (R. 468); that
34
plaintiff's Plymouth sedan was found upside down under the
bridge (R. 464) ; that he saw plaintiff in the Milwaukee Cafe
in Ottumwa within a few minutes after the accident and that
plaintiff was then moving around in said place (R. 456-458).
The Witness Young simply testified to the fact that plaintiff's
automobile was found upside down under the bridge and that
part of the bridge railing had been knocked down (R. 473-76).
Testimony of the Witness Lippincott was that on the day
after the accident, plaintiff had a small bandage on his fore-
head and that plaintiff stated that he did not feel well enough
to go to town (R. 478-480). In short, none of these witnesses
testified that plaintiff was in the car when it went over the
bridge, much less that plaintiff had sustained any injuries as
a consequence thereof. Plaintiff’s statement that he was not
well enough to go to town on the day following the accident
was not shown to relate to any disability caused by the bridge
accident, and therefore, under the authorities cited, was not
admissible.
Plaintiff's own version was that the bridge accident oc-
curred because of the slippery and icy condition of the road
that night; that the car skidded; that the skidding knocked
out part of the railing on the west side of the bridge; that
plaintiff got out of the car just before it went off the bridge.
At that time plaintiff was sober (R. 107-112). Plaintiff’s tes-
timony, in part, is:
“Q. All right, you tell us what happened.
“A. On this particular date I was going home, and
it was a very rough approach onto this bridge, and the
bridge was covered with ice; I was only driving five
or six miles an hour slowed down with the brake, and
the car started to skid, and it crashed into the railing on
the right side, and it bumped along there a little, and
I opened the door and got out—the car practically
came to a stop—I opened the door and got out of the car,
and the car did turn over and fall off the bridge. I was
never into the left hand rail or any place; it just kind
35
of skidded sideways; it was a wooden guard rail, by the
way, knocking that off, and the car skidded—it was only
going a mile or two an hour, a mile I would say—I
opened the door, got out, and the car turned over.
“Q. You got out of the car and let the car go off the
bridge and fall down 12 or 15 feet down below, and turn
upside down?
“A. The car went off five or six feet, I guess, some-
thing like that.
“Q. It is 12 or 15 feet down there?
“A. Regardless of what it is, the car went over the
bridge.
“Q. Did you have any injuries?
“A. Absolutely not, except a scratch on my forehead.
I had a scratch on my forehead as I got out, I bumped
the door and had a scratch on my forehead.” (R. 107-
108.) (Emphasis supplied. )
Plaintiff's testimony that he did not sustain any injuries
in the bridge accident except the scratch on his forehead was
absolutely uncontradicted and undisputed.
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court simply
followed the well-established rules of evidence in striking
the testimony of Kemp, Young and Lippincott because it
was not shown; first, that plaintiff had sustained any in-
juries as the result of the bridge accident, except the scratch
on the forehead; and secondly, because it was not shown that
the scratch on the forehead had anything to do with the in-
juries for which plaintiff sought recovery against the defend-
ant.
36
it.
Striking Testimony Is Not Prejudicial Where the Facts to Which
the Testimony Relates Is Otherwise Established.
It is the rule of this Court, and also of the State Courts,
that exclusion of evidence is not prejudicial where the facts
to which the excluded evidence relates is otherwise estab-
lished by other evidence.
Matheson v. United States, 227 U. 8. 540, 57 L. Ed. 631,
33 8. Ct. 355.
Drumm-Flato Commission Co. v. Edmisson, 208 U. 8.
534, 52 L. Ed. 606, 28 8. Ct. 367.
Lucas v. Brooks, 18 Wall. (U. 8.) 436, 21 L. Ed. 779.
Cannon v. Pratt, 99 U. 8. 619, 25 L. Ed. 446.
Schmitt v. Emery, 211 Minn. 547, 2 N. W. 2d 413, 139
A. L. R. 1242.
Metalak v. Rasmussen, 184 Minn. 260, 288 N. W. 478.
5 C. J. 8., Appeal and Error, Sec. 1749.
In the Matheson case, this Court said (227 U. 8. 543) that:
“The exclusion of testimony as to facts subsequently
proved”
presents no ground for reversal.
While it is true that the testimony of Kemp, Young and
Lippincott relating to the bridge accident was stricken,
there was neither a motion to strike nor an order striking
the testimony of plaintiff, himself, who stated the facts rela-
tive to the bridge accident more fully and adequately than
did defendant’s witnesses. Thus, after the order striking the
testimony of Kemp, Young and Lippincott relating to the
bridge accident, all the facts to which their testimony related
appeared from the testimony of the plaintiff, which was not
stricken. Defendant had the full benefit of this testimony of
plaintiff for the consideration of the jury. Thus, the facts
to which the testimony of Kemp, Young and Lippincott re-
37
lated remained for the consideration of the jury because of
the testimony of plaintiff. The exclusion of the testimony
of the three witnesses named certainly was not prejudicial
for the reasons stated.
CONCLUSION
The Petition for Certiorari raises no substantial question
for consideration of this Court. We not only approve the
rules laid down by this Court in the cases cited by peti-
tioner, viz. :
Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., Inc., 319 U. 8. 350, 63
8. Ct. 1062, 87 L. Ed. 1444 (1943).
Carter v. Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay Ry. Co., 338 U. 8.
430, 70 8S. Ct. 226, 94 L. Ed. 236 (1949).
Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R. Co., 342 U. 8.
359, 72 8. Ct. 312, 96 L. Ed. 398 (1952).
Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U. 8. 645, 66 8. Ct. 740, 90 L. Ed.
916 (1946).
M. St. P. & 8. 8. M. Ry. Co. v. Moquin, 283 U. 8. 520,
51 8. Ct. 501, 75 L. Ed. 1243 (1931).
Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. Ry. Co., 321 U. 8. 29, 64 8. Ct.
409, 88 L. Ed. 520 (1944).
Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U. 8. 54, 63
8. Ct. 444, 87 L. Ed. 610 (1943).
Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U. 8. 53, 69 8. Ct. 413, 93
L. Ed. 497 (1949) ;
but we also think that the rule of these cases should be ex-
tended so as to encompass every case where the evidence
presents any issue of fact. We think that the instant case
does not come within the rule of those cases for the reason
there was no evidentiary connection shown between the in-
juries sustained by plaintiff as the result of defendant’s neg-
ligence and the head-scratch injury sustained by him as a
consequence of the bridge accident.
38
We therefore respectfully submit that the Court should .
deny the Petition for Certiorari. $
ee
Respectfully submitted,
Harry H. Pererson and
EvuGENE A. RERAT,
610 Baker Building,
Minneapolis 2, Minnesota,
Attorneys for Respondent.
In THE
Supreme Court of the Gnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1953
No. 580
CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. PAUL AND PACIFIC
RAILROAD COMPANY, a Corporation,
Petitioner,
vs.
WILLIAM J. WOODROW,
Respondent.
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT
OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF MINNESOTA
INTRODUCTION
Respondent has not only avoided but has concealed and
confused the question presented herein. Accordingly a brief
reply is deemed appropriate to clarify:the single question pre-
sented and to correct the wholly inadequate and misleading
analysis of the problem urged upon the Court by respondent.
bo
THE QUESTION PRESENTED
At the outset of respondent’s brief under the heading
“Question Presented” is a long, involved question based upon
inaccurate and presumed facts and having little or no real
significance herein. One broad question of law is presented
to the Court by the petition—whether the Minnesota Supreme
Court has ignored the strict and repeated pronouncements
of this Court in reference to the litigant’s right to trial by
jury of disputed questions of fact in actions under the Fed-
eral Employers’ Liability Act. Under that Act material
questions of fact are matters for determination by the jury
and not the Court.
The exercise of the Court’s discretion is sought not only
because it is believed that the decision below is erroneous but
also upon the broader ground that an important question of
Federal law is presented ; that the principle involved herein,
namely, the right of a defendant (and not only a plaintiff)
to trial by jury under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act,
is unique and of far-reaching nationa) significance in the
adjudication of the rights and liabilities created by the Fed-
eral Employers’ Liability Act. The petition is further based
upon the ground that the decision of the Minnesota Supreme
Court herein is irreconcilably opposed to the applicable deci-
sions of this Court.
Respondent has in no sense challenged this foundation of
the petition nor has he attempted to distinguish the present
case from the numerous decisions of this Court in which
certiorari has been granted to review the failure of a state
court to recognize the right to a jury determination of all
material questions of fact in actions under the Federal Em-
ployers’ Liability Act. In this sense respondent has ignored
the broad question of law presented herein.
The specific question presented by the evidence is whether
the claimed permanent back injury complained of by plain-
: : 3
tiff at the time of trial was caused, contributed to, or aggra-
vated by an automobile accident at the Black Hawk Bridge
more than two years after plaintiff's alleged railroad acci-
dent. It is petitioner’s sole contention that this is a question
of fact for the exclusive determination of the jury and not
one for the trial court.
It, of course, is not necessary for defendant to show that
plaintiff's condition of injury at the time of trial was solely
the result of the Black Hawk Bridge accident, but it is suffi-
cient if the testimony raises the inference that his disability
is in any part the result of said bridge accident. Defendant
should not be required to respond in damages in any amount
whatsoever for the injuries received by plaintiff in such
bridge accident. The lower court took this question of fact
away from the jury.
RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Thirty-one pages of respondent’s 38-page answering brief
are devoted to a discussion of selected portions of the evi-
dence. Part of respondent’s statement is repetitious of that
made by petitioner while respondent has discussed other
facts at length which are not material to the question pre-
sented. Certain other statements are not only misleading but
wholly inaccurate. Those portions of the evidence detri-
mental to respondent’s case have been carefully avoided.
We do not say there was no evidence on which the verdict
for plaintiff was based, but we do say there was substantial
material evidence withdrawn by the Court from the con-
sideration of the jury upon which the jury properly could
have found plaintiff's disability at the time of the trial was
wholly or partially proximately caused by the bridge acci-
dent. w
In addition to other unsupported accusations contained in
respondent’s brief, petitioner is accused of having gone be-
4
yond the scope of the question presented in discussing the
evidence relating to plaintiff’s claimed shaker bar accident.
It is not petitioner’s intention to raise an additional question
by presenting these facts but only to show the legal incon-
sistency between the holding below in reference to the ques-
tion of the alleged shaker bar accident and the holding below
on the question of the bridge accident.
It is the decision of the lower court that it is for the jury
to determine whether the shaker bar accident occurred as
claimed by plaintiff and whether the disabilities found by
plaintiff's doctor at the time of trial were caused by said
shaker bar accident. On the other hand, the lower court held
that it is for the Court to say whether the bridge accident
occurred as claimed by defendant and whether the disabili-
ties found by plaintiff's doctor at the time of trial were
caused or contributed to by the bridge accident. This gross
inconsistency is one of law and can only be shown by relating
the facts surrounding plaintiff's doubtful shaker bar acci-
dent. For instance, in the shaker bar accident, the Court,
without any direct evidence at all, let the jury infer from
circumstances set out by plaintiff that the grate rods, below
the deck of engine, and out of sight of plaintiff (R. 99, 100),
may have been bent, causing the accident.
On the other hand, in the bridge accident where plaintiff's
car knocked out 10 feet of railing on the left side of the bridge
and then crossed to the right side of the bridge and knocked
down 60 or 70 feet of substantial posts and railings, the
Court in substance held as a matter of law that the car was
going two miles an hour as testified to by plaintiff. Cer-
tainly from these facts the jury would be justified in holding
the car was going not at two miles per hour but at a very
rapid rate of speed and that plaintiff must have fallen off
the bridge with his car and, of course, sustained a tremendous
jolt or concussion to his person.
5
Defendant’s Exhibits “E”, “F” and “G” are pictures of
the Black Hawk Bridge after it had been repaired. These
are included in the appendix, infra. The pictures graphically
show the heavy construction of the bridge rail and the dis-
tance from the bridge to the ground.
A further comparison of the evidence in relation to the
two accidents is of significance in that it reveals that the
likelihood of injury from the bridge accident is far greater
than the possibility of injury in the rather insignificant
shaker bar accident. Had the issue of the bridge accident
been submitted to the jury, it would have been of significance
that plaintiff failed to report his alleged railroad accident
and the allegedly defective condition of the grate shaking
equipment to the conductor and members of his train crew
(R. 219-221) ; that plaintiff failed to report the engine defect
on his engine condition report made at the end of his train’s
run (R. 97-99; Exhibit “C”) ; that plaintiff explained to Dr.
Householder in January, 1950, how the accident occurred
and made no reference tothe shaker bar having come loose
nor to his having been thrown against the boiler head (R. 264,
265) ; that in June, 1950, plaintiff again described the acci-
dent to Witness McLaughlin and affirmatively stated that
there was nothing defective about the shaker bar and that
the shaker bar did not come loose (R. 485, 486, 492, 493) ;
and that the physical construction of the grate shaking appa-
ratus was such that plaintiff, as shown by his own son and
by certain defendant witnesses, could not have sustained
injury in the manner described by him at the time of trial
(R. 547, 548, 232, 240, 441, 446). Of additional importance
is the fact that on March 9, 1950, plaintiff wrote a letter to
defendant stating that he had “recovered” from his recent
injury (R. 105). This letter, Defendant’s Exhibit “D”, is
reproduced in the appendix, infra.
a
Respondent has commented on the fact that defendant
called only two of the six doctors who either examined or
treated plaintiff before the bridge accident. Dr. Householder
was called not only because of his high professional qualifi-
cations but because he was in a better position to know plain-
tiff’s physical condition following his alleged railroad acci-
dent than any of the other doctors who attended him, having
treated plaintiff constantly during his two periods of hos-
pitalization from January 18, 1950, to February 10, 1950
(R. 267), and from September 26, 1950, to December, 1950
(R. 275, 295). Respondent’s statement at page 24 of his brief
that none of the doctors called by defendant had ever treated
plaintiff professionally is, therefore, shown by the record
to be false.
Dr. Conley is one of the ost distinguished and outstand-
ing orthopedic surgeons in the United States and the head
of the Orthopedic Surgery Department of the Cook County
Hospital, the largest hospital under one roof in the country
(R. 329). Dr. Conley was called because it was felt that by
virtue of his professional experience and standing he was
better qualified to objectively ascertain and describe plain-
tiff’s back condition than any of the other doctors who had
treated or examined plaintiff after his claimed railroad acci-
dent.
Dr. Yoerg was called because he had examined plaintiff
after the bridge accident and was familiar with plaintiff's
condition at that time.
Certainly no inference unfavorable to defendant may be
drawn from the fact that defendant did not also call Doctors
Nelson, Fox, Thornton or Metz as additional medical wit-
nesses to testify to plaintiff's condition between the time of
the alleged railroad accident and the time of the bridge acci-
dent. Such additional testimony would have been merely
cumulative of that of Doctors Householder and Conley.
sf
It is also important that none of these doctors were resi-
dents of Minnesota. Plaintiff's case having been imported
into the Minnesota courts from Iowa, the defendant was
powerless to compel the attendance of witnesses residing
outside the state who did not wish to voluntarily testify.
Likewise the Minnesota court did not have jurisdiction to
subpoena their presence. The record is clear that defendant,
without success, exerted every possible effort to have Dr.
Nelson’s office records brought to the trial as soon as it de-
veloped they were material (R. 496). The record further
shows that at the time of trial Dr. Nelson was in Arkansas
on vacation (R. 496).
The record is also clear that pre-trial depositions of
numerous witnesses were taken by plaintiff and at plaintiff's
instance in Ottumwa, Iowa (R. 9, 10); that defendant was
given notice of plaintiff’s intention to take the deposition of
Dr. Nelson of Ottumwa at the same time (R. 497-501) ; and
that at the last minute plaintiff's attorney changed his mind
and decided not to take Dr. Nelson’s deposition, even though
Dr. Nelson was present in Ottumwa and available at the time
as were the attorneys for both parties (R. 501). Plaintiff
could also have taken the depositions of Doctors Fox and
Thornton at the same time.
Notice was also given of plaintiff's intention to take the
deposition of Dr. Metz, and the Record Librarian of Wesley
Memorial Hospital on January 18, 1952, at Chicago, Illinois
(R. 10). While the Record Librarian’s deposition was so
taken in Chicago with attorneys for both sides in attendance
(Ex. 5), plaintiff again changed his mind and refrained from
taking Dr. Metz’s deposition although there was ample oppor-
tunity for plaintiff to do so.
It is therefore clear from the evidence that if Doctors
Nelson, Fox, Thornton or Metz could have given the slightest
testimony to support plaintiff's claim of back injury follow-
ing his alleged railroad accident, plaintiff would have ob-
tained that testimony. Plaintiff obviously could find no
doctor familiar with plaintiff’s condition between the time
of the alleged railroad accident and the time of the bridge
accident who would testify that plaintiff had any back injury
or disability resulting from the claimed railroad accident.
Apparently the only doctor plaintiff produced who would
testify that plaintiff had objective symptoms or back injury
was Dr. Bratrud, whose examination and testimony was based
entirely on plaintiff’s condition several months after the
bridge accident. If there is any unfavorable inference to be
drawn from the failure to produce the testimony of Doctors
Nelson, Fox, Thornton and Metz, the inference is unfavorable
to plaintiff and not defendant.
it Is for the Jury to Determine Whether Plaintiff Sustained Back
Injury or Aggravation in the Bridge Accident.
Respondent argues with great vigor that where there is
subsequent injury to a different part of the body from that
upon which plaintiff's cause of action is based, evidence con-
cerning the subsequent injury is not admissible. This may
be the law but it has no application whatsoever to the pres-
ent case. Respondent’s entire argument is based upon the
fallacy that the only injury sustained by plaintiff in the
bridge accident is a “head scratch.” In other words, respond-
ent has assumed, as a matter of law, a fact which is the crux
of the issne presented. For this reason, his argument is not
only meaningless, but frivolous.
In support of his argument, respondent has taken an iso-
lated segment of the evidence consisting of plaintiff's own
version of the bridge accident and plaintiffs own version of
the “head scratch” injuries he claims to have sustained there-
jn and has argued this evidence in the light most favorable
to plaintiff. The conclusion respondent has reached by this
-
type of legal reasoning is not surprising. It is so well settled
as to obviate citation of authority that in determining wheth-
er there is sufficient basis to submit an issue of fact to the
jury, all the relevant evidence as well as the inferences to be
reasonably drawn therefrom must be examined in the light
most favorable to the party asserting the issue. Here the de-
fendant is the party asserting the issue before the Court.
Respondent refuses to examine the evidence in the light
favorable to defendant since to do so is fatal to his position.
If all the evidence is examined, as well as the reasonable
inferences, in the light most favorable to defendant, the evi-
dentiary basis for a jury issue becomes clear. Aside from
the compelling circumstances surrounding the happening of
the bridge accident itself, the pertinent medical testimony
is either overlooked or misstated by respondent, since it, too,
condemns his position.
Nothing can explain away the testimony of Dr. Bratrud,
plaintiff's only medical witness, who testified that AFTER
the bridge accident plaintiff had a prolapsed intervertebral
disc (R. 67), and who further testified that plaintiff had a
long-existing arthritic condition of the back which had been
aggravated (R. 63, 65, 73, 74), and who further testified that
any trauma will always aggravate such arthritic condition
and will always cause pain (R. 66). Dr. Bratrud did not
know plaintiff’s condition before the bridge accident and
could not testify as to whether the back injury which he
tound was a result of the bridge accident 314 months before
his examination or whether it was a result of the alleged
railroad accident 27 months before he had seen plaintiff.
If the jury could not infer a connection between the back
injury described by Dr. Bratrud and the bridge accident, then
it could not infer a connection between the said injury and
the railroad accident, which was far more remote in point
of time than was the bridge accident. The point ignored by
10
respondent is that the injury his own doctor found could
have been caused by either accident, or both. The likelihood
is that the condition found by Dr. Bratrud was caused wholly
or at least in part in the bridge accident. But whatever the
answer to this question is, it is a question of fact within the
exclusive province of the jury.
Respondent has also accused petitioner of now taking an
inconsistent position, because it is stated that defendant
contended at the time of trial that plaintiff was not injured
in any respect. For example, see Respondent’s Brief, page 2,
where it is stated, “* * * Where the defendant at the tria:
contended that plaintiff was not injured in any respect,” and
also see Respondent’s Brief, at page 33, to the same effect.
The record shows respondent’s statements to be untrue. Dr.
Yoerg, defendant’s witness, who, like Dr. Bratrud, had not
examined plaintiff until after the bridge accident, agreed
with Dr. Bratrud that plaintiff was not in shape to resume
work at that time due to his back condition (R. 378). Dr.
Yoerg further testified that after the bridge accident plain-
tiff had muscle spasm in his back (R. 375) and a limitation
of motion (R. 387), and that the muscle spasm is an indica-
tion of an abnormal back condition and may indicate serious
back injury (R. 389). He also testified that a fall or con-
cussion, such as plaintiff must have experienced in the bridge
accident, would aggravate a degenerative arthritic condition
of the back such as plaintiff was suffering from, and that even
stooping down to pick up something might aggravate it (R.
410). :
The reasonable inference to be drawn from the medical
testimony itself is that the disability found by Dr. Bratrud
and Dr. Yoerg was caused by the bridge accident. This is
especially true in view of the testimony of Doctors Honse-
holder and Conley, who did not examine plaintiff after the
bridge accident but who did treat and examine plaintiff fol-
11
lowing his alleged railroad injury. In the opinion of both
Doctors Householder and Conley, plaintiff had absolutely
no objective evidence of back injury after the railroad acci-
dent and before the bridge accident. (Dr. Householder: R.
270-273, 275, 284, 285; Dr. Conley: R. 340, 341, 342, 346).
Plaintiff's subjective complaints of back pain at that time,
which did not relate to the back of the spine (R. 263) nor
to the area of the fourth or fifth vertebra (R. 282) were
ascribed to plaintiff's degenerative arthritic condition (R.
269, 271, 273) and to an acute rectal abscess which was dis-
abling and required immediate surgery (R. 266, 267).
In addition to the medical testimony, other aspects of the
evidence connect plaintiff's condition at the time of trial with
the bridge accident. For example, plaintiff suffered a sub-
stantial loss of weight at about the time of the bridge acci-
dent (R. 115). His weight remained constant for sixteen
months after his alleged railroad accident (R. 343, 344, 407,
408, Ex. 5). Plaintiff also claimed an inability to sleep at
the time of trial because of the condition of his back (R. 216),
but hospital records showed that at various times during the
year following his alleged railroad injury plaintiff “slept
well,” “slept good,” or “slept comfortably” (Ex. 5). It is
also significant that plaintiff continued working after his
alleged railroad accident and worked more regularly and
earned more money than at any time before his alleged rail-
road accident (R. 40, 87, Ex. A). Following the bridge acci-
dent, plaintiff did not and apparently could not work, and
according to his own testimony was under the constant care
of Dr. Nelson (R. 517-520).
12
The Stricken Testimony Was Not Cumulative: its Exclusion With-
drew the Issue From the Jury.
It is apparently respondent’s position that even though it
may have been error to strike the testimony of witnesses
Young, Kemp and Lippincott, there was no prejudice to de-
fendant because the stricken evidence was merely cumula-
tive. Here, again, respondent has not only failed to examine
the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant but re-
fuses to give any weight whatsoever to the testimony favor-
able to defendant.
The record shows plaintiff's own unsupported, interested
testimony as to the happening and results of the Black Hawk
Bridge accident is diametrically opposed to the stricken tes-
timony of the three witnesses for defendant, to-wit, City
Police Officer Young, Deputy Sheriff Lippincott and Railroad
Police Officer Kemp. Without the testimony of defendant’s
witnesses, plaintiff’s version of the manner in which the acci-
dent occurred does not make an issue of fact. It is this dis-
pute in the testimony which gives rise to the jury question
as to what happened on the Black Hawk Bridge and also as
to whether plaintiff received substantial injuries in said acci-
dent. According to plaintiff's version, the bridge was covered
with ice. He started to skid, slowed to one or two miles per
hour and leisurely stepped from the automobile before it
toppled through the railing and fell five or six feet to the
ground below the bridge. Plaintiff claims to have sustained
only a head scratch in getting out of the car (R. 107-108).
Accepting plaintiff's miraculous version alone creates no
issue of fact. From this testimony alone the jury could, of
course, not infer back injury or aggravation in the bridge
accident. :
The stricken testimony of defendant’s witnesses on the
other hand shows an entirely different occurrence—a dry
bridge (R. 469, 474), a car speeding out of control with such
4
18
terrific force as to sheer off ten feet of heavy guard rail on
the left side of the bridge, and then to still have sufficient
momentum to cross the bridge, crash into the guard rail on
the right-hand side and destroy 70 additional feet of railing
before plummeting ten or twelve feet to the ground (R. 465,
467, 474, 475).
Attention is again invited to the pictures of the bridge,
Defendant’s Exhibits “E,” “F” and “G” in the Appendix,
infra.
The stricken testimony further described the position of
plaintiff's demolished automobile after it had gone over the
bridge and overturned (R. 474-476), as well as plaintiff's
physical appearance following the accident, his soiled, mud
and vomit-stained clothing (R. 460-462) (the mud being in-
dicative that plaintiff fell with the car and the vomit indi-
cating the possibility of serious concussion and internal in-
juries), and his own admission to Deputy Sheriff Lippincott
that he was not able to obey an arrest warrant on the follow-
ing day (R. 477-480). :
Without the testimony stricken by the trial court, there
were no facts left in the case available to defendant to argue
this major issue to the jury. The exclusion of the evidence
deprived defendant of the right to a jury trial on this im-
portant and controlling issue of the case.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that respondent has wholly
failed to meet and answer the question presented herein.
Respondent has paid lip service to the numerous decisions
of this Court which hold that disputed questions of fact are
for the exclusive determination of the jury rather than the
Court, but he seeks to avoid their application to defendants
and particularly to this “special case.”
On the one hand respondent has implied that there is not
14
a sufficient evidentiary basis to create an issue of fact, but
on the other hand respondent’s 38-page brief is an argument
of these facts and the merits of the evidence favorable to his
theory that the back injury found by Dr. Bratrud at the time
of trial was not caused or contributed to by the bridge acci-
dent. Respondent’s Brief has the flavor of a jury argument
and should be recognized as such.
The point overlooked by respondent as well as the lower
court is that this is a disputed question of fact, and as such
_it is for the sole determination of the jury and not one for
‘the trial court. Therefore, it is again respectfully suggested
that the stricken testimony of Young, Lippincott and Kemp
made at least a clear question of fact as to whether the Black
Hawk accident was a serious one as testified to by them or
merely a trivial one as described by plaintiff alone. We,
therefore, again respectfully request the Court to grant the
Petition for Writ of Certiorari herein.
Respectfully submitted,
A. C. ERDALL,
Attorney for Petitioner.
Of Counsel:
- M. L, Buu,
C. L. TAYLOR,
of Chicago, Illinois.
8. W. Riper, JR.,
G. F. BENNETT,
of Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Taken at Ottumwa, Iowa, Jan. 15th, 1952, about 10 A. M.
Looking West
DEFENDENTS EXHIBIT "E"
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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.