Opposition Brief — Epstein v. National Labor Relations Board
Supreme Court brief1954
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INDEX
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Opinions below .... fiche Chena e crs Or etre Te 1
fs Skuse Fad Deely eV kes , hea 2
Statute involved 2
Questions presented . 2
Statement:
A. The Board’s findings of fact ; 2
1. The unfair labor practices committed prior to the
filing and service of the original charge .. 2
2. Petitioners continued anti-union campaign after
the filing of the original charge .. te 6
B. The Boards conclusions and order ee 7
C. The decision of the court below : 8
Argument irs: SLAG ae rome Are ET Reig s 10
Conclusion ad AP eee re AAS Ae ie 14
Appendix . re nee Fag tate teeta 15
CITATIONS
Cases:
Franks Bros. Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 321
WETS WII ig 6 ts alta es a Ea ROSS uae bina 12
D. H. Holmes Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 179
eC RE AS Reh An pere rae Bene e 12
Indiana Metal Products Corp. v. National Labor Relations
I ME I EUR 5-5 <>. s oe Conte MS ane a ek eee 9,10
Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board,
185 F. 2d 732, certiorari denied, 341 U.S. 914...... 12
May Dept. Stores Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,
326 U.S. 376 . CE ev erra gs cd Pi ge eS eR at eee 12
Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 321 U.S. 678 _. 12
National Labor Relations Board v. Mz A. Hanna Co., 125
ee RO Ae tot ee rc baleen: 12
National Labor Relations Board v. Harris, 200 F. 2d 656 10
National Labor Relations Board v. Minnesota Mining and
PEE 0s LEU By MEO ok he ea ae welts sees 12
National Labor Relations Board v. Newport News Ship-
building & Dry Dock Co., 308 U.S. 241 . ay 12
National Labor Relations Board v. Reed & Prince M fg.
Co., decided June 9, 1953, 32 LRRM 2225... ......... 12
National Labor Relations Board v. Van Kleeck, 189 F.
ARES leat ee ian bias taped ent Sah Ur rene hE wi 12
National Labor Relations Board v. ‘Yale ¢& Towne M fg.
Co., 114 F. 2d 376 . ERSTE ee ee OL eRe 12
National Licorice Co. v. . National Labor Relations Board,
SR OI, ho os drs cee ak ys Se Le oueee mee 9
Oughton v. National Labor Relations Board, 118 F. 2d 486 12
(1)
ul
Statutes :
Page
National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat, 136,
29 U.S.C., Supp. V, 151, et seq.):
Section 7 .. ar See Bak oe Sie 15
SS errs rar MR ee gem! 15
ee eee Nene 15
a i
Ynthe Supreme Court of the Wnited States
OcToBER TERM, 1953
No. 210
Harry Epsreix, Irnvina Epstein, AND LENA Ep-
sTEtN, Co-Partners, d/b/a Tor Mopr Manv-
i FACTURING Co., PETITIONERS
= NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BoArD
Md
; ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
; UNITED STATES COURT OF 47PPEALS FOR THE THIRD
CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
i The opinion of the court below (R. 412-416) is
§ reported at 203 F, 2d 482. The findings of fact, con-
clusions of law, and order of the National Labor
Relations Board (R. 4a-10a, 11a-75a) are reported
at 97 NLRB 1273.
(1)
2 }
JURISDICTION
The decree of the court below (R. 423-426) was
entered on May 19, 1953. The petition for a writ
of certiorari was filed on July 27, 1953. The juris-
diction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
1254 (1).
STATUTE INVOLVED }
The pertinent provisions of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C.,
Supp. V, 151, et seq.), are set forth in the Appen-
dix, infra, pp. 15-16.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the Board was precluded by the limi-
tations proviso in Section 10(b) of the Act from
making any findings with respect to unfair labor
practices committed by petitioners after the filing
of a charge against them and more than six months
prior to the filing of an amended charge, restating
and bringing up to date the averments of the orig-
inal charge, where the intervening unfair labor
practices were a continuation of, and of the same
class as, those timely averred in the original charge.
2. Whether, in any event, the unfair labor prac- Pe
tices to which the foregoing question is immaterial
are sufficient to sustain the Board’s order in its en-
tirety.
STATEMENT
A. The Board’s findings of fact
1. The unfair labor practices committed prior to
the filing and service of the original charge
On August 29, 1949 the Union (Local 108, Inter-
national Ladies’ Garment Workers Union, A. F.
PEREIRA NRRL HN SRM tH NEARY TN TF RINE aT PE RDTION TE GE NTRS
3
of L.), having in its possession authorization cards
signed by 14 of petitioners’ 27 employees constitut-
ing an appropriate unit, wrote to petitioners ad-
vising them of the Union’s majority status and
requesting petitioners to bargain collectively (R.
26a-27a ; 151a-152a, 365a, 369a-370a). As of Sep-
tember 4, a total of 24 of the employees had signed
cards designating the Union as their bargaining
representative (R. 27a; 369a-370a). On Septem-
ber 6, 1949, petitioners’ attorney, without question-
ing the Union’s majority status, replied to the
Union’s request for bargaining, stating in sub-
stance that petitioners would not recognize the
Union until it had been duly certified by the
Board, after an election, as bargaining represent-
ative of the employees (R. 29a; 366a-377a). On
September 7, the Union filed a petition for certifica-
tion with the Board (R. 29a; 134a-136a, 157a-158a).
On September 6, 1949, the same day that peti-
tioners’ counsel advised the Union that it would not
be recognized until certified by the Board, petition-
ers, as the Board found, set about to alienate the
employees from the Union and thereby destroy the
Union’s majority status. Thus, on the morning
of September 6, Harry Epstein, one of the firm
partners, accused employee Baker of organizing
the plant, and threatened that if the Union came
in he would reduce the workweek of the cutters and
shippers from fifty to forty hours (R. 42a;
263a-265a, 305a). Later that day, or the next,
Epstein told employees Yoder and Baker that
if the Union was successful he could cut their
work to 2 or 3 days per week, and could also close
— SEAR OEE LEE EL EL TTR IR III ER AEE SY I RE
= - See ree be Peeters
4
the plant (R. 48a; 248a-249a). On the afternoon
of September 6, Epstein assembled the employees
and delivered a speech about the Union, in the
course of which he promised that they would soon be
put on piece work rates, thereby earning more
money (R. 35a, 65a; Tr. 1014). After the meeting,
Epstein asked employee Gearheart how he and the
other employees felt about the Union and urged
him ‘‘to be for me”’ (R. 41a; 2138a-215a). Shortly
thereafter Epstein asked employee Yoder to in-
form him concerning the sentiment of other em-
ployees toward the Union, and the following morn-
ing demanded that Yoder report to him the names
of the employees who had attended a Union meet-
ing the previous evening and what had occurred.
In the course of the same conversations Epstein
requested that Yoder keep him advised concerning
the Union’s plans, and promised that Yoder would
not regret cooperating with him (R. 41a-42a; 241a-
245a).
During this period Epstein also urged Baker to
induce the employees to vote against the Union
in the election; stated to Gearheart that he, Ep-
stein, could. control the hours the plant would
operate ; a after questioning three employees,
Gruver, Singer, and Spangler, about their feel-
ings toward the Union, threatened to close the
plant if the Union was successful (R. 42a-44a;
221a-222a, 227a-229a, 275a). On September 19,
petitioners put into effect the changeover from the
hourly rates to the piece work rates which Epstein
had promised on September 6, and on the following
———E eer
4)
day, September 20, Epstein attempted to have the
election postponed so that the employees would
have ‘‘full opportunity’”’ to realize the improve-
ment he had made in their wages, and ‘‘ would know
exactly what they were voting for’”’ (R. 35a, 37a;
140a, 144a-146a, 163a). During the following week
Epstein promised employees Yoder, Gearheart,
Baker, and Snow that he would ‘‘bend over back-
wards”’ for them if they ‘‘stuck with him”’ and give
them a raise ‘‘when this thing blows over’’ (R. 7a,
44a; 217a-219a, 242a-243a, 271a-272a, 315a-317a).
On September 28, the Union, after investigating
reports concerning the above-described conduct,
withdrew its petition for certification and filed a
charge’ against petitioners averring in substance
that petitioners had violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act by refusing to bargain with the Un-
ion and Section 8(a)(1) ‘‘by other acts and con-
duct extending over a period from August 31, 1949
to the date hereof, including but not limited to in-
terrogation of employees concerning their union
membership, solicitation of employees to act as
informers on union activities, promises of benefits
to employees, threats of reprisal if the Union
should win an election, misrepresentations con-
cerning Union wages, hours and working condi-
tions and other similar acts and conduct too nu-
merous to detail herein * * *.”? (R.45a; 148a,
168a-169a, 350a-352a).
1 The petition (p. 5) states that this charge was served on
the employers on October 3, 1949.
6
2. Petitioners’ continued anti-union campaign
after the filing of the original charge
Following the filing of the charge, petitioners
continued, by an almost identical course of conduct,
to undermine the Union’s status. Thus, about Oc-
tober 21, 1949, Epstein told employee Yoder that
he would be rewarded ‘‘in the end’”’ if he remained
‘‘loyal’’ to his employers, and at about the same
time interrogated employees Baddorf, Bellman,
Freeland, and Jacobs as to whether they had re-
ceived any recent communications from the Union
(R. 45a ; 233a-234a, 246a-247a, 312a-313a). Shortly
thereafter Epstein participated in the preparation
of a petition disavowing the Union, which was then
circulated among the employees and signed by all
of them (R. 46a-47a; 51a; 276a-299a, 371a). And,
during a Christmas party held in the plant in De-
cember, Epstein told employee Baker that if they
had not ‘‘done something to stop the Union,’’ the
plant would have been closed (R. 5la-52a; 302a- .
303a). During this period petitioners, in order to | )
keep abreast of the gains won by the Union in other )
plants, also instituted unilaterally a noncontribu- |
tory sick benefit plan and a program of paid vaca-
tions (R. 52a; 104a-106a; 276a). In February,
1951, petitioners unilaterally granted a general
wage increase of 6 percent (R. 52a; 105a-107a).
On April 2, 1951, the Union filed an amended
charge which repeated the allegations of the orig-
inal charge and extended them ‘‘to the date hereof”’
(R. 353a-355a).
PE LR I SE IR RRL AEE RAN ANEN Si ite SA at ET eT BMT TARE PCE CSL Ni PAT TIT CU mb By rae oa i ea WT
7
B. The Board’s conclusions and order
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, the Board
concluded that petitioners had violated Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act during the period im-
mediately preceding the filing of the original
charge by refusing to bargain collectively with the
Union on and after September 6, 1949,* interro-
gating their employees concerning their union ac-
tivity, threatening to curtail work and to close
the plant if the Union was successful, promising
benefits to employees if they would cooperate to
keep the Union out of the plant, and unilaterally
instituting wage increases and improved working
conditions (R. 5a-8a, 40a-44a, 56a, 67a-68a). The
Board further found that after the filing of the
original charge petitioners had persisted in their
misconduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (5)
of the Act by continuing to interrogate emnloyees
concerning their union activities, by prom. .ng and
granting benefits to employees for opposing the
Union, and by unilaterally instituting changes in
working conditions (R. 68a-69a, 7a).
The Board’s order requires petitioners to cease
and desist from (R. 8a-9a) :
2 The Board found that petitioners’ insistence upon a Board
election to determine the Union’s majority status was not
prompted by any good faith doubt as to that status but, as
petitioners’ subsequent illegal conduct demonstrated, by a pur-
pose to take advantage of the intervening time prior to the
election to dissipate the Union’s majority. The Board accord-
ingly concluded that petitioners’ refusal to bargain with the
Union on and after September 6, 1949 was violative of the
Act (R. 5a-6a, 57a-67a).
SREB PATI BORER KMS LTR GS It Peale te
8) STAIN gS ape
Ai tig hots H2DINN
Sie SMe
Pe de NGS.
8
Interrogating their employees concerning
their union activities ; threatening to cut down
their work or shut down the plant, and prom-
ising them economic benefits, to discourage
their union affiliations and activities; taking
unilateral action apart from the statutory bar-
gaining representative of their employees af-
fecting the working conditions of their em-
ployees, and in any other manner interfering
with, restraining or coercing their employees
in the exercise of the rights of self-organiza-
wae,
The order also requires petitioners to cease and
desist from refusing to bargain with the Union
upon request, and affirmatively, to bargain when
requested to do so (tbid.).
C. The decision of the court below
Upon proceedings to enforce the Board’s order,
the court below granted enforcement in full. It
agreed with the Board that petitioners had by their
anti-union activities prior to the filing of the orig-
inal charge engaged in unfair labor practices in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act
and, further, that petitioners had continued to
engage in similar misconduct after the filing of
that charge (R. 413-415). The court rejected pe-
titioners’ contention that the limitations proviso to
Section 10(b) of the Act precluded the Board from
making any findings with respect to the unfair
labor practices occurring after the filing of the
original charge (September 28, 1949) and more
than six months prior to the filing of the amended
NT i es ag 2s
-
9
charge (April 2, 1951) (R. 414-415). The court
stated that ‘‘the complaint in this case could have
properly included the matters occurring subse-
quent to the filing of the charge, for the original
charge was of a continuing violation and the sub-
sequent acts were of the same class and were con-
tinuations of it and in pursuance of the same ob-
jects’ (R. 416). Relying upon this Court’s hold-
ing in National Licorice Co. v. National Labor Re-
lations Board, 309 U.S. 350, 369, ‘‘that the Board
was empowered to redress ‘unfair labor practices
which are related to those alleged in the charge and
which grow out of them while the proceeding is
pending before the Board,’ ’’ the court below con-
cluded that the ‘‘amendment to the Act does not
change that holding”’ (ibid.).
Alternatively, the court held that since the
‘Camended charge alleged acts and conduct similar
to those complained of in the original charge
* * * Tit was] a verbatim restatement of the orig-
inalcharge * * * extended ‘to the date hereof’ ”’
(R. 415). Applying the settled rule that a charge
is not a pleading, but ‘‘merely sets the Board’s
investigatory powers in motion,’’ the court held
that Section 10(b) permits inclusion within the
complaint of amended charges—filed after the six-
month limitation period—which ‘‘relate back’’ to
or ‘‘define more precisely”’ the charges enumerated
within the original and timely charge (R. 415-416).
The court noted that in this respect its decision
differed from that of the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in Indiana Metal Products Corp.
10
v. National Labor Relations Board, 202 F. 2d 613,
619 (R. 415, n. 5).
ARGUMENT
The Board concedes that the ruling below, in
sustaining the Board’s power to make findings with
respect to the unfair labor practices committed
after the filing of the original charge and more than
six months prior to the filing of the amended
charge, is in conflict with the decision of the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the Indiana
Metal case. Although since the enactment of the
limitations proviso to Section 10(b) the precise
point presented here has been urged before the
courts only in these two cases,*® the issue is a re-
curring one before the Board and hence of im-
portance in the administration of the Act. Never-
theless, the Board believes that the instant case
is inappropriate for the resolution of this question
and that the writ should therefore be denied.
For even if the decision below were incorrect on
the ‘‘narrow ground”’ (Pet. 5) petitioners urge, the
validity of the Board’s order as enforced by the
court below would remain unimpaired. The
Board’s findings, approved by the court below,
3In National Labor Relations Board v. Harris, 200 F. 2d
656, 658 (C.A. 5) the court raised the question sua sponte and
resolved it in accord with the decision below. In Gaynor
News Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, pending reargu-
ment, No. 7, this Term, a related question is presented, namely,
whether the General Counsel of the Board, consistent with the
limitations proviso, may, upon a charge filed by an employee
alleging unlawful employer discrimination against him, prop-
erly include in the complaint other employees on whose behalf
no charges have been filed but who are in a situation similar
to that of the charging employee.
11
with respect to the unfair labor practices com-
mitted by petitioners within the six months prior
to the filing of the original charge and within the
six months prior to the filing of the amended charge
fully suffice, we believe, to support the order in its
entirety without regard to those findings based
upon conduct which may be affected by the limita-
tions proviso. Indeed, the major portion of peti-
tioners’ acts and statements found to be violative
of_the statute occurred immediately prior to the
filing of the origina] charge. As the Board found
(supra, pp. 2-5, 7), within the six months prior
to the filing of the original charge, petitioners,
in violation of the Act, refused to bargain col-
lectively with the Union which a majority of the
employees had chosen as their bargaining repre-
sentative ; interrogated employees concerning their
union activities; threatened economic reprisals if
the Union was successful; promised economic
benefits to the employees in order to keep the Union
out of the plant; and after the Union’s request for
bargaining, unilaterally instituted changes in
employment conditions. Within the six months
prior to the filing of the amended charge peti-
tioners, again acting unilaterally, put into effect a
general wage increase (supra, p. 6).
Except for a passing challenge to the ‘‘factual
foundation” for these findings (Pet. 9), petitioners
; do not, and indeed could not, question that these
unfair labor practices alone, which were timely
charged, constitute sufficient support for the
SR G3 CRE ca FEELERS SIE IM
12
Board’s order in its entirety.‘ The unfair labor
practices which occurred after the filing of the
original charge and more than six months prior
to the filing of the amended charge were merely
cumulative or, as the court below observed (R.
416), of the ‘‘same class’’ and ‘‘continuations’’ of
the unfair labor practices which were timely
averred in the original charge. And, we think, it
can be fairly implied from the decisions below (R.
67a-69a, Ta, 414, 416), that both the Board and the
Court of Appeals were of the view that the unfair
labor practices timely charged by the original and
amended charges alone constituted sufficient bases
for the order issued by the Board and enforced by
the court below.’ Thus, the court below, making :
it clear that petitioners had committed all of the Hl
Dy Lk CRETE CRUEL
* Franks Bros. Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 321
U.S. 702, 704-705; May Dept. Stores Co. vy. National Labor Re-
lations Board, 326 U.S. 376, 385; Medo Photo Supply Corp. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 678, 686; Joy Silk
Mills, Inc.. v. National Labor Relations Board, 185 F. 2d 732,
739 (C.A.D.C.), certiorari denied, 341 U.S. 914; Oughton v. Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, 118 F. 2d 486, 498-499 (C.A. 3);
National Labor Relations Board vy. Van Kleeck, 189 F. 2d 516,
517 (C.A. 2).
5 To uphold a Board order it is not necessary, of course, for
a reviewing court to sustain each and every one of the Board's
subsidiary findings. It is enough if the findings which are 4
sustained afford an otherwise adequate basis for the order in x
its entirety. National Labor Relations Board v. Newport 5
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U.S. 241, 247; Na- &
tional Labor Relations Board v. M. A. Hanna Co., 125 F. 2d
786, 789 (C.A. 6); National Labor Relations Board v. Yale &
Towne Mfg. Co., 114 F. 2d 376, 379 (C.A. 2); D. H. Holmes
Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 179 F. 2d 876, 879- »
880 (C.A. 5); National Labor Relations Board v. Minnesota d
Mining and Mfg. Co., 179 F. 2d 323, 326 (C.A. 8); National ie
Labor Relations Board v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., decided
June 9, 1953, 32 IRRM 2225, 2232 (C.A. 1).
WATE ONES ERIE
13
unfair labor practices in question prior to the orig-
inal charge, declared (R. 414):
* * * The record here is replete with sub-
stantial evidence to support the finding of a
lack of bona fide doubt lof the Union’s ma-
jority]. The time gained by the insistence
upon an election was immediately put to use
by Epstein to undermine the union. Em-
ployees were threatened with economic re-
prisals, interrogated concerning the union ac-
tivity, solicited to report union affairs and
sentiments, importuned to induce other em-
ployees to abandon the union, and promised
and granted economic benefits. After the un-
fair labor practice charge was filed, the con-
duct was continued * * *, [Emphasis added. ]
The question of which petitioners seek review, af-
fecting only the continuation of these practices,
would, however answered, leave the Board’s order
intact. The Court, in short, would be unlikely to
reach the question as to which a conflict is pre-
sented.
OF AEE PELE BRE i ARR:
14
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully sub-
mitted that the petition for a writ of certiorari
should be denied,
Roserr L, STERN,
Acting Solicitor General.
Gerorak J. Bort,
General Counsel,
Davip P. Funviina,
Associate General Counsel,
Dominick L. MANOLA,
Assistant General Counsel,
Harvey B. Diamonp,
Attorney,
National Labor Relations Board.
Avavust, 1953.
PAS REINER ROSS kT RENIN £8) GPR NI peg Aa ON IT 'foe obtains
15
APPENDIX
The relevant provisions of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C.,
Supp. V, 151, e¢ seq.), are as follows:
SP eee. ee
a
Mase cacnV SEAS
—"
49;
Riauts OF EMPLOYEES
Sec. 7. Employees shall have the right to
self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have
the right to refrain from any or all of such ac-
tivities except to the extent that such right may
be affected by an agreement requiring mem-
bership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment as authorized in section 8
(a) (3).
Unrarr LABOR PRACTICES
Section 8 (a) It shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer—
(1) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed in section 7;
* = * * ”
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with
the representatives of his employees, sub-
ject to the provisions of section 9(a).
os * * * *
eS Le ae ee
16
PREVENTION OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Sec. 10.
* * * * *
(b) Whenever it is charged that any person
has engaged in or is engaging in any such
unfair labor practice, the Board, or any agent
or agency designated by the Board for such
purposes, shall have power to issue and cause
to be served upon such person a complaint
stating the charges in that respect, and con-
taining a notice of hearing before the Board
or a member thereof, or before a designated
agent or agency, at a place therein fixed, not
less than fjye days after the serving of said
complaint: Provided, That no complaint shall
issue based upon any unfair labor practice oc-
curring more than six months prior to the fil-
ing of the charge with the Board and the serv-
ice of a copy thereof upaqn the person against
whom such charge is made,\ unless the person
aggrieved thereby was prevented from filing
such charge by reason of service in the armed
forces, in which event the six-month period
shall be computed from the day of his dis-
charge. Any such complaint may be amended
by the member, agent, or agency conducting
the hearing or the Board in its discretion at
any time prior to the issuance of an order
based thereon. * * *
* U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1983 268728 222
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