Opposition Brief — 346 U.S. 901

INDEX

SESE GAD pee TOMO rE EME gi Ee

SE te TR See aici tox Wea weak Gs Bouse RTE ware ee

FEED DAE EL OLS PT Ae Or eT

EE OA PR Svacce ke A OREN Se Rae e a eal at Rose

Srl hs og vas oh ay ses wks Skea neneRhaes

IE Tu ors Gro Gy a tela ayia hips Woes calg PS gaia’ pads

CITATIONS

Cases:

Bailey v. City of New York, 55 F. Supp. 699 (8.D. N.Y.),

eee, 208 ©, 28 Git (OAL) ok Se s..

Bowers v. Seas Shipping Co., Inc., 185 F. 2d 352 (C.A.

—URRSRDESSSIR a gb ayt ote uray eae orca ge Nee eee ng ad eg a

Calmar S. S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525.............

Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 335 U.S.

Ney Ay a Wee a ee ee OTL a IW aia ouik dal p CO wat cces

De Zon v. American President Lines, 318 U.S. 660......

Field v. Waterman 8S. S. Corp., 104 F. 2d 849 (C.A. 5)..

Jackson v. Pittsburgh S. S. Co., 131 F. 2d 668 (C.A. 6).

Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46.................

June v. Pan-American Petroleum & Transport Co., 25 F.

ME ALUM OR Ss fc cara ok eee tay Wig Sona ec eda

Lake v. Standard Fruit & Steamship Co., 185 F. 2d 354

SGM A Sy BR GR ish CS Wie nda AR ee

Mullen v. Fitz Simons & Connell Dredge & Dock Co.,

191 F. 2d 82 (C.A. 7), certiorari denied, 342 U.S.

Bi ihe omare bees ce shesp uted | pte oe tenga e ua ch Sie

Murphy v. American Barge Line Co., 169 F. 2d 61 (C.A.

3), certiorari denied, 335 U.S. 869...................

Roberts v. United Fisheries Vessels Co., 141 F. 2d 288

(C.A. 1), certiorari denied, 323 U.S. 758.............

Ryan v. United States, 150 F. 2d 366 (C.A.3)..........

Saguache, The, 112 F. 2d 482 (@.A.2).................

United States v. Loyola, 161 F. 2d 126 (C.A.9)........

SE NG, ME MENS BO os oor eA sk cs oe oak Nek

Statutes :

Federal Employers’ Liability Act, See. 1, 35 Stat. 65, 45

NE td) hg) 2° hg eR sasa deia tai Wi Saco Be WR Ws

Merchant Marine Act of 1920, Sec. 33, 41 Stat. 1007, 47

U.S.C. 688

28 U.S.C. 1916

Miscellaneous:

Federal Rules ot Civil Procedure, Rule 75.............

Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the 7th

Circuit, Rule 10

14

14

a ig ce

Ynthe Supreme Gourt of the Bnited States

OctToBER TERM, 1953

No. 416

THORVOLD REPSHOLDT, PETITIONER

v.

UnItTEep STaTEs OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELGW

The findings of fact and conclusions of law en-

tered by the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois are unreported. The

opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Seventh Circuit is reported at 205 F’. 2d 852.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was en-

tered on July 17, 1953. A motion for rehearing

filed on July 23, 1953, was denied on September 8,

(1)

2

1953. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed

on October 15, 1953. The jurisdiction of this Court

is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether any negligence on the part of re-

spondent proximately caused an injury to peti-

tioner’s knee for which recovery may be had under

the Jones Act.

2. Whether petitioner may recover maintenance

and cure for a minor and temporary injury which

he failed to report, for which he sought no hospital-

ization although free marine hospitalization was

readily available, and which was treated at no ex-

pense to him. —

3. Whether any action of the trial court or of the

Court of Appeals denied petitioner due process of

law.

STATEMENT

Petitioner, Thorvold Repsholdt, an experienced

seaman, made a coastwise voyage in 1948 as first

cook upon the government operated tanker Fort

Stephenson (Tr. 80, 91). Repsholdt occupied an

outside cabin by himself (Tr. 86). During the even-

ing of March 4, 1948, the weather became rough

and a northeasterly sea brought heavy swells and

shipped seas over the main deck of the Fort Steph-

enson (Dep. of Thomas, pp. 8, 11; Log of Ship

1 There is no printed record in this case. Petitioner, as a

seaman, is proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 1916, and asserts that

he is without funds to print the record. Accordingly, refer-

ence is made herein to the various documents, not numbered

consecutively, which make up the record.

3

attached to Respondent’s Answer to Interroga-

tories).

Petitioner knew that squalls and rolly waves were

in progress (Tr. 89). He was off duty that evening

and about 11 p. m. was in the mess hall watching a

card game and having coffee (Tr. 92). Thereafter,

he went to the quarters of the night cook to visit

(Tr. 93). In about half an hour someone told him

that his cabin deck was flooded (Tr. 93). He then

went to his cabin and found it flooded with about

six inches of water (Tr. 93). Water entered peti-

tioner’s cabin through the porthole which had been

left open and its cover unsecured (Tr. 63, 94). Pe-

titioner and a fellow seaman named Sloane then

entered the cabin to retrieve petitioner’s gear and

‘bail the water out. Petitioner slipped, fell forward

and landed on his right knee (Tr. 94, 95), and

thereafter went to the galley and allegedly slipped

on the companionway steps, although the com-

panionway was equipped with handrails on either

side (Tr. 99,146). Petitioner stated ‘‘I bruised my

knee the third time—the second time”’ (Tr. 99),

and ‘‘T imagine I hurt myself a little’ (Tr. 150).’

When the Fort Stephenson arrived in Provi-

2 Petitioner told a different story to his own physician and

also in giving his medical history to Veterans Administi ution

doctors after he had sustained a fall on April 19, 1948, which

fractured his right patella (Tr. 11, 189-191). He then stated

that he had been on a tanker the front of which blew up and

that he ran up on deck, slipped twice and injured his right

knee (Tr. 33, 190). According to this medical history peti-

tioner was able to continue working and in two weeks his knee

was apparently normal (Tr. 33). At the trial of this cause,

petitioner admitted that there was no explosion on board the

tanker (Tr. 166).

4

dence, Rhode Island, petitioner asked to quit and

gave no reason therefor (Dep. of Thomas, p. 5).

Petitioner testified that the morning following the

alleged injury he went to the mess hall and showed

his knee to the captain and the purser (Tr. 101).

This is the same knee which petitioner testified had

swollen to ten inches in diameter (Tr. 151). On

the other hand, the captain testified that petitioner

did not report any injury whatsoever and that he

did not observe any change in petitioner’s appear-

ance when he was paid off in the mess hall on March

6, 1948 (Dep. of Thomas, pp. 5,6). The mate testi-

fied that he saw petitioner when he was paid off and

that he walked all right and appeared to be no

different then than at any other time (Dep. of

Serenius, p. 23). The second cook testified that

petitioner did not ‘‘report’’ any accident or injury

to him, that there was no accident aboard and that

he did not see any swollen leg (Dep. of Pollard, pp.

6,7).

Petitioner, on leaving the Fort Stephenson, pro-

ceeded to his home in Oshkosh, Wisconsin, by train.

changing trains in New York, Chicago and Milwau-

kee (Tr. 152, 154, 155, 157, 158). He asked for no

hospital ticket on leaving the tanker and he did not

report to any of the marine hospitals available to

him at Providence, New York City, Chicago or

Milwaukee, although he knew that free medical at-

tention was there available (Tr. 152, 154).* The

3 Petitioner claimed that he telephoned the Marine Hospital

linie in New York on Sunday but that no one answered (Tr.

155). However, he admitted that the Marine Hospital was

5

injuries later sustained by petitioner on April 19,

1948, were treated by the Veterans Administration

at no expense to petitioner (Tr. 112).

In November 1949, petitioner filed a libel in the

United States District Court for the Northern Dis-

trict of Illinois claiming damages under the Jones

Act for injuries allegedly received on the Fort

Stephenson in March 1948. A claim for mainte-

nance and cure was the subject of the second cause

stated in petitioner’s libel. Libellant alleged, among

other things, that the respondent was negligent in

allowing the portholes of the Fort Stephenson to

remain open and in not notifying petitioner in ad-

vance that the vessel was headed into a storm. Re-

spondent’s answer and exceptions set forth that the

petitioner signed off the Fort Stephenson on March

6, 1948, at Providence, Rhode Island, without hav-

ing reported or made any claim for injury, denied

open twenty-four hours a day every day (Tr. 169,170). Peti-

tioner first testified that he had seen a Doctor Pfefferkorn in

Oshkosh shortly after his return (Tr. 160), but the doctor

denied this in a statement (Tr. 190) and petitioner then testi-

fied he did not see Doctor Pfefferkorn until after he had fallen

on the back steps of his house on April 19, 1948, more than a

month after he returned home (Tr. 162). Petitioner also testi-

fied that he went to Milwaukee to see a doctor at the United

States Public Health Service Clinic and that the doctor pre-

scribed pills and hot applications (Tr. 110, 159, 163-164). A

search of the records of the United States Public Health Serv-

ice Clinic at Milwaukee failed to disclose any record of a visit

by petitioner (Tr. 57). Petitioner’s testimony in regard to

this visit is confusing inasmuch as he also testified that he

“stayed there [Oshkosh} until the 19th of April when my leg

broke” (Tr. 158). The medical history given Veterans Ad-

ministration doctors by petitioner subsequent to his injury on

April 19, 1948, recites “History of injury to knee in March

1948, X-rays negative at the time” (Tr. 47),

6

that he was injured, and further denied any negli-

gence on the part of the Government or its agents.

Subsequent to filing suit, petitioner took a Civil

Service examination and, in October 1950, obtained

tu!! time employment with the Veterans Adminis-

tration Hospital at Wood, Wisconsin (Tr. 119).

On his way to work one day, in February 1951, he

slippe. nan icy sidewalk at the hospital and broke

his r ght leg (Tr. 18, 168). He has since been re-

ceiving disability benefit payments of $119.00 per

month under.the Federal Employees’ Compensation

Act on account of the injuries sustained in that fall

(Tr. 121).

On March 5, 1951, petitioner amended his libel

to allege, among other things, the negligence of

respondent in failing to provide adequate and

proper drainage facilities in petitioner’s cabin on

the Fort Stephenson. Respondent denied the addi-

tional allegations.

The District Court found that, although peti-

tioner’s testimony was vague and contradictory, he

had sustained an injury of minor and temporary

character aboard the Fort Stephenson; that there

was no causal connection between the injury on the

tanker and the subsequent falls sustained by peti-

tioner; that the vessel did not have scuppers or

drains in the cabin which petitioner occupied ; and

that such drains were required by law. The Dis-

trict Court, however, held that it was petitioner’s

duty to keep the porthole in his sleeping quarters

a

7

closed in rough weather* and that petitioner was

guilty of contributory negligence in failing to

close his porthole, thus permitting water to enter

his cabin. Although respondent did not warn peti-

tioner that the weather was rough, the District

Court found that petitioner was an experienced sea-

man and there was no duty or reason to warn him.

Petitioner was awarded $1,000 damages under the

Jones Act and $600 for maintenance and cure.

Cross appeals were taken by both parties from

the judgment. The United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit concurred in the finding of

the District Court that there was no causal connec-

tion between the petitioner’s injury on the Fort

Stephenson and his subsequent falls of April 19,

1948, and February 1951. The Court of Appeals

further held that it was petitioner’s duty to close

the portholes in his cabin and that, had the porthole

cover been closed and fastened, the cabin would not

have been flooded and he would not have been in-

* The captain of the tanker testified that such portholes were

for the use of the crew and it was assumed that they would

close them in bad weather (Dep. of Thomas, p. 16). The sec-

ond cook testified that every crew member was responsible for

his own quarters and was supposed “to go look” (Dep. of

Pollard, pp. 18-19). Petitioner at first testified that early in

his sailing career it was the sailor’s duty to close the portholes

in his cabin but that this rule had been changed (Tr. 90).

However, he subsequently admitted that it was his duty to

close “he portholes in his quarters (Tr. 143, 144). Petitioner’s

witness Sloane stated that common sense told him to keep the

portholes closed (Tr. 72). Petitioner’s witness Noal at first

testified that it was the duty of the mate on watch to close the

portholes (‘Tr. 175). Subsequently, he admitted that a seaman

knows when the weather is rough without being told, that he

knew enough to secure his own porthole, and that it was his

duty to do so (Tr. 179-180).

erences enema

8

jured. The absence of scuppers in each individual

cabin was held not to be a proximate cause of peti-

tioner’s injury and the court found no negligence

on the part of respondent proximately causing in-

jury to petitioner. The court further found that

petitioner had much experience in obtaining medi-

cal aid in Marine hospitals; that he failed to act

with reasonable diligence to find out what was really

the matter with him and secure treatment ; and that

under the facts of this case he was not entitled to

maintenance and cure. Accordingly, it reversed the

judgment of the District Court.

ARGUMENT

Petitioner seeks to bring before this Court for

review a decision which correctly resolves the es-

sentially factual issues in favor of respondent.

Contrary to the contentions of petitioner, no con-

flict is presented, and the case involves no question

of general legal importance meriting review by this

Court. Petitioner has not been denied due process

of law nor does this ease call for the exercise of this

Court’s power of supervision with regard to the

judicial procedures employed in the courts below.

1. Petitioner has failed to establish that any neg-

ligence on the part of respondent or its agents

proximately caused any injury to petitioner.’ Peti-

5 The basis for determining liability is found in Section 1 of

the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65, 45 USC. 51,

made applicable by the Jones Act. Section 33, Merchant

Marine Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. 688. Damages are

recoverable only for negligence (De Zon v. American President

Lines, 318 U.S. 660, 671) and the negligence claimed must be

9

tioner’s fall in his cabin was directly due to his own

negligence in failing to close the porthole in his

cabin when he knew a northeaster was in progress,

bringing rain squalls and heavy seas. The evidence

overwhelmingly shows that it was his duty to close

the porthole and not that of respondent or its

agents, and both courts below so found.® Petitioner

cannot challenge that two-court finding here. Com-

stock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 335 U.S.

211, 213-214.

_ The court below properly held that the absence

of a scupper or drain in petitioner’s cabin was not

a proximate cause of his injury. The presence of

a drain could not have prevented the entry of water

through the open porthole nor its sloshing back and

forth across the cabin floor with the roll of the

ship. The floor and petitioner’s shoes would have

been slippery in any event.’ Both courts below were

in agreement that respondent was under no duty to

the proximate cause of the injury. Jackson v. Pittsburgh S. S.

Co., 131 F. 2d 668, 669 (C.A. 6) ; Ryan v. United States, 150 F.

2d 366, 368 (C.A. 3).

® The case of Mullen v. Fitz Simons & Connell Dredge &

Dock Co., 191 F. 2d 82 (C.A. 7), certiorari denied, 342 US.

888, cited by petitioner, does not hold otherwise. The injured

deckhand in that case had been assigned the responsibility of

closing the hatches and doors of a tug in heavy weather. The

tug did not have private cabins with portholes and the closing

of such portholes was not in issue. In the Mullen case, as in

the instant case, the claimant’s injury was due to his own negli-

gence and not that of the shipowner.

7 Petitioner’s subsequent fall on the comrs>ionway stairs

was likewise attributed by him to the slippage of his shoes

which were wet by the water entering his cabin through the

porthole (Tr. 99). His failure to use the handrails provided

for his safety on either side of the companionway was, no

doubt, a contributing cause to this fall.

10

warn petitioner, an experienced seaman, of the ap-

proach of a storm. In the absence of proof that

any negligence on the part of respondent proxi-

mately caused any injury to petitioner the court

below correctly denied recovery under the Jones

Act.

2 Petitioner is not entitled to maintenance and

cure under the circumstances of this case. He was

not deprived of subsistence by any inability to

work. Rather, he voluntarily quit his job without

giving any reason therefor ; he simply went home to

visit his family. Moreover, petitioner has not shown

the expenditure by him of any funds which may

properly be attributed to his claimed injury aboard

the Fort Stephenson.” Since petitioner was not de-

8 Contrary to the contention of petitioner, the court below

did not rely upon the defense of assumption of risk. The

court does quote from the case of Roberts v. United Fisheries

Vessels Cu., 141 F. 2d 288, 293 (C.A. 1), certiorari denied, 323

US. 753, which held that, while the defense of assumption of

risk is not available under the Jones Act, that Act does not

shift the usual and ordinary risks of the calling to the employer

if he is otherwise without fault. See also Lake v. Standard

Fruit & Steamship Co., 185 F. 2d 354, 356 (C.A. 2).

® The superficial character of the claimed injury is shown in

that responsible witnesses testified that petitioner reported no

injury on board the vessel; that he walked through the pay

line and they observed no change in his appearance, and that

he asked for no hospital ticket. Petitioner by his own ad-

mission rode trains from Providence, Rhode Island to Wis-

consin and visited none of the marine hospitals in any of the

cities where he changed trains, although he knew that free

medical care was available to him there. The medical history

subsequently given Veterans Administration doctors was that

X-rays of petitioner’s right knee were negative; that he was

able to continue working; and, that in two weeks his knee was

apparently normal.

% The District Court accepted petitioner’s testimony that

he remained at home until after he was again injured on April

ll

prived of subsistence and he incurred no medical

expenses attributable to the injury of March 4, 1948,

he was properly denied maintenance and cure by the

court below. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46,

50; Field v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 104 F. 2d 849,

851 (C.A. 5).

The denial of maintenance and cure is further

supported by the finding that petitioner failed to

act with reasonable diligence to find out what was

wrong and to secure treatment. Bowers v. Seas

Shipping Co., Inc., 185 F. 2d 352 (C.A. 4). Peti-

tioner knew that free medical attention and hospi-

talization were available to him. A seaman who

neglects to make use of hospital treatment available

to him or who declines hospital treatment calculated

to improve his condition may not obtain an award

of maintenance and cure at his employer’s expense.

Bailey v. City of New York, 55 F. Supp. 699, 703

(S.D. N.Y.), affirmed, 153 F. 2d 427 (C.A. 2). An

offer of hospitalization in a Marine hospital fully

discharges the obligation to furnish maintenance

and cure and a seaman’s refusal to accept treatment

19, 1948. Even if petitioner visited the United States Public

Health Service Clinic at Milwaukee as claimed (see fn. 3,

supra, pp. 4-5), it appears that the pills prescribed were given

to him and that the home remedy of hot applications cost him

nothing. Any expenditures made for medical care subsequent

to April 19, 1948, would be attributable to the intervening

injury of that date, or the subsequent injury of February 1951,

which both courts below concluded had no causal connection

with the first injury. Under settled principles the concurrent

findings of these two courts should be accorded controlling

weight. See supra, p. 9. In any event, it appears that subse-

quent to April 19, 1948, petitioner was hospitalized without

expense to himself by the Veterans Administration and that

he has drawn $119 per month in federal employees compen-

sation since his most recent injury.

i

12

therein waives all further rights against his em-

ployer. June v. Pan-American Petroleum & Trans-

port Co., 25 F. 2d 457, 458 (C.A. 5) ; The Saguache,

112 F. 2d 482, 483 (C.A. 2) ; United States v. Loyola,

161 F. 2d 126, 127 (C.A. 9) ; Murphy v. American

Barge Line Co., 169 F. 2d 61, 63 (C.A. 3), certiorari

denied, 335 U.S. 859. In the present case it was

impossible for respondent to offer petitioner hos-

pitalization because he failed to report any injury.

Since he knew free hospitalization was available

and did not seek it, the result is the same as if he

‘had refused a positive offer of hospitalization.”

There is no conflict with the cases quoted at pages

31 and 32 of the petition. Those cases involve the

question of the seaman’s conduct leading to injury

rather than the question of the seaman’s conduct

with reference to securing treatment and mitigat-

ing the amount of expenditure required for main-

tenance and cure after his injury. Moreover, this

Court, noting that seamen can secure treatment

at Marine hospitals, often without expense, has rec-

ognized the rule that limits recovery ‘*to the expense

of such maintenance and cure as is not at the dis-

posal of the seaman through recourse to that ser-

vice”. Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525,

531.”

11 Any other rule would make it possible for seamen to avoid

prompt hospitalization and diagnosis and thus prolong, perhaps

indefinitely, the duration of illness or convalescence and thereby

greatly increase the burden of maintenance and cure.

12 The contention that the decision of the court below “‘con-

flicts” with the law of Illinois with reference to the finding

that there was no causal connection between the various in-

juries sustained by petitioner is without merit. Counsel for

-—

13

3. Contrary to the contention of petitioner, the

proceedings in the courts below present no depar-

ture from the usual and accepted course of judicial

proceedings and there has been no denial of due

process of law. Petitioner complains that he was

not given a fair, impartial and speedy trial.

Although the records do not so disclose, the truth of

| the matter is that petitioner’s counsel failed to ap-

| pear on the trial call of this case on January 16,

1951 and the case was placed on the passed case cal-

endar ; and that the trial, once begun, was not con-

tinued in order that respondent’s counsel might go

on vacation but, on the contrary, because of the

heavy docket of the District Judge who was then

hearing the duPont anti-trust case. Petitioner’s

counsel himself suggested the date for resumption

of the trial of this matter (Tr. 76) and the trial was

actually resumed a day earlier than proposed by

counsel. Petitioner nowhere suggests in what way

he may have been prejudiced by any delay in the

trial and the record speaks for itself regarding the

fairness of the trial.

Other contentions of error in the trial are equally

without merit.“ There is nothing to distinguish

petitioner apparently uses the term “conflict” loosely in the

sense that any result which he believes to be erroneous is “in

conflict”. The question of the causal relationship between

successive injuries is purely a fact question, each case turning

upon its own facts. Other suggestions of conflict contained in

the petition are equally transparent, and no attempt will be

made to answer these numerous contentions seriatim.

8 The production of written statements of respondent’s wit-

ness was not ordered because no written statements were taken

from those witnesses. The records used in the cross-examina-

tion and impeachment of petitioner’s medical witness were not

14

the method of procedure in the courts below from

that generally followed in similar cases. Conse-

quently, there was no denial of procedural due pro-

cess. Hx Parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 289."

Petitioner’s real objection to the decision of the

two courts below is that factual issues have been

decided adversely to his cause. It is familiar that

seamen are wards of the admiralty and that the

courts are diligent to protect their rights. How-

ever, no principle of law requires the award of a

judgment to which the seaman is not entitled nor

excuses him from the requirement that he prove

his case. Petitioner has had his day in court and

the procedures obtaining therein fully comport with -.

procedural due process.

ordered produced because they were sent to the United States

Attorney, just as Veterans Administration records are sent to

United States Attorneys in other cases in which they may be

relevant, in whose custody petitioner’s counsel might examine

them in detail prior to the trial. Both the witness and counsel

conceded the authenticity of these records and no objection was

made to their use (Tr. 40, 46, 48, 50). Nor did counsel object

when the court was advised of their inadvertent return to the

Veterans Administration before the conclusion of the trial.

14 Petitioner also urges that respondent’s depositions were

improperly made a part of the record on appeal. Counsel for

respondent followed the procedure established in Rule 75 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, made applicable b

Rule 10 of the United States Court of Appeals for the 7t

Circuit, and, contrary to the present representations of counsel

for petitioner, counsel was duly served with copies of the

notice to correct the record on appeal and he signed a copy as

having received the same. The cases cited at page 36 of the

petition enjoin the raising of an issue on appeal which was not

presented in the trial court. Every issue raised by respondent’s

cross-appeal was fully presented in the District Court.

15

CONCLUSION

The decision below is correct and further review

is not warranted. It is respectfully submitted that

the petition for writ of certiorari should be denied.

Rosert L, Stern,

Acting Solicitor General.

WakkEN E. Burger,

Assistant Attorney General.

Pau A. SWEENEY,

LEAVENWORTH COoLBY,

RussELL CHAPIN,

Attorneys.

NOVEMBER 1953.

wu. s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1953 279297 548