Respondents Brief — Charles v. City of Chicago
Supreme Court brief1953
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I. The poultry ordinance properly and reasonably
regulates the retail live poultry business for the
protection of the health and welfare of the pub-
lice and does not violate the Constitution of the
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II. The fact that the poultry ordinance is limited
to the retail live poultry business and does not
regulate every phase of the poultry business
does not make it arbitrary or discriminatory
between businesses because such a limitation is
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III. There are no important questions of law or
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TABLE OF Cases CITED.
Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U. S. 241, 258................
Biffer v. City of Chicago, 278 Ill. 562, 573, 575........
Casparis Stone Co. v. Industrial Board, 278 Ill. 77, 80
Charles v. City of Chicago, 413 Ill. 428, 482, 434, 435. .
City of Chicago v. Arbuckle Bros., 344 Ill. 597, 604....
City of Chicago v. R. & X. Restaurant, 369 Ill. 65.....
Chicago L. Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U. 8. 25, 30........
Illinois Cigarette Service Co. v. City of Chicago, 89 F.
CR CGN SANG Kau RSREV CRG RES RUC as oes
Josma v. Western Steel Car Co., 249 Tl. 508, 516......
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394, 413...........
Harmison v. City of Lewiston, 153 Ill. 313............
Larson v. City of Rockford, 371 Ill. 441, 446..........
il
Patterson v. Johnson, 214 Ill. 481, 488, 489, 490.......
People v. Callicott, 322 TH. S00, OZ... 0... .csccvseees
eo ae Re Deere eer eee ree
Roich v. Board of Commissioners of Union City, 168
ee Ee ca BOKER RMU STE Sa code RCS HEROS
Stearns v. City of Chicago, 368 Ill. 112, 117..........
Williams v. City of Chicago, 266 Ill. 267.............
STATUTES.
Municipal Code of Chicago, Sections 194A-10 (6) ;
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
Ocroper Term, 1952.
No. 720
LE ROY G. CHARLES, JOHN L. CHARLES, MARY
E. CHARLES, WOODROW CHARLES, DOCK
CHARLES, EUGENE CHARLES, and GRADY
JONES,
Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal Corporation,
Respondent.
On Petition ror Writ oF CERTIORARI TO THE
Supreme Court or ILurnois.
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION.
The respondent, City of Chicago, a municipal corpora-
tion, opposes the petition for certiorari on the following
grounds:
Be
The poultry ordinance properly and reasonably regulates
the retail live poultry business for the protection of the
health and welfare of the public and does not violate the
Constitution of the United States.
The petitioners admit ‘‘that all phases of the poultry
business in Illinois are subject to reasonable regulation by
the respondent herein’’ (Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
2
p. 23) but seek to show that the Supreme Court of Illinois
deprived them of constitutional rights when it held that the
poultry ordinance ‘‘. . . is designed to protect public health
by imposing more stringent sanitation requirements upon a
business involving the sale of food for human consumption,
and one which may also be offensive . . .’’ (Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, p. 59); Charles v. City of Chicago, 413
Til. 428, 432.
This holding does not present a federal or constitutional
question. It presents the judgment of the Supreme Court
of Illinois that the regulations of the poultry ordinance are
reasonable and designed to correct abuses inimical to the
public health and welfare.
The petitioners are complaining, not of want of due
process but of an alleged erroneous decision of the Su-
preme Court of Illinois in the course of the usual judicial
process. The Federal Constitution offers no guarantee of
correct decisions.
Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 258.
Chicago L. Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U.S. 25, 30.
The petitioners try to create the impression that the
poultry ordinance excludes retail live poultry dealers from
doing business in the City of Chicago. It does not do this.
It merely provides the conditions that such a business must
meet.
It is a matter of common knowledge, and such that judi-
cial notice is taken thereof, that the retail live poultry busi-
ness is an Offensive, unwholesome business that is a
nuisance and municipalities have the power to prohibit it
entirely. (Harmison v. City of Lewiston, 153 Til. 313.)
In fact, the preamble to the poultry ordinance clearly
states the reason for its passage. It provides:
‘*Whereas, the handling and slaughtering of live
poultry and other fowl, in and about retail food estab-
lishments, requires that such poultry and fowl be de-
3
livered in crates and other receptacles which are
deposited upon the sidewalks of the City, and, when
emptied, remain thereon for considerable periods of
time; and whereas, the handling and slaughtering of
live poultry and fowl, in and about retail food estab-
lishments, requires that such poultry and fowl be
opened, cleaned and plucked, whereby the refuse, blood
and feathers remain therein for considerable periods
of time; and whereas, this creates a nuisance and at-
tracts rats and other vermin, causing health and other
hazards; therefore, for the purpose of protecting the
health and welfare of the people of Chicago from such
unclean and insanitary conditions, in and about retail
food establishments: . . .”’
The preamble could also have included the stench and
noxious odors emanating from retail live poultry markets.
This characteristic of retail live poultry markets was recog-
nized in Roich v. Board of Commissioners of Union City,
168 A. 165 (Supreme Court of New Jersey). In that case
an ordinance vested in the municipality’s health officer and
board of commissioners the discretion to license live poul-
try markets.
The plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus to compel the
issuance of a license to operate a live poultry market. The
court refused the writ and said (p. 165):
‘“‘Live poultry markets are not favorably regarded
by the health officer of Union City because of the
stench and vermin incident thereto. It seems that the
board of commissioners may very well refuse tu issue
new permits for what they believe to be an unneces-
sary and an unsanitary business.”’
In Paterson v. Johnson, 214 Ill. 481, the court held valid
an ordinance of the City of Chicago regulating the con-
struction or removal of wooden buildings within its cor-
porate limits but outside the ‘‘fire limits’’, The court said
(p. 488) :
“the city council—of a city—organized under that act
(City and Village act) has the power to declare what
4
shall be considered nuisances and to abate and remove
the same,—, and we think the power to regulate the
construction or removal of wooden buildings anywhere
within the corporate limits of such municipalities is
clearly implied as incident to those powers, although
such powers are conferred upon such municipalities
only in general terms.’’
The court cited (p. 489) King v. Davenport, 98 Ill. 310,
and quoted from said case (p. 489):
‘*The inquiry then must be whether the enactment
of such a law (declaring what shall constitute a nui-
sance) is within the competency of legislative power.
Unwholesome trades, slaughter-houses, operations
offensive to the senses,—may all, says Chancellor Kent,
be interdicted by law in the midst of dense masses of
population, on the general and rational principle that
every person ought to so use his property as not to
injure his neighbors, and that private interests must
be subservient to the general interests of the com-
munity. (2 Kent’s Com. 340.)”’
The court also cited (p. 490) Wadleigh v. Gilman, 12 Me.
405, and quoted from said case (p. 490) :
‘*Police regulation may forbid such a use and such
modification of private property as would prove in-
jurious to the citizens generally. This is one of the
benefits which we derive from associating in communi-
tics. It may sometimes occasion an inconvenience to
an individual, but he has a compensation in participat-
ing in the general advantage. Laws of this character
are unquestionably within the scope of the legislative
power without impairing any constitutional provi-
sions.”’
Instead of complaining about the poultry ordinance,
which is designed to transform the retail live poultry busi-
ness into one that will not be a public nuisance, the peti-
tioners should be more than willing to comply with the pro-
visions of the poultry ordinance, in order not to be legis-
lated out of business.
5
The petitioners have gone to great lengths in their peti-
tion to show that the poultry ordinance is unconstitutional
because it deprives them of property rights without due
process of law. We submit that in the instant case, the
subject matter,—retail live poultry markets,—without any
doubt, falls within the police power, so that the cases cited
by petitioners are not applicable.
The petitioners take the position that since they com-
plied with the ordinances in effect at the time they went
into the retail live poultry business, they cannot now be
compelled by the present ordinance to do anything further
to remain in business (Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
p. 24). They admit their business is subject to regulation
but they want to fix the regulations.
In City of Chicago v. Arbuckle Bros., 344 Ill. 597, an
ordinance of the City of Chicago providing for sanitary
regulations and licensing of wholesale food establishments
was held valid. The court said (p. 604) :
‘“‘If there is a reasonable connection between any
| business or occupation and danger to the public a rea-
sonable ground for regulation is presented. Insani-
tary conditions in the production, keeping, handling
and sale of food may result in unwholesome food and
affect the health of the persons who purchase it. The
probability of the existence of these conditions ren-
ders the business of the sale of food a proper one for
municipal regulation, and the city council is the judge
of the expediency or regulation. (Ruban v. City of
Chicago, 330 Ill. 97.)’’ (Emphasis added.)
In City of Chicago v. R. € X. Restaurant, 369 Ill. 65, a
restaurant ordinance was held valid that defined food dis-
pensers, regulated the storage, handling and sale at retail
of foods and drinks intended for human consumption; pro-
vided regulations as to dining rooms, kitchens, storerooms,
pantries, refrigerators, plumbing, screens and employees;
designated the manner of cleaning dishes, eating and drink-
I eeensnereneeeeneaieneenieaetetaiaal
6 |
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ing vessels, silverware, kitchenware and utensils; provided
for protection of foods from rats, mice, vermin, insects,
flies and dust; required the wearing by employees of suit-
able, clean and washable clothing; provided for the dis-
position of refuse and garbage and the keeping of recep-
tacles therefor; and practically covered the entire field of
regulation of the business of selling to the public at retail
foods and drinks for consumption on the premises.
A comparison of the restaurant ordinance with the
poultry ordinance shows that they are, for all practical
purposes, identical in their objectives. The poultry ordi-
nance accomplishes for the protection of the public the
same things that the restaurant ordinance does.
The provisions of the poultry ordinance relating to the
type of material and mode of construction of the prepara-
tion or slaughtering room are objected to by petitioners
on the grounds that compliance therewith will cost peti-
tioners money and that the regulations of the former ordi-
nance are adequate. Here the petitioners again assume to
legislate for the city council.
We submit that every regulation in the poultry ordinance
is reasonable and necessary for the public health and wel-
fare. The most important police power of a municipality
is that of caring for the safety and health of the community,
and ordinances for that purpose should be liberally con-
strued. (Biffer v. City of Chicago, 278 Ill. 562; Williams
v. City of Chicago, 266 Ill. 267.)
A rightful exercise of the police power is not a viola-
tion of the fourteenth amendment even though property
interests are affected. (The People v. Weiner, 271 Ill. 74,
78.)
ae.
The fact that the poultry ordinance is limited to the retail
live poultry business and does not regulate every phase
of the poultry business does not make it arbitrary or
discriminatory between businesses because such a limi-
tation is proper and reasonable.
The petitioners seek to show that the poultry ordinance
arbitrarily discriminates against them because it does not
apply to dressed poultry dealers and wholesale poultry
dealers.
The difference between a retail live poultry market and
a retail dressed poultry market is so obvious as to need
no explanation.
This difference was fully recognized by the Supreme
Court of Illinois when it said (Petition for Writ of Certi-
orari, p. 61), Charles v. City of Chicago, 413 Ill. 428 (p.
434) :
“It is common knowledge that the retail live poultry
business, as suggested in the preamble of the ordi-
nance, involves the shipment of live chickens and other
fowl in crates into retail stores, and the killing,
bleeding, disemboweling and eviscerating of such poul-
try, with its attendant stench, refuse, vast quantities
of blood, waste matter from the live chickens, and
noise. Moreover, the blood and entrails attract vermin
and rats, and the refuse incidental to the plucking and
cleaning, plus the empty filthy crates stored on the
sidewalks, forms an ideal breeding place for such
vermin and disease germs. ...
“In contrast, the operations of the retail dressed-
poultry dealers, while located in the same area, involve,
at most, evisceration of the poultry, and the refuse
incidental thereto. The operations of these retail
dressed-poultry dealers do not involve the shipment of
live chickens in crates, with the attendant waste mat-
ter from the live poultry, vermin and stench; nor do
8
they involve the killing, plucking and bleeding, with the
extensive refuse and pools of blood, which attract rats
and flies, nor the storing of dirty crates on the side-
walks. It is not merely the presence of a ‘few additional
feathers’ which distinguishes the classes, as suggested
by plaintiff. In fact, it is difficult to perceive how the
operations of the retail live-poultry dealers and the
retail dressed-poultry dealers can be classed together
with respect to the public health hazards they cre-
ate; hence, it is in no way arbitrary to differentiate be-
tween these two classes and to regulate only the retail
live-poultry dealers whose operations have a far more
dangerous effect on public health.”
The petitioners try to put themselves in the same clas-
sification as a wholesale poultry dealer by claiming that
wholesale poultry dealers do the same acts they do, such
as slaughter, bleed, remove the feathers, the heads and feet
from, and eviscerate the poultry. The fact that wholesale
poultry dealers do the same thing as the retail live poul-
try dealers does not put both in the same class for leg-
islative purposes. They are different in that one is a
wholesaler and one is a retailer. They are different in that
uhder the zoning lavs of the City of Chicago they are in
different districts. A retail live poultry store is permis-
sible in a business district (Municipal Code of Chicago,
section 194A-10 [6], while “Poultry, game and small ani-
mal hatching, raising, breeding killing, packing and
storage for wholesale distribution” are only permissible in
a manufacturing district (Municipal Code of Chicago, sec-
tion 194A-12 [2] ) and obviously do not affect the public
generally. In manufacturing districts, noise and odors
are not as bothersome a nuisance as in a business district
or one close to residences and living quarters, because of
the very nature of a manufacturing district and the many
industrial uses found there. But in places near where
people live or collect in large numbers for health, recrea-
tion, education and worship, the filth and noisome odors
9
of slaughter, the rats attracted by the odor of blood, the
vermin, lice and poultry droppings brought into the vi-
cinity on the poultry and in the crates, creates a nuisance
and a health hazard which justifies the classification, ne-
cessitates the regulation, and affords a compelling need for
regulating the distance of slaughter of poultry from the
specified places.
The legislature may, in the exercise of the police power,
classify persons if the classification is based upon some
reasonable distinction having reference to the object of the
legislation. (Josma v. Western Steel Car Co., 249 IIl. 508,
516.)
It is well settled that law-making bodies possess a broad
discretion in making classifications for legislative pur-
poses, and that the exercise of this power will not be judi-
cially disturbed unless clearly unreasonable. (People v.
Callicott, 322 Ill. 390, 392; Biffer v. City of Chicago, 278
Ill. 562, 573-575; Casparis Stone Co. v. Industrial Board,
278 Ill. 77, 80.)
In Stearns v. City of Chicago, 368 Ill. 112, the city coun-
cil amended its public garage licensing ordinance and
classified garages into Class I or housed garages, and Class
II or open-air garages. The license fee prescribed for
open-air garages was 400 per cent higher than that ex-
acted from housed garages, and the ordinance was at-
tacked as being unlawfully discriminatory against open-
air garages and hence violative of the federal and state
constitutions. The court upheld the constitutionalty of
the ordinance and said (p. 117):
“Laws will not be regarded as special or class legis-
lation merely because they affect one class ard not
another, provided they affect all members of the same
class alike. (People v. Sisk, 297 Ill. 314 and People
v. Callicott, 322 id. 390.) <A classification will be sus-
tained if it is reasonably adapted io secure the purpose
-
10
for which it is intended and not purely arbitrary, and
such a classification will not be disturbed by the courts,
unless it can be clearly seen there is no fair reason for
the distinction made.”
In Larson v. City of Rockford, 371 Ill. 441, 446, it was
held that the fact that the operation of automatic machines
dispensing confectioneries was regulated by one ordi-
nance and retail confectionery stores were regulated by
another ordinance did not render the ordinance regulating
the machines arbitrary or discriminatory.
In Illinois Cigarette Service Co. v. City of Chicago,
C. C. A. UL, 89 F. 2d 610, it was held that an ordinance
prohibiting the use of automatic vending machines for
the sale of cigarettes in order to prevent sales to minors
was within the powers conferred on the City of Chicago
and not unconstitutional as depriving manufacturers and
lessors of such machines of their property without due
process of law, or as unreasonably and arbitrarily diserim-
inating between persons and businesses of the same general
class and character. The court said (p. 612):
“In Grundling v. City of Chicago, 176 Ill. 340,...
the court said: ‘When the city council considers some
occupation or thing dangerous to the health of the
community, and, in the exercise of its discretion, passes
an ordinance to prevent such a danger, it is the policy
of the law to favor such legislation as being humane
and essential to the preservation and protection of the
community. Municipalities are allowed a greater de-
gree of liberty of legislation in this direction than
any other.’”
The petitioners claim “that they who buy, slaughter and
sell poultry to retail dealers may legally operate in a busi-
ness district” (Petition for Writ of Certiorari, p. 26) and
cite section 194A-11 of the Municipal Code of Chicago as
authority. They did not make this contention below and
are in error when they now make it.
1l
Section 194A-11 pertains to commercial districts and
not business districts and although it allows “any use per-
mitted in a business district” it does not allow commercial
uses in business districts.
We deny that the term “wholesale produce market” used
in section 194A-11 allows a slaughter house in a commercial
district. The definition of “produce” cited by petitioners
from State v. Hurst, 41 P. (2d) 1079, 1081, fails to sustain
their claim. In any event, wholesale slaughterers are not
allowed in business districts.
The Supreme Court of Illinois recognized as valid the
reason why the poultry ordinance differentiates between
retail and wholesale live poultry dealers. It said (Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, pp. 62-63); Charles v. City of Chi-
cago, 413 Ill. 428 (p. 4385):
“With reference to the classification between the
wholesale and retail-live poultry dealers, it is apparent
that while their operations are identical in many re-
spects, nevertheless, they are conducted in different
proximity to the public. The court may properly take
judicial notice of the zoning ordinance whereby whole-
sale live-poultry dealers may operate only in a manu-
facturing district. (Municipal Code of Chicago, sec-
tion 194A-12 (2).) Under these circumstances, the
noxious operations of the wholesalers are not con-
ducted in an area which the public must traverse for
its shopping or its recreation, or in close proximity
to dwelling places, churches, hospitals, or other places
where people congregate, as are the operations of the
retail live-poultry dealers. Consequently, the dangers
to the public health from the vermin, disease germs,
rats, stench, and other nanseons elements incidental to
the live-poultry business are not as great from the
operations of the wholesale dealers as they are from
the operations of the retail-live-poultry dealers. There-
fore, a legitimate basis for differentiation exists be-
tween these two classes, which warrants imposing the
additional sanitation requirements upon only the retail
live-poultry dealers.
12
“On the basis of this analysis it is our judgment
that the classification effected by the controverted
ordinance is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, and
therefore, in no way constitutes a denial of due process
or equal protection of the laws, or of other rights
guaranteed by the State and Federal constitutions.”’
In Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, this court held
valid an ordinance of the city of Los Angeles prohibiting
the manufacturing of bricks within specified limits of the
city. This court said (p. 413):
‘*In his petition and argument something is made of
the ordinance as fostering a monopoly and suppressing
his competition with other bricklayers. The charge
and argument are too illusive. It is part of the charge
that the ordinance was directed against him. The
charge, we have seen, was rejected by the Supreme
Court, and we find nothing to justify it.
“Tt may be that brick yards in other localities with-
in the city where the same conditions exist are not
regulated or prohibited, but it does not follow that they
will not be. That petitioner’s business was first in
time to be prohibited does not make its prohibition
unlawful. And it may be, as said by the Supreme
Court of the State, that the conditions justify a dis-
tinction. However, the inquiries thus suggested are
outside of our province.
“... we cannot declare invalid the exertion of a
power which the city undoubtedly has because of a
charge that it does not exactly accommodate the con-
ditions or that some other exercise would have been
better or less harsh. We must accord good faith to
the city in the absence of a clear showing to the con-
trary and an honest exercise of judgment upon the
circumstances which induced its action.”
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that petitioners’
contentions of invalidity based upon the claim of unreason-
able classification and lack of uniformity in operation are
not sustainable.
13
The petitioners’ exception to the fact that the Supreme
Court of Illinois reversed part of the judgment not ap-
pealed from is not well taken. We submit that it does
not present a question that comes within the purview of
a petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court of Illinois
properly took the view that it should decide the validity
of every section of the poultry ordinance.
III.
There are no important questions of law or policy involved.
It is respectfully submitted that this case presents no
important questions of federal law and that it is not in
conflict with the decisions of this court or with those of
any other federal court of appellate jurisdiction. There
is no showing that this decision does more than help the
City of Chicago to protect the public from the abuses of a
business which has been held to be a nuisance.
Conclusion.
For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully submitted
that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
JoHn J. Mortimer,
Corporation Counsel of the City of Chicago,
511 City Hall, Chicago 2, Illinois,
Attorney for Respondent.
L. Louis Karron,
Head of Appeals and Review Division,
Harry H. Poiiack,
Assistant Corporation Counsel.
Of Counsel.
eerste
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