Brief for the Respondents in Opposition — Glenn L. Martin Nebraska Co. v. Culkin
Supreme Court brief1952
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Text
INDEX
Pages
Statement of Issues 1,2
Factual Statement 2
Witnesses :
John E. Kerwin 11
Alex Feilmeyer 13
Statement of Trial Attorney 10
Propositions of Law 19
RES?ONDENT’S AUTHORITIES
Armour & Co. vs. Wantock, 323 U. S. 126 29, 35, 36
Biggs et al vs. Joshua Hendy Corporation (C. C. A. 9),
183 Fed. 2d 515 28, 29, 33
Central Missouri Telephone Company vs. Conwell (C.
C. A. 8), 170 Fed. 2d 641 19, 25, 34, 35
F. W. Stock & Sons, Inc., vs. Thompson (C. C. A. 6),
194 Fed. 2d 493 .
Landaas et al vs. Camister Co. et al (C. C. A. 3), 188
Fed. 2d 768 37
Skidmore vs. Swift ck Co., 323 U. S. 13429, 35, 36
United States Steel Co. vs. Burkett et al (C. C. A. 4),
192 Fed. 2d 489
Rule 52 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9, 39
LOWER COURT OPINIONS IN PRESENT CASE
Culkin et al vs. Glenn L. Martin Nebraska Co., 97
Fed. Supp. 661 8, 22, 30, 39
Glenn L. Martin Nebraska Co. vs. Culkin et al, (C.
C. A. 8) 197 Fed. 2d 981 9, 10, 11, 30, 39
ii
PETITIONER’S AUTHORITIES ANALYZED
: Pages
Armour d Co. vs. Wantock, 323 U. S. 126 29, 35, 36
Battaglia vs. General Motors Corp. (C.C. A. 2), 2
Fed. 2d 254 23, 24, 25
Bauler vs. Pressed Steel . Co., 81 Fed. Supp. 172,
182 Fed. 2d 357 29, 30
Boerkoel vs. Hayes Manufacturing Co., 76 Fed. Supp.
771
Cobb vs. Aluminum Co. of America, 226 S. W. 2d 110. 31
Jax Beer Co. vs. Redfern (C. C. A. 5), 124 Fed. 2d 172 32
Kemp vs. Day d Zimmerman, 33 N. W. 2d 6
Love vs. United States Rubber Company, 92 Fed.
Supp. 174 32
Redwitz vs. Ford Motor Co., 80 Fed. Supp. 265. 32
Rokey vs. Day & Zimmerman (C. C. A. 8), 157 Fed.
2d 734 33
Seese vs. Bethlehem Steel Company (C. C. A. 4), 74
Fed. Supp. 412, 168 Fed. 2d 58 23, 24, 25, 28
Skidmore vs. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134.29, 35, 36
Tipton vs. Bearl Sprott Co., Inc. (C. C. A. 9), 175 Fed.
2d 432
United States Cartridge Co. vs. Powell (C. C. A. 8),
185 Fed. 2d 67
Welsh vs. W. J. Dillner Transfer Co., 91 Fed. Supp.
685 33
Williams vs. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 315 U.S.
386 34
— x.
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1952
°
THE GLENN L. MARTIN NEBRASKA CO.,
A CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
vs
WREN L. CULKIN, GLEN WEST, FRANCIS H.
MASKER, AND ALEX FEILMEYER, INDIVID-
UALLY AND AS AGENTS AND REPRESENTA-
TIVES TO MAINTAIN THIS ACTION FOR AND
IN BEHALF OF ALL EMPLOYEES SIMILARLY
SITUATED, |
Respondents.
tt.
—
STATEMENT AND BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS IN
OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI
——
» sn
As we view the matter there are just two questions
involved in this proceeding and both involve only basic
questions of fact. These are:
ee
a
2
1. Is it necessary to plead and prove a contract, cus-
tom or practice when the activities involved, as in the
present case, are substantially those of the regular work-
day of the employee?
2. Is there a conflict of holdings between the various
Courts of Appeal of the different circuits?
-"
2
FACTUAL STATEMENT
On pages 2 to 12, inclusive, of its printed Petition and
Brief herein, Petitioner sets out a brief summary of the
facts. A true understanding of the questions involved re-
quires, we think, some enlargement on this statement.
Also, it seems to us a rather peculiar procedure, to say
the least, to turn, as Petitioner has, to the dissenting
opinion of Judge Riddick of the Court of Appeais for
the facts in the case rather than to the specific findings
of the Trial Judge which, in turn, were likewise found
and approved by the majority opinion of the Court of Ap-
peals in this case.
These facts are important and must be kept in mind.
This was a war plant engaged in the assembly and modi-
fication of many hundreds of war planes during the war.
It was of the utmost importance that this highly impor-
tant military endeavor be carefully guarded and protected
every moment. Some 12,000 or 14,000 were employed on
this seven hundred-acre enclosed plant area. They worked
in three shifts around the clock, seven full days a week,
day after day, week after week and month after month.
It was. of the utmost importance that fires be prevented
3
as well as that they be put out if and when one started.
Tt was also of the utmost importance that throughout
every hour and every minute of every hour, day and
night, the entire plant be protected against sabotage, theft
and disturbances of any and every kind. How well this
was accomplished over the eighteen-month period here
involved by these particular respondents is best shown
by the fact, as correctly stated by Petitioner, that only
one serious emergency occurred during all of this time;
and that was when a plane flying in the air crashed
through a roof of one of the buildings. There was hardly
any way these Respondents could have prevented that.
There were twelve to fourteen firemen on each shift
and usually from about forty to forty-eight guards on
each of their shifts. It must be kept clearly in mind that
not only the protective force but the entire plant force
worked three full shifts so that the plant was in full
operation day and night and every hour of the day and
night during this period.
The facts are further detailed in the Supplemental
Record forming a part of the record in this case. The
Court’s attention is respectfully directed to the headnote
appearing on pages 1 and 2 of said Supplemental Record,
all in explanation thereof.
The simple fact is this: These firemen worked pri-
marily in the same manner as regular firemen in the fire
department of a city or town, except only that here more
watching and inspection are involved because of the par-
ticular hazards growing out of the work and type of
work of this plant. The duties of the guards were sub-
stantially those of a regular town or city police officer
—
a |
walking his beat, with some additional activities here due
to the needs of the work and the large number of em-
ployees in this compact area and also involving some par-
ticular duties of watching and checking specific operations
and some messenger service.
It is and always has been the position of Respond-
ents that their activities during the so-called half-hour
lunch period were almost exactly the same as during any
other part of the day.
Before March 6, 1943, they ate their lunch at their
post. Then the directive (page 4, Petitioner’s Petition)
was issued by the employer. Thereafter, on paper a
different plan of operations was supposed to be followed
by the guards. This, however, is a case to which the well-
known statement that It is a condition, not a theory,
that confronts us” has full application.
It is not a question of what these Respondents could
do in theory; it is a question of what, under direction of
their superior officers and the compulsion of their work,
they were required to do and did.
Briefly then, what are the facts?
As to the firemen, before March 6, 1943, all except
the two or three out on inspection brought their lunch
with them and at some available time around midshift ate
their lunch at a table in the fire house. All were required
to be in full uniform, even while eating. All were required
to be ready at a second’s notice to answer a fire call or
other call to more active duty. Group by group they
manned the crash truck and ambulance. The planes were
flying in and out all hours of the day. This fact, together
4
5
with the great number of employees generally, necessi-
tated frequent use of the crash trick and the ambulance.
The two or three firemen on inspection, in addition to full
uniform, were required to carry portable telephones. Be-
fore March 6, 1943, they could eat their lunch when and
where they wished, still, however, being in full uniform
and awake to their surroundings and with their portable
telephones strapped over their shoulder. What change
took place when this bulletin was issued on March 61
Exactly this and nothing more: thereafter instead of
bringing their lunch the firemen, not on inspection, went
one by one to the cafeteria next door, hastily picked up
a tray of food, returned to the fire house and ate it there
at the same table in exactly the same manner as before.
The two or three firemen on inspection now ate in the
cafeteria near which they might be at eating time. They
still ate in full uniform, required to keep their caps on
and their portable telephones over their shoulder and
ready to answer any call, including plugging in their
phones and answering signals flashed over the plant by
a light system. Furthermore, meal time of itself with
three to five thousand employees crowding into these cafe-
terias was a necessary and appropriate time for these
firemen inspectors to be in a cafeteria checking and watch-
ing at the very moment they swallowed their bit of lunch.
There is not even any claim of any witness in this entire
record that any fireman ever found it possible to wander
off to a locker room during a so-called lunch period.
Where is there any difference between the activities of
these firemen during the so-called lunch period and their
regular required activities during every other hour of
their regular * Throughout all the long history
6
of this litigation counsel for Petitioner has entirely failed
to point out one iota of difference save only that during
the lunch period, when it was not interrupted, the fire-
men, in addition to their regular activities, chewed and
swallowed a little food; but without at the same time
giving up or leaving any of their regular duties or
activities.
_ Petitioner repeats and repeats the statement that
these employees were only interrupted in their actual
lunch period on rare occasions. If they had never been
actually interrupted by a fire, it would not be important.
Is a city fireman on duty and performing his regular ac-
tivities entitled to pay only while he is answering a
fire call or fighting a fire? That seems to be the position
of Petitioner here. Of course, this is not the practice.
Anyone is familiar with the fact that regular firemen
spend much of their time just sitting around the fire barn
either reading or playing cards or listening to a radio,
being, however, alert to answer immediately to a fire call.
The same considerations exactly apply to these guards.
A policeman on his beat may actually stop a disturbance,
catch a burglar or make an arrest only once in a month.
His purpose and his presence in walking his beat in full
uniform is to prevent law violation. The same is true of
these guards. It is undisputed in this record that they,
and every one of them, were specifically required by di-
rect orders of their superior officers to remain in full
uniform throughout every minute of this 84-hour shift
period. Certainly some of them could go to the cafeteria
and eat their lunch there but on the way to and from the
cafeteria and while in the cafeteria they, too, were re-
7
quired specifically to remain in full uniform and were not
permitted to remove their cap or insignia or gun even
while sitting down to swallow a little food.
Furthermore, and again remembering that during the
lunch period four or five thousand employees crowded into
these cafeterias, it was most appropriate that guards in
uniform walk in and out of the cafeteria and that some
of them be there among all of these other employees. It
is a matter of common social knowledge that disturbances,
thefts and other law violations occur more generally in
such crowded conditions than elsewhere. It is true that
on some occasions a guard was stationed at one door of
one of the cafeterias as a regular guard post, but one
guard in that position could not possibly serve the need
of guards throughout all of the cafeterias with all of these
employees eating there. It should also be remembered
that the cafeterias were only open for lunch abowt an
hour and a half, midway in each shift, and all of these
employees had to crowd in there and eat during that brief
period.
Incidentally, there were three cafeterias, not five.
Two of theme were divided into two sides or divisions
but they were still only two large adjoining rooms amd not
separate cafeterias.
Only two or three rovers were furnished to relieve
all of these guards. It was the plan that the others
were to “relieve themselves,” whatever that meamt. It
does not appear just who was to relieve a guard who
was relieving another guard. Again, it is a matter of
common social knowledge that saboteurs, and there were
some during the war, would watch a plant and determine
ae
when it was weakly guarded and perform their acts of
sabotage during such period. Petitioner knew this very
well. That was the basic reason for the change from 8
to 8% hours beginning March 6, 1943; that is, so that
no part of the plant would remain unguarded even briefly
at the time of changing shifts. Exactly the same con-
siderations applied during the so-called lunch period.
Again on paper, according to this directive, these
guards could do this and that. They could go to the locker
room or be at ease. But did they? Was it possible as
an actual matter of fact and practice for them to so be
at ease? Petitioner has had and has the names and ad-
dresses of all of their employees. Not a single one of
them was called as a witness by Petitioner to show even
a few incidents when any of these guards would be found
lying around at ease or loafing in the locker room during
the so-called lunch period. In fact, as stated by one of
the witnesses, the locker doom was too far away from
practically all of them to even have time to walk there
and back in a half hour.
We will not prolong this statement by quotations from
the specific findings by the Trial Judge which will be
found in the Record and which the Court will want to
read in full, anyway. We do callgattention to this fact:
Trial of this case was started in February, 1948, after
many previous arguments on pleadings, ete. After sev-
eral days trial, the Trial Judge became temporarily indis-
posed and it was necessary to adjourn the trial for a
time. Then other matters developed, including litigation
over the country in other cases, and the trial was not
resumed until July, 1948. Then the evidence was heard
8
9
over a further period of more than two weeks. Then
briefs were filed and matters presented from time to time
in connection with legislation and opinions of this and
other Federal Courts. Thus, over a long period of time
the Trial Judge had all of these matters under consid-
eration repeatedly, and in detail. If there ever was a
ease in which Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure should be strictly applied, this is such a case.
Petitioner repeatedly refers to what it calls the un-
disputed evidence.” The only factual point in the evi
dence not disputed is the fact of the issuance on paper
of the directive of March 3, 1943, effective March 6, 1943.
There is extensive and detailed dispute in the record in
the way of the evidence of Respondents as to what
actually happened, notwithstanding this paper directive.
Petitioner draws some support from the above men-
tioned dissenting opinion of Judge Riddick, and partic-
ularly the last portion thereof appearing on page 11 of
Petitioner’s Petition and Brief. With all due respect to
Judge Riddick there is an obvious basic error in his
reasoning and his conclusions. He seems to have been in-
fluenced considerably by the fact, as he states, that only
12 of some 250 plaintiffs were called to testify. This point
was never raised, at least by way of dispute, at any time
during the trial or the appeal to the Court of Appeals or
the argument in the Court of Appeals. Therefore, there
was no occasion to call the attention of Judge Riddick to
the true picture in this connection. Until his dissenting
opinion was written and published there was no thought
of any question on this point. The simple fact is that
at the trial this matter was covered by a statement in
10
open court at the close of Respondents’ case and was not
questioned by the Trial Court or counsel for Defendant
and Petitioner. The statement made by the trial attorney
for Plaintiffs and Respondents is found on page 158 of
the Record. Perhaps the language and the English em-
ployed could be improved upon, but we quote this state-
ment exactly as it was made. It was our position then,
and it is our position now, and as stated was never ques-
tioned until Judge Riddick, apparently without having
noted this statement, wrote his dissenting opinion. The
sttaement is this:
„Mn. Murpuy: Now, if the court please, I would
like permission to have the record show this very
brief statement, and that is in support of our theory
of proof of this case. As outlined in procedure in
many other cases, we have called representative em-
ployees, old and young, guards and firemen, men
and women, particularly a number who were there
throughout the entire period; covered the general pic-
ture; many of the individual situations; the partic-
ular situation with respect to some that were not in
the ordinary line of work of the general run, so that
as I view the evidence thus far adduced by these
witnesses covers the entire picture of the employment
as to all parties of the case, and that any further
witnesses or testimony would be merely repetition
and unduly extend the record and that is our theory
at this time, and the plaintiffs rest.”
Thus, it is necessary to multiply the testimony of
each of the 12 witnesses by 3 to cover each shift and by
the additional number of guards on some posts. Again,
with all due respect to Judge Riddick, we insist the Rec-
ord shows a great many specific instances of calls to
active duty during the lunch period. Furthermore, we
11
are sure the Record in no instance shows any witness
stating that unless called to duty he had an uninterrupted
thirty minutes for lunch or that if interrupted by call to
duty he could return to lunch at a later period. In this
connection, attention is again directed to the plain fact
of the evidence and that is that when any witnesses, in
answer to questions upon cross-examination, made any
statement to the effect that they could have a half-hour
lunch period or that they could, if interrupted, return at
a later period, they were referring specifically to the
paper directive. Each and all of them made it abundantly
clear that this did not work out in practice. When re-
turning after an interrupted lunch period, the cafeterias
would be closed. Also, we fail to find in the Record sup-
port of Judge Riddick’s statement that only one wit-
ness testifled that he was always on duty throughout the
lunch period.“ Every one of these twelve witnesses tes-
tified not only that he but every other guard and fireman on
every shift was on duty throughout the lunch period.“
Also, we fail to find the contradictory evidence referred
to by Judge Riddick. The simple fact is, as the Record
discloses without dispute, that even the few witnesses
called by Petitioner, with only one exception, fully cor-
roborated the testimony of all Respondents’ witnesses to
the effect that they were on full duty throughout the en-
tire 84-hour shift, including the so-called lunch period.
The contradiction referred to is only apparent; not
real. Respondents’ witness, John E. Kerwin (Supp. Rec-
ord 16), testified he had to read the water record every
twenty minutes and report it every hour. Incidentally, he
testified that this was true as to all three shifts on that
particular post. None of the other men who worked that
12
post were called by Petitioner to dispute this in the least.
Petitioner does a lot of talking about this guard post not
being interrupted because they only had to report the
water reading once an hour. But that isn’t the point.
The point and the undisputed evidence is that they had
to read it every twenty minutes and this was true during
any lunch period as well as at any other time.
Without further prolonging this discussion of the
facts, we think it might be advisable to quote in detail
from the Record, the testimony of Respondents’ witness,
Alex Feilmeyer. Petitioner on page 58 of its Brief refers
to some brief excerpts of the testimony of this witness
and on page 60 of its Brief to very brief excerpts from
the testimony of the above mentioned witness, John Ker-
win. These are perfect examples of lifting a few words
out of the context. The testimony of Alex Feilmeyer
in its entirety is typical of the testimony of all of the
other witnesses and applicable to a considerable extent
to all posts on all shifts. It covers this point of number
of interruptions. It will be noted that far from failing
to remember any interruptions, he testifies specifically
that these would occur at least three or four times a
week and that he was unable to get back and eat his lunch
later and finally had to just quit eating any lunch at all.
His testimony also covers the undisputed instructions of
the superior officers to all guards. It also covers the
complaints made by these employees during this eighteen-
month period until Petitioner began paying for this lunch
period after being called upon by representatives of the
Wage and Hour Division. It will be remembered that the
references to particular pages and lines refer to the pri-
mary record so that this narrative stat nt could easily
13
be checked. The testimony of Mr. Feilmeyer (Supplemen-
tal Record 7, 8, 9) is as follows::
4% ALEX Femmeyer, witness called on behalf of
plaintiffs. Employed continuously as guard from Au-
gust, 1942, to April, 1946, and having worked all three
shifts, usually as guard at main gate.
Direct Examination—page 137, line 16 to page 143,
line 18.
„I knew about the order issued on or about March
6, 1943. Up until then I had brought my lunch and
ate when and where I could and was paid full time,
irrespective of where I ate. Beginning March 6, 1943,
we were to be relieved by a guard. You would go
to the cafeteria and get your lunch and either take
your lunch and eat it there, or eat it on the post;
either way. We were instructed that in case our
light went on, or anything, it was our duty to phone
in and find out what the order was, and if there
would be an emergency we were supposed to leave
our lunch and take care of whatever it might be and
then go back, and so on. There were signal lights at
the cafeteria up at modification. The light would
flash quite frequently. I would say three times a
week, maybe four. On the first shift it was worse
than the second and third. If the light flashed you
would go to the phone and if it was probably some-
one quitting, or you had to pick up someone at the
plant, you would have to leave your lunch and go
up and get whoever it was and bring them back and
go down and eat, if you had time to go back. On
the first shift I would leave my lunch quite often.
Finally, I just quit taking my lunch at all and would
eat when I got home, because I wouldn’t have time
to eat. It seemed like during the first shift there was
generally a lot of activity there and that was the
reason I forgot my lunch entirely.
*
{ |
i
14
„We had side arms and under instructions from
our officers, who were civilian officers, we wore these
at lunch. We also had a cap with insignia on it and
we were not permitted to leave that off when we
went to lunch. These instructions were from our of-
ficers. This continued right along after March 6, 1943,
and on after September 16, 1944. I remember the
date of September 16, 1944, and that following that
we were paid for 8% hours. There was no change,
as a matter of actual fact, in our way of working on
or about September 16, 1944, either as to the lunch
situation or anything of that sort. The officer I re-
ferred to was Captain Berry. He was a civilian cap-
tain; not an army captain. I talked with him ten or
twelve times about this lunch situation over the
period from March 6, 1943, to September 16, 1944.
He told me I was on duty at all times whether I
was in the cafeteria, or out; even though I was re-
_ lieved, in case someone was in the cafeteria and
didn’t have a badge on, it was my duty to see where
the badge was, or their identification; if any trouble
would arise while I was in there, it was my duty to
try and straighten it out; or, if I was subject to call,
in case the light went on and I had to call in, and
I brought that up to him, I imagine, ten or twelve
times.”
Page 147, line 16 to page 148, line 13:
„ told Captain Berry I thought we should get
paid for the half-hour, as we were on duty and had
to check badges, and so on, and then be called in
case the light went on and gave us some duties to
perform and we would have to go and drop our
lunch and come back later and eat it. That was the
kick I had about it, that our half-hour wasn’t our
own. He told me he didn’t have anything to do with
that, but as long as we had that badge on we were
on duty. He said he couldn’t do anything about the
pay check. The men, through an organization, were
15
making complaints about the fact that our pay was
not being based on 8½ hours. I never did agree with
Martin, or anyone else, that I was entitled to only 8
hours pay for that period of time.”
Cross-Examination—page 162, line 13 to page 164,
line 6:
‘Tf I was called out, no record of that would be
made. I would just have to pick up my lunch some
way. A lot of times I wouldn't, after I came back.
I remember being called out while at lunch on many
more than four or five times altogether. I would be
called to go up to the plant and pick up a vendor, or
there would be a group of people quitting and I would
have to go and take them through the plant, and so
on and so forth, and sometimes on some days that
would be all day long; there would be people quit-
ting on Fridays, especially, or some vendor would
come in the plant and they would tell me to go and
pick him up. A vendor is a person who would con-
tact some of the purchasing departments and we
would have to pick them up at the gate and maybe
the other guards would be tied up and they would say,
‘You have to go. They are waiting for you.“
Usually four guards were posted at this particular
gate. Thus, the testimony of this one witness covers the
individual similar experience of twelve men; that is, four
men on each of the three shifts per days of twenty-four
hours. The testimony of all of these witnesses was sub-
mitted and received in such similar representative ca-
pacity in keeping with the uniform practice in cases of
this type.
Petitioner submitted officers’ daily report for Au-
gust 16, 1944, as representative of these daily reports.
This covers the day shift for that day (R. 203). Now the
16
lunch period for that particular day was 10'30 A. M. to
12:30 P. M. (R. 160). Let this particular report of Au-
gust 16 shows a fire call to which the fire department em-
ployees responded from 10:55 A. M. to 11:45 A. M. Thus,
on the only occasion which Petitioner furnishes us with
their own records it appears that the firemen were actually
on a fire call during fifty minutes of their supposed lunch
period. It might be argued from this that this was a
daily occurrence but, of course, we make no such argu-
ment. It was not a question of whether they were actually
out fighting a fire every other day or so during the so-
called lunch period. The point is that the fires occurred
irrespective of the time of day or night and they accepted
fire calls exactly the same during the so-called lunch
period as on any other occasion. That was what they
were there for. That was their regular workday activity
along with the inspection work and other similar matters.
Petitioner states on page 30 of its Brief that none of
the other 10,000 or 12,000 employees were paid for their
lunch periods. So far as we know that is perfectly true.
But it was not the custom or practice of the mechanics,
welders, bookkeepers, etc., to continue their regular work
during the lunch period. Without question they had a
perfectly free half-hour lunch period except only that they
could not leave the plant area. We have never contended
that the mere fact that these guards and firemen could not
leave the plant area would make them eligible for pay
during the lunch period.
Petitioner further states on page 62 of its Brief that
It was not until long after the war was over and long
after the plant was closed that claim was made to the
effect ng 180 men were be paid for this lunch
17
period.” This statement is quite in keeping with the re-
peated statement of Petitioner as to ‘‘yndisputed evi-
dence.’? Now the simple fact is as shown without dis-
pute by the above quoted testimony of Alex Feilmeyer,
and other witnesses testifying likewise, all of these em-
ployees complained throughout the period of March 6,
1943, to September 16, 1944, that they were not being
paid for this lunch period and made claim for such pay.
If our memory of recent history is correct, and we have
reason to remember it very definitely, the war was in full
force during these months. This suit was originally in-
stituted in January of 1945. The war was still very much
with us at that time and for several months thereafter.
The plant was not closed until September, 1945, or more
than two years after these claims were first made and
nine months after this suit was first filed. Respondents
are in no way responsible for the many and long delays
that occurred in this litigation thereafter.
There is just one other factual situation we wish to
discuss before passing on to a review of the authorities.
Petitioner relies almost entirely upon opinions of a
few courts which, however, were in cases involving the
two-platoon system. It should be remembered that at all
times in the present case there were three regular daily
shifts. This was true of the entire plant. There was no
closing down of any department during the night or at
any other time. This two-platoon system, limited almost
entirely to firemen, was used in some instances in other
plants. Mostly these were packing house plants. Invari-
ably those plants. operated only one or, at the most, two
shifts per day. During at least 8 hours over the night
|
16
lunch period for that particular day was 10'30 A. M. to
12:30 P. M. (R. 160). Yet this particular report of Au-
gust 16 shows a fire call to which the fire department em-
ployees responded from 10:55 A. M. to 11:45 A. M. Thus,
on the only occasion which Petitioner furnishes us with
their own records it appears that the firemen were actually
on a fire call during fifty minutes of their supposed lunch
period. It might be argued from this that this was a
daily occurrence but, of course, we make no such argu-
ment. It was not a question of whether they were actually
out fighting a fire every other day or so during the so-
called lunch period. The point is that the fires occurred
irrespective of the time of day or night and they accepted
fire calls exactly the same during the so-called lunch
period as on any other occasion. That was what they
were there for. That was their regular workday activity
along with the inspection work and other similar matters.
Petitioner states on page 30 of its Brief that none of
the other 10,000 or 12,000 employees were paid for their
lunch periods. So far as we know that is perfectly true.
But it was not the custom or practice of the mechanics,
welders, bookkeepers, ete., to continue their regular work
during the lunch period. Without question they had a
perfectly free half-hour lunch period except only that they
could not leave the plant area. We have never contended
that the mere fact that these guards and firemen could not
leave the plant area would make them eligible for pay
during the lunch period.
Petitioner further states on page 62 of its Brief that
It was not until long after the war was over and long
after the plant was closed that claim was made to the
effect that these men were to be paid for this lunch
17
period.” This statement is quite in keeping with the re-
peated statement of Petitioner as to ‘‘undisputed evi-
dence.’? Now the simple fact is as shown without dis-
pute by the above quoted testimony of Alex Feilmeyer,
and other witnesses testifying likewise, all of these em-
ployees complained throughout the period of March 6,
1943, to September 16, 1944, that they were not being
paid for this lunch period and made claim for such pay.
If our memory of recent history is correct, and we have
reason to remember it very definitely, the war was in full
force during these months. This suit was originally in-
stituted in January of 1945. The war was still very much
with us at that time and for several months thereafter.
The plant was not closed until September, 1945, or more
than two years after these claims were first made and
nine months after this suit was first filed. Respondents
are in no way responsible for the many and long delays
that occurred in this litigation thereafter.
There is just one other factual situation we wish to
discuss before passing on to a review of the authorities.
Petitioner relies almost entirely upon opinions of a
few courts which, however, were in cases involving the
two-platoon system. It should be remembered that at all
times in the present case there were three regular daily
shifts. This was true of the entire plant. There was no
closing down of any department during the night or at
any other time. This two-platoon system, limited almost
entirely to firemen, was used in some instances in other
plants. Mostly these were packing house plants. Invari-
ably those plants. operated only one or, at the most, two
shifts per day. During at least 8 hours over the night
18
period the plants were closed and inoperative. Thus,
during this night period there was no fire danger re-
sulting from plant operations because there were no
operations. The presence of any outsider could be readily
detected in the quiet of the night. Such was not the situa-
tion in the present case. In those two-platoon system
cases generally the courts allowed a workday of 16 hours.
It is true that in some instances the courts speak in
passing of deductions from working time of ‘‘sleeping
and eating time.’’ In none of these cases was any par-
ticular point made of the eating time. Under this two-
platoon system one complete group worked a full 24
hours. Then that group would be off and the other pla-
toon on duty the next 24 hours. That is, each worked al-
ternate 24-hour straight periods. The members of each
platoon, of course, had to sleep during that 24-hour
period. While many of us get along on less than 8 hours
sleep a day, yet we think it is quite well recognized that
particularly among men and women engaged in manual
labor, 8 hours sleep is the normal thing. Now, as stated,
the courts, in these two-platoon system cases, allowed pay
for 16 hours. Thus, as a matter of fact, even in those
cases the employees were considered as being on duty
and entitled to pay during their so-called eating time.
Even if we reduce the sleeping time some it should be
remembered that there are three meal periods in each 24
hours. Limiting each to the minimum of 144 hour means
1¥% hours per day. If this is included in the 8-hour period
mentioned then it left only 6% hours sleeping time. If
8 hours is a little more than necessary as actual sleeping
time, 6% hours just as surely is too short an allowance.
We repeat, therefore, that even those cases when ana-
19
lyzed are found to have allowed at least a portion, if not
all, of the eating time as regular compensable working
time.
There is no similarity between the situation as to
activities in those two-platoon system cases and the ac-
tivities in the present case. Of course, in those two-pla-
toon system cases the employees performed none of their
regular activities during this 8-hour night period whether
we call it sleeping time or eating time, or both. At least
we find no indication in any of the court opinions in those
cases that, contrary to the laws of nature, those employees
during that night period slept standing up on their feet
in full uniform and with their eyes open.
— ‘
—
PROPOSITIONS OF LAW
At the outset of this discussion we call attention to
the fact that Petitioner rests its claim that this Court
should review this case upon the proposition that there
is a conflict of holdings between the various circuits; and
particularly that the Second, Third, Fourth and Ninth
Circuits hold contrary to the Eighth Circuit in this case
and in the case of Central Missouri Telephone Company
v. Conwell, 170 Fed. 2d 641. It is further the contention
of Petitioner, as we understand it, that the Courts of these
four circuits hold that it is necessary to plead and prove
a contract, custom or practice even though the activities
involved are those of the normal workday.
We shall demonstrate the falsity of these proposi-
tions. We shall demonstrate clearly by an analysis of
20
Petitioner’s authorities and the citations of and quota-
tion from recent opinions of the Courts of Appeal of three
of these four circuits that far from there being any con-
flict, those Courts of Appeal approve and follow the pres-
ent case and the aforesaid Conwell case. The result is
that there simply is nothing whatever in this case re-
quiring or even indicating any necessity for the granting
of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari or the consideration
of this case by this Court.
This proposition, while not proven, is certainly indi-
cated by the fact that Petitioner is required to fall back
almost entirely upon District Court opinions and, in fact,
two State Court opinions. Following the adoption of the
Portal to Portal Act there was something of a flurry of
District Court opinions arrived at apparently under the
mistaken idea that the Portal to Portal Act repealed the
Fair Labor Standards Act. Of course, that was found
to be far from the truth. Mature consideration of the
problems involved has resulted in uniform holding of the
Courts of Appeal of every circuit in the country where
the issue has been squarely presented. We repeat, there
remains nothing for the consideration and decision of this
Court.
The position of Petitioner in this matter, as we under-
stand it, is based primarily upon its contention that it
is necessary to plead and prove a contract, custom or
practice even though it be found that the activities in-
volved are not portal to portal in character.
We think the Amended Complaint in the present case
alleges and the evidence proves such contract, custom and
21
practice but we do not rest our position on this proposi-
tion alone.
It is conceivable that a situation might arise in which
the activities involved were not exactly portal to portal
in character and yet were not the normal activities of
the regular workday. In such a situation perhaps it is
necessary under Section 2 of the Portal to Portal Act
to clearly and specifically plead and prove such contract,
custom or practice, but that is not the situation here. In
the present case the findings of the Trial Court and the
Court of Appeals are not simply that these activities were
not portal to portal in character. The decision in the
present case is based rather upon the affirmative finding
that the activities of these Plaintiffs and Respondents
during this half-hour so-called lunch period, were the
regular activities of their normal workday.
In the very nature of things it necessarily follows
then that there was a contract and that it was the cus-
tom and practice to pay for such activities. It should be
remembered that the language of the Act is the ‘‘ac-
tivities’; not the time of day or the name given to some
particular period of the day. When one enters into the
employ of an employer there is always necessarily a con-
tract under which the employer agrees to pay the em-
ployee for the time the employee devotes to the employ-
er’s service in the activities covered by the employment.
It is always the custom and practice to pay the employee
for such activities and for all the time devoted to such
activities. The only alternative is employment without
pay. We think this type of relationship was terminated
22
permanently by the Thirteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
The basis of the present decision and the rule of law
now uniformly adopted in all circuits, so far as we can
determine, is based upon the affirmative findings as above
mentioned. In the present case these findings of the Trial
Court, after long and careful consideration and as af-
firmed by the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals
of this, the Eighth Circuit, are found particularly in that
portion of the Trial Court’s opinion found in the first full
paragraph on page 71 and the latter portion of the last
paragraph on page 71 and extending over to page 72 of
the Record. We quote:
„This view, that Section 2 of the Portal Act is
directed against claims for compensation for activities
such as dressing work, traveling within the plant to
job location, ete., which are different from the ac-
tivities which comprise the regular normal part of
employment and that the section has no application
where the work for which compensation is being
claimed is the same kind of work as was performed
throughout the remainder of the workweek, has also
been accepted by courts in other circuits.
* * *
„Whether the time is Portal-to-Portal time de-
pends upon the nature of the activity engaged in
during the period in question; and not upon the term
by which the period is known. The evidence in this
case clearly establishes as a matter of fact that during
the lunch periods’ in question, the employees were
engaged im the principal activity of the workweek
and were not merely taking care of preliminary or
postliminary matters. This being so, the court has
23
concluded that Section 2 of the Portal Act is inap-
plicable to this case and that the plaintiffs are not re-
quired to plead and prove a contract, custom or prac-
tice to compensate them for the hours worked during
the lunch period.’’ (Emphasis added.)
On page 32 of its Brief, Petitioner discusses the case
of Battaglia, et al. v. General Motors Corp., 169 Fed. 2d
254. This is Petitioner’s supposed authority for their
position with respect to the Second Circuit. Also in this
connection Petitioner, on page 36 of its Brief, discusses
and apparently lays great stress on the opinion of the
District Court of Maryland in the Fourth Circuit in Seese
v. Bethlehem Steel Co. This case was appealed and the
Court of Appeals opinion is found in 168 Fed. 2d 58.
We will discuss these two cases together and follow them
in later decisions and thus, as stated, demonstrate clearly
and beyond question the complete lack of foundation for
Petitioner’s position in this present matter.
It takes much stretching of the imagination to find
anything in this Battaglia case from the Second Circuit
which in the slightest degree supports the position of
Petitioner. As especifically stated in the opinion, the
claim there was for activities preliminary to, and after
engagement in, the principal activities of the employees.
That is the direct opposite of the situation in the pgesent
case. It is perfectly true that in the opinion, referring to
the activities generally and after detailing these activities
‘‘before and after their main activities, passing refer-
ence is made to lunch and rest periods during which
their time was not entirely at their own disposal.“ How-
ever, just what activities were involved in that connec-
24
tion is not disclosed. Probably it was only that the em-
ployees could not leave the premises. As above stated, we
make no claim here on that point.
The important point, however, in connection with this
Battaglia case is that the only point actually presented
and argued and decided in the Court of Appeals was the
question of the constitutionality of the Portal to Portal
Act. Nothing more can be read into that opinion no mat-
ter how hard one may try.
In the above mentioned Seese case from the Fourth
Circuit, again the only point actually presented, argued
and decided was the constitutionality of the Portal to
Portal Act. Little is said about the activities involved but
from what is said it is at once perfectly clear that these
were portal to portal in nature and by no stretch of the
imagination could they be considered as normal activities
of other portions of the regular workday. In fact, the
opinion specifically refers to the activities involved in the
following language:
4% * but recovery is asked solely on the ground
that plaintiffs were required to be on the premises of
defendant before and after working time for the pur-
pose of changing clothes and walking to and from the
place where the work was carried on.“
But we are not left to mere speculation as to what the
courts hold. There is a later case from the Fourth Cir-
cuit which involved the original issues in the present case.
This is the case of United States Steel Co. v. Burkett, et
al., 192 Fed. 2d 489, decided less than a year ago on No-
vember 5, 1951. Again we emphasize that this case is
from the Fourth Circuit. That is the same Court that
25
decided the Seese case. In this Burkett case the Court
of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit cited with approval and
followed the Conwell case from this Eighth Circuit, that
is, Central Missouri Tel. Co. v. Conwell, 170 Fed. 2d 641,
and adopted exactly the same rule and followed exactly
the same reasoning as did both the Trial Court and the
majority opinion of the Court of Appeals in the present
‘ease. Furthermore, this Court of Appeals of the Fourth
ircuit in this Burkett case specifically distinguishes be-
tween cases where the activities were of the nature in-
volved in the present case, that is, substantially normal
activities of the workday, on the one hand, and cases such
as the Seese case and the Battaglia case in which the
activities were strictly portal to portal in nature. In this
Burkett case claim was made by foremen who were re-
quired by the employer to report one-half hour before
the regular starting hour and to remain ten minutes after
the regular quitting hour for the purpose of handing out
‘slips and doing other tasks which were of the same nature
as those performed during the regular portion of their
workday. There was no contract, custom or practice to
pay these foremen for these periods. The Trial Court
found, of course, that there was the usual oral contract
to pay them for actual time worked, including any over-
time devoted to their regular duties or activities. The
opinion cites numerous cases and covers the question
fully. Therefore, and without going into more detail, we
quote from the opinion the following rather lengthy ex-
cerpt because we are sure this is the settled law in all cir-
cuits where the point has been raised:
„The overtime work which plaintiffs did was not
a matter of reaching the place of work or of personal
26
preparation, but was normal work of the employer of
the kind for which overtime compensation was pro-
vided by the contract of employment. With respect
to this the District Judge found: ‘5. There was an
express oral contract between the defendant and the
plaintiff to pay the plaintiffs for any overtime which
they worked as a part of their duties in the capacity
in which they were employed, and the thirty minutes
before the regular shift and the ten minute period
after the regular shift were made compensable by an
express contract when the plaintiffs were employed as
turn foreman.’
„The District Judge held that upon these facts
the plaintiffs were entitled to recover wages and over-
time for the 40 minutes work done before and after
their regular shifts and that they are not barred of
recovery by reason of section 2 of the Portal-to-
Portal Act, 29 U. S. C. A. No. 252. We think that
this was clearly correct. We are in accord with what
was said by the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Biggs v. Joshua Hendy Corp., 183 F. 2d 515,
520, as follows: Cross-appellants further contend that
work performed by appellants during lunch periods
cannot be the basis for recovery under the Fair La-
bor Standards Act by reason of No. 2 of the Portal-
to-Portal Act, 29 U. S. C. A., No. 252, because such
work is not made compensable by the express provi-
sion of a contract within the meaning of No. 2(a)
(1). That section is directed against claims for com-
pensation for activities, such as dressing for work,
traveling within the plant to the job location, etc.,
which are different from the activities which com-
prise the regular, normal part of the employment.
The section has no application where, as here, the
work for which compensation is being claimed is the
same kind of work as was performed throughout the
remainder of the workweek.’
As was well said by Judge Rifkind in Galvin v.
National Biscuit Co., D. C., 82 F. Supp. 535, 537:
27
‘Neither contract nor custom can open an avenue of
escape from the obligations imposed by the Fair La-
bor Standards Act, 29 U. S. C. A. No. 201 et seq. A
contract may not validly dictate that eight hours
work shall be calculated as seven hours.’ See also
Frank v. Wilson & Co., 7 Cir., 172 F. 2d 712; Joshua
Henry Corp. v. Mills, 9 Cir., 169 F. 2d 898, 900; Smith
v. Cleveland Pneumatic Tool Co., 6 Cir., 173 F. 2d
775; Michigan Window Cleaning Co. v. Martino, 6
Cir., 173 F. 2d 466; Central Missouri Tel. Co. v. Con-
well, 8 Cir., 170 F. 2d 641, 645. As said by Judge
Gardner in the case last cited:
44% In the instant case there is no claim seeking
to recover for time consumed in walking to work or
other activities either before or after the normal
working hours. Here the claim is that these em-
ployees actually worked many hours in excess of the
forty hours permitted by the Fair Labor Standards
Act, not for activities of a Portal-to-Portal nature,
such as were involved in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens
Pottery Company, supra (328 U. S. 680, 66 S. Ct. 1187,
90 L. Ed. 1515), and we agree with the trial court
that it was not the purpose of the Portal Act to de-
stroy such claims.
‘¢ ‘Section 207 of the Fair Labor Standards Act
provides that, No employer shall, except as other-
wise provided in this section, employ any of his em-
ployees who is engaged in commerce or in the pro-
duction of goods for commerce—* * for a work-
week longer than forty hours * * *, unless such em-
ployee receives compensation for his employment in
excess of the hours above specified at a rate not
less than one and one-half times the regular rate at
which he is employed.’ ”’
% We are of the view that this provision of the
Fair Labor Standards Act was neither repealed nor
so modified as to make it necessary to plead, in an
action to recover compensation for time actually de-
voted to the normal work for which the employee was
employed, an express written contract or unwritten
contract, or a practice or custom. Jackson v. North-
west Airlines, D. C. Minn., 76 F. Supp. 121. The
court therefore had jurisdiction of the action and
properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss.’
„There is nothing to the contrary in our decision
in Seese v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 4 Cir., 168 F. 2d 58,
64. That case involved claims for time of changing
clothes and walking to and from the place where work
was carried on, not the doing of work of the em-
ployer of the very sort that the employees were hired
and paid to perform. The holding of the case was
that Congress had not violated the Constitution in
denying recovery for ‘claims of purely statutory
origin, claims given by statute not as compensation
for labor performed but as a means of regulating
wages and hours of work in interstate commerce.’
What we held to be stricken down by the Portal-to-
Portal Act were ‘claims * * * not based on contract,
custom or practice.’ There is nothing said in the
case which would prevent recovery of wages or over-
time compensation for work and labor performed as
here in regular line of duty and under the regular
contract of employment in excess of the hours per-
mitted by the Fair Labor Standards Act.“
This, we think, fully disposes of the claim of Peti-
tioner that there is any conflict between this Eighth Cir-
cuit in this case and the Conwell case and either the Sec-
ond or the Fourth Circuits. Let us turn then to the Ninth
Circuit, in which jurisdiction Petitioner claims there is
such conflict.
There is a fairly recent case from that circuit
which is the latest word on the point in that circuit. This
is the case of Biggs, et al. v. Joshua Hendy Corporation,
183 Fed. 2d 515. It will be observed that this Court of
— —————
29
Appeals of the Ninth Circuit in this last mentioned case
cites, and we think correctly, as the basis for its holding,
two of the opinions of this Court which Petitioner pre-
tends to rely on for some support for its position. These
are the cases of Armour ck Co. v. Wantock, 323 U. S. 126,
and Skidmore v. Swift ck Co., 323 U. S. 134. Following is
the language of the Court in the above mentioned Biggs
case:
„Oross-appellants further contend that work per-
formed by appellants during lunch periods cannot be
the basis for recovery under the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act by reason of No. 2 of the Portal-to-Portal
Act, 29 U. S. C. A., No. 252, because such work is
not made compensable by the express provision of
a contract within the meaning of No. 2(a) (1). That
section is directed against claims for compensation
for activities, such as dressing for work, traveling
within the plant to the job location, ete., which are
different from the activities which comprise the reg-
ular, normal part of the employment. The section
has no application where, as here, the work for which
compensation is being claimed is the same kind of
work as was performed throughout the remainder of
the workweek.
„Appellee's final contention on cross-appeal is
that there is insufficient evidence to support the
finding of the trial court that appellant Biggs worked
during all of his lunch periods. We think the evidence
sustains the finding. He was on call at all times and
time thus spent was compensable under the Fair La-
bor Standards Act. Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 1944,
323 U. S. 126, 65 S. Ct. 165, 89 L. Ed. 118; Skidmore
v. Swift & Co., 1944, 323 U. S. 134, 65 S. Ct. 161, 89
L. Ed. 124.“
We turn again to some more of the supposed au-
thorities relied upon by Petitioner. Let us examine Bauler
30
v. Pressed Steel Car Co., 182 Fed. 2d 357, from the Sev-
enth Circuit. Here again we must go back to the basic
question of fact. That is the point of this entire pro-
ceeding. Once the facts are determined then the law is
well settled and there is no conflict. The Trial Court and
the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals in the pres-
ent case determined the facts. We do not understand that
it is the desire of this Court nor, in fact, usual recognized
procedure to grant a writ of certiorari merely for the pur-
pose of reviewing and redetermining a question of fact.
Yet that is what Petitioner, in actual effect, is asking this
Court to do in this present procedure.
Here again in this Bauler case as a matter of fact,
the activities involved were portal to portal in nature and
were not, as found and determined in the present case,
the usual and ordinary activities of the regular workday
of the employee concerned. The facts are summarized in
the opinion in the following language:
„The work for which they seek overtime com-
pensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act con-
sisted in marching to and from their respective posts
of duty, in a military manner, changing their attire
from civilian dress to guard uniforms, or from guard
uniforms to civilian dress, cleaning their equipment
and examining the bulletin board.
Boerkoel v. Hayes Manufacturing Company, 76 Fed.
Supp. 771 (D. C. Michigan), is another supposed author-
ity relied upon by Petitioner. This, as stated, is a Dis-
trict Court opinion. It is not clear from the opinion just
what activities were involved. Therefore, the case can be
of no help. But above and beyond that point we call at-
31
tention to a recent opinion of the Court of Appeals of
that Sixth Circuit.
F. W. Stock & Sons, Inc. v. Thompson, 194 Fed. 2d
493, from that Sixth Cireuit decided as late as February
7, 1952, fully and completely supports the position of Re-
spondents in this proceeding. Far from there being any
conflict, the Court of Appeals in this Stock case cites,
approves and follows the above mentioned Conwell case
‘from this Eighth Circuit and the Biggs case, also above
cited and discussed. While the employees in this Stock
case were not guards or firemen but rather engineers, yet
their activities during a so-called lunch period were in-
volved in much the same manner as in the present case.
There again the Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit held
that since during the so-called lunch period and notwith-
standing orders and directives, the employee was, as a
matter of fact, required to continue substantially his reg-
ular duties even while he ate a bit of lunch, it is not
necessary to plead or prove a contract, custom or prac-
tice to treat such periods as compensable working time.
Turning again to the cases cited by Petitioner we
find two State Court opinions, being those of Cobb v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 226 S. W. 2d 110, and Kemp
v. Day & Zimmerman (Iowa), 33 N. W. 2d 569. Neither
of these cases as we read them give due consideration to
the basic question as to the activities involved and whether
or not these activities are those of the normal workday;
that is, the activities which the employee was hired tc
perform. Furthermore, and with all due respect to these
State Courts, we cannot see where these opinions, in any
32
event, enter into the present picture; that is, proceedings
in connection with petition for writ of certiorari.
Next, let us examine Petitioner’s supposed authority,
Jax Beer Co. v. Redfern, 124 Fed. 2d 172. This case was
decided December 10, 1941, or several years before the
Portal to Portal Act was adopted. It could not possibly,
therefore, be any authority on the real issues in the pres-
ent proceeding. Petitioner apparently cites it in the way
of grasping at a straw on the theory that this Court should
review the facts in the present case. It is true that the
Court of Appeals in this last mentioned case found that
the evidence as to material facts was so uncertain as
not to constitute substantial basis for the judgment. That
was a proper point to be examined and determined by
the Court of Appeals. But in the present case, not only
the Trial Court but the Court of Appeals in the majority
opinion has found that the evidence clearly established
the fact that these employees during the so-called lunch
period were engaged in performing the regular and nor-
mal activities of their employment. We do not under-
stand that it is the policy of this Court under the law to
review findings of fact so established.
Love v. United States Rubber Company (D. C. Pa.),
92 Fed. Supp. 174, cited by Petitioner is a two-platoon
system case. We have discussed the situation in these
eases earlier in this brief and will not repeat that dis-
cussion here. There just is nothing in this Love case that
supports Petitioner’s position.
Redwitz v. Ford Motor Co. (D. C. Ky.), 80 Fed. Supp.
265, is another of Petitioner’s supposed authorities that
just isn’t any authority in this proceeding. There again
33
the only point actually presented, argued and decided was
the constitutionality of the Portal to Portal Act. The case
did not in any way involve the basic factual situation that
we have in the present case.
Rokey v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc. (Eighth Circuit),
157 Fed. 2d 734, again is a two-platoon system case. Fur-
thermore, this case was decided before the enactment of
the Portal to Portal Act and could not possibly be of any
help in the present case. Again it is a case from this same
Eighth Circuit and has been properly and fully distin-
guished by the same Court.
Tipton v. Bearl Sprott Co., Inc. (Ninth Circuit), 175
Fed. 2d 432, is another case relied upon by Petitioner.
The opinion does not disclose the nature of the activities
involved. The question in that case was primarily whether
or not the employees were engaged in the production of
goods for commerce so as to come within the provisions
of the Fair Labor Standards Act. There is a finding in
the opinion that the plaintiffs there failed to allege a con-
tract, custom or practice but without any discussion as
to the activities involved. Later in the Biggs case, from
that same Ninth Circuit, hereinabove cited and discussed,
that Court had occasion to consider the precise questions
involved in the present case and adopted and followed
specifically the law as followed by the Court of Appeals
in the present case and every other Court of Appeals
opinion that we have been able to find wherein the present
factual situation existed.
Welsh v. W. J. Dillner Transfer Co. (D. C. Pa.), 91
Fed. Supp. 685, again is a District Court opinion. The
opinion fails to detail the activities involved so it is im-
34
possible to determine whether that court would have held
as it did in a factual situation such as we have in the
present case It is true that the district judge did not
scan to agree with the law as laid down in the above dis-
cussed Conwell case. But every Court of Appeals in
every circuit in the country in which the issue has been
squarely presented has, so far as we can determine, fol-
lowed explicitly the rule of law of this Conwell case.
Let us consider next the case of Williams v. Jackson-
ville Terminal Co., 315 U. S. 386, cited and discussed by
Petitioner beginning on page 48 of their Brief. This case
apparently is cited in support of Petitioner’s contention
that the employees in the present case by continuing to
work thereby entered into some sort of implied contract
to work without pay during this half-hour lunch period.
Surely this Court did not lay down any such rule in this
Williams case. Here again, the factual situation and the
issues involved were entirely different. Let us consider
the facts in the present case for a moment. These present
Plaintiffs and Respondents constituted practically the en-
tire protection force of this vitally important war plant.
They had a choice of continuing work under protest or
going on strike. They did the former and declined to
take the latter action. Remember this was in 1943 and
most of 1944. It was a time when every moment counted.
If these employees had gone on strike this entire plant
would have been closed down right at the height of the
war effort. This war plant could not operate for a mo-
ment without this protection. These employees were
trained ‘specialists. It would not have been possible to
go out and secure other men and women to take their
places without considerable training. We cannot conceive
35
of this or any other court in these circumstances holding
that these or any other employees by remaining patriot-
ically on the job under protest instead of going out on
strike, thereby forfeited their lawful rights. We think
nothing more need be said on this point.
Petitioner cites the Court of Appeals opinion in the
Powell case, that is, United States Cartridge Company v.
Powell, 185 Fed. 2d 67, following the disposition of that
case in this Court in the opinion of this Court appearing
at 339 U. S. 497. It is quite true that the Court of Ap-
peals in that case made passing reference to a thirty-
minute lunch period as being portal to portal in character.
However, this statement was made in connection with the
reference to activities ‘‘before the beginning of the reg-
ular shift.’’ There is nothing in this Powell opinion at
all contrary to the holding of the same Eighth Circuit
Court in the present case when the factual situation is
considered. This same Court of Appeals of the Eighth
Circuit, both in the Conwell case and in the present case,
just like the Court of Appeals in every other circuit where
the point has been under consideration, has expressly
held that when the activities of the employees during any
so-called lunch period are, in fact, substantially those of
the ordinary workday, then these activities are not
portal to portal in character; and that it is not necessary
to either plead or prove a contract, custom or practice of
payment.
Finally on the points being discussed, Petitioner re-
fers in its brief to the cases of Armour d Company v.
Wantock, 323 U. S. 126, and Skidmore v. Swift é Com-
pany, 323 U. S. 134. We certainly find nothing in either
36
of these cases to support Petitioner’s position either in
this proceeding or upon the issues of this case in chief.
On the contrary, both of these cases clearly support Re-
spondents’ position throughout. In the light of these two
cases we can see nothing requiring the attention of this
Court in the present case.
We quote briefly from the Skidmore case as follows:
„Page 136. ‘We have not attempted to, and we
cannot, lay down a legal formula to resolve cases so
varied in their facts as are the many situations in
which employment involves waiting time. Whether in
a concrete case such time falls within or without the
Act is a question of fact to be resolved by appropriate
findings of the trial court. (Emphasis added.)
en general, the answer depends ‘‘upon the de-
gree to which the employee is free to engage in per-
sonal activities during periods of idleness when he is
subject to call and the number of consecutive hours
that the employee is subject to call without being re-
quired to perform active work.“ Hours worked are
not limited to the time spent in active labor but in-
clude time given by the employee to the employer.“
We likewise quote from the above mentioned Wan-
tock case, pages 132 and 133 of the opinion, as follows:
„t is timely again to remind counsel that words
of our opinions are to be read in the light of the facts
of the case under discussion.“
Generally as to the rule applicable, the Court says:
Page 133. ‘Of course an employer, if he chooses,
may hire a man to do nothing or to do nothing but
wait for something to happen. Refraining from other
activity often is a factor of instant readiness to serve,
and idleness plays a part in all employments in a
37
stand-by capacity. Readiness to serve may be hired,
quite as much as service itself, and time spent lying
in wait for threats to the safety of the employer’s
property may be treated by the parties as a benefit
to the employer. Whether time is spent predominantly
for the employer’s benefit or for the employee’s is a
question dependent upon all the circumstances of the
case.
Petitioner in its petition and brief refers to the rule
of De Minimus Non Curat Lex.“ However, Petitioner
cites no authority whatever to support any contention,
if any, of Petitioner on this point. This we think is
purely a matter within the discretion of the trial court
in a case such as the present one. We respectfully di-
rect the attention of the Court to the opinion of the Court
of appeals in this case on this as well as other points in-
volved. We also quote briefly from the opinion in a case
from the Third Circuit where the amounts and general
facts are somewhat similar. This is the case of Landaas,
et al. v. Canister Co., et al., 188 Fed. 2d 768. That Court
in its opinion, page 771, had this to say:
„The employer makes another argument to the
effect that the maxim ‘de minimum non curat lex’
should be applied here. The basis for this argument
is that many of the employees have small claims.
They run from $21.67 to $256.88. But it will be noted
that the period involved to acquire this much of a
claim is three years. The amount accruing for each
day is, therefore, very small. The employer gets en-
couragement from certain words about trivial delays
in the portal-to-portal case discussions.
„We think there is nothing to this point. It has
been said that the maxim de minimus does not apply
to money demands. Kennedy v. Gramling, 1890, 33
38
S. C. 367, 11 S. E. 1081, 1088. In any event, the maxim
is based on common sense and practicalities. The
consideration of plaintiffs’ claims does not take the
court into the realm of the picayune or hypertech-
nical.“
In conclusion, we refer briefly to the specific ‘‘Rea-
sons Relied on For Granting the Writ’? appearing on
page 21 of Petitioner’s petition herein.
1. We have demonstrated above that beyond ques-
tion the Courts of Appeal of the Fourth, Sixth and Ninth
Circuits, as well as other holdings of our own Eighth
Circuit, are in complete harmony with the holding and
rules of law of the Court of Appeals in the present case.
We have further demonstrated that there is in fact no
authority, when the facts are considered, from any other
eircuit holding to the contrary. This is particularly true
as to the Courts of Appeal of all other circuits. There
just is no conflict.
2. No important questions of federal law were de-
cided by the Court of Appeals which have not been or
should be settled by this Court. The general rules have
all been well settled by prior decisions of this Court as
pointed out in the foregoing brief. Furthermore, in view
of the uniform holding of all Courts of Appeal in every
circuit in which the question has been actually presented,
there is clearly nothing remaining requiring the present
attention of this Court in this case.
3. There just are no decisions of this Court which
in any manner conflict with the holding of the Court of
Appeals in this case.
39
4. The holding of the Court of Appeals affirming
the findings of fact of the Trial Court are supported by
substantial evidence; and when this evidence is given full
consideration these findings of fact not only are not er-
roneous but just could not be otherwise. Furthermore,
Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
many cases decided under this rule dispose of this con-
tention of Petitioner.
5. What is said in the next preceding paragraph ap-
plies equally to Petitioner’s Proposition No. 5.
6. There is nothing in this case calling for the ap-
plication of the rule of ‘‘De Minimus Non Curat Lex’’ and
Petitioner cites no authorities supporting its position on
this point.
We earnestly suggest, therefore, as stated at the out-
set of this brief that there is nothing here calling for re-
view by this Court. The whole matter reverts back to the
basic determination of the questions of fact. The case
was tried to the court without a jury. It was given long
and careful study and consideration. The factual sit-
uation was determined by the Trial Court. This factual
determination was approved by the Court of Appeals.
No substantial reason is advanced by Petitioner as to
why this Court should réview these questions of fact. The
questions of law depend upon this determination of the
question of fact. When we keep in mind this situation we
find that, far from there being any conflict among the
Courts of Appeal of the various circuits or with any de-
cisions of this Court, on the contrary, all applicable
decisions are in complete uniformity.
40
Respondents, therefore, respectfully suggest that the
Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
n= Etre ty
Emmet L. Munrhr,
Attorneys for Respondents.
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1952
0 0 0
No. 326
0 0 0
THE GLENN L. MARTIN NEBRASKA COMPANY,
a Corporation, N
Petitioner
vs.
WRENN L. CULKIN, GLEN WEST, FRANCIS H.
MASKER, and ALEX FEILMEYER, Individually
and as Agents and Representatives to Maintain This
Action for and in Behalf of All Employees Similarly
Situated,
Respondents.
Oo 0 —
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER
— —
J. A. C. Kennepy, Omaha, Nebraska,
Georcz L. DeLacy, Omaha, Nebraska,
Lzo Eisenstatt, Omaha, Nebraska,
Dowatp Lzacu, Columbus, Ohio,
Kennepy, HoxLaxp, DeLacy & Svosopa,
Omaha, Nebraska,
Attorneys for Petitioner.
Law Briefs — OMAHA LINO-SLUG PRINTING CO. — 418 So. 15th St.
INDEX
Central Missouri Telephone Company v. Conwell, 170 F. (24)
. —**ů2 „eee eee es eee 10
Reply to Comments on Facts by Respondents................ ee 20
Angeline EB. Way............... —— „eee 2 1
„ . 22
Conclusion —V—l — 2 -
CASES CITED
Amelbo v. Penn Salt Manufacturing Company (D. C. Penn., 1949),
KK eee 9
Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Company, 328 U. 8. 680.... 10, 11
Battaglia v. General Motors Corporation, 169 Fed. (2d) 254. 9
Central Missouri Telephone Company vs. Conwell, 170 F. (2d)
—B—BP . A caune 8 e 3, 9, 10, 15, 16
Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 325 U. 8. 161 11
Newsom v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 173 F. (24) 856, 860 18
Overnight Motor Transportation Co., Inc., v. Missel, 316 U. 8. 572 10
D. A. Schulte, Inc., v. Gangi, 328 U. 8. 1066. „eee 10
Seese v. Bethlehem Steel Co. (D. C. Md.), 74 F. Supp. 412
Shaivety v. Laks, et al. (D. C. N. Y., 1948), 80 F. Supp. 241..
Welsh v. Dillner Transfer Co. (D. C. Penn., 1950). Commerce
Clearing House Labor Cases, Vol. 18, Sec. 65,896, 91 Fed.
BapR. GBB nccccccccccccccccces „eee ‚· +7*r 2 2 4010
STATUTES AND MISCELLANEOUS
e x.
Ar 6. . . oe eee eee eee e —j[— . 10
Congressional Record, Vol. 93
PAGO % „„ „„ „ „„ „ „„ „„ „ 2—*2 * ——VnX;!' . I
. „„ „„ „„ „6666666 — — 12
PAGO o... „ „ „„ 6 0 —U— . . I
N lj... „„ „„ „„ „ „„ „ „ „„ 4 — 12
CO SSSESSSSSSHSSSSHSSSSSHSSHSSSSHSOHSSSSSSHOHSHSOOOOS
SCSSSSESSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSHSSSSSSOSSSSSHSSSHLOOSOSOSS
SCOSESOSSHSSSSSSSHSSSSSHSSSSSSSSSHSSHSHSSSHSHSOHSOOSS
10
9 9 +Z n eee ee
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U. 8. C. A, Sec. 251, et seq.:
50 AAA 17
c ccenetineninee 17
Dae 8 (BD. ococccsoscoreseceresascoserccsensecsqenepacnes 17
en eee eee ee ee 3.9, 10, 11
2 255*%˙(ůũ UOC O COC CEP PEPE SESS ESSE
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1952
o———_o—_—o
No. 326
0 0 0
THE GLENN L. MARTIN NEBRASKA COMPANY,
a Corporation,
Petitioner
vs,
‘WRENN L. CULKIN, GLEN WEST, FRANCIS H.
MASKER, and ALEX FEILMEYER, Individually
and as Agents and Representatives to Maintain This
Action for and in Behalf of All Employees Similarly
Situated,
Respondents.
0 —
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER
o—-0— 0
If the Court Please:
In the above entitled case, four employees of The
Glenn L. Martin Nebraska Company sued as agents and
representatives of some 250 employees (207 Guards,
21 firemen, 26 both capacities) to recover overtime for
alleged activities during thirty minute lunch periods al-
lowed by the employer, the Petitioner. The periods in-
2
volved are from March 6, 1943, to September 17, 1944.
Only the lunch periods are involved. The suit was
brought under Section 16 of the Fair Labor Standards
Act. Some twelve employees were produced by the plain-
tiffs as witnesses. They did not testify in detail as to
any particular activities during their own lunch periods
or the time consumed by any alleged activities, but sued
for the whole thirty minute lunch period.
The Petitioner was engaged in the manufacture
of bombing planes during the last war for the U. S. Army,
and had some 13,000 or 14,000 persons employed at its
plant near Omaha, Nebraska. The plant area was some
700 acres. The guards were stationed at definite posts
around the perimeter of the area and within the various
buildings. The guards were in three shifts. The Com-
pany had provided cafeterias which were available to
their employees. The production employees and all em-
ployees other than guards and firemen were allowed an
identical thirty minute lunch period and were allowed to
go to the cafeterias and, of course, were not paid for
their lunch period.
Up until March 6, 1943, the guards and firemen were
on their posts from seven a. m. to three p. m.; three p. m.
to eleven p. m.; eleven p. m. to seven a.m. They were
not allowed to go to the cafeterias, and they were not al-
lowed to leave their posts and they were paid for eight
hours. On March 6, 1943, by special order and bulletin,
it was provided that the first shift of guards should
clock in at 6:45 a. m. They were to be on the
post at seven a. m. They left their post at three p. m.
and clocked out at 3:15 p. m. The schedules for the other
two shifts corresponded.
.
—
3
The Bulletin, and order promulgated by the Bulletin,
provided:
„Guards will not be allowed to eat on their posts.
They will be allowed thirty (30) minutes for lunch.
The Rover in this case when on relief will check the
Guard out and in during the lunch period. The
Guards will be allowed to eat in the Cafeteria dur-
ing the lunch period.“
The Lower Court found (Printed Record, p. 64) that
the employees knew of this order, and knew that they
were not to be paid for the thirty minute lunch period.
The Lower Court found there was no contract to pay
the guards or firemen for this thirty minute lunch pe-
riod,
The Lower Court did not find that there was any cus-
tom or practice to pay for this lunch period within the
meaning of the Portal-to-Portal Act.
The Lower Court, while admitting that there was a
diversity of opinion on the subject, held, and this was
affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, as follows:
„This being so, the court has concluded that Sec-
tion 2 of the Portal Act is inapplicable to this case
and that the plaintiffs are not required to plead and
prove a contract, custom or practice to compensate
them for the hours worked during the lunch period.“
The Court of Appeals held the case fell within the
rule laid down in the Central Missouri Telephone Com-
pany case, 170 Fed. (2d) 641.
As heretofore indicated, this suit was brought by
four plaintiffs. Glen West was one of them. He testified
4
(R., page 143) that after March 6th that the guards were
permitted to go to lunch to the cafeterias, and were per-
mitted thirty minutes. He testified that that order was
posted on a bulletin, and he understood that they were
not to be paid for that thirty minutes. His exact testi-
mony is quoted on page 54 of our original Brief.
These guards, as has been said before, were stationed
at various posts. At some of the posts there were three
or four guards so that they could relieve each other when
it came to the lunch period. Every morning the lunch pe-
riod allowed each guard was posted up. If the guard was
to be relieved by a rover or other guard, that fact was
included in the bulletin.
It is apparent that if there were three or four guards
at a post, one could remain while the others went to
lunch. The guards at some of the posts could leave their
posts without being watched, and could go to the cafe-
teria. Some of the guards who were stationed at posts
a considerable distance from the cafeterias were relieved
by rovers or other employees driving out with jeeps and
they were allowed to drive to the cafeteria. There is no
dispute in the record as to these facts.
The Lower Court in its Finding of Fact, on page 61
of the Printed Record, found: :
„The system was essentially this: Every day the
Company would post a bulletin assigning each guard to
a particular post and assign someone to relieve each
guard for lunch at a certain time. For the purpose
ef clarity a representative bulletin has been set forth
in the margin. An examination of these bulletins
5
shows that in many instances a guard would be di-
rected to relieve himself; in other instances a guard
would be required to relieve others; and in still other
instances, ‘Rovers’ were assigned to relieve guards
for lunch. ‘Rovers’ were guards whose only duty
was to relieve other guards.’’
In Petitioner’s original Brief, commencing on page
54 and running to page 61, there are quotations from the
testimony of the plaintiffs’ witnesses. These quotations
show that after March 6, 1943, the guards were assigned
lunch periods. This assignment was posted up every
morning in a bulletin, the same bulletin indicated by
whom they were to be relieved, and they were allowed to
go to the cafeteria, and they did go to the cafeteria.
The plaintiffs alleged in their original Complaint, as
follows (Printed Record, page 4) :
„that between the dates of March sixth, 1943, and
September sixteenth, 1944, said guards were per-
mitted to leave their posts for a period of thirty min-
utes each day to enable them to walk to the cafeteria
to secure foo.
The undisputed evidence shows that the guards did
not take their food out; they ate their food in the various
cafeterias. The claim made in the Complaint was that the
guards were required while on their way to the cafeteria
and while at the cafeteria to ‘‘guard the property to ascer-
tain if intruders or strangers were on the premises and
were subject to call for any emergency“ (Record, pages
4 and 5).
As to the firemen, it was alleged that during the
same period they were allowed to go to the cafeteria to
secure food, bring the same back to their station and eat.
—
6
It was alleged that they were required to be on the
alert for fire duty and were not relieved for any meal
hour and were required to be on duty as herein de-
scribed“ (Record, page 6). There were only a few firemen
stationed at the firehouse, three or four of them. The
other firemen were out on the crash truck for periods
of time and were on inspection in the various buildings.
These firemen out on inspection went to the cafeterias and
ate their lunch at the cafeterias just as the guards did.
The plaintiffs introduced testimony to the effect that on
occasions very rare indeed the lunch period of a few
guards was interrupted, and that they were called to
the phone.
The evidence shows that the regular duties of the
guards consisted of being stationed at their posts, check-
ing people desiring to come into the plant, checking auto-
mobiles, keeping a certain record of it, and generally act-
ing as guards, watching for sabotage and so forth dur-
ing the war.
The claim was that when they were walking to the
cafeteria, they checked badges, and while in the cafe-
teria they were sometimes called to the phone. No guard
testified to more than three or four such episodes, and
the Lower Court in its Finding of Fact (Printed Record,
pages 62 and 63) found that the instances where a guard
was required to take any affirmative action were not 1 la-
tively great, but the Court held that the fact that the
guards were fully uniformed was a deterrent to lawless-
ness, and was necessarily beneficial to the defendant.
As to the firemen, the Court stated (Printed Record,
page 62) that the instances in which affirmative action was
required were relatively few, saying that it was nonethe-
7
less apparent that the firemen were required to be con-
stantly vigilant.
The Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the nature
of the activities during the lunch period was to a con-
siderable extent a standby capacity (Additional Record,
page 11).
It should be remembered that Section 2, Part II of
the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 uses these words:
„No employer shall be subject to any liability
under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 as
Amended * on account of the failure of such em-
ployer to pay an employee minimum wages, or to
pay an employee overtime compensation, for or on
account of any activity of an employee engaged in
prior to the date of the enactment of this Act, except
an activity which was compensable by either —
„s) an express provision of a written or non-
written contract in effect, at the time of such activity,
between such employee, his agent, or collective-bar-
gaining representative and his employer; or
**(2) A custom or practice in effect, at the time
of such activity, at the establishment or other place
where such employee was employed, covering such
activity, not inconsistent with a written or —
contract, in effect at the time of such activity, be-
tween such employee, his agent, or collective-bar-
ganing representative and his employer.“
The Lower Court and the Court of Appeals came
to the conclusion that this Section 2, above-quoted, did
not apply unless the work involved was in the nature
of preliminary or postliminary work, that is, dressing,
going to and from work, and so forth; that it did not
apply to employees’ regular activities. Part II of the
Portal-to-Portal Act, quoted above, applies to existing
claims, that is, for work done before the passage of the
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947. The work involved in the
case at bar was from March, 1943, to September, 1944.
The Court will remember that Section 4 of Part III
of the Act has to do with future claims, and has to do
with claims for activities occurring after the enactment
of the Portal-to-Portal Act.
This Section 4 describes the activities which are pre-
liminary or postliminary to the principal activity, but
Section 2 of Part II applies to any activities.
It is the claim of the Petitioner that before there can-
be any recovery in the case at bar for these alleged ac-
tivities during the lunch period, there would have to be
established a contract or a custom to pay for them within
the meaning of the Portal-to-Portal Act. The Peti-
tioner for Certiorari also asserts that there is a di-
versity of holdings on this point in the various circuits.
The Lower Court was of the opinion that there was
such a diversity of opinion, for the Court said in the
opinion on page 674, 97 Fed. Supp.:
4% Counsel for the plaintiff, on the other hand,
strenuously urges that, since the activities engaged
in during the lunch period were part of the day’s
principal activities and not preliminary or postlim-
inary in character, Section 2 of the Portal to Portal
Act does not apply. Though there is some authority
to the contrary in other circuits,** the view adopted
in our own circuit seems to be in accordance with that
suggested by counsel for the plaintiffs.’’
: In the footnote 36, he lists the contra cases as fol-
ows:
Seese v. Bethlehem Steel Co. (D. C. Md), 74 F.
Supp. 412; Welsh v. Dillner Transfer Co. (D. C. Penn.,
1950), reported in Commerce Clearing House Labor
cases, Vol. 18, Sec. 65, 896. Amelbo v. Penn Salt
Manufacturing Company (D. C. Penn., 1949), 83 F.
Supp. 456; Shaivety v. Laks, et al. (D. C. N. V., 1948),
80 F. Supp. 241.
The Court of Appeals in this case concluded :
Section 2 of the Portal Act is inapplicable
to this case and that the plaintiffs are not required
to plead and prove a contract, custom or practice to
compensate them for the hours worked during the
lunch period.“
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is to the effect
that in a suit brought under Section 16 of the Fair Labor
Standards Act to recover for overtime under that Act, the
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 does not apply unless the ac-
tivities were preliminary or postliminary in character.
The Court held that for the claimed activities during the
lunch period, a recovery could be had under the Fair
Labor Standards Act, and that Section 2 of the Portal-
to-Portal Act did not apply even though the activities
were prior to the passage of the Portal-to-Portal Act in
May, 1947. As we have said before, we believe the weight
of authority in the Country is to the contrary and that
other circuits have held to the contrary. In addition to
the cases cited in the District Court’s opinion in Note
36, we again call attention to the case of Battaglia v.
General Motors Corporation, 169 Fed. (2d) 254, which
certainly is to the contrary (also the other cases cited in
our original brief). ‘This cited case involved activities
during lunch periods and rest periods, As we have said
before, the Court of Appeals and the Lower Court were
of the opinion that the Central Missouri Telephone case,
170 Fed. (2d) 641, was decisive.
10
Central Missouri Telephone Company v. Conwell,
170 F. (2d) 641
Various courts have commented on this Telephone
case. For instance, in the case of Welsh v. W. J. Dillner
Transfer Co., 91 Fed. Supp. 685, the Court said, ‘‘the
plaintiffs have substantial authority for their position,
Central Missouri Telephone Company vs. Conwell, 170
Fed. (2d) 641.“ On the other hand, the weight of author-
ity appears to be that Section 2 of the Portal-to-Portal
Act applies to all claims for overtime,
In our original brief we cited annotations from 3 A.
L. R. (2), p. 1129, and 21 A. L. R. (2), p. 1337. These an-
notations dealt with the question of whether or not Section
2 of Part II of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 was lim-
ited to Portal-to-Portal activities.
We wish to discuss this Conwell case and the back-
ground leading up to question involved.
Congress was well aware of this situation when it
debated the Portal-to-Portal Act. Anderson v. Mt. Clem-
ens Pottery Company, 328 U. S. 680, was merely the pre-
cipitating cause of that legislation, and when Congress de-
clared in Section 1 that the FLSA ‘‘Has been interpreted
judicially in disregard of long-established customs, prac- ,
tices and contracts between employers and employees,
it referred to the entire course of interpretation. In Sec-
tion 10, Congress made liquidated damages no longer
‘ mandatory, and in Section 3, it permitted compromises
under proper safe-guards, undoing the injustices perpe-
trated by Overnight Motor Transportation Co., Inc. v.
Missel, 316 U. S. 572, and D. A, Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi,
328 U. S. 108. In Section 8, Congress provided
that good faith reliance on administrative rulings
and interpretations should constitute a defense to the
—
1¹
employer, contrary to the holding in Jewell Ridge Coal
Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 325 U. S. 161. In Sec-
tion 4, so far as the prospective operation of the FLSA
was concerned, Congress accepted in other respects the
interpretations of the Supreme Court, except as to the
travel time and preliminary and postliminary activities
which were considered ‘‘work’’ in the Tennessee Coal,
Jewell Ridge and Mt. Clemens Pottery cases. In Section
2, however, dealing with existing claims, it carefully
chose language appropriate to wipe the slate clean and
give employers a fresh start in their efforts to comply
with the Act. In Section 5 Congress emphasized this pol-
icy by putting a short period of limitations on existing
claims which could be shown to be founded on contract or
custom.
No one can doubt after reading the debate in the
Senate that Congress knew exactly what it was doing and
intended to bar all existing claims, unless founded on con-
tract or custom, and not merely the portal-to-portal type
of claim. Senator Aiken raised the question even before
Senator Donnell, who had charge of the bill on the floor,
commenced his presentation of the bill itself. He said
(93 Cong. Rec. p. 2098):
There must be a good many times when legiti-
mate suits are brought for back pay. Is the bill go-
ing to outlaw the nuisance suits and still make it per-
missible to bring legitimate suits?’’
Senator Donnell, in reply, admitted that the bill might
result in some injustice, and that a plaintiff who had failed
to collect regular overtime pay due him in the past, would
have to show, in order to collect it through the courts,
‘‘either that he had a contract or that there was a cus-
tomary practice in the plant or other place of work in
12
which he was employed, entitling him to such compensa-
tion.“
In reply to a question by Senator Lodge, whether the
bill did not run to things other than portal-to-portal
matters, Senator Donnell replied that it did (93 Con.
Rec., p. 2113).
The following exchange between Senator Lucas and
Senator Donnell (93 Cong. Rec., p. 2123) is relevant:
„MR. LUCAS. I wish to ask the Senator about
the bill as it had been reported by the committee, and
I have specific reference to section 2 (a) of Part II.
I ask him whether he believes that every conceiv-
able claim based on any activity not compensable by
contract or custom or practice, is wiped out by the
bill. I am now talking about all claims, over and be-
- yond those which are set forth in the portal-to-portal
suits, and I wish to know whether the bill included
such claims,
MR. DONNELLL. The answer, Mr. President,
is that the section to which the Senator from Illinois
has referred destroys every claim * except those
that were compensable by either contract, custom, or
practice, as described in that section.
MR. LUCAS. Then the Senator from Missouri
and I are in agreement as to what this section means.
‘In other words, any and all claims, over and above
and beyond anything that has happened in these
portal-to-portal suits, are also wiped out or outlawed,
so to speak,
If my position is correct in that respect, I wish
to make this further statement for the record: namely,
that the section we are discussing contains no defi-
nition of portal-to-portal claims, and makes no dis-
tindtion between suits based on out-and-out viola-
tions of the Fair Labor Standards Act * and the
portal- to-portal suits.
13
Senator Donnell, explaining the difficulties encountered
in drafting the bill, had this to say (93 Cong. Rec., p.
2132):
„Finally we came to the conclusion * * that in-
stead of — * our bill apply to the 24 hour period,
around the clock, we would make it apply only to the
period preceding the beginning of the normal workday
and subsequent to the end of the normal workday—
what might be termed the whistle-to-whistle period.
So we started to make all activities prior to the be-
ginning of the workday compensable only if so under
a contract or custom, and to make all activities after
the conclusion of the workday compensable only if
so under contract or custom, leaving the broad field
of the workday itself, the great bulk of the time,
with no new legislation applicable to it.
„Then we were confronted by these considera-
tions * * * that if we should not legislate with ref-
erence to the shift period, that is to say, between
whistle and whistle, we would still leave unattained
our object to wipe out the portal-to-portal suits. For
illustration, in connection with lunch time, as I re-
member it, it was alleged in the Mt. Clemens case by
the employees that they were entitled to compensa-
tion from the time they left their work places to the
time they reached the cafeteria, and for the time
spent in returning . If we adopted the plan of
legislating as to existing claims merely with re-
spect to activities before tue beginning of the workday
and after the end of the workday, in all probability
there would still be left pending in the courts a great
mass of suits.
„1 have gone into this subject at great length
because I think it is exceedingly important as show-
ing that Congress, when it legislates to affect the
rights of persons other than those who have engaged
in portal-to-portal activities and to affect rights other
than those accruing from Portal-to-Portal activities,
is not acting capriciously or arbitrarily, but within
ene ee
14
its scund discretion is using what the Congress deems
to be the best practical approach to demolishing the
portal-to-portal cases.
Senator Lucas again raised the point that Section 2 (a)
wiped out ‘‘every conceivable claim based on any activity
not compensable by contract, custom or practice, and
this time Senator Ferguson answered him as follows
(Cong. Rec., p. 2234) :
J answer by saying that it is the intent of the
section referred to to abolish every known claim
that could exist under the Fair Labor Standards Act,
the Walsh-Healy Act, or the Bacon-Davis Act—spe-
cifically under the acts and by virtue of nothing else
than the acts—except claims which may arise under
any express or implied contract * * * I think it was
the intention of the drafters of the legislation to
wipe out everything under those acts that was not
based upon contract or custom or practice. That
was the intention.“
Senator McCarran, launching a bitter attack on the bill,
said (93 Cong. Rep., p. 2244):
Senator McGrath, also opposed, had this to say (93 Cong.
Rec., p. 2248):
= do I say that? Because the committee it-
self admits that under the language of the bill many
— E ñö—j—j—
15
they can press their claims regardless of how right
they may be or how just they may be or how unjust
or cruel the employer. By this bill we give forgive-
ness of the sins of the many employers who have
abused their workers, and we place a premium on
that kind of action at the expense of the vast ma-
jority of American Employers who have been loyal
and fair in dealing with their workers.“
When Central Missouri Telephone Co. v. Conwell, su-
pra, was in the District Court on motion to dismiss, 74 F.
Supp. 542, Judge Duncan had before him the debate in
the Senate and noted that apparently ‘‘it was the in-
tention of the Congress to wipe out every existing claim
except those that had arisen under contract, written or
unwritten, express or implied, or pursuant to custom or
practice. The he seized upon the term implied con-
tract, used by Senator Ferguson in replying to Senator
Lucas but not found in the Act, and proceeded to imply
a contract from the fact that the plaintiffs had worked
many hours of overtime without being paid in accordance
with the FLSA. He argued in support of this implied
contract only that an arrangement under which overtime
work was performed without payment was illegal and
not binding on the employee. Even Judge Duncan’s sense
of logic balked at stating the naked syllogism. Major
premise: a contract for overtime work without payment
is illegal. Minor premise: the parties are not bound by an
illegal contract. Conclusion: Therefore a contract to
pay for overtime work is implied.
The court made short work of the same argument in
Newsom v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 173 F. (2d)
856, 860. There a written contract provided that ‘‘time
and one-half or double time will be paid when required
by law or Government regulation,’’ thus incorporating the
16
FLSA by express reference, and not merely by implica-
tion. As the Court pointed out, however, one purpose of
the Portal-to-Portal Act was to repeal the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the FLSA as to what activities
constituted ‘‘work.’’ To read the FLSA into the con-
tract between the parties, including the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of that Act, would nullify both the pur-
pose and the provisions of the Portal-to-Portal Act.’’
It is obvious, of course, that Judge Duncan’s device of
implying a contract to pay for overtime work in accord-
ance with the FLSA, carried to its logical conclusion,
would absolutely nullify the Portal-to-Portal Act in every
case,
When Central Missouri Telephone Co. v. Conwell
reached the Court of Appeals, 170 F. (2d) 641, the judges
of that court agreed with Judge Duncan, and cited in
support of his conclusion an interpretative bulletin of the
Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the De-
partment of Labor and the remarks of President Truman
on the occasion of signing the Portal-to-Portal Act. The
Administrator quoted the sponsors of the Act as saying
that it protects the legitimate claims, and therefore
concluded that Congress did not intend to change the
general rule that the remedial provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act should be liberally construed and
exemptions therefrom narrowly construed. The Presi-
dent said that he was ‘‘confident that the purpose of the
main provisions of the Act is to eliminate the immense po-
tential liabilities which have arisen as a result of the
‘portal - to- portal’ claims, and that it was not the
purpose of the Act to permit violation of our funda-
mental wage and hour standards or to allow a lowering
of those standards.
17
It is undisputed that in the case at bar, whatever
activity or requirement of availability there may have
been during the lunch periods involved, the claimants
did not expect to be paid for their lunch periods. They
knew that the lunch periods were not to be paid for.
In Section 1 (a) (4) of the Portal-to-Portal Act, Con-
gress found that one of the evils of the FLSA, as in-
terpreted by the Supreme Court, was that ‘‘employees
would receive windfall payments, including liquidated
damages, of sums for activities performed by them with-
out any expectation of reward beyond that included in
their agreed rates of pay,’’ and in Section 1 (a) (5) Con-
gress found that if the FLSA were permitted to stand as
interpreted, it would promote ‘‘increasing demands for
payment to employees for engaging in activities no com-
pensation for which had been contemplated by either the
employer or employee at the time they were engaged in.“
These and other evils were found to burden and obstruct
commerce, and in Section 1 (b) Congress declared its
policy ‘‘to relieve and protect commerce from practices
which burden and obstruct it * * “.“
The Court will remember that Section 2 of the Portal-
to-Portal Act provides that there should be no liability
for “an activity engaged in prior to the date of the
enactment of the Act, except activities compensable by
either (1) an express provision of a written or non-writ-
ten contract, in effect at the time of such activity between
such employee, his agent, or collective bargaining repre-
sentative and his employer.“
In the case at bar the Lower Court found that:
„The Company stopped paying for activities en-
gaged in during the lunch period and the employees .
18
continued to work with the knowledge that they were
not being paid for this time.’’ (Printed Record, page
64.)
One of the plaintiffs, Glen E. West, testified as fol-
lows:
„. After March 6, 1943, you were permitted to go
to lunch at the Cafeteria and permitted thirty
minutes? A. That was right.
Q. That was posted as a bulletin? A. Yes.
Q. Of course, you weren’t to be paid for that thirty
minutes, you understand that?
A. That is right.“ (Printed Record, page 143.)
In addition, Respondents in their brief herein in re-
ferring to the testimony of Alex Feilmeyer (page 15 of
Respondent’s brief) say:
The men through an organization were making
complaints about the fact that our pay was not being
based on eight and one-half hours. I never did agree
with Martin or any one else that I was entitled to
only eight hours pay for that period of time.“
Again in the brief it is stated that complaints were
made by the employees about not receiving pay for the
thirty minute lunch period, and that these complaints con-
tinued until September, 1944, when a different arrange-
ment was made.
It is apparent that in this case there was not any con-
tract, express or implied, to pay the men for the lunch
period. As a matter of fact, they understood they were
not being paid for the lunch period and claimed that
through their organizations they objected.
— *
The record discloses that in September, 1944, the
following Bulletin was posted, being Exhibit 38, Printed
Record, pages 120 and 121:
To All Guards and Firemen from L. H. Krumm,
Guards Eating Lunch on their Post. Effective with the
second shift September 17, 1944, it will be required
that all men eat their lunch on their post of duty,
and not go to the cafeteria to eat lunch. No deduc-
— shall be made thereafter for the usual lunch pe-
riod.
19
L. H. Krumm.“
During the period involved from March 6, 1943, until
September 17, 1944, there was a directive to the timekeep-
ing department which read at follows:
„All guards will be allowed thirty minutes lunch
period, the lunch period is to be deducted from the
time shown on the time card.
„This will mean that all guards will have eight
and one-half hours shown on their time cards, but
will be credited with eight hours only.’
Again the Court in his Findings of Fact found as fol-
lows (see Printed Record, page 64):
The plaintiffs have alleged that the activities
engaged in during the lunch period were compensable
throughout the period in question ‘under the general
non-written contract in eftect between defendant and
each of said employees.’ The evidence, however,
does not support this allegation; ‘consequently, the
court is unable to find that the activities were com-
pensable by contract.
Your Petitioner again submits to the Court that both
the Lower Court and the Court of Appeals erred in com-
ing to the conclusion that Section 2 of the Portal- to-
Portal Act did not apply.
EE RR — ES
20
In Respondents’ Brief appears the following lan-
guage:
„It is conceivable that a situation might arise
in which the activities involved were not exactly
portal to portal in character and yet were not the
normal activities of the regular workday. In such a
situation perhaps it is necessary under Section 2 of
the Portal to Portal Act to clearly and specifically
plead and prove such contract, custom or practice,
but that is not the situation here.“
The Court’s findings as herein set out indicate the
regular activities of the guards. The claimed and al-
leged activities during the lunch period are certainly dif-
ferent from the regular activities as found by the
Court. We, therefore, submit that under any view of
the case, the plaintiffs were required to prove either a
contract or a custom as required by Section 2 of the
Portal-to-Portal Act.
REPLY TO COMMENTS ON FACTS BY
RESPONDENTS
We do not believe that the comments as to the facts
made in Respondents’ Brief are accurate. In the Lower
Court’s Opinion as hereinbefore quoted, he set forth on
page 61 of the Printed Record the practice in re the thirty
minute lunch periods, On page 11 of Respondents’ Brief
it is said:
When any witnesses in answer to questions upon
cross examination made any statement to the effect
that they could have a half hour lunch period, etc.,
they were referring to the specific paper directive.
The record does not at all support this statement. For
instance, one of the plaintiffs, Alex Feilmeyer, on page
131 of the record testified as follows:
— —
„„. When you did go to a cafeteria to eat, did you
have full half hour at any time? (This was a
question propounded by Mr. Murphy, Counsel
for the plaintiff)
A. If you weren’t called away, yes you would have
your half hour.’’
This witness also testified as follows:
Then after this March 6, 1943, you were per-
mitted to go to the cafeteria? A. Les.
Q. And you would go, of course, to the Cafeteria
that was nearest you at Modification? A. Yes.’’
Again he testified:
„. When it came to lunch, you were again relieved
by a Rover and went to the cafeteria? A. Les.
Q. And you were allowed thirty minutes for this
lunch? (Record, pages 132, 133 and 134).
A. Zea.”
Angeline E. Way
She was called as a witness by the plaintiff and tes-
tified :
460. You knew after you came to work you were en-
titled to thirty minutes to go to lunch to a
cafeteria? A. That is right.
see
Q. If you wanted to you could sit in the Cafeteria
the whole thirty minutes?
That is right, if you weren’t called.
Q. During all the time you were employed there,
you were called out of the lunch period twice?
A. That is right.“ (Record, pages 146, 147.)
William A. Keefer
He was called as a witness for the plaintiff and tes-
tified :
„A. Yes, I think after March 6, 1943, we were per-
mitted to be relieved by a Rover and to eat in
the Cafeteria, (Record, page 124.)
Q. Do you remember when you were a guard of
ever being called when you were at lunch in the
Cafeteria? A. Called away from the cafeteria?
Q. Yes.
A. No, I can’t remember of any instance.“ (Record,
pages 127, 128.) a
The record discloses that these guards and firemen
during their shift period were allowed two rest periods
of ten minutes. These rest periods were not deducted from
their time (Record, page 126).
Mr. Murphy in the trial of the case was attempting
to prove that while they were at lunch the claimants were
interrupted at times, and called away. But as said be-
fore, during the eighteen months involved no one of them
was called away more than two or three times. Surely
the activity of the guard seated at lunch and eating his
lunch in a cafeteria, provided by his employer, is dif-
ferent in character from the guard’s activities when he
is at his post checking automobiles and persons in and out
of the plant, checking railroad cars, and generally doing
other guard duties. The Lower Court and the Circuit
Court of Appeals attempted to avoid the consequences
of the Portal-to-Portal Act by asserting that the guards
were doing their regular work because of the fact that
while eating their lunch in the cafeteria they had their
complete uniforms on. The plaintiffs tried to prove that
23
they had some duties as to checking badges while on
their way to the cafeteria or entering the cafeteria, but
this faded away and there was a lack of evidence to es-
tablish any such activities. One of the witnesses testi-
fied that on one occasion he checked a badge. The truth
is, and the record without dispute establishes it, that
after March 6, 1943, and until September 16, 1944, the
guards could go to the cafeteria for their lunch, were re-
lieved so that they could do so, and those who were sta-
tioned at distant posts were transported to the cafeteria.
They availed themselves of this period. There was no
contract or custom to pay them for this thirty minute
period. The record discloses an attempt on the part of
some twelve claimants to try to establish that the guards
or firemen performed some activities during this thirty
minute lunch period. However, the attempts were so
feeble that on cross-examination it was established that
only on the very rarest occasions while the guards were
at lunch was their lunch interfered with. This also is
true as to the firemen. For the information of the Court
we advise that there were 207 claimants who were guards
and 21 who were firemen, and 26 who served in both ca-
pacities,
On page 247 of the Printed Record the Court took
over the examination of a witness by the name of Al Wolf.
The following questions were asked by the Court, also the
answers of the witness:
„e. Likewise it is true that this order of March 6,
1943, the guards had thirty minutes in which to
eat their lunches, it was made available to them
and they could go to the cafeteria and if they
were disturbed they took it at another time if
they cared to? A. Yes.
Q. And there isn’t any doubt about that? A. No, sir.”
_ ee
24
We call attention of the Court to the Printed Record
commencing on page 183. This is a photostatic copy
of the Daily Report made by the Production Depart-
ment (pages 183 to 201) covering the guards. The Fire
Department report appears on pages 202, 203, 204, and
on page 208 appears the assignment of the firemen to
their various duties. On page 185 of the Printed Record
appears a copy of the bulletin showing the assignment
of the various guards to their various posts and lunch
reliefs and by whom they were to be relieved,
It appears that in September, 1944, the entire plant
voted to go on a two shift schedule of nine hours each, in-
stead of the three shift schedule so that the welders and
other workers might have a little more take home pay
(Record, pages 165-166). The evidence is that in order
to give the guards and firemen some additional take home
pay, it was agreed effective September 16, 1944, that they
would again eat their lunch on their post and not go to
the cafeteria and for this period they would be paid and
they would be paid for eight and one-half hours (Record,
pages 166, 167). Again the approval of the Air Corps
was obtained for this change. The letter approving the
change appeared on page 176 of the printed Record. The
pertinent part of the letter is as follows (Record, page
167):
„J. Consideration has been given to the pro-
posal contained in referenced letter regarding the
contractor’s desire to allow plant protection guards
to eat their lunch at their posts during their tour of
duty in order to eliminate the necessity for relief
guards to replace such personnel while on a regu-
larly scheduled lunch period.
442. The undersigned approves the above men-
tioned procedure with the provision that the guards
. eee
%
will not be allowed to leave their posts to eat lunch
at any of the eating facilities in operation at the
premises, that they be required to have lunch at
their regular station of duty. This procedure to be-
come effective on and after 17 September, 1944.
For the A. A. F. Representative: J. T. Rey-
monds, Ist Lt., Air Corps Contracting Officer.“
„The testimony of Mr. Robert L. Evans, who
was the personnel director of the defendant, is that
he took up the matter with the unions representing
the guards and firemen and made this change so that
the guards and firemen could likewise have some in-
crease in take-home pay to correspond with current
increases available to all the other employees.’’ (Rec-
ord, page 166.)
As to the duty of the guards the Lower Court in its
Finding of Fact held (see page 60 of the Printed Record) :
The primary function of a guard, irrespective
of his particular station at the plant, involved con-
stant vigilance for the security of the defendant's
property. Each guard, however, had certain specific
duties, routine in character, which were, in a sense
at least, related to the individual post, e. g. the guards
at the main gate were required to examine the creden-
tials of all persons seeking admittance to the plant;
the guard at the water tower was required to take a
water reading every twenty minutes; and the guard
on freight inspection duty was required to check in-
coming carloads of freight.“
The Court likewise in its Finding of Fact held:
„when the guards were relieved for lunch they could
go either to the nearest cafeteria or to the smoking
area. (Printed Record, page 62.)
As has been said before, the Lower Court held there
was no contract to pay either the guards or firemen for
their lunch period. This appears on page 64 of the
Printed Record. The Lower Court likewise found the fol-
lowing fact:
„the Company stopped paying for activities engaged
in during the lunch period and the employees con-
tinued to work with the knowledge that they were not
being paid for this time. (page 64.)
Your Petitioner again asserts that the Lower Court’s
findings that the claimants were performing their or-
dinary work during the lunch period was clearly erron-
eous within the meaning of Rule 52 of the Federal Rules
of Procedure.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this Brief and the rea-
sons set forth in our original Brief, Petitioner respect-
fully prays for a Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit to review the decision of
that Court in the above entitled case.
Respectfully submitted
J. A. C. Kor,
ron L. DxLaor,
Leo Eisaxsrarr,
Omaha, Nebraska,
Doxalo Laacn,
Columbus, Ohio,
Attorneys for Petitioner.
eam
Office - Supreme Court, U
FT T., E D
952
ue ere —
—
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1952
o- 0——o
No. 326
THE GLENN L. MARTIN NEBRASKA COMPANY,
a Corporation,
Petitioner,
vs.
WREN L. CULKIN, GLEN WEST, FRANCIS H. MAS.
KER, and ALEX FEILMEYER, Individually and
as Agents and Representatives to Maintain This
Action for and in Behalf of All Employees Sim-
ilarly Situated,
Respondents.
o———_o——-o
PETITION FOR REHEARING
o——0—""——-0
Attorneys for Petitioner.
— —
- LINO-SLUG PRINTING CO. — 418 Bo. 15th a,
INDEX
Page
66 — — 2 1
7 d—— 33344 6 3
— 4
Cases Cited
Amelbo v. Penn Salt Manufacturing Company (D. C. Penn., 1949),
Ea ae 3
Central Missouri Telephone Company vs. Conwell, 170 Fed. (2d)
it Soin . A 2,3
Seese v. Bethlehem Steel Co. (D. C. Md.), 74 F. Supp. 412 8 3
Shaivety v. Laks, et al. (D. C. N. v. 1948), 80 F. Supp. 241. 3
Welsh v. Diliner Transfer Co. (D. C. Penn, 1950), Commerce
Clearing House Labor Cases, Vol. 18, Sec. 65,896 bees 3
Statutes and Miscellaneous
Pair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U. 8. C., Sec. 201, et seq.:
— ä be 2
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U. 8. C. A, Sec. 251, et seq.:
% — ͤ WW 2. 3. 4
WWW
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1952
— —
THE GLENN L. MARTIN NEBRASKA COMPANY,
a Corporation,
Petitioner,
vs.
WREN L. CULKIN, GLEN WEST, FRANCIS H. MAS-
KER, and ALEX FEILMEYER, Individually and
as Agents and Representatives to Maintain This
Action for and in Behalf of All Employees Sim-
ilarly Situated,
Respondents.
o———_0——_—_0
PETITION FOR REHEARING
oo —
Your Petitioner, The Glenn L. Martin Nebraska Com-
pany, a corporation, prays for a rehearing of the order
of this Court dated October 27, 1952, denying its Peti-
tion for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
BASIC FACTS
This is an action brought by four employees of The
Glenn L. Martin Nebraska Company, as agents and rep-
sentatives of 207 guards and 21 firemen and 26 others
2
who had served in both capacities to recover overtime
and liquidated damages under Section 16 of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. There were some 13,000 or 14,000 em-
ployees at this plant where bombers were made during
the last war. The date involved is from March 16, 1943,
to September 16, 1944. The claim is for payment for a
thirty minute lunch period which was allowed to the
guards under an order and bulletin dated March 6, 1943,
which provided that after that date the guards would
have a thirty minute lunch period, would have their lunch
at the cafeterias, and would be relieved where relief was
necessary. There is no dispute but that the guards were
allowed this thirty minute lunch period; that some of
them were transported to the cafeterias. The claim was
made that during the lunch period, they wore their uni-
forms and that they acted in a Standby capacity.
The defense raised was that under Section 2 of the
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, there was no contract or
custom as required by the Portal-to-Portal Act.
The Lower Court, as a Finding of Fact, found that
there was no contract; found that the guards and fire-
men knew that they were not being paid for the thirty
minute lunch period. The Court did not find that there
was any custom, but the Court found that there was no
need to plead a contract or custom under the Portal-to-
Portal Act of 1947, this because the Lower Court found
that the activities performed during the lunch period
were not preliminary or postliminary.
The Court relied upon the case of Central Missouri
Telephone Company vs. Conwell, 170 Fed. (2d) 641.
ARGUMENT
Petitioner assigns the following reason for granting
this Petition—
There is a conflict in the decisions of the various
circuits, as to whether or not it is necessary to plead and
prove a contract or custom to pay in accordance with
Section 2 of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947. That
there was such a conflict was found by the Lower Court,
the Lower Court saying in its opinion—
Counsel for the plaintiff, on the other
hand, strenuously urges that, since the activities en-
gaged in during the lunch period were part of the
day’s principal activities and not preliminary or
posliminary in character, Section 2 of the Portal
to Portal Act does not apply. Though there is some
authority to the contrary in other circuits,** the view
adopted in our own circuit seems to be in accordance
with that suggested by counsel for the plaintiffs. ’’
In the footnote 36, he lists the contra cases as fol-
lows:
“‘Seese v. Bethlehem Steel Co. (D. C. Md.), 74 F. Supp.
412; Welsh v. Dillner Transfer Co. (B. C. Penn.,
1950), reported in Commerce Clearing House Labor
cases, Vol. 18, Sec. 65,896. Amelbo v. Penn Salt Man-
ufacturing Company (D. C. Penn., 1949), 83 F. Supp.
456; Shaivety v. Laks, et al. (D. C. N. Y., 1948), 80
F. Supp. 241.”
Your Petitioner prepared a Reply Brief in answer
to Respondents’ Brief in Opposition to a Petition for
Writ of Certiorari. This Brief set forth the comments of
the Lower Court to the effect that there was a diversity of
holding and contained a complete analysis of the Central
Missouri Telephone Company v. Conwell case, supra,
— — Ä
4
and contained quotations from the Congressional Record,
showing the debate which was carried on in the United
States Senate relative to the meaning of Section 2 of
the Portal-to-Portal Act, which debate is set forth in
your Petitioner’s Reply Brief; that said Reply Brief was
prepared in accordance with the rules of this Court, was
served upon counsel for the Respondents, and was for-
warded to this Court for filing. However, because of
the delay in transportation, this Reply Brief arrived in
Washington and in the Clerk’s office on October 28th,
1952, the day after the order of this Court denying cer-
tiorari.
We believe that a reading of this Reply Brief would
have convinced the Court that both the Lower Court and
the Court of Appeals’ were wrong in their construction of
Section 2 of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, and were
wrong in holding that said Act was not applicable to the
case at bar.
We believe likewise that a reading of said Reply
Brief would convince the Court that there was actually
a diversity of holdings on the point involved as between
the various circuits, and that the Lower Court was like-
wise of the opinion that there was such a diversity.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reason, Petitioner respectfully
prays that the order of the Court denying its Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit be re-heard and vacated, and that the Pe-
tition be granted, and your Petitioner prays that the said
Reply Brief received by the Clerk of the Supreme Court
of the United States on the 28th day of October, 1952, be
considered by the Court and that it be filed in the office
of the Clerk of the Court.
The undersigned, G. L. DeLacy, attorney for the Pe-
titioner, hereby certifies that the Petition for Rehearing
filed in this cause is presented in good faith, that in his
judgment said Petition is restricted to the grounds speci-
fied in paragraph 2 of Rule 33 as amended, and that said
Petition for 1 for dela
3 G L. DaLacy, 7
Atto for Petitioner.
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