Brief for the Respondents in Opposition — Glenn L. Martin Nebraska Co. v. Culkin

Supreme Court brief1952

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Text

INDEX

Pages

Statement of Issues 1,2

Factual Statement 2

Witnesses :

John E. Kerwin 11

Alex Feilmeyer 13

Statement of Trial Attorney 10

Propositions of Law 19

RES?ONDENT’S AUTHORITIES

Armour & Co. vs. Wantock, 323 U. S. 126 29, 35, 36

Biggs et al vs. Joshua Hendy Corporation (C. C. A. 9),

183 Fed. 2d 515 28, 29, 33

Central Missouri Telephone Company vs. Conwell (C.

C. A. 8), 170 Fed. 2d 641 19, 25, 34, 35

F. W. Stock & Sons, Inc., vs. Thompson (C. C. A. 6),

194 Fed. 2d 493 .

Landaas et al vs. Camister Co. et al (C. C. A. 3), 188

Fed. 2d 768 37

Skidmore vs. Swift ck Co., 323 U. S. 13429, 35, 36

United States Steel Co. vs. Burkett et al (C. C. A. 4),

192 Fed. 2d 489

Rule 52 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9, 39

LOWER COURT OPINIONS IN PRESENT CASE

Culkin et al vs. Glenn L. Martin Nebraska Co., 97

Fed. Supp. 661 8, 22, 30, 39

Glenn L. Martin Nebraska Co. vs. Culkin et al, (C.

C. A. 8) 197 Fed. 2d 981 9, 10, 11, 30, 39

ii

PETITIONER’S AUTHORITIES ANALYZED

: Pages

Armour d Co. vs. Wantock, 323 U. S. 126 29, 35, 36

Battaglia vs. General Motors Corp. (C.C. A. 2), 2

Fed. 2d 254 23, 24, 25

Bauler vs. Pressed Steel . Co., 81 Fed. Supp. 172,

182 Fed. 2d 357 29, 30

Boerkoel vs. Hayes Manufacturing Co., 76 Fed. Supp.

771

Cobb vs. Aluminum Co. of America, 226 S. W. 2d 110. 31

Jax Beer Co. vs. Redfern (C. C. A. 5), 124 Fed. 2d 172 32

Kemp vs. Day d Zimmerman, 33 N. W. 2d 6

Love vs. United States Rubber Company, 92 Fed.

Supp. 174 32

Redwitz vs. Ford Motor Co., 80 Fed. Supp. 265. 32

Rokey vs. Day & Zimmerman (C. C. A. 8), 157 Fed.

2d 734 33

Seese vs. Bethlehem Steel Company (C. C. A. 4), 74

Fed. Supp. 412, 168 Fed. 2d 58 23, 24, 25, 28

Skidmore vs. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134.29, 35, 36

Tipton vs. Bearl Sprott Co., Inc. (C. C. A. 9), 175 Fed.

2d 432

United States Cartridge Co. vs. Powell (C. C. A. 8),

185 Fed. 2d 67

Welsh vs. W. J. Dillner Transfer Co., 91 Fed. Supp.

685 33

Williams vs. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 315 U.S.

386 34

— x.

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1952

°

THE GLENN L. MARTIN NEBRASKA CO.,

A CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

vs

WREN L. CULKIN, GLEN WEST, FRANCIS H.

MASKER, AND ALEX FEILMEYER, INDIVID-

UALLY AND AS AGENTS AND REPRESENTA-

TIVES TO MAINTAIN THIS ACTION FOR AND

IN BEHALF OF ALL EMPLOYEES SIMILARLY

SITUATED, |

Respondents.

tt.

—

STATEMENT AND BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS IN

OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF

CERTIORARI

——

» sn

As we view the matter there are just two questions

involved in this proceeding and both involve only basic

questions of fact. These are:

ee

a

2

1. Is it necessary to plead and prove a contract, cus-

tom or practice when the activities involved, as in the

present case, are substantially those of the regular work-

day of the employee?

2. Is there a conflict of holdings between the various

Courts of Appeal of the different circuits?

-"

2

FACTUAL STATEMENT

On pages 2 to 12, inclusive, of its printed Petition and

Brief herein, Petitioner sets out a brief summary of the

facts. A true understanding of the questions involved re-

quires, we think, some enlargement on this statement.

Also, it seems to us a rather peculiar procedure, to say

the least, to turn, as Petitioner has, to the dissenting

opinion of Judge Riddick of the Court of Appeais for

the facts in the case rather than to the specific findings

of the Trial Judge which, in turn, were likewise found

and approved by the majority opinion of the Court of Ap-

peals in this case.

These facts are important and must be kept in mind.

This was a war plant engaged in the assembly and modi-

fication of many hundreds of war planes during the war.

It was of the utmost importance that this highly impor-

tant military endeavor be carefully guarded and protected

every moment. Some 12,000 or 14,000 were employed on

this seven hundred-acre enclosed plant area. They worked

in three shifts around the clock, seven full days a week,

day after day, week after week and month after month.

It was. of the utmost importance that fires be prevented

3

as well as that they be put out if and when one started.

Tt was also of the utmost importance that throughout

every hour and every minute of every hour, day and

night, the entire plant be protected against sabotage, theft

and disturbances of any and every kind. How well this

was accomplished over the eighteen-month period here

involved by these particular respondents is best shown

by the fact, as correctly stated by Petitioner, that only

one serious emergency occurred during all of this time;

and that was when a plane flying in the air crashed

through a roof of one of the buildings. There was hardly

any way these Respondents could have prevented that.

There were twelve to fourteen firemen on each shift

and usually from about forty to forty-eight guards on

each of their shifts. It must be kept clearly in mind that

not only the protective force but the entire plant force

worked three full shifts so that the plant was in full

operation day and night and every hour of the day and

night during this period.

The facts are further detailed in the Supplemental

Record forming a part of the record in this case. The

Court’s attention is respectfully directed to the headnote

appearing on pages 1 and 2 of said Supplemental Record,

all in explanation thereof.

The simple fact is this: These firemen worked pri-

marily in the same manner as regular firemen in the fire

department of a city or town, except only that here more

watching and inspection are involved because of the par-

ticular hazards growing out of the work and type of

work of this plant. The duties of the guards were sub-

stantially those of a regular town or city police officer

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walking his beat, with some additional activities here due

to the needs of the work and the large number of em-

ployees in this compact area and also involving some par-

ticular duties of watching and checking specific operations

and some messenger service.

It is and always has been the position of Respond-

ents that their activities during the so-called half-hour

lunch period were almost exactly the same as during any

other part of the day.

Before March 6, 1943, they ate their lunch at their

post. Then the directive (page 4, Petitioner’s Petition)

was issued by the employer. Thereafter, on paper a

different plan of operations was supposed to be followed

by the guards. This, however, is a case to which the well-

known statement that It is a condition, not a theory,

that confronts us” has full application.

It is not a question of what these Respondents could

do in theory; it is a question of what, under direction of

their superior officers and the compulsion of their work,

they were required to do and did.

Briefly then, what are the facts?

As to the firemen, before March 6, 1943, all except

the two or three out on inspection brought their lunch

with them and at some available time around midshift ate

their lunch at a table in the fire house. All were required

to be in full uniform, even while eating. All were required

to be ready at a second’s notice to answer a fire call or

other call to more active duty. Group by group they

manned the crash truck and ambulance. The planes were

flying in and out all hours of the day. This fact, together

4

5

with the great number of employees generally, necessi-

tated frequent use of the crash trick and the ambulance.

The two or three firemen on inspection, in addition to full

uniform, were required to carry portable telephones. Be-

fore March 6, 1943, they could eat their lunch when and

where they wished, still, however, being in full uniform

and awake to their surroundings and with their portable

telephones strapped over their shoulder. What change

took place when this bulletin was issued on March 61

Exactly this and nothing more: thereafter instead of

bringing their lunch the firemen, not on inspection, went

one by one to the cafeteria next door, hastily picked up

a tray of food, returned to the fire house and ate it there

at the same table in exactly the same manner as before.

The two or three firemen on inspection now ate in the

cafeteria near which they might be at eating time. They

still ate in full uniform, required to keep their caps on

and their portable telephones over their shoulder and

ready to answer any call, including plugging in their

phones and answering signals flashed over the plant by

a light system. Furthermore, meal time of itself with

three to five thousand employees crowding into these cafe-

terias was a necessary and appropriate time for these

firemen inspectors to be in a cafeteria checking and watch-

ing at the very moment they swallowed their bit of lunch.

There is not even any claim of any witness in this entire

record that any fireman ever found it possible to wander

off to a locker room during a so-called lunch period.

Where is there any difference between the activities of

these firemen during the so-called lunch period and their

regular required activities during every other hour of

their regular * Throughout all the long history

6

of this litigation counsel for Petitioner has entirely failed

to point out one iota of difference save only that during

the lunch period, when it was not interrupted, the fire-

men, in addition to their regular activities, chewed and

swallowed a little food; but without at the same time

giving up or leaving any of their regular duties or

activities.

_ Petitioner repeats and repeats the statement that

these employees were only interrupted in their actual

lunch period on rare occasions. If they had never been

actually interrupted by a fire, it would not be important.

Is a city fireman on duty and performing his regular ac-

tivities entitled to pay only while he is answering a

fire call or fighting a fire? That seems to be the position

of Petitioner here. Of course, this is not the practice.

Anyone is familiar with the fact that regular firemen

spend much of their time just sitting around the fire barn

either reading or playing cards or listening to a radio,

being, however, alert to answer immediately to a fire call.

The same considerations exactly apply to these guards.

A policeman on his beat may actually stop a disturbance,

catch a burglar or make an arrest only once in a month.

His purpose and his presence in walking his beat in full

uniform is to prevent law violation. The same is true of

these guards. It is undisputed in this record that they,

and every one of them, were specifically required by di-

rect orders of their superior officers to remain in full

uniform throughout every minute of this 84-hour shift

period. Certainly some of them could go to the cafeteria

and eat their lunch there but on the way to and from the

cafeteria and while in the cafeteria they, too, were re-

7

quired specifically to remain in full uniform and were not

permitted to remove their cap or insignia or gun even

while sitting down to swallow a little food.

Furthermore, and again remembering that during the

lunch period four or five thousand employees crowded into

these cafeterias, it was most appropriate that guards in

uniform walk in and out of the cafeteria and that some

of them be there among all of these other employees. It

is a matter of common social knowledge that disturbances,

thefts and other law violations occur more generally in

such crowded conditions than elsewhere. It is true that

on some occasions a guard was stationed at one door of

one of the cafeterias as a regular guard post, but one

guard in that position could not possibly serve the need

of guards throughout all of the cafeterias with all of these

employees eating there. It should also be remembered

that the cafeterias were only open for lunch abowt an

hour and a half, midway in each shift, and all of these

employees had to crowd in there and eat during that brief

period.

Incidentally, there were three cafeterias, not five.

Two of theme were divided into two sides or divisions

but they were still only two large adjoining rooms amd not

separate cafeterias.

Only two or three rovers were furnished to relieve

all of these guards. It was the plan that the others

were to “relieve themselves,” whatever that meamt. It

does not appear just who was to relieve a guard who

was relieving another guard. Again, it is a matter of

common social knowledge that saboteurs, and there were

some during the war, would watch a plant and determine

ae

when it was weakly guarded and perform their acts of

sabotage during such period. Petitioner knew this very

well. That was the basic reason for the change from 8

to 8% hours beginning March 6, 1943; that is, so that

no part of the plant would remain unguarded even briefly

at the time of changing shifts. Exactly the same con-

siderations applied during the so-called lunch period.

Again on paper, according to this directive, these

guards could do this and that. They could go to the locker

room or be at ease. But did they? Was it possible as

an actual matter of fact and practice for them to so be

at ease? Petitioner has had and has the names and ad-

dresses of all of their employees. Not a single one of

them was called as a witness by Petitioner to show even

a few incidents when any of these guards would be found

lying around at ease or loafing in the locker room during

the so-called lunch period. In fact, as stated by one of

the witnesses, the locker doom was too far away from

practically all of them to even have time to walk there

and back in a half hour.

We will not prolong this statement by quotations from

the specific findings by the Trial Judge which will be

found in the Record and which the Court will want to

read in full, anyway. We do callgattention to this fact:

Trial of this case was started in February, 1948, after

many previous arguments on pleadings, ete. After sev-

eral days trial, the Trial Judge became temporarily indis-

posed and it was necessary to adjourn the trial for a

time. Then other matters developed, including litigation

over the country in other cases, and the trial was not

resumed until July, 1948. Then the evidence was heard

8

9

over a further period of more than two weeks. Then

briefs were filed and matters presented from time to time

in connection with legislation and opinions of this and

other Federal Courts. Thus, over a long period of time

the Trial Judge had all of these matters under consid-

eration repeatedly, and in detail. If there ever was a

ease in which Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-

cedure should be strictly applied, this is such a case.

Petitioner repeatedly refers to what it calls the un-

disputed evidence.” The only factual point in the evi

dence not disputed is the fact of the issuance on paper

of the directive of March 3, 1943, effective March 6, 1943.

There is extensive and detailed dispute in the record in

the way of the evidence of Respondents as to what

actually happened, notwithstanding this paper directive.

Petitioner draws some support from the above men-

tioned dissenting opinion of Judge Riddick, and partic-

ularly the last portion thereof appearing on page 11 of

Petitioner’s Petition and Brief. With all due respect to

Judge Riddick there is an obvious basic error in his

reasoning and his conclusions. He seems to have been in-

fluenced considerably by the fact, as he states, that only

12 of some 250 plaintiffs were called to testify. This point

was never raised, at least by way of dispute, at any time

during the trial or the appeal to the Court of Appeals or

the argument in the Court of Appeals. Therefore, there

was no occasion to call the attention of Judge Riddick to

the true picture in this connection. Until his dissenting

opinion was written and published there was no thought

of any question on this point. The simple fact is that

at the trial this matter was covered by a statement in

10

open court at the close of Respondents’ case and was not

questioned by the Trial Court or counsel for Defendant

and Petitioner. The statement made by the trial attorney

for Plaintiffs and Respondents is found on page 158 of

the Record. Perhaps the language and the English em-

ployed could be improved upon, but we quote this state-

ment exactly as it was made. It was our position then,

and it is our position now, and as stated was never ques-

tioned until Judge Riddick, apparently without having

noted this statement, wrote his dissenting opinion. The

sttaement is this:

„Mn. Murpuy: Now, if the court please, I would

like permission to have the record show this very

brief statement, and that is in support of our theory

of proof of this case. As outlined in procedure in

many other cases, we have called representative em-

ployees, old and young, guards and firemen, men

and women, particularly a number who were there

throughout the entire period; covered the general pic-

ture; many of the individual situations; the partic-

ular situation with respect to some that were not in

the ordinary line of work of the general run, so that

as I view the evidence thus far adduced by these

witnesses covers the entire picture of the employment

as to all parties of the case, and that any further

witnesses or testimony would be merely repetition

and unduly extend the record and that is our theory

at this time, and the plaintiffs rest.”

Thus, it is necessary to multiply the testimony of

each of the 12 witnesses by 3 to cover each shift and by

the additional number of guards on some posts. Again,

with all due respect to Judge Riddick, we insist the Rec-

ord shows a great many specific instances of calls to

active duty during the lunch period. Furthermore, we

11

are sure the Record in no instance shows any witness

stating that unless called to duty he had an uninterrupted

thirty minutes for lunch or that if interrupted by call to

duty he could return to lunch at a later period. In this

connection, attention is again directed to the plain fact

of the evidence and that is that when any witnesses, in

answer to questions upon cross-examination, made any

statement to the effect that they could have a half-hour

lunch period or that they could, if interrupted, return at

a later period, they were referring specifically to the

paper directive. Each and all of them made it abundantly

clear that this did not work out in practice. When re-

turning after an interrupted lunch period, the cafeterias

would be closed. Also, we fail to find in the Record sup-

port of Judge Riddick’s statement that only one wit-

ness testifled that he was always on duty throughout the

lunch period.“ Every one of these twelve witnesses tes-

tified not only that he but every other guard and fireman on

every shift was on duty throughout the lunch period.“

Also, we fail to find the contradictory evidence referred

to by Judge Riddick. The simple fact is, as the Record

discloses without dispute, that even the few witnesses

called by Petitioner, with only one exception, fully cor-

roborated the testimony of all Respondents’ witnesses to

the effect that they were on full duty throughout the en-

tire 84-hour shift, including the so-called lunch period.

The contradiction referred to is only apparent; not

real. Respondents’ witness, John E. Kerwin (Supp. Rec-

ord 16), testified he had to read the water record every

twenty minutes and report it every hour. Incidentally, he

testified that this was true as to all three shifts on that

particular post. None of the other men who worked that

12

post were called by Petitioner to dispute this in the least.

Petitioner does a lot of talking about this guard post not

being interrupted because they only had to report the

water reading once an hour. But that isn’t the point.

The point and the undisputed evidence is that they had

to read it every twenty minutes and this was true during

any lunch period as well as at any other time.

Without further prolonging this discussion of the

facts, we think it might be advisable to quote in detail

from the Record, the testimony of Respondents’ witness,

Alex Feilmeyer. Petitioner on page 58 of its Brief refers

to some brief excerpts of the testimony of this witness

and on page 60 of its Brief to very brief excerpts from

the testimony of the above mentioned witness, John Ker-

win. These are perfect examples of lifting a few words

out of the context. The testimony of Alex Feilmeyer

in its entirety is typical of the testimony of all of the

other witnesses and applicable to a considerable extent

to all posts on all shifts. It covers this point of number

of interruptions. It will be noted that far from failing

to remember any interruptions, he testifies specifically

that these would occur at least three or four times a

week and that he was unable to get back and eat his lunch

later and finally had to just quit eating any lunch at all.

His testimony also covers the undisputed instructions of

the superior officers to all guards. It also covers the

complaints made by these employees during this eighteen-

month period until Petitioner began paying for this lunch

period after being called upon by representatives of the

Wage and Hour Division. It will be remembered that the

references to particular pages and lines refer to the pri-

mary record so that this narrative stat nt could easily

13

be checked. The testimony of Mr. Feilmeyer (Supplemen-

tal Record 7, 8, 9) is as follows::

4% ALEX Femmeyer, witness called on behalf of

plaintiffs. Employed continuously as guard from Au-

gust, 1942, to April, 1946, and having worked all three

shifts, usually as guard at main gate.

Direct Examination—page 137, line 16 to page 143,

line 18.

„I knew about the order issued on or about March

6, 1943. Up until then I had brought my lunch and

ate when and where I could and was paid full time,

irrespective of where I ate. Beginning March 6, 1943,

we were to be relieved by a guard. You would go

to the cafeteria and get your lunch and either take

your lunch and eat it there, or eat it on the post;

either way. We were instructed that in case our

light went on, or anything, it was our duty to phone

in and find out what the order was, and if there

would be an emergency we were supposed to leave

our lunch and take care of whatever it might be and

then go back, and so on. There were signal lights at

the cafeteria up at modification. The light would

flash quite frequently. I would say three times a

week, maybe four. On the first shift it was worse

than the second and third. If the light flashed you

would go to the phone and if it was probably some-

one quitting, or you had to pick up someone at the

plant, you would have to leave your lunch and go

up and get whoever it was and bring them back and

go down and eat, if you had time to go back. On

the first shift I would leave my lunch quite often.

Finally, I just quit taking my lunch at all and would

eat when I got home, because I wouldn’t have time

to eat. It seemed like during the first shift there was

generally a lot of activity there and that was the

reason I forgot my lunch entirely.

*

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„We had side arms and under instructions from

our officers, who were civilian officers, we wore these

at lunch. We also had a cap with insignia on it and

we were not permitted to leave that off when we

went to lunch. These instructions were from our of-

ficers. This continued right along after March 6, 1943,

and on after September 16, 1944. I remember the

date of September 16, 1944, and that following that

we were paid for 8% hours. There was no change,

as a matter of actual fact, in our way of working on

or about September 16, 1944, either as to the lunch

situation or anything of that sort. The officer I re-

ferred to was Captain Berry. He was a civilian cap-

tain; not an army captain. I talked with him ten or

twelve times about this lunch situation over the

period from March 6, 1943, to September 16, 1944.

He told me I was on duty at all times whether I

was in the cafeteria, or out; even though I was re-

_ lieved, in case someone was in the cafeteria and

didn’t have a badge on, it was my duty to see where

the badge was, or their identification; if any trouble

would arise while I was in there, it was my duty to

try and straighten it out; or, if I was subject to call,

in case the light went on and I had to call in, and

I brought that up to him, I imagine, ten or twelve

times.”

Page 147, line 16 to page 148, line 13:

„ told Captain Berry I thought we should get

paid for the half-hour, as we were on duty and had

to check badges, and so on, and then be called in

case the light went on and gave us some duties to

perform and we would have to go and drop our

lunch and come back later and eat it. That was the

kick I had about it, that our half-hour wasn’t our

own. He told me he didn’t have anything to do with

that, but as long as we had that badge on we were

on duty. He said he couldn’t do anything about the

pay check. The men, through an organization, were

15

making complaints about the fact that our pay was

not being based on 8½ hours. I never did agree with

Martin, or anyone else, that I was entitled to only 8

hours pay for that period of time.”

Cross-Examination—page 162, line 13 to page 164,

line 6:

‘Tf I was called out, no record of that would be

made. I would just have to pick up my lunch some

way. A lot of times I wouldn't, after I came back.

I remember being called out while at lunch on many

more than four or five times altogether. I would be

called to go up to the plant and pick up a vendor, or

there would be a group of people quitting and I would

have to go and take them through the plant, and so

on and so forth, and sometimes on some days that

would be all day long; there would be people quit-

ting on Fridays, especially, or some vendor would

come in the plant and they would tell me to go and

pick him up. A vendor is a person who would con-

tact some of the purchasing departments and we

would have to pick them up at the gate and maybe

the other guards would be tied up and they would say,

‘You have to go. They are waiting for you.“

Usually four guards were posted at this particular

gate. Thus, the testimony of this one witness covers the

individual similar experience of twelve men; that is, four

men on each of the three shifts per days of twenty-four

hours. The testimony of all of these witnesses was sub-

mitted and received in such similar representative ca-

pacity in keeping with the uniform practice in cases of

this type.

Petitioner submitted officers’ daily report for Au-

gust 16, 1944, as representative of these daily reports.

This covers the day shift for that day (R. 203). Now the

16

lunch period for that particular day was 10'30 A. M. to

12:30 P. M. (R. 160). Let this particular report of Au-

gust 16 shows a fire call to which the fire department em-

ployees responded from 10:55 A. M. to 11:45 A. M. Thus,

on the only occasion which Petitioner furnishes us with

their own records it appears that the firemen were actually

on a fire call during fifty minutes of their supposed lunch

period. It might be argued from this that this was a

daily occurrence but, of course, we make no such argu-

ment. It was not a question of whether they were actually

out fighting a fire every other day or so during the so-

called lunch period. The point is that the fires occurred

irrespective of the time of day or night and they accepted

fire calls exactly the same during the so-called lunch

period as on any other occasion. That was what they

were there for. That was their regular workday activity

along with the inspection work and other similar matters.

Petitioner states on page 30 of its Brief that none of

the other 10,000 or 12,000 employees were paid for their

lunch periods. So far as we know that is perfectly true.

But it was not the custom or practice of the mechanics,

welders, bookkeepers, etc., to continue their regular work

during the lunch period. Without question they had a

perfectly free half-hour lunch period except only that they

could not leave the plant area. We have never contended

that the mere fact that these guards and firemen could not

leave the plant area would make them eligible for pay

during the lunch period.

Petitioner further states on page 62 of its Brief that

It was not until long after the war was over and long

after the plant was closed that claim was made to the

effect ng 180 men were be paid for this lunch

17

period.” This statement is quite in keeping with the re-

peated statement of Petitioner as to ‘‘yndisputed evi-

dence.’? Now the simple fact is as shown without dis-

pute by the above quoted testimony of Alex Feilmeyer,

and other witnesses testifying likewise, all of these em-

ployees complained throughout the period of March 6,

1943, to September 16, 1944, that they were not being

paid for this lunch period and made claim for such pay.

If our memory of recent history is correct, and we have

reason to remember it very definitely, the war was in full

force during these months. This suit was originally in-

stituted in January of 1945. The war was still very much

with us at that time and for several months thereafter.

The plant was not closed until September, 1945, or more

than two years after these claims were first made and

nine months after this suit was first filed. Respondents

are in no way responsible for the many and long delays

that occurred in this litigation thereafter.

There is just one other factual situation we wish to

discuss before passing on to a review of the authorities.

Petitioner relies almost entirely upon opinions of a

few courts which, however, were in cases involving the

two-platoon system. It should be remembered that at all

times in the present case there were three regular daily

shifts. This was true of the entire plant. There was no

closing down of any department during the night or at

any other time. This two-platoon system, limited almost

entirely to firemen, was used in some instances in other

plants. Mostly these were packing house plants. Invari-

ably those plants. operated only one or, at the most, two

shifts per day. During at least 8 hours over the night

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16

lunch period for that particular day was 10'30 A. M. to

12:30 P. M. (R. 160). Yet this particular report of Au-

gust 16 shows a fire call to which the fire department em-

ployees responded from 10:55 A. M. to 11:45 A. M. Thus,

on the only occasion which Petitioner furnishes us with

their own records it appears that the firemen were actually

on a fire call during fifty minutes of their supposed lunch

period. It might be argued from this that this was a

daily occurrence but, of course, we make no such argu-

ment. It was not a question of whether they were actually

out fighting a fire every other day or so during the so-

called lunch period. The point is that the fires occurred

irrespective of the time of day or night and they accepted

fire calls exactly the same during the so-called lunch

period as on any other occasion. That was what they

were there for. That was their regular workday activity

along with the inspection work and other similar matters.

Petitioner states on page 30 of its Brief that none of

the other 10,000 or 12,000 employees were paid for their

lunch periods. So far as we know that is perfectly true.

But it was not the custom or practice of the mechanics,

welders, bookkeepers, ete., to continue their regular work

during the lunch period. Without question they had a

perfectly free half-hour lunch period except only that they

could not leave the plant area. We have never contended

that the mere fact that these guards and firemen could not

leave the plant area would make them eligible for pay

during the lunch period.

Petitioner further states on page 62 of its Brief that

It was not until long after the war was over and long

after the plant was closed that claim was made to the

effect that these men were to be paid for this lunch

17

period.” This statement is quite in keeping with the re-

peated statement of Petitioner as to ‘‘undisputed evi-

dence.’? Now the simple fact is as shown without dis-

pute by the above quoted testimony of Alex Feilmeyer,

and other witnesses testifying likewise, all of these em-

ployees complained throughout the period of March 6,

1943, to September 16, 1944, that they were not being

paid for this lunch period and made claim for such pay.

If our memory of recent history is correct, and we have

reason to remember it very definitely, the war was in full

force during these months. This suit was originally in-

stituted in January of 1945. The war was still very much

with us at that time and for several months thereafter.

The plant was not closed until September, 1945, or more

than two years after these claims were first made and

nine months after this suit was first filed. Respondents

are in no way responsible for the many and long delays

that occurred in this litigation thereafter.

There is just one other factual situation we wish to

discuss before passing on to a review of the authorities.

Petitioner relies almost entirely upon opinions of a

few courts which, however, were in cases involving the

two-platoon system. It should be remembered that at all

times in the present case there were three regular daily

shifts. This was true of the entire plant. There was no

closing down of any department during the night or at

any other time. This two-platoon system, limited almost

entirely to firemen, was used in some instances in other

plants. Mostly these were packing house plants. Invari-

ably those plants. operated only one or, at the most, two

shifts per day. During at least 8 hours over the night

18

period the plants were closed and inoperative. Thus,

during this night period there was no fire danger re-

sulting from plant operations because there were no

operations. The presence of any outsider could be readily

detected in the quiet of the night. Such was not the situa-

tion in the present case. In those two-platoon system

cases generally the courts allowed a workday of 16 hours.

It is true that in some instances the courts speak in

passing of deductions from working time of ‘‘sleeping

and eating time.’’ In none of these cases was any par-

ticular point made of the eating time. Under this two-

platoon system one complete group worked a full 24

hours. Then that group would be off and the other pla-

toon on duty the next 24 hours. That is, each worked al-

ternate 24-hour straight periods. The members of each

platoon, of course, had to sleep during that 24-hour

period. While many of us get along on less than 8 hours

sleep a day, yet we think it is quite well recognized that

particularly among men and women engaged in manual

labor, 8 hours sleep is the normal thing. Now, as stated,

the courts, in these two-platoon system cases, allowed pay

for 16 hours. Thus, as a matter of fact, even in those

cases the employees were considered as being on duty

and entitled to pay during their so-called eating time.

Even if we reduce the sleeping time some it should be

remembered that there are three meal periods in each 24

hours. Limiting each to the minimum of 144 hour means

1¥% hours per day. If this is included in the 8-hour period

mentioned then it left only 6% hours sleeping time. If

8 hours is a little more than necessary as actual sleeping

time, 6% hours just as surely is too short an allowance.

We repeat, therefore, that even those cases when ana-

19

lyzed are found to have allowed at least a portion, if not

all, of the eating time as regular compensable working

time.

There is no similarity between the situation as to

activities in those two-platoon system cases and the ac-

tivities in the present case. Of course, in those two-pla-

toon system cases the employees performed none of their

regular activities during this 8-hour night period whether

we call it sleeping time or eating time, or both. At least

we find no indication in any of the court opinions in those

cases that, contrary to the laws of nature, those employees

during that night period slept standing up on their feet

in full uniform and with their eyes open.

— ‘

—

PROPOSITIONS OF LAW

At the outset of this discussion we call attention to

the fact that Petitioner rests its claim that this Court

should review this case upon the proposition that there

is a conflict of holdings between the various circuits; and

particularly that the Second, Third, Fourth and Ninth

Circuits hold contrary to the Eighth Circuit in this case

and in the case of Central Missouri Telephone Company

v. Conwell, 170 Fed. 2d 641. It is further the contention

of Petitioner, as we understand it, that the Courts of these

four circuits hold that it is necessary to plead and prove

a contract, custom or practice even though the activities

involved are those of the normal workday.

We shall demonstrate the falsity of these proposi-

tions. We shall demonstrate clearly by an analysis of

20

Petitioner’s authorities and the citations of and quota-

tion from recent opinions of the Courts of Appeal of three

of these four circuits that far from there being any con-

flict, those Courts of Appeal approve and follow the pres-

ent case and the aforesaid Conwell case. The result is

that there simply is nothing whatever in this case re-

quiring or even indicating any necessity for the granting

of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari or the consideration

of this case by this Court.

This proposition, while not proven, is certainly indi-

cated by the fact that Petitioner is required to fall back

almost entirely upon District Court opinions and, in fact,

two State Court opinions. Following the adoption of the

Portal to Portal Act there was something of a flurry of

District Court opinions arrived at apparently under the

mistaken idea that the Portal to Portal Act repealed the

Fair Labor Standards Act. Of course, that was found

to be far from the truth. Mature consideration of the

problems involved has resulted in uniform holding of the

Courts of Appeal of every circuit in the country where

the issue has been squarely presented. We repeat, there

remains nothing for the consideration and decision of this

Court.

The position of Petitioner in this matter, as we under-

stand it, is based primarily upon its contention that it

is necessary to plead and prove a contract, custom or

practice even though it be found that the activities in-

volved are not portal to portal in character.

We think the Amended Complaint in the present case

alleges and the evidence proves such contract, custom and

21

practice but we do not rest our position on this proposi-

tion alone.

It is conceivable that a situation might arise in which

the activities involved were not exactly portal to portal

in character and yet were not the normal activities of

the regular workday. In such a situation perhaps it is

necessary under Section 2 of the Portal to Portal Act

to clearly and specifically plead and prove such contract,

custom or practice, but that is not the situation here. In

the present case the findings of the Trial Court and the

Court of Appeals are not simply that these activities were

not portal to portal in character. The decision in the

present case is based rather upon the affirmative finding

that the activities of these Plaintiffs and Respondents

during this half-hour so-called lunch period, were the

regular activities of their normal workday.

In the very nature of things it necessarily follows

then that there was a contract and that it was the cus-

tom and practice to pay for such activities. It should be

remembered that the language of the Act is the ‘‘ac-

tivities’; not the time of day or the name given to some

particular period of the day. When one enters into the

employ of an employer there is always necessarily a con-

tract under which the employer agrees to pay the em-

ployee for the time the employee devotes to the employ-

er’s service in the activities covered by the employment.

It is always the custom and practice to pay the employee

for such activities and for all the time devoted to such

activities. The only alternative is employment without

pay. We think this type of relationship was terminated

22

permanently by the Thirteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution.

The basis of the present decision and the rule of law

now uniformly adopted in all circuits, so far as we can

determine, is based upon the affirmative findings as above

mentioned. In the present case these findings of the Trial

Court, after long and careful consideration and as af-

firmed by the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals

of this, the Eighth Circuit, are found particularly in that

portion of the Trial Court’s opinion found in the first full

paragraph on page 71 and the latter portion of the last

paragraph on page 71 and extending over to page 72 of

the Record. We quote:

„This view, that Section 2 of the Portal Act is

directed against claims for compensation for activities

such as dressing work, traveling within the plant to

job location, ete., which are different from the ac-

tivities which comprise the regular normal part of

employment and that the section has no application

where the work for which compensation is being

claimed is the same kind of work as was performed

throughout the remainder of the workweek, has also

been accepted by courts in other circuits.

* * *

„Whether the time is Portal-to-Portal time de-

pends upon the nature of the activity engaged in

during the period in question; and not upon the term

by which the period is known. The evidence in this

case clearly establishes as a matter of fact that during

the lunch periods’ in question, the employees were

engaged im the principal activity of the workweek

and were not merely taking care of preliminary or

postliminary matters. This being so, the court has

23

concluded that Section 2 of the Portal Act is inap-

plicable to this case and that the plaintiffs are not re-

quired to plead and prove a contract, custom or prac-

tice to compensate them for the hours worked during

the lunch period.’’ (Emphasis added.)

On page 32 of its Brief, Petitioner discusses the case

of Battaglia, et al. v. General Motors Corp., 169 Fed. 2d

254. This is Petitioner’s supposed authority for their

position with respect to the Second Circuit. Also in this

connection Petitioner, on page 36 of its Brief, discusses

and apparently lays great stress on the opinion of the

District Court of Maryland in the Fourth Circuit in Seese

v. Bethlehem Steel Co. This case was appealed and the

Court of Appeals opinion is found in 168 Fed. 2d 58.

We will discuss these two cases together and follow them

in later decisions and thus, as stated, demonstrate clearly

and beyond question the complete lack of foundation for

Petitioner’s position in this present matter.

It takes much stretching of the imagination to find

anything in this Battaglia case from the Second Circuit

which in the slightest degree supports the position of

Petitioner. As especifically stated in the opinion, the

claim there was for activities preliminary to, and after

engagement in, the principal activities of the employees.

That is the direct opposite of the situation in the pgesent

case. It is perfectly true that in the opinion, referring to

the activities generally and after detailing these activities

‘‘before and after their main activities, passing refer-

ence is made to lunch and rest periods during which

their time was not entirely at their own disposal.“ How-

ever, just what activities were involved in that connec-

24

tion is not disclosed. Probably it was only that the em-

ployees could not leave the premises. As above stated, we

make no claim here on that point.

The important point, however, in connection with this

Battaglia case is that the only point actually presented

and argued and decided in the Court of Appeals was the

question of the constitutionality of the Portal to Portal

Act. Nothing more can be read into that opinion no mat-

ter how hard one may try.

In the above mentioned Seese case from the Fourth

Circuit, again the only point actually presented, argued

and decided was the constitutionality of the Portal to

Portal Act. Little is said about the activities involved but

from what is said it is at once perfectly clear that these

were portal to portal in nature and by no stretch of the

imagination could they be considered as normal activities

of other portions of the regular workday. In fact, the

opinion specifically refers to the activities involved in the

following language:

4% * but recovery is asked solely on the ground

that plaintiffs were required to be on the premises of

defendant before and after working time for the pur-

pose of changing clothes and walking to and from the

place where the work was carried on.“

But we are not left to mere speculation as to what the

courts hold. There is a later case from the Fourth Cir-

cuit which involved the original issues in the present case.

This is the case of United States Steel Co. v. Burkett, et

al., 192 Fed. 2d 489, decided less than a year ago on No-

vember 5, 1951. Again we emphasize that this case is

from the Fourth Circuit. That is the same Court that

25

decided the Seese case. In this Burkett case the Court

of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit cited with approval and

followed the Conwell case from this Eighth Circuit, that

is, Central Missouri Tel. Co. v. Conwell, 170 Fed. 2d 641,

and adopted exactly the same rule and followed exactly

the same reasoning as did both the Trial Court and the

majority opinion of the Court of Appeals in the present

‘ease. Furthermore, this Court of Appeals of the Fourth

ircuit in this Burkett case specifically distinguishes be-

tween cases where the activities were of the nature in-

volved in the present case, that is, substantially normal

activities of the workday, on the one hand, and cases such

as the Seese case and the Battaglia case in which the

activities were strictly portal to portal in nature. In this

Burkett case claim was made by foremen who were re-

quired by the employer to report one-half hour before

the regular starting hour and to remain ten minutes after

the regular quitting hour for the purpose of handing out

‘slips and doing other tasks which were of the same nature

as those performed during the regular portion of their

workday. There was no contract, custom or practice to

pay these foremen for these periods. The Trial Court

found, of course, that there was the usual oral contract

to pay them for actual time worked, including any over-

time devoted to their regular duties or activities. The

opinion cites numerous cases and covers the question

fully. Therefore, and without going into more detail, we

quote from the opinion the following rather lengthy ex-

cerpt because we are sure this is the settled law in all cir-

cuits where the point has been raised:

„The overtime work which plaintiffs did was not

a matter of reaching the place of work or of personal

26

preparation, but was normal work of the employer of

the kind for which overtime compensation was pro-

vided by the contract of employment. With respect

to this the District Judge found: ‘5. There was an

express oral contract between the defendant and the

plaintiff to pay the plaintiffs for any overtime which

they worked as a part of their duties in the capacity

in which they were employed, and the thirty minutes

before the regular shift and the ten minute period

after the regular shift were made compensable by an

express contract when the plaintiffs were employed as

turn foreman.’

„The District Judge held that upon these facts

the plaintiffs were entitled to recover wages and over-

time for the 40 minutes work done before and after

their regular shifts and that they are not barred of

recovery by reason of section 2 of the Portal-to-

Portal Act, 29 U. S. C. A. No. 252. We think that

this was clearly correct. We are in accord with what

was said by the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Cir-

cuit in Biggs v. Joshua Hendy Corp., 183 F. 2d 515,

520, as follows: Cross-appellants further contend that

work performed by appellants during lunch periods

cannot be the basis for recovery under the Fair La-

bor Standards Act by reason of No. 2 of the Portal-

to-Portal Act, 29 U. S. C. A., No. 252, because such

work is not made compensable by the express provi-

sion of a contract within the meaning of No. 2(a)

(1). That section is directed against claims for com-

pensation for activities, such as dressing for work,

traveling within the plant to the job location, etc.,

which are different from the activities which com-

prise the regular, normal part of the employment.

The section has no application where, as here, the

work for which compensation is being claimed is the

same kind of work as was performed throughout the

remainder of the workweek.’

As was well said by Judge Rifkind in Galvin v.

National Biscuit Co., D. C., 82 F. Supp. 535, 537:

27

‘Neither contract nor custom can open an avenue of

escape from the obligations imposed by the Fair La-

bor Standards Act, 29 U. S. C. A. No. 201 et seq. A

contract may not validly dictate that eight hours

work shall be calculated as seven hours.’ See also

Frank v. Wilson & Co., 7 Cir., 172 F. 2d 712; Joshua

Henry Corp. v. Mills, 9 Cir., 169 F. 2d 898, 900; Smith

v. Cleveland Pneumatic Tool Co., 6 Cir., 173 F. 2d

775; Michigan Window Cleaning Co. v. Martino, 6

Cir., 173 F. 2d 466; Central Missouri Tel. Co. v. Con-

well, 8 Cir., 170 F. 2d 641, 645. As said by Judge

Gardner in the case last cited:

44% In the instant case there is no claim seeking

to recover for time consumed in walking to work or

other activities either before or after the normal

working hours. Here the claim is that these em-

ployees actually worked many hours in excess of the

forty hours permitted by the Fair Labor Standards

Act, not for activities of a Portal-to-Portal nature,

such as were involved in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens

Pottery Company, supra (328 U. S. 680, 66 S. Ct. 1187,

90 L. Ed. 1515), and we agree with the trial court

that it was not the purpose of the Portal Act to de-

stroy such claims.

‘¢ ‘Section 207 of the Fair Labor Standards Act

provides that, No employer shall, except as other-

wise provided in this section, employ any of his em-

ployees who is engaged in commerce or in the pro-

duction of goods for commerce—* * for a work-

week longer than forty hours * * *, unless such em-

ployee receives compensation for his employment in

excess of the hours above specified at a rate not

less than one and one-half times the regular rate at

which he is employed.’ ”’

% We are of the view that this provision of the

Fair Labor Standards Act was neither repealed nor

so modified as to make it necessary to plead, in an

action to recover compensation for time actually de-

voted to the normal work for which the employee was

employed, an express written contract or unwritten

contract, or a practice or custom. Jackson v. North-

west Airlines, D. C. Minn., 76 F. Supp. 121. The

court therefore had jurisdiction of the action and

properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss.’

„There is nothing to the contrary in our decision

in Seese v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 4 Cir., 168 F. 2d 58,

64. That case involved claims for time of changing

clothes and walking to and from the place where work

was carried on, not the doing of work of the em-

ployer of the very sort that the employees were hired

and paid to perform. The holding of the case was

that Congress had not violated the Constitution in

denying recovery for ‘claims of purely statutory

origin, claims given by statute not as compensation

for labor performed but as a means of regulating

wages and hours of work in interstate commerce.’

What we held to be stricken down by the Portal-to-

Portal Act were ‘claims * * * not based on contract,

custom or practice.’ There is nothing said in the

case which would prevent recovery of wages or over-

time compensation for work and labor performed as

here in regular line of duty and under the regular

contract of employment in excess of the hours per-

mitted by the Fair Labor Standards Act.“

This, we think, fully disposes of the claim of Peti-

tioner that there is any conflict between this Eighth Cir-

cuit in this case and the Conwell case and either the Sec-

ond or the Fourth Circuits. Let us turn then to the Ninth

Circuit, in which jurisdiction Petitioner claims there is

such conflict.

There is a fairly recent case from that circuit

which is the latest word on the point in that circuit. This

is the case of Biggs, et al. v. Joshua Hendy Corporation,

183 Fed. 2d 515. It will be observed that this Court of

— —————

29

Appeals of the Ninth Circuit in this last mentioned case

cites, and we think correctly, as the basis for its holding,

two of the opinions of this Court which Petitioner pre-

tends to rely on for some support for its position. These

are the cases of Armour ck Co. v. Wantock, 323 U. S. 126,

and Skidmore v. Swift ck Co., 323 U. S. 134. Following is

the language of the Court in the above mentioned Biggs

case:

„Oross-appellants further contend that work per-

formed by appellants during lunch periods cannot be

the basis for recovery under the Fair Labor Stand-

ards Act by reason of No. 2 of the Portal-to-Portal

Act, 29 U. S. C. A., No. 252, because such work is

not made compensable by the express provision of

a contract within the meaning of No. 2(a) (1). That

section is directed against claims for compensation

for activities, such as dressing for work, traveling

within the plant to the job location, ete., which are

different from the activities which comprise the reg-

ular, normal part of the employment. The section

has no application where, as here, the work for which

compensation is being claimed is the same kind of

work as was performed throughout the remainder of

the workweek.

„Appellee's final contention on cross-appeal is

that there is insufficient evidence to support the

finding of the trial court that appellant Biggs worked

during all of his lunch periods. We think the evidence

sustains the finding. He was on call at all times and

time thus spent was compensable under the Fair La-

bor Standards Act. Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 1944,

323 U. S. 126, 65 S. Ct. 165, 89 L. Ed. 118; Skidmore

v. Swift & Co., 1944, 323 U. S. 134, 65 S. Ct. 161, 89

L. Ed. 124.“

We turn again to some more of the supposed au-

thorities relied upon by Petitioner. Let us examine Bauler

30

v. Pressed Steel Car Co., 182 Fed. 2d 357, from the Sev-

enth Circuit. Here again we must go back to the basic

question of fact. That is the point of this entire pro-

ceeding. Once the facts are determined then the law is

well settled and there is no conflict. The Trial Court and

the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals in the pres-

ent case determined the facts. We do not understand that

it is the desire of this Court nor, in fact, usual recognized

procedure to grant a writ of certiorari merely for the pur-

pose of reviewing and redetermining a question of fact.

Yet that is what Petitioner, in actual effect, is asking this

Court to do in this present procedure.

Here again in this Bauler case as a matter of fact,

the activities involved were portal to portal in nature and

were not, as found and determined in the present case,

the usual and ordinary activities of the regular workday

of the employee concerned. The facts are summarized in

the opinion in the following language:

„The work for which they seek overtime com-

pensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act con-

sisted in marching to and from their respective posts

of duty, in a military manner, changing their attire

from civilian dress to guard uniforms, or from guard

uniforms to civilian dress, cleaning their equipment

and examining the bulletin board.

Boerkoel v. Hayes Manufacturing Company, 76 Fed.

Supp. 771 (D. C. Michigan), is another supposed author-

ity relied upon by Petitioner. This, as stated, is a Dis-

trict Court opinion. It is not clear from the opinion just

what activities were involved. Therefore, the case can be

of no help. But above and beyond that point we call at-

31

tention to a recent opinion of the Court of Appeals of

that Sixth Circuit.

F. W. Stock & Sons, Inc. v. Thompson, 194 Fed. 2d

493, from that Sixth Cireuit decided as late as February

7, 1952, fully and completely supports the position of Re-

spondents in this proceeding. Far from there being any

conflict, the Court of Appeals in this Stock case cites,

approves and follows the above mentioned Conwell case

‘from this Eighth Circuit and the Biggs case, also above

cited and discussed. While the employees in this Stock

case were not guards or firemen but rather engineers, yet

their activities during a so-called lunch period were in-

volved in much the same manner as in the present case.

There again the Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit held

that since during the so-called lunch period and notwith-

standing orders and directives, the employee was, as a

matter of fact, required to continue substantially his reg-

ular duties even while he ate a bit of lunch, it is not

necessary to plead or prove a contract, custom or prac-

tice to treat such periods as compensable working time.

Turning again to the cases cited by Petitioner we

find two State Court opinions, being those of Cobb v.

Aluminum Co. of America, 226 S. W. 2d 110, and Kemp

v. Day & Zimmerman (Iowa), 33 N. W. 2d 569. Neither

of these cases as we read them give due consideration to

the basic question as to the activities involved and whether

or not these activities are those of the normal workday;

that is, the activities which the employee was hired tc

perform. Furthermore, and with all due respect to these

State Courts, we cannot see where these opinions, in any

32

event, enter into the present picture; that is, proceedings

in connection with petition for writ of certiorari.

Next, let us examine Petitioner’s supposed authority,

Jax Beer Co. v. Redfern, 124 Fed. 2d 172. This case was

decided December 10, 1941, or several years before the

Portal to Portal Act was adopted. It could not possibly,

therefore, be any authority on the real issues in the pres-

ent proceeding. Petitioner apparently cites it in the way

of grasping at a straw on the theory that this Court should

review the facts in the present case. It is true that the

Court of Appeals in this last mentioned case found that

the evidence as to material facts was so uncertain as

not to constitute substantial basis for the judgment. That

was a proper point to be examined and determined by

the Court of Appeals. But in the present case, not only

the Trial Court but the Court of Appeals in the majority

opinion has found that the evidence clearly established

the fact that these employees during the so-called lunch

period were engaged in performing the regular and nor-

mal activities of their employment. We do not under-

stand that it is the policy of this Court under the law to

review findings of fact so established.

Love v. United States Rubber Company (D. C. Pa.),

92 Fed. Supp. 174, cited by Petitioner is a two-platoon

system case. We have discussed the situation in these

eases earlier in this brief and will not repeat that dis-

cussion here. There just is nothing in this Love case that

supports Petitioner’s position.

Redwitz v. Ford Motor Co. (D. C. Ky.), 80 Fed. Supp.

265, is another of Petitioner’s supposed authorities that

just isn’t any authority in this proceeding. There again

33

the only point actually presented, argued and decided was

the constitutionality of the Portal to Portal Act. The case

did not in any way involve the basic factual situation that

we have in the present case.

Rokey v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc. (Eighth Circuit),

157 Fed. 2d 734, again is a two-platoon system case. Fur-

thermore, this case was decided before the enactment of

the Portal to Portal Act and could not possibly be of any

help in the present case. Again it is a case from this same

Eighth Circuit and has been properly and fully distin-

guished by the same Court.

Tipton v. Bearl Sprott Co., Inc. (Ninth Circuit), 175

Fed. 2d 432, is another case relied upon by Petitioner.

The opinion does not disclose the nature of the activities

involved. The question in that case was primarily whether

or not the employees were engaged in the production of

goods for commerce so as to come within the provisions

of the Fair Labor Standards Act. There is a finding in

the opinion that the plaintiffs there failed to allege a con-

tract, custom or practice but without any discussion as

to the activities involved. Later in the Biggs case, from

that same Ninth Circuit, hereinabove cited and discussed,

that Court had occasion to consider the precise questions

involved in the present case and adopted and followed

specifically the law as followed by the Court of Appeals

in the present case and every other Court of Appeals

opinion that we have been able to find wherein the present

factual situation existed.

Welsh v. W. J. Dillner Transfer Co. (D. C. Pa.), 91

Fed. Supp. 685, again is a District Court opinion. The

opinion fails to detail the activities involved so it is im-

34

possible to determine whether that court would have held

as it did in a factual situation such as we have in the

present case It is true that the district judge did not

scan to agree with the law as laid down in the above dis-

cussed Conwell case. But every Court of Appeals in

every circuit in the country in which the issue has been

squarely presented has, so far as we can determine, fol-

lowed explicitly the rule of law of this Conwell case.

Let us consider next the case of Williams v. Jackson-

ville Terminal Co., 315 U. S. 386, cited and discussed by

Petitioner beginning on page 48 of their Brief. This case

apparently is cited in support of Petitioner’s contention

that the employees in the present case by continuing to

work thereby entered into some sort of implied contract

to work without pay during this half-hour lunch period.

Surely this Court did not lay down any such rule in this

Williams case. Here again, the factual situation and the

issues involved were entirely different. Let us consider

the facts in the present case for a moment. These present

Plaintiffs and Respondents constituted practically the en-

tire protection force of this vitally important war plant.

They had a choice of continuing work under protest or

going on strike. They did the former and declined to

take the latter action. Remember this was in 1943 and

most of 1944. It was a time when every moment counted.

If these employees had gone on strike this entire plant

would have been closed down right at the height of the

war effort. This war plant could not operate for a mo-

ment without this protection. These employees were

trained ‘specialists. It would not have been possible to

go out and secure other men and women to take their

places without considerable training. We cannot conceive

35

of this or any other court in these circumstances holding

that these or any other employees by remaining patriot-

ically on the job under protest instead of going out on

strike, thereby forfeited their lawful rights. We think

nothing more need be said on this point.

Petitioner cites the Court of Appeals opinion in the

Powell case, that is, United States Cartridge Company v.

Powell, 185 Fed. 2d 67, following the disposition of that

case in this Court in the opinion of this Court appearing

at 339 U. S. 497. It is quite true that the Court of Ap-

peals in that case made passing reference to a thirty-

minute lunch period as being portal to portal in character.

However, this statement was made in connection with the

reference to activities ‘‘before the beginning of the reg-

ular shift.’’ There is nothing in this Powell opinion at

all contrary to the holding of the same Eighth Circuit

Court in the present case when the factual situation is

considered. This same Court of Appeals of the Eighth

Circuit, both in the Conwell case and in the present case,

just like the Court of Appeals in every other circuit where

the point has been under consideration, has expressly

held that when the activities of the employees during any

so-called lunch period are, in fact, substantially those of

the ordinary workday, then these activities are not

portal to portal in character; and that it is not necessary

to either plead or prove a contract, custom or practice of

payment.

Finally on the points being discussed, Petitioner re-

fers in its brief to the cases of Armour d Company v.

Wantock, 323 U. S. 126, and Skidmore v. Swift é Com-

pany, 323 U. S. 134. We certainly find nothing in either

36

of these cases to support Petitioner’s position either in

this proceeding or upon the issues of this case in chief.

On the contrary, both of these cases clearly support Re-

spondents’ position throughout. In the light of these two

cases we can see nothing requiring the attention of this

Court in the present case.

We quote briefly from the Skidmore case as follows:

„Page 136. ‘We have not attempted to, and we

cannot, lay down a legal formula to resolve cases so

varied in their facts as are the many situations in

which employment involves waiting time. Whether in

a concrete case such time falls within or without the

Act is a question of fact to be resolved by appropriate

findings of the trial court. (Emphasis added.)

en general, the answer depends ‘‘upon the de-

gree to which the employee is free to engage in per-

sonal activities during periods of idleness when he is

subject to call and the number of consecutive hours

that the employee is subject to call without being re-

quired to perform active work.“ Hours worked are

not limited to the time spent in active labor but in-

clude time given by the employee to the employer.“

We likewise quote from the above mentioned Wan-

tock case, pages 132 and 133 of the opinion, as follows:

„t is timely again to remind counsel that words

of our opinions are to be read in the light of the facts

of the case under discussion.“

Generally as to the rule applicable, the Court says:

Page 133. ‘Of course an employer, if he chooses,

may hire a man to do nothing or to do nothing but

wait for something to happen. Refraining from other

activity often is a factor of instant readiness to serve,

and idleness plays a part in all employments in a

37

stand-by capacity. Readiness to serve may be hired,

quite as much as service itself, and time spent lying

in wait for threats to the safety of the employer’s

property may be treated by the parties as a benefit

to the employer. Whether time is spent predominantly

for the employer’s benefit or for the employee’s is a

question dependent upon all the circumstances of the

case.

Petitioner in its petition and brief refers to the rule

of De Minimus Non Curat Lex.“ However, Petitioner

cites no authority whatever to support any contention,

if any, of Petitioner on this point. This we think is

purely a matter within the discretion of the trial court

in a case such as the present one. We respectfully di-

rect the attention of the Court to the opinion of the Court

of appeals in this case on this as well as other points in-

volved. We also quote briefly from the opinion in a case

from the Third Circuit where the amounts and general

facts are somewhat similar. This is the case of Landaas,

et al. v. Canister Co., et al., 188 Fed. 2d 768. That Court

in its opinion, page 771, had this to say:

„The employer makes another argument to the

effect that the maxim ‘de minimum non curat lex’

should be applied here. The basis for this argument

is that many of the employees have small claims.

They run from $21.67 to $256.88. But it will be noted

that the period involved to acquire this much of a

claim is three years. The amount accruing for each

day is, therefore, very small. The employer gets en-

couragement from certain words about trivial delays

in the portal-to-portal case discussions.

„We think there is nothing to this point. It has

been said that the maxim de minimus does not apply

to money demands. Kennedy v. Gramling, 1890, 33

38

S. C. 367, 11 S. E. 1081, 1088. In any event, the maxim

is based on common sense and practicalities. The

consideration of plaintiffs’ claims does not take the

court into the realm of the picayune or hypertech-

nical.“

In conclusion, we refer briefly to the specific ‘‘Rea-

sons Relied on For Granting the Writ’? appearing on

page 21 of Petitioner’s petition herein.

1. We have demonstrated above that beyond ques-

tion the Courts of Appeal of the Fourth, Sixth and Ninth

Circuits, as well as other holdings of our own Eighth

Circuit, are in complete harmony with the holding and

rules of law of the Court of Appeals in the present case.

We have further demonstrated that there is in fact no

authority, when the facts are considered, from any other

eircuit holding to the contrary. This is particularly true

as to the Courts of Appeal of all other circuits. There

just is no conflict.

2. No important questions of federal law were de-

cided by the Court of Appeals which have not been or

should be settled by this Court. The general rules have

all been well settled by prior decisions of this Court as

pointed out in the foregoing brief. Furthermore, in view

of the uniform holding of all Courts of Appeal in every

circuit in which the question has been actually presented,

there is clearly nothing remaining requiring the present

attention of this Court in this case.

3. There just are no decisions of this Court which

in any manner conflict with the holding of the Court of

Appeals in this case.

39

4. The holding of the Court of Appeals affirming

the findings of fact of the Trial Court are supported by

substantial evidence; and when this evidence is given full

consideration these findings of fact not only are not er-

roneous but just could not be otherwise. Furthermore,

Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the

many cases decided under this rule dispose of this con-

tention of Petitioner.

5. What is said in the next preceding paragraph ap-

plies equally to Petitioner’s Proposition No. 5.

6. There is nothing in this case calling for the ap-

plication of the rule of ‘‘De Minimus Non Curat Lex’’ and

Petitioner cites no authorities supporting its position on

this point.

We earnestly suggest, therefore, as stated at the out-

set of this brief that there is nothing here calling for re-

view by this Court. The whole matter reverts back to the

basic determination of the questions of fact. The case

was tried to the court without a jury. It was given long

and careful study and consideration. The factual sit-

uation was determined by the Trial Court. This factual

determination was approved by the Court of Appeals.

No substantial reason is advanced by Petitioner as to

why this Court should réview these questions of fact. The

questions of law depend upon this determination of the

question of fact. When we keep in mind this situation we

find that, far from there being any conflict among the

Courts of Appeal of the various circuits or with any de-

cisions of this Court, on the contrary, all applicable

decisions are in complete uniformity.

40

Respondents, therefore, respectfully suggest that the

Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

n= Etre ty

Emmet L. Munrhr,

Attorneys for Respondents.

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1952

0 0 0

No. 326

0 0 0

THE GLENN L. MARTIN NEBRASKA COMPANY,

a Corporation, N

Petitioner

vs.

WRENN L. CULKIN, GLEN WEST, FRANCIS H.

MASKER, and ALEX FEILMEYER, Individually

and as Agents and Representatives to Maintain This

Action for and in Behalf of All Employees Similarly

Situated,

Respondents.

Oo 0 —

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER

— —

J. A. C. Kennepy, Omaha, Nebraska,

Georcz L. DeLacy, Omaha, Nebraska,

Lzo Eisenstatt, Omaha, Nebraska,

Dowatp Lzacu, Columbus, Ohio,

Kennepy, HoxLaxp, DeLacy & Svosopa,

Omaha, Nebraska,

Attorneys for Petitioner.

Law Briefs — OMAHA LINO-SLUG PRINTING CO. — 418 So. 15th St.

INDEX

Central Missouri Telephone Company v. Conwell, 170 F. (24)

. —**ů2 „eee eee es eee 10

Reply to Comments on Facts by Respondents................ ee 20

Angeline EB. Way............... —— „eee 2 1

„ . 22

Conclusion —V—l — 2 -

CASES CITED

Amelbo v. Penn Salt Manufacturing Company (D. C. Penn., 1949),

KK eee 9

Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Company, 328 U. 8. 680.... 10, 11

Battaglia v. General Motors Corporation, 169 Fed. (2d) 254. 9

Central Missouri Telephone Company vs. Conwell, 170 F. (2d)

—B—BP . A caune 8 e 3, 9, 10, 15, 16

Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 325 U. 8. 161 11

Newsom v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 173 F. (24) 856, 860 18

Overnight Motor Transportation Co., Inc., v. Missel, 316 U. 8. 572 10

D. A. Schulte, Inc., v. Gangi, 328 U. 8. 1066. „eee 10

Seese v. Bethlehem Steel Co. (D. C. Md.), 74 F. Supp. 412

Shaivety v. Laks, et al. (D. C. N. Y., 1948), 80 F. Supp. 241..

Welsh v. Dillner Transfer Co. (D. C. Penn., 1950). Commerce

Clearing House Labor Cases, Vol. 18, Sec. 65,896, 91 Fed.

BapR. GBB nccccccccccccccccces „eee ‚· +7*r 2 2 4010

STATUTES AND MISCELLANEOUS

e x.

Ar 6. . . oe eee eee eee e —j[— . 10

Congressional Record, Vol. 93

PAGO % „„ „„ „ „„ „ „„ „„ „ 2—*2 * ——VnX;!' . I

. „„ „„ „„ „6666666 — — 12

PAGO o... „ „ „„ 6 0 —U— . . I

N lj... „„ „„ „„ „ „„ „ „ „„ 4 — 12

CO SSSESSSSSSHSSSSHSSSSSHSSHSSSSHSOHSSSSSSHOHSHSOOOOS

SCSSSSESSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSHSSSSSSOSSSSSHSSSHLOOSOSOSS

SCOSESOSSHSSSSSSSHSSSSSHSSSSSSSSSHSSHSHSSSHSHSOHSOOSS

10

9 9 +Z n eee ee

Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U. 8. C. A, Sec. 251, et seq.:

50 AAA 17

c ccenetineninee 17

Dae 8 (BD. ococccsoscoreseceresascoserccsensecsqenepacnes 17

en eee eee ee ee 3.9, 10, 11

2 255*%˙(ůũ UOC O COC CEP PEPE SESS ESSE

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1952

o———_o—_—o

No. 326

0 0 0

THE GLENN L. MARTIN NEBRASKA COMPANY,

a Corporation,

Petitioner

vs,

‘WRENN L. CULKIN, GLEN WEST, FRANCIS H.

MASKER, and ALEX FEILMEYER, Individually

and as Agents and Representatives to Maintain This

Action for and in Behalf of All Employees Similarly

Situated,

Respondents.

0 —

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER

o—-0— 0

If the Court Please:

In the above entitled case, four employees of The

Glenn L. Martin Nebraska Company sued as agents and

representatives of some 250 employees (207 Guards,

21 firemen, 26 both capacities) to recover overtime for

alleged activities during thirty minute lunch periods al-

lowed by the employer, the Petitioner. The periods in-

2

volved are from March 6, 1943, to September 17, 1944.

Only the lunch periods are involved. The suit was

brought under Section 16 of the Fair Labor Standards

Act. Some twelve employees were produced by the plain-

tiffs as witnesses. They did not testify in detail as to

any particular activities during their own lunch periods

or the time consumed by any alleged activities, but sued

for the whole thirty minute lunch period.

The Petitioner was engaged in the manufacture

of bombing planes during the last war for the U. S. Army,

and had some 13,000 or 14,000 persons employed at its

plant near Omaha, Nebraska. The plant area was some

700 acres. The guards were stationed at definite posts

around the perimeter of the area and within the various

buildings. The guards were in three shifts. The Com-

pany had provided cafeterias which were available to

their employees. The production employees and all em-

ployees other than guards and firemen were allowed an

identical thirty minute lunch period and were allowed to

go to the cafeterias and, of course, were not paid for

their lunch period.

Up until March 6, 1943, the guards and firemen were

on their posts from seven a. m. to three p. m.; three p. m.

to eleven p. m.; eleven p. m. to seven a.m. They were

not allowed to go to the cafeterias, and they were not al-

lowed to leave their posts and they were paid for eight

hours. On March 6, 1943, by special order and bulletin,

it was provided that the first shift of guards should

clock in at 6:45 a. m. They were to be on the

post at seven a. m. They left their post at three p. m.

and clocked out at 3:15 p. m. The schedules for the other

two shifts corresponded.

.

—

3

The Bulletin, and order promulgated by the Bulletin,

provided:

„Guards will not be allowed to eat on their posts.

They will be allowed thirty (30) minutes for lunch.

The Rover in this case when on relief will check the

Guard out and in during the lunch period. The

Guards will be allowed to eat in the Cafeteria dur-

ing the lunch period.“

The Lower Court found (Printed Record, p. 64) that

the employees knew of this order, and knew that they

were not to be paid for the thirty minute lunch period.

The Lower Court found there was no contract to pay

the guards or firemen for this thirty minute lunch pe-

riod,

The Lower Court did not find that there was any cus-

tom or practice to pay for this lunch period within the

meaning of the Portal-to-Portal Act.

The Lower Court, while admitting that there was a

diversity of opinion on the subject, held, and this was

affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, as follows:

„This being so, the court has concluded that Sec-

tion 2 of the Portal Act is inapplicable to this case

and that the plaintiffs are not required to plead and

prove a contract, custom or practice to compensate

them for the hours worked during the lunch period.“

The Court of Appeals held the case fell within the

rule laid down in the Central Missouri Telephone Com-

pany case, 170 Fed. (2d) 641.

As heretofore indicated, this suit was brought by

four plaintiffs. Glen West was one of them. He testified

4

(R., page 143) that after March 6th that the guards were

permitted to go to lunch to the cafeterias, and were per-

mitted thirty minutes. He testified that that order was

posted on a bulletin, and he understood that they were

not to be paid for that thirty minutes. His exact testi-

mony is quoted on page 54 of our original Brief.

These guards, as has been said before, were stationed

at various posts. At some of the posts there were three

or four guards so that they could relieve each other when

it came to the lunch period. Every morning the lunch pe-

riod allowed each guard was posted up. If the guard was

to be relieved by a rover or other guard, that fact was

included in the bulletin.

It is apparent that if there were three or four guards

at a post, one could remain while the others went to

lunch. The guards at some of the posts could leave their

posts without being watched, and could go to the cafe-

teria. Some of the guards who were stationed at posts

a considerable distance from the cafeterias were relieved

by rovers or other employees driving out with jeeps and

they were allowed to drive to the cafeteria. There is no

dispute in the record as to these facts.

The Lower Court in its Finding of Fact, on page 61

of the Printed Record, found: :

„The system was essentially this: Every day the

Company would post a bulletin assigning each guard to

a particular post and assign someone to relieve each

guard for lunch at a certain time. For the purpose

ef clarity a representative bulletin has been set forth

in the margin. An examination of these bulletins

5

shows that in many instances a guard would be di-

rected to relieve himself; in other instances a guard

would be required to relieve others; and in still other

instances, ‘Rovers’ were assigned to relieve guards

for lunch. ‘Rovers’ were guards whose only duty

was to relieve other guards.’’

In Petitioner’s original Brief, commencing on page

54 and running to page 61, there are quotations from the

testimony of the plaintiffs’ witnesses. These quotations

show that after March 6, 1943, the guards were assigned

lunch periods. This assignment was posted up every

morning in a bulletin, the same bulletin indicated by

whom they were to be relieved, and they were allowed to

go to the cafeteria, and they did go to the cafeteria.

The plaintiffs alleged in their original Complaint, as

follows (Printed Record, page 4) :

„that between the dates of March sixth, 1943, and

September sixteenth, 1944, said guards were per-

mitted to leave their posts for a period of thirty min-

utes each day to enable them to walk to the cafeteria

to secure foo.

The undisputed evidence shows that the guards did

not take their food out; they ate their food in the various

cafeterias. The claim made in the Complaint was that the

guards were required while on their way to the cafeteria

and while at the cafeteria to ‘‘guard the property to ascer-

tain if intruders or strangers were on the premises and

were subject to call for any emergency“ (Record, pages

4 and 5).

As to the firemen, it was alleged that during the

same period they were allowed to go to the cafeteria to

secure food, bring the same back to their station and eat.

—

6

It was alleged that they were required to be on the

alert for fire duty and were not relieved for any meal

hour and were required to be on duty as herein de-

scribed“ (Record, page 6). There were only a few firemen

stationed at the firehouse, three or four of them. The

other firemen were out on the crash truck for periods

of time and were on inspection in the various buildings.

These firemen out on inspection went to the cafeterias and

ate their lunch at the cafeterias just as the guards did.

The plaintiffs introduced testimony to the effect that on

occasions very rare indeed the lunch period of a few

guards was interrupted, and that they were called to

the phone.

The evidence shows that the regular duties of the

guards consisted of being stationed at their posts, check-

ing people desiring to come into the plant, checking auto-

mobiles, keeping a certain record of it, and generally act-

ing as guards, watching for sabotage and so forth dur-

ing the war.

The claim was that when they were walking to the

cafeteria, they checked badges, and while in the cafe-

teria they were sometimes called to the phone. No guard

testified to more than three or four such episodes, and

the Lower Court in its Finding of Fact (Printed Record,

pages 62 and 63) found that the instances where a guard

was required to take any affirmative action were not 1 la-

tively great, but the Court held that the fact that the

guards were fully uniformed was a deterrent to lawless-

ness, and was necessarily beneficial to the defendant.

As to the firemen, the Court stated (Printed Record,

page 62) that the instances in which affirmative action was

required were relatively few, saying that it was nonethe-

7

less apparent that the firemen were required to be con-

stantly vigilant.

The Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the nature

of the activities during the lunch period was to a con-

siderable extent a standby capacity (Additional Record,

page 11).

It should be remembered that Section 2, Part II of

the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 uses these words:

„No employer shall be subject to any liability

under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 as

Amended * on account of the failure of such em-

ployer to pay an employee minimum wages, or to

pay an employee overtime compensation, for or on

account of any activity of an employee engaged in

prior to the date of the enactment of this Act, except

an activity which was compensable by either —

„s) an express provision of a written or non-

written contract in effect, at the time of such activity,

between such employee, his agent, or collective-bar-

gaining representative and his employer; or

**(2) A custom or practice in effect, at the time

of such activity, at the establishment or other place

where such employee was employed, covering such

activity, not inconsistent with a written or —

contract, in effect at the time of such activity, be-

tween such employee, his agent, or collective-bar-

ganing representative and his employer.“

The Lower Court and the Court of Appeals came

to the conclusion that this Section 2, above-quoted, did

not apply unless the work involved was in the nature

of preliminary or postliminary work, that is, dressing,

going to and from work, and so forth; that it did not

apply to employees’ regular activities. Part II of the

Portal-to-Portal Act, quoted above, applies to existing

claims, that is, for work done before the passage of the

Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947. The work involved in the

case at bar was from March, 1943, to September, 1944.

The Court will remember that Section 4 of Part III

of the Act has to do with future claims, and has to do

with claims for activities occurring after the enactment

of the Portal-to-Portal Act.

This Section 4 describes the activities which are pre-

liminary or postliminary to the principal activity, but

Section 2 of Part II applies to any activities.

It is the claim of the Petitioner that before there can-

be any recovery in the case at bar for these alleged ac-

tivities during the lunch period, there would have to be

established a contract or a custom to pay for them within

the meaning of the Portal-to-Portal Act. The Peti-

tioner for Certiorari also asserts that there is a di-

versity of holdings on this point in the various circuits.

The Lower Court was of the opinion that there was

such a diversity of opinion, for the Court said in the

opinion on page 674, 97 Fed. Supp.:

4% Counsel for the plaintiff, on the other hand,

strenuously urges that, since the activities engaged

in during the lunch period were part of the day’s

principal activities and not preliminary or postlim-

inary in character, Section 2 of the Portal to Portal

Act does not apply. Though there is some authority

to the contrary in other circuits,** the view adopted

in our own circuit seems to be in accordance with that

suggested by counsel for the plaintiffs.’’

: In the footnote 36, he lists the contra cases as fol-

ows:

Seese v. Bethlehem Steel Co. (D. C. Md), 74 F.

Supp. 412; Welsh v. Dillner Transfer Co. (D. C. Penn.,

1950), reported in Commerce Clearing House Labor

cases, Vol. 18, Sec. 65, 896. Amelbo v. Penn Salt

Manufacturing Company (D. C. Penn., 1949), 83 F.

Supp. 456; Shaivety v. Laks, et al. (D. C. N. V., 1948),

80 F. Supp. 241.

The Court of Appeals in this case concluded :

Section 2 of the Portal Act is inapplicable

to this case and that the plaintiffs are not required

to plead and prove a contract, custom or practice to

compensate them for the hours worked during the

lunch period.“

The opinion of the Court of Appeals is to the effect

that in a suit brought under Section 16 of the Fair Labor

Standards Act to recover for overtime under that Act, the

Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 does not apply unless the ac-

tivities were preliminary or postliminary in character.

The Court held that for the claimed activities during the

lunch period, a recovery could be had under the Fair

Labor Standards Act, and that Section 2 of the Portal-

to-Portal Act did not apply even though the activities

were prior to the passage of the Portal-to-Portal Act in

May, 1947. As we have said before, we believe the weight

of authority in the Country is to the contrary and that

other circuits have held to the contrary. In addition to

the cases cited in the District Court’s opinion in Note

36, we again call attention to the case of Battaglia v.

General Motors Corporation, 169 Fed. (2d) 254, which

certainly is to the contrary (also the other cases cited in

our original brief). ‘This cited case involved activities

during lunch periods and rest periods, As we have said

before, the Court of Appeals and the Lower Court were

of the opinion that the Central Missouri Telephone case,

170 Fed. (2d) 641, was decisive.

10

Central Missouri Telephone Company v. Conwell,

170 F. (2d) 641

Various courts have commented on this Telephone

case. For instance, in the case of Welsh v. W. J. Dillner

Transfer Co., 91 Fed. Supp. 685, the Court said, ‘‘the

plaintiffs have substantial authority for their position,

Central Missouri Telephone Company vs. Conwell, 170

Fed. (2d) 641.“ On the other hand, the weight of author-

ity appears to be that Section 2 of the Portal-to-Portal

Act applies to all claims for overtime,

In our original brief we cited annotations from 3 A.

L. R. (2), p. 1129, and 21 A. L. R. (2), p. 1337. These an-

notations dealt with the question of whether or not Section

2 of Part II of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 was lim-

ited to Portal-to-Portal activities.

We wish to discuss this Conwell case and the back-

ground leading up to question involved.

Congress was well aware of this situation when it

debated the Portal-to-Portal Act. Anderson v. Mt. Clem-

ens Pottery Company, 328 U. S. 680, was merely the pre-

cipitating cause of that legislation, and when Congress de-

clared in Section 1 that the FLSA ‘‘Has been interpreted

judicially in disregard of long-established customs, prac- ,

tices and contracts between employers and employees,

it referred to the entire course of interpretation. In Sec-

tion 10, Congress made liquidated damages no longer

‘ mandatory, and in Section 3, it permitted compromises

under proper safe-guards, undoing the injustices perpe-

trated by Overnight Motor Transportation Co., Inc. v.

Missel, 316 U. S. 572, and D. A, Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi,

328 U. S. 108. In Section 8, Congress provided

that good faith reliance on administrative rulings

and interpretations should constitute a defense to the

—

1¹

employer, contrary to the holding in Jewell Ridge Coal

Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 325 U. S. 161. In Sec-

tion 4, so far as the prospective operation of the FLSA

was concerned, Congress accepted in other respects the

interpretations of the Supreme Court, except as to the

travel time and preliminary and postliminary activities

which were considered ‘‘work’’ in the Tennessee Coal,

Jewell Ridge and Mt. Clemens Pottery cases. In Section

2, however, dealing with existing claims, it carefully

chose language appropriate to wipe the slate clean and

give employers a fresh start in their efforts to comply

with the Act. In Section 5 Congress emphasized this pol-

icy by putting a short period of limitations on existing

claims which could be shown to be founded on contract or

custom.

No one can doubt after reading the debate in the

Senate that Congress knew exactly what it was doing and

intended to bar all existing claims, unless founded on con-

tract or custom, and not merely the portal-to-portal type

of claim. Senator Aiken raised the question even before

Senator Donnell, who had charge of the bill on the floor,

commenced his presentation of the bill itself. He said

(93 Cong. Rec. p. 2098):

There must be a good many times when legiti-

mate suits are brought for back pay. Is the bill go-

ing to outlaw the nuisance suits and still make it per-

missible to bring legitimate suits?’’

Senator Donnell, in reply, admitted that the bill might

result in some injustice, and that a plaintiff who had failed

to collect regular overtime pay due him in the past, would

have to show, in order to collect it through the courts,

‘‘either that he had a contract or that there was a cus-

tomary practice in the plant or other place of work in

12

which he was employed, entitling him to such compensa-

tion.“

In reply to a question by Senator Lodge, whether the

bill did not run to things other than portal-to-portal

matters, Senator Donnell replied that it did (93 Con.

Rec., p. 2113).

The following exchange between Senator Lucas and

Senator Donnell (93 Cong. Rec., p. 2123) is relevant:

„MR. LUCAS. I wish to ask the Senator about

the bill as it had been reported by the committee, and

I have specific reference to section 2 (a) of Part II.

I ask him whether he believes that every conceiv-

able claim based on any activity not compensable by

contract or custom or practice, is wiped out by the

bill. I am now talking about all claims, over and be-

- yond those which are set forth in the portal-to-portal

suits, and I wish to know whether the bill included

such claims,

MR. DONNELLL. The answer, Mr. President,

is that the section to which the Senator from Illinois

has referred destroys every claim * except those

that were compensable by either contract, custom, or

practice, as described in that section.

MR. LUCAS. Then the Senator from Missouri

and I are in agreement as to what this section means.

‘In other words, any and all claims, over and above

and beyond anything that has happened in these

portal-to-portal suits, are also wiped out or outlawed,

so to speak,

If my position is correct in that respect, I wish

to make this further statement for the record: namely,

that the section we are discussing contains no defi-

nition of portal-to-portal claims, and makes no dis-

tindtion between suits based on out-and-out viola-

tions of the Fair Labor Standards Act * and the

portal- to-portal suits.

13

Senator Donnell, explaining the difficulties encountered

in drafting the bill, had this to say (93 Cong. Rec., p.

2132):

„Finally we came to the conclusion * * that in-

stead of — * our bill apply to the 24 hour period,

around the clock, we would make it apply only to the

period preceding the beginning of the normal workday

and subsequent to the end of the normal workday—

what might be termed the whistle-to-whistle period.

So we started to make all activities prior to the be-

ginning of the workday compensable only if so under

a contract or custom, and to make all activities after

the conclusion of the workday compensable only if

so under contract or custom, leaving the broad field

of the workday itself, the great bulk of the time,

with no new legislation applicable to it.

„Then we were confronted by these considera-

tions * * * that if we should not legislate with ref-

erence to the shift period, that is to say, between

whistle and whistle, we would still leave unattained

our object to wipe out the portal-to-portal suits. For

illustration, in connection with lunch time, as I re-

member it, it was alleged in the Mt. Clemens case by

the employees that they were entitled to compensa-

tion from the time they left their work places to the

time they reached the cafeteria, and for the time

spent in returning . If we adopted the plan of

legislating as to existing claims merely with re-

spect to activities before tue beginning of the workday

and after the end of the workday, in all probability

there would still be left pending in the courts a great

mass of suits.

„1 have gone into this subject at great length

because I think it is exceedingly important as show-

ing that Congress, when it legislates to affect the

rights of persons other than those who have engaged

in portal-to-portal activities and to affect rights other

than those accruing from Portal-to-Portal activities,

is not acting capriciously or arbitrarily, but within

ene ee

14

its scund discretion is using what the Congress deems

to be the best practical approach to demolishing the

portal-to-portal cases.

Senator Lucas again raised the point that Section 2 (a)

wiped out ‘‘every conceivable claim based on any activity

not compensable by contract, custom or practice, and

this time Senator Ferguson answered him as follows

(Cong. Rec., p. 2234) :

J answer by saying that it is the intent of the

section referred to to abolish every known claim

that could exist under the Fair Labor Standards Act,

the Walsh-Healy Act, or the Bacon-Davis Act—spe-

cifically under the acts and by virtue of nothing else

than the acts—except claims which may arise under

any express or implied contract * * * I think it was

the intention of the drafters of the legislation to

wipe out everything under those acts that was not

based upon contract or custom or practice. That

was the intention.“

Senator McCarran, launching a bitter attack on the bill,

said (93 Cong. Rep., p. 2244):

Senator McGrath, also opposed, had this to say (93 Cong.

Rec., p. 2248):

= do I say that? Because the committee it-

self admits that under the language of the bill many

— E ñö—j—j—

15

they can press their claims regardless of how right

they may be or how just they may be or how unjust

or cruel the employer. By this bill we give forgive-

ness of the sins of the many employers who have

abused their workers, and we place a premium on

that kind of action at the expense of the vast ma-

jority of American Employers who have been loyal

and fair in dealing with their workers.“

When Central Missouri Telephone Co. v. Conwell, su-

pra, was in the District Court on motion to dismiss, 74 F.

Supp. 542, Judge Duncan had before him the debate in

the Senate and noted that apparently ‘‘it was the in-

tention of the Congress to wipe out every existing claim

except those that had arisen under contract, written or

unwritten, express or implied, or pursuant to custom or

practice. The he seized upon the term implied con-

tract, used by Senator Ferguson in replying to Senator

Lucas but not found in the Act, and proceeded to imply

a contract from the fact that the plaintiffs had worked

many hours of overtime without being paid in accordance

with the FLSA. He argued in support of this implied

contract only that an arrangement under which overtime

work was performed without payment was illegal and

not binding on the employee. Even Judge Duncan’s sense

of logic balked at stating the naked syllogism. Major

premise: a contract for overtime work without payment

is illegal. Minor premise: the parties are not bound by an

illegal contract. Conclusion: Therefore a contract to

pay for overtime work is implied.

The court made short work of the same argument in

Newsom v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 173 F. (2d)

856, 860. There a written contract provided that ‘‘time

and one-half or double time will be paid when required

by law or Government regulation,’’ thus incorporating the

16

FLSA by express reference, and not merely by implica-

tion. As the Court pointed out, however, one purpose of

the Portal-to-Portal Act was to repeal the Supreme

Court’s interpretation of the FLSA as to what activities

constituted ‘‘work.’’ To read the FLSA into the con-

tract between the parties, including the Supreme Court’s

interpretation of that Act, would nullify both the pur-

pose and the provisions of the Portal-to-Portal Act.’’

It is obvious, of course, that Judge Duncan’s device of

implying a contract to pay for overtime work in accord-

ance with the FLSA, carried to its logical conclusion,

would absolutely nullify the Portal-to-Portal Act in every

case,

When Central Missouri Telephone Co. v. Conwell

reached the Court of Appeals, 170 F. (2d) 641, the judges

of that court agreed with Judge Duncan, and cited in

support of his conclusion an interpretative bulletin of the

Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the De-

partment of Labor and the remarks of President Truman

on the occasion of signing the Portal-to-Portal Act. The

Administrator quoted the sponsors of the Act as saying

that it protects the legitimate claims, and therefore

concluded that Congress did not intend to change the

general rule that the remedial provisions of the Fair

Labor Standards Act should be liberally construed and

exemptions therefrom narrowly construed. The Presi-

dent said that he was ‘‘confident that the purpose of the

main provisions of the Act is to eliminate the immense po-

tential liabilities which have arisen as a result of the

‘portal - to- portal’ claims, and that it was not the

purpose of the Act to permit violation of our funda-

mental wage and hour standards or to allow a lowering

of those standards.

17

It is undisputed that in the case at bar, whatever

activity or requirement of availability there may have

been during the lunch periods involved, the claimants

did not expect to be paid for their lunch periods. They

knew that the lunch periods were not to be paid for.

In Section 1 (a) (4) of the Portal-to-Portal Act, Con-

gress found that one of the evils of the FLSA, as in-

terpreted by the Supreme Court, was that ‘‘employees

would receive windfall payments, including liquidated

damages, of sums for activities performed by them with-

out any expectation of reward beyond that included in

their agreed rates of pay,’’ and in Section 1 (a) (5) Con-

gress found that if the FLSA were permitted to stand as

interpreted, it would promote ‘‘increasing demands for

payment to employees for engaging in activities no com-

pensation for which had been contemplated by either the

employer or employee at the time they were engaged in.“

These and other evils were found to burden and obstruct

commerce, and in Section 1 (b) Congress declared its

policy ‘‘to relieve and protect commerce from practices

which burden and obstruct it * * “.“

The Court will remember that Section 2 of the Portal-

to-Portal Act provides that there should be no liability

for “an activity engaged in prior to the date of the

enactment of the Act, except activities compensable by

either (1) an express provision of a written or non-writ-

ten contract, in effect at the time of such activity between

such employee, his agent, or collective bargaining repre-

sentative and his employer.“

In the case at bar the Lower Court found that:

„The Company stopped paying for activities en-

gaged in during the lunch period and the employees .

18

continued to work with the knowledge that they were

not being paid for this time.’’ (Printed Record, page

64.)

One of the plaintiffs, Glen E. West, testified as fol-

lows:

„. After March 6, 1943, you were permitted to go

to lunch at the Cafeteria and permitted thirty

minutes? A. That was right.

Q. That was posted as a bulletin? A. Yes.

Q. Of course, you weren’t to be paid for that thirty

minutes, you understand that?

A. That is right.“ (Printed Record, page 143.)

In addition, Respondents in their brief herein in re-

ferring to the testimony of Alex Feilmeyer (page 15 of

Respondent’s brief) say:

The men through an organization were making

complaints about the fact that our pay was not being

based on eight and one-half hours. I never did agree

with Martin or any one else that I was entitled to

only eight hours pay for that period of time.“

Again in the brief it is stated that complaints were

made by the employees about not receiving pay for the

thirty minute lunch period, and that these complaints con-

tinued until September, 1944, when a different arrange-

ment was made.

It is apparent that in this case there was not any con-

tract, express or implied, to pay the men for the lunch

period. As a matter of fact, they understood they were

not being paid for the lunch period and claimed that

through their organizations they objected.

— *

The record discloses that in September, 1944, the

following Bulletin was posted, being Exhibit 38, Printed

Record, pages 120 and 121:

To All Guards and Firemen from L. H. Krumm,

Guards Eating Lunch on their Post. Effective with the

second shift September 17, 1944, it will be required

that all men eat their lunch on their post of duty,

and not go to the cafeteria to eat lunch. No deduc-

— shall be made thereafter for the usual lunch pe-

riod.

19

L. H. Krumm.“

During the period involved from March 6, 1943, until

September 17, 1944, there was a directive to the timekeep-

ing department which read at follows:

„All guards will be allowed thirty minutes lunch

period, the lunch period is to be deducted from the

time shown on the time card.

„This will mean that all guards will have eight

and one-half hours shown on their time cards, but

will be credited with eight hours only.’

Again the Court in his Findings of Fact found as fol-

lows (see Printed Record, page 64):

The plaintiffs have alleged that the activities

engaged in during the lunch period were compensable

throughout the period in question ‘under the general

non-written contract in eftect between defendant and

each of said employees.’ The evidence, however,

does not support this allegation; ‘consequently, the

court is unable to find that the activities were com-

pensable by contract.

Your Petitioner again submits to the Court that both

the Lower Court and the Court of Appeals erred in com-

ing to the conclusion that Section 2 of the Portal- to-

Portal Act did not apply.

EE RR — ES

20

In Respondents’ Brief appears the following lan-

guage:

„It is conceivable that a situation might arise

in which the activities involved were not exactly

portal to portal in character and yet were not the

normal activities of the regular workday. In such a

situation perhaps it is necessary under Section 2 of

the Portal to Portal Act to clearly and specifically

plead and prove such contract, custom or practice,

but that is not the situation here.“

The Court’s findings as herein set out indicate the

regular activities of the guards. The claimed and al-

leged activities during the lunch period are certainly dif-

ferent from the regular activities as found by the

Court. We, therefore, submit that under any view of

the case, the plaintiffs were required to prove either a

contract or a custom as required by Section 2 of the

Portal-to-Portal Act.

REPLY TO COMMENTS ON FACTS BY

RESPONDENTS

We do not believe that the comments as to the facts

made in Respondents’ Brief are accurate. In the Lower

Court’s Opinion as hereinbefore quoted, he set forth on

page 61 of the Printed Record the practice in re the thirty

minute lunch periods, On page 11 of Respondents’ Brief

it is said:

When any witnesses in answer to questions upon

cross examination made any statement to the effect

that they could have a half hour lunch period, etc.,

they were referring to the specific paper directive.

The record does not at all support this statement. For

instance, one of the plaintiffs, Alex Feilmeyer, on page

131 of the record testified as follows:

— —

„„. When you did go to a cafeteria to eat, did you

have full half hour at any time? (This was a

question propounded by Mr. Murphy, Counsel

for the plaintiff)

A. If you weren’t called away, yes you would have

your half hour.’’

This witness also testified as follows:

Then after this March 6, 1943, you were per-

mitted to go to the cafeteria? A. Les.

Q. And you would go, of course, to the Cafeteria

that was nearest you at Modification? A. Yes.’’

Again he testified:

„. When it came to lunch, you were again relieved

by a Rover and went to the cafeteria? A. Les.

Q. And you were allowed thirty minutes for this

lunch? (Record, pages 132, 133 and 134).

A. Zea.”

Angeline E. Way

She was called as a witness by the plaintiff and tes-

tified :

460. You knew after you came to work you were en-

titled to thirty minutes to go to lunch to a

cafeteria? A. That is right.

see

Q. If you wanted to you could sit in the Cafeteria

the whole thirty minutes?

That is right, if you weren’t called.

Q. During all the time you were employed there,

you were called out of the lunch period twice?

A. That is right.“ (Record, pages 146, 147.)

William A. Keefer

He was called as a witness for the plaintiff and tes-

tified :

„A. Yes, I think after March 6, 1943, we were per-

mitted to be relieved by a Rover and to eat in

the Cafeteria, (Record, page 124.)

Q. Do you remember when you were a guard of

ever being called when you were at lunch in the

Cafeteria? A. Called away from the cafeteria?

Q. Yes.

A. No, I can’t remember of any instance.“ (Record,

pages 127, 128.) a

The record discloses that these guards and firemen

during their shift period were allowed two rest periods

of ten minutes. These rest periods were not deducted from

their time (Record, page 126).

Mr. Murphy in the trial of the case was attempting

to prove that while they were at lunch the claimants were

interrupted at times, and called away. But as said be-

fore, during the eighteen months involved no one of them

was called away more than two or three times. Surely

the activity of the guard seated at lunch and eating his

lunch in a cafeteria, provided by his employer, is dif-

ferent in character from the guard’s activities when he

is at his post checking automobiles and persons in and out

of the plant, checking railroad cars, and generally doing

other guard duties. The Lower Court and the Circuit

Court of Appeals attempted to avoid the consequences

of the Portal-to-Portal Act by asserting that the guards

were doing their regular work because of the fact that

while eating their lunch in the cafeteria they had their

complete uniforms on. The plaintiffs tried to prove that

23

they had some duties as to checking badges while on

their way to the cafeteria or entering the cafeteria, but

this faded away and there was a lack of evidence to es-

tablish any such activities. One of the witnesses testi-

fied that on one occasion he checked a badge. The truth

is, and the record without dispute establishes it, that

after March 6, 1943, and until September 16, 1944, the

guards could go to the cafeteria for their lunch, were re-

lieved so that they could do so, and those who were sta-

tioned at distant posts were transported to the cafeteria.

They availed themselves of this period. There was no

contract or custom to pay them for this thirty minute

period. The record discloses an attempt on the part of

some twelve claimants to try to establish that the guards

or firemen performed some activities during this thirty

minute lunch period. However, the attempts were so

feeble that on cross-examination it was established that

only on the very rarest occasions while the guards were

at lunch was their lunch interfered with. This also is

true as to the firemen. For the information of the Court

we advise that there were 207 claimants who were guards

and 21 who were firemen, and 26 who served in both ca-

pacities,

On page 247 of the Printed Record the Court took

over the examination of a witness by the name of Al Wolf.

The following questions were asked by the Court, also the

answers of the witness:

„e. Likewise it is true that this order of March 6,

1943, the guards had thirty minutes in which to

eat their lunches, it was made available to them

and they could go to the cafeteria and if they

were disturbed they took it at another time if

they cared to? A. Yes.

Q. And there isn’t any doubt about that? A. No, sir.”

_ ee

24

We call attention of the Court to the Printed Record

commencing on page 183. This is a photostatic copy

of the Daily Report made by the Production Depart-

ment (pages 183 to 201) covering the guards. The Fire

Department report appears on pages 202, 203, 204, and

on page 208 appears the assignment of the firemen to

their various duties. On page 185 of the Printed Record

appears a copy of the bulletin showing the assignment

of the various guards to their various posts and lunch

reliefs and by whom they were to be relieved,

It appears that in September, 1944, the entire plant

voted to go on a two shift schedule of nine hours each, in-

stead of the three shift schedule so that the welders and

other workers might have a little more take home pay

(Record, pages 165-166). The evidence is that in order

to give the guards and firemen some additional take home

pay, it was agreed effective September 16, 1944, that they

would again eat their lunch on their post and not go to

the cafeteria and for this period they would be paid and

they would be paid for eight and one-half hours (Record,

pages 166, 167). Again the approval of the Air Corps

was obtained for this change. The letter approving the

change appeared on page 176 of the printed Record. The

pertinent part of the letter is as follows (Record, page

167):

„J. Consideration has been given to the pro-

posal contained in referenced letter regarding the

contractor’s desire to allow plant protection guards

to eat their lunch at their posts during their tour of

duty in order to eliminate the necessity for relief

guards to replace such personnel while on a regu-

larly scheduled lunch period.

442. The undersigned approves the above men-

tioned procedure with the provision that the guards

. eee

%

will not be allowed to leave their posts to eat lunch

at any of the eating facilities in operation at the

premises, that they be required to have lunch at

their regular station of duty. This procedure to be-

come effective on and after 17 September, 1944.

For the A. A. F. Representative: J. T. Rey-

monds, Ist Lt., Air Corps Contracting Officer.“

„The testimony of Mr. Robert L. Evans, who

was the personnel director of the defendant, is that

he took up the matter with the unions representing

the guards and firemen and made this change so that

the guards and firemen could likewise have some in-

crease in take-home pay to correspond with current

increases available to all the other employees.’’ (Rec-

ord, page 166.)

As to the duty of the guards the Lower Court in its

Finding of Fact held (see page 60 of the Printed Record) :

The primary function of a guard, irrespective

of his particular station at the plant, involved con-

stant vigilance for the security of the defendant's

property. Each guard, however, had certain specific

duties, routine in character, which were, in a sense

at least, related to the individual post, e. g. the guards

at the main gate were required to examine the creden-

tials of all persons seeking admittance to the plant;

the guard at the water tower was required to take a

water reading every twenty minutes; and the guard

on freight inspection duty was required to check in-

coming carloads of freight.“

The Court likewise in its Finding of Fact held:

„when the guards were relieved for lunch they could

go either to the nearest cafeteria or to the smoking

area. (Printed Record, page 62.)

As has been said before, the Lower Court held there

was no contract to pay either the guards or firemen for

their lunch period. This appears on page 64 of the

Printed Record. The Lower Court likewise found the fol-

lowing fact:

„the Company stopped paying for activities engaged

in during the lunch period and the employees con-

tinued to work with the knowledge that they were not

being paid for this time. (page 64.)

Your Petitioner again asserts that the Lower Court’s

findings that the claimants were performing their or-

dinary work during the lunch period was clearly erron-

eous within the meaning of Rule 52 of the Federal Rules

of Procedure.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth in this Brief and the rea-

sons set forth in our original Brief, Petitioner respect-

fully prays for a Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Ap-

peals for the Eighth Circuit to review the decision of

that Court in the above entitled case.

Respectfully submitted

J. A. C. Kor,

ron L. DxLaor,

Leo Eisaxsrarr,

Omaha, Nebraska,

Doxalo Laacn,

Columbus, Ohio,

Attorneys for Petitioner.

eam

Office - Supreme Court, U

FT T., E D

952

ue ere —

—

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1952

o- 0——o

No. 326

THE GLENN L. MARTIN NEBRASKA COMPANY,

a Corporation,

Petitioner,

vs.

WREN L. CULKIN, GLEN WEST, FRANCIS H. MAS.

KER, and ALEX FEILMEYER, Individually and

as Agents and Representatives to Maintain This

Action for and in Behalf of All Employees Sim-

ilarly Situated,

Respondents.

o———_o——-o

PETITION FOR REHEARING

o——0—""——-0

Attorneys for Petitioner.

— —

- LINO-SLUG PRINTING CO. — 418 Bo. 15th a,

INDEX

Page

66 — — 2 1

7 d—— 33344 6 3

— 4

Cases Cited

Amelbo v. Penn Salt Manufacturing Company (D. C. Penn., 1949),

Ea ae 3

Central Missouri Telephone Company vs. Conwell, 170 Fed. (2d)

it Soin . A 2,3

Seese v. Bethlehem Steel Co. (D. C. Md.), 74 F. Supp. 412 8 3

Shaivety v. Laks, et al. (D. C. N. v. 1948), 80 F. Supp. 241. 3

Welsh v. Diliner Transfer Co. (D. C. Penn, 1950), Commerce

Clearing House Labor Cases, Vol. 18, Sec. 65,896 bees 3

Statutes and Miscellaneous

Pair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U. 8. C., Sec. 201, et seq.:

— ä be 2

Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U. 8. C. A, Sec. 251, et seq.:

% — ͤ WW 2. 3. 4

WWW

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1952

— —

THE GLENN L. MARTIN NEBRASKA COMPANY,

a Corporation,

Petitioner,

vs.

WREN L. CULKIN, GLEN WEST, FRANCIS H. MAS-

KER, and ALEX FEILMEYER, Individually and

as Agents and Representatives to Maintain This

Action for and in Behalf of All Employees Sim-

ilarly Situated,

Respondents.

o———_0——_—_0

PETITION FOR REHEARING

oo —

Your Petitioner, The Glenn L. Martin Nebraska Com-

pany, a corporation, prays for a rehearing of the order

of this Court dated October 27, 1952, denying its Peti-

tion for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court

of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

BASIC FACTS

This is an action brought by four employees of The

Glenn L. Martin Nebraska Company, as agents and rep-

sentatives of 207 guards and 21 firemen and 26 others

2

who had served in both capacities to recover overtime

and liquidated damages under Section 16 of the Fair Labor

Standards Act. There were some 13,000 or 14,000 em-

ployees at this plant where bombers were made during

the last war. The date involved is from March 16, 1943,

to September 16, 1944. The claim is for payment for a

thirty minute lunch period which was allowed to the

guards under an order and bulletin dated March 6, 1943,

which provided that after that date the guards would

have a thirty minute lunch period, would have their lunch

at the cafeterias, and would be relieved where relief was

necessary. There is no dispute but that the guards were

allowed this thirty minute lunch period; that some of

them were transported to the cafeterias. The claim was

made that during the lunch period, they wore their uni-

forms and that they acted in a Standby capacity.

The defense raised was that under Section 2 of the

Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, there was no contract or

custom as required by the Portal-to-Portal Act.

The Lower Court, as a Finding of Fact, found that

there was no contract; found that the guards and fire-

men knew that they were not being paid for the thirty

minute lunch period. The Court did not find that there

was any custom, but the Court found that there was no

need to plead a contract or custom under the Portal-to-

Portal Act of 1947, this because the Lower Court found

that the activities performed during the lunch period

were not preliminary or postliminary.

The Court relied upon the case of Central Missouri

Telephone Company vs. Conwell, 170 Fed. (2d) 641.

ARGUMENT

Petitioner assigns the following reason for granting

this Petition—

There is a conflict in the decisions of the various

circuits, as to whether or not it is necessary to plead and

prove a contract or custom to pay in accordance with

Section 2 of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947. That

there was such a conflict was found by the Lower Court,

the Lower Court saying in its opinion—

Counsel for the plaintiff, on the other

hand, strenuously urges that, since the activities en-

gaged in during the lunch period were part of the

day’s principal activities and not preliminary or

posliminary in character, Section 2 of the Portal

to Portal Act does not apply. Though there is some

authority to the contrary in other circuits,** the view

adopted in our own circuit seems to be in accordance

with that suggested by counsel for the plaintiffs. ’’

In the footnote 36, he lists the contra cases as fol-

lows:

“‘Seese v. Bethlehem Steel Co. (D. C. Md.), 74 F. Supp.

412; Welsh v. Dillner Transfer Co. (B. C. Penn.,

1950), reported in Commerce Clearing House Labor

cases, Vol. 18, Sec. 65,896. Amelbo v. Penn Salt Man-

ufacturing Company (D. C. Penn., 1949), 83 F. Supp.

456; Shaivety v. Laks, et al. (D. C. N. Y., 1948), 80

F. Supp. 241.”

Your Petitioner prepared a Reply Brief in answer

to Respondents’ Brief in Opposition to a Petition for

Writ of Certiorari. This Brief set forth the comments of

the Lower Court to the effect that there was a diversity of

holding and contained a complete analysis of the Central

Missouri Telephone Company v. Conwell case, supra,

— — Ä

4

and contained quotations from the Congressional Record,

showing the debate which was carried on in the United

States Senate relative to the meaning of Section 2 of

the Portal-to-Portal Act, which debate is set forth in

your Petitioner’s Reply Brief; that said Reply Brief was

prepared in accordance with the rules of this Court, was

served upon counsel for the Respondents, and was for-

warded to this Court for filing. However, because of

the delay in transportation, this Reply Brief arrived in

Washington and in the Clerk’s office on October 28th,

1952, the day after the order of this Court denying cer-

tiorari.

We believe that a reading of this Reply Brief would

have convinced the Court that both the Lower Court and

the Court of Appeals’ were wrong in their construction of

Section 2 of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, and were

wrong in holding that said Act was not applicable to the

case at bar.

We believe likewise that a reading of said Reply

Brief would convince the Court that there was actually

a diversity of holdings on the point involved as between

the various circuits, and that the Lower Court was like-

wise of the opinion that there was such a diversity.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reason, Petitioner respectfully

prays that the order of the Court denying its Petition

for a Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the

Eighth Circuit be re-heard and vacated, and that the Pe-

tition be granted, and your Petitioner prays that the said

Reply Brief received by the Clerk of the Supreme Court

of the United States on the 28th day of October, 1952, be

considered by the Court and that it be filed in the office

of the Clerk of the Court.

The undersigned, G. L. DeLacy, attorney for the Pe-

titioner, hereby certifies that the Petition for Rehearing

filed in this cause is presented in good faith, that in his

judgment said Petition is restricted to the grounds speci-

fied in paragraph 2 of Rule 33 as amended, and that said

Petition for 1 for dela

3 G L. DaLacy, 7

Atto for Petitioner.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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