Brief for the Respondent in Opposition — Frad v. Columbian National Life Insurance

Supreme Court brief1952

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Supreme Court of the United States

Exia Fran,

Plaintiff-Petitioner,

against

Tue CoLuMBIAN Nationa. Lire InsurANCE

Company,

Defendant-Respondent,

a

against

Eta Frap, as Executrix under the Last

Will and Testament of William D. Frad,

deceased,

Third Party Sage

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Respondent respectfully submits that the case at bar is

unique in its facts; the ruling of the Court of Appeals is

narrow in its application; there is nothing to warrant

special attention by this Court; and finally, the point has

been reached, at long last, when this litigation should be

permitted to come to an end.

The Facts.

The evidence produced at the trial showed that in 1928

and 1929, defendant issued to William D. Frad, three

policies of life insurance which provided, all together, for

the payment of $20,000 to Ella Frad, his wife, upon his

death; and for the waiver of premiums and payment of

$200 a month in the event of his total and permanent

ey aan BESS

2

disability (Pltf’s Exs. 5, 6 and 7; admitted p. 163, printed

p. 262-5). In his application for each of these policies,

Frad represented that he was a clothing salesman.

In November 1935, Frad made claim for disability bene-

fits, asserting that he was totally and permanently dis-

abled by a heart condition (ff. 820-825). Investigation of

this claim then revealed that Frad was not a clothing

salesman but an international cardsharp who had spent

the past two years in the Federal Penitentiary for having

obtained and used false United States passports in the

name of ‘‘Frederick Warren Gorham,’’ and a false Cana-

dian passport in the name of ‘‘Daniel Edward Swift”’

(ff. 1159-1160; 1439-1440).

Although defendant would, no doubt, have refused to

issue the policies had it known that Frad was a cardsharp,

the policies had become incontestable and therefore on the

advice of its examining physician that the insured had a

serious heart condition (f. 852), defendant approved the

claim (f. 830), waived premiums, and paid disability bene-

fits from January 1936 through July 1937 (Deft’s Ex. II;

admitted p. 207, printed p. 397).

When defendant then learned that Frad had taken more

than $30,000 from a man named Richter on the SS Santa

Rosa in October 1936, and had probably participated in

still another card game (ff. 1058, 1347-1350), it refused to

pay further disability benefits (ff. 97-100). Thereupon

Frad brought suit in the City Court of the City of New

York to compel defendant to continue the disability pay-

ments, but, before the action could be brought on for trial,

he was returned to the Federal Penitentiary where he re-

mained until the spring of 1939 (ff. 1056-1058; 1439-1440;

1451, 659 and 662). Upon his release, his action was

brought on for trial in the City Court and settled by the

payment of $4,696.55 in compromise of accrued benefits

of some $6,000 (ff. 809-812); and defendant thereupon re-

3

opened the claim, waived premiums, and paid es

benefits until April 1940 (f. 1191).

Upon receipt of information that Frad had again en-

gaged in card games for money, defendant, for the second

time, terminated its payments (ff. 115-117, 1351-1353), and

Frad once more brought suit to compel defendant to con-

tinue the payments. This time the Municipal Court of

the City of New York was the forum and defendant not

only denied its liability to pay further benefits but asserted

a counterclaim for the recovery of the benefits which it had

already paid (ff. 756-764).

An intensive and singularly successful investigation was

then undertaken by defendant which yielded an impressive

amount of evidence concerning the activities in which Frad

had been engaged while collecting disability benefits and

enjoying a waiver of premium (ff. 632-637). This evidence,

which has been collated in defendant’s exhibits GG-1 and

GG-2 (admitted p. 205, printed pp. 393-4), indicated that

from 1929 to 1942, Frad’s constant occupation when not

under Federal detention had been to cheat at cards for high

stakes. Although the pattern of his operations was always

the same, he underwent several changes of identity in the

process, and with each change associated himself with a

new set of companions.

From May 1929 to June 1931, travelling under a false

United States passport, he worked the North Atlantie as

‘Frederick Warren Gorham”’ of the Gorham Silver Com-

pany. His companions were Messrs. Davis, Mull and

Schwartz (Deft’s Exs. GG-1). Colonel John C. Minor, who

lost $19,090.80 at ‘old fashioned bridge’? on board the SS

Paris in June 1929, was one of the victims of this period

(ff. 509-534), which was brought to an end by Frad’s first

indictment for passport fsauds on June 16, 1931 (f. 1438).

From June 1932, to November 1933, travelling under a

false Canadian passport, Frad continued to work the North

Atlantic, but now he was ‘* Daniel Edward Swift’’, a Cana-

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dian meat packer (f. 1160), and his companions were

Messrs. Asheroft, Buttolph and Bowen (Deft’s Ex. GG-1).

This period was brought to an end in February 1934, by

his second indictment (f. 1439), arrest and conviction (ff.

659-660).

For a few months in 1936 after his release from the

Federal Penitentiary, Frad sailed under his own name with

several of his old companions on vessels cruising to the

Caribbean and to California (Deft’s Ex. GG-2). This

gave him an opportunity to take nearly $32,000 from

Francis G. Landon on the SS Rotterdam in August 1936

(ff. 1201-1203), and to ‘‘win’’ $36,000 (later compromised

at $18,000) from Paul K. Richter on the SS Santa Rosa in

October 1936 (ff. 686-687, 1056-1058). This brief inter-

lude under his own name was terminated when the insured

was arraigned and remanded for violation of his parole in

November 1936 (f. 660), but this did not put an end to his

depredations for he sued out a writ of habeas corpus which

was sustained and then, while the case was taken first to

the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

(Kelly, Marshall v. United States ex rel Frad, 89 F. 2d,

865), and then to this Court (F'rad v. Kelly, 302 U.S. 312),

he resumed his activities as ‘‘Daniel Fulton’’, millionaire

operator from Oklahoma. ‘‘Fulton’’ was even more success-

ful than ‘‘Gorham’’ and ‘‘Swift’’ had been in taking sub-

stantial sums of money from elderly gentlemen at crooked

ecards. With the assistance of Messrs. Hudson and Daly

(Deft’s Ex. GG-2), ‘*Fulton’’ took $13,300 from William T.

Dowling on board the SS Columbus in April 1937 (ff. 1204-

1217); $96,000 from George A. Ball on board the SS

Reliance in June 1937 (Deft’s Ex. GG-2; ff. 682, 1440);

$47,000 from Alexander Glass in September 1947 (Deft’s

Ex. GG-2; ff. 683-684) ; and $6,217 from Professor Charles

Cheney Hyde on board the SS Columbus in October 1937

(Deft’s Ex. GG-2; f. 1218). This very lucrative’ period

came to an end in November 1937 when this Court sus-

4)

tained the order of the Court of Appeals and ‘‘Fulton”’

returned to the Federal penitentiary to serve the balance

of Frad’s sentence (Frad v. Kelly, supra).

Released again in the spring of 1939 (f. 661), Frad

immediately picked up where he had left off and, once more

using the name of ‘‘Daniel Fulton’’, renewed his Caribbean

cruises (Deft’s Ex. GG-2). It was on one of these cruises,

on the SS Nreww Amsterdam in February 1940, that he

took notes for $3,200 from C. Stowe Spencer (ff. 1263-

1286), and for $3,125 from George A. Wedge (ff. 1240-

1262). A few months earlier, in November 1939, assisted

by Messrs. Raphael, Daly and Darnell, he had taken

$15,925 from Frederick R. Sears at the Ambassador Hotel

in New York (ff. 1287-1310) ; and in the following autumn,

again with Darnell’s assistance, he took some $15,000 from

Eugene S. Halle at the Hotel Claridge in Atlantie City

(ff. 1311-1343). How Frad fared thereafter the record

does not reveal, except that he experienced at least one

final change of name when he became ‘‘*Thomas F. Hunt’’

who frequented fashionable hotels along the Atlantic sea-

board (Deft’s Ex. GG-2).

When all of this information had come into its posses-

sion in the late summer and early fall of 1942 (ff. 632 and

638), defendant amended its answer in the Municipal Court

action so as to plead, as an equitable defense, that the

policies had lapsed for non-payment of the premiums which

had been erroneously waived in reliance upon the in-

sured’s representation that he was totally disabled (ff.

1418-1422), but at the trial of the Municipal Court action,

this defense was struck out upon the ground that the Court

lacked jurisdiction to entertain an equitable defense (ff.

625-626). Accordingly, the questions put to the jury were

(1) whether the insured was disabled in April, May and

June 1940, so as to be entitled to $600 in disability bene-

fits, and (2) whether he had collected benefits for earlier

periods when he was not entitled to them so as to be

Sees Sa Say

6

liable on defendant’s counterclaim for their recovery. The

jury answered each of these questions in the negative but,

on appeal, the judgment was vacated, in so far as it dis-

missed defendant’s counterclaim, and the counterclaim was

remanded for retrial (rad v. Columbian, New York Law

Journal, Vol. 109, 4/22/48, page 1562; Frad v. Columbian,

New York Law Journal, Vol. 109, 6/17/48, page 2368).

Instead of being re-tried, however, the counterclaim was

discontinued (Frad v. Columbian, New York Law Journal,

Vol. 111, 2/18/44, page 658), and reasserted in the action

at bar.

This concludes the story of the issuance of the policies

to the supposed clothing salesman in 1928 and 1929; the

payment of disability benefits and the waiver of premiums

for long periods of time when, unknown to the Company,

he was engaged under various aliases and with various

confederates in making thousands upon thousands of dol-

lars at his usual and chosen occupation; the settlement of

the City Court action for want of evidence to defend it;

and, finally, the defeat of the Municipal Court action by

the overwhelming evidence which was eventually marshalled

against him.

A general knowledge of these events is essential to

an understanding of the facts leading up to the surrender

of the policies and the institution of the present litigation.

In January 1941, Frad applied to the Colonial Trust

Company for a loan to be secured by the policies. The

Municipal Court action was pending at that time but no

claim had then been made that the policies had lapsed for

non-payment of premiums erroneously waived, for the de-

fendant had not then uncovered the evidence of Frad’s

activities which has been described above. Accordingly,

when the Trust Company made inquiry of defendant con-

cerning the status of the policies, it was informed that each

policy was in force with no premiums in arrears and no

loans outstanding, and that the loan and cash surrender

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7

values exceeded the loan sought by the insured (ff. 118-131).

Upon receipt of this information, the Trust Company

loaned Frad $4,000 (subsequently increased to $6,300)

on the security of the policies (ff. 174-176). The form of

collateral assignment which was used for this purpose gave

the Trust Company the sole right to surrender the policies

and receive the cash values at any time. It also gave the

Trust Company the sole right to obtain loans on the policies.

Further, it authorized the insurer to recognize the as-

signee’s claim to rights under the assignment without in-

vestigating the reason for any action taken by the assignee.

In this same connection, it provided that the sole signature

of the assignee would suffice for the exercise of any rights

under the policies, that the sole receipt of the assignee of

any sums received should be a full discharge and release

to the insurer, and that checks for any sums payable under

the policies should be drawn to the exclusive order of the

assignee (ff. 1061-1076).

In September 1942, which was about a year and eight

months after the loan was made, defendant, having un-

covered Frad’s very lucrative activities, amended its

answer to the complaint in the Municipal Court action so

as to allege that the policies had lapsed for non-payment

of the premiums of which it had been defrauded. This,

quite naturally, alarmed the Trust Company, which took

the position that, as to it, defendant was estopped to claim

that the policies had lapsed for non-payment of premiums

(ff. 175-176).

On January 17, 1943, the loan went into default which,

of course, made it-necessary for the Trust Company to take

some affirmative action. Having endeavored, in vain, to

persuade defendant to recognize the estoppel which it

claimed, or to make some other arrangement satisfactory to

it (ff. 174-180; 1105-1121), the Trust Company, finally, made

an absolute and unequivocal demand upon defendant for

the cash surrender values of the policies (ff, 1147-1153).

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Defendant complied with the demand (ff. 1156-1158). Soon

afterwards Frad commenced the present action to have the

transaction construed as if, instead of having been a pay-

ment of cash surrender values (> the Trust Company, it had

been a loan made to him on the security of the policies. He

did not join the Trust Company as a party to the litigation.

One other phase of the matter should be mentioned

before we turn to points of law raised by the pending peti-

tion. The beneficiary of the life insurance policies was the

wife of the insured. After his death, she became the plain-

tiff in the action in her own right as beneficiary, and she

is now the one who petitions for a writ of certiorari. She

knew that her husband travelled under false passports; she

knew that his occupation was to play cards for money; she

was acquainted with the men who accompanied him on his

eard playing trips; she was familiar with the arrangement

between her husband and his companions for the division of

their ‘‘winnings’’; she kept large amounts of cash for him

in a safe deposit box; she knew he used assumed names in

pursuing his occupation, and she, herself, used an assumed

name in maintaining a safe deposit box to which he had

access; she knew the names of quite a number of the men

who were his victims (ff. 642-701, 703). When her husband

was away on trips, it was she who endorsed his disability

checks and deposited them in a joint account which she

maintained with him (ff. 675-676, 1189-1191). In short, she

was perfectly aware that he was gainfully employed at his

usual occupation while collecting disability benefits from

defendant and enjoying a waiver of premiums. She even

assisted him in collecting the disability benefits, and she

personally profited by the fraud.

Opinions Below.

On the foregoing evidence, the District Court held that

defendant was entitled to recover from the estate of the

insured (which was bankrupt) the disability benefits of

9

which it had been defrauded and the premiums which it

had been fraudulently induced to waive. At the same time,

the Court held that the beneficiary, who now petitions

for certiorari, was entitled to recover the face amount of

the insured’s policies, less the cash surrender values which

had been paid to the Trust Company and the premiums

which had neither been paid nor waived. The heart of

the decision, we believe, was the holding that once pre-

miums have been waived, the only recourse open to the

insurer, when it finds that it has been defrauded, is to bring

an action against the insured as for a debt: and that it

cannot declare the policies lapsed for non-payment of

premium. This, we respectfully submit, is neither good law

nor good sense.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

unanimously reversed the District Court and dismissed the

complaint upon the ground (1) that the insurer could not

have been compelled to make a loan to the Trust Company

or to any one else, for the loan values of the policies had

been exhausted by the insured’s fraud; and (2) that neither

the insured nor the beneficiary, who had kept the policies in

foree by fraudulently inducing the insurer to waive the

premiums, came to the Court with clean hands and, hence,

neither of them was entitled to have the policies reinstated.

POINT I.

There is no novel or substantial question which re-

quires this Court’s review.

Fortunately for the life insurance industry there ean

only be one William D. Frad, and he is dead. Fortunately,

also, the litigation which he occasioned is essentially unique.

Petitioner’s contention that the decision of the Court of

Appeals has swept away the rights of all insured persons,

their assignees and beneficiaries, is patently absurd. What

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petitioner’s counsel is really trying to do is to induce this

Court to assume the function of the Court of Appeals

of the State of New York because her judgment has been

reversed, but he is unable to assign any unusual or compel-

ling circumstances to justify such a course. His plea that

the Court below failed to follow the statutory and common

law of the State of New York is no different from the plea

which is always presented to an appellate court and has

in it no factor which calls for special consideration by the

United States Supreme Court.

POINT II.

The decision of the Court of Appeals does not con-

flict with the statutory law of the State of New York.

Over and over again in the petition and brief our oppon-

ent contends that the decision of the Court of Appeals vio-

lated Section 155(g) of the Insurance Law of the State of

New York which requires insurers to lend money within the

limits of the cash values of their policies.

Over and over again our opponent also contends that the

decision violates Section 166(1)(5) of the Insurance Law

which protects the ‘‘proceeds and avails’’ of life insurance

policies for the benefit of third party beneficiaries as against

the claims of creditors of the insured.

The answer to these contentions, as Judge CHASE so

clearly puts it, is that each of the policies which are the

subject of the present litigation expressly provides that any

indebtedness to the Company on the policy will diminish

the cash and loan values. In other words, in the language

of Section 166(1), the ‘‘proceeds and avails’’ are to be

determined only after the insured’s indebtedness to the

Company has been deducted. In the case at bar, the ‘‘pro-

ceeds and avails’’ must be identified as of the time when, if

ever, defendant should have made a loan to the Trust

11

Company. This, of course, limits them to the cash and loan

values, for the insured was then alive and the policies had

not then matured as death claims.

Unlike the insured, the beneficiary never had any inter-

est in the cash and loan values and, consequently, Section

166(1)(5) of the Insurance Law was not called into play.

It could not protect her interest because she had none at

that time. It did not even purport to protect his interest.

The insured, of course, would have had an interest in

the cash and loan values, had they not been previously ex-

hausted vy his indebtedness to the Company. Because of

this indebtedness, however, there was no obligation to make

a loan to him or to make a loan for his benefit and, conse-

quently, Section 155(g) of the Insurance Law was not

violated. As Judge CuHasr puts it:

‘The insurer, being obliged to make loans on the

policies only to the extent of their existing loan

values, was therefore free to refuse to make any loan

on the policies for the benefit of the insured whose

equities in the policies had been extinguished by his

receipt of the proceeds of his own fraud’’ (p. 542).

Accordingly, we perceive no violation of the statutory

law of the State of New York upon which the petitioner so

heavily relies.

POINT III.

The decision of the Court of Appeals does not con-

flict with the case law of the State of New York.

Over and over again in the petition and brief our oppon-

ent contends that the decision of the Court of Appeals is

contrary to the decisions of the courts of the State of New

York, and, more particularly, runs counter to Wilkes v.

Equitable Life Assurance Society, 262 App. Div. 73, modi-

fied 289 N. Y. 63; Standard v. Equitable Life, N. Y. Law

12

Journal 3/7/36 p. 1197, aff’d 247 App. Div. 617, aff’d 274

N. Y. 519; Orent v. Equitable Life, 268 App. Div. 299; and

Grauer v. Equitable Life, 167 Mise. 30.

Our denial of this contention is twofold: first, the Wilkes,

Standard, Orent and Grauer cases do not support the propo-

sition for which our opponent cites them; and, second, the

decision of the Court of Appeals does not conflict with them

but, on the contrary, cites them correctly.

At page 12 of the petition, our opponent cites the fore-

going cases for the proposition that ‘‘where an assured

obtains disability benefits from an insurer by fraud * * *

the insurer has a claim for debt as a creditor against the

assured, but * * * this claim, just as any claim of any other

creditor, is barred from being offset against the policies,

or beneficial rights or interests therein of the assured or the

beneficiary.’’ In our opinion, these cases stand for no such

proposition. They do not limit the insurer to a claim for

debt as a creditor. Neither do they relate to the offset of

claims against policies. The proposition for which they

stand, and for which Judge Cuasr correctly cited them on

page 541 of his opinion, is that life insurance policies can-

not be lapsed by the unilateral act of the insurer but only

after the insurer has given the insured a new, reasonable

time, fixed by the Court, within which to pay the arrears

of premium.

Moreover, the cases in question should also be dis-

tinguished on their facts from the case at bar. In the

case at bar, instead of meeting his obligation, fixed by

contract, to pay premiums at stated intervals, the insured

deliberately elected to defraud the Company by falsely con-

tending that he was disabled. In the cited cases, with the

exception of the Orent case, there was no fraudulent repre-

sentation that the insured was disabled but only a claim

that he had made some material misrepresentation, when,

many years earlier, he applied for his insurance, and that,

by reason of such misrepresentation, the insurer was en-

titled to rescind the disability coverage and retroactively

99

13

annul the waiver of premiums. In such circumstances, the

New York courts have held that the insurer must prove the

material misrepresentation before the insured can be called

upon to pay the arrears of premium. To put the dis-

tinction another way, in the case at bar, the insured avoided

his obligation to pay premiums by fraudulently represent-

ing that he was totally disabled, whereas in the cited cases,

it was claimed that he had made a material misrepresenta-

tion when, originally, he applied for the insurance.

The Orent case, however, was like the case at bar in that

the insured obtained a waiver of premiums by fraudulently

representing that he was totally disabled. That case may

nevertheless be distinguished because, when the insurer

granted the waiver of premiums to Orent, it had ample

notice of his fraud but, for reasons sufficient to itself,

elected to continue to pay the disability benefits.

Accordingly, we perceive no conflict between the decision

of the Court of Appeals in the case at bar and the decisions

of the New York courts in the cases so frequently cited

and so heavily relied upon by the petitioner.

POINT IV.

The decision of the Court of Appeals does not con-

flict with Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Langreder.

Over and over again in the petition and brief our

opponent contends that the decision of the Court of Appeals

conflicts with the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Missouri

State Life Ins. Co. v. Langreder, 87 F. (2d) 810.

The short answer to this contention is simply to refer

the Court to Judge Cuase’s opinion at the top of page 542

in which he indicates, quite clearly, that it is not the inten-

tion of the Court to take issue with that case. Furthermore,

it must be obvious that, since the Langreder decision was de-

voted to the interpretation of Illinois law, any conflict be-

DAC MEE A IES CME LT ETI NM SD EI SAN

14

tween that decision and the decision of the Second Circuit

interpreting New York law would not be the type of con-

flict which should interest or concern this Court.

POINT V.

The Court of Appeals correctly held that the peti-

tioner was not entitled to equitable relief.

As a second and quite independent reason for the dis-

missal of the complaint the Court of Appeals held that,

since the insured and the beneficiary had defrauded the

insurer and had retained the fruits of the fraud, the bene-

ficiary (the insured having died) was no proper person to

seek affirmative equitable relief.

It could not be gainsaid that the policies had, in fact,

been surrendered or that without the intervention of a

court of equity, they could never mature as death claims.

As Judge Cuase pointed out in the concluding paragraph

of his opinion, it is a fundamental rule that one who comes

into equity must do so with clean hands. In this case

nothing could be more clear then that both the insured and

the beneficiary came to the court with unclean hands. There-

fore, even if there were any merit to the petitioner’s con-

tentions, which we have just reviewed, the clean hands

doctrine would, alone, suffice to sustain the decision of the

Court of Appeals.

We make no special comment on Point VI of the peti-

tioner’s brief except to call the attention of the Court to

the fact that in each one of the cases there cited the insurer

was guilty of gross fraud in effecting the surrender of a

policy of life insurance, whereas, in the case at bar, there

is no proof and no finding that the insurer practiced any

fraud of any kind but only that it asserted legal rights in

the policies in contravention of rights claimed by the in-

sured and the assignee.

15

CONCLUSION.

The petition for certiorari should be denied.

Dated: December 14, 1951.

Respectfully submitted,

Samve M. Lang,

Counsel for Defendant-Respondent,

120 Broadway,

New York 5, New York.

CLaus Morutsky,

Of Counsel.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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