Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Illinois Central Railroad v. Alford
Supreme Court brief1951
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Petition for Writ of Certiorari.............. 1
Summary Statement of the Matter Involved. _. 1
Reasons Relied on for the Allowance of the
WE oa oe eee lata 6
(1) Conflict with Decision of Supreme Court
and Decisions of other Court of Ap-
STIRS SA Sa th ene de tare ee 6
(3) Giber Mrvers ....................... 6
sans oy Stags <,.. ee 8
Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari__ 9
Opinion of Court Below.................._ 9
Jurisdiction to Grant the Petition... 9
Specification of Errors...................__ 10
Statement of the Case........ Specs 10
SEES eS fear Sere an eeetreaan es | 13
TS SRR RCRA iiiacet nce tee vr thie aaa alee iti 13
SEE A ean 0s thet eek een A Dt 14
MIE Merl, 8h ey ee ay APN ae 15
5 MODE erene rte oaate eee 15
ERC LRAG Nea edt aera Sieantengn ETDS tN 20
Beseman v. Penn. R.R. Co., 50 N.J.L. 235...... 15
Bunting v. Penn. R.R. Co., C.C.A., 203 F.193. _. 6, 13, 15, 17
Baltimore and P. R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108
22s se | 5 ina 15
Catholic Church v. Penn. R.R. Co., C.C.A., 207 F.
Seer Eaten eA etie thie fi tt Ty eo ae 6, 15
6,15
13
15
15
ws ARRESTS
li INDEX
Page
Richards vy. Washington Terminal Company, 233 U.S.
ons SECM SS ast alaiamuereinarins 6,15
State v. Erie R. waa... 13
State v. Erie R. sia. yall o_o ae 13
Tucker v. V. S. & P. R.R. Co., 125 La. 689, 51 So.
os DE REEL a alaaaaliaa 15
Constitution of the United States, Fifth Amendment. 10
jhe gh apollo. 5, eS arene 9
28 U.S. C. A., Title 28, Section 1254...” 5
Texts
American J urisprudence, N uisance, Vol. 39, Sections
16, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, . . aaa 8
Joyce on N uisance, Sees. 135, 3 ae 14
Wood on N uisance, Sees. 505, _ 8 See 15
a EI TOT LOST OS SARI TINS TRAE ANT Ely EO Re ae aL we
ag
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1951
No. 170
ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY,
Petitioner,
vs.
ARTHUR ALFORD, ET AL.,
Respondents
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FIFTH CIRCUIT.
May IT PLEASE THE CouRT:
The petition of Illinois Central Railroad Company re-
spectfully shows to this Honorable Court:
A
Summary Statement of the Matter Involved
This is a tort action by neighboring property owners to
recover damages of petitioner, an authorized railroad doing
interstate business, claimed to have been suffered by their
property and themselves personally as a result of emissions
of smoke, soot and cinders from petitioner’s coal-burning
—e
2
engines used in petitioner’s public utility business at Bos-
sier City, a small municipality in the State of Louisiana.
There was no charge that petitioner’s roundhouse facili-
ties had beeu improperly or negligently located or that
the alleged nuisance was the result of the use of soft coal as
a fuel, although that (the use of soft coal) is the sole ground
on which the Court of Appeals found defendant had main-
tained a nuisance and, accordingly, affirmed the judgment.
Petitioner by appropriate pleadings denied that its opera-
tions constituted an actionable nuisance or that smoke or
other substances emitted from its engines during the times
they were being serviced for road and switching work dam-
aged respondents’ property or caused them substantial per-
sonal injury (R. 1-90).
A jury trial was waived.
The District Court in a written opinion, handed down on
September 24th, 1949 (R. 10-2674) and in its Special Find-
ings of Fact (R. 10-2742), obviously concurred in and
adopted by the Court of Appeals, found that ‘defendants
facilities are far in advance of the facilities used by rail-
roads generally to prevent or suppress smoke or other
deleterious substances,’ and ‘‘defendant has done all that
can be done to prevent the creation or emission into the air
of smoke or other deleterious substances, and, according to
the weight of testimony, no one has yet been able to suggest
any additional method or device’? (R. 10-2737-8). These
findings of fact are wholly inconsistent with any liability
whatever.
The District Court further found that ‘‘the residential
area is very clean in every particular; no person driving
through would ever suspect an existing nuisance-cancer as
was described,’’ and that this fine, clean appearance was
found to exist at the times ‘the area was visited by the
trial judge, on which occasions, during the trial and after
a
NON meee me
3
its close, no black smoke was seen—only white, steam like
smoke that at once vanished in the air’’ (OP R. 10-2680-1) ;
that ‘‘the coal, mine run, had a sulphur content of from one
(1%) to three and one-half (31%4%) per cent,’’ the So,
being further reduced by the ‘‘dilution taking place in the
fire box of the locomotive’’ and by a ‘‘washing or scrubbing
process when an engine is being fired’’; that ‘‘each of the
radial tracks in the roundhouse area is equipped with a
bell-shaped device, inverted, which is lowered and set over
the smoke stack of the locomotive being serviced, and dur-
ing the time the locomotive is being fired or serviced is con-
stantly sprayed with water of a temperature of 180 degrees
Fahrenheit and a pressure varying from 150 to 225 pounds
per square inch for the purpose of washing the stack gases
and depositing them on the ground instead of permitting
their escape into the air’’ (R. 10-2737); that ‘‘an over-fire
airfork, with a compressed air pressure of about 100 pounds
per square inch, in the bed of the locomotive, furnishes addi-
tional oxygen for a quicker combustion of coal and thereby
keeps the creation of smoke within unavoidable limits”’;
that ‘‘the personnel’ of petitioner ‘‘have at all times given
zealous attention to the conservation of coal and the sup-
pression of smoke’’; that ‘‘there never was and there is no
damage now to the paint (exterior or interior) on the houses
of the plaintiffs caused by defendant’s engines or opera-
tions’? (Findings R. 10-2735-8) ; that ‘‘any damage before
and after December 1, 1948, to the screens and draperies of
plaintiffs’ houses has been from gas-water vapor, resulting
from the burning of natural gas for heat in space or open
heaters (inside plaintiffs’ houses) or from normal atmos-
pherie conditions ordinarily prevalent”’ (R. 10-2682) ; that
the ‘‘health of not a single man, woman or child was dam-
aged’’ by defendant’s operations (OP R. 10-2694-2735) ;
that ‘‘there has not been a single instance of a reduction in
——e
4
value, the sale of lots with their pretty and attractive houses
upon them has always been brisk’’ (R. 10-2739).
In its Conclusions of Law the Court found that a smoke
nuisance may exist in the absence of negligence—negligence
not being ‘‘the deciding point’? (R. 10-2741). The Court
refused to find, as requested by defendant, that no actionable
nuisance (no complaint being made of improper location)
can exist in the absence of negligence.
In irreconcilable conflict with this factual situation, the
trial court nevertheless found that a nuisance existed prior
to December 1, 1948, but had been abated on that date, and
awarded damages to plaintiffs in the aggregate amount of
$43,661.66 (R. 10-2698), including damages to paint and |
screens when none was found to have existed.
From the judgment of the District Court, believed to be
manifestly erroneous, an appeal was prosecuted to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
In an opinion handed down on February 9, 1951, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the judgment appealed from and held
that ‘‘common sense and experience lend support to the
finding below, that the smoke nuisance here was directly
and materially contributed to by appellant’s burning of
soft or bituminous coal’’ (R. 10-2769), although no such
ground for recovery was pleaded and no such finding of
fact was made by the District Court.
An application for a rehearing was denied on May 14,
1951 (R. 10-2776).
Petitioner claims grievous error in the opinion and ruling
of the Court of Appeals, as well as of the District Court,
and here seeks relief through the supervisory jurisdiction
of this Court.
——
5
B
Jurisdiction to Review
The statutory provision believed and relied upon to sus-
tain the jurisdiction of this Court to grant certiorari is:
Title 28, U.S.C.A., Sec. 1254, Act of Congress June 25,
1948, C 646, 62 Statutes 928, Rule 38 of this Court.
C
The Questions Presented and Errors Assigned
The decree here questioned is erroneous because:
(1) The mere use or burning of soft coal, in a normal and
non-negligent manner, as fuel for petitioner’s locomotives
engaged in the doing of its public utility busiress (the use
of this type of fuel not forbidden nor regulateu by statute
or ordinance) did not in and of itself constitute or contrib-
ute to an actionable nuisance, per accidens.
To condemn petitioner to pay a substantial sum of money
to neighboring property owners for the ordinary and conse-
quential damage unavoidably resulting from the non-
negligent use of soft coal for its motive power is gross error
—the practical effect of such decree is to take from peti-
| tioner its property and prevent the normal performance of
| its public utility business, without due process of law and
without just compensation, in contravention to the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
(2) In the absence of negligence, a railroad, including its
facilities for the servicing of its locomotives, constructed
and operated for public use is not subject to an action by
neighboring property owners for the ordinary, incidental,
and consequential damage arising from the necessary emis-
sion of smoke from its locomotives; from which damages a
ASS gooey
———
6
railroad enjoys immunity, a ‘‘doctrine which has become so
well established that it amounts to a rule of property’’,
Reasons Relied On for the Allowance of the Writ
(1) The decision here questioned is on conflict with the
decision of this Court in Richards v. Washington Terminal
Company, 233 M. 8. 546, and in conflict with the decisions of
the Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, in Bunting v. Pennsyl-
vania Railroad Company, 203 F. 193, and of the Court of
Appeals, Third Circuit, in Catholic Church v. Pennsylvania
Railroad Company, 207 F. 897, and of the Court of Appeals,
Eighth Cireuit, in Kimball v. Guy A. Thompson, Trustee,
Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 165 F. (2d) 677, on
the same matter, each of which cases recognizes and applies
the principle announced by this Court in Richards v. Wash-
ington Terminal Company, supra, that ‘‘railroads con-
structed and operated for the public use, although with
private capital and for private gain, are not subject to ac-
tions in behalf of neighboring property owners for the
ordinary damages attributable to the operation of the rail-
road, in the absence of negligence * * * ’, The immunity
from such damages ‘‘includes * * * the necessary emission
of smoke and sparks from the locomotives and similar
annoyance inseparable from the normal and non-negligent
operation of a railroad’’,
(2) The ruling of the Court of Appeals that an actionable
nuisance may be predicated on the use of soft coal as a fuel
for a railroad’s locomotives, in the absence of a finding that
it was used or burned in a negligent manner (the trial court,
whose findings of fact were affirmed or approved by the
Court of Appeals, having found that petitioner’s operations
were not conducted in an unreasonable or negligent man-
ner), imposes on petitioner and other railroads and in-
dustry generally an unjust and v»due burden, sine coal is
the nation’s major or predominant fuel, and it in effect
| *
7
deprives petitioner of its property without due process of
law and without conpensation.
(3) This ruling does violence to universally accepted law
that smoke, inherent in the burning or combustion of coal,
is not in itself an actionable nuisance. It becomes such only
when created and emitted in unreasonable, excessive and
avoidable amount, and causes substantial damage to adja-
cent proprietors.
(4) The principle announced by the Court of Appeals, the
correctness of which is here questioned, is of such peculiar
gravity and general importance and nation-wide interest,
affecting materially and substantially, as it does, the rail
transportation systems of the nation so essential to the
commerce and prosperity of the nation and its defense in
times of emergency, the Court, in the exercise of its sound
judicial discretion, should grant certiorari and review the
decree here questioned.
(5) The findings of fact by the trial court, adopted by the
Court of Appeals, alone afford proof that the decree here
questioned is lacking in factual support (R. 10-2742).
If, as the Court found, petitioner has done all that can be
done to keep the ‘‘creation of smoke within unavoidable
limits’, that the ‘‘residential area is very clean in every
particular’’; that ‘‘there never was and there is no damage
now to the paint (exterior or interior) on the houses of the
plaintiffs caused by defendant’s engines or operations’;
that the damage before and after December 1, 1948, to the
screens and draperies of plaintiffs houses has been from
gas-water vapor * * * or from normal atmospheric condi-
tions ordinarily prevalent; ‘‘that there has not been a single
instance of a reduction in value, the sale of lots with their
pretty and attractive houses upon them has always been
brisk’’, (R. 10-2735-8, 2694-2735-39), factual support for
the ruling that an actionable nuisance in fact existed is
absent. Such findings negative damage and injury. Absent
ate may |
i 3 PA D)R Bar att
|
8
substantial property damage and tangible injury resulting
in actual, physical discomfort, ( annoyance, inconvenience or
discomfort not constituting a nuisance) no actionable nui-
sance exists. (Am. Jur., Nuisances, Vol. 39, Secs. 16, 26, 27,
28, 30, 54).
Wherefore, your petitioner respectfuly prays that a writ
of certiorari be issued out of and under the seal of this
Honorable Court, directed to the said United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, commanding that Court to
certify and to send to this Court for its review and determi-
nation on a day certain to be therein named, a full and com-
plete transcript of the record and all proceedings in the case
numbered and entitled on its docket No. 13,246, ‘‘ Illinois
Central Railroad Company, Appellant, vs. Arthur Alford,
et al., Appellees’’, and that said decree and judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
may be reversed by this Honorable Court, and that your
petitioner may have such other and further relief in the
premises as to this Honorable Court may seem meet and
just ; and your petitioner ever prays.
Iuurnois Centrat Ramroap Company.
JosepH H. Wricut,
135 East 11th Place,
Chicago, Illinois;
Cuas. A. HELsett,
135 East 11th Place,
Chicago, Illinois;
A B. Freyer,
First National Bank Building,
Shreveport, Louisiana;
M. C. THompson,
Bernhardt Building,
Monroe, Louisiana,
Counsel for Petitioner.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1951
No. 170
ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY,
Petitioner,
vs.
ARTHUR ALFORD, ET AL.,
Respondents
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI
May IT PLEASE THE CourT:
I
The opinion of the District Court is reported in 86 F.
Supp. 424.
II
The opinion of the Court of Appeals, F’fth Circuit, is
reported in 187 F. R. (2d Series) 144.
III
Jurisdiction
The statutory provision believed and relied upon to sus-
tain the power to grant this petition is:
Title 28, United States Code, Judiciary and Judicial
Procedure, Section 1254.
; 7
IV
Specification of Errors
The decision of the Court of Appeals, here complained of,
is fundamentally erroneous in these respects:
(a) In holding that the mere use or burning of soft or
bituminous coal as fuel for a railroad’s engines, even
though such use be in a normal and non-negligent manner,
constitutes an actionable nuisance or contributes directly
and materially to an actionable nuisance ; the effect of which
holding is to deprive petitioner of the use of this fuel
essential to its transportation business, and thus take from )
petitioner its property without due process of law, in
contravention of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States;
(b) In holding that an actionable nuisance may be predi-
cated on the mere use or burning of soft coal, the Court
below has departed from universally accepted law that j
smoke becomes an actionable nuisance only when created
and emitted in unreasonable and excessive amount, with
consequent substantial damage to neighboring proprietors;
(c) In denying to petitioner the long-recognized immunity
from the ordinary damages attributable to the necessary
emission of smoke from its locomotives, inseparable from ;
normal and non-negligent operation.
V
Statement of the Case
Some one-hundred fifty-seven property owners living in
a subdivision of Bossier City, Louisiana, two-thirds of
whose houses have been built since petitioner established in
1933 its roundhouse facilities on a ten acre tract, ‘‘sepa-
a
11
rated by a wide public highway from the area in’ whicjch
respondents’ homes are located’’, claim damages of petotj-
tioner on the ground that smoke from petitioner’s enginges
while they are being re-fueled infiltrates their homes annd
damages the paint and screens of their homes and caus¢es
them to suffer physical inconvenience and discomfort. Thenre
was no allegation that petitioner’s facilities for servicinng
its locomotives were improperly located in that they werye
located in such close proximity to respondents’ homes aag
to constitute an actionable nuisance. The Court founng
that petitioner’s facilities were not improperly or neglijj-
gently located (R. 10-2674).
Petitioner denied that its operations constituted a nuijj-
sance.
A jury trial was waived.
The District Court, in a written opinion, handed dowyn
on September 24, 1949 (R. 10-2674), held that no nuisanc¢ee
existed on December 1, 1948 but that a nuisance existeed
prior to that date, although the factual situation was pree-
cisely the same before December 1, 1948 as it was on théat
date, and awarded damages to plaintiffs in the aggregatte
amount of $43,661.66. Judgment was entered November 228,
1949 (R. 10-2744).
The Court of Appeals, in an opinion handed down oon
February 9, 1951, affirming the judgment of the Distriict
Court, held that ‘‘common sense and experience lend su]p-
port to the finding below, that the smoke nuisance here
was directly and materially contributed to by appellantt’s
burning of soft or bituminous coal’’ (R. 10-2769). Theire
was no ‘‘finding below’’ that the nuisance was the result
of petitioner’s burning of soft coal. This type of fuel wias
used by petitioner on December 1, 1948 as well as before,
Petitioner’s application for a rehearing was denied on
May 14, 1951 (R. 10-2776).
12
The District Court, in its Findings of Fact (R. 10-2742)
and in its Opinion (R. 10-2674), concurred in and adopted
by the Court of Appeals, found that the ‘‘average consump-
tion of coal’’ by petitioner’s “‘engines, engaged in all types
of service, during a twenty-four hour period was eighteen
tons’’; ‘‘excluding coal consumed in running operations,
the consumption during a twenty-four hour period was
seven and one-half tons’’; ‘the coal, mine run, had a sul-
phur content of from one (1%) to three and one-half
(342%) per cent’’, the SO» being further reduced by the
‘dilution taking place in the fire box of the locomotive’’
and by a ‘‘washing or scrubbing process when an engine is
being fired’’; that “‘coal, before it is dropped from the
elevator into the tender of an engine is subjected to a
spray of hot water to prevent the fine coal dust from being
blown into the atmosphere’’; that each of the ‘radial
tracks in the roundhouse area is equipped with a bell-
shaped device, inverted, which is lowered and set over the
smoke stack of the locomotive being serviced, and during
the time the locomotive is being fired or serviced its stack
is constantly sprayed with water of a temperature of 180
degrees Fahrenheit and a pressure varying from 150 to
225 pounds per square inch for the purpose of washing
the stack gases and removing the solids and depositing
them on the ground near the locomotive instead of per-
mitting their escape into the air”? (R. 10-2737) ; ‘‘an over-
fire airfork, with a compressed air pressure of about 100
pounds per square inch, in the bed of the locomotive,
furnishes additional oxygen for a quicker combustion of
coal and thereby keeps the creation of smoke within un-
avoidable limits’’; ‘these and other improved devices for
the suppression of smoke were installed by the defendant
whose trained personnel operated them in a prudent man-
ner’’. ‘‘The personnel”? of petitioner ‘‘have given zealous
attention to the conservation of coal and the supnression
RSL HE ee
ee, sums
13
of smoke’’. ‘These facilities are far in advance of the
facilities used by railroads generally to prevent or suppress
smoke, or other deleterious substances’’. Defendant has
| done all that can be done to prevent the creation of ‘*emis-
sion into the air of smoke or other deleterious substances,
and, according to the weight of testimony, no one has yet
been able to suggest any additional method or device’’,
(R. 10-2737-38) ; that ‘‘there never was and there is no
damage now to the paint (exterior or interior) on the
houses of the plaintiffs caused by defendant’s engines or
operations’’ (R. 10-2735-8), but notwithstanding this find-
ing of fact the Court awarded damages for this item;
‘that any damage before and after December 1, 1948, to
the screens and draperies of plaintiffs’ houses has been
from gas-water vapor, resulting from the burning of natu-
| ral gas for heat in space or open heaters or from normal
atmospheric conditions ordinarily prevalent”? (R. 10-2682),
| but notwithstanding this finding of fact damages were
allowed for this item; that ‘‘the health of not a single man,
woman or child has been damaged’? (R. 10-2694-2735) ; and
| ‘‘there has not been a single instance of reduction in value,
the sale of lots with their pretty and attractive houses upon
them has always been brisk’? (R. 10-2739).
Point 1
It was error for the Court of Appeals to hold that the
creation of a nuisance may be predicated solely on the
burning of soft coal.
Bunting v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 203 F.
193 ;
Mayor of Jersey City v. Abercrombie, 58 Atl. 73;
State v. Erie R. Co., 84 Atl. 698 ;
State v. Erie R. Co., 87 Atl. 141.
14
Point 1-A
To deprive petitioner of the use of soft coal for its
motive power is to take petitioner’s property without due
process of law.
If, as the Court found, the use or burning of soft coal
constitutes an actionable nuisance or contributes directly
thereto, even though it is burned in a careful and non-
negligent manner, and even though one has done all that
can be done to keep the smoke inherent in such use within
unavoidable limits, it necessarily follows as a practical
result that petitioner will be deprived of the use of its
motive power essential to the performance of its public
utility business, for coal-burning engines constitute the
greater part of its motive power, and thus petitioner’s
property will be taken without due process of law.
Although in recent years other types of fuel have come
into use by railroads to generate motive power, the fact
is that coal still constitutes as it has down the years the
major or predominant railroad fuel, as also the nation’s
major fuel supply, and if, as the Court o¢ Appeals holds,
the non-negligent use or burning of soft evui is in itself an
actionable nuisance or materially contributes thereto, not
only the railroads but all users of this type of fuel are
offenders against the law of nuisance. To so hold is the
same as to hold that the burning of soft coal or the smoke
necessarily created thereby is a nuisance absolute—a
nuisance per se.
But smoke from the burning of coal is not a nuisance
per se. It becomes an actionable nuisance only when by
reason of improper operation it is emitted in unreasonable,
unnecessary and avoidable amount and causes substantial
injury to neighboring property or materially interferes
with its use and enjoyment.
Am. Jur., Nuisance, Vol. 39, pgs. 310, 337;
Joyce on Nuisance, Sees. 135, 137, 139;
15
Wood on Nuisances, Sees. 505, 506, 507 ;
Richards v. Washington Terminal Company, 233 U. S.
546;
Tucker v. V. S. & P. R.R. Co., 125 La. 689, 51 So. 689.
Point 2
The operation of a lawfully constructed railroad includ-
ing facilities for the firing of its locomotives, in the absence
of negligence, does not by reason of attendant smoke or
other annoyances necessarily incident thereto constitute
an actionable nuisance.
Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546,
Catholic Church v. Penn. RR Co., 207 F. 897,
Baltimore & P. R. Co. v. Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317,
Northern Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635,
Beseman v. Penn. RR Co., 50 N. J. L. 235,
Kimball v. Guy A. Thompson, Trustee Missouri Pacific
RR Co., 165 F. (2d) 677,
Tucker v. V. S. & P. RR Co., 125 La. 689; 51 So. 689,
McGee v. Y. d M. V. RR Co., 19 So. (2d) 21.
Point 3
The decision here questioned is in conflict with the deci-
sion of this Court in Richards v. Washington Terminal
Company, 233 U.S. 546, and with the decision of the Court
of Appeals, Third Circuit, in Bunting v. Pennsylvania
Railroad Company, 203 F. 193, and with the decision of
the Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, in Catholic Church v.
Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 207 F. 897, and with the
decision of the Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, in Kim-
ball v. Thompson, Trustee, Missouri Pacific Railroad Com-
pany, 165 F. (2d) 677.
In Richards v. Washington Terminal Company, this
Court held:
16
‘*But the question remains, in cases of the class now
before us, what is to be deemed a private nuisance such
as amounts to a taking of property? And by great
and preponderant weight of judicial authority in those
states whose constitutions contain a prohibition of the
taking of private property for public use without
compensation, substantially in the form employed in
the Fifth Amendment, it has become established that
railroads constructed and operated for the public use,
although with private capital and for private gain, are
not subject to actions in behalf of neighboring property
owners for the ordinary damages attributable to the
operation of the railroad, in the absence of negligence.
Such roads are treated as public highway, and the pro-
prietors as public servants, with the exemption nor-
mally enjoyed by such servants from liability to pri-
vate suit, so far as concerns the incidental damages
accruing to owners of non-adjacent land through the
proper and skillful management and operation of the
railways. Any diminution of the value of property
not directly invaded nor particularly affected, but
sharing in the common burden of incidental damages
arising from the legalized nuisance, is held not to be a
‘taking’ within the constitutional provision. The im-
munity is limited to such damages as naturally and
unavoidably result from the proper conduct of the
road and are shared generally by property owners
whose lands lie within the range of the inconveniences
necessarily incident to proximity to a railroad. It
includes the noises and vibrations incident to the run-
ning of trains, the necessary emission of smoke and
sparks from the locomotives, and similar annoyance
inseparable from the normal and non-negligent opera-
tion of a railroad. Northern Transportation Co. vy.
Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 25 L. Ed. 336; Besemen v, Penn-
sylvania RR Co., 50 N.J.L. 235, affirmed in 52 N.J.L.
221.’’ (Italics ours.)
‘*The immunity from liability for incidental injuries
is attended with a considerable degree of hardship to
the private landowner, and has not been adopted with-
P
out some judicial protest. But, as pointed out by Chief
Justice Beasley in the Beseman case, 50 N.J.L. at
page 238, if railroad companies were liable to suit
| for such damages upon the theory that with respect to
them the company is a tort-feasor, the practical result
would be to bring the operation of railroads to a stand-
still. And, on the whole, the doctrine has become so
well established that it amounts to a rule of property,
and should be modified, if at all, only by the law-mak-
ing power.’’
17
In Bunting v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, Court of
Appeals, Third Circuit, 203 F. 193, it was held:
The proposition on which the plaintiff’s case is put
is that the defendant company has been negligent in
firing these engines where they stood, and in going
in and out of Broad Street station, so as to produce
an unnecessary and avoidable quantity of smoke, con-
stituting the nuisance complained of. This negligence
is charged in two respects, namely, in making use of
a variety of fuel on these engines while so standing,
or while going in and out of the Broad Street tunnel,
which emits, when burning, a large and unnecessary
amount of smoke, and also in the manner in which its
employees handle the furnaces and fires in its said
locomotives and shops, and in omitting such devices
and safeguards as would prevent such excessive pro-
duction of smoke.
‘‘As to its manner of using bituminous coal, the jury
found in favor of the railroad, and that it was guilty
of no negligence in that respect. But it is contended
the trial judge erred in withdrawing from the jury the
question whether, in spite of this non-negligent use of
bituminous coal, the railroad was guilty of negligence
in not substituting a coke or anthracite coal therefor.
We have given this contention the deliberation and
thorough consideration which so grave and far-reach-
ing a question demands. We are not convinced, how-
ever, that error was committed by the court’s action
in the premises.”’
18
After commenting on the testimony relative to the use
of coke by other railroads, the court said, at page 196:
“We do not mean to find that a general usage is an
exclusive or final test in the premises, but that, where
plaintiff undertakes to show, in a business so large
and wide-extended as railroads, what has been done
by other railroads as a test or standard of duty for
the defendant, it must be made evident that what is
proposed is not only scientifically practicable, but also
economically and financially sound.”’
The court continued at the bottom of pages 197 and 198:
‘‘The plaintiff’s case, as set forth in the statement
of claim and as tried in the court below, as we have
seen, rested solely upon two grounds: First, that by
the use of a different kind of fuel in the operation of
these locomotives, the injury complained of could have
been avoided and therefore that failure to use such
fuel was negligent.
‘Second, that it was negligence upon the part of the
railroad company’s servants, in the operation and man-
agement of these locomotives, and particularly in the
operation and management of the fire thereon, which
caused an undue and excessive emission of smoke.
“It was not claimed in the pleadings nor seriously
contended in argument, that defendant was liable, as
for a nuisance, for maintaining its tracks, roundhouse
and terminal in the place and position in which they
were maintained. Liability was based on the specific
charges of negligence in using a fuel that produced
an unnecessary amount of smoke, and in not using rea-
sonable care in firing the locomotives, so as to prevent
the unnecessary emission of such smoke. In this
salient feature, this case differs from that of the
Baltimore & P. Ry. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108
U. S. 317, 27 L. Ed. 739, cited by plaintiffs in error.”’
[iiss
19
The court then discussed the facts involved in Baltimore
and P. R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, supra, and com-
mented, pages 198-9:
‘There is nothing in the report of the case to show
that the action was maintained for, or that there was
any question as to, the mere negligent use of the shops
and premises of the defendant in consequence of which
negligent use the nuisance arose. It was not the neg-
ligent use of lawfully maintained shops and round-
house, but the maintenance itself of such shops in such
close proximity to the church that the necessary and
non-negligent use and occupation thereof constituted
the injury complained of. It was the placing and main-
tenance of these works themselves so close to the
church property, with their necessary and unavoidable
accompaniments of noise, steam and smoke, and ob-
struction on the tracks entering the same, that consti-
tuted the nuisance. Such works could have been and
should have been erected elsewhere.’’
In Catholic Church v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company,
Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, the Court held:
“It may be stated, therefore, as a principle well
established by reason and authority, that the conse-
quential, incidental and unavoidable annoyance or dam-
age resulting to the occupiers of land adjacent to a
duly authorized railroad, from its non-negligent and
careful operation, does not constitute an actionable
nuisance. It is also equally well established that, where
such damages are the result of the want of due care
and skill in the conduct and operation of the railroad,
the defendant company is liable to those injured
thereby.’’
In Kimball v. Thompson, Trustee, Missouri Pacific Rail-
road Company, the Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, held:
‘“‘No citation of authority is necessary to demon-
strate that in so far as the smoke, soot, ete. thrown
20
upon plaintiffs’ property are due to the proximity of
their property to the railroad tracks there can be no
recovery of damages. Such injury as results from that
fact is ‘common to the public at large’. Any difference
in amount is one of degree only. Carroll v. Wisconsin
Cent. R. Co., 40 Minn. 168, 41 N. W. 661, 662. All homes
constructed near a railroad or acquired after the rail-
road has been located and put in use are subject to the
inconveniences necessarily incident to the reasonable
operation of the railroad as a public utility. See Louis-
ville & N. Terminal Co. v. Lellysett, 114 Tenn. 368, 85
S. W. 881, 1 L. R. A., N. S., 49 and cases cited.
‘‘We next inquire what damage, if any, is recover-
able because four or five times a day, an engine is
spotted near plaintiffs’ property when it might
have been spotted a little further south toward Grace
Street. The undisputed evidence, as stated supra,
shows that homes are built up all along the bank on
which plaintiffs’ house stands south to Grace Street.
But plaintiff George F. Kimball testified with reference
to the relative amount of smoke and soot cast upon his
house by the standing engines that ‘We have the cor-
ner house and our house gets it worst’. Again, the
excess complained of is one of degree only. When
engines are spotted farther south for similar neces-
sary purposes the neighboring property ‘gets it worst’.
In other words, the injury complained of is ‘common
to the public’ whose property is situated as are plain-
tiffs’ premises near the switchyard.’’
The magnitude of the issue here present, its general
importance, affecting so seriously and adversely the opera-
tions of petitioner and other rail transportation systems,
using coal-burning engines for motive power, and the appar-
ent conflict of the decision here sought to be reviewed with
the decisions in Richards v. Washington Terminal Co. and
in Bunting v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, and in
Catholic Church v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, con-
21
stitute, we submit, special and important considerations
which justify if they do not compel the granting of certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
JosepH H. Wricut,
135 East Eleventh Place,
Chicago, Illinois;
Cuartes A. HeELseE.t,
135 East Eleventh Place,
Chicago, Illinois;
A. B. Freyer,
First National Bank Bldg.,
Shreveport, Louisiana;
M. C. THompson,
Bernhardt Building,
Monroe, Louisiana.
(5854)
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