Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Illinois Central Railroad v. Alford

Supreme Court brief1951

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Petition for Writ of Certiorari.............. 1

Summary Statement of the Matter Involved. _. 1

Reasons Relied on for the Allowance of the

WE oa oe eee lata 6

(1) Conflict with Decision of Supreme Court

and Decisions of other Court of Ap-

STIRS SA Sa th ene de tare ee 6

(3) Giber Mrvers ....................... 6

sans oy Stags <,.. ee 8

Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari__ 9

Opinion of Court Below.................._ 9

Jurisdiction to Grant the Petition... 9

Specification of Errors...................__ 10

Statement of the Case........ Specs 10

SEES eS fear Sere an eeetreaan es | 13

TS SRR RCRA iiiacet nce tee vr thie aaa alee iti 13

SEE A ean 0s thet eek een A Dt 14

MIE Merl, 8h ey ee ay APN ae 15

5 MODE erene rte oaate eee 15

ERC LRAG Nea edt aera Sieantengn ETDS tN 20

Beseman v. Penn. R.R. Co., 50 N.J.L. 235...... 15

Bunting v. Penn. R.R. Co., C.C.A., 203 F.193. _. 6, 13, 15, 17

Baltimore and P. R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108

22s se | 5 ina 15

Catholic Church v. Penn. R.R. Co., C.C.A., 207 F.

Seer Eaten eA etie thie fi tt Ty eo ae 6, 15

6,15

13

15

15

ws ARRESTS

li INDEX

Page

Richards vy. Washington Terminal Company, 233 U.S.

ons SECM SS ast alaiamuereinarins 6,15

State v. Erie R. waa... 13

State v. Erie R. sia. yall o_o ae 13

Tucker v. V. S. & P. R.R. Co., 125 La. 689, 51 So.

os DE REEL a alaaaaliaa 15

Constitution of the United States, Fifth Amendment. 10

jhe gh apollo. 5, eS arene 9

28 U.S. C. A., Title 28, Section 1254...” 5

Texts

American J urisprudence, N uisance, Vol. 39, Sections

16, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, . . aaa 8

Joyce on N uisance, Sees. 135, 3 ae 14

Wood on N uisance, Sees. 505, _ 8 See 15

a EI TOT LOST OS SARI TINS TRAE ANT Ely EO Re ae aL we

ag

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1951

No. 170

ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY,

Petitioner,

vs.

ARTHUR ALFORD, ET AL.,

Respondents

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIFTH CIRCUIT.

May IT PLEASE THE CouRT:

The petition of Illinois Central Railroad Company re-

spectfully shows to this Honorable Court:

A

Summary Statement of the Matter Involved

This is a tort action by neighboring property owners to

recover damages of petitioner, an authorized railroad doing

interstate business, claimed to have been suffered by their

property and themselves personally as a result of emissions

of smoke, soot and cinders from petitioner’s coal-burning

—e

2

engines used in petitioner’s public utility business at Bos-

sier City, a small municipality in the State of Louisiana.

There was no charge that petitioner’s roundhouse facili-

ties had beeu improperly or negligently located or that

the alleged nuisance was the result of the use of soft coal as

a fuel, although that (the use of soft coal) is the sole ground

on which the Court of Appeals found defendant had main-

tained a nuisance and, accordingly, affirmed the judgment.

Petitioner by appropriate pleadings denied that its opera-

tions constituted an actionable nuisance or that smoke or

other substances emitted from its engines during the times

they were being serviced for road and switching work dam-

aged respondents’ property or caused them substantial per-

sonal injury (R. 1-90).

A jury trial was waived.

The District Court in a written opinion, handed down on

September 24th, 1949 (R. 10-2674) and in its Special Find-

ings of Fact (R. 10-2742), obviously concurred in and

adopted by the Court of Appeals, found that ‘defendants

facilities are far in advance of the facilities used by rail-

roads generally to prevent or suppress smoke or other

deleterious substances,’ and ‘‘defendant has done all that

can be done to prevent the creation or emission into the air

of smoke or other deleterious substances, and, according to

the weight of testimony, no one has yet been able to suggest

any additional method or device’? (R. 10-2737-8). These

findings of fact are wholly inconsistent with any liability

whatever.

The District Court further found that ‘‘the residential

area is very clean in every particular; no person driving

through would ever suspect an existing nuisance-cancer as

was described,’’ and that this fine, clean appearance was

found to exist at the times ‘the area was visited by the

trial judge, on which occasions, during the trial and after

a

NON meee me

3

its close, no black smoke was seen—only white, steam like

smoke that at once vanished in the air’’ (OP R. 10-2680-1) ;

that ‘‘the coal, mine run, had a sulphur content of from one

(1%) to three and one-half (31%4%) per cent,’’ the So,

being further reduced by the ‘‘dilution taking place in the

fire box of the locomotive’’ and by a ‘‘washing or scrubbing

process when an engine is being fired’’; that ‘‘each of the

radial tracks in the roundhouse area is equipped with a

bell-shaped device, inverted, which is lowered and set over

the smoke stack of the locomotive being serviced, and dur-

ing the time the locomotive is being fired or serviced is con-

stantly sprayed with water of a temperature of 180 degrees

Fahrenheit and a pressure varying from 150 to 225 pounds

per square inch for the purpose of washing the stack gases

and depositing them on the ground instead of permitting

their escape into the air’’ (R. 10-2737); that ‘‘an over-fire

airfork, with a compressed air pressure of about 100 pounds

per square inch, in the bed of the locomotive, furnishes addi-

tional oxygen for a quicker combustion of coal and thereby

keeps the creation of smoke within unavoidable limits”’;

that ‘‘the personnel’ of petitioner ‘‘have at all times given

zealous attention to the conservation of coal and the sup-

pression of smoke’’; that ‘‘there never was and there is no

damage now to the paint (exterior or interior) on the houses

of the plaintiffs caused by defendant’s engines or opera-

tions’? (Findings R. 10-2735-8) ; that ‘‘any damage before

and after December 1, 1948, to the screens and draperies of

plaintiffs’ houses has been from gas-water vapor, resulting

from the burning of natural gas for heat in space or open

heaters (inside plaintiffs’ houses) or from normal atmos-

pherie conditions ordinarily prevalent”’ (R. 10-2682) ; that

the ‘‘health of not a single man, woman or child was dam-

aged’’ by defendant’s operations (OP R. 10-2694-2735) ;

that ‘‘there has not been a single instance of a reduction in

——e

4

value, the sale of lots with their pretty and attractive houses

upon them has always been brisk’’ (R. 10-2739).

In its Conclusions of Law the Court found that a smoke

nuisance may exist in the absence of negligence—negligence

not being ‘‘the deciding point’? (R. 10-2741). The Court

refused to find, as requested by defendant, that no actionable

nuisance (no complaint being made of improper location)

can exist in the absence of negligence.

In irreconcilable conflict with this factual situation, the

trial court nevertheless found that a nuisance existed prior

to December 1, 1948, but had been abated on that date, and

awarded damages to plaintiffs in the aggregate amount of

$43,661.66 (R. 10-2698), including damages to paint and |

screens when none was found to have existed.

From the judgment of the District Court, believed to be

manifestly erroneous, an appeal was prosecuted to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

In an opinion handed down on February 9, 1951, the Court

of Appeals affirmed the judgment appealed from and held

that ‘‘common sense and experience lend support to the

finding below, that the smoke nuisance here was directly

and materially contributed to by appellant’s burning of

soft or bituminous coal’’ (R. 10-2769), although no such

ground for recovery was pleaded and no such finding of

fact was made by the District Court.

An application for a rehearing was denied on May 14,

1951 (R. 10-2776).

Petitioner claims grievous error in the opinion and ruling

of the Court of Appeals, as well as of the District Court,

and here seeks relief through the supervisory jurisdiction

of this Court.

——

5

B

Jurisdiction to Review

The statutory provision believed and relied upon to sus-

tain the jurisdiction of this Court to grant certiorari is:

Title 28, U.S.C.A., Sec. 1254, Act of Congress June 25,

1948, C 646, 62 Statutes 928, Rule 38 of this Court.

C

The Questions Presented and Errors Assigned

The decree here questioned is erroneous because:

(1) The mere use or burning of soft coal, in a normal and

non-negligent manner, as fuel for petitioner’s locomotives

engaged in the doing of its public utility busiress (the use

of this type of fuel not forbidden nor regulateu by statute

or ordinance) did not in and of itself constitute or contrib-

ute to an actionable nuisance, per accidens.

To condemn petitioner to pay a substantial sum of money

to neighboring property owners for the ordinary and conse-

quential damage unavoidably resulting from the non-

negligent use of soft coal for its motive power is gross error

—the practical effect of such decree is to take from peti-

| tioner its property and prevent the normal performance of

| its public utility business, without due process of law and

without just compensation, in contravention to the Fifth

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

(2) In the absence of negligence, a railroad, including its

facilities for the servicing of its locomotives, constructed

and operated for public use is not subject to an action by

neighboring property owners for the ordinary, incidental,

and consequential damage arising from the necessary emis-

sion of smoke from its locomotives; from which damages a

ASS gooey

———

6

railroad enjoys immunity, a ‘‘doctrine which has become so

well established that it amounts to a rule of property’’,

Reasons Relied On for the Allowance of the Writ

(1) The decision here questioned is on conflict with the

decision of this Court in Richards v. Washington Terminal

Company, 233 M. 8. 546, and in conflict with the decisions of

the Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, in Bunting v. Pennsyl-

vania Railroad Company, 203 F. 193, and of the Court of

Appeals, Third Circuit, in Catholic Church v. Pennsylvania

Railroad Company, 207 F. 897, and of the Court of Appeals,

Eighth Cireuit, in Kimball v. Guy A. Thompson, Trustee,

Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 165 F. (2d) 677, on

the same matter, each of which cases recognizes and applies

the principle announced by this Court in Richards v. Wash-

ington Terminal Company, supra, that ‘‘railroads con-

structed and operated for the public use, although with

private capital and for private gain, are not subject to ac-

tions in behalf of neighboring property owners for the

ordinary damages attributable to the operation of the rail-

road, in the absence of negligence * * * ’, The immunity

from such damages ‘‘includes * * * the necessary emission

of smoke and sparks from the locomotives and similar

annoyance inseparable from the normal and non-negligent

operation of a railroad’’,

(2) The ruling of the Court of Appeals that an actionable

nuisance may be predicated on the use of soft coal as a fuel

for a railroad’s locomotives, in the absence of a finding that

it was used or burned in a negligent manner (the trial court,

whose findings of fact were affirmed or approved by the

Court of Appeals, having found that petitioner’s operations

were not conducted in an unreasonable or negligent man-

ner), imposes on petitioner and other railroads and in-

dustry generally an unjust and v»due burden, sine coal is

the nation’s major or predominant fuel, and it in effect

| *

7

deprives petitioner of its property without due process of

law and without conpensation.

(3) This ruling does violence to universally accepted law

that smoke, inherent in the burning or combustion of coal,

is not in itself an actionable nuisance. It becomes such only

when created and emitted in unreasonable, excessive and

avoidable amount, and causes substantial damage to adja-

cent proprietors.

(4) The principle announced by the Court of Appeals, the

correctness of which is here questioned, is of such peculiar

gravity and general importance and nation-wide interest,

affecting materially and substantially, as it does, the rail

transportation systems of the nation so essential to the

commerce and prosperity of the nation and its defense in

times of emergency, the Court, in the exercise of its sound

judicial discretion, should grant certiorari and review the

decree here questioned.

(5) The findings of fact by the trial court, adopted by the

Court of Appeals, alone afford proof that the decree here

questioned is lacking in factual support (R. 10-2742).

If, as the Court found, petitioner has done all that can be

done to keep the ‘‘creation of smoke within unavoidable

limits’, that the ‘‘residential area is very clean in every

particular’’; that ‘‘there never was and there is no damage

now to the paint (exterior or interior) on the houses of the

plaintiffs caused by defendant’s engines or operations’;

that the damage before and after December 1, 1948, to the

screens and draperies of plaintiffs houses has been from

gas-water vapor * * * or from normal atmospheric condi-

tions ordinarily prevalent; ‘‘that there has not been a single

instance of a reduction in value, the sale of lots with their

pretty and attractive houses upon them has always been

brisk’’, (R. 10-2735-8, 2694-2735-39), factual support for

the ruling that an actionable nuisance in fact existed is

absent. Such findings negative damage and injury. Absent

ate may |

i 3 PA D)R Bar att

|

8

substantial property damage and tangible injury resulting

in actual, physical discomfort, ( annoyance, inconvenience or

discomfort not constituting a nuisance) no actionable nui-

sance exists. (Am. Jur., Nuisances, Vol. 39, Secs. 16, 26, 27,

28, 30, 54).

Wherefore, your petitioner respectfuly prays that a writ

of certiorari be issued out of and under the seal of this

Honorable Court, directed to the said United States Court

of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, commanding that Court to

certify and to send to this Court for its review and determi-

nation on a day certain to be therein named, a full and com-

plete transcript of the record and all proceedings in the case

numbered and entitled on its docket No. 13,246, ‘‘ Illinois

Central Railroad Company, Appellant, vs. Arthur Alford,

et al., Appellees’’, and that said decree and judgment of

the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

may be reversed by this Honorable Court, and that your

petitioner may have such other and further relief in the

premises as to this Honorable Court may seem meet and

just ; and your petitioner ever prays.

Iuurnois Centrat Ramroap Company.

JosepH H. Wricut,

135 East 11th Place,

Chicago, Illinois;

Cuas. A. HELsett,

135 East 11th Place,

Chicago, Illinois;

A B. Freyer,

First National Bank Building,

Shreveport, Louisiana;

M. C. THompson,

Bernhardt Building,

Monroe, Louisiana,

Counsel for Petitioner.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1951

No. 170

ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY,

Petitioner,

vs.

ARTHUR ALFORD, ET AL.,

Respondents

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF

CERTIORARI

May IT PLEASE THE CourT:

I

The opinion of the District Court is reported in 86 F.

Supp. 424.

II

The opinion of the Court of Appeals, F’fth Circuit, is

reported in 187 F. R. (2d Series) 144.

III

Jurisdiction

The statutory provision believed and relied upon to sus-

tain the power to grant this petition is:

Title 28, United States Code, Judiciary and Judicial

Procedure, Section 1254.

; 7

IV

Specification of Errors

The decision of the Court of Appeals, here complained of,

is fundamentally erroneous in these respects:

(a) In holding that the mere use or burning of soft or

bituminous coal as fuel for a railroad’s engines, even

though such use be in a normal and non-negligent manner,

constitutes an actionable nuisance or contributes directly

and materially to an actionable nuisance ; the effect of which

holding is to deprive petitioner of the use of this fuel

essential to its transportation business, and thus take from )

petitioner its property without due process of law, in

contravention of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution

of the United States;

(b) In holding that an actionable nuisance may be predi-

cated on the mere use or burning of soft coal, the Court

below has departed from universally accepted law that j

smoke becomes an actionable nuisance only when created

and emitted in unreasonable and excessive amount, with

consequent substantial damage to neighboring proprietors;

(c) In denying to petitioner the long-recognized immunity

from the ordinary damages attributable to the necessary

emission of smoke from its locomotives, inseparable from ;

normal and non-negligent operation.

V

Statement of the Case

Some one-hundred fifty-seven property owners living in

a subdivision of Bossier City, Louisiana, two-thirds of

whose houses have been built since petitioner established in

1933 its roundhouse facilities on a ten acre tract, ‘‘sepa-

a

11

rated by a wide public highway from the area in’ whicjch

respondents’ homes are located’’, claim damages of petotj-

tioner on the ground that smoke from petitioner’s enginges

while they are being re-fueled infiltrates their homes annd

damages the paint and screens of their homes and caus¢es

them to suffer physical inconvenience and discomfort. Thenre

was no allegation that petitioner’s facilities for servicinng

its locomotives were improperly located in that they werye

located in such close proximity to respondents’ homes aag

to constitute an actionable nuisance. The Court founng

that petitioner’s facilities were not improperly or neglijj-

gently located (R. 10-2674).

Petitioner denied that its operations constituted a nuijj-

sance.

A jury trial was waived.

The District Court, in a written opinion, handed dowyn

on September 24, 1949 (R. 10-2674), held that no nuisanc¢ee

existed on December 1, 1948 but that a nuisance existeed

prior to that date, although the factual situation was pree-

cisely the same before December 1, 1948 as it was on théat

date, and awarded damages to plaintiffs in the aggregatte

amount of $43,661.66. Judgment was entered November 228,

1949 (R. 10-2744).

The Court of Appeals, in an opinion handed down oon

February 9, 1951, affirming the judgment of the Distriict

Court, held that ‘‘common sense and experience lend su]p-

port to the finding below, that the smoke nuisance here

was directly and materially contributed to by appellantt’s

burning of soft or bituminous coal’’ (R. 10-2769). Theire

was no ‘‘finding below’’ that the nuisance was the result

of petitioner’s burning of soft coal. This type of fuel wias

used by petitioner on December 1, 1948 as well as before,

Petitioner’s application for a rehearing was denied on

May 14, 1951 (R. 10-2776).

12

The District Court, in its Findings of Fact (R. 10-2742)

and in its Opinion (R. 10-2674), concurred in and adopted

by the Court of Appeals, found that the ‘‘average consump-

tion of coal’’ by petitioner’s “‘engines, engaged in all types

of service, during a twenty-four hour period was eighteen

tons’’; ‘‘excluding coal consumed in running operations,

the consumption during a twenty-four hour period was

seven and one-half tons’’; ‘the coal, mine run, had a sul-

phur content of from one (1%) to three and one-half

(342%) per cent’’, the SO» being further reduced by the

‘dilution taking place in the fire box of the locomotive’’

and by a ‘‘washing or scrubbing process when an engine is

being fired’’; that “‘coal, before it is dropped from the

elevator into the tender of an engine is subjected to a

spray of hot water to prevent the fine coal dust from being

blown into the atmosphere’’; that each of the ‘radial

tracks in the roundhouse area is equipped with a bell-

shaped device, inverted, which is lowered and set over the

smoke stack of the locomotive being serviced, and during

the time the locomotive is being fired or serviced its stack

is constantly sprayed with water of a temperature of 180

degrees Fahrenheit and a pressure varying from 150 to

225 pounds per square inch for the purpose of washing

the stack gases and removing the solids and depositing

them on the ground near the locomotive instead of per-

mitting their escape into the air”? (R. 10-2737) ; ‘‘an over-

fire airfork, with a compressed air pressure of about 100

pounds per square inch, in the bed of the locomotive,

furnishes additional oxygen for a quicker combustion of

coal and thereby keeps the creation of smoke within un-

avoidable limits’’; ‘these and other improved devices for

the suppression of smoke were installed by the defendant

whose trained personnel operated them in a prudent man-

ner’’. ‘‘The personnel”? of petitioner ‘‘have given zealous

attention to the conservation of coal and the supnression

RSL HE ee

ee, sums

13

of smoke’’. ‘These facilities are far in advance of the

facilities used by railroads generally to prevent or suppress

smoke, or other deleterious substances’’. Defendant has

| done all that can be done to prevent the creation of ‘*emis-

sion into the air of smoke or other deleterious substances,

and, according to the weight of testimony, no one has yet

been able to suggest any additional method or device’’,

(R. 10-2737-38) ; that ‘‘there never was and there is no

damage now to the paint (exterior or interior) on the

houses of the plaintiffs caused by defendant’s engines or

operations’’ (R. 10-2735-8), but notwithstanding this find-

ing of fact the Court awarded damages for this item;

‘that any damage before and after December 1, 1948, to

the screens and draperies of plaintiffs’ houses has been

from gas-water vapor, resulting from the burning of natu-

| ral gas for heat in space or open heaters or from normal

atmospheric conditions ordinarily prevalent”? (R. 10-2682),

| but notwithstanding this finding of fact damages were

allowed for this item; that ‘‘the health of not a single man,

woman or child has been damaged’? (R. 10-2694-2735) ; and

| ‘‘there has not been a single instance of reduction in value,

the sale of lots with their pretty and attractive houses upon

them has always been brisk’? (R. 10-2739).

Point 1

It was error for the Court of Appeals to hold that the

creation of a nuisance may be predicated solely on the

burning of soft coal.

Bunting v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 203 F.

193 ;

Mayor of Jersey City v. Abercrombie, 58 Atl. 73;

State v. Erie R. Co., 84 Atl. 698 ;

State v. Erie R. Co., 87 Atl. 141.

14

Point 1-A

To deprive petitioner of the use of soft coal for its

motive power is to take petitioner’s property without due

process of law.

If, as the Court found, the use or burning of soft coal

constitutes an actionable nuisance or contributes directly

thereto, even though it is burned in a careful and non-

negligent manner, and even though one has done all that

can be done to keep the smoke inherent in such use within

unavoidable limits, it necessarily follows as a practical

result that petitioner will be deprived of the use of its

motive power essential to the performance of its public

utility business, for coal-burning engines constitute the

greater part of its motive power, and thus petitioner’s

property will be taken without due process of law.

Although in recent years other types of fuel have come

into use by railroads to generate motive power, the fact

is that coal still constitutes as it has down the years the

major or predominant railroad fuel, as also the nation’s

major fuel supply, and if, as the Court o¢ Appeals holds,

the non-negligent use or burning of soft evui is in itself an

actionable nuisance or materially contributes thereto, not

only the railroads but all users of this type of fuel are

offenders against the law of nuisance. To so hold is the

same as to hold that the burning of soft coal or the smoke

necessarily created thereby is a nuisance absolute—a

nuisance per se.

But smoke from the burning of coal is not a nuisance

per se. It becomes an actionable nuisance only when by

reason of improper operation it is emitted in unreasonable,

unnecessary and avoidable amount and causes substantial

injury to neighboring property or materially interferes

with its use and enjoyment.

Am. Jur., Nuisance, Vol. 39, pgs. 310, 337;

Joyce on Nuisance, Sees. 135, 137, 139;

15

Wood on Nuisances, Sees. 505, 506, 507 ;

Richards v. Washington Terminal Company, 233 U. S.

546;

Tucker v. V. S. & P. R.R. Co., 125 La. 689, 51 So. 689.

Point 2

The operation of a lawfully constructed railroad includ-

ing facilities for the firing of its locomotives, in the absence

of negligence, does not by reason of attendant smoke or

other annoyances necessarily incident thereto constitute

an actionable nuisance.

Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546,

Catholic Church v. Penn. RR Co., 207 F. 897,

Baltimore & P. R. Co. v. Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317,

Northern Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635,

Beseman v. Penn. RR Co., 50 N. J. L. 235,

Kimball v. Guy A. Thompson, Trustee Missouri Pacific

RR Co., 165 F. (2d) 677,

Tucker v. V. S. & P. RR Co., 125 La. 689; 51 So. 689,

McGee v. Y. d M. V. RR Co., 19 So. (2d) 21.

Point 3

The decision here questioned is in conflict with the deci-

sion of this Court in Richards v. Washington Terminal

Company, 233 U.S. 546, and with the decision of the Court

of Appeals, Third Circuit, in Bunting v. Pennsylvania

Railroad Company, 203 F. 193, and with the decision of

the Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, in Catholic Church v.

Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 207 F. 897, and with the

decision of the Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, in Kim-

ball v. Thompson, Trustee, Missouri Pacific Railroad Com-

pany, 165 F. (2d) 677.

In Richards v. Washington Terminal Company, this

Court held:

16

‘*But the question remains, in cases of the class now

before us, what is to be deemed a private nuisance such

as amounts to a taking of property? And by great

and preponderant weight of judicial authority in those

states whose constitutions contain a prohibition of the

taking of private property for public use without

compensation, substantially in the form employed in

the Fifth Amendment, it has become established that

railroads constructed and operated for the public use,

although with private capital and for private gain, are

not subject to actions in behalf of neighboring property

owners for the ordinary damages attributable to the

operation of the railroad, in the absence of negligence.

Such roads are treated as public highway, and the pro-

prietors as public servants, with the exemption nor-

mally enjoyed by such servants from liability to pri-

vate suit, so far as concerns the incidental damages

accruing to owners of non-adjacent land through the

proper and skillful management and operation of the

railways. Any diminution of the value of property

not directly invaded nor particularly affected, but

sharing in the common burden of incidental damages

arising from the legalized nuisance, is held not to be a

‘taking’ within the constitutional provision. The im-

munity is limited to such damages as naturally and

unavoidably result from the proper conduct of the

road and are shared generally by property owners

whose lands lie within the range of the inconveniences

necessarily incident to proximity to a railroad. It

includes the noises and vibrations incident to the run-

ning of trains, the necessary emission of smoke and

sparks from the locomotives, and similar annoyance

inseparable from the normal and non-negligent opera-

tion of a railroad. Northern Transportation Co. vy.

Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 25 L. Ed. 336; Besemen v, Penn-

sylvania RR Co., 50 N.J.L. 235, affirmed in 52 N.J.L.

221.’’ (Italics ours.)

‘*The immunity from liability for incidental injuries

is attended with a considerable degree of hardship to

the private landowner, and has not been adopted with-

P

out some judicial protest. But, as pointed out by Chief

Justice Beasley in the Beseman case, 50 N.J.L. at

page 238, if railroad companies were liable to suit

| for such damages upon the theory that with respect to

them the company is a tort-feasor, the practical result

would be to bring the operation of railroads to a stand-

still. And, on the whole, the doctrine has become so

well established that it amounts to a rule of property,

and should be modified, if at all, only by the law-mak-

ing power.’’

17

In Bunting v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, Court of

Appeals, Third Circuit, 203 F. 193, it was held:

The proposition on which the plaintiff’s case is put

is that the defendant company has been negligent in

firing these engines where they stood, and in going

in and out of Broad Street station, so as to produce

an unnecessary and avoidable quantity of smoke, con-

stituting the nuisance complained of. This negligence

is charged in two respects, namely, in making use of

a variety of fuel on these engines while so standing,

or while going in and out of the Broad Street tunnel,

which emits, when burning, a large and unnecessary

amount of smoke, and also in the manner in which its

employees handle the furnaces and fires in its said

locomotives and shops, and in omitting such devices

and safeguards as would prevent such excessive pro-

duction of smoke.

‘‘As to its manner of using bituminous coal, the jury

found in favor of the railroad, and that it was guilty

of no negligence in that respect. But it is contended

the trial judge erred in withdrawing from the jury the

question whether, in spite of this non-negligent use of

bituminous coal, the railroad was guilty of negligence

in not substituting a coke or anthracite coal therefor.

We have given this contention the deliberation and

thorough consideration which so grave and far-reach-

ing a question demands. We are not convinced, how-

ever, that error was committed by the court’s action

in the premises.”’

18

After commenting on the testimony relative to the use

of coke by other railroads, the court said, at page 196:

“We do not mean to find that a general usage is an

exclusive or final test in the premises, but that, where

plaintiff undertakes to show, in a business so large

and wide-extended as railroads, what has been done

by other railroads as a test or standard of duty for

the defendant, it must be made evident that what is

proposed is not only scientifically practicable, but also

economically and financially sound.”’

The court continued at the bottom of pages 197 and 198:

‘‘The plaintiff’s case, as set forth in the statement

of claim and as tried in the court below, as we have

seen, rested solely upon two grounds: First, that by

the use of a different kind of fuel in the operation of

these locomotives, the injury complained of could have

been avoided and therefore that failure to use such

fuel was negligent.

‘Second, that it was negligence upon the part of the

railroad company’s servants, in the operation and man-

agement of these locomotives, and particularly in the

operation and management of the fire thereon, which

caused an undue and excessive emission of smoke.

“It was not claimed in the pleadings nor seriously

contended in argument, that defendant was liable, as

for a nuisance, for maintaining its tracks, roundhouse

and terminal in the place and position in which they

were maintained. Liability was based on the specific

charges of negligence in using a fuel that produced

an unnecessary amount of smoke, and in not using rea-

sonable care in firing the locomotives, so as to prevent

the unnecessary emission of such smoke. In this

salient feature, this case differs from that of the

Baltimore & P. Ry. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108

U. S. 317, 27 L. Ed. 739, cited by plaintiffs in error.”’

[iiss

19

The court then discussed the facts involved in Baltimore

and P. R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, supra, and com-

mented, pages 198-9:

‘There is nothing in the report of the case to show

that the action was maintained for, or that there was

any question as to, the mere negligent use of the shops

and premises of the defendant in consequence of which

negligent use the nuisance arose. It was not the neg-

ligent use of lawfully maintained shops and round-

house, but the maintenance itself of such shops in such

close proximity to the church that the necessary and

non-negligent use and occupation thereof constituted

the injury complained of. It was the placing and main-

tenance of these works themselves so close to the

church property, with their necessary and unavoidable

accompaniments of noise, steam and smoke, and ob-

struction on the tracks entering the same, that consti-

tuted the nuisance. Such works could have been and

should have been erected elsewhere.’’

In Catholic Church v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company,

Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, the Court held:

“It may be stated, therefore, as a principle well

established by reason and authority, that the conse-

quential, incidental and unavoidable annoyance or dam-

age resulting to the occupiers of land adjacent to a

duly authorized railroad, from its non-negligent and

careful operation, does not constitute an actionable

nuisance. It is also equally well established that, where

such damages are the result of the want of due care

and skill in the conduct and operation of the railroad,

the defendant company is liable to those injured

thereby.’’

In Kimball v. Thompson, Trustee, Missouri Pacific Rail-

road Company, the Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, held:

‘“‘No citation of authority is necessary to demon-

strate that in so far as the smoke, soot, ete. thrown

20

upon plaintiffs’ property are due to the proximity of

their property to the railroad tracks there can be no

recovery of damages. Such injury as results from that

fact is ‘common to the public at large’. Any difference

in amount is one of degree only. Carroll v. Wisconsin

Cent. R. Co., 40 Minn. 168, 41 N. W. 661, 662. All homes

constructed near a railroad or acquired after the rail-

road has been located and put in use are subject to the

inconveniences necessarily incident to the reasonable

operation of the railroad as a public utility. See Louis-

ville & N. Terminal Co. v. Lellysett, 114 Tenn. 368, 85

S. W. 881, 1 L. R. A., N. S., 49 and cases cited.

‘‘We next inquire what damage, if any, is recover-

able because four or five times a day, an engine is

spotted near plaintiffs’ property when it might

have been spotted a little further south toward Grace

Street. The undisputed evidence, as stated supra,

shows that homes are built up all along the bank on

which plaintiffs’ house stands south to Grace Street.

But plaintiff George F. Kimball testified with reference

to the relative amount of smoke and soot cast upon his

house by the standing engines that ‘We have the cor-

ner house and our house gets it worst’. Again, the

excess complained of is one of degree only. When

engines are spotted farther south for similar neces-

sary purposes the neighboring property ‘gets it worst’.

In other words, the injury complained of is ‘common

to the public’ whose property is situated as are plain-

tiffs’ premises near the switchyard.’’

The magnitude of the issue here present, its general

importance, affecting so seriously and adversely the opera-

tions of petitioner and other rail transportation systems,

using coal-burning engines for motive power, and the appar-

ent conflict of the decision here sought to be reviewed with

the decisions in Richards v. Washington Terminal Co. and

in Bunting v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, and in

Catholic Church v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, con-

21

stitute, we submit, special and important considerations

which justify if they do not compel the granting of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

JosepH H. Wricut,

135 East Eleventh Place,

Chicago, Illinois;

Cuartes A. HeELseE.t,

135 East Eleventh Place,

Chicago, Illinois;

A. B. Freyer,

First National Bank Bldg.,

Shreveport, Louisiana;

M. C. THompson,

Bernhardt Building,

Monroe, Louisiana.

(5854)

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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