Petition for A Writ of Certiorari — Clougherty v. James Vernor Co.

Supreme Court brief1951

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

: Bis RIK AE RE ‘

iD, Ayaan Ree ae th eee LYNN Y

Cre

i A ae eee

“tage

SERA Nee eT CRN Te

INDEX

NE NE ke aed sch abte Ket eedee kb a eae

SUR ae nd Eo i ae oben) eS Me as

NE NE i's ks op enleeneuces ete kbe aoe

EE oe pee Pannen eee

NE seal te Raina e Ww ah duns oe Rae ue

I i OUNINS 55 5 0nd sekvaee suckcaroune

Reasons for granting the writ....................

EER Rr ORE SES Dev Cones ej aa ER ee EH

CITATIONS

Cases:

Borden Co. v. Borella, 325 U. S. 679, 65 S. Ct. 1223

Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U. S. 697,

ee GELS CNA aed awk knees keen vans

D. A. Schulte v. Gangi, 328 U. S. 108, 66 S. Ct. 925

Dize v. Maddrix (C. A. 4), 144 F. 2d 584.........

Enterprise Box Co. v. Fleming (C. A. 5), 125 F.

a Ub ake Oa. n cures ts ibius aubmauens

Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517, 62'S. Ct.

EE Wri wk icoasd sig hci A cas Maa ROAD ans

Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 327 U.

Oe ee ee a I is ovine ce ek Kin ee as

Roland Electric Co. v. Walling, 326 U. S. 657, 66

es ME 5 FN 4 oan chee dacayeas ueeeeuss

Warren-Bradshaw Co. v. Hall, 317 U. S. 88, 63 S.

Se EN x ehccs vine vheks kan cue phe weee eens

Western Union v. Lenroot, 323 U. S. 490, 65 S. Ct.

8-13

ii

Page

Federal Statutes:

Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ec. 676, 52 Stat.

1060, 29 U.S. C., See. 201:

a Fe ee ere re rer Tree 3

re peer rr. ce reer 3

errr errr er Tere rrr 4

Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949, Act

of October 26, 1949, c. 736, 63 Stat. 910, 29 U.

S. C., See. 201:

BE a bs. dn ote wate aeweehawecsentees 3, 10

Se fo hee sree Perret eer 4

Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 84, 29 U.S.

C. 260:

a Mende arava, al aa 4,12

Judicial Code, Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat.

a a acai: 2

RM NR occ uc san nean divin 2

<=

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1950

JOHN P. CLOUGHERTY, in behalf of himself and other

presert and former employees, similarily situated,

of the defendant corporation,

Petitioners,

vs.

JAMES VERNOR COMPANY,

a Michigan corporation,

Respondent

—>———_

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF AP-

PEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

eS ee

John P. Clougherty, in behalf of himself and other

employees, similarly situated, prays that a writ of cer-

tiorari issue to review the judgment of the Cireuit Court

of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit entered in this case on

February 19, 1951. Review is sought of that part of the

judgment pertinent to the questions hereafter presented.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the District Court (R. 157-168) is re-

ported at 74 F. Supp. 364. The opinion of the Court of

Appeals (R. 182-190) is reported at 187 F. 2d. 288,

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on

February 19, 1951. The jurisdiction of this Court is in-

voked under Title 28, Section 1254 (1), United States Code

pursuant to the Judicial Code, Act of June 25, 1948 (Ch.

646, 62 Stat. 928, See. 1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Where used, empty bottles belonging to and bearing

the label of a ginger ale manufacturer doing business

throughout Michigan and in interstate commerce, are col-

lected and transported by employees of the manufacturer

from points within the state to the plant of the manufac-

turer in the state, to be used by the manufacturer for the

production of ginger ale and as containers for its interstate

and intrastate distribution, are such employees who per-

form the labor of collecting and transporting such bottles

engaged in the production of ‘‘goods for commerce”’ or in

‘‘any process or occupation necessary to the production

thereof?’ within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards

Act of 1938?

2. Whether bottles used by a manufacturer in the manu-

facture and distribution of ginger ale are ‘‘goods’’ within

the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.

re roars aor RaINES ——

3

3. Whether a judgment for unpaid overtime compensa-

tion under the Act should include interest from the date

of the accrual of the claim when no liquidated damages

are awarded.

STATUTE INVOLVED

The statute involved is the ‘‘Fair Labor Standards Act

of 1938”’ as a:nended, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U. S. C. 201 ff. The

pertinent portions of the statute involved are:

“See. 3 (i) ‘Goods’ means goods (including

ships and marine equipment), wares, products,

commodities, merchandise, or articles or subjects

of commerce of any character, or any part or in-

gredient thereof, but does not include goods after

their delivery into the actual physical possession

of the ultimate consumer thereof other than a pro-

ducer, manufacturer or processor thereof.’’

See. 3 (j) ‘*Produced’’ means produced, manu-

faetured, mined, handled, or in any other manner

worked on in any State; and for the purposes of

this Act (Sees. 201 to 219 of this title) an employee

shall be deemed to have been engaged in the pro-

duction of goods if such employee was employed

in producing, manufacturing, mining, handling,

transporting, or in any other manner working on

such goods, or in any process or occupation neces-

sary to the production thereof, in any State.”’

Involved also may be Section 3 (j) of the Fair Labor Stand-

ards Amendments of 1949:

‘¢*Produced’ means produced, manufactured,

mined, handled, or in any other manner worked on™

in any State: and for the purposes of this Act an

employee shall be deemed to have been engaged in

the production of goods if such employee was em-

ployed in producing, manufacturing, mining, han-

+

dling, transporting, or in any other manner work-

ing on such goods, or in any closely related process

or occupation directly essential to the production

thereof, in any State.”’

although Section 16 (d) of the Amendments of 1949 pro-

vides :

‘‘No amendment made by this Act shall affect

any penalty or liability with respect to any act or

omission occurring prior to the effective date of

this Act.”’

Also involved is Section 16 (b) of the ‘‘Fair Labor

Standards Act’’:

‘ ‘‘Any employer who violates the provisions of

See. 6 or See. 7 of this Act shall be liable to the

employee or employees affected in the amount of

their unpaid minimum wages or their unpaid over-

time compensation as the case may be and in an

additional equal amount as liquidated damages.”’

amended by Section 11 of the ‘‘Portal-to-Portal Act of

1947’’, Title 29, U. S. C. 260:

‘‘In any action commenced prior to or on or

after the date of the enactment of this Act (May

14, 1947) to recover minimum wages, unpaid over-

time compensation, or liquidated damages under the

Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 as amended, if

the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court

that the act or omission giving rise to such action

was in good faith and that he had reasonable

grounds for believing that his act or omission was

not a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act °

of 1938, as amended, the court may in its sound

discretion award no liquidated damages or award

any amount thereof not to exceed the amount speci-

fied in Section 16 (b) of such Act.’’

STATEMENT

1. This is an action for overtime compensation, brought

under Section 216 (b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of

1938, 29 U. S. C. 216 (b). It is conceded that the employees

involved have worked more hours than specified in Sec-

tion 7 of the Act, Title 29, U. S. C. 207, and have not re-

ceived statutory compensation (R. 182).

s

2. The period involved in these proceedings covers

March 23, 1939 to December 31, 1944.

3. The respondent manufactures gingerale at its plant

in Detroit (R. 15, 105). It distributes its product, prin-

cipally as bottle goods, in interstate commerce through

its branches located at Toledo, Cincinnati, Akron, Dayton,

Cleveland, and Columbus, Ohio, Buffalo, New York, and

Erie Pennsylvania (R. 126). Interstate distribution

amounts to some 14% to 20% of the respondent’s business

(R. 153, 184). It distributes its product, principally as

bottle goods, in intrastate commerce through approxi-

mately 6,000 to 8,000 wholesale outlets in Detroit (R. 106)

and through its branches in Port Huron, Lansing, Saginaw,

Jackson, Ann Arbor, and Monroe, Michigan (R. 24).

4. The respondent distributes hundreds of millions of

bottles of its product yearly (R. 135). Each bottle bears

the label of the respondent company. Since 1941 the label

has been embossed or integrated into the bottle (R. 40, 41,

42).

5. The respondent owns the bottles in which the ginger

ale is manufactured and distributed (R. 31, 32, 43, 120).

To insure the return of the empty bottles for continued use

by the respondent, a monetary deposit is charged (R. 36,

113).

6

6. The petitioners make deliveries of filled bottles in the

city of Detroit and in the state of Michigan (R. 25, 122).

The petitioners pick up empty bottles at the time delivery

of filled bottles is made at each stop (R. 31, 36, 38, 39, 45,

47, 53). Empty bottles so picked up by the petitioners

are transported back to the plant of the respondent com-

pany by truck (R. 27, 57). The number of empty bottles

picked up by the petitioners corresponds substantially with

the number of filled bottles delivered (R. 36). About 3%

of the bottles are lost or destroyed in the course of delivery

and return (R. 117, 121). New bottles are employed to

make up for the loss and to take care of increased con-

sumer demand (R. 117). New and used bottles are handled

alike in processing (R. 120).

7. On returning to the plant with the empty bottles,

the body of the truck driven by the petitioners is lifted

from the chassis by a crane and swung into the plant and

deposited on a dolly manned by other employees of the

respondent (R. 28, 185). The bottles so returned from

points within the state of Michigan are intermingled with

bottles returned from points outside the state of Michigan

(R. 28). The intermingling of bottles used for interstate

and intrastate commerce is conceded (R. 49, 50, 185). The

empty bottles so returned and so intermingled are placed

in the stockroom and from there withdrawn to be put into

readiness for process and manufacture. They are taken

by conveyor to the bottling department where they are

washed, then to the syruper where the syrup is put into

the bottles, then to the filler machine where carbonated

water is added to the syrup, then to the crowning or cap-

ping machine, and then to the spinner. The spinner mixes

or agitates the contents or ingredients in the bottle to make

sure that the contents or ingredients are thoroughly mixed

and distributed throughout the bottle (R. 30, 31, 32, 120,

— .

7

184). After the bottles are filled and mixed, they are placed

in cases and conveyed to the shipping room for delivery to

the respective outlets of the company in Michigan and in

other states (R. 33, 34, 133).

8. The District Court found that certain of the peti-

tioners who participated in the delivery of ginger ale from

the respondent’s plant to the docks of vessels that ply the

Great Lakes were engaged in interstate commerce (R. 167).

The Court of Appeals affirmed this finding (R. 189). The

District Court awarded interest to such petitioners on their

respective claims from the date of the rendition of its

opinion (R. 170). Such petitioners claimed that they should

have been awarded interest from the date of the accrual of

their claims and presented such question on appeal to the

Court of Appeals (R. 174). The Court of Appeals modified

the allowance of interest from the date of the rendition of

the opinion to allow interest only from the date of rendi-

tion of the judgment (R. 189, 190).

SPECIFICATION OF ERRORS TO BE URGED

The Court of Appeals erred:

1. In holding that bottles ‘‘necessary not merely to hold

the product but actually to produce it’’ (R. 187) are not

‘*goods’’ contemplated by the Act.

’

2. In holding that the bottles are not “goods” within

the contemplation of the Act because the respondent neither

makes nor sells the bottles.

3. In holding that the petitioners were not engaged in

the ‘‘production of goods’’ or in ‘‘any process or occupa-

tion necessary to the production thereof’’ because their

handling of the bottles preceded the process of manufactur-

ing ginger ale.

8

4. In holding that ‘‘returning the empties to the plant

for a use which is partially interstate’’ (R. 187) does not

have such a close and immediate tie with the process of

production so as to constitute an occupation necessary to

the production of goods tor commerce.

5. In not distinguishing the handling and transporta-

iton of the empty bottles to the plant preliminary to the

manufacturing process of ginger ale, from the handling

that accomplishes the interstate transit or movement in

commerce itself.

6. In affirming the District Court on the first and sec-

ond questions here presented.

7. In denying interest from the date of the accrual of

their claims to the petitioners in whose favor a judgment

was rendered by the District Court without liquidated dam-

ages.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. CONFLICT WITH APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT. The decision of

the Court of Appeals erases the final clause of Section 3 (j)

of the Act of 1938 and renders meaningless the final clause

of Section 3 (j) of the Amendments of 1949. Despite its

findings that the empties are returned to the plant for a use

which is partially interstate (R. 187) and that the bottles

are necessary not merely to hold the product but to ateually

produce it (R. 187), the Court of Appeals holds that the

drivers are not covered by the Act because their handling

and transporting of the empty bottles back to the plant

preceded the process of producing ginger ale and is no part

of the production of ginger ale. It further holds that peti-

tioners are not covered by the Act because they did not

participate in the physical process of making ginger ale.

9

These holdings are in conflict with pertinent decisions of

the Supreme Court.

Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517, 62 S. Ct.

1116;

Roland Electric Co. v. Walling, 326 U. S. 657, 66

S. Ct. 413;

Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 327

U.S. 173, 66 S. Ct. 379;

Borden Co. v. Borella, 325 U.S. 679, 65 S. Ct. 1223;

Warren-Bradshaw Co. v. Hall, 317 U. S. 88, 63

S. Ct. 125;

D. A. Schulte v. Gangi, 328 U. S. 108, 66 S. Ct.

925.

If the respondent did not have the empty bottles re-

turned by its employees it would have been handicapped

in its manufacture and distribution of ginger ale, especially

during the war years covered by this action when there

was a shortage of bottles (R. 127, 157). Indeed, there were

periods of time when the respondent did not have a single

case of new bottles in its inventory (R. 155). During these

periods the respondent’s manufacturing and distributive

processes would have been paralyzed but for the activi-

ties of the petitioners. The activities of the petitioners were

not only necessary but were also ‘‘closely mlated’’ and

‘*directly essential to production.’’

1In Kirschbaum v. Walling, supra, the Supreme Court states at 316

U. S. 524: “Nor can we find in the Act, as do the petitioners, any require-

ment that employees must themselves participate in the physical pro-

cess of the making of the goods before they can be regarded as engaged

in their production. Such a construction erases the final clause of Sec-

tion 3 (j) which includes employees engaged ‘in any process or occupa-

tion necessary to the production’ and thereby does not limit the scope of

the statute to the preceding clause which deals with employees ‘in any

other manner working on such goods.’ ”

10

2. The decision of the Court of Appeals erroneously

extends the decision of the Supreme Court in Western

Uman v. Lenroot, 323 U. 8. 490, 65 S. Ct. 335, to include

the transportation of goods to the plant of the respondent

prior to the completion of the manufacturing process in

the category of ‘‘the handling or working on which ac-

complishes the interstate transit or movement in commerce

itself.’’

3. The decision of the Court of Appeals has erroneously

interpreted the statutory definition of ‘‘goods.’’ The inter-

pretation of the Court of Appeals limits the definition to

goods made or sold by an employer. This was obviously

not the legislative intent and is in apparent conflict with

applicable decisions of the Supreme Court.

Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., supra;

Roland Electric Co. v. Walling supra.

In neither of these cases were the goods made or sold by

the employer. In the case at bar, the collection, return,

washing, and filling of the bottles were all steps that re-

sulted in the ultimate product—a bottle of ginger ale.

4. IMPORTANT QUESTIONS OF FEDERAL LAW

WHICH SHOULD BE SETTLED BY THIS COURT. In

view of the Amendments of 1949 restricting the statutory

definition of ‘‘produced”’ in Section 3 (j) of the Act from

“fany process or occupation necessary to the production

thereof’’ to ‘‘closely related process or occupation directly

essential to the production’’, the Court of Appeals has

decided an important question of Federal law which should

be settled by this Court. The petitioners believe that even

under the more restricted test it seems plain that bringing

bottles to a plant for use in the manufacture, production

and distribution of bottled beverages is ‘‘closely related’’

11

and ‘‘directly essential’’ to such production. If the deci-

sion of the Circuit Court of Appeals stands uncorrected,

the scope of the Fair Labor Standards Act will be limited

to the preceding clause in Section 3 (j) which deals with

employees ‘‘in any other manner working on such goods.’’

A closer relationship or tie between steps preparatory to

manufacture or actual production and actual production

itself than in the instant case is almost inconceivable. If

such relationship is denied under the less limited definition

of the Act prior to the Amendment of 1949, then pursuant

to the amendment every activity that precedes the process

of actual manufacture of the goods sold by the interstate

shipper will be beyond the scope of the Act. Compare

Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 at 525, 62 S. Ct. 1116

at 1121, where it is held that the employees (persons

charged with the effective maintenance of a loft building,

the tenants of which are principally engaged in the pro-

duction of goods for interstate commerce) had such a close

and immediate tie with the process of production for com-

merce and were such an essential part of it that the em-

ployees were engaged in an occupation necessary to the

production of goods for commerce. Compare also Roland

Electric Co. v. Walling, 326 U. S. 607, 66 S. Ct. 413.

5. The Court of Appeals held that the petitioners in

whose favor a judgment was rendered without liquidated

damages were not entitled to interest from the date of the

accrual of their respective claims. Interest is allowed only

from the date of the rendition oi the judgment by the Dis-

trict Court. The decision is predicated upon the state-

ment that the Fair Labor Standards Act makes no provi-

sion for interest, and upon the decision of this Court in

Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U. S. 697, 65 S. Ct.

895. It should be noted that in Brooklyn Savings Bank v.

O’Neil the claimant was awarded statutory liquidated-dam-

12

ages, and interest was disallowed solely on the grounds

that the statutory liquidated damages served the same pur-

pose as interest, and that to allow interest on liquidated

damages would be to grant double compensation for dam-

ages. Inasmuch as the Brooklyn Savings Bank case was

decided before Section 11 of the Portal-to-Portal Act of

1947 was enacted, the question of an employee’s right to

interest on a claim for unpaid compensation when he is

disallowed liquidated damages is again unanswered by

any decision of this Court.

6. CONFLICT WITH THE DECISIONS OF THE

CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEAL OF THE FOURTH

AND FIFTH CIRCUITS. The statement by the Court of

Appeals:

‘‘Here the purely intrastate delivery of filled

and pick-up of empty bottles does not have such a

close and immediate. tie with the process of pro-

duction as to enable the court to hold these drivers

to be engaged in an occupation necessary to the

production of goods for commerce * * * their ac-

tivities constitute a separate loca] distribution

* 8 @))

disregards the principal fact that the pick-up of the empty

bottles and the delivery of such empties to the plant make

available to a ginger ale manufacturer containers in which

ginger ale is manufactured and then distributed in inter-

state commerce. This holding abnegates the legal effect of

all activity preparatory to putting goods into readiness for

interstate commerce which occurs prior to the manufacture

of goods which are the subject of interstate commerce.

This holding is in conflict with a related decision in the

Fifth Cireuit, Enterprise Box Co. v. Fleming, 125 F. 2d

897 (Cert. Den. 316 U. S. 704) where a manufacturer pro-

duced and sold boxes locally to a producer of cigars as

13

containers for cigars shipped in interstate commerce. Like-

wise the holding is in conflict with a decision of the Fourth

Cireuit, Dize v. Maddria, 144 F. 2d 584, where the subject

matter manufactured were boxes and barrels used as con-

tainers to hold seafood shipped in interstate commerce. It

should be noted that neither the cigar nor the sea food

required a container ‘‘actually to produce it’’ and further,

the cigars at any rate could be shipped in interstate com-

merce without the container involved.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, this petition for a writ of cer-

tiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

ARTHUR J. HASS,

1910 Buhl Building,

Detroit 26, Michigan,

Attorney for Petitioners.

April 30, 1951.

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1950

——>———_

No. MH 55

a. a

JOHN P. CLOUGHERTY, in behalf of himself and other

present and former employees, similarily situated,

of the defendant corporation,

Petitioners,

vs.

JAMES VERNOR COMPANY,

a Michigan corporation,

Respondent

a

RESPONDENT’S OBJECTIONS TO THE PETI-

TION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH

CIRCUIT

—_—__o——_

WILBER M. BRUCKER,

2850 Penobscot Building,

Detroit 26, Michigan,

Attorney for Respondent.

Interstate Brief & Reeord Co., 642 Beaubien S&t., Detroit 26, Michigan

eee

Gifice-Suprame Court, |

iD

SUBJECT INDEX

Page

EE Perey er err er ye rey 16

Counter-Statement of Facts.............seeeeeeee 3-6

Counter-Statement of Questions Presented........ 2-3

SE. iii ib 5 Kon coeds haps onan cuese a bASOhs 2

No Important Question of Federal Law is Involved

Ce PS in bs b hedertteerveerenecksewees 7-8

Opinion Below ...........cceccecssscvccsesccons 2

Respondent’s Objections to Petitioners’ Statements

Contained in Their Specifications of Errors.... 9-10

Respondent’s Objections to Petitioners’ Reasons for

Granting the Wit... ..ccescscscsnesscsccess 10-16

DE ok cask rca enakcaetevsaeeeres 3

INDEX TO AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases

Page

Borden Co. v. Borella, 325 U. S. 679, 65 S. Ct. 1223. . 11

Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neill (1944), 324 U.S.

OF cheb k pekeasees yoiear Gikeiuuatnietakeasens 15

Dise v. Maddrix, 144 F’. 2d S64... 0... ccc sccavvees 15

Enterprise Box Co. v. Fleming, 125 F. 2d 827...... 15

Keen v. Mid-Continental Petroleum Corp. (1945),

(D. C. No. Iowa), 63 F. Supp. 120............. 15

Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 62 S. Ct. 1116 11, 14

Martino v. Mich. Window Cleaning Co., 327 U. S.

Se es US eA binned pedibeseagess 11

Roland Electric Co. v. Walling, 326 U. S. 657, 66 S.

Si EE ca Va abit a web patina khuee beet eee newes 11,14

D. A. Schulte Co. v. Gangi, 328 U. S. 108, 66 S. Ct

Beak hades bare REE Sb Ud Ve Naa eaenewen 11

Warren-Bradshaw Co. v. Hall, 317 U. S. 88, 63 S. Ct

BE Ch cok rik wuhansak Whad deed oad Bae 11

Western Union v. Lenroot, 323 U. S. 490, 65 S. Ct

SK WAaNG Gk Rohde SUMRSERGN Lawes eae eeRs 12

Statutes

Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Sec. 3 (i) and

3 (j), 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S. C. 201 ff.......... :

Michigan Statutes Annotated, Sec. 19.11........... 15

TEED AMOR i s s'ks oo alieha ddd Mae Sohne sewes 15

United States Code, Title 28, See. 811..............

—

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1950

a a

No. 730

searerves saint

JOHN P. CLOUGHERTY, in behalf of himself and other

present and former employees, similarily situated,

of the defendant corporation,

Petitioners, *

vs.

JAMES VERNOR COMPANY,

a Michigan corporation,

Respondent

ane snes

RESPONDENT'S OBJECTIONS TO THE PETI-

TION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH

CIRCUIT

>

James Vernor Company, respondent, objects to the Peti-

tion filed herein for a Writ of Certiorari to review the

judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit entered in this ease on February 19, 1951.

Respondent will follow the outline used in the Petition

in its objections to the Petition.

EPS ETS aaa a rar strc:

RNS ema PERLE RT AAD UN ee AS, Bee an, eer ot SR ean any ak 2 : 2

OPINION BELOW

This statement by petitioners is correct.

JURISDICTION

This statement by petitioners is correct.

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS

PRESENTED

(Respondent cannot accept the statement by petitioners)

1. Where a ginger ale manufacturer is engaged in dis-

tributing ginger ale intrastate, by city drivers in bottles

to local retail outlets, and such city drivers pick up and

bring back therefrom empty bottles which are stored in

a common stock pile at the manufacturer’s plant along with

other empty bottles returned from company branches lo-

cated in other states, are the city drivers who pick up and

return (intrastate) such empty bottles from the local retail

outlets to the manufacturer’s plant engaged in ‘‘the pro-

duction of goods for commerce’’ within the meaning of the

Fair Labor Standards Act?

2. Where a ginger ale manufacturer is engaged in dis-

tributing intrastate by city drivers ginger ale in bottles to

local retail outlets and such city drivers pick up and bring

back therefrom empty bottles which are stored in a com-

mon stock pile at the manufacturer’s plant with other

empty bottles returned from company branches located

in other states, are the empty bottles, picked up at the local

retail outlets, ‘‘goods’’ within the meaning of the Fair

Labor Standards Act? ©

3

3. Where a judgment is rendered by the District Court

for overtime compensation under the Act, but no liqui-

dated damages are awarded, should interest start from the

date of the accrual of the claim or the date of the judgment

of the District Court?

STATUTE INVOLVED

Section 3 (i) and 3 (j) of the Fair Labor Standards Act

of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U. 8. C. 201 ff are involved.

Section 3 (j) of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments

of 1949 does not govern inasmuch as the period for which

recovery is sought is from March 23, 1939 to December

31, 1944.

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS

(Respondent admits paragraphs 1, 2, and 8 of Petitioner’s

“Statement” but cannot accept the other paragraphs there-

of because they are wholly inadequate to a proper under-

standing of the case.)

(Unless otherwise clearly shown by context, figures in parentheses

refer to pages of the printed record)

Respondent adopts the statement of the Circuit Court

(184-187) and the District Court (158, 159). For a more

adequate counter-statement of facts, respondent submits

the following:

A. The James Vernor Company, respondent, has its

manufacturing plant at 239 Woodward Avenue, Detroit,

Michigan, and is engaged in the manufacture and sale of

a soft drink beverage called ‘‘Vernor’s Ginger Ale’’ (105).

The product is bottled in eight-ounce and twenty-four-ounce

bottles, which are carried in cardboard cartons (25). Each

carton contains two dozen eight-ounce bottles, or one dozen

twenty-four-ounce bottles (25). A small amount of draft

7

4

ginger ale is also produced and carried in large eylindrical

tanks (25).

B. A large stock pile of empty bottles is usually main-

tained at the company’s manufacturing plant (33, 35, 117).

Four rooms twenty feet wide and from eighty to ninety

feet long are required to store the cases of empty bottles

(119). The machine which puts ginger ale into the bottles

does not run continually (121) and the empty bottles are

stored for a matter of days, weeks or months, depending

upon the need for production (119). Before starting the

bottling machine, an adequate supply of empty bottles

is requisitioned from the stock pile (33, 120). These empty

bottles are then placed upon a conveyor which carries them

from the bottle storage rooms on the upper floors down to

the ‘‘soaker and rinser’’ where they are thoroughly cleaned,

sterilized and rinsed (39-40, 120). From there the empty

bottles proceed by conveyor to the syrup machine where

extract and syrup are put in the bottles. From there the

bottles go by conveyor to the filling machine where car-

bonated water is added in sufficient quantity. From there

the bottles go by conveyor to the crowning machine where

they are securely capped (120). Thereafter the bottles

go to the ‘‘spinner’’ where the bottles are agitated as an

added precaution so as to mix the extract and syrup with

carbonated water (31). The bottles of ginger ale are then

placed in cardboard cases, which proceed by conveyor to the

stock room where the filled cases are placed in stock (33,

35, 120). The filled cases remain in stock until they are

requisitioned for shipment by the shipping department (33,

120).

C. The company serves from 6,000 to 8,000 wholesale

outlets in Detroit (106). It solicits and receives numerous

orders from grocery stores, drug stores and other retail

establishments in Detroit—mostly by telephone (106). In

5

filling such orders, a requisition is made by the shipping de-

partment upon the stock room, whereupon cases of ginger

ale are placed on the conveyor and sent to the shipping

room floor (33, 106). There, the cases are loaded on a truck

body, which in turn is lifted by a crane and placed upon a

truck chassis waiting outside on the street (24, 113). In this

manner the city driver receives a load of cases containing

bottles filled with ginger ale ready for him to deliver (24,

113). The city driver is given two copies of the orders

for delivery of his load of ginger ale, arranged in the se-

quence in which he is to deliver the same, and proceeds to

drive his truck and follow such orders (25). At each stop

the city driver delivers one or more cases of ginger ale

to the retail store (31). The number of cases of empty

bottles picked up by the city driver corresponds substan-

tially with the number of filled cases delivered by him (31,

36, 114). Upon his return to the plant with eases of empty

bottles, the truck body with cases of empty bottles is then

lifted from its chassis by the crane and brought inside the

plant (24, 114); the returned empty bottles are then un-

loaded by shipping floor employees (28) and proceed by

conveyor to the stock pile in the plant to be stored until

further use is required of them (33).

D. The defendant company owns its own bottles (117);

it purchases new bottles of both sizes from an out-of-state

glass-bottle manufacturing company (117). Such new bot-

tles are labelled with the company’s trade-mark so that the

label is non-removable (40, 126). About three (3%) per

cent of the bottles put into use are lost, damaged, destroyed

or not returned (117, 121). This loss is offset by the con-

stant purchase of new bottles (121). Any increase in busi-

ness also requires the adding of new bottles to the inven-

tory (136, 137). The ownership of the cartons and bottles —

remains in the company and a small cash deposit equal

—

to the value of the bottle is required to induce the return

of empty bottles (36, 113).

E. During the period in question (March 23, 1939 to

December 31, 1944) the company manufactured its product

exclusively at its plant in the city of Detroit (126). The

company had eight branch warehouses in other cities in

Michigan as well as eight branch warehouses in three other

states to which the company shipped cases of ginger ale

which were manufactured at Detroit (126).

F. During the period in question (1939 to 1944, incl.)

the company shipped to its branch warehouses in other

states from 14% to 20% of all bottled ginger ale produced

by it (153). The balance—80% to 86%—was shipped in

Michigan to its branch warehouses and also to drug stores,

grocery stores and other retail stores and places of busi-

ness in Detroit where it finally reached the ultimate con-

sumer (126).

G. There is no segregation among empty bottles or

filled cases in the company’s stock piles between ginger ale

for interstate and intrastate shipment (29, 49). Filled

cases of ginger ale are requisitioned from the stock pile

and shipped either outside or inside the state of Michigan

as orders come for shipping (126).

H. In addition to city drivers there are city salesmen

(who are ‘‘peddlers’’, each having his own customers) (47,

48, 159), and city salesmen’s helpers (who assist the city

salesmen in handling their loads) (47, 159). City sales-

men’s helpers are employed by the company and not by the

driver-salesmen (48). Such helpers assist in delivering

the cartons of ginger ale to the retail stores and assist in

picking up cartons of empty bottles to return to the plant

(47, 48, 111, 112). Such helpers sometimes assist in driv-

ing the driver-salesmen’s trucks (45).

6

NO IMPORTANT QUESTION OF FEDERAL LAW

IS INVOLVED IN THE PETITION

1, The questions raised by petitioners have been. vir-

tually rendered moot since December 31, 1944, except for

petitioners’ claim for money recovery for the period prior

thereto.

The opinion of the Circuit Court states:

‘*All of those in classifications 1, 2 and 3 since

January 1, 1945, have been paid by defendant in

accordance with the provisions of the Fair Labor

Standards Act, being under a specific reservation

that the defendant is not legally liable to make these

payments. The period involved in the suit covers

March 23, 1939 to December 31, 1944.’’

These employees have been voluntarily included by the re-

spondent under the Act since January 1, 1945. Accord-

ingly, the opinion of the Circuit Court shows upon its face

that for the past 614 years there has been no existing prob-

lem of enforcement of the Act. Since December 31, 1944, the

— sole question of law concerning coverage of these drivers

under the Act has been rendered moot, except for peti-

tioners’ claim for money recovery for the period prior to

January 1, 1945.

2. The questions raised by petitioners have been vir-

tually rendered moot since the amendment of Section 3 (j)

of the Act in 1949—except for petitioner’s claim for money

recovery for the period prior to January 1, 1945. The

period involved in this section is from March 23, 1939 to

December 31, 1944 (184).

Section 3 (j) of the Act was amended in 1949 so as to

change the definition of the word ‘‘produced’’. As origi-

nally enacted, Section 3 (j) of the Act provided:

8

‘**Produced’ means ‘produced, manufactured,

mined, handled or in any other manner worked on

in any state and for the purposes of this chapter,

an employee shall be deemed to have been engaged

in the production of goods if such employee was

employed in producing, manufacturing, mining,

handling, transporting or in any other manner

working on such goods or in any process or oc-

cupation necessary to the production thereof im

any state.’’’ (Emphasis supplied.)

In 1949 Section 3 (j) of the Act was amended so as to

change its context and legal implications. It now reads

as follows:

‘**Produced’ means ‘produced, manufactured,

mined, handled, or in any other manner worked on

in any state; and for the purposes of this Act, an

employee shal] be deemed to have been engaged in

the production of goods if such employee was em-

ployed in producing, manufacturing, mining, han-

dling, transperting or in any other manner working

on such goods, or in any closely related process or

occupation directly essential to the production

thereof in any state.’’’ (Emphasis supplied.)

Far from being a question of important public conse-

quence, the meaning of the old Section 3 (j) has now be-

come virtually moot. While the opinion of this Court upon

the old Act would be interesting, it would not provide any

precedent for future litigants in the determination of ques-

tions which will arise hereafter under the amended Act.

The issues involved in this case are confined to the scope

of ‘‘produced”’ as it existed prior to the amendment of the

Act in 1949. No further claims can now arise under the

old act by reason of the expiration of the statute of limi-

tations.

RESPONDENT’S OBJECTIONS TO PETITIONERS’

STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN THEIR

SPECIFICATIONS OF ERRORS

While respondent recognizes that petitioners may state

their own ‘‘Specifications of Errors’’, nevertheless re-

spondent objects to those assertions which misconceive the

import of the Circuit Court’s decision and do not correctly

state the court’s conclusions. In order to avoid any con-

fusion, we wish to touch upon the first three specifications

which we believe to contain unjustified assumptions as to

the holding of the Cireuit Court.

1 and 2. The first and second specifications of error—

that the Circuit Court’s opinion was based upon the con-

cept that the bottles were not ‘‘goods’’ as contemplated

by the Act, is incomplete. The reasons for the court’s

decision are set forth at pages 187 and 188. It was there

concluded that the activity of the local drivers was not even

remotely connected with production and, therefore, the

local drivers were not engaged in the ‘‘production’”’ of

‘“goods’’. In so deciding, the Court noted, im addition, that

the Vernor Company was not manufacturing bottles and

therefore, bottles were not the sort of ‘‘goods’’ contem-

plated by the Act, so the drivers could be held to be pro-

ducing them. On the other hand, the petitioners attempt to

characterize the reasoning differently. They assert that the

Court concluded that these bottles were not ‘‘goods’’ within

the meaning of the Act and, therefore, despite the drivers’

connection with them, they could not be within the Act.

This entirely misconceives the gravamen of the Circuit

Court’s rulings.

3. This specification does not correctly state the basis

of the Circuit Court’s decision. It was not ruled, ipso

10

facto that because the handling of bottles preceded the

production of ginger ale, the employees were thereby out-

side the operation of the Act. On the contrary, relying upon

the record and the findings of fact in the district court, it

was quite apparent that the connection between the activi-

ties of local drivers did not bring them within the Act. In

the course of reaching this conclusion, the Court did com-

ment upon the fact that the picking up of empty bottles

preceded the production of ginger ale. However, this was

not the basis of the opinion—which was the remoteness of

the drivers’ activities (187, 188).

RESPONDENT'S OBJECTIONS TO PETITIONERS’

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. There is no conflict with applicable decisions of

United States Supreme Court. Petitioners claim that the

Cireuit Court ‘‘renders meaningless the final clause of

Section 3 (j) of the Amendments of 1949°’. This could not

be correct because the Cireuit Court specifically confined

its decision to Section 3 (j) of the old Fair Labor Stand-

ards Act of 1938, inasmuch as the period covered by the

claim is limited from March 28, 1939 to December 31,

1944 (184, 186).

Petitioners claim that the Cireuit Court ‘‘holds that

petitioners are not covered by the Act because they did not

participate in the physical process of making ginger ale.”’

This is an absolutely incorrect summary of the Circuit

Court’s holding. The lower court completely recognized

the principle that embraces maintenance employees who do

not participate in the physical process of making the

product, but the lower court also recognized the limita-

tions of this doctrine (187, 188).

11

Petitioners cite six decisions of the Supreme Court with

which they claim the instant decision is in conflict. All of

these cases embrace employees who may be termed ‘‘main-

tenance’’ employees of one kind or another. There is no

conflict with these holdings. The Supreme Court has

clearly indicated that the Act is not confined to employees

actually at the machine which fabricates the raw material

into articles of commerce. For this reason, maintenance

employees who contribute to production are considered

within the Act. Consequently Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316

U. S. 517, 62 S. Ct. 1116 falls into the logical pattern of

the rule. The mere fact that the employees of the owner of

a loft building did the maintenance work did not change the

character of their duties. The criterion of eligibility was

held to be the function of the individual employee him-

self. Also Martino _v. Mich. Window Cleaning Co., 327

U.S. 173, 66 S. Ct. 379, held that window washers employed

by an independent contractor but who served an industrial

plant were eligible under the Act as maintenance em-

ployees. In Borden Co. v. Borella, 325 U.S. 679, 65 S. Ct.

1223, the same principle controlled even though the offices

of the interstate producer were removed to a separate

establishment physically disassociated from the production

of milk in interstate commerce. In Warren-Bradshaw Co.

v. Hall, 317 U.S. 88, 63 S. Ct. 125, the same pattern was

followed as to employees who actually participated in

drilling an oil well which was completed by other employees

who did the same work. There is of course no analogy

between oil drillers and local city drivers returning empty

bottles. In D. A. Schulte Co. v. Gangt, 328 U.S. 108, 66'S.

Ct. 925, maintenance employees in a loft building were like-

. Wise embraced even though not employed by the manu-

facturer. Roland Electric Co. v. Walling, 326 U. S. 657, 66

S. Ct. 413, held that employees of an independent electric |

repair shop working upon electric motors and maintaining

12 .

the machines producing the company’s product were like-

wise eligible. However, the petitioners were in no sense

‘maintenance’? employees. There is no valid comparison

between local city drivers who are a part of a city delivery

system and the ‘‘maintenance’’ employees in the six cases

cited by petitioners.

2. The Circuit Court did not improperly ‘‘extend’’ the

decision of this Court in Western Union v. Lenroot, 323

U. S. 490, 65 S. Ct. 335. In Western Union v. Lenroot,

supra, messenger boys who picked up and delivered tele-

grams for transmission and also delivered the completed

message at the point of destination, were held to be out-

side the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act. That

decision directly involved the question of whether handling

or transporting, as such, standing alone, placed the em-

ployees within the provision of the Fair Labor Standards

Act. Certainly the contact of these employees in picking

up and delivering the message was as direct as that of the

city drivers who delivered ginger ale and picked up empty

bottles. The Supreme Court found that the telegrams were

goods but that the handling involved in the Western Union

case was not the kind contemplated in the Act. Mr. Justice

Jackson stated:

‘**If we go beyond this and assume that handling

for transit purposes is handling in production, we

encounter results which we think Congress could °

not have intended.’’

The Vernor employees, as a part of the city delivery sys-

tem, handled empty bottles for transit purposes. The empty

bottles were then stored in the stock pile at the company’s

plant. No clearer application of the Western Union case

could be found.

13

3. The Circuit Court did not erroneously interpret the

statutory definition of ‘‘goods’’.

Petitioners’ reliance upon Martino v. Michigan Window

Cleaning Co., supra, and Roland Electric Co. v. Walling,

supra, to establish that the bottles were ‘‘goods’’ is diffi-

cult to understand. In both cases, the employees involved

actually worked upon and wrought a change in the subject

of their employer’s business (windows were cleaned in

the Martino case and motors were rewound and repaired

in the Roland case). This was the subject of the employer’s

business. However, in the instant case the employees did

not ‘‘produce’’ bottles. The empty bottles had long since

been fabricated by the bottle manufacturers. These local

drivers by their activities did not change their character,

number, quality or content. The company itself was not a

producer of bottles. Its business was the production and

sale of ginger ale. The respondent could operate its plant

continuously for weeks and there would not be one more

empty bottle produced by reason of its activity. At best,

the bottle ultimately became the container of its product,

but this did not cause it to be ‘‘goods’’ or the subject

of commerce by respondent.

4. Petitioners have not pointed out any important ques-

tions to be settled by this Court.

Petitioners base their claim under this topic upon ‘‘the

Amendments of 1949 restricting the statutory definition of

‘produced’ in Section 3(j) of the Act.’’ We are at a loss

to know how petitioners can possibly be interested in the

‘Amendments of 1949’’, which occurred nearly 5 years

after December 31, 1944—the end of the period claimed by

petitioners in their suit.

Another strange circumstance is petitioners’ anxiety

to get a ruling under the ‘‘less limited definition’? prior to

SILLA RII UE AEs NH EET RG RG AE Re el eee Se

14

1949 in order to aid the future construction of Section 3

(j) of the Amendments of 1949. What interest do peti-

tioners have in assuming the role of the Secretary of

Labor in asserting an interest in future litigation under

the Amendments of 1949 when the period covered in their

suit is March 23, 1939 to December 31, 1944?

Petitioners’ citation of Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.

S. 517, 62 S. Ct. 1116, is clearly inapplicable to the instant

ease. In the Kirschbaum case the employees were mainten-

ance employees in a loft building. There is no similarity

between such employees and city drivers who pick up

empty bottles as a part of a local delivery system. Nor is

there a valid analogy between the instant case and Roland

Electric Co. v. Walling, 326 U. S. 657, 66 S. Ct. 413, where

the employees of an independent electric repair shop

actually worked upon the motors and maintained the ma-

chines producing the company’s product.

5. Allowance of interest from the date of rendition of

the judgment was proper. [Respondent does not concede

that the question of interest is properly before this Court

as a matter of independent jurisdiction—less than $200

being involved].

The granting of interest is controlled by Title 28 U. S.

C., Section 811, which provides:

‘Interest shall be allowed on any money judg-

ment in a civil case recovered in a district court.

Execution therefor may be leveled by the marshal,

in any case where, by the law in the state in which

such court is held, execution may be levied for in-

terest on judgments recovered in the courts of the

State. Such interest shall be calculated from the

date of the entry of the judqment at the vate al-

lowed by state law.’’ (Emphasis supplied.)

TRAN PS TE NONE RR See ye ———

15

Under Sec. 19.11 of Michigan Statutes Annotated, the

legal rate is five per cent. Interest was not allowed at

common law and the granting of interest is purely a statu-

tory matter. In Keen v. Mid-Continental Petroleum Cor-

poration (1945), (D. C. No. Iowa), 63 F. Supp. 120, it was

held that interest under this Act is not permitted until the

entry of judgment.

The arguments advanced by petitioners misconceive the

effect of the Portal-to-Portal Act. The Court has in its

power the right under the Portal-to-Portal Act to grant or

withhold liquidated damages, and nothing else can be read

into that statute. Furthermore Congress had the benefit of

Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neill (1944), 324 U. S. 697, at

the time it passed the Portal-to-Portal Act in 1947. Peti-

tioners are now attempting to read language into a Con-

gressional Act which is not there.

6. There is no conflict with the decisions of the Fourth

and Fifth Circuit Courts. Petitioners argue that local

delivery drivers, engaged purely in local delivery activi-

ties and confined solely within the area of metropolitan De-

troit, are by an attenuated chain of reasoning, engaged in

producing goods for commerce. These drivers in no respect

fabricate hottles or in any way work on the ginger ale

which is the product of the company. On the contrary,

they are a part of a purely local delivery system whereby

they deliver ginger ale to retailers and return empty bot-

tles to the plant, which bottles are subsequently stored

and at some future time are refilled with ginger ale. Peti-

tioners strive to contend that these drivers are like the em-

ployees in Enterprise Box Co. v. Fleming, 125 F. 2d 827,

and Dize v. Maddrirx, 144 F. 2d 584.

There is no similarity between those two cases and the

instant case. In Enterprise Box Co. v. Fleming, supra, and

Dize v. Maddrix, supra, the employees involved were di-

do eS STS Ct as Rc oO aca a NS RSS ASS atc Pat

16

rectly engaged in the production and fabrication of con-

tainers which were sold for the purpose of holding articles

to be shipped in interstate commerce. They directly con-

tributed to the fabrication of the container. The contrary

is true of the Vernor city drivers. They merely handled,

in the course of returning to the plant, empty bottles.

Their activity in no way changed the form, character, num-

ber or content of the bottles, and had no effect upon them

whatever. The distinction between the Enterprise and

Dize cases is so clear that two courts have rejected the argu-

ment which counsel is now advancing for a third time in

this Petition. There is no conflict between the Sixth Cir-

cuit Court of Appeals’ decision and the Enterprise and

Dize cases.

CONCLUSION

Petitioners have not presented any valid reasons for

granting a writ of certiorari. In addition, it is evident that

the issues raised in this case are virtually moot except for

money recovery for the period prior to December 31, 1944.

Accordingly, respondent requests that the petition be de-

nied.

Respectfully submitted,

WILBER M. BRUCKER,

2850 Penobscot Building,

Detroit 26, Michigan,

Attorney for Respondent.

Mated: May 25, 1951

Detroit, Michigan.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.