Petition for A Writ of Certiorari — Clougherty v. James Vernor Co.
Supreme Court brief1951
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Reasons for granting the writ....................
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CITATIONS
Cases:
Borden Co. v. Borella, 325 U. S. 679, 65 S. Ct. 1223
Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U. S. 697,
ee GELS CNA aed awk knees keen vans
D. A. Schulte v. Gangi, 328 U. S. 108, 66 S. Ct. 925
Dize v. Maddrix (C. A. 4), 144 F. 2d 584.........
Enterprise Box Co. v. Fleming (C. A. 5), 125 F.
a Ub ake Oa. n cures ts ibius aubmauens
Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517, 62'S. Ct.
EE Wri wk icoasd sig hci A cas Maa ROAD ans
Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 327 U.
Oe ee ee a I is ovine ce ek Kin ee as
Roland Electric Co. v. Walling, 326 U. S. 657, 66
es ME 5 FN 4 oan chee dacayeas ueeeeuss
Warren-Bradshaw Co. v. Hall, 317 U. S. 88, 63 S.
Se EN x ehccs vine vheks kan cue phe weee eens
Western Union v. Lenroot, 323 U. S. 490, 65 S. Ct.
8-13
ii
Page
Federal Statutes:
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ec. 676, 52 Stat.
1060, 29 U.S. C., See. 201:
a Fe ee ere re rer Tree 3
re peer rr. ce reer 3
errr errr er Tere rrr 4
Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949, Act
of October 26, 1949, c. 736, 63 Stat. 910, 29 U.
S. C., See. 201:
BE a bs. dn ote wate aeweehawecsentees 3, 10
Se fo hee sree Perret eer 4
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 84, 29 U.S.
C. 260:
a Mende arava, al aa 4,12
Judicial Code, Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat.
a a acai: 2
RM NR occ uc san nean divin 2
<=
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1950
JOHN P. CLOUGHERTY, in behalf of himself and other
presert and former employees, similarily situated,
of the defendant corporation,
Petitioners,
vs.
JAMES VERNOR COMPANY,
a Michigan corporation,
Respondent
—>———_
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF AP-
PEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
eS ee
John P. Clougherty, in behalf of himself and other
employees, similarly situated, prays that a writ of cer-
tiorari issue to review the judgment of the Cireuit Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit entered in this case on
February 19, 1951. Review is sought of that part of the
judgment pertinent to the questions hereafter presented.
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the District Court (R. 157-168) is re-
ported at 74 F. Supp. 364. The opinion of the Court of
Appeals (R. 182-190) is reported at 187 F. 2d. 288,
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on
February 19, 1951. The jurisdiction of this Court is in-
voked under Title 28, Section 1254 (1), United States Code
pursuant to the Judicial Code, Act of June 25, 1948 (Ch.
646, 62 Stat. 928, See. 1).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Where used, empty bottles belonging to and bearing
the label of a ginger ale manufacturer doing business
throughout Michigan and in interstate commerce, are col-
lected and transported by employees of the manufacturer
from points within the state to the plant of the manufac-
turer in the state, to be used by the manufacturer for the
production of ginger ale and as containers for its interstate
and intrastate distribution, are such employees who per-
form the labor of collecting and transporting such bottles
engaged in the production of ‘‘goods for commerce”’ or in
‘‘any process or occupation necessary to the production
thereof?’ within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938?
2. Whether bottles used by a manufacturer in the manu-
facture and distribution of ginger ale are ‘‘goods’’ within
the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.
re roars aor RaINES ——
3
3. Whether a judgment for unpaid overtime compensa-
tion under the Act should include interest from the date
of the accrual of the claim when no liquidated damages
are awarded.
STATUTE INVOLVED
The statute involved is the ‘‘Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938”’ as a:nended, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U. S. C. 201 ff. The
pertinent portions of the statute involved are:
“See. 3 (i) ‘Goods’ means goods (including
ships and marine equipment), wares, products,
commodities, merchandise, or articles or subjects
of commerce of any character, or any part or in-
gredient thereof, but does not include goods after
their delivery into the actual physical possession
of the ultimate consumer thereof other than a pro-
ducer, manufacturer or processor thereof.’’
See. 3 (j) ‘*Produced’’ means produced, manu-
faetured, mined, handled, or in any other manner
worked on in any State; and for the purposes of
this Act (Sees. 201 to 219 of this title) an employee
shall be deemed to have been engaged in the pro-
duction of goods if such employee was employed
in producing, manufacturing, mining, handling,
transporting, or in any other manner working on
such goods, or in any process or occupation neces-
sary to the production thereof, in any State.”’
Involved also may be Section 3 (j) of the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Amendments of 1949:
‘¢*Produced’ means produced, manufactured,
mined, handled, or in any other manner worked on™
in any State: and for the purposes of this Act an
employee shall be deemed to have been engaged in
the production of goods if such employee was em-
ployed in producing, manufacturing, mining, han-
+
dling, transporting, or in any other manner work-
ing on such goods, or in any closely related process
or occupation directly essential to the production
thereof, in any State.”’
although Section 16 (d) of the Amendments of 1949 pro-
vides :
‘‘No amendment made by this Act shall affect
any penalty or liability with respect to any act or
omission occurring prior to the effective date of
this Act.”’
Also involved is Section 16 (b) of the ‘‘Fair Labor
Standards Act’’:
‘ ‘‘Any employer who violates the provisions of
See. 6 or See. 7 of this Act shall be liable to the
employee or employees affected in the amount of
their unpaid minimum wages or their unpaid over-
time compensation as the case may be and in an
additional equal amount as liquidated damages.”’
amended by Section 11 of the ‘‘Portal-to-Portal Act of
1947’’, Title 29, U. S. C. 260:
‘‘In any action commenced prior to or on or
after the date of the enactment of this Act (May
14, 1947) to recover minimum wages, unpaid over-
time compensation, or liquidated damages under the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 as amended, if
the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court
that the act or omission giving rise to such action
was in good faith and that he had reasonable
grounds for believing that his act or omission was
not a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act °
of 1938, as amended, the court may in its sound
discretion award no liquidated damages or award
any amount thereof not to exceed the amount speci-
fied in Section 16 (b) of such Act.’’
STATEMENT
1. This is an action for overtime compensation, brought
under Section 216 (b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, 29 U. S. C. 216 (b). It is conceded that the employees
involved have worked more hours than specified in Sec-
tion 7 of the Act, Title 29, U. S. C. 207, and have not re-
ceived statutory compensation (R. 182).
s
2. The period involved in these proceedings covers
March 23, 1939 to December 31, 1944.
3. The respondent manufactures gingerale at its plant
in Detroit (R. 15, 105). It distributes its product, prin-
cipally as bottle goods, in interstate commerce through
its branches located at Toledo, Cincinnati, Akron, Dayton,
Cleveland, and Columbus, Ohio, Buffalo, New York, and
Erie Pennsylvania (R. 126). Interstate distribution
amounts to some 14% to 20% of the respondent’s business
(R. 153, 184). It distributes its product, principally as
bottle goods, in intrastate commerce through approxi-
mately 6,000 to 8,000 wholesale outlets in Detroit (R. 106)
and through its branches in Port Huron, Lansing, Saginaw,
Jackson, Ann Arbor, and Monroe, Michigan (R. 24).
4. The respondent distributes hundreds of millions of
bottles of its product yearly (R. 135). Each bottle bears
the label of the respondent company. Since 1941 the label
has been embossed or integrated into the bottle (R. 40, 41,
42).
5. The respondent owns the bottles in which the ginger
ale is manufactured and distributed (R. 31, 32, 43, 120).
To insure the return of the empty bottles for continued use
by the respondent, a monetary deposit is charged (R. 36,
113).
6
6. The petitioners make deliveries of filled bottles in the
city of Detroit and in the state of Michigan (R. 25, 122).
The petitioners pick up empty bottles at the time delivery
of filled bottles is made at each stop (R. 31, 36, 38, 39, 45,
47, 53). Empty bottles so picked up by the petitioners
are transported back to the plant of the respondent com-
pany by truck (R. 27, 57). The number of empty bottles
picked up by the petitioners corresponds substantially with
the number of filled bottles delivered (R. 36). About 3%
of the bottles are lost or destroyed in the course of delivery
and return (R. 117, 121). New bottles are employed to
make up for the loss and to take care of increased con-
sumer demand (R. 117). New and used bottles are handled
alike in processing (R. 120).
7. On returning to the plant with the empty bottles,
the body of the truck driven by the petitioners is lifted
from the chassis by a crane and swung into the plant and
deposited on a dolly manned by other employees of the
respondent (R. 28, 185). The bottles so returned from
points within the state of Michigan are intermingled with
bottles returned from points outside the state of Michigan
(R. 28). The intermingling of bottles used for interstate
and intrastate commerce is conceded (R. 49, 50, 185). The
empty bottles so returned and so intermingled are placed
in the stockroom and from there withdrawn to be put into
readiness for process and manufacture. They are taken
by conveyor to the bottling department where they are
washed, then to the syruper where the syrup is put into
the bottles, then to the filler machine where carbonated
water is added to the syrup, then to the crowning or cap-
ping machine, and then to the spinner. The spinner mixes
or agitates the contents or ingredients in the bottle to make
sure that the contents or ingredients are thoroughly mixed
and distributed throughout the bottle (R. 30, 31, 32, 120,
— .
7
184). After the bottles are filled and mixed, they are placed
in cases and conveyed to the shipping room for delivery to
the respective outlets of the company in Michigan and in
other states (R. 33, 34, 133).
8. The District Court found that certain of the peti-
tioners who participated in the delivery of ginger ale from
the respondent’s plant to the docks of vessels that ply the
Great Lakes were engaged in interstate commerce (R. 167).
The Court of Appeals affirmed this finding (R. 189). The
District Court awarded interest to such petitioners on their
respective claims from the date of the rendition of its
opinion (R. 170). Such petitioners claimed that they should
have been awarded interest from the date of the accrual of
their claims and presented such question on appeal to the
Court of Appeals (R. 174). The Court of Appeals modified
the allowance of interest from the date of the rendition of
the opinion to allow interest only from the date of rendi-
tion of the judgment (R. 189, 190).
SPECIFICATION OF ERRORS TO BE URGED
The Court of Appeals erred:
1. In holding that bottles ‘‘necessary not merely to hold
the product but actually to produce it’’ (R. 187) are not
‘*goods’’ contemplated by the Act.
’
2. In holding that the bottles are not “goods” within
the contemplation of the Act because the respondent neither
makes nor sells the bottles.
3. In holding that the petitioners were not engaged in
the ‘‘production of goods’’ or in ‘‘any process or occupa-
tion necessary to the production thereof’’ because their
handling of the bottles preceded the process of manufactur-
ing ginger ale.
8
4. In holding that ‘‘returning the empties to the plant
for a use which is partially interstate’’ (R. 187) does not
have such a close and immediate tie with the process of
production so as to constitute an occupation necessary to
the production of goods tor commerce.
5. In not distinguishing the handling and transporta-
iton of the empty bottles to the plant preliminary to the
manufacturing process of ginger ale, from the handling
that accomplishes the interstate transit or movement in
commerce itself.
6. In affirming the District Court on the first and sec-
ond questions here presented.
7. In denying interest from the date of the accrual of
their claims to the petitioners in whose favor a judgment
was rendered by the District Court without liquidated dam-
ages.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
1. CONFLICT WITH APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT. The decision of
the Court of Appeals erases the final clause of Section 3 (j)
of the Act of 1938 and renders meaningless the final clause
of Section 3 (j) of the Amendments of 1949. Despite its
findings that the empties are returned to the plant for a use
which is partially interstate (R. 187) and that the bottles
are necessary not merely to hold the product but to ateually
produce it (R. 187), the Court of Appeals holds that the
drivers are not covered by the Act because their handling
and transporting of the empty bottles back to the plant
preceded the process of producing ginger ale and is no part
of the production of ginger ale. It further holds that peti-
tioners are not covered by the Act because they did not
participate in the physical process of making ginger ale.
9
These holdings are in conflict with pertinent decisions of
the Supreme Court.
Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517, 62 S. Ct.
1116;
Roland Electric Co. v. Walling, 326 U. S. 657, 66
S. Ct. 413;
Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 327
U.S. 173, 66 S. Ct. 379;
Borden Co. v. Borella, 325 U.S. 679, 65 S. Ct. 1223;
Warren-Bradshaw Co. v. Hall, 317 U. S. 88, 63
S. Ct. 125;
D. A. Schulte v. Gangi, 328 U. S. 108, 66 S. Ct.
925.
If the respondent did not have the empty bottles re-
turned by its employees it would have been handicapped
in its manufacture and distribution of ginger ale, especially
during the war years covered by this action when there
was a shortage of bottles (R. 127, 157). Indeed, there were
periods of time when the respondent did not have a single
case of new bottles in its inventory (R. 155). During these
periods the respondent’s manufacturing and distributive
processes would have been paralyzed but for the activi-
ties of the petitioners. The activities of the petitioners were
not only necessary but were also ‘‘closely mlated’’ and
‘*directly essential to production.’’
1In Kirschbaum v. Walling, supra, the Supreme Court states at 316
U. S. 524: “Nor can we find in the Act, as do the petitioners, any require-
ment that employees must themselves participate in the physical pro-
cess of the making of the goods before they can be regarded as engaged
in their production. Such a construction erases the final clause of Sec-
tion 3 (j) which includes employees engaged ‘in any process or occupa-
tion necessary to the production’ and thereby does not limit the scope of
the statute to the preceding clause which deals with employees ‘in any
other manner working on such goods.’ ”
10
2. The decision of the Court of Appeals erroneously
extends the decision of the Supreme Court in Western
Uman v. Lenroot, 323 U. 8. 490, 65 S. Ct. 335, to include
the transportation of goods to the plant of the respondent
prior to the completion of the manufacturing process in
the category of ‘‘the handling or working on which ac-
complishes the interstate transit or movement in commerce
itself.’’
3. The decision of the Court of Appeals has erroneously
interpreted the statutory definition of ‘‘goods.’’ The inter-
pretation of the Court of Appeals limits the definition to
goods made or sold by an employer. This was obviously
not the legislative intent and is in apparent conflict with
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court.
Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., supra;
Roland Electric Co. v. Walling supra.
In neither of these cases were the goods made or sold by
the employer. In the case at bar, the collection, return,
washing, and filling of the bottles were all steps that re-
sulted in the ultimate product—a bottle of ginger ale.
4. IMPORTANT QUESTIONS OF FEDERAL LAW
WHICH SHOULD BE SETTLED BY THIS COURT. In
view of the Amendments of 1949 restricting the statutory
definition of ‘‘produced”’ in Section 3 (j) of the Act from
“fany process or occupation necessary to the production
thereof’’ to ‘‘closely related process or occupation directly
essential to the production’’, the Court of Appeals has
decided an important question of Federal law which should
be settled by this Court. The petitioners believe that even
under the more restricted test it seems plain that bringing
bottles to a plant for use in the manufacture, production
and distribution of bottled beverages is ‘‘closely related’’
11
and ‘‘directly essential’’ to such production. If the deci-
sion of the Circuit Court of Appeals stands uncorrected,
the scope of the Fair Labor Standards Act will be limited
to the preceding clause in Section 3 (j) which deals with
employees ‘‘in any other manner working on such goods.’’
A closer relationship or tie between steps preparatory to
manufacture or actual production and actual production
itself than in the instant case is almost inconceivable. If
such relationship is denied under the less limited definition
of the Act prior to the Amendment of 1949, then pursuant
to the amendment every activity that precedes the process
of actual manufacture of the goods sold by the interstate
shipper will be beyond the scope of the Act. Compare
Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 at 525, 62 S. Ct. 1116
at 1121, where it is held that the employees (persons
charged with the effective maintenance of a loft building,
the tenants of which are principally engaged in the pro-
duction of goods for interstate commerce) had such a close
and immediate tie with the process of production for com-
merce and were such an essential part of it that the em-
ployees were engaged in an occupation necessary to the
production of goods for commerce. Compare also Roland
Electric Co. v. Walling, 326 U. S. 607, 66 S. Ct. 413.
5. The Court of Appeals held that the petitioners in
whose favor a judgment was rendered without liquidated
damages were not entitled to interest from the date of the
accrual of their respective claims. Interest is allowed only
from the date of the rendition oi the judgment by the Dis-
trict Court. The decision is predicated upon the state-
ment that the Fair Labor Standards Act makes no provi-
sion for interest, and upon the decision of this Court in
Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U. S. 697, 65 S. Ct.
895. It should be noted that in Brooklyn Savings Bank v.
O’Neil the claimant was awarded statutory liquidated-dam-
12
ages, and interest was disallowed solely on the grounds
that the statutory liquidated damages served the same pur-
pose as interest, and that to allow interest on liquidated
damages would be to grant double compensation for dam-
ages. Inasmuch as the Brooklyn Savings Bank case was
decided before Section 11 of the Portal-to-Portal Act of
1947 was enacted, the question of an employee’s right to
interest on a claim for unpaid compensation when he is
disallowed liquidated damages is again unanswered by
any decision of this Court.
6. CONFLICT WITH THE DECISIONS OF THE
CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEAL OF THE FOURTH
AND FIFTH CIRCUITS. The statement by the Court of
Appeals:
‘‘Here the purely intrastate delivery of filled
and pick-up of empty bottles does not have such a
close and immediate. tie with the process of pro-
duction as to enable the court to hold these drivers
to be engaged in an occupation necessary to the
production of goods for commerce * * * their ac-
tivities constitute a separate loca] distribution
* 8 @))
disregards the principal fact that the pick-up of the empty
bottles and the delivery of such empties to the plant make
available to a ginger ale manufacturer containers in which
ginger ale is manufactured and then distributed in inter-
state commerce. This holding abnegates the legal effect of
all activity preparatory to putting goods into readiness for
interstate commerce which occurs prior to the manufacture
of goods which are the subject of interstate commerce.
This holding is in conflict with a related decision in the
Fifth Cireuit, Enterprise Box Co. v. Fleming, 125 F. 2d
897 (Cert. Den. 316 U. S. 704) where a manufacturer pro-
duced and sold boxes locally to a producer of cigars as
13
containers for cigars shipped in interstate commerce. Like-
wise the holding is in conflict with a decision of the Fourth
Cireuit, Dize v. Maddria, 144 F. 2d 584, where the subject
matter manufactured were boxes and barrels used as con-
tainers to hold seafood shipped in interstate commerce. It
should be noted that neither the cigar nor the sea food
required a container ‘‘actually to produce it’’ and further,
the cigars at any rate could be shipped in interstate com-
merce without the container involved.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
ARTHUR J. HASS,
1910 Buhl Building,
Detroit 26, Michigan,
Attorney for Petitioners.
April 30, 1951.
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1950
——>———_
No. MH 55
a. a
JOHN P. CLOUGHERTY, in behalf of himself and other
present and former employees, similarily situated,
of the defendant corporation,
Petitioners,
vs.
JAMES VERNOR COMPANY,
a Michigan corporation,
Respondent
a
RESPONDENT’S OBJECTIONS TO THE PETI-
TION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH
CIRCUIT
—_—__o——_
WILBER M. BRUCKER,
2850 Penobscot Building,
Detroit 26, Michigan,
Attorney for Respondent.
Interstate Brief & Reeord Co., 642 Beaubien S&t., Detroit 26, Michigan
eee
Gifice-Suprame Court, |
iD
SUBJECT INDEX
Page
EE Perey er err er ye rey 16
Counter-Statement of Facts.............seeeeeeee 3-6
Counter-Statement of Questions Presented........ 2-3
SE. iii ib 5 Kon coeds haps onan cuese a bASOhs 2
No Important Question of Federal Law is Involved
Ce PS in bs b hedertteerveerenecksewees 7-8
Opinion Below ...........cceccecssscvccsesccons 2
Respondent’s Objections to Petitioners’ Statements
Contained in Their Specifications of Errors.... 9-10
Respondent’s Objections to Petitioners’ Reasons for
Granting the Wit... ..ccescscscsnesscsccess 10-16
DE ok cask rca enakcaetevsaeeeres 3
INDEX TO AUTHORITIES CITED
Cases
Page
Borden Co. v. Borella, 325 U. S. 679, 65 S. Ct. 1223. . 11
Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neill (1944), 324 U.S.
OF cheb k pekeasees yoiear Gikeiuuatnietakeasens 15
Dise v. Maddrix, 144 F’. 2d S64... 0... ccc sccavvees 15
Enterprise Box Co. v. Fleming, 125 F. 2d 827...... 15
Keen v. Mid-Continental Petroleum Corp. (1945),
(D. C. No. Iowa), 63 F. Supp. 120............. 15
Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 62 S. Ct. 1116 11, 14
Martino v. Mich. Window Cleaning Co., 327 U. S.
Se es US eA binned pedibeseagess 11
Roland Electric Co. v. Walling, 326 U. S. 657, 66 S.
Si EE ca Va abit a web patina khuee beet eee newes 11,14
D. A. Schulte Co. v. Gangi, 328 U. S. 108, 66 S. Ct
Beak hades bare REE Sb Ud Ve Naa eaenewen 11
Warren-Bradshaw Co. v. Hall, 317 U. S. 88, 63 S. Ct
BE Ch cok rik wuhansak Whad deed oad Bae 11
Western Union v. Lenroot, 323 U. S. 490, 65 S. Ct
SK WAaNG Gk Rohde SUMRSERGN Lawes eae eeRs 12
Statutes
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Sec. 3 (i) and
3 (j), 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S. C. 201 ff.......... :
Michigan Statutes Annotated, Sec. 19.11........... 15
TEED AMOR i s s'ks oo alieha ddd Mae Sohne sewes 15
United States Code, Title 28, See. 811..............
—
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1950
a a
No. 730
searerves saint
JOHN P. CLOUGHERTY, in behalf of himself and other
present and former employees, similarily situated,
of the defendant corporation,
Petitioners, *
vs.
JAMES VERNOR COMPANY,
a Michigan corporation,
Respondent
ane snes
RESPONDENT'S OBJECTIONS TO THE PETI-
TION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH
CIRCUIT
>
James Vernor Company, respondent, objects to the Peti-
tion filed herein for a Writ of Certiorari to review the
judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit entered in this ease on February 19, 1951.
Respondent will follow the outline used in the Petition
in its objections to the Petition.
EPS ETS aaa a rar strc:
RNS ema PERLE RT AAD UN ee AS, Bee an, eer ot SR ean any ak 2 : 2
OPINION BELOW
This statement by petitioners is correct.
JURISDICTION
This statement by petitioners is correct.
COUNTER-STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS
PRESENTED
(Respondent cannot accept the statement by petitioners)
1. Where a ginger ale manufacturer is engaged in dis-
tributing ginger ale intrastate, by city drivers in bottles
to local retail outlets, and such city drivers pick up and
bring back therefrom empty bottles which are stored in
a common stock pile at the manufacturer’s plant along with
other empty bottles returned from company branches lo-
cated in other states, are the city drivers who pick up and
return (intrastate) such empty bottles from the local retail
outlets to the manufacturer’s plant engaged in ‘‘the pro-
duction of goods for commerce’’ within the meaning of the
Fair Labor Standards Act?
2. Where a ginger ale manufacturer is engaged in dis-
tributing intrastate by city drivers ginger ale in bottles to
local retail outlets and such city drivers pick up and bring
back therefrom empty bottles which are stored in a com-
mon stock pile at the manufacturer’s plant with other
empty bottles returned from company branches located
in other states, are the empty bottles, picked up at the local
retail outlets, ‘‘goods’’ within the meaning of the Fair
Labor Standards Act? ©
3
3. Where a judgment is rendered by the District Court
for overtime compensation under the Act, but no liqui-
dated damages are awarded, should interest start from the
date of the accrual of the claim or the date of the judgment
of the District Court?
STATUTE INVOLVED
Section 3 (i) and 3 (j) of the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U. 8. C. 201 ff are involved.
Section 3 (j) of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments
of 1949 does not govern inasmuch as the period for which
recovery is sought is from March 23, 1939 to December
31, 1944.
COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS
(Respondent admits paragraphs 1, 2, and 8 of Petitioner’s
“Statement” but cannot accept the other paragraphs there-
of because they are wholly inadequate to a proper under-
standing of the case.)
(Unless otherwise clearly shown by context, figures in parentheses
refer to pages of the printed record)
Respondent adopts the statement of the Circuit Court
(184-187) and the District Court (158, 159). For a more
adequate counter-statement of facts, respondent submits
the following:
A. The James Vernor Company, respondent, has its
manufacturing plant at 239 Woodward Avenue, Detroit,
Michigan, and is engaged in the manufacture and sale of
a soft drink beverage called ‘‘Vernor’s Ginger Ale’’ (105).
The product is bottled in eight-ounce and twenty-four-ounce
bottles, which are carried in cardboard cartons (25). Each
carton contains two dozen eight-ounce bottles, or one dozen
twenty-four-ounce bottles (25). A small amount of draft
7
4
ginger ale is also produced and carried in large eylindrical
tanks (25).
B. A large stock pile of empty bottles is usually main-
tained at the company’s manufacturing plant (33, 35, 117).
Four rooms twenty feet wide and from eighty to ninety
feet long are required to store the cases of empty bottles
(119). The machine which puts ginger ale into the bottles
does not run continually (121) and the empty bottles are
stored for a matter of days, weeks or months, depending
upon the need for production (119). Before starting the
bottling machine, an adequate supply of empty bottles
is requisitioned from the stock pile (33, 120). These empty
bottles are then placed upon a conveyor which carries them
from the bottle storage rooms on the upper floors down to
the ‘‘soaker and rinser’’ where they are thoroughly cleaned,
sterilized and rinsed (39-40, 120). From there the empty
bottles proceed by conveyor to the syrup machine where
extract and syrup are put in the bottles. From there the
bottles go by conveyor to the filling machine where car-
bonated water is added in sufficient quantity. From there
the bottles go by conveyor to the crowning machine where
they are securely capped (120). Thereafter the bottles
go to the ‘‘spinner’’ where the bottles are agitated as an
added precaution so as to mix the extract and syrup with
carbonated water (31). The bottles of ginger ale are then
placed in cardboard cases, which proceed by conveyor to the
stock room where the filled cases are placed in stock (33,
35, 120). The filled cases remain in stock until they are
requisitioned for shipment by the shipping department (33,
120).
C. The company serves from 6,000 to 8,000 wholesale
outlets in Detroit (106). It solicits and receives numerous
orders from grocery stores, drug stores and other retail
establishments in Detroit—mostly by telephone (106). In
5
filling such orders, a requisition is made by the shipping de-
partment upon the stock room, whereupon cases of ginger
ale are placed on the conveyor and sent to the shipping
room floor (33, 106). There, the cases are loaded on a truck
body, which in turn is lifted by a crane and placed upon a
truck chassis waiting outside on the street (24, 113). In this
manner the city driver receives a load of cases containing
bottles filled with ginger ale ready for him to deliver (24,
113). The city driver is given two copies of the orders
for delivery of his load of ginger ale, arranged in the se-
quence in which he is to deliver the same, and proceeds to
drive his truck and follow such orders (25). At each stop
the city driver delivers one or more cases of ginger ale
to the retail store (31). The number of cases of empty
bottles picked up by the city driver corresponds substan-
tially with the number of filled cases delivered by him (31,
36, 114). Upon his return to the plant with eases of empty
bottles, the truck body with cases of empty bottles is then
lifted from its chassis by the crane and brought inside the
plant (24, 114); the returned empty bottles are then un-
loaded by shipping floor employees (28) and proceed by
conveyor to the stock pile in the plant to be stored until
further use is required of them (33).
D. The defendant company owns its own bottles (117);
it purchases new bottles of both sizes from an out-of-state
glass-bottle manufacturing company (117). Such new bot-
tles are labelled with the company’s trade-mark so that the
label is non-removable (40, 126). About three (3%) per
cent of the bottles put into use are lost, damaged, destroyed
or not returned (117, 121). This loss is offset by the con-
stant purchase of new bottles (121). Any increase in busi-
ness also requires the adding of new bottles to the inven-
tory (136, 137). The ownership of the cartons and bottles —
remains in the company and a small cash deposit equal
—
to the value of the bottle is required to induce the return
of empty bottles (36, 113).
E. During the period in question (March 23, 1939 to
December 31, 1944) the company manufactured its product
exclusively at its plant in the city of Detroit (126). The
company had eight branch warehouses in other cities in
Michigan as well as eight branch warehouses in three other
states to which the company shipped cases of ginger ale
which were manufactured at Detroit (126).
F. During the period in question (1939 to 1944, incl.)
the company shipped to its branch warehouses in other
states from 14% to 20% of all bottled ginger ale produced
by it (153). The balance—80% to 86%—was shipped in
Michigan to its branch warehouses and also to drug stores,
grocery stores and other retail stores and places of busi-
ness in Detroit where it finally reached the ultimate con-
sumer (126).
G. There is no segregation among empty bottles or
filled cases in the company’s stock piles between ginger ale
for interstate and intrastate shipment (29, 49). Filled
cases of ginger ale are requisitioned from the stock pile
and shipped either outside or inside the state of Michigan
as orders come for shipping (126).
H. In addition to city drivers there are city salesmen
(who are ‘‘peddlers’’, each having his own customers) (47,
48, 159), and city salesmen’s helpers (who assist the city
salesmen in handling their loads) (47, 159). City sales-
men’s helpers are employed by the company and not by the
driver-salesmen (48). Such helpers assist in delivering
the cartons of ginger ale to the retail stores and assist in
picking up cartons of empty bottles to return to the plant
(47, 48, 111, 112). Such helpers sometimes assist in driv-
ing the driver-salesmen’s trucks (45).
6
NO IMPORTANT QUESTION OF FEDERAL LAW
IS INVOLVED IN THE PETITION
1, The questions raised by petitioners have been. vir-
tually rendered moot since December 31, 1944, except for
petitioners’ claim for money recovery for the period prior
thereto.
The opinion of the Circuit Court states:
‘*All of those in classifications 1, 2 and 3 since
January 1, 1945, have been paid by defendant in
accordance with the provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, being under a specific reservation
that the defendant is not legally liable to make these
payments. The period involved in the suit covers
March 23, 1939 to December 31, 1944.’’
These employees have been voluntarily included by the re-
spondent under the Act since January 1, 1945. Accord-
ingly, the opinion of the Circuit Court shows upon its face
that for the past 614 years there has been no existing prob-
lem of enforcement of the Act. Since December 31, 1944, the
— sole question of law concerning coverage of these drivers
under the Act has been rendered moot, except for peti-
tioners’ claim for money recovery for the period prior to
January 1, 1945.
2. The questions raised by petitioners have been vir-
tually rendered moot since the amendment of Section 3 (j)
of the Act in 1949—except for petitioner’s claim for money
recovery for the period prior to January 1, 1945. The
period involved in this section is from March 23, 1939 to
December 31, 1944 (184).
Section 3 (j) of the Act was amended in 1949 so as to
change the definition of the word ‘‘produced’’. As origi-
nally enacted, Section 3 (j) of the Act provided:
8
‘**Produced’ means ‘produced, manufactured,
mined, handled or in any other manner worked on
in any state and for the purposes of this chapter,
an employee shall be deemed to have been engaged
in the production of goods if such employee was
employed in producing, manufacturing, mining,
handling, transporting or in any other manner
working on such goods or in any process or oc-
cupation necessary to the production thereof im
any state.’’’ (Emphasis supplied.)
In 1949 Section 3 (j) of the Act was amended so as to
change its context and legal implications. It now reads
as follows:
‘**Produced’ means ‘produced, manufactured,
mined, handled, or in any other manner worked on
in any state; and for the purposes of this Act, an
employee shal] be deemed to have been engaged in
the production of goods if such employee was em-
ployed in producing, manufacturing, mining, han-
dling, transperting or in any other manner working
on such goods, or in any closely related process or
occupation directly essential to the production
thereof in any state.’’’ (Emphasis supplied.)
Far from being a question of important public conse-
quence, the meaning of the old Section 3 (j) has now be-
come virtually moot. While the opinion of this Court upon
the old Act would be interesting, it would not provide any
precedent for future litigants in the determination of ques-
tions which will arise hereafter under the amended Act.
The issues involved in this case are confined to the scope
of ‘‘produced”’ as it existed prior to the amendment of the
Act in 1949. No further claims can now arise under the
old act by reason of the expiration of the statute of limi-
tations.
RESPONDENT’S OBJECTIONS TO PETITIONERS’
STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN THEIR
SPECIFICATIONS OF ERRORS
While respondent recognizes that petitioners may state
their own ‘‘Specifications of Errors’’, nevertheless re-
spondent objects to those assertions which misconceive the
import of the Circuit Court’s decision and do not correctly
state the court’s conclusions. In order to avoid any con-
fusion, we wish to touch upon the first three specifications
which we believe to contain unjustified assumptions as to
the holding of the Cireuit Court.
1 and 2. The first and second specifications of error—
that the Circuit Court’s opinion was based upon the con-
cept that the bottles were not ‘‘goods’’ as contemplated
by the Act, is incomplete. The reasons for the court’s
decision are set forth at pages 187 and 188. It was there
concluded that the activity of the local drivers was not even
remotely connected with production and, therefore, the
local drivers were not engaged in the ‘‘production’”’ of
‘“goods’’. In so deciding, the Court noted, im addition, that
the Vernor Company was not manufacturing bottles and
therefore, bottles were not the sort of ‘‘goods’’ contem-
plated by the Act, so the drivers could be held to be pro-
ducing them. On the other hand, the petitioners attempt to
characterize the reasoning differently. They assert that the
Court concluded that these bottles were not ‘‘goods’’ within
the meaning of the Act and, therefore, despite the drivers’
connection with them, they could not be within the Act.
This entirely misconceives the gravamen of the Circuit
Court’s rulings.
3. This specification does not correctly state the basis
of the Circuit Court’s decision. It was not ruled, ipso
10
facto that because the handling of bottles preceded the
production of ginger ale, the employees were thereby out-
side the operation of the Act. On the contrary, relying upon
the record and the findings of fact in the district court, it
was quite apparent that the connection between the activi-
ties of local drivers did not bring them within the Act. In
the course of reaching this conclusion, the Court did com-
ment upon the fact that the picking up of empty bottles
preceded the production of ginger ale. However, this was
not the basis of the opinion—which was the remoteness of
the drivers’ activities (187, 188).
RESPONDENT'S OBJECTIONS TO PETITIONERS’
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
1. There is no conflict with applicable decisions of
United States Supreme Court. Petitioners claim that the
Cireuit Court ‘‘renders meaningless the final clause of
Section 3 (j) of the Amendments of 1949°’. This could not
be correct because the Cireuit Court specifically confined
its decision to Section 3 (j) of the old Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act of 1938, inasmuch as the period covered by the
claim is limited from March 28, 1939 to December 31,
1944 (184, 186).
Petitioners claim that the Cireuit Court ‘‘holds that
petitioners are not covered by the Act because they did not
participate in the physical process of making ginger ale.”’
This is an absolutely incorrect summary of the Circuit
Court’s holding. The lower court completely recognized
the principle that embraces maintenance employees who do
not participate in the physical process of making the
product, but the lower court also recognized the limita-
tions of this doctrine (187, 188).
11
Petitioners cite six decisions of the Supreme Court with
which they claim the instant decision is in conflict. All of
these cases embrace employees who may be termed ‘‘main-
tenance’’ employees of one kind or another. There is no
conflict with these holdings. The Supreme Court has
clearly indicated that the Act is not confined to employees
actually at the machine which fabricates the raw material
into articles of commerce. For this reason, maintenance
employees who contribute to production are considered
within the Act. Consequently Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316
U. S. 517, 62 S. Ct. 1116 falls into the logical pattern of
the rule. The mere fact that the employees of the owner of
a loft building did the maintenance work did not change the
character of their duties. The criterion of eligibility was
held to be the function of the individual employee him-
self. Also Martino _v. Mich. Window Cleaning Co., 327
U.S. 173, 66 S. Ct. 379, held that window washers employed
by an independent contractor but who served an industrial
plant were eligible under the Act as maintenance em-
ployees. In Borden Co. v. Borella, 325 U.S. 679, 65 S. Ct.
1223, the same principle controlled even though the offices
of the interstate producer were removed to a separate
establishment physically disassociated from the production
of milk in interstate commerce. In Warren-Bradshaw Co.
v. Hall, 317 U.S. 88, 63 S. Ct. 125, the same pattern was
followed as to employees who actually participated in
drilling an oil well which was completed by other employees
who did the same work. There is of course no analogy
between oil drillers and local city drivers returning empty
bottles. In D. A. Schulte Co. v. Gangt, 328 U.S. 108, 66'S.
Ct. 925, maintenance employees in a loft building were like-
. Wise embraced even though not employed by the manu-
facturer. Roland Electric Co. v. Walling, 326 U. S. 657, 66
S. Ct. 413, held that employees of an independent electric |
repair shop working upon electric motors and maintaining
12 .
the machines producing the company’s product were like-
wise eligible. However, the petitioners were in no sense
‘maintenance’? employees. There is no valid comparison
between local city drivers who are a part of a city delivery
system and the ‘‘maintenance’’ employees in the six cases
cited by petitioners.
2. The Circuit Court did not improperly ‘‘extend’’ the
decision of this Court in Western Union v. Lenroot, 323
U. S. 490, 65 S. Ct. 335. In Western Union v. Lenroot,
supra, messenger boys who picked up and delivered tele-
grams for transmission and also delivered the completed
message at the point of destination, were held to be out-
side the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act. That
decision directly involved the question of whether handling
or transporting, as such, standing alone, placed the em-
ployees within the provision of the Fair Labor Standards
Act. Certainly the contact of these employees in picking
up and delivering the message was as direct as that of the
city drivers who delivered ginger ale and picked up empty
bottles. The Supreme Court found that the telegrams were
goods but that the handling involved in the Western Union
case was not the kind contemplated in the Act. Mr. Justice
Jackson stated:
‘**If we go beyond this and assume that handling
for transit purposes is handling in production, we
encounter results which we think Congress could °
not have intended.’’
The Vernor employees, as a part of the city delivery sys-
tem, handled empty bottles for transit purposes. The empty
bottles were then stored in the stock pile at the company’s
plant. No clearer application of the Western Union case
could be found.
13
3. The Circuit Court did not erroneously interpret the
statutory definition of ‘‘goods’’.
Petitioners’ reliance upon Martino v. Michigan Window
Cleaning Co., supra, and Roland Electric Co. v. Walling,
supra, to establish that the bottles were ‘‘goods’’ is diffi-
cult to understand. In both cases, the employees involved
actually worked upon and wrought a change in the subject
of their employer’s business (windows were cleaned in
the Martino case and motors were rewound and repaired
in the Roland case). This was the subject of the employer’s
business. However, in the instant case the employees did
not ‘‘produce’’ bottles. The empty bottles had long since
been fabricated by the bottle manufacturers. These local
drivers by their activities did not change their character,
number, quality or content. The company itself was not a
producer of bottles. Its business was the production and
sale of ginger ale. The respondent could operate its plant
continuously for weeks and there would not be one more
empty bottle produced by reason of its activity. At best,
the bottle ultimately became the container of its product,
but this did not cause it to be ‘‘goods’’ or the subject
of commerce by respondent.
4. Petitioners have not pointed out any important ques-
tions to be settled by this Court.
Petitioners base their claim under this topic upon ‘‘the
Amendments of 1949 restricting the statutory definition of
‘produced’ in Section 3(j) of the Act.’’ We are at a loss
to know how petitioners can possibly be interested in the
‘Amendments of 1949’’, which occurred nearly 5 years
after December 31, 1944—the end of the period claimed by
petitioners in their suit.
Another strange circumstance is petitioners’ anxiety
to get a ruling under the ‘‘less limited definition’? prior to
SILLA RII UE AEs NH EET RG RG AE Re el eee Se
14
1949 in order to aid the future construction of Section 3
(j) of the Amendments of 1949. What interest do peti-
tioners have in assuming the role of the Secretary of
Labor in asserting an interest in future litigation under
the Amendments of 1949 when the period covered in their
suit is March 23, 1939 to December 31, 1944?
Petitioners’ citation of Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.
S. 517, 62 S. Ct. 1116, is clearly inapplicable to the instant
ease. In the Kirschbaum case the employees were mainten-
ance employees in a loft building. There is no similarity
between such employees and city drivers who pick up
empty bottles as a part of a local delivery system. Nor is
there a valid analogy between the instant case and Roland
Electric Co. v. Walling, 326 U. S. 657, 66 S. Ct. 413, where
the employees of an independent electric repair shop
actually worked upon the motors and maintained the ma-
chines producing the company’s product.
5. Allowance of interest from the date of rendition of
the judgment was proper. [Respondent does not concede
that the question of interest is properly before this Court
as a matter of independent jurisdiction—less than $200
being involved].
The granting of interest is controlled by Title 28 U. S.
C., Section 811, which provides:
‘Interest shall be allowed on any money judg-
ment in a civil case recovered in a district court.
Execution therefor may be leveled by the marshal,
in any case where, by the law in the state in which
such court is held, execution may be levied for in-
terest on judgments recovered in the courts of the
State. Such interest shall be calculated from the
date of the entry of the judqment at the vate al-
lowed by state law.’’ (Emphasis supplied.)
TRAN PS TE NONE RR See ye ———
15
Under Sec. 19.11 of Michigan Statutes Annotated, the
legal rate is five per cent. Interest was not allowed at
common law and the granting of interest is purely a statu-
tory matter. In Keen v. Mid-Continental Petroleum Cor-
poration (1945), (D. C. No. Iowa), 63 F. Supp. 120, it was
held that interest under this Act is not permitted until the
entry of judgment.
The arguments advanced by petitioners misconceive the
effect of the Portal-to-Portal Act. The Court has in its
power the right under the Portal-to-Portal Act to grant or
withhold liquidated damages, and nothing else can be read
into that statute. Furthermore Congress had the benefit of
Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neill (1944), 324 U. S. 697, at
the time it passed the Portal-to-Portal Act in 1947. Peti-
tioners are now attempting to read language into a Con-
gressional Act which is not there.
6. There is no conflict with the decisions of the Fourth
and Fifth Circuit Courts. Petitioners argue that local
delivery drivers, engaged purely in local delivery activi-
ties and confined solely within the area of metropolitan De-
troit, are by an attenuated chain of reasoning, engaged in
producing goods for commerce. These drivers in no respect
fabricate hottles or in any way work on the ginger ale
which is the product of the company. On the contrary,
they are a part of a purely local delivery system whereby
they deliver ginger ale to retailers and return empty bot-
tles to the plant, which bottles are subsequently stored
and at some future time are refilled with ginger ale. Peti-
tioners strive to contend that these drivers are like the em-
ployees in Enterprise Box Co. v. Fleming, 125 F. 2d 827,
and Dize v. Maddrirx, 144 F. 2d 584.
There is no similarity between those two cases and the
instant case. In Enterprise Box Co. v. Fleming, supra, and
Dize v. Maddrix, supra, the employees involved were di-
do eS STS Ct as Rc oO aca a NS RSS ASS atc Pat
16
rectly engaged in the production and fabrication of con-
tainers which were sold for the purpose of holding articles
to be shipped in interstate commerce. They directly con-
tributed to the fabrication of the container. The contrary
is true of the Vernor city drivers. They merely handled,
in the course of returning to the plant, empty bottles.
Their activity in no way changed the form, character, num-
ber or content of the bottles, and had no effect upon them
whatever. The distinction between the Enterprise and
Dize cases is so clear that two courts have rejected the argu-
ment which counsel is now advancing for a third time in
this Petition. There is no conflict between the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals’ decision and the Enterprise and
Dize cases.
CONCLUSION
Petitioners have not presented any valid reasons for
granting a writ of certiorari. In addition, it is evident that
the issues raised in this case are virtually moot except for
money recovery for the period prior to December 31, 1944.
Accordingly, respondent requests that the petition be de-
nied.
Respectfully submitted,
WILBER M. BRUCKER,
2850 Penobscot Building,
Detroit 26, Michigan,
Attorney for Respondent.
Mated: May 25, 1951
Detroit, Michigan.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.