Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Fremont Cake & Meal Co. v. Wilson & Co.

Supreme Court brief1951

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I Ea eS a eile he Gina gic dr en ee Al 2

TREE EGS Aree aoa a Gee ere 2

NS ETE OEE ETT ORT TOTP Eee 3

Se ene care We eo atthe re ST ind 10

Reasons for granting the writ ....................

SII fee ee Cee Bem. aa adie te 21

I II ooo vin onc eatin dicesnisc cna s coxe 22

I i.e i eine aca ke wae ee 23

eines CITATIONS

Wilson & Company, Inc. v. Fremont Cake & Meal

i Me es en CE, «ratte ewok ceca 1

BOGE E:T, ee es Bs ee eh ee ives. 3

Brown v. Western Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294. ... 3

Jones Nat. Bank v. Yates, 240 U.S. 541........ 3

Miller v. Lancaster Bank, 106 U.S. 542........ 3

Wilson & Co., Inc. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co.,

Be os oes pre es ee 7

Wilson & Co., Inc. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co.,

8 ke re a ie ee ne eres 8

Schrandt v. Young, 62 Neb. 254, 86 N. W.'1085. . 9

National Masonic Accident Assn. v. Burr, 44 Neb.

Bs I PWN ais cs iwrae Soa eas eevee 9

German-American Ins. Co. v. Etherton, 25 Neb.

Se SRR ee Sere ee ne oe re 9

Rentschler v. Missouri P. R. R. Co., 126 Neb.

493, 253 N. W. 694, 95 A. L. R. 1 9

Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F. (2d) 876........ 10

Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S.

Ee ogee kk Bier De ase as oh eo 11

Textile Workers Union of America, C.I.0. v. Aleo

ee Cig OO We MO WIP: os ccc aes panes 11

Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod Car-

ORRPR, GEG, THe Ws COP MIO. vow bee ks tees: 11

Fremont Cake & Meal Co. v. Wilson & Co., Inc.,

NE OEE hv ees coe vba cet Valen 8

—4221

ii INDEX

Galion Iron Works & Mfg. Co. v. J. D. Adams

map Ga, Be we Ge Gee... 5 5 ee en... 13

American Locomotive Co. v. Chemical Research

Corp., 171 F. (2d) 115, certiorari denied 69

Page

ee 8 28 Srey eee 13

Almacenes Fernandez, S. A. v. Golodetz, 148 F. ~

Ce Ge Oe ss oe .. =. 13

Bank of Madison v. Graber, 158 F. (2d) 137.... 13

Uniao De Transportadores Para Importacao E.

Commercio, LTDA. v. Companhia De Nave-

gacao Carregadores Acoreanos, 84 F. Supp.

ERIS all Sat) So OE ee ee 13

Kulukundis Shipping Co. S/A v. Amtorg Trad-

ing Corp., 126 F. (2d) 978.................. 13

The Belize, 25 F. Supp. 663................... 13

Shanferoke Co. v. Westchester Co., 293 U. S.

I a a oe ies wp ww os 13

Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester

8 ee 13

Fremont Cake & Meal Co. v. Wilson € Co., Inc.,

look ad sv ed ay Sow nes 0 «0 18

Nagy v. Arcas Brass & Iron Co., 242 N. Y. 97, 150

ISS Se eae a 19

Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Louis Bossert €

Sons (2 Cir.), 62 F. (2d 1004 .............. 19

Radiator Specialty Co. v. Cannon Mills, 4 Cir.,

97 F. (2d) 318, 117 A. L. R. 299..............

McDowell v. Thomas, 4 Neb. 542.............. 20

Hughes v. Sarpy County, 97 Neb. 90, 149 N. W.

309

LS he i i 20

Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U. S. 263,

ee as ey Pe Oe ee. 20

Young v. Ragen, 337 U. S. 235................ 21

Statutes:

Title 28, U. S. C., Sec. 1257 (3) July 30, 1947, c.

ME I ce ce te ccc cee 3

Title 9, U. S. C., Sec. 2, July 30, 1947, c. 392,

RI Sea eran a 2

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1950

No. 675

FREMONT CAKE & MEAL COMPANY, a corporation,

Petitioner,

v.

WILSON 2 COMPANY, INC., a corporation,

Respondent

PETITION FOR WRT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

SUPREME: COURT OF NEBRASKA

Petitioner prays that a writ of certiorari be issued to

review a judgment on a directed verdict and order of the

District Court of Dodge County, Nebraska, entered on Sep-

tember 24, 1949, directing a verdict for the respondent

and entering judgment for it in the sum of $41,175.00

against the petitioner, which judgment was affirmed by the

Supreme Court of Nebraska in-an opinion dated August

2, 1950 and a motion for rehearing overruled by that Court

on January 13, 1951.

Opinion Below

The opinion of the Supreme Court of Nebraska has not

yet been reported in the official Nebraska reports but is

reported in 43 N. W. (2d) 657. A copy of this opinion

is attached to this petition as Exhibit B of the Appendix

to the petition (mfra) p. 23.

2

Jurisdiction

The date of the overruling of the motion for a rehear-

ing by the Supreme Court of Nebraska is January 13,

1951.

Questions Presented

1. Whether 2 State Court is required to enforce a writ-

ten agreement for arbitration in a contract involving inter-

state commerce, if the right to arbitration is not waived.

2. Whether a State Court may disregard the declara-

tion by Congress in the Federal Arbitration Statute, Sec-

tion 2 (Title 9, U. S. C., See. 2, July 30, 1947, ce. 392, Sec. 1,

61 Stat. 669), to the effect that a written provision in any

contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to

settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out

of such contract ‘‘shall be valid, irrevocable and enforce-

able.’’

3. Whether a State Court may disregard large parts of

a contract involving interstate commerce and defenses

and other rights available to the parties thereunder be-

cause such provisions refer to enforcement thereof by

arbitration and the courts of the State refuse to enforce

any agreement requiring arbitration.

4. Where a contract involving interstate commerce re-

quires arbitration as a condition precedent to the bringing

of any action, may the State Court disregard the require-

ment and entertain the action, as though such provision

were not valid, irrevocable and enforceable?

5. Is the question of the right to arbitration of a con-

troversy arising out of a contract involving a transaction

in interstate commerce controlled by the Federal statute

and decisions thereunder, or by State laws and decisions.’

1 Other points to be presented if a writ is granted are:

a. May a state court deny to a party to a contract the benefit of sub-

stantial defenses thereunder merely because the agreement provides for ~

3

Statute Involved

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 62 Stat.

929, June 25, 1948, c. 646, Section 1257 (3) of Title 28,

U.S.C. The points discussed also involve Title 9, U. S. C.

Section 2, July 30, 1947, c. 392, Sec. 1, 61 Stat. 669.

Paragraph (3) of 62 Stat. 929, June 25, 1948, c. 646,

confers upon this Court jurisdiction to review by writ of

certiorari judgments or decrees of the highest court of a

State in which a decision could be had where a title, right,

privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed under

a statute of the United States.

The following decisions sustain the power and jurisdic-

tion of this Court to review the order and judgment, re-

view of which is herewith sought:

Nutt v. Knut, 200 U. S. 12;

Brown v. Western Ry. of Ala., 338 U. S. 294;

Jones Nat. Bank v. Yates, 240 U. S. 541;

Miller v. Lancaster Bank, 106 U. S. 542.

The Federal question of the right of the petitioner to

have the controversy herein submitted to arbitration in ac-

their enforcement by arbitration and that court refuses to enforce the

obligations to arbitrate?

b. Is a party excused from performing a contract where he has provided

therein to be relieved in the event of war and interference with performance

for that reason as an excuse, although enforceable by arbitration, and he

is so limited in production by war regulations and war restrictions on

repairs and replacements that he is unable to perform his contract?

c. Where the time for performance of a contract has expired, is a

promise thereafter for delivery without any new consideration enforce-

able where no damage resulted from the failure to deliver within the

original time limit?

d. Did the Supreme Court of Nebraska err in affirming the order of

the District Court of Dodge County, Nebraska?

e. Where arbitration is a condition precedent under the agreement, does

the party against whom a claim is asserted have to proceed with the

procedures of arbitration, in order not to lose his right, or is it sufficient

if he continually claims at every opportunity that the opposing party may

only proceed by way of arbitration?

4

cordance with the written contract between the parties and

Section 2, Title 9, United States Code (Appendix A, infra,

pp. 22), was raised in the following manner in the State

Court:

1. In the trial court a motion was made on June 24,

1949 to continue the case until arbitration could be had

(R., p. 8, Tr., pp. 13-17). This motion was overruled on

September 8, 1949 (R. 37, Tr., p. 32).

2. A further motion to stay proceedings until a deci-

sion could be had in the action to compel arbitration brought

in the United States District Court for the District of

Nebraska, Lincoln Division, was made on September 12,

1949 (R. 37, Tr., pp. 33-41). This motion was overruled

by the trial court on the ground that the ‘‘parties cannot

oust the jurisdiction of the Courts by Contract,’’ on Sep-

tember 16, 1949 (R., p. 95, B. of Ex., p. 10).

3. On September 19, 1949, the first day of the trial of

the action after the jury was empaneled byt before any

evidence was introduced, the petitioner moved the Court

to dismiss the action as prematurely brought ‘‘for the

reason that there is no showing that any arbitration pro-

ceedings have been held in regard to this controversy in

accordance with the requirements of the contract and the

Statutes of the United States and the laws of the State of

Nebraska (R., p. 95, B. of Ex., p. 10). The same day that

motion was overruled (R. 95, B. of Ex., p. 10). ;

4. During the trial large portions of the contract de-

fining the rights and liabilities of the parties were excluded

on the ground that there was a reference to arbitration in

such portions of the agreement (R. 178-189, B. of Ex., pp.

162-232, 354-356).

5. At the close of respondent’s case petitioner moved

to dismiss the petition on the ground that arbitration had

not been had according to the requirements of the contract

5

and this motion was overruled (R. 167, B. of Ex., pp. 139,

140).

6. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Nebraska error

was assigned as to each of the rulings, as follows:

Assignment of Errors

8. ‘‘The Court erred in not admitting the arbitra-

tion rules in evidence as a part of the contract be-

tween the parties.’’

11. ‘‘The Court erred in not holding that arbitra-

tion was a condition precedent to any enforcement of

the contract herein.’’

12. ‘‘The Court erred in not enforcing Title 9,

United States Code Annotated, Section 2, and holding

that the requirement for arbitration in the contract

involved in this action was ‘valid, irrevocable and en-

forceable.’ ’’

13. ‘‘The Court erred in holding that the question

of arbitration involved in this case was controlled by

the laws of the State of Nebraska and not the Federal

statutes on arbitration and the decisions thereunder.”’

14. ‘‘The Court erred in holding that the Federal

statutes on arbitration oust the jurisdiction of the

State Courts.’’

7. The Supreme Court of Nebraska in its opinion denied

the right of the petitioner to enforcement of the require-

ment for arbitration under the Federal arbitration stat-

ute, saying:

‘‘The Fremont company asserts the contract is sub-

ject to the rules of the National Soybean Processors

Association which appear in the Year Book and Trad-

ing Rules of the National Soybean Processors Asso-

ciation. Rule 115 contained therein deals with arbi-

tration. Rule 116 deals with contingencies, and spe-

cifically refers to war. We will discuss this rule later

in the opinion. In addition, rules for arbitration of

the American Arbitration Association are also perti-

6

nent to the contract, and the Fremont company as-

serts that the refusal of the trial court to admit into

evidence all of such rules relating to arbitration con-

stitutes prejudicial error. Further, the United States .

Arbitration Act, Title 9, U. S. C. A., sections 2,

3, and 4, are applicable and should be enforced in

the State Courts, and the failure of the trial court to

so do constitutes prejudicial error.

‘‘In this act it is provided that a written provision

in any contract involving commerce to settle by arbi-

tration an existing controversy arising out of such

contract shall be valid and enforceable. By section 3

it is provided that if any suit or proceeding be brought

in any court of the United States upon any issue re-

ferable to arbitration, the court in which the suit is

pending, shall, on application of one of the parties stay

the trial until such arbitration has been had, provided

the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceed-

ings in such arbitration.

‘‘Section 4 provides in part as follows: ‘A party

aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of

another to arbitrate under a written agreement for

arbitration may petition any court of the United States

which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdic-

tion under the judicial code at law, in equity, or in

admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out

of the controversy between the parties, for an order

directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner

provided for in such agreement.’

‘‘The proper legal steps were taken by the Fremont

company to present to the district court for Dodge

County the question as to whether or not arbitration

should be invoked by the trial court in the instant case.

The trial court ruled against the Fremont company

on its contention in such respect.

‘*A brief history in this litigation is appropriate to

relate in connection with this assignment of error. On

July 11, 1947, Wilson & Company filed suit in the

United States District Court for the District of Ne-

braska, Omaha Division, to recover damages against

7

the Fremont company for alleged breach of contract

(the contract involved in the instant case). On August

2, 1947, the Fremont company filed a motion to stay

proceedings until arbitration had been had in accord-

ance with Title 9, U. S. C. A., section 3. This motion

was sustained. Subsequent proceedings in the Federal

Court hereinafter referred to disclose no order upon

the ruling of the Court was signed by the parties

or presented to the Court for approval. See Wilson &

Co., v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 77 F. Supp. 364.

‘‘On July 19, 1948, Wilson & Company filed a mo-

tion to dismiss its action in the United States District

Court. This was before the service or filing of an an-

swer by the Fremont company. This motion was sus-

tained. In sustaining the plaintiff’s motion the Court

said the plaintiff had, perhaps still has, the absolute

choice of forums for the recovery of the damages it

claims, beyond the possible intervention of the defend-

ant. By plaintiff is meant Wilson & Company, by de-

fendant is meant the Fremont company. That reflec-

tion does not enter into the ruling upon the point;

but it obviates the suggestion that the procedure that

is made mandatory in the Federal Court is being im-

posed upon a litigant brought there against its will

and thereby deprived of the supposed advantages to

it of the State Court’s traditional usages unaffected

by Title 9, U. S. C. A., section 3. See Wilson & Co.,

Inc. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., supra.

‘‘The instant case was filed by Wilson & Company

in the district court for Dodge County on October 29,

1948. The case proceeded to trial in the latter part

of September 1949, and judgment was entered on the

verdict on September 24, 1949.

‘‘On April 8, 1949, the Fremont company filed an

original action in the United States District Court for

the District of Nebraska, Omaha Division, seeking an

affirmative order to require Wilson & Company to sub-

mit this controversy to arbitration, as provided for

in U. 8. C. A., Title 9, section 4. This original action

was filed while the instant action was pending and

8

undetermined in the district court for Dodge County,

Nebraska. The United States District Court dis-

missed the Fremont company’s original action filed

therein on October 8, 1949, holding that the Fremont

company not only had taken none of the explicitly de-

fined steps to institute arbitration, but that its course

in the entire controversy had been dilatory and ob-

structive only. Despite the early threats of Wilson &

Company in two letters to invoke the arbitration clause

of the contract, it remained silent on the question

touching arbitration and did not itself initiate the

process or even assent to Wilson & Company’s sug-

gestion of its liability. See Wilson & Co., Inc. v. Fre-

mont Cake & Meal Co., 83 F. Supp. 900.

‘‘This case was appealed to the United States Court

of Appeals, 8th Circuit, and on June 27, 1950, an opin-

ion was rendered by that Court wherein the United

States District Court was affirmed. There is no oc-

casion to quote from the opinion, except to say that

the Circuit Court stated the State Court obtained jur-

isdiction of the controversy between Wilson & Com-

pany and the Fremont company long prior to the com-

mencement of the present proceeding. ‘A conflict of

jurisdiction is always to be avoided if possible and it

is a general rule that the right of a plaintiff to prose-

cute his suit in a court having once attached, will not

be taken away by proceedings in another court. The

decision in this case does not purport to interfere in

any respect with the jurisdiction of the State Court

but unless it could have such an effect it can not be

said to determine any actual substantive controversy

between the parties.’ Fremont Cake & Meal Co. v.

Wilson € Co., Inc., 183 F. 2d 60.

‘‘In connection with this assignment of error the

following authorities of this jurisdiction are appli-

cable.

‘“Whatever distinction may be made elsewhere be-

tween arbitration generally and arbitration as to dam-

ages only, it is well settled in this State that a pro-

vision in a contract requiring arbitration, whether of

9

all disputes arising under contract, or only the amount

of loss or damages sustained by the parties thereto,

will not be enforced, and that refusal to arbitrate is

not available to the parties in an action growing out

of the contract. See, Schrandt v. Young, 62 Neb. 254,

86 N. W. 1085; National Masonic Accident Assn. v.

Burr, 44 Neb. 256, 62 N. W. 466; German-American

Ins. Co. v. Etherton, 25 Neb. 505, 41 N. W. 406; Rents-

chler v. Missouri P. R. R. Co., 126 Neb. 493, 253 N. W.

694, 95 A. L. R. 1. -

‘*We conclude that the Fremont company’s assign-

ment of error here discussed cannot be sustained.’’

It will be noted that the Supreme Court stated:

‘“‘The proper legal steps were taken by the Fremont

company to present to the District Court of Dodge

County the question as to whether or not arbitration

should be invoked by the trial court in the instant case.

The trial court ruled against the Fremont company

on its contention in such respect’? (R., p. 61).

In regard to the right of enforcement of the arbitration

provisions in the Supreme Court, it will be noted that

that Court said:

‘‘In connection with this assignment of error the fol-

lowing authorities of this jurisdiction are applicable.

‘*Whatever distinction may be made elsewhere be-

tween arbitration generally and arbitration as to dam-

ages only, it is well settled in this State that a pro-

vision in a contract requiring arbitration, whether of

all disputes arising under contract, or only the amount

of loss or damage sustained by the parties thereto,

will not be enforced, and that refusal to arbitrate 1s

not available to the parties in an action growing out

of the contract. See, Schrandt v. Young, 62 Neb. 254,

86 N. W. 1085; National Masonic Accident Assn. v.

Burr, 44 Neb. 256, 62 N. W. 466; German-American

Ins. Co. v. Etherton, 25 Neb. 505, 41 N. W. 406; Rent-

schler v. Missouri P. R. R. Co., 126 Neb. 495, 253 N. W.

10

694, 95 A. L. R. 1. We conclude that the Fremont

company’s assignment of error here discussed cannot

be sustained’’ (R., pp. 62, 63).

Statement

1. There is a clear conflict in the present case between

the authority of the Congress of the United States and the

Courts of the State of Nebraska concerning the enforce-

ability of an arbitration provision in a contract involving

interstate commerce. In Title 9, Section 2, United States

Code, Congress has directed that such an arbitration pro-

vision shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable. The

District Court of Nebraska and the Supreme Court of

Nebraska have both held in this case that such a require-

ment for arbitration is in Nebraska, invalid and unen-

forceable under a long line of decisions.

In Jackson v. Kentucky River Mills, 65 F. Supp. 601,

the United States District Court for the District of Ken-

tucky, held that Section 2, Title 9, United States Code,

provided a substantive right.2, In Wilson & Co. v. Fremont

Cake & Meal Co.,77 F.. Supp. 364, the United States District

Court for the District of Nebraska, held in like manner in

a companion case where an application for a stay under

Title 9, Section 3, United States Code, was granted.’

In the case of Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F. (2d) 876,

2It said: ‘‘When Congress declares that a provision for arbitration in any

contract involving interstate commerce or a maritime transaction is valid,

irrevocable and enforceable, the enforcement of such a provision is a substan-

tive right.’’

8It said: “Then the second section proceeds to lay down a rule of sub-

stantive law regarding the validity of an agreement for arbitration in case of

any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving com-

merce. Congress was here making a rule concerning subject matter within its

own constitutional legislative authority. It was not seeking to confer validity

to arbitration agreements generally, a matter outside the scope of Federal

powers. Instead it picked out’two important classes of transactions within

the Federal legislative domain and declared the effect of arbitration clauses

in agreements concerned therewith.’’

li

the Cireuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held

that an agreement that all differences arising under a con-

tract shall be submitted to arbitration relates to the law of

remedies and the law that governs remedies is the law of

the forum.

In Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. 8. 109,

123, this Court said the substantive right created by an

agreement to submit disputes to arbitration is recognized

as a perfect obligation.

Thus we find a conflict between the Federal Courts as

to scope and effect of the Federal Arbitration Act and a

complete disregard of its provisions by the Supreme Court

of Nebraska in this case.

In a comparable situation regarding the provisions of

Section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act

of 1947, the Federal Courts have held that a new substan-

tive right actionable in the Federal Courts was created by

Congress.*

2. The situation here well demonstrates the thwarting

of the congressional purposes and objects set forth in the

Federal Arbitration Act.

On July 11, 1947, respondent filed a complaint against

__petitioner in the United States District Court for the

District of Nebraska, Omaha Division, seeking damages in

the sum of $43,005.00 for the failure of petitioner to de-

liver six tank cars of soybean oil ander the written contract

involved in this appeal (R., p. 41, Tr., pp. 35, 36).° Petitioner

4 Textile Workers Union of America, C. I. 0. v. Aleo Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp.

626: ‘‘The remedy created by provision of Labor Management Relations Act

conferring upon Federal District Courts jurisdiction in actions for violation

of a contract between employer and labor organization representing employees

in an industry affecting ecommerce creates a Federal remedy which is not con-

trolled by State law.’’ To like effect, see Shirley-Herman Co. v. International

Hod Carriers, etc., 182 F. 2d 806. é

58ee opinion Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 77 F. Supp. 364.

This was the same contract and almost identical complaint with the one in-

volved in this petition for certiorari.

12

did not answer but filed a motion to stay the proceedings

pending arbitration under Section 3, Title 9, United States

Code. The Court sustained the motion. Before a formal

order was entered, respondent dismissed the complaint

without prejudice and brought the action now appealed

from in the District Court of Dodge County, Nebraska (R.,

pp. 41, 42, Tr., pp. 37, 38).

Before answering to that petition and on April 8, 1949,

the petitioner here filed a complaint against the respond-

ent in the United States District Court of Nebraska, Omaha

Division, to require the respondent to arbitrate the con-

troversy under the agreements in the written contract

(R., pp. 11-16, Tr., pp. 17-22). The District Court dismissed

the complaint on the merits on the ground that although it

was stipulated that the respondent refused to arbitrate,

the petitioner here had taken none of the definitive steps

to initiate arbitration. The dismissal was affirmed on

the ground that the case was moot since the State Court

had entered judgment in favor of the respondent herein in

the amount of $41,175.00 and on the merits.’

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed

the lower court in holding that the respondent should have

proceeded with the definite steps for arbitration if it was

to obtain an affirmative order under Section 4 even though

it was stipulated and pleaded in the action to compel arbi-

tration under Section 4 of the Arbitration Act that the

6 The Court said in Fremont Cake & Meal Co. v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 83 F.

Supp. 900: ‘‘It has taken no affirmative action looking to the resolution, by

any forum, of its differences with Wilson & Company.’’

7In Fremont Cake & Meal Co. v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 183 F. (2d) 57, the

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit said: ‘‘A conflict of jurisdiction is

always to be avoided if possible and it is a general rule that the right of a

plaintiff to prosecute his suit in a court having once attacked will not be taken

away by proceedings in another court. The decision in this case does not pur-

port to interfere in any respect with the jurisdiction of the State Court but

unless it could have such an effect it cannot be said to determine any actual

controversy between the parties.’’

13 P

respondent had refused to arbitrate and the record showed

that it had fought arbitration every step of the way. Such

an interpretation of the Act puts an unusual burden upon

a party who is not seeking any affirmative action as to the

controversy which is to be arbitrated according to the

contract. The Statutes and other Federal Courts have

always held that rights under the law could not be waived

or lost except by conduct that amounted to a relinquish-

ment ef rights and privileges under the general law of

waiver.®

However, the Court of Appeals used care to state that

8 Waiver of the right to arbitration requires affirmative action of the party

involved to give up the right with full knowledge.

Commencement of an action in court rather than reliance on arbitration with

answer by the opposing party on the merits is a waiver by both parties. Galion

Iron Works & Mfg. Co. v. J. D. Adams Mfg. Co., 128 F. (2d) 411. American

Locomotive Co. v. Chemical Research Corp., 171 F. (2d) 115, certiorari denied

69 S. Ct. 515, 336 U. 8, 909. If one party to a contract brings suit and the

other party answers on merits instead of relying on arbitration, conduct may

amount to waiver. Almacenes Fernandez, S. A. v. Golodetz, 148 PF. (2) 625,

161 A. L. R. 1420; Bank of Madison v. Graber, 158 F. (2d) 137.

Where one party seeks to waive, repudiate or abandon arbitration, the other

may claim it as a defense.

Uniao De Transportadores Para Importacao E. Commercio, LTDA. v.

Companhia De Navegacao Carregadores Acoreanos, 84 F. Supp. 582; Kulukun-

dis Shipping Co. 8/A v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F. (2d) 978; The Belize,

25 F. Supp. 663.

This Court in Shanferoke Co. v. Westchester Co., 293 U. 8. 449, affirmed the

Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit and approved the grounds given by

that Court in denying the claim of waiver. The Court of Appeals held in

Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester 8. Corp., 70 F. (2d) 297, that

it was the duty of the plaintiff to take the initiative in seeking arbitration,

saying in an opinion by Learned Hand, Circuit Judge, on p. 299: ‘*The plain-

tiff further objects that the defendant is ‘in default in proceeding with such

arbitration,’ within the meaning of section 3. True, it has not named its

arbitrator, but in its answer and moving affidavits has merely expressed its

willingness to submit to arbitration. This appears to us enough. It was the

plaintiff who declared the contract to be at an end; and with that the defend-

ant was contented. If the plaintiff meant to proceed further and enforce a

claim for damages, the initiative rested upon it; it should have named the

first arbitrator. If it did not but sued instead, it was itself the party who

fell ‘in default in proceeding with such arbitration,’ not the defendant.’’

14

its action should have no effect on the State Court action

(p. 12, supra). Returning to the State Court action now

involved in this petition for certiorari, we find that after

the petition was filed by respondent in the State Court

action on October 29, 1948, petitioner on November 18, 1948

filed a motion to dismiss for failure to file security for costs

required by the Nebraska law, which security having been

given after the motion was filed but before ruling, the mo-

tion was overruled on November 24, 1948. On December 3,

1948, petitioner filed a motion to make the petition more

definite and certain, which was overruled on April 4, 1949.

On June 24, 1949, having already on April 8, 1949 filed the

complaint to compel arbitration by Wilson & Company,

petitioner here filed a motion for a continuance and stay of

proceedings, pending the decision by the Federal Court

(R., pp. 8-11, Tr., pp. 13-17). That motion was argued be-

fore the State Court on August 22, 1949. The Court over-

ruled the motion (R., p. 95, Tr., p. 32).

Petitioner answered, praying for a stay pending arbi-

tration and presenting other defenses (R., pp. 5-7, Tr., pp.

9-11). Before the trial began after the jury was empaneled,

petitioner made a further motion to have the State Court

proceeding dismissed because it was prematurely brought

since there had been no arbitration as required by the con-

tract. This motion was overruled September 19, 1949

(R., p. 95, Tr., p. 52).

_* The case then went to trial before a jury and the Court

excluded large parts of the contract because they provided

for enforcement of arbitration (R., pp. 178-189, B. of Ex.,

pp. 162-232, 354-356). At the close of the case the State

Court directed a verdict for the plaintiff and entered judg-

ment in the amount of $41,175.00 against the petitioner

herein.

15

3. The parties agreed that any controversy arising out

of the contract in question should be settled by arbitration.°

Reasons for Granting the Writ

Petitioner tried in every way to get the matter decided

by arbitration. Each of the procedures urging such ac-

tion is set forth in detail above and will not be repeated.

9**Rule 115—Arbitration.

‘*Section 1. All controversies arising out of contracts made under these

Trading Rules or the breach thereof, unless amicably adjusted otherwise, shall

be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Rules, then obtaining, of the

American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the award rendered

may be entered in the highest court of the forum, State or Federal, having

jurisdiction.’’

Wilson & Co., Inc. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 77 F. Supp. 364: ‘‘The

first dispute between the parties is whether there is in their contract any actual

agreement to arbitrate. That is one of two primary and equally vital ques-

tions presented upon the record. The plaintiff denies that such an agreement

was ever made. The contract must, therefore, be examined. It is set out in

a footnote.!

‘*Without resting any argument upon this factor, the plaintiff directs the

Court’s attention to the verbal parsimony which the contract betrays, and to

its execution for both parties to it by a single broker. Upon the latter point

it need be said only that both parties to this action adopted the memorandum

as their contract, the defendant delivered and the plaintiff accepted thirty

ear loads of oil under it, and the plaintiff’s entire complaint rests upon its

validity. And, so far as brevity is concerned, it is neither a virtue nor a vice,

except as it may disclose or obscure the intent of the makers of an agreement.

‘*‘The presently significant language of the contract is: ‘Rules National

Soybean Processors Association.’ Those rules are shown in an exhibit at-

tached to a stipulation in the files, generally entitled: ‘Year Book and Trad-

ing Rules, 1945-1946, National Soybean Processors Association.’ The trading

rules governing the purchase and sale of soybean oil are seventeen in number,

identified as Rules 101 to 117, both inclusive. Their text covers some fourteen

pages of a printed booklet, Rule 115, dealing with arbitration, is in the follow-

ing language:

‘«¢All controversies arising out of contracts made under these Trading

Rules or the breach thereof, unless amicably adjusted otherwise, shall be

settled by arbitration in accordance with the Rules, then obtaining of the

American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the award rendered

may be entered in the highest court of the forum, State or Federal having

jurisdiction.’

** Another booklet presented in evidence by the stipulation includes the rules

for arbitration of the American Arbitration Association, which are compre-

16

It would be difficult to find a case where a party was more

consistent in trying to obtain the benefits of its contract

under the Federal statute and its interpretations. Is it

possible that merely by going from a Federal Court to a

State Court a party to a contract involving interstate com-

merce may defeat the will of Congress regarding arbitra-

tion of controversies arising out of a contract involving

commerce?

There are thousands of contracts outstanding at all

times in the United States where a transaction involving

interstate commerce is involved and arbitration of any

controversy thereunder is stipulated by the parties in their

agreement. How are they to get the benefits of their con-

tract if it can be brushed aside as it was in this case? It is

hensive and voluminous and provide a detailed program or procedure for arbi-

tration. By the stipulation of the parties upon the submission of this motion,

they agree that ‘they are the rules which would govern the arbitration re-

quested by the defendant herein.’ Of that procedure, this Court now says

only that it is obviously operable. Whether resort to it is prudent or desir-

able is beyond the proper scope of the present study.’’

Fremont Cake & Meal Co. v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 83 F. Supp. 900: ‘‘ Wilson

& Company reasserts in argument all of its formerly tendered objections to

the imposition upon it of the obligation to suffer or participate in arbitration

of its claim. These include the contentions, (a) that the contract between the

parties does not contain a provision for arbitration; (b) that the contract

does not evidence any contract involving commerce within the true meaning

of Title 9, U. 8S. C. A., sections 1 and 2; (c) that the application of any or

all of the provisions of Title 9, U. 8. C. A. is limited to contracts which do

evidence a transaction involving commerce; and (d) that there is no arbitrable

controversy between the parties. Items (a) and (b) of those positions are

sufficiently discussed in the opinion reported in 77 F. Supp. 364; But it may

be added, without discussion or particularization, that the additional material

now before the Court in the way of letters between the parties and oral

testimony serves clearly to confirm the Court’s earlier and now reiterated, con-

clusion that the contract evidences a transaction involving commerce. In the

Court’s opinion that conclusion eliminates the necessity of passing upon the

academic question raised in item (ce). And, touching the presence of an

arbitrable controversy, the Court, at this time, in view of the entire record

before it, including the issues made by the pleadings in the Dodge County

case, still considers and holds that that question must be answered in the

affirmative.’’

17

important to the commercial activity of this country that

contracting parties be able to know whether such an agree-

ment for arbitration in a contract involving a transaction

in interstate commerce is valid, irrevocable and enforce-

able, or that such a Federal statute is merely so many

words without effect if the other party can rush the case

into the State Court first.

Obviously, the plaiatiff has the right to choose the forum

and in many cases titere is no ground for removal. If the

State Court has the power to strike down the Federal stat-

ute in this manner, arbitration agreements can have effect

only when the party asserting the complzint so elects.

The Federal Courts are overburdened with litigation

at many points throughout the country. The enforcement

of arbitration agreements and proper use of the arbitra-

tion statute should relieve some of that load. The statute

does not purport to require arbitration against the will of

the parties. It is only when they so agree in writing that

it applies. Why should a person be relieved of such an

agreement any more than the other terms of the contract?

In many cases as in this one the provision for arbitra-

tion makes it possible to have persons determine the factual

questions and apply principles of commercial law, where

they are peculiarly well informed in the field which is the

subject of controversy. In this action there were restric-

tions of the War Food Administration, the Commodity

Credit Corporation, the Department of Agriculture and the

Office of Price Administration, as well as technical ques-

tions as to the amount of oil that can be extracted from

a bushel of soybeans by various methods. There were ques-

tions about the effect of shutdowns caused by war priori-

ties on the capacity of the plant and the requirement that

oil be manufactured out of a certain crop. Respondent

knew that these matters would not be disregarded by

18

arbitrators who were familiar with the practices of the

trade and it was for that reason it was very eager to avoid

arbitration as was clearly demonstrated.”

Even though it first brought its case in Federal Court

it departed therefrom as soon as the Court ordered a

stay until arbitration could be had. It hoped that all of

the technical questions would be promptly brushed aside

on the ground that there was a reference to arbitration and

10In Fremont Cake & Meal Co. v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 86 F. Supp. 968,

Judge Delehant said: ‘‘Stated simply, until one party to the contract has

pursued its prescribed initiatory steps, it has not made any ‘demand’ and

thereby decisively required the other party to answer, or to act upon, such

demand for arbitration; and the vital condition precedent to a mandatory

order to proceed to arbitration has not been performed.

‘*That Fremont Company has taken none of those explicitly defined steps

is established by stipulation and evidence. Its course in the entire con-

troversy has been dilatory and obstructive only. It has taken no affirmative

action looking to the resolution, by any forum, of its differences with Wilson &

Company. Its claimed default in the delivery of soybean oil occurred late

in 1946, nearly three years ago. Despite the early threats of Wilson & Com-

pany in two letters, supra, to invoke the arbitration clause of the contract,

it remained silent touching arbitration and did not itself initiate the process

or even assent to Wilson & Company’s suggestion of its availability. Wilson

& Company then sued in this Court. Still, Fremont Company took no steps

to commence arbitration. It obtained the ruling announcing the granting of

its motion for a stay of proceedings in that suit, pending arbitration, which

was made over the vigorous objection of its adversary on many grounds, in-

cluding its position that it was not a party to any contract containing a valid

agreement to arbitrate on any agreement whatsoever upon the subject. That

motion did not demand, and the order if it had been entered, would not have

required, that Wilson & Company initiate arbitration. The action contem-

plated was merely the suspension of the prosecution of the suit pending arbi-

tration, presumably upon the initiation of Fremont Company, which, alone,

contended for it. Even then, with its right to require arbitration vindicated,

it remained silent and inert until the first case here had been dismissed and

the Dodge County, Nebraska, case had been instituted and pressed for nearly

six months, when it started this action. And it need not be asserted that the

filing of this case is no substitute for the initiatory steps contractually de-

fined for the setting on foot of arbitration.

**Confronted with that history of inaction, this Court finds that Wilson &

Company has not ‘failed, neglected or refused to arbitrate,’ and is not ‘in

default’ in the performance of any obligation incident to arbitration within

the meaning of Title 9, U. S. C. A., section 4; and that Fremont Company

is not ‘aggrieved’ by any default in that behalf on the part of Wilson &

19

for that reason they could not be considered. It was cor-

rect. The State Court even held that defenses because of

war and other contingencies could not be considered because

the agreement provided for their enforcement by arbitra-

tion. Large sections of the contract were not even al-

lowed to be introduced into evidence for this reason. If

the right to arbitration as to controversies involving inter-

state commerce is to be valid, irrevocable and enforceable,

it must be given such effect in all of the forty-eight States

and not thrown out in Nebraska or other jurisdictions

which decide to disregard this Federal statute.

It is not as though Congress has not provided ample

safeguards for the courts to review any arbitration award.

Title 9, United States Code, covers those problems in de-

tail.”

Company. Nagy v. Arcas Brass & Iron Co., 242 N. Y. 97, 150 N. E. 614,

Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Louis Bossert & Sons (2 Cir.) 62 F. (2) 1004,

Radiator Specialty Co. v. Cannon Mills, supra.

‘*The Court is not unmindful of the admission in the pleadings by Wilson

& Company that it has refused to arbitrate and a like, though somewhat

qualified, stipulation upon the trial. But that ‘refusal’ must be understood

in its proper context. Denying its obligation to arbitrate under its contract,

Wilson & Company has not initiated the arbitration process but has refused

(or failed or neglected) to participate in arbitration proceedings started by

its opponent, for none have been thus started.

‘*Consideration has been given to the question whether the asserted denial

of the obligation to arbitrate relieves Fremont Company of the necessity of

taking the initiatory steps in arbitration, if it desires to insist upon its right

to that procedure. But the Court holds that the question must be answered

negatively. Here the very existence of an agreement for arbitration is in

bona fide dispute. That the dispute is real and substantial is not altered by

the circumstance that the Court has heretofore announced its conclusion that

there is such an agreement. Wilson & Company sincerely believes that the

Court was mistaken in that ruling. Such being the situation, Fremont Com-

pany ought to be required to take the definitive steps setting the arbitration

machinery in motion, thus putting Wilson & Company under the necessity of

determining whether, on the faith of its legal contention, it should ‘ fail,

neglect or refuse to arbitrate’ and thereby enter into ‘default’ in that respect.’’

11 Section 3 provides for stay of any court proceeding pending arbitration;

Section 4, for an order by the Federal Court compelling arbitration; Section

5, for the appointment of arbitrators; Section 6, for any application to be

handled as a motion; Section 7, procedures for handling witnesses before the

20

In Nebraska the same power to review arbitration awards

is recognized.”

4. If the Federal Arbitration Act is to be effective, it

should be liberally construed to carry out the congres-

sional purpose.”* It should not be defeated by conduct such

as is shown in this case.

arbitrators; Section 8, for proceedings begun by libel in admiralty and then

arbitration; Section 9, for confirmation of the award; Section 10, for vacat-

ing the award in any of the following situations: (a) where the award was

procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (b) where there was evident

partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (c) where the

arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing,

upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and

material to the controversy; or of other misbehavior by which the rights of

any party have been prejudiced; (d) where the arbitrators exceeded their

powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite

award upon the subject matter submitted was not made; and in (e) a rehear-

ing by the arbitrators at the Court’s discretion; Section 11, modification or

correction of award upon the following grounds: (a) where there was an

evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material mistake in

the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award;

(b) where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them,

unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter

submitted; and (c) where the award is imperfect in matter of form not

affecting the merits of the controversy; Section 12, notice of motions to

vacate or modify and manner of service, stay of proceedings; Section 13, the

papers to be filed with order on motions, judgment, force and effect of the

judgment and its enforcement; Section 14, that the act should not apply

to contracts made prior to January 1, 1926.

12 Fraud, corruption, or misbehavior of the arbitrators is ground for set-

ting aside or impeaching the award. McDowell v. Thomas, 4 Neb. 542; Hughes

v. Sarpy County, 97 Neb. 90, 149 N. W. 309.

18 Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F. (2d) 978:

‘«The United States Arbitration Act of 1925 was sustained as constitutional,

in its application to cases arising in admiralty. Marine Transit Corp. Vv.

Dreyfus, 1932, 284 U. 8. 263, 52 8. Ct. 166, 76 L. Ed. 516. The purpose of

that Act was deliberately to alter the judicial atmosphere previously exist-

ing. The report of the House Committee states, in part: ‘Arbitration agree-

ments are purely matters of contract, and the effect of the bill is simply to

make the contracting party live up to his agreement. He can no longer

refuse to perform his contract when it becomes disadvantageous to him, An

arbitration agreement is placed upon the same footing as other contracts,

where it belongs. * * * The need for the law arises from an anachronism of our

American law. Some centuries ago, because of the jealousy of the English

courts for their own jurisdiction, they refused to enforce specific agreements

'

21

Conclusion :

The foregoing reasons, this petition for a writ of cer-

tiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

MaxweELu V. BEGHTOL,

J. Lez Rankin,

Counsel for Petitioner.

to arbitrate upon the ground that the courts were thereby ousted from their

jurisdiction. This jealousy survived for so long a period that the principle

became firmly embedded in the English common law and was adopted with it

by the American courts. The courts have felt that the precedent was too

-strongly fixed to be overturned without legislative enactment, although they

have frequently criticized the rule and recognized its illogical nature and the

injustice which results from it. The bill declares simply that such agree-

ments for arbitration shall be enforced, and provides a procedure in the

Federal courts for their enforcement. * * * It is particularly appropriate that

the action should be taken at this time when there is so much agitation against

the costliness and delays of litigation. These matters, can be largely elimi-

nated by agreements for arbitration, if arbitration agreements are made

valid and enforceable.’

‘In the light of the clear intention of Congress, it is our obligation to

shake off the old judicial hostility to arbitration. Accordingly, in a case like

this, involving the Federal Act, we should not follow English or other deci-

sions which have narrowly construed the terms of arbitration agreements or

arbitration statutes.’’

Circuit Judge Frank presents an excellent discussion of the history of the

hostility of the courts toward arbitration agreements and rights in this case,

which the Court may wish to consider.

Young v. Ragen, Warden, 337 U. 8S. 235: ‘‘More than a question of State

procedure is involved when a State Court of last resort closes the door to

any consideration of a claim of denial] of a Federal right.’’

22

APPENDIX A

Title 28, U. S. C. A., Sec. 1257, Par. (3)

Sec. 1257. State courts; appeal; certiorari

Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest

court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be

reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows:

* * * * * * *

(3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of a treaty

or statute of the Unité States is drawn in question or

where the validity of a State statute is drawn in question

on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution,

treaties or laws of the United States, or where any title,

right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed

under the Constitution, treaties or statutes of, or commis-

sion held or authority exercised under, the United States.

June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat. 929.

Title 9, U. S. C. A., See. 1

Sec. 1. ‘‘Maritime transactions’’ and ‘‘commerce’’ de-

fined; exceptions to operation of title

‘‘Maritime transactions’’, as herein defined, means char-

ter parties, bills of lading of water carriers, agreements

relating to wharfage, supplies furnished vessels or repairs

to vessels, collisions, or any other matters in foreign com-

merce which, if the subject of controversy, would be em-

braced within admiralty jurisdiction; ‘‘commerce’’, as

herein defined means commerce among the several States

or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United

States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such

Territory and another, or between any such Territory and

any State or foreign nation, or between the District of

Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation,

but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of

employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other

class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate com-

merce. July 30, 1947, c. 392, Sec. 1, 61 Stat. 669.

23

Sec. 2. Validity, irrevocability, and enforcement of

agreements to arbitrate

A written provision in any maritime transaction or a

contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to

settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out

of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform

the whole or any part thetdof or an agreement in writing

to submit to arbitration existing controversy arising

out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be

valid, irrevocable, and enfo ‘ceable, save upon such grounds

as exist at law or in equity'for the revocation of any con-

tract. July 30, 1947, c. 392, Sec. 1, 61 Stat. 669.

APPENDIX B

Wuson & Company, Inc., a corporation, Appellee,

v.

Fremont Cake & Meat Company, A CORPORATION,

Appellant

43 N. W. 2d 657

Filed July 24, 1950. No. 32745

1. Trial. In determining whether or not a verdict should

have been directed by the trial court, the evidence must be

considered in the light most favorable to the party against

whom the motion was made; that is, every controverted

fact must be resolved in his favor and he should have the

benefit of every inference that can reasonably be deduced

therefrom.

2. Arbitration and Award: Courts. Where arbitration

constitutes a part of the contract between parties to it and

an attempt is made to enforce arbitration by invoking the

Federal Arbitration Act, in the courts of this state the

issue is one of procedure and not of substantive right, and

the laws of this state are controlling.

3. Arbitration and Award: Contracts. In this jurisdic-

24

tion a provision in a contract requiring arbitration, whether

of disputes arising under the contract generally or only

of the amount of any loss or damages sustained by the

parties thereto, will not be enforced; nor will refusal to

arbitrate be available in an action growing out of the con-

tract.

4. Sales. Where a certain date is fixed as the time limit

for delivery of six tank cars of soybean oil by the seller

to the purchaser, and by subsequent agreement between the .

parties in the form of correspondence the time limit date

for delivery is postponed, such agreement does not dis-

charge the original contract, but the same remains in full

force, changed only to the extent that delivery is post-

poned.

5. Contracts. If a party by his contract creates a duty

or imposes a charge upon himself, he must under any and

all conditions substantially comply with the undertaking.

6. —————. Inconvenience or the cost of compliance,

though they might make compliance a hardship, cannot

excuse a party from the performance of an absolute and

unqualified undertaking to do a thing that is possible and

lawful.

7. ————. A contract is not invalid, nor is the obligor

therein in any manner discharged from its binding effect,

because it turns out to be difficult or burdensome to per-

form.

8. Contracts: Sales. An abnormal rise in the price of

soybean products due to war or unusual trade conditions,

so that the processor thereof cannot perform a contract to

process and deliver the same to a contractee without greater

expense than anticiputed, is not an impossibility excusing

performance.

9. Sales: Damages. The measure of damages is the dif-

ference in the contract price of the merchandise and the

market value of the same at the time to which delivery is

postponed. If delivery is postponed by agreement of the

parties, the market value at the time to which delivery

is postponed is taken as the criterion.

Appeal from the district court for Dodge County: Rus-

sell A. Robinson, Judge. Affirmed.

Beghtol & Rankin, Sidner, Lee & Gunderson, Kenneth

25

E. Anderson, Nate C. Holman, George E. Svoboda, and

John C. Mason, for appellant.

Kennedy, Holland, DeLacy & Svoboda, Louis R. Simp-

son, and Spear, Lamme & Flory, for appellee.

Heard before Simmons, C. J., Carter, Messmore, Yeager,

Chappell, Wenke, and Boslaugh, JJ.

Messmore, J.

This is an action at law brought by the plaintiff, Wilson

& Company, a corporation, against the Fremont Cake &

Meal Company, a corporation, to recover damages for the

alleged breach of contract for the sale and delivery of soy-

bean oil to the plaintiff. At the close of all the evidence

the plaintiff moved for a directed verdict. This motion was

sustained. From the overruling of defendant’s motion for

a new trial and entry of judgment on the verdict in the

amount of $41,175 and costs, the defendant perfected ap-

peal to this court.

For convenience we will refer to the appellant, Fremont

Cake & Meal Company, a corporation, as the Fremont com-

pany, and to the appellee, Wilson & Company, corpora-

tion, as Wilson & Company. The Commodity Credit Cor-

poration, Washington, D. C., a corporate agency of the

United States government, will be referred to as the CCC,

and the Office of Price Administration, an agency of the

United States government, as the OPA.

We review the record with the following rule in mind:

‘‘In determining whether or not a verdict should have been

directed by the trial court, the evidence must be considered

in the light most favorable to the party against whom the

motion was made; that is, every controverted fact must

be resolved in his favor and he should have the benefit of

every inference that can reasonably be deduced there-

from.’’ Thoren v. Myers, 151 Neb. 453, 37 N. W. 2d 725.

The following facts are not in substantial dispute: On

August 10, 1945, Wilson & Company entered into a contract

identified as No. 3447-W, negotiated by B. E. Forssell, the

manager of the refinery department of Wilson & Company,

through the Marwood Company, Incorporated, a broker-

age concern. The contract was confirmed by B. E. Forssell,

and is as follows:

26

‘‘August 10, 1945 No. 3447-W

Seller; Marr Soybean Processing Company, 130 North

Broad Street, Fremont, Nebraska.

Buyer; Wilson and Company, Refinery Department, 4100

South Ashland Avenue, Chicago 9, Illinois.

Gentlemen: We confirm transaction today for your ac-

count as follows:

Commodity: Soybean oil.

Quality: Crude. ‘

Quantity: Thirty-six (36) Buyer furnishing tankcars |

of approximately 61,000 pounds capacity each.

Weight: Certified.

Price: Eleven and three-quarters cents (11%4c) per

pound (or O.P.A. ceiling price in effect at time of ship-

ment) f.o.b. Fremont, Nebraska.

Terms: Sight Draft/Bill of Lading attached for amount

of invoice, free of exchange to buyer. Weights & quality

guaranteed at destination.

Shipment: Time Three (3) tankcars each month Octo-

ber, 1945, through September, 1946. From Fremont, Ne-

braska.

Other Conditions: Seller warrants that crude soybean oil

covered by this contract will be produced from beans ac-

quired in accordance with his processor contract with the

CCC, or any other government agency controlling the

marketing and crushing of oilseeds during season 1945-46.

This contract is subject to any government regulation con-

trolling the movement and allocation of crude soybean oil.

Subject to tankear reguiations by ODT.

Rules Brokerage: National Soybean Processors Associa-

tion.

This confirmation is made in triplicate, one copy being

sent to the buyer, one to the seller, and one retained on

file in this office.

Marwood Company, Inc., As Brokers only, By Mar-

vin Wood. P,

Buyer to have privilege of unloading shipments imme-

diately on receipt, seller to be notified by mail of details

as to quality and weight adjustment.”’

27

On or about September 1, 1945, the Fremont company

succeeded to the business of the Marr Soybean Processing

Company. The Fremont company, with the consent of

Wilson & Company and the Marr Soybean Processing Com-

pany, adopted and agreed to carry out the terms of the

contract set out, and which will hereinafter be referred to

as the contract. The Fremont company, under the terms

of the contract, delivered to Wilson & Company 30 tank cars

of soybean oil at the price provided for in the contract.

When the Fremont company assumed the contract it was

obligated to take over contracts to furnish Armour &

Company 36 cars of oil, the Interstate Cottonseed Oil

Refining Company a minimum of 33 cars, in addition to

the 36 cars for Wilson & Company, making the total com-

mitment of 105 cars of oil.

On September 10, 1945, Harry E. Wiysel, manager of

the Fremont company, signed for the company the CCC

contract. The CCC contract provided: ‘‘1. Purchase of

Soybeans. The processor shall purchase for his own ac-

count, upon the terms and conditions hereinafter specified,

soybeans of the 1945 crop, either directly from producers

or from others who have paid producers not less than the

support prices specified * * * in a total quantity not in

excess of the quantity he can process on or before October

10, 1946 (to be determined by multiplying the total daily

capacity of the Plant * * *).’’

The last delivery was made by the Fremont company

on September 24, 1946, leaving six tank cars of soybean oil

to be delivered to Wilson & Company, which were never

delivered and which constitute the subject matter of the

instant case.

The plaintiff’s petition alleged that six tank cars of

soybean oil remained undelivered under the contract; that

by mutual consent the time for delivery of the same was

extended so that there could be delivered during the latter

part of October 1946, three of the tank cars of soybean oil,

and the last three during the latter part of November

1946. Due to the failure of delivery as pleaded, the plain-

tiff prayed damages in the amount of $43,005, based upon

7

28

the failure of the Fremont company to perform the con-

tract.

The defendant’s answer, insofar as the same need be

considered, alleged in substance that delivery under the

eontratt was to be made from October 1945, through Sep-

tember 1946; the soybean oil to be furnished under the

contract was required to be produced according to the

Fremont company’s contract with the CCC or any other

government agency controlling the marketing and crushing

of soybeans into oil during the 1946 season which ran from

September 10, 1945, to October 10, 1946; that the ¢ efend-

ant used all soybeans allowed it under the CCC contract

and allocated the oil processed therefrom between the three

contracts to which it was committed when it assumed the

contract from the Marr company; and that defendant noti-

fied plaintiff it would be required under a prior contract,

before proceeding with new contracts, to furnish two tank

cars of soybean oil. Defendant also alleged that Wilson &

Company was advised early in October 1946, that the con-

tract could not be fulfilled because of government regula-

tions controlling the movement and allocation of soybean

oil, and its processor’s contract; that any default that oc-

curred was on or before October 1, 1946; and further, that

Wilson & Company gave no notice of default as required

by rule 116 of the Soybean Processors Trading Rules. De-

fendant also alleged that the terms ‘‘Eleven and three-

quarters cents (1134c) per pound (or O.P.A. ceiling in

effect at time of shipment) f.o.b. Fremont, Nebraska,’’ were

intended and understood by the parties and the industry

and interpreted in practice to mean ceiling price now in

effect, or ceiling price in effect at the time of delivery, or

if no ceiling price, then market price at the time of de-

livery; and that the Fremont company never at any time

after October 1, 1946, offered to ship any soybean oil to

Wilson & Company except at the market price at time of

delivery.

Wilson & Company is engaged in the packing business,

and also refines crude soybean oil into margarine or cook-

ing oil.

29

We make reference to the documentary evidence only

insofar as the same relates to the six tauk cars of soybean

oil not delivered.

B. E. Forssell testified in behalf of Wilson & Company

that on or about the 10th of September 1946, he was in

Fremont and contacted Mr. Wiysel, manager of the Fre-

mont company. His purpose was to endeavor to purchase

soybean oil for his company. He talked to Wiysel about

the scarcity of oil and this contract. Wiysel told him:

‘*We owe you six tanks more than we are shipping this

month, but I think by next month we will be Okeh and

ship again.’’’ Forssell said that would be all right, ‘‘we

have a contract on it and I suppose you will live up to your

contract.’’ There was nothing more said by Wiysel.

On October 11, 1946, Wilson & Company wired the Fre-

mont company: ‘‘According Our Records We Have Six

Tanks Soybean Oil Still Due Us Marwood Contract 3447-W

Stop Please Wire When You Plan Load These Remaining

Six Tanks Due Give Us Loading Dates As You See Them.’’

On October 14, 1946, the Fremont company wired Wilson

& Company: ‘‘Expect To Load Three Tanks Last Half

October Three Tanks Last Half November Will Advise

Loading Dates Later.’’

This witness testified that he kept familiar with the OPA

ceiling prices, and on October 1, 1946, the ceiling price

was 11% cents per pound for soybean oil, the price -when

the contract was entered into. There was a very short

period during the summer when the ceiling prices were

off, but during the interim the price stayed at 1134 cents

per pound. The OPA was put back on with the same ceil-

ing price. On October 1, 1946, an order of the OPA made

the ceiling price 1314 cents per pound for soybean oil. One

delivery on this contract was made between October 1 and

October 16, 1946. It was shipped in September. The ceil:

ing price on the day of the last shipment was 1154 cents

per pound. The latter part of October and November

1946, when the Fremont company, by its telegram of Oc-

tober 14, 1946, stated it expected to load three tanks the

last part of October and three tanks the last half of Novem-

30

ber, the ceiling price at that time was 134% cents per pound.

On October 16, 1946, the ceiling price was withdrawn.

On November 1, 1946, Wilson & Company wired the Fre-

mont company, ‘‘Your Wire Oct. 14th Advising Expect To

Load Three Tanks Soybean Oil Last Half October Three

Tanks November When Will You Want These Empty

Tanks For Loading Wire Reply.’’ On November 2, 1946,

the Fremont company wired Wilson & Company: ‘‘Retel

Will Not Have Oil To Ship Until Late November Will

Contact You When Can Ship And Set Price On Oil.’’ This

last telegram received from the Fremont company by Wil-

son & Company was the first indication that there would

be any other price than the contract price charged for

the soybean oil.

On November 5, 1946, this witness received a long dis-

tance telephone call from Wiysel wherein Wiysel wanted

to make an adjustment as to prices on the six cars that

had not been delivered. He was informed that there was

no-adjustment, as the price was on the contract, 1154 cents

per pound.

On November 15, 1946, this witness wrote the Fremont

company referring to the telephone conversation with

Wiysel, and stated that this oil, on the basis of the con-

tract, was due and coming to Wilson & Company at 11%

cents per pound, f.o.b. Fremont, inasmuch as this was the

last OPA ceiling price in effect.

~ On November 16, 1946, the Fremont company wired

Forssell in Chicago: ‘‘Offer To Ship Six Cars Soybean

Oil December January If Accepted In Full Satisfaction

Of Harwood Contract No. 3447W.’’ On November 16, 1946,

Forssell wired the Fremont company in reply to this offer

to ship six cars of soybean oil December 1946, and Janu-

ary 1947, and that it was satisfactory to ship same on

dates mentioned at 1314 cents per pound in full satisfac-

tion of the contract.

On November 18, 1946, the Fremont company wired Fors-

sell: ‘‘Our Wire 16th Offer To Ship Six Cars Predicated

On Agreement At Current Oil Market Which We Believe

Is 23 Cents.’’ This marked the first time that the Fremont

company set a definite figure for the price of the six cars

31

in controversy, which was the current price on that date.

There was a fluctuation of prices after the ceiling was re-

moved, from 20 to 23 cents, and then from 24 to 25 cents the

latter part of November 1946. The last day of October the

market price was 22 cents.

On November 18, 1946, Forssell wrote the Fremont com-

pany making reference to its telegram of November 16th

wherein it offered to ship six cars of soybean oil in De-

cember and January in full satisfaction of the contract,

to which Wilson & Company replied that it would -accept

the six tanks at 13% cents per pound, and that they re-

ceived a telegram from Fremont company offering the six

cars at 23 cents per pound. Not to have any misunder-

standing, Wilson & Company reiterated the position as

outlined in its letter of November 15th, ‘‘that on the basis

of our contract with you this oil is due and coming to us at

11%¢, per lb., but without waiving any of our rights we

would accept these six tanks you offer us for December-

January shipment at 1314c per Ib. in full satisfaction of

this contract.’’ There was no reply received to this letter.

On December 2, 1946, Forssell wired the Fremont com-

pany: ‘‘No Reply Our Letter November 18th What Can

We Expect Six Tanks Soybean Oil Due On Marwood Con-

tract No. 3447-W.’’ December 3, 1946, the Fremont com-

pany wired Forssell: ‘‘Retel Offer Ship Car Soybean Oil

Current Market 25 Cents.’’ On December 3, 1946, the mar-

ket price of soybean oil was 25 cents per pound.

Harry E. Wiysel, manager for the Fremont company,

testified that its factory was located at Fremont, Nebraska,

and that it engaged in the processing of soybean oil; that

he was familiar with the CCC contract with his company,

and the same was referred to in the contract between

the Fremont company and Wilson & Company under the

language contained therein, ‘‘Other Conditions’’; and that

the CCC contract was the only contract under which the

Fremont company operated in the processing of soybeans

into crude oil during the season of 1945-1946. In accord-

ance with the CCC contract, the Fremont company went

into the market and purchased soybeans at $2.04 per

bushel, paid to the grower. The Fremont company sold

32

the soybeans to the CCC for $2.04 per bushel, and repur-

chased them from the CCC at 37 cents less a bushel, which

constituted the margin of profit to the Fremont company.

The CCC contract provided that the Fremont company

(the processor) was privileged to purchase soybeans of the

1945 crop ‘‘in a total quantity not in excess of the quantity

he (the processor) can process on or before October 10,

1946 (to be determined by multiplying the total daily ca-

pacity of the Plant * * *,’’ which is in this instance 2,300

bushels daily, which would entitle the Fremont company

to purchase 759,000 bushels. Wiysel further testified that

a bushel of soybeans would produce 8% pounds of oil, or,

6,451,500 pounds of soybeans would be equivalent to 105 2/3

tank cars. At the time the CCC contract was entered into

the Fremont company had commitments of 105 tank cars.

The Fremont company purchased 691,338 bushels of soy-

beans under the CCC contract between October 1, 1945, and

October 10, 1946, the production was based on 80 percent

of the plant’s capacity. Assuming that there were 8%

pounds of oil to the bushel, 96 tank cars of oil could be

produced. Thirty cars were delivered to Armour & Com-

pany, 27 cars to the Interstate Cottonseed Oil Refining

Company, and 30 cars to Wilson & Company, or a total

of 87 cars. Wiysel further testified that the total produc-

tion of soybean oil from the 1945 bean crop was 5,588,120

pounds. This would be equivalent to 91% cars.

The Fremont company’s plant was shut down in Sep-

tember, the greater part of October, and in November,

1945, due to inability to procure adequate machinery, steel,

and other items necessary to keep the plant in full produc-

tion.

Wiysel further testified that Wilson & Company never

at any time informed the Fremont company it would waive

the requirements that any soybean oil sold to it under this

contract be produced from beans acquired in accordance

with its contract with the CCC or any other government

agency controlling the marketing or crushing of oilseeds

during the season of 1945-1946, and nothing was said to

the Fremont company about waiving the defaults and the

delivery of soybean oil in October’ 1945, and April and

—-

33

May 1946. He testified that he kept advised of the OPA

ceiling prices in effect from time to time, and that after

October 16, 1946, the ceiling was unlimited; it was the

market price. He related his conversation with Forssell in

September 1946, where matters were discussed about the

contract, and wherein he related to Forssell the difficulties

he had during the past year, previous to September 1946,

to the effect that one large expeller was on order, that

delivery was promised in time to commence operation on

the 1945-1946 crop, that delivery was not made until Octo-

ber 1, and the plant was not in operation until the end of

October. He also explained to Forssell the difficulties in

obtaining repairs for the other expellers. One expeller

was down for six weeks and another a like period of time

in December and January, and they were unable to obtain

repairs due to war conditions. He further explained to

Forssell that the Fremont company had other contracts

that were to be filled, and that the Fremont company

carried the contracts making delivery on a pro rata basis,

month by month. Forssell said nothing with reference to

that matter, and indicated he would accept the oil at a

later date. Wiysel testified that the Fremont company

was agreeable to shipping the remaining six cars of oil

at a later date at the maximum permitted under the OPA.

The Fremont company asserts the contract is subject

to the rules of the National Soybean Processors Associa-

tion which appear in the Year Book and Trading Rules

of the National Soybean Processors Association. Rule 115

contained therein deals with arbitration. Rule 116 deals

with contingencies, and specifically refers to war. We will

discuss this rule later in the opinion. In addition, rules

for arbitration of the American Arbitration Association

are also pertinent to the contract, and the Fremont com-

pany asserts that the refusal of the trial court to admit

into evidence all of such rules relating to arbitration con-

stitutes prejudicial error. Further, the United States

Arbitration Act, Title 9, U. S. C. A., sections 2, 3, and 4,

are applicable and should be enforced in the state courts,

and the failure of the trial court to so do constitutes preju-

dicial error.

34

In this act it is provided that a written provision in

any contract involving commerce to settle by arbitration

an existing controversy arising out of such contract shall

be valid and enforceable. By section 3 it is provided that

if any suit or proceeding be brought in any court of the

United States upon any issue referable to arbitration, the

court in which the suit is pending, shall, on application of

one of the parties stay the trial until such arbitration has

been had, provided the applicant for the stay is not in de-

fault in proceedings in such arbitration.

Section 4 provides in part as follows: ‘‘A party ag-

grieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another

to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may

petition any court of the United States which, save for

such agreement, would have jurisdiction under the judi-

cial code at law, in equity, or in admiralty of the subject

matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between

the parties, for an order directing that such arbitration

proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.”’

The proper legal steps were taken by the Fremont com-

pany to present to the district court for Dodge County

the question as to whether or not arbitration should be

invoked by the trial court in the instant case. The trial

court ruled against the Fremont company on its conten-

tion in such respect.

A brief history of this litigation is appropriate to relate

in connection with this assignment of error. On July 11,

1947, Wilson & Company filed suit in the United States

District Court for the District of Nebraska, Omaha Divi-

sion, to recover damages against the Fremont company for

alleged breach of contract (the contract involved in the

instant case). On August 2, 1947, the Fremont company

filed a motion to stay proceedings until arbitration had

been had in accordance with Title 9, U. S. C. A., section 3.

This motion was sustained. Subsequent proceedings in

the federal court hereinafter referred to disclose no order

upon the ruling of the court was signed by the parties or

presented to the court for approval. See Wilson & Co.,

Ine. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 77 F. Supp. 364.

On July 19, 1948, Wilson & Company filed a motion to

35

dismiss its action in the United States District Court.

This was before the service or filing of an answer by the

Fremont company. This motion was sustained. In sus-

taining the plaintiff’s motion the court said the plaintiff

had, perhaps still has, the absolute choice of forums for

the recovery of the damages it claims, beyond the possible

intervention of the defendant. By plaintiff is meant Wil-

son & Company, by defendant is meant the Fremont com-

pany. That reflection does not enter into the ruling upon

the point; but it obviates the suggestion that the proce-

dure that is made mandatory in the federal court is being

imposed upon a litigant brought there against its will

and thereby deprived of the supposed advantages to it of

the state court’s traditional usages unaffected by Title 9,

U.S. C. A., section 3. See Wilson & Co., Inc. v. Fremont

Cake & Meal Co., supra.

The instant case was filed by Wilson & Company in

the district court for Dodge County on October 29, 1948.

The case proceeded to trial in the latter part of Septem-

ber 1949, and judgment was entered on the verdict on Sep-

tember 24, 1949.

On April 8, 1949, the Fremont company filed an origi-

nal action in the United States District Court for the

District of Nebraska, Omaha Division, seeking an affirma-

tive order to require Wilson & Company to submit this

controversy to arbitration, as provided for in U. S. C. A,,

Title 9, section 4. This original action was filed while the

instant action was pending and undetermined in the district

court for Dodge County, Nebraska. The United States Dis-

trict Court dismissed the Fremont company’s original

action filed therein on October 8, 1949, holding that the

Fremont company not only had taken none of the explicitly

defined steps to institute arbitration, but that its course

in the entire controversy had been dilatory and obstruc-

tive only. Despite the early threats of Wilson & Company

in two letters to invoke the arbitration clause of the con-

tract, it remained silent on the question touching arbitra-

tion and did not itself initiate the process or even assent

to Wilson & Company’s suggestion of its liability. See

36

Wilson & Co., Inc. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 83 F. Supp.

- 900.

This case was appealed to the United States Court of

Appeals, 8th Circuit, and on June 27, 1950, an opinion

was rendered by that court wherein the United States

District Court was affirmed. There is no occasion to

quote from the opinion, except to say that the Circuit

Court stated the state court obtained jurisdiction of the

controversy between Wilson & Company and the Fremont,

company long prior to the commencement of the present

proceeding. ‘‘A conflict of jurisdiction is always to be

avoided if possible and it is a general rule that the right

of a plaintiff to prosecute his suit in a court having once

attached, will not be taken away by proceedings in an-

other court. The decision in this case does not purport

to interfere in any respect with the jurisdiction of the

State Court but unless it could have such an effect it can

not be said to determine any actual substantive contro-

versy between the parties.” Fremont Cake & Meal Co.

v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 183 F. 2d 60.

In eonnection with this assignment of error the fol-

lowing authorities of this jurisdiction are applicable.

Whatever distinction may be made elsewhere between

arbitration generally and arbitration as to damages

it is well settled in this state that a provision in a

tract requiring arbitration, whether of all disputes arising

under contract, or only the amounts of loss or damages

sustained by the parties thereto, will not be enforced, and

that refusal to arbitrate is not available to the parties in

an action growing out of the contract. See, Schrandt v.

Young, 62 Neb. 254, 86 N. W. 1085; National Masonic Acci-

dent Assn. v. Burr, 44 Neb. 256, 62 N. W. 466; German-

American Ins. Co. v. Etherton, 25 Neb. 505, 41 N. W. 406;

Rentschler v. Missouri P. R. R. Co., 126 Neb. 493, 253

N. W. 694, 95 A. L. R. 1.

We conclude that the Fremont company’s assignment

of error here discussed cannot be sustained.

The Fremont company contends a question for the jury

was presented by the conflict in the testimony of Forssell

and Wiysel regarding the telegrams and correspondence

only,

con-

a,

37

between them as to whether or not a new contract was

made between the parties requiring delivery at an agreed

price after September 1946.

The evidence shows that on October 11, 1946, a telegram

from Wilson & Company to the Fremont company stated:

‘‘ According Our Records We Have Six Tanks Soybean Oil

Still Due Us Marwood Contract 3447-W Stop Please Wire

When You Plan Load These Remaining Six Tanks Due

Give Us Loading Dates As You See Them.’’ The Fremont

company’s answer dated October 14, 1946, said: ‘‘Expect

To Load Three Tanks Last Half October Three Tanks

Last Half November Will Advise Loading Dates Later.’’

We believe this exchange of telegrams constituted the terms

of an extension agreement. It may be noted also that on

November 16, 1946, the Fremont company offered to ship

six cars of soybean oil in December and January, if ac-

cepted in full satisfaction of the Marwood contract, which

was accepted by Wilson & Company.

There is an exchange of telegrams between Wilson &

Company and the Fremont company with reference to the

acceptance of the six tank cars of oil in December 1946,

and January 1947, at 1344 cents per pound, which occurred

after the Fremont company refused to deliver at the con-

tract price. These telegrams show that in order to get

the oil, Wilson & Company not only agreed to a future

- delivery, but to an increase in price to meet the OPA ceiling

price in effect October 16, 1946.

Where a certain date is fixed as the time limit for de-

livery of merchandise by the seller to the purchaser, and

by subsequent agreement between the parties in the form

of correspondence the time limit date for delivery is post-

poned, such agreement does not discharge the original

contract, but the same remains in full force, changed only

to the extent that delivery is postponed. See, Sussman,

Wormser & Co. v. Sea Food Co., 127 Miss. 420, 90 So. 116.

See, also, Gruner Lumber Co. v. Algonquin Lumber Co.,

123 Miss. 157, 85 So. 191; Roberts v. Benjamin, 124 U. S.

64, 8S. Ct. 393, 31 L. Ed. 334.

There was no new contract made between the parties;

38

there was merely an extension of time for delivery of the

soybean oil.

The Fremont company contends that the trial court

erred in denying it a right at the close of the evidence

to amend its answer to further develop the defense that

it was precluded from performing the contract because

of war and conditions resulting therefrom.

This assignment of error is based on the evidence ad-

duced that the Fremont company was unable to procure,

due to priorities, the necessary machinery, supplies, and’

repairs to carry on maximum production of its plant; that

the plant was shut down at intervals during the period of

the contract so that delivery was impossible to be made

under the terms of the contract; and that this condition

made so by war developed unforeseen difficulties, and in

addition, by soybean shortages and the CCC contractual

limitations in procurement of the same. The evidence

does not show that the Fremont company was hindered,

delayed, or prevented by any act of war from processing

and delivering the six tanks of soybean oil in question.

The evidence does show that Wilson & Company con-

sented to and acquiesced in each delay of delivery with-

out waiving any of its rights under the contract to delivery

of the six tank cars of oil in question. No facts existed

when the contract in the instant case was made and as-

sumed by the Fremont company, which made it impossible

of performance.

‘Inconvenience or the cost of compliance, though they

might make compliance a hardship, cannot excuse a party

from the performance cf an absolute and unqualified

undertaking to do a thing that is possible and lawful.

Parties sui juris bind themselves by their lawful contracts,

and courts cannot alter them because they work a hard-

ship. The rights of the parties must be measured by the

contract which they themselves made. A contract is not

invalid, nor is the obligor therein in any manner discharged

from its binding effect, because it turns out to be difficult

or burdensome to perform. It has been said that difficul-

ties, even if unforeseen and however great, are no excuse,

and that the fact that a contract has become more burden-

39

some in its operation than was anticipated is not ground

for its rescission.’’ 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, § 362, p. 928.

‘*Contract obligations are not generally within the rule

that a person will be absolved from nonperformance of an

obligation or a duty imposed on him by law if performance

is rendered impossible without his fault by an act of God

or an unavoidable accident. * * * A more general rule which

is well settled, though subject to exceptions, is that super-

vening impossibility is not an excuse for nonperformance

of an act promised. A contract which is possible of per-

formance when made does not become invalid or unen-

forceable because conditions afterwards arise which render

' performance impossible. * * * If a party by his own con-

tract creates a duty or imposes a charge on himself, he

must under any and all conditions substantially comply

with the undertaking.’’ 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, § 363, p.

930. See, also, Columbus Ry. L. & P. Co. v. Columbus, 249

U. S. 399, 39 S. Ct. 349, 63 L. Ed. 699, 6 A. L. R. 1648;

Cameron-Hawn Realty Co. v. Albany, 207 N. Y. 377, 101

N. E. 162, 49 L. R. A. N. S. 922.

In the absence of a statute to the contrary, conditions

arising from a state of war in which this country is en-

gaged will not ordinarily constitute an excuse for non-

performance of contract. See 17 C. J. S., Contracts, § 463,

p. 953. See, also, J. C. Lysle Milling Co. v. Sharp (Mo.

App.), 207 S. W. 72; Ingram Day Lumber Co. v. Kola

Lumber Co., 122 Miss. 632, 84 So. 693.

As stated in Porto Rico Sugar Co. v. Lorenzo, 222 U. S.

481, 32 S. Ct. 133, 56 L. Ed. 277: ‘‘A part of the delay

seems to have been caused by the repeated breaking down

of the machinery, but nothing appears to take the case

out of the ordinary rule that performance of an absolute

undertaking is not exéused by facts of that sort.’’ See.

also, Sunseri v. Garcia & Maggini Co., 298 Pa. 249, 148

A. 81, 67 A. L. R. 1428.

Some contention is made by the Fremont company that

rule 116 of the Trading Rules 1945-1946, National Soybean

Processors Association, which constitutes a part of the

contract, governs. This rule deals with contingencies

and does mention: ‘‘If in consequence of any act of God,

40

fire, flood, wind, explosion, war, * * * an act of government,

* * * the Seller may be unable to ship or the Buyer un-

able to receive, * * *,’’ then provides a course of proce-

dure to invoke the rule. The contention is that Wilson &

Company failed to abide by or avail itself of this rule. The

rule was not admitted into evidence. The trial court re-

jected rule 116 on the ground that it was tied into the arbi-

tration feature of the contract. The rule also provided

that on failure of the parties to agree that the contingency |

‘has or will delay the execution of the contract, then the

matter shall be arbitrated in accordance with Rule 115

of these Trading Rules * * *.’’

We have heretofore expressed the inapplicability of

the rules with reference to arbitration in the instant case.

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its dis-

cretion in denying the Fremont company the right to amend

its answer, as contended for by it.

The Fremont company further contends that the trial

court erred in not admitting all of the correspondence

between the parties, citing section 25-1215, R. R. S. 1943,

as follows: ‘‘When part of an act, declaration, conversa-

tion or writing is given in evidence by one party, the

whole on the same subject may be inquired into by the

other. When a letter is read, all other letters on the same

subject between the same parties may be given. When a

detached act, declaration, conversation or writing is given

in evidence, any other act, declaration or writing which is

necessary to make it fully understood, or to explain the

same, may also be given in evidence.’ It cites also, Jensen

v. Romigh, 133 Neb. 71, 274 N. W. 199; Culver v. Union

P. R. R. Co., 112 Neb. 441, 199 N. W. 794; Roeder v. State,

119 Neb. 116, 227 N. W. 446. ?

This assignment of error involves certain correspond-

ence between Wilson & Company and one Mr. Eighmy,

connected with a firm processing soybean oil which had

no connection with the Fremont company. This corre-

spondence was to the effect that Wilson & Company de-

sired Eighmy to use his best offices to persuade the Fre-

mont company to abide by the terms of its contract with

Wilson & Company. Eighmy’s reply was to the effect that

41

Wilson & Company should not Ue favored in such respect,

and should pay the market price for soybean oil. We are

unable to discern in what manner this correspondence

could affect any issue in this case. No prejudicial error

resulted to the Fremont company by the rejection of this

evidence.

The balance of the evidence upon which the Fremont

company predicates error by the trial court not admitting

the same, relates to correspondence by Wilson & Com-

pany through its counsel and representatives, relating to

invoking arbitration against the Fremont company, also

the refusal of the trial court in not admitting in evidence

the entire complaint filed by the Fremont company in

the federal court, after Wilson & Company introduced

a part thereof as admissions against interest. The part

of the complaint the Fremont company desired in evi-

dence dealt with arbitration. Suffice it is to say, the arbi-

tration feature of the contract is not here involved. The

trial court did not commit prejudicial error in rejecting

this evidence.

The Fremont company contends the jury should have

been permitted to decide whether or not, under the pecu-

liar condition existing at the time the contract was made,

the parties intended the price to be 1134 cents in any

event unless the OPA fixed a different price, or whether

it was the intention to recite the OPA price then in effect

and prescribe a third person, to wit the OPA, to fix the

price. If the latter was the case, then the failure of the

OPA to fix any price after October 16, 1946, would dis-

charge both parties from any liability under the contract.

The Fremont company cites section 69-410, R. S. 1943.

The contract is plain. It provided for 11% cents per pound

unless the OPA raised the ceiling above that figure, and

then it would be the ceiling price fixed by the OPA. In

the absence of a ceiling price fixed by the OPA, the contract

price is just what the contract provided, 1134 cents per

pound. .

Forssell testified that the OPA ceiling was removed

October 16, 1946. The evidence is that the OPA eliminated

all control of soybeans. There was no ceiling price there-

42

after. The seller could sell at the market price, above the

market price, or below the market price. There were no

restrictions, and no reason why a jury should pass upon

the question as contended for by the Fremont company.

The Fremont company was obligated and required to fulfill

its contractual obligation to Wilson & Company separate

and apart from any contract with the CCC which it vol-

untarily entered into. In this connection there is no doubt

that the Wilson & Company contract could have been ful-

filled by the Fremont company. They were permitted to

purchase enough soybeans under the CCC contract to ful-

fill this contract. There was no reason for Wilson & Com-

pany to be required to prorate with any other commitments

held by the Fremont company when they took over the

Marr company obligations.

The measure of damages, where the delivery date within

which delivery must be made has been postponed by the

parties, is the difference between the contract price of the

goods and their market value at such postponed date of

delivery. See Sussman, Wormser & Co. v. Sea Food Co.,

supra.

The measure of damages in this case is the difference in

the contract price of the six tank cars of soybean oil in

question and the market value of the same at the time

to which delivery is postponed. If delivery is postponed

by agreement of the parties, the market value at the time

to which delivery is postponed is taken as the criterion.

See, Summers v. Hibbard, 153 Ill. 102, 38 N. E. 899, 46

Am. 8S. R. 872; Crescent City Mfg. Co. v. Slattery, 132

La. 917, 61 So. 870; Covington Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 204

Ala. 192, 85 So. 726; Loy v. Storz Electric Refrigeration

Co., 122 Neb. 357, 240 N. W. 423.

An abnormal rise in the price of goods due to unusual

trade conditions, such that a producer cannot perform

his contract to fill his order without greater expense than

anticipated, is not within the provisions of the contract

relieving him from liability in case of unavoidable acci-

dents, wars, strikes, fires, labor trouble, or other delays.

See Farmers Fertilizer Co. v. Lillie, 18 F. 2d 197, 52 A. L. R.

43

552. See, also, Wickham & B. Coal Co. v. Minnesota Coal

Co., 7 F. 2d 873.

The evidence discloses that there was no dispute be-

tween the parties as to what the market price was on

any given date after the ceiling was eliminated.

Where the defendant had defaulted on its contract to

deliver equal monthly installments of merchandise and

such requirement had been waived by plaintiff’s acquies-

cence, the defendant had no right to insist that plaintiff’s

damages for breach should be measured by the market

price in the months preceding the final breach of the

contract, the market price of such merchandise having

increased after the final breach. See Brevard Tannin Co.

v. J. F. Mosser Co., 288 F. 725.

Other assignments of error need not be discussed.

For the reasons herein given, the judgment entered by

the trial court on the verdict is sustained.

Affirmed.

Chappell, J., dissents.

(4221)

| | YEAR BOOK

and

i . TRADING RULES

‘ 1945-1946

: National Soybean Processors Association

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reassess

National Soybean Processors Association

Constitution and By-Laws, Code of Ethics,

Officers, Directors, List of Standing Commit-

tees, Names of Members, Trading Rules, ete.

Official Copy

Published by the Association 50 cents per copy

3818 Board of Trade Building, Chicago 4, Illinois

Index

Page

Constitution and By-Laws and Code of Ethics.................. 3

Officers, Directors and Committees for 1945-46............0000. 13

Membership of the National Soybean Processors Association..... 18

Trading Rules on Soybean Oil Meal..... 2.20.0... 0c cccceececcee 21

Appendix to Trading Rules on Soybean Oil Meal.............. 34

Official Methods of Analysis

PN PGc AER ietieb cbs cddutbockksveubececcides 34

CES SEENON AT eA ow tobi bK6¢ 000s vivcvenvnns 34

EES eee eae RE

We Es io eid c ic cicccccsccicdecccrec 39

Appendix to Trading Rules on Soybean Oil................... 53

I 56 2s hn 5 setae dé-rack da be bcdede 53

NN ds kv a cins coda vdcda xudésd cde 55

I aaa cans idea divnas sudedbae See 55

Tentative Official Centrifugal Refining Test.......... 57

Soybean Oil Bleach Test—Refined Oils................... 58

ae re a aaa an ne Cac re w'ae bubs Kickaine 59

Tentative Method of Grading Soybean Oil for Green Color.. 59

Official Method for Oil Sampling..................0c0eeee 63

Standard Specifications for Crude Soybean Oil for Technical

EE sobs OWES Onde vhs kha cu veda pansies 6xbeesuss 64

Moisture and Volatile Matter...............cescesceccece 65

I I Be oink viv cn eciccveccandposac 65

Pe I I a Ph 65h csv checb cae cde ceesv couse at 66

PG IE I PUD oon ccc ccescccdencescavens 67

Iodine Number—Wijs Method. ..............ccccccccecce 68

I PI ne oo ca dbindadncicsidceccdbnkaas 70

CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS

(As amended Sept. 22, 1944)

ARTICLE I

Title and Object

Title

Section 1. This organization shall be known as the National Soy-

bean Processors Association.

Object

Section 2-a. To strengthen the character of its members and incul-

cate in them those principles so essential in the discharge of the duties

of the individuals as members of society.

Section 2-b. To promote the welfare of its members and to foster

and encourage the exchange of such information as may be considered

lawful in order that the consuming public may profit from economies

effected.

Section 2-c. To seek to remove the attendant evils and trade cus-

toms contrary to sound business principles and highest standard of

ethics and to formulate constructive policies for the cooperation of its

members as a means of eliminating grievances by fair and equitable

adjustment.

Section 3. The Association shall not directly or indirectly restrict

free and lawful competition.

ARTICLE II

Membership

Section 1. Any individual, firm or corporation regularly engaged

in che actual processing of Soybeans or any association or group

representing firms or corporations regularly engaged in the actual

processing of Soybeans for the manufacture of Soybean’ Oil Meal

and Soybean Oil may become a regular Member of this Association,

upon the approval of the Board of Directors and by complying with the

Constitution and By-Laws of this Association, and subscribing to the

Code of Ethics.

ial Associate Members

Section 2-a. An individual who may have rendered meritorious

service in the Soybean industry may become a Special Associate Mem-

ber upon approval of the Board of Directors.

Section 2-b. A Special Associate Member shall not be entitled to a

vote, or to hold office, but may otherwise participate in the affairs of

the Association by serving on standing or special committees, when

and if appointed by the President to render such service.

Application For Membership

Section 3. Applications for Membership shall be referred to the

President who shall submit them at once to the Board of Directors

of this Association. If the vote of the Board of Directors is favorable,

the President shall notify the applicant, and applicant shall be en-

rolled in the Membership of this Association.

Section 4. The Board of Directors may terminate the Membership

of any Member whose conduct or Code of Ethics is inimical to this

tion.

3

ARTICLE III

Board of Directors

Section 1. The management of the affairs of this Association,

including the determination of the voting rights of affiliated Members,

shall be vested in a Board of Directors, the number of which is to be

specified by the By-Laws of this Association. Directors to fill vacan-

cies on the Board of Directors shall be elected by this Association at

its Annual Meeting from its regular Members, as the last order of

business. They shall take office immediately following the Annual

Meeting and shall serve for three years. In case of death or resigna-

tion of a Member of the Board of Directors, the Executive .Com-

mittee shall appoint a Director from the regular Membership to °

serve for the remainder of the unexpired term.

Section 2. Only one representative of a firm, corporation, associa-

tion or group holding Membership in this Association may serve on

the Board of Directors at the same time.

Officers

Section 3. The Officers of this Association shall be compced.of

the President, Vice President, Secretary, Treasurer and Assistant

Treasurer. The President shall preside at all meetings of the Member-

ship, Board of Directors and the Executive Committee. In the absence

of the President, the Vice President shall preside and in the absence

of both the President and the Vice President, the Secretary shall pre-

side. The Vice. President shall serve as Chairman of the Executive

Committee, and in his absence the Secretary shall serve as Chairman

of the Executive Committee. In case of death or resignation of an

Officer, the Board of Directors shall fill such office for the remainder

of the unexpired term.

Section 4. The Officers of this Association shall be selected for

one year by the Board of Directors, at a meeting immediately follow-

ing the Annual Meeting of the Association.

Section 5. Only one representative of a firm, corporation, asso-

ciation or group holding regular Membership in this Association may

hold office at the same time.

Executive Committtee

Section 6. The Executive Committee shall be composed of the

President, Vice President, Secretary and Treasurer and four (4)

other Directors, elected by the Board of Directors at its meeting im-

mediately following the Annual Meeting: In the case of death or

resignation of a Member of the Executive Committee, the Board of

Directors shall fill such office for the remainder of the unexpired

term. The Vice President shall serve as Chairman of the Executive

Committee and in his absence the Secretary shall so serve.

Section 7. Only one representative of a firm, corporation, associa-

tion or group holding Membership in this Association may serve on

the Executive Committee at the same time.

4

ARTICLE IV

Duties of Officers

Section 1. Duties of the President: It shall be the duty of the

President to call all meetings of this Association except the Annual

Meeting which is provided for in Section 1 of Article VII of this

Constitution. He shall appoint such committees and fill vacancies

upon such committees as are provided under the Constitution and

By-Laws of the Association. He shall be an ex-officio member of all

committees. He shall carry on the general business management of

the Association and shal! perform such other executive duties as the

Board of Directors of the Association may direct.

Section 2. Duties of the Vice President: The Vice President shall

perform all duties of the President in his absence and such other

duties as may be assigned to him by the Board of Directors or the

Executive Committee. He shall approve all expenditures as authorized

by the Board of Directors and/or the Executive Committee. He shall

preside at all meetings of the Board of Directors and Executive Com-

mittee of this Association in the absence of the President.

Section 3. Duties of the Secretary: It shall be the duty of the

Secretary to keep a record of the proceedings of all meetings of the

Association and to perform such other duties incident to his office as

may arise. He shall prepare and present a report at the annual meet-

ing covering his work for the year. His report may be combined with

or embodied in that of the President. He shall be responsible directly

to the Executive Committee. In the absence of both the President and

the Vice President, the Secretary shall perform the duties of the

President and the Vice President in their absence, and also such

duties as may be assigned to him by the Board of Directors and/or

the Executive Committee.

Section 4. Duties of the Treasurer: It shall be the duty of the

Treasurer to collect all moneys due the Association and pay out such

moneys in settlement of just debts of the Association under direction

and authority of the Vice President and Chairman of the Executive

Committee when and as provided. He shall, at the request of the

Executive Committee, provide suitable bond to insure faithful per-

formance of his duties, expense of such bond to be borne by the

Association. He shall keep a true and accurate record of all receipts

and disbursements and submit an annual report at the annual meeting

of the Association. He shall, at the request of the Executive Com-

mittee, submit the books of the Association for an audit, expense of

such audit to be borne by the Association.

Duties of the Executive Committee

Section 5. The Executive Committee shall act as the Executive

Body for the Association under the direction and authority of the

Board of Directors. It shall be the duty of the Executive Committee

to approve the expenditure of moneys available for current operating

expenses and to confer on regular or special committees authority to

5

oe

expend such funds as may have been set aside or collected for their

specific use. The Executive Committee shall direct the President in

all Association matters, acting in behalf of the Board of Directors.

=

Duties of the Board of Directors

Section 6. The Board of Directors shall act as the governing body

in all matters of administration and policy for the Association, It shall

direct the Executive Committee, which will act as Executive Body for

the Board in the interim between Board meetings.

ARTICLE V

Initiation Fee and Dues

Section 1. The initiation fee for each individual, firm, corpora-

tion, association or group Member shall be fixed by the Board of

Directors. Check for this amount should be made payable to this Associ-

ation and be attached to application for Membership.

Section 2. The Executive Committee shall make recommendation

to the Board of Directors as to annual dues. The annual dues for each

individual, firm, corporation, association or group Member shall be

determined by the Board of Directors from year to year and shall

be paid in the manner prescribed.

Section 3. A Member individual, firm, corporation, association or

group paying its initiation fee and annual dues shall be entitled to

have several Members participate in the work of this Association,

yet shall be entitled to only one vote, per Section 6 of Article VII.

Members, who in the opinion of the Board of Directors, maintain

a common affiliation shall be so designated and such group shall have

only one vote.

Section 4. Special dues and assessments for specific purposes may

be provided for at an annual meeting or a general meeting called for

that purpose when recommended by the Executive Committee.

Section 5. Any regular Member failing to pay the annual dues

as provided in Section 2 of this Article or any special assessment

shall not be entitled to vote at any meetings of this Association and

such failure to pay shall be considered equivalent to resignation.

Section 6. There shall be no initiation fee, dues or special assess-

ments of any kind for Special Associate Members.

ARTICLE VI

Fiscal Year

Section 1. The fiscal year shall run from October 1 to Septem-

ber 30.

ARTICLE VII

Meetings

Section 1. The Annual Meeting shall be held at a date selected

by the President, approved by the Board of Directors, or otherwise

as directed.

6

Section 2. The President, or the Executive Committee, shall call

all meetings of the Association (except the annual meeting as provided

for in Section 1 of this Article) as and when they are deemed advis-

able, to transact matters requiring prompt action, fixing the exact time

and place of all meetings and making all arrangements for same.

Section 3. The President cr Vice President or, in their absence,

the Secretary may call a meeting of the Board of Directors as often

as necessary. The President or Vice President or, in their absence,

the Secretary may call a meeting of the Executive Committee as often

as necessary to take care of matters in the interim between meetings

of the Board of Directors. Notice of all stated or special meetings

of this Association shall be mailed to each participating Member at

least one week prior to the date of such meeting.

Section 4. Quorum: A majority of the Directors shall constitute

a quorum at all Directors’ Meetings of this Association; a majority

shall constitute a quorum for all meetings of the Executive Committee

of this Association.

Section 5. Representation at Meetings: Any individual, firm,

corporation, association or group holding regular Membership in this

Association may be represented at Annual Meetings of this Associa-

tion by one or more representatives, but only one representative shall

be entitled to vote on the same question.

Section 6. Each individual, firm, corporation, association or group

holding regular Membership in this Association shall designate the

Member of such organization, firm, corporation, association or group

who is to vote at stated or special meetings by sending a letter to the

Central Office in advance of such meeting.

ARTICLE VIII

Voting by Mail

Section 1. Executive Committee: When necessary, the Executive

Committee shall vote by mail on questions presented by the President

or Vice President or, in their absence, by the Secretary, and a majority

of the votes received within five (5) days shall be decisive, providing

a majority of the Executive Committee Members have voted.

Board of Directors: When necessary, the Board of Directors shall

vote by mail on questions presented by the President or Vice Presi-

dent or, in their absence, by the Secretary, and the majority of the

votes received within five (5) days shall be decisive, providing a

majority of the Directors have voted.

Section 2. Members: Questions which in the judgment of the

Board of Directors or Executive Committee are of sufficient impor-

tance for the consideration of this Association, and are not im-

portant enough for a special meeting of this Association, may be

voted upon by mail, and a majority of the votes received within fifteen

(15) days from the voting Membership of this Association shall be

— if more than fifty percent of the total Membership have

voted.

7

° ARTICLE IX

Committees

Section 1. The President shall appoint annually, at as early a

date as possible after the Annual Meeting, the following Standing

Committees consisting of not less than five Members.

(a) Oil Trading Rules Committee

(b) Meal Trading Rules Committee

(c) Technical Committee

(d) Traffic and Transportation Committee

(e) Soybean Grades and Contracts Committee

(f) Trade Development Committee

(g) Soybean Research Council

(h) Crop Improvement Committee -

(i) Soy Flour Committee

(j) Research Committee

(k) Edible Soybean Committee

(1) — Rules and Standards Committee for Soybean Oil

Mea

The President may also appoint such special committees as he may

feel necessary as the occasion arises.

The President shall appoint, after receiving the approval of the

Board of Directors or the Executive Committee, at least thirty days

before the Annual Meeting, a Nominating Committee of six (6)

from the Membership. At least two of this Nominating Committee

are to be Members of the present Board of Directors and, further,

this Nominating Committee shall represent as far as possible the

varied and different interests of this Association, with consideration

given to geographical locations of the Membership.

Section 2. Function of Committees:

(a) Oil Trading Rules Committee

It shall be the function of this committee to constantly study the

Trading Rules of the Association with a view to maintaining fair and

equitable conditions for both buyex and seller and when modern com-

mercial practices warrant changes, to promptly make such recom-

mended revisions. It shall also be the function of this committee to

interpret the Trading Rules when called upon by any member to do

so. Proposed rules, initiated by the Technical Committee or other com-

mittee, bearing on transactions in soybean oil shall first be submitted

to this committee for consideration and recommendation. ;

(b) Meal Trading Rules Committee

It shall be the function of this committee to constantly study the

Trading Rules of the Association with a view to maintaining fair and

equitable conditions for both buyer and seller and when modern com-

mercial practices warrant changes, to promptly make such recom-

mended revisions. It shall also be the function of this committee to

interpret the Trading Rules when called upon by any member to do

aiidenaale _—

so. Proposed rules, initiated by the Technical Committee or other

committee, bearing on the transactions in soybean oil meal shall first

be submitted to this committee for consideration and recommendation.

(c) Technical Committee

It shall be the function of this committee to cooperate with all

government standards committees and the various official societies and

other agencies in maintaining standards for our products which will

afford commercial protection to buyer and seller. As occasion arises,

this committee shall also carry on studies with a view to making recom-

mendations to the Trading Rules Committees with respect to any rules

or amendments to the rules.

(d) Traffic and Transportation Committee

It shall be the function of this committee to maintain close con-

tact with all rate making bodies, to represent the Association at hear-

ings on proposed changes in freight rates, to keep the Association

intormed on all rate developments directly or indirectly affecting the

soybean industry, to submit briefs and verbal arguments in behalf of

the Association and generally to see to it that the interests of the

industry as a whole are properly protected.

(e) Soybean Grades and Contracts Committee

It shall be the function of this committee in protecting the inter-

ests of the industry to see that fair and just grades are established

either by the United States Department of Agriculture or for the sev-

eral primary markets, keeping in mind that equal protection must be

afforded buyer and seller. This committee shall likewise guard the

industry against improper grain exchange trading rules and contracts.

The committee shall be responsible for such other matters as fair and

equitable schedules of discounts for moisture, foreign material and

damaged soybeans in excess of maximum amounts allowed for the

standard grades.

(f) Trade Development Committee

It shall be the function of this committee to study the major aspects

of the industry as a whole, possible future developments, the creation

of new channels of consumption for soybean products, and to suggest

policies of a broad, constructive character looking to the greater future

efficiency and economy of the industry and its relationship to other

allied or competitive industries.

(g) Soybean Research Council

The Couxci! shall be made up of scientific men from the various

member firms and from whatever outside organization shall be agreed

upon by the Executive Committee. The Council shall issue from time

to time literature bearing the Council imprint which will be distributed

in accordance with instructions by the Executive Committee. The

Council shall keep in touch with all research developments in various

agricultural colleges and universities and government experiment sta-

9

tions, shall hold meetings with college groups carrying on research

work or desiring information available to the Council. The Council

shall meet regularly, shall keep the membership advised of develop-

ments and shall submit an annual report covering fully the activities

of the year.

(h) Crop Improvement Committee

It shall be the function of this committee to cooperate with the

agricultural interests to encourage the growing of soybeans in the

United States and to cooperate with the agricultural colleges and

experiment stations in developing new strains of soybzans which yield

more and better quality oil.

(i) Soy Flour Committee

It shall be the function of this committee to keep the member-

ship informed with respect to the development of the soy flour

industry and to make suggestions and recommendations with a view

to the enlargement of this branch of the industry.

(j) Research Committee

It shall be the function of this committee to study soybean prod:

ucts, new outlets for soybeans, new types and varieties, new develop

ments in governmental and other research efforts, complete coopera:

tion to be extended to this committee by the membership.

(k) Edible Soybean Committee

It shall be the function of this committee to keep the Association

fully intormed with respect to the progress made in the development

of the edible soybean field.

(1) Uniform Rules and Standards Committee for Soybean Oil

Meal

It shall be the function of this Committee to maintain close con-

tact with the Association of American Feed Control Officials. Any

proposed changes in existing soybean product definitions or definitions

of new soybean products shall be cleared to the membership after

consultation with the designated Feed Control official.

Section 3. The Chairman of each committee shall prepare and

present a report at the annual meeting covering the progress and

scope of the work done for the year, and shall make recommenda-

tions for the guidance of their successors.

10

ARTICLE X

Rules

Section 1. The proceedings of all meetings of this Association and

its Executive Committee shall be subject to parliamentary rules as

indicated in Roberts’ Rules of Order.

ARTICLE XI

Code of Ethics

We, members of the National Soybean Processors Association,

mindful that we are engaged in a vocation affording us a distinct

opportunity to serve society and to promote and maintain friendly

and truthful relations among men, do pledge ourselves:

First: To strive by sincere, intelligent and lawful cooperation to

use our best endeavors to elevate the standards of the vocation in

which we are engaged and to so conduct our affairs that others in our

vocation may find it wise, profitable and conducive to happiness to

emulate our example.

Second: To employ workers of high character and dependability,

and to provide conditions favorable to their welfare and moral devel:

opment, and to pay for an honest day's labor an adequate wage con-

sistent with standards of living and services rendered.

Third: To use only high grade materials and to seek by every

possible means to know the true value of same in order that misrepre-

sentation, unknowingly, may be avoided. To refrain from using

inferior materials or imitation products in order to meet some unusual

competitive conditions or for the purpose of returning a larger margin

of profit.

Fourth: To observe truth and honesty in all interviews with sales

men and to make no false or misleading statements to secure price

revision. To conscientiously comply with terms or payments, accord:

ing to terms of purchase and to refrain from making unjust and unrea-

sonable claims in an attempt to evade liability under a purchase

contract.

Fifth: To compete always with fairness, securing patronage on

merit and confidence, rather than by derogatory reference to a com-

petitor or his goods and to abstain at all times from making false or

disparaging statements, either written or oral or circulate harmful

rumors regarding a competitor's products, financial or personal

reputation.

Sixth: To refrain from infringing upon the equal rights of a com-

petitor and unfairly interfering with his business or misappropriating

his trade names, or formulae, or by enticing away his employees.

Seventh: To be guided by a spirit of justice, integrity and honor

in all our relations with members of the allied trades, realizing that

the standard of ethics in our own industry so vitally affects the stand-

ards maintained in associated industries. To encourage the allied trades

to adopt similar codes and to discourage unfair trade practices in those

industries even though such business methods are to our own imme-

diate advantage.

11

Eighth: To conduct our business in such a manner that we may

render a highly satisfactory and economical service to our customers.

To know accurately our costs of management, production, and dis-

tribution, in order that a fair price may be ed and a reasonable

profit assured. To represent our products truthfully at all times in our

advertising and our labeling and to adhere to specifications as care-

fully as is commercially possible. To strive to constantly improve the

quality of our products and services and to build an established con-

fidence in the hearts of our patrons.

Ninth: To conscientiously adhere to the rules of conduct herein

set forth and to inspire others in our industry to do likewise, believ-

ing sincerely that the Golden Rule in business is the only safe guide

of conduct conducive to continued satisfaction and happiness.

Tenth: Any violation of this Code shall be referred by the Presi-

dent of the National Soybean Processors Association to the Executive

Committee for consideration and action. .

ARTICLE XII

Amendments

Section 1. This Constitution may be amended at any annual meet-

ing of the Association, or at any special meeting called for this purpose

by a two-thirds vote of voting members present, provided, however, that

such amendments be submitted in writing to each member of the

Association at least one week prior to the meeting at which action is

to be taken.

BY-LAWS

Section 1. The Board of Directors shall consist of eighteen (18)

regular members.

Section 2. At the Annual Meeting of this Association held in

September, 1944, there shall be elected eighteen Directors divided

into three classes: Class one shall be six Directors who shall serve

for the ensuing three years; in class two shall be six Directors who

shall serve for the ensuing two years, and in class three shall be six

Directors who shall serve for the ensuing year.

a

OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, AND COMMITTEES

of

NATIONAL SOYBEAN PROCESSORS ASSOCIATION

For 1945-46

CReiien OE Gi SO oi ed Edward J. Dies

Naish ie cist iceenstlib Ok sebvrehotdctionaniatnlensaigsinoatocionat casein R. G. Houghtlin

og a 3 SESAME erat 8 ee Ree ON D. J. Bunnell

ease wnt Sa hse aprecinuadiniee is gncenttcosnlie W. L. Shellabarger

I a itesbicinsvis nate deadncdehvanaubondcmabianaaaiann’ \....E, F. Johnson

PR NO ascii siiailingsachiatepbera handed gta cca cath F. G. Duncanson

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

D. J. Bunnell, Chairman

H. E. Carpenter Karl Nolin

Philip S. Duff E. K. Scheiter

R. G. Houghtlin W. L. Shellabarger

E. F. Johnson

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

(Term Expiring September, 1946)

H. A. Abbott H. E. Carpenter Philip S. Duff

D. J. Bunnell J. J. Quinlan P. M. Jarvis

(Term Expiring September, 1947)

J. H. Caldwell June S. Mitchell H. R. Schultz

Jasper Giovanna E. K. Scheiter . P.E. Sprague

(Term Expiring September, 1948)

H. L. Dannen W. H. Eastman W. H. Knapp

Roger Drackett Howard Kellogg, Jr. Karl Nolin

STANDING COMMITTEES

TRAFFIC AND TRANSPORTATION:

W. C. Newman, Chairman.......... Archer-Daniels-Midland Co..............0ece0e

pescenseca tea ass vaxate x 839, Minneapolis 2, Minn

BR Ws RR eke a Allied Mills, Inc

pleat Sneek Board of Trade Bldg., Chicago 4, IIl.

Lae. 1, ee nee The Buckeye Cotton Oil Co.......Cincinnati 1, O.

Bi. Ce NNR os os Cargill, Inc Cedar Rapids, Ia.

Bo A” ON ene Central Soya Co., Inc............. Fort Wayne 2, Ind.

Thomas H. Smith......................... Clinton Company inton, Ia.

SO ees eee The Drackett Company............ Cincinnati 32, O.

CaMONe Dy CONGR oa ices cs The Glidden Company.

wa ae 2670 Elston Ave., Chicago 47, Ill.

Harold Woodard.......................... Pillsbury Feed Mills Clinton, Ia.

TES i ION ose secs soa asec Ralston Purina Co St. Louis 2, Mo.

RSET Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc

Box 989, Buffalo 5, N. Y.

eR ietccncteiiocpasecssecnnnniae A. E. Staley Mfg. Co Decatur, Il.

| aaa ir eae Swift & Co.....Union Stock Yards, Chicago 9, Ill.

13

STANDING COMMITTEES—(Cont’d)

RESEARCH:

Dr. W. L. Burlison, Chairman.....University of Illinois...........-.-------------- Urbana, Ill.

Dr. Frank Hasbrouck.............-.---- Allied Mills, Inc Peoria 1, Ill.

Dr. J. W. Hayward............-.-.----- _Archer-Daniels-Midland Co

5 uae iba caatel Box 839, Minneapolis 2, Minn

Dr. Re -Waher...:s...<-5s-s sees Northern Regional Research Laboratory.........--.

rae Peoria 5, Ill.

TECHNICAL:

Egbert Freyer, Chairman.............Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc........----.--<----------0-+

parte teense 389 Ganson St., Buffalo 3, N. Y.

M. M. Durkee, V. Chairman........ A. E. Staley Mfg. Co Decatur, Ill.

Frank Hasbrouck..........--------------+- Allied Mills, Inc _wsee--Peoria 1, Ill.

S. O. Sorensen. ......-..-------++---00-ce0e _Archer-Daniels-Midland Co

Soietaancnrtecsed x 839, Minneapolis 2, Minn

vee . . Reereneueererercee _The Buckeye Cotton Oil Co.......Cincinnati 1, O

Julius Hendel Cargill, Inc......<-. 761 Chamber of Commerce,

a Minneapolis 15, Minn.

N. F. Kruse Central Soya Company, Inc...........-- Decatur, Ind.

L. A. Spielman Durkee Famous Foods

CCR Eaeire: 2670 Elston Ave., Chicago 47, Ill.

Karl Nooliin..........--------sceseseeeesenees Farmers Cooperative Assn..........------- Ralston, Ia.

Was Albert. 2.25 -.s5i ees a Products Co.........-- Galesburg, Ill.

Tis Die ac 5-2 General Mills, Inc., Vegetable Oil and Protein

Division.......... Chamber of Commerce Bldg.,

‘ os Minneapolis 15, Minn.

Lamar Kishlar a es fen ae ancmeene St. Louis 2, Mo.

H. S. Mitchell Swift & Co.....Union Stock Yards, Chicago 9, Ill.

a dg "SSDS enter Northern Regional Research Laboratory.........-

2 ras “my a aE le te Gel ib tanaeemgcqmecnsnaesenencs Peoria 5, Ill.

SOYBEAN GRADES AND CONTRACTS:

F. 7 Benson, Chairman..........-.-- ..Archer-Daniels-Midland Co i

ge a Box 839, Minneapolis 2, Minn.

H. J. Kapp, V. Chairman...........- A. E. Staley Mfg. Co Decatur, Ill.

J. J. Quinlan Allied Mills, Inc

cee nese Board of Trade Bldg., Chicago 4, Ill.

W. W. Hastings The Buckeye Cotton Oil Co.......Cincinnati 1, O.

L. O. Hauskins. Cargill, Inc Cedar Rapids, Ia.

Roger Drackett The: PrMCeett Osa isacececisensecs Cincinnati 32, O

J. R. Pentis. The Glidden Co

re ae 5165 W. Moffat St., Chicago 39, Il.

W. E. Flumerfelt General Mills, Inc., Vegetable Oil and Protein

Division Belmond, Ia.

D. O. Andreas. Honeymead Products Co........... Cedar Rapids, Ia.

J. H. Caldwell, Jr Hoosier Soybean Mills, Inc.........-...- Marion, Ind.

W. L. Shellabarger Shellabarger Soybean Mills.

Ra SR 364-366 Citizens Bldg., Decatur 30, Ill.

H. H. Heeman Soya Processing Co Wooster, O.

John Clark Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc............- Decatur, Ill.

Be EF NOE as i nssicecnninis oe senn mae Soy Bean Processing Co...............---- Waterloo, Ia.

A. E. Leathers Swift & Co Des Moines, Ia.

14

J. H. Brown Toledo Soybean Products Co............-.- Toledo, O.

oe

STANDING COMMITTEES—(Cont’d)

OIL TRADING RULES:

A. C. Hoehne, Chairman............. Aachavinnalle tone Co

Box 839, Minneapolis 2, Minn.

D. J. Bunnell, V. Chairman.......... Central Soya Co., Inc

Sincoanchossaed Board of Trade Bldg., Chicago 4, Ill.

J. J. Quinlan Allied Mills, Inc

anccttpiesieche Board of Trade Bldg., Chicago 4, Ill.

aE SET TEE The Buckeye Cotton Oil Co.......Cincinnati 1, O.

A. T. Madra Cairo Meal & Cake Co Cairo, Ill.

E. W. Myers.............- Clinton Company. Clinton, Ia.

G. Norman Bruce The Glidden Company

mectanareeebacel 2670 Elston Ave., Chicago 47, IIl.

Lamar Kishlar. Ralston Purina Co ’St. Louis 2, ‘Mo

H. _ Scsoae bec caketacaeeses Sioux Soya Co............. Box 357, Sioux City 2, Ta.

LAGE se sea emo Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc

Box 989, Buffalo 5, N. Y.

H. W. Galley A. E. Staley Mfg. Co Decatur, Ill.

MOREE: NUMER E Saiicccsecacistccs Stayed Ralph Wells & Go..........:.-...0ccass Monmouth, IIl.

MEAL TRADING RULES:

J. E. Johnson, Chairman............... Spencer Kellogg 8 —, Inc

Box 989, Buffalo 5, N. Y.

I. C. Bradley Allied Mills, Inc............. Box 388, Taylorville, Ill.

je a 2: ee a senincianemnenins *-y Co

Box 839, Minneapolis 2, Minn.

W. H. Kaspp Se eciietinca ec iaee The Buckeye Cotton Oil Co.......Cincinnati 1, ©.

D. J. Bunnel Central Soya Company, Inc

sutbustkosatess) Board of Trade Bldg., Chicago 4, Ill.

Jasper Giovanna Decatur Soy Products Co................. Decatur, Il.

BRS PEI soc ssigs tsk. ccteceets Fairfield Soy Mill Fairfield, Ta.

ee | ee The Glidden Company.

Pe Sa 5165 Moffat St., Chicago 39, Ill.

M. R. Eighm = eo SL ae Gooch Milling ¥ Elev. & Sed Lincoln, Neb.

J. H. Caldwell Ralston Purina Co St. Louis 2, Mo.

H. T. Morris. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co Decatur, Iil.

ED FP IR cca cs as oearntnceonesnn SOE A Rains Sco casei Box 68, Champaign, III.

SOY FLOUR:

W. L. Shellabarger, Chairman.....Shellabarger Soybean Mills

Spapeisieste 364-366 Citizens Bldg., Decatur 30, Ill.

R. G. Brierley Archer- Denisivtdend Co

Box 839, Minneapolis 2, Minn.

D. J. Bunnell Central Soya Co., Inc

elastic dt Board of Trade Bldg., Chicago 4, Ill.

R. R. Stigler. The Glidden Company.

eh D 5165 W. Moffat ™ —— 39, Ill.

H. A. Olendorf. ree Kellogg & Sons, Inc... _..Decatur, Ill.

G. H. Walker. Pi. Re Ry Wa ae ec cectesis Decatur, Ill.

15

STANDING COMMITTEES—(Cont’d)

CROP IMPROVEMENT:

C. Kenneth Shuman, Chairman...The Glidden Company

peice 5165 W. Moffat St., Chicago 39, Ill.

©. Bro soe Allied Mills, Inc

Veh usbaeeaisoas Board of Trade Bldg., Chicago 4, Ill.

Bel ncaa ee Archer-Daniels-Midland Co

Rae ea Box 839, Minneapolis 2, Minn.

NOU Aes RIAD ood oo os Satan The Buckeye Cotton Oil Co......... Cincinnati 1, O.

Be ORIN os ones Socata oalgienesn mone Central Soya Co., Inc

SESE RENE: Board of Trade Bldg., Chicago 4, Ill.

TY. Ee Dees... osc Dannen Grain & Milling Co

- Box 429, St. Joseph 1, Mo.

Jasper Giovanna..........-..-..--.-----+-- Decatur Soy Products Co..........-1+------ Decatur, Ill.

po eer Gooch Milling & Elev. Co............. Lincoln, Neb.

ge SO", SR etna nega The Kansas Soybean Mills, Inc.....Emporia, Kans.

Bc eer IONE 5 Sie cas oncespccnnconeat I. F. Laucks, Inc Portsmouth, Va.

NE i RNIN accesso sh sisodessotcrensonne Mankato Soybean Products, Inc

Mankato, Minn.

OS Ge MR CET 6 ono caine ckoestord Owensboro Grain Co.........--------+ Owensboro, Ky.

PRE CONE soi diss dasnissasnacinasweat Pillsbury Feed Mills. Clinton, Ia.

pK Wiintecringer. 5. Producers Cooperative Oil Mill

Box 911, Oklahoma City 1, Okla.

recov 662s acrccwcsnnrtee Quincy Soybean Products Co............- Quincy, Ill.

fh 9 ERS eeyyeronnn Ralston Purina Co.............-..-.-.--. Kansas City, Mo.

ae RIT eave case srgect ontecaoes The Southern Cotton Oil Co.....Goldsboro, N. C.

De IE Reiser scsosScsteceusnndcbacoees Soy-Rich Products, Inc............. Wichita 4, Kans.

pe ey Oem Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc

Box 989, Buffalo 5, N. Y.

Thomas Longbon.................-------- A. E. Staley Mfg. Co.....Box 670, Painesville, O.

AR gt || SER eR Swift & Co Frankfort, Ind.

Rails ets oo ccs Ralph Wells & Co Monmouth, IIl.

| leo: es Say re Western Soybean Mills-........ Sioux Falls, S$. Dak.

SOYBEAN RESEARCH COUNCIL:

AR Sealey Mig: Coen. icc.<.-is.. seen Decatur, Ill.

PORE ge Sh ee ae Peoria 1, Iil.

Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.........------.-----+--1--2++

hd ee) oxen crane Box 839, Minneapolis 2, Minn.

...The Buckeye Cotton Oil Co.......Cincinnati 1, O.

= Acenteal Seva Go., Wie... ensess Decatur, Ind.

‘The Deackett Od... -i 5. Cincinnati 32, O.

eo ee i eh ee General Mills, Inc...........Chamber of Commerce

Bldg. Minneapolis 15, Minn.

The Glidden Company

Be ens 5165 W. Moffat St., Chicago 39, Ill.

Pillsbury Flour Mills Co......... Minneapolis, Minn.

iad Seat hese cect Ralston Purina Co St. Louis 2, Mo.

Simonsen Mill-Rendering Plant.........- Quimby, Ia.

Egbert Freyer Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc

Re EID tele ES 389 Ganson St., Buffalo 3, N. Y.

Pe OS Ween eo an ar Swift & Co.....Union Stock Yards, Chicago 9, Ill.

R. T. Milner. Northern Regional Research Laboratory..........

...Peoria 5, Ill.

16

STANDING COMMITTEES—(Cont’d)

TRADE DEVELOPMENT:

Philip S. Duff Archer-Daniels-Midland Co

Shreve M. Archer, alternate..... Box 839, Minneapolis 2, Minn.

J. J. Quinlan Allied Mills, Inc

eee Board of Trade Bldg., Chicago 4, Ill.

W.H. Knapp The Buckeye Cotton Oil Co.......Cincinnati 1, O.

W. W. Hastings, alternate.......

Julius Hendel Cargeh, Bibi... 761 Chamber of Commerce,

Minneapolis 15, Minn.

D. J. Bunnell Central Soya Co., Inc

eae Board of Trade Bldg., Chicago 4, Ill.

D. W. McMillen, alternate....... (Fort Wayne 2, Ind.)

Ware NS aii cccvasiceaecnt General Mills, Inc., Vegetable Oil and Protein

‘ a Nee nao Chamber of Commerce Bldg.

vhs Minneapolis 15, Minn.

P. E. Sprague The Glidden Co

Adrian D. Joyce, alternate........ 1396 Union Commerce Bldg., Cleveland 14, O.

E. F. Johnson Ralston Purina Co................--.-++ St. Louis 2, Mo.

John H. Caldwell, alternate......

C. E. Butler Soy Bean Processing Co..............----- Waterloo, Ia.

Howard Kellogg, Jr..............-------- Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc............-...---2+-++--

Box 989, Buffalo 5, N. Y.

E. K. Scheiter A. E. Staley Mfg. Co Decatur, Ill.

EDIBLE SOYBEAN:

E. D. Funk, Jr., Chairman............ Funk Bros. Seed Co.............-...--+- Bloomington, Ill.

Glestte: WA Sea geP oc ccen ced American Soybean Assn............-.-.----- Hudson, Ia.

Howard Roach ..American Soybean Assn............------- Plainfield, Ia.

J. W. Lloyd University of Illinois Urbana, Ill.

UNIFORM RULES AND STANDARDS FOR SOYBEAN OIL MEAL:

D. J. Bunnell, Chairman..............! Central Soya Co., Inc

eesti Board of Trade Bldg., Chicago 4, Ill.

J. W. Hayward Archer-Daniels-Midland Co

Box 839, Minneapolis 2, Minn.

W. H. Knapp The Buckeye Cotton Oil Co.......Cincinnati 1, O.

P. E. Sprague The Glidden Company

1396 Union Commerce Bldg., Cleveland 14, O.

C. E. Butler Soy Bean Processing Co................--- Waterloo, Ia.

J. E. Johnson Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc

Box 989, Buffalo 5, N. Y.

P. R. Record i Fe Se Occ Decatur, Ill.

MEMBERS

NATIONAL SOYBEAN PROCESSORS ASSOCIATION

Albers neising 20 W. P. on 1060 Stuart Bldg., Seattle 11, Wash.

Allied Mills, Inc J. J. Quinlan

Scsudsnaeeeid Board of Trade Bldg., ae * A

P. J. Scherer Ill.

I Pa ccascescsiscess Box 388, Ta vioeutle’ Il

Leo T. Murphy aha, Neb

F. H. Shelby Portsmouth, Va.

Archer-Daniels-Midland Co......... | ae Box 839, Minneapolis 2, Minn.

i a ee Minnea lis, Minn.

Ty ie MARU So ccsnscepcsnnsa gasccnncatesstoeted icago, Ill.

R. S. White Decatur, Il.

H. C. Hansen Toledo, O.

The Berea Milling Co.................. H. E. Carpenter Lexington, O.

Big 4 Co-op. Process. Assn..........Merel M. Stientjes............-.-----.---s---0-- Sheldon, Ia.

The Blanton Mill..............-.......-... G. M. Gibson... "3336 N. Wharf, St. Louis 7, Mo.

Boone Valley Co-op. Pro. Co......Edward Olson Eagle Grove, Ta.

The Buckeye Cotton Oil Co......... Ce yO cree: Cincinnati 1, O.

W.H. Knapp Louisville, Ky.

W.H. Knapp Memphis, Tenn

Cairo Meal and Cake Co.............. A. T. Madra Cairo, Ill.

Cargill, Inc Julius Hendel........ 761 Chamber of ie 1, Min

pear 15

Eric Nadel «Springfield, I .

Ti, ds, SAE aacicencsnecaeiccuscesinand Rapids, Ia.

| ae RT eee Fort Dodge, Ia.

Central Iowa Bean Mill................ Paul K. Klinefelter Sc ionaech siaaiea bea Gladbrook, Ia.

Central Soya Company, Inc......... Dj}. B

ispedceageaces Board of Trade Bldg., Chicago 4, Ill.

T. H. Allwein Gibson ity, Ill.

E. V. McCann Decatur, Ind.

Clinton Company. .....i..::..ics.cs E. W. Myers Clinton, Ia.

Concord Soya Gupeeaien sath tcose -W. C. Whittecar cca tis tcteetp acd Concord, Mich.

Dannen Grain and Milling Co.....H. L. Dannen.............. Box 429, St. Joseph 1, Mo.

Decatur Soy Products Co............. Jasper Giovanna Decatur, Ill.

The Delphos Grain and

Milling Co Floyd E. Hiegel Delphos, O.

The Drackett Company.............. Be SORES Cincinnati 32, O.

Elevators and Mills, Inc................ (Mr.) June S. Mitchell.................. Windfall, Ind.

Fairfield Soy Mill Jos. Sinaiko Fairfield, Ia.

Farmers Cooperative Assn.......... Karl Nolin Ralston, Ia.

Farmers Cooperative Co..............- C. M. Gregory Dike, Ia.

Farmers Cooperative Elevator...... a B. Lovig Martelle, Ia.

Fayette Soy Bean Mill................. V. Clark Fayette, Ia.

Fremont Cake and Meal Corp..... Harry E. Weipel Fremont, Neb.

Funk Bros. Seed Co.................-2-« 2 | a er Bloomington, IIl.

Galesburg Soy Products Co.......... cas Albert Galesburg, III.

General Mills, Inc., Vegetable

Oil and Protein Division.......... W. H. Eastman....Chamber of Commerce Bldg.,

inneapolis 15, Minn.

W. E. Flumerfelt Belmond, Ta.

The Glidden Company................. P. E. Sprague......1396 Union Commerce Bidg. es

Cleveland 14, O.

r. ‘ —— -5165 W. Moffat St., Chicago 39, Til.

Gooch Milling & Elevator Co.......M.

Lincoln, Neb.

Haynes Soy Products, Inc............. Ww. V. ie Portland, Ind.

Hemphill Soy Products Co........... og Sees Kennett, Mo.

Hiawatha Soybean Mill.............. ..A. G. Thomson............ Box 263, Hiawatha, Kans.

Holland Pioneer Mills, Inc...........G. A. Holland Ohio City, O.

18

; MEMBERS—(Cont’d)

Honeymead Products Co............ .D. O. Andreas................-..--...-..Cedar Rapids, Ia.

Steve Burke ; Spencer, Ia.

S. H. Burchfield Washington, Ia.

Hoosier Soybean Mills, Inc........... J. H. Caldwell, Jr Marion, Ind.

Huegely Elevator Co..................-. J. W. Huegely Nashville, Ill.

Hulches Soy Products. Norman E. Hulcher Virden, Ill.

Iowa Soya Company.................... H.R. Straight Redfield, Ia.

Janesville Mills, Inc A. Roger Hook Janesville, Wis.

The Kansas Soya Prod., Inc......... Richard W. Lord

....18th and Bayard Ave., Kansas City 3, Kans.

‘The Kansas Soybean Mills, Inc.....Ted W. Lord Emporia, Kans.

11. F. Laucks, Inc H. F. Armstrong.......... piecscaccees Portsmouth, Va.

Mankato Soybean Prod., Inc W. A. Berge Mankato, Minn.

Mellott Grain Compan Milford Knowles Mellott, Ind.

Muscatine Processing SRS PY oer eam Muscatine, Ia.

North Iowa Co-op. Pro. Assn.......Glenn Pogeler Manly, Ia.

Old Fort Mills, Inc...................... Ralph Kai Marion, O.

Owensboro Grain Company......... William Pils UP EGE csccsssesicivssnsed Owensboro, Ky.

Pillsbury Soy Mills. H. R. Schultz Clinton, Ia.

H. R. Schultz Centerville, Ia.

The Procter & Gamble

Distributing Co W.H. Knapp Cincinnati 1, O.

Procter & Gamble......................... W.H. Knapp Ivorydale, O.

Producers Co-op. Oil Mill............ O. K. Winterringer

pat aaa LST ox 911, Oklahoma City, Okla.

Quincy Soybean Prod. Co Irving Rosen Quincy, Ill.

Ralston Purina Company.. E. F. Johnson St. Louis 2, Mo.

OR eS SE Soe ener Kansas City, Mo.

Ralph Guenther Lafayette, Ind.

H. N. Johnson Iowa Falls, Ia.

R. H. Dean Circleville, O.

Shellabarger Soybean Mills.......... W. L. Shellabarger

Sephascecsaa 364-366 Citizens Bldg., Decatur 30, Ill.

Simonsen Mill-Rendering Plant...W. E. Simonsen Quimby, Ia.

Sioux Soya Company..................- H. R. Scroggs.............. Box 357, Sioux City 2, Ia.

The Southern Cotton Oil Co........ Othe Ra i AEE Goldsboro, N. C.

W. A. Moore Tarboro, N. C.

Soya Processing Company........... SEAS ac RROD click ve iccs cues tenayncdatcoeeen Wooster, O.

Soy Bean Processing Company....C. E. Butler Waterloo, Ia.

Soy-Rich Products, Inc................. B. S. Brooks.

tne 1425 N. Mosley Ave., Wichita 4, Kans.

Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc......... Howard Kellogg, Jr.......Box 989, Buffalo 5, N. Y.

Howard Kellogg, Jr. Chicago, Ill.

Howard Kellogg, Jr. Decatur, III.

BIDWOEG BONOOE, JE. 5a. cvsiecesenceeneccs Des Moines, Ia.

A.B. Staley Mie. Co...c.c-cccinscccs E. K. Scheiter Decatur, Ill.

Thos. Longbons................ Box 670, Painesville, O.

Swift & Company................-......-- P. M. Jarvis....Union Stock Yards, Chicago 9, Ill.

Swift & Company Oil Mill........... W. B. Stone Cairo, II.

Swift & Co. Soybean Mill..:.......... N. P. Noble Champaign, Ill.

Swift & Co. Soybean Mill............. S. D. Hollett .:---Frankfort, Ind.

Swift & Co. Soybean Mill............ A. F. Leathers Des Moines, Ia.

Swift & Co. Soybean Mill............. H. S. Byrd Fostoria, O.

Toledo Soybean Products Co........ (a. ie eee 215 Pontiac St., Toledo, O.

Ralph Wells & Co Ralph Wells Monmouth, III.

West Bend Elevator Co................ R. W. Jurgens West Bend, Ia.

Western Soybean Mills................ E. A. Woodard Sioux Falls, S. Dak.

Williams Milling Company.......... Leo W. Williams Sac City, Ia.

TRADING RULES

Governing Purchase and Sale

of

SOYBEAN OIL MEAL

Adopted October 18, 1933; Amended February 17, 1939; Amended

October 18, 1940; Amended October 13, 1941; Effective October

13, 1941; Amended February 23, 1942; Effective April 1, 1942;

Amended September 15, 1943; Effective October 1, 1943; Amended

September 22, 1944; Effective September 22, 1944.

RULE 1— CONTRACTS

Section 1. All sales of Soybean Oil Meal by Members

of the

Association shall be made under a written contract under the Rules of

the Association and shall be signed by both Buyer and Seller.

Contracts shall be signed in duplicate by an officer of each Com-

pany, showing official title, or by some one duly authorized to sign

contracts for Buyer and Seller.

Section 2. Uniform Sales Contract. No.

Contract made at... (City)... ...... (State)... this...0000.... day of

, 19........, between......(Seller)......, of ....... (City)...

anu (State)... hereinafter called the Seller, and ......... (Buyer)......... of

_.. (City)... ...... (State)......., hereinafter called the Buyer.

The Seller hereby sells and agrees to deliver, and the Buyer hereby

purchases and agrees to receive in the amounts and on the terms and

conditions hereinafter set forth, the following quantity of SOYBEAN

OIL MEAL, ...........% PROTEIN:

Price { Bags $

per

Ton (Bulk $

Tons

F. O. B

Terms: Net cash — Sight Dratt, Bill of Lading attached.

For shipment in car lots during periods specified below:

19... Tons 19... Tons

Quick (within 3 days) — eee: = =| en

Immediate (within 5 days) ...... Feb. ..- Aug. ~—....-

Prempt eh Dae) nw. Med... Te...

Within 20 days........... a a. a

Within 30 days........... —————_— Ae |

Within 45 days........... oe ee | een

Agent or Broker.

————

This sale is made under the Trading Rules of the National Soybean

Processors Association governing purchase and sale of Soybean Oil

Meal in effect on date of purchase, which rules are hereby made a

part of this contract. -

The Buyer hereby acknowledges familiarity with the text of the

Trading Rules of the National Soybean Processors Association and

Buyer ~~ Seller agree to be bound by the terms and conditions of

said Rules.

This document and said Trading Rules contain the entire agree-

ment between the parties hereto.

This contract shall be construed under the laws of the State of

IN WITNESS WHEREOEF, the respective parties have signed

these presents at

(Buyer) a (Seller)

By By

(Title) (Title)

(This contract must be signed in duplicate by an officer of each

Company, ag Bogs title, or by some one duly authorized to

sign contracts for both Buyer and Seller.)

Original to be signed and returned to Seller. Duplicate for Buyer.

RULE 2— QUALITY

Section 1. The standard of quality shall be Soybean Oil Meal of

fair merchantable quality based on the season's production and con-

forming to standard definitions and standard ifications of the Asso-

ciation, which are herewith made a part of the Trading Rules and which

specifications are subject to modification from season to season as condi-

tions may warrant, upon recommendation of the Technical Committee.

Section 2. Standard Definitions.

A. Expeller, Screw Press or Mechanical Press Soybean Chips is the

product obtained after expressing part of the~oil from soybeans by

crushing, cooking and mechanical pressure. 41% Protein Expeller,

Screw Press or Mechanical Press Soybean Oil Meal is the product

resulting from grinding the above chips.

23

B. Hydraulic Soybean Oil Cake is the product obtained after

expressing part of the oil from soybeans by crushing, cooking, and

hydraulic pressure. 41% Protein Hydraulic Soybean Oil Meal is the

product resulting from grinding the above cake.

C. Extracted Soybean Flakes is the product obtained after extract-

ing part of the oil from soybeans by crushing, cooking, and the use of

solvents. 44% Protein Soybean Oil Meal is the product resulting from

grinding the above Flakes.

D. Ground Soybeans is the product obtained by grinding whole

soybeans without cooking or removing any of the oil.

Note: This product is sometimes called Soybean Meal, thus con-

fusing it with Soybean Oil Meal.

E. If a name descriptive of the process of manufacture, such as

expeller, screw press, hydraulic, or extracted be used, the product must

correspond thereto.

Section 3. Standard Specifications.

A. Old Process Expeller or Screw Press Soybean Chips, Old

Process Hydraulic Soybean Oil Cake, and Old Process Soybean Oil

Meal are products produced by cooking ground soybeans and reduc-

ing the oil content of the cooked product by pressure to 6% or less

on a commercial basis. Standard Specifications are as follows:

a a ahi ona aad Rd Minimum 41.0%

et eee ket eee tae Minimum 3.5%

(SEA Sere © Maximum 7.0%

Ceneigeaes iN ices Minimum 29.0%

B. New Process Extracted Soybean Flakes and New Process

Soybean Oil Meal are products produced by cooking ground soybeans

and reducing the oil content of the cooked product by the use of

solvents to 1% or less on a commercial basis. Standard Specifications

are as follows:

Nine Se ae La won wala deed Minimum 44.0%

Ee el rae Geen ok e Pelee Minimum 0.5%

ea ae Foy Maximum 7.0%

Combeliycretes Me as Minimum 29.0%

Moisture (when shipped by Seller)... .. Maximum 12.5%

Section 4. Official Methods of Analysis.

Official testing methods are set forth in an appendix to this volume,

pp. 34-37.

Section 5. Unless otherwise adjusted between the parties any soy-

bean oil meal shipment or lot which does not comply with require-

ments above will be promptly replaced without expense to the buyer

except, however, that any shipment or lot testing 13% or less on arrival

24

ama

at destination, or which seller can show did not contain more than

12.5% moisture when shipped to buyer, shall not be subject to claim

or rejection on account of moisture content.

Section 6. In the event that buyer and seller cannot agree as to

the quality, on the basis of qualitative determinations, sample shall be

submitted to an official chemist of the Association who will make

oficial determinations by the methods described above.

Section 7. A. The Board of Directors shall certify not less than 7

Association Official Chemists whose tenure of office shall be at the

pleasure of the Board of Directors, and only those chemists who meet

the requirements of this Association and the Referee Board of the

American Oil Chemists Society shall be considered.

B. The Board of Directors shall request the Chairman of the

Technical Committee to investigate and approve any new laboratory

or chemist as to suitability of his equipment and knowledge of the

Official Methods and tests required before certification.

C. Upon request of the Board of Directors, the Technical Com-

mittee shall check with any or all of the present Official Chemists to

make sure that the laboratory is using equipment that will meet the

specifications of the tests required and that tests are being conducted

in accordance with these rules.

D. The Association has designated as Official Chemists for Meal

the following:

Robt. H. Acock, Acock Laboratories, Box 148, Austin, Texas.

Chas. V. Bacon, 117 Liberty St., New York, N. Y.

G. W. Agee, E. R. Barrow, J. R. Mays, Jr., Barrow-Agee Labora-

tories, Inc., Memphis, Tenn.

P. W. Tompkins, Curtis & Tompkins, Ltd., 236 Front St., San

Francisco, Calif.

R. H. Fash, F. B. Porter, The Fort Worth Laboratories, Fort Worth,

Texas.

F. R. Robertson, Houston Laboratories, 1206! Preston Ave.,

Houston, Texas.

H. M. Bulbrook, Industrial Laboratories, 8282 Taylor St., Fort

Worth, Texas.

M. F. Lauro, Produce Exchange Bldg., 2 Broadway, New York, N.Y.

Thos. C. Law., J. D. Evans, Law & Company, Inc., Atlanta, Georgia.

D. C. Pickard, Pickard Testing Laboratories, 2920 Seventh Ave.,

So., Birmingham, Alla.

R. * Pope, Pope Testing Laboratories, P. O. Box 903, Dallas 1,

exas.

P. McG. Shuey, Shuey & Company, 115 East Bay St., Savannah,

Georgia.

Southwestern Laboratories, Board of Trade Bldg., Kansas City, Mo.

N. C. Hamner, Southwestern Laboratories, Dallas, Tex.

Paul D. Cretien, Texas Testing Laboratories, Inc., 1416 Young St.,

Dallas, Tex.

E. H. Tenent, Woodson-Tenent Laboratories, Memphis, Tenn.

Section 8. Sales of Soybean Oil Cake and Meal in any shape,

size, or grind are subject to all Trading Rules of the Association.

Section 9. Seller shall not be responsible for adaptability of goods

for any specific purpose, unless pothie at provided for in the contract.

Section 10. Samples for the purpose of establishing the quality of

any lot or shipment of Soybean Oil Meal shall be fairly representative

of the entire lot and shall be drawn within 24 hours of arrival at desti-

nation in the manner specified for sampling grain per Chapter 1, Grain

Inspectors Manual, Agricultural Marketing Service, U. S. Department

of Agriculture, dated July 1940. Each sample shall consist of at least

two pounds and shall be placed at once in an airtight container, sealed

and marked for identification.

RULE 3 — QUANTITY

Section 1. Soybean Oil Meal for domestic consumption shall be

sold on a net weight basis in tons. The unit of weight is the short

ton (2,000 pounds).

Section 2. The contract shall state the specific number of tons

sold, and shall be completed by shipping the exact number of tons

unless otherwise arranged between Buyer and Seller.

Section 3. A carload shall be forty thousand (40,000) pounds,

unless otherwise specified at time of purchase, provided that where

rules of carriers lawfully on file with the Interstate Commerce Com-

mission or State Railway Commissions provide for minimum carload

weights other than the above, such minimum weights shall constitute

a carload within the meaning of this rule.

Section 4. In completing round-lot contracts, Seller shall load cars

to “minimum weight” as required by railroad regulations, unless specific

instructions to the contrary shall have been given by Buyer, in which

case Buyer shall be liable for excess freight.

RULE 4— PRICE

Section 1. The price on Soybean Oil Meal shall be quoted in U. S.

dollars per ton.

Section 2. Unless specifically stated by Seller and mutually agreed

upon by Buyer and Seller at time of sale, prices quoted are delivered

prices. Seller shall prepay freight on all shipments sold on a delivered

price basis. Seller shall also have the option of prepaying freight on

shipments sold on an F. O. B. mill basis and add the freight to invoice

and draft at the regular published rail tariff rates.

Section 3. Unless otherwise specified at time of sale, prices quoted

are for regular fine ground Soybean Oil Meal in new and/or recon-

ditioned 100 pound bags.

Section 4. In the event that Buyer calls for delivery of Soybean

Oil Cake or Meal in any shape, size, or grind other than fine ground

Meal against a contract written on a regular fine ground meal basis in

sacks, Seller's differentials for the respective grades prevailing on date

26

ae

of sale shall apply in determining the invoice price of the specific

delivery made against contract.

Section 5. On contracts made on a delivered price basis, unless

otherwise specified in the contract, delivery point specified shall be

considered as a rate basis only and not necessarily final destination ot

goods. If Buyer requests shipment to other points than the delivery

point specified in contract, the increase or decrease in freight costs are

for account of Buyer, unless otherwise specified in the contract. Freight

allowances on sales of Soybean Oil Meal when shipped in bags will

be made on a gross weight basis.

Section 6. Any special billing or reference stipulated at time of

sale, as a part of the purchase price, shall be shown in contract.

Section 7. Any taxes now or hereafter imposed by the U. S.

Federal Authorities or by any state upon the manufacture and/or sale

of Soybean Oil Meal are for the account of Buyer.

RULE 5 — TERMS

Section 1. Unless otherwise specified at time of sale, terms of

payment on Soybean Oil Meal are to be net cash — sight draft, bill

of lading attached.

Section 2. Seller reserves the right to restrict the terms of pay’

ment if in his judgment the financial responsibility of the Buyer does

not warrant shipment on terms originally stated in contract.

Section 3. Failure to accept delivery of or pay for any portion of

specified quantity of Soybean Oil Meal covered by contract shall at

Seller's option release Seller from making further deliveries. In case

of default in payment of any invoice when due, the whole sum owed

by the Buyer shall become due at once.

RULE 6—INQUIRIES, QUOTATIONS AND

CONFIRMATIONS

Section 1. All inquiries shall state quantity in tons, kind, grade,

time of shipment, chipping point preferred, delivery or rate basing

point, and any special billing, reference or routing requested.

Section 2. All quotations shall state quantity in tons, time of

shipment, F. O. B. mill or delivered price specifying mill point and/or

delivery or rate basing point as requested, minimum per cent protein

guaranteed, any special billing, reference or routing if requested, bulk

price only if requested.

Section 3. It shall be the duty of both Buyer and Seller, not later

than the close of business day following day of sale, to mail, each to

the other, a written confirmation or contract (the Buyer a confirmation

of purchase and the Seller a confirmation and/or contract of sale),

27

setting forth the specifications as agreed upon in original articles of

trade, however conducted. Upon receipt a said confirmations the

parties thereto shall check carefully all specifications stated therein and,

upon finding any differences, shall immediately notify the other party

to the contract, by wire or telephone, and confirm in writing, except

in the case of manifest errors and/or differences of minor character, in

which event notice by return mail will suffice.

Section 4. When a trade is made through a commission agent or

broker, it shall be the duty of said agent or broker, not later than the

close of business day following day Z sale, to send a written confirma-

tion to each of the principals (to the Buyer a confirmation of sale

and to the Seller a confirmation of purchase), setting forth the specifi-

cations of the trade as made for their account. Upon receipt of said

confirmations the parties thereto shall carefully check all specifications

stated therein and, upon finding any differences, shall immediately notify

the other party to the contract by wire or telephone, and confirm in

writing. In default of such notice the contract shall be filled in accord-

ance with the terms of the confirmation issued by agent or broker.

RULE 7

TIME OF SHIPMENT — CARRYING CHARGE

Section 1. Unless the exact shipping date is agreed upon by Buyer

and Seller at time of sale, shipments for nearby positions shall be inter-

preted as follows, starting from date shipping instructions are received

by Seller:

Quick shipment —within 3 working days

Immediate shipment — within 5 working days

Prompt shipment — within 10 working days

“In transit” shall mean that the bill of lading must be dated at

least one day prior to date of sale.

“Loaded, spot, instant or on track” shall mean that the Soybean

Oil Meal is actually loaded and ready for billing, and the bill of lading

must be dated on the day of sale.

Section 2. On contracts covering specific quantities for shipment

during the first half or second half of a given month, it shall be under-

stood that up to midnight of the fifteenth (15th) shall be considered

the first half (this including February), the remainder of the month

to be considered as second half.

Section 3. On contracts covering specific quantities for shipment

during a specified period, shipment is to be made during the month

or months specified in the contract with no tolerance period allowed

to Buyer.

Section 4. Unless otherwise agreed in the contract, all sales are

understood to be for shipment at Seller's option at any time during

period specified in contract.

28

—

Section 5. Specifications and shipping instructions on sales for

“in transit,” spot, immediate, and ouik shipments must be furnished

by Buyer at the time contract is made.

Section 6. Specifications and shipping instructions on sales for

prompt shipment must be furnished by Buyer within seven (7) days

from date of contract, including Sundays and Holidays.

Section 7. On contracts covering specific quantities for shipment,

during a specified period, the Buyer shall furnish specifications and

shipping instructions within the first week of the month during which

shipment is wanted to enable Seller to execute order within the period

or periods specified in contract.

Section 8. In the event that Buyer fails to furnish specifications

and shipping instructions within the period or periods specified in

contract, the Seller shall have the following discretionary rights, sub-

ject, however, to Seller notifying Buyer by wire or mail the day fol-

lowing contract period expiration, notifying Buyer which right Seller

elects to exercise under the contract:

(a) To resell Soybean Oil Meal in the open market for Buyer's

account, Buyer to pay Seller the loss incurred; or

(b) To retain Soybean Oil Meal, Buyer to pay Seller difference

between contract price and market price in the event of mar-

ket price being lower, and also in addition thereto such actual

expense as shall have been incurred; or

(c) To cancel the contract on any unshipped portion thereof; or

(d) To postpone delivery of such past due Soybean Oil Meal and

carry same for Buyer subject to a carrying charge of 25 cents

per ton for each 15 days or fraction thereof for a period not

to exceed 60 days from the expiration of the contract. The

carrying charges accruing against each specific shipment shall

be added to each invoice and draft by Seller and listed as a

separate item showing how each computation is made.

Section 9. In the event that Seller fails to ship any portion of

Soy

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