Appendix — Montana Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission
Supreme Court brief1951
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APPENDIX
The Federal Power Act (Act of August 26, 1935, c. 687,
49 Stat. 838; 16 U.S.C. 791 et seq.)
Section 3(8)
Section 3(8) of the Federal Power Act defines “navigable
waters” as follows:
“ ‘Navigable waters’ means those parts of streams or other
bodies of water over which Congress has jurisdiction under
its authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations and
among the several States, and which either in their natural
or improved condition notwithstanding interruptions be-
tween the navigable parts of such streams or waters by falls,
shallows, or rapids compelling land carriage, are used or
suitable for use for the transportation of persons or property
in interstate or foreign commerce, including therein all such
interrupting falls, shallows, or rapids, together with such
other parts of streams as shall have been authorized by Con-
gress for improvement by the United States or shall have
been recommended to Congress for such improvement after
investigation under its authority.”
Sec. 23(a) - U.S.C., Title 16, Sec. 816:
“Sec. 23. (a) The provisions of this Part shall not be
construed as affecting any permit or valid existing right-
of-way heretofore granted or as confirming or otherwise
affecting any claim, or as affecting any authority heretofore
given pursuant to law, but any person, association, corpora-
tion, State, or municipality holding or possessing such per-
mit, right-of-way, or authority may apply for a license
hereunder, and upon such application the Commission may
issue to any such applicant a license in accordance with the
provisions of this Part and in such case the provisions of this
Act shall apply to such applicant as a licensee hereunder:
PROVIDED, That when application is made for a license
under this section for a project or projects already con-
structed the fair value of said project or projects deter-
mined as provided in this section, shall for the purposes
of this Part and of said license be deemed to be the amount
to be allowed as the net investment of the applicant in such
project or projects as of the date of such license, or as of
—A2—
the date of such determination, if license has not been issued.
Such fair value shall be determined by the Commission after
notice and opportunity for hearing.”
Sec. 23(b) - U.S.C. Title 16, Sec. 817:
“(b) It shall be unlawful for any person, State, or
municipality, for the purpose of developing electric power,
to construct, operate, or maintain any dam, water conduit,
reservoir, power house, or other works incidental thereto
across, along, or in any of the navigable waters of the United
States, or upon any part of the public lands or reservations
of the United States (including the Territories), or utilize
the surplus water or water power from any Government
dam, except under and in accordance with the terms of a
permit or valid existing right-of-way granted prior to June
10, 1920, or a license granted pursuant to this Act. Any
person, association, corporation, State, or municipality in-
tending to construct a dam or other project works across,
along, over, or in any stream or part thereof, other than
those defined herein as navigable waters, and over which
Congress has jurisdiction under its authority to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and among the several States
shall before such construction file declaration of such in-
tention with the Commission, whereupon the Commission
shall cause immediate investigation of such proposed con-
struction to be made, and if upon investigation it shall find
that the interests of interstate or foreign commerce would
be affected by such proposed construction, such person,
association, corporation, State, or municipality shall not con-
struct, maintain, or operate such dam or other project works
until it shall have applied for and shall have received a license
under the provisions of this Act. If the Commission shall
not so find, and if no public lands or reservations are af-
fected, permission is hereby granted to construct such dam
or other project works in such stream upon compliance with
State laws.”
Sec. 308(b) - U.S.C. Title 16, Sec. 825g(b):
“(b) All hearings, investigations, and proceedings under
this Act shall be governed by rules of practice and procedure
to be adopted by the Commission, and in the conduct thereof
the technical rules of evidence need not be applied. No in-
cas
ee a
mn
formality in any hearing, investigation, or proceeding or in
the manner of taking testimony shall invalidate any order,
decision, rule, or regulation issued under the authority of
this Act.”
The Federal Water Power Act (Act of June 10, 1920,
Chapt. 285, Sec. 23, 41 Stat. 1075, U.S.C, Title 16,
Secs. 816, 817). (Before Amendment of 1935.)
“Sec. 23. That the provisions of this Act shall not be
construed as affecting any permit or valid existing right of
way heretofore granted, or as confirming or otherwise af-
fecting any claim, or as affecting any authority heretofore
given pursuant to law, but any person, association, corpora-
tion, State, or municipality, holding or possessing such permit,
right of way, or authority may apply for a license here-
under, and upon such application the commission may issue
to any such applicant a license in accordance with the pro-
visions of this Act, and in such case the provisions «his
Act shall apply to such applicant as a licensee hereunder:
PROVIDED, That when application is made for a license
under this section for a project or projects already con-
structed, the fair value of said project or projects, deter-
mined as provided in this section, shall for the purposes of
this Act and of said license be deemed to be the amount
to be allowed as the net investment of the applicant in such
project or projects as of the date of such license, or as of
the date of such determination, if license has not been issued.
Such fair value may, in the discretion of the commission,
be determined by mutual agreement between the com-
mission and the applicant, or, in case they can not agree,
jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon the district court of
the United States in the district within which such project
or projects may be located, upon the application of either
party, to hear and determine the amount of such fair value.
“That ary person, association, corporation, State, or
municipality intending to construct a dam or other project
works across, along, over, or in any stream or part thereof,
other than those defined herein as navigable waters, and over
which Congress has jurisdiction under its authority to regu-
lace commerce between foreign nations and among the
several States, may in their discretion file declaration of
such intention with the commission, whereupon the com-
SRR an a EE MS AEE MI ER 8 ECON RB as me area inn i it
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mission shall cause immediate investigation of such proposed
construction to be made, and if upon investigation it shall
find that the interests of interstate or foreign commerce
would be affected by such proposed construction, such
person, association, corporation, State, or municipality shall
not proceed with such construction until it shall have ap-
plied for and shall have received a license under the pro-
visions of this Act. If the commission shall not so find,
and if no public lands or reservations are affected, per-
mission is hereby granted to construct such dam or other
project works in such stream upon compliance with State
laws.”
Revised Statutes, Sec. 3477 (10 Stat. 170, Title 31, U.S.C. ;
Sec. 203).
“203. Assignments of claims void. All transfers and
assignments made of any claim upon the United States, or
of any part or share thereof, or interest therein, whether :
absolute or conditional, and whatever may be the considera- ‘
tion therefor, and all powers of attorney, orders, or other t
authorities for receiving ayment of any such claim, or of
any part or share, thereof, shall be absolutely null and void, ;
unless they are freely made and executed in the presence F
of at least two attesting witnesses, after the allowance of such ’
a claim, the ascertainment of the amount due, and the issuing |
of a warrant for the payment thereof.* * *.”
The Act of February 15, 1901, c. 372, 31 Stat. 790, U.S.C,
Title 16, Sec. 79.
“Chap. 372 - An Act Relating to rights of way through §
certain parks, reservations, and other public lands.
“Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
That the Secretary of the Interior be, and hereby is, author- :
ized and empowered, under general regulations to be fixed :
by him, to permit the use of rights of way through the
public lands, forest and other reservations of the United
States, and the Yosemite, Sequoia, and General Grant y
national parks, California, for electrical pon poles, and al
lines for the generation and distribution of electrical power, ta
and for telephone and telegraph purposes, and for canals,
ditches, pipes and pipe lines, flumes, tunnels, or other water
BPE SS RE
a om
conduits, and for water plants, dams, and reservoirs used to
promote irrigation or mining or quarrying, or the man-
ufacturing or cutting of timber or lumber, or the supplying
of water for domestic, public, or any other beneficial uses
to the extent of the ground occupied by such canals, ditches,
flumes, tunnels, reservoirs, or other water conduits or water
plants, or electrical or other works permitted hereunder, and
not to exceed fifty feet on each side of the marginal limits
thereof, or not to exceed fifty feet on each side of the center
line of such pipes and pipe lines, electrical, telegraph, and
telephone lines and poles, by any citizen, association, or
corporation of the United States, where it is intended by
such to exercise the use permitted hereunder or any one
or more of the purposes herein named: PROVIDED, That
such permits shall be allowed within or through any of said
parks or any forest, military, Indian, or other reservation
only upon the approval of the chief officer of the Depart-
ment under whose supervision such park or reservation falls
and upon a finding by him that the same is not incompatible
with the public interest: PROVIDED FURTHER, That
all permits given hereunder for telegraph and telephone pur-
noses shall be subject to the provision of title sixty-five of
the Revised Statutes of the United States, and amendments
thereto, regulating rights of way for telegraph companies
over the public domain; AND PROVIDED FURTHER,
That any permission given by the Secretary of the Interior
under the provisions of this Act may be revoked by him
or his successor in his discretion, and shall not be held to
confer any right, or easement, or interest in, to, or over any
public land, reservation, or park.”
By the Act of February 1, 1905, c. 288 (33 Stat. 628), the
Secretary of Agriculture was authorized to issue such per-
mits under the 1901 Statute for use of lands within national
forests reserves.
REGULATIONS
Department of the Interior (March 1, 1913 - 41 L.D. 532
et seq.)
“Reg. 19. Violation by a final permittee of any of the
provisions of these regulations, or of any of the conditions
of a permit issued to him thereunder, shall be sufficient
=e
ground for revocation of such permit; but attention is called
to the statute under which these regulations are issued, which
provides:
“That any permission given by the Secretary of the In-
terior under the provisions of this act may be revoked by
him or by his successor in his discretion.
“No permit will be deemed to be revoked except on the
issuance by the Secretary of a specific order of revocation.
Change of jurisdiction over lands from one executive depart-
ment to another will not revoke but will change the ad-
ministrative jurisdiction over a permit for the occupancy
and use of such lands. The final disposal by the United
States of any tract traversed by a right of way permitted
under this act shall not be construed to be a revocation of
such permission in whole or in part, but such final disposal
shall be deemed and taken to be subject to such right of
way until such permission shall have been specifically revoked
in accordance with the provisions of said act.”
Department of Agriculture (Issued December 14, 1915).
“Reg. L-17. Permission to occupy and use National
Forest lands may be transferred to a new permittee under
the following conditions and not otherwise: The proposed
transferee shall file with the district forester of the district
in which the lands under permit are situated the decree,
execution of judgment, will, contract of sale, or other written
instrument upon which the proposed transfer is based, or
a properly certified copy thereof, also a written applica-
tion for the transfer. A stipulation binding the proposed
transferee to the performance of such of the old condi-
tions and of such new and additional conditions as the
Secretary may deem necessary will be prepared and sub-
mitted to the proposed transferee for execution and return
to the district forester; and thereupon, if the Secretary ap-
proves of the transfer and issues a new permit, the transferee
shall succeed to the rights and obligations of the original
permittee, subject, however, to such new and additional con-
ditions as shall have been embodied in said stipulation and
permit.”
“Reg. L-19. Violation by a final permittee of any of the
= \
provisions of these regulations, or of any of the conditions
of a stipulation executed by him or of a permit issued to him
thereunder, shall be sufficient ground for revocation of such
permit.
“No final permit will be deemed to be terminated except
upon formal revocation thereof by the Secretary and until
the permittee shall have had a reasonable time - not to exceed
90 days - within which to show cause why such revocation
should not be made.”
TABLE OF DISTANCES —A8—
Distances up the Missouri River from its mouth to some
of the points referred to in the record.
Location Mile Location Mile
Mouth of River 0 Ryan 2249
Yellowstone River 1690 Site “C” 2251
Big Muddy Creek 1735 Crooked Falls 2254
Poplar River 1785 Rainbow Falls 2254
Redwater Creek 1787 Colters Fall 2254
Wolf Point, Mont. 1811 Rainbow Dam 2254
Wolf Creek 1817 Black Eagle Falls 2258
Little Porcupine Creek 1850 Black Eagle Dam 2258
Milk River 1866 Great Falls City 2260
Fr. Peck Dam 1878 Sun River 2261
Blackfoot Creek 1965 Smith River 2290
Trover Point 1975 Ulm 2292
Musselshell River 2004 Cascade 2316
Carroll, Mont. 2041 Half Breed Rapids 2327
Two Calf Island 2067 Dearborn River 2337
Zortman Ferry 2078 Stickney Creek 2340
Cow Island 2082 Craig 2343
Snake Point Island 2087 Little Prickly Pear Creek 2348
Snake Creek 2089 Holter Dam 2351
Bird Rapids 2096 Oxbow Bend 2358
Lone Pine Rapids 2103 Cottonwood Creek 2362
Dauphins Rapids 2109 Beartooth Rapids 2365
Gallatin Rapids 2113 Elkhorn Creek 2367
Holmes Rapids 2119 Mann Gulch 2368
Judith River 2124 Picnic Gulch 2370
Drowned Mans Rapids 2126 Gate of the Mountains 2372
Pablos Rapids 2137 American Bar 2373
Steamboat Rock 2142 Hauser Lake Dam 2380
Coal Banks Landing 2170 Prickly Pear Creek 2381
Loma 2190 Stubbs Ferry 2390
Marias River 2190 French Bar 2395
Brule Bar 2196 Canyon Ferry Dam 2398
Fontanelle Bar 2197 Townsend, Mont. 2432
Fort Benton 2212 Deep Creek 2435
Highwood Creek 2237 Cow Creek 2445
Portage Coulee 2242 Toston 2447
Belt Creek 2244 Gallatin River 2474
Morony 2245 Three Forks 2475
Great Falls 2249 |
Page
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RRO MU MIN ND 555 cosa is ceca cevaiccssieeuchisvalinigvuks sipapssaivasanan dadeyinleibarianson 2
SOUND Sasss5ss ca sseedsvivetinasiecraceciolentcsbisectusreinven 2
A. Navigability of the River 5
Actual use 6
Suitability for use 9
Improvements above Fort Benton 11
Congressional assertion of jurisdiction .........c.c.ccseseseee-e 12
B. Claimed authorizations to oceupy public lands .............000... 13
a. Hauser 13
b. Hebgen 15
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Conclusion .......... isesbdsineUniscledievaraabieclpsed 33
CITATIONS
Cases:
Arizona Vv. California, 283 U. 8. 423....ccccccccscsscsesceeees . 38, 19
Ball, Daniel, The, 10 Wall. 557 23, 26
Belmont Bridge v. Wheeling Bridge, 138 U.S. 287 ..cccccccccccccossss 25
Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183 25
Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,
SPE WE G2 EN, ROPE Aaiescobsiva cue sites cilviesasin pine daal chusencacsievincioebunecivens ieee? 18
Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U. 8. 113
aseepisestss 18, 19, 20, 22
Georgia Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 152 F. 2d 5
PO vai ecsss sashes vccatn sau cagtanscnsstoeacondisieontstovsunidhicautessduos tsienctdesicskcoousns 1
Gray v. Powell, 314 U. 8. 402 30
Louisville § Nashville RR v. Kentucky, 161 U. 8. 677.....0.0... 25
Moline Properties v. Commissioner, 319 U. 8. 436 .....c.ccccccesee.0- 30
Montana Power Co., Re, 4 F. P. C. 213 29
Montello, The, 20 Wall. 430 18, 19, 20, 21, 22
National Labor Relations Board v. Pennsylvania Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 303 U. S. 261..... 27
National Licorice Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,
309 U. S. 350 27
Novo Trading Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
113 F. 2d 320 ee 30
Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U. 8. 574 22
Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U. 8. 126 ..ccccccccccososeos... 18
Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Power Com-
mission, 324 U. 8S. 635 4
Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Federal Power Commis-
sion, 123 F. 2d 155, certiorari denied, 315 U. 8. 806........ 18, 23, 26
Seaboard Air Line Railway v. United States, 256 U. 8. 655.... 30
Schenley Corp. v. United States, 326 U. 8. 432 30
Southern California Edison Co., In re, 7 F. P. C. Ann. Rep.
(1927) 142 ...... 27, 30
Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. 8. 381 27
United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U. 8. 377
paren ers 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23
United States v. Arizona, 295 U. 8. 174 4
United States v. California, 332 U. 8. 19 32
(I)
II
Page
United States v. City and County of San Francisco, 310 U. S.
16 : 32
United States v. Utah, 283 U. S. 64 20
Wisconsin Public Service Corp. v. Federal Power Commission,
147 F. 2d 743, certiorari denied, 325 U. S. 880................ 18, 19, 26
Statutes:
Act of June 8, 1894 (28 Stat. 91) 13
Act of June 3, 1896 (29 Stat. 202) 12, 13
Act of March 23, 1900, c. 88, 31 Stat. 50.......cccccccccesesesesceceeeses 25
Act of February 15, 1901 (31 Stat. 790, modified by 33 Stat.
628, 16 U. S. C. 79, 522, 43 U. 8. C. 959)........ 2, 4, 13, 15, 27, 37
Act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat. 570) 13
Act of February 1, 1905 (33 Stat. 628) 14, 38
Act of April 12, 1906 (34 Stat. 111) 13
Act of February 20, 1907 (34 Stat. 912) 13
Act of February 27, 1915 c. 68, 38 Stat. 816 : 25
Federal Water Power Act (41 Stat. 1063, as amended by 49
Stat. 838, 16 U. S. C. 791a et seq.) :
Sec. 3(8) 2, 3, 17, 20, 21, 35
Sec. 23(b) 2, 5, 26, 35 |
See IUD A: bas sinsahn eas sqabsensoen ceastentonad eases kine tuscenpeaneinlanuasoncleaiiebal 18, 36 |
See. 313(b) 4, 18
Federal Water Power Act, 41 Stat. 1063 2
Rev. Stat. 3477 31
River and Harbor Act of July 13, 1892 (27 Stat. 88).............0 12
= and Harbor Act of August 18, 1894 (28 Stat. 338,
D. Sinbkesinabickanss ov ssesh chsghsitiaaiesbobateestatae oeatababoasadasdassaasnrast a eksh a biaiansa 11
River and Harbor Act of March 3, 1899 (30 Stat. 1121, 1151) 4
River and Harbor Act of 1935 (49 Stat. 1028, 1034)................ 24
33 U. 8. C. 21-55 : 25
Montana Laws, Territory, 1867, 4th Reg. sess., p. 109.............. 8
Miscellaneous:
Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers for the Year 1901.... 9
Annual Report, Chief of Engineers (1947) 25
History of the Pacific States, Hubert Howe Bancroft (1890) 7
House Doc. No. 238, 73rd Cong., 2d sess., pp. 12, 268, 269 .... 24, 25
H. Rep. No. 910, 66th Cong., 2d sess., Pp. 7......cccceccsecseseeeeseeresees 23
Journals of Lewis and Clark 7
36 Land Decisions 579 14, 27
41 Land Decisions 150 13, 27, 28
41 Land Decisions 532 27
32 Op. A..G. 525 14, 32, 38
Regulations, Dept. of Agric., Forest Service Use Book, 1907
p 43, 1908, p. 55, 1911, pp. 32, 33 14, 28
5 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed.), Secs. 1422, 1597, 1598............ 18
RETREAT SIR er aa eee og ches een ony
Anthe Supreme Court of the United States
OcToBER TERM, 1950
No. 518
THE Montana Power CoMPANY, a corporation,
PETITIONER
v.
FEDERAL PowreR COMMISSION
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION
IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Federal Power Commission
(R. 54-98) is reported at 77 P.U.R. 299. The opin-
ion of the Court of Appeals (R. 1670-1676) is re-
ported at 185 F. 2d 491.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was en-
tered on October 4, 1950 (R. 1683). A petition for
rehearing, filed on October 18, 1950 (R. 1677), was
denied on November 1, 1950 (R. 1681). The peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari was filed on January
26,1951. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1) and under Section 313(b)
of the Federal Power Act.
(1)
POLAR ARE NG AS ST
2
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the Missouri River, at the sites occu-
pied by six hydroelectric developments owned and
operated by The Montana Power Company consti-
tutes ‘‘navigable waters” as defined in Section 3 (8)
of the Federal Power Act.
2. Whether The Montana Power Company occu-
pies public lands at its Hauser and Hebgen devel-
opments “‘under and in accordance with the terms
of a permit or valid existing right-of-way granted
prior to June 10, 1920”’ within the exception con-
tained in Section 23(b) of the Act.
STATUTES INVOLVED
The pertinent provisions of the Federal Water
Power Act (41 Stat. 1063, as amended by 49 Stat.
838, 16 U.S.C. 791a et seq.) and of the Act of Feb-
ruary 15, 1901 (31 Stat. 790, modified by 33 Stat.
628, 16 U.S.C. 79, 522, 43 U.S.C. 959) are set forth
in the Appendix, infra, pp. 35-38.
STATEMENT
The petition in this case seeks further review
of that portion of the order of the Federal Power
Commission (Commission), issued on December
7, 1948, requiring The Montana Power Company
(Company), petitioner herein, to file applications
for license under the Federal Power Act for seven !
The Commission’s order, as issued, applied to the Com-
pany’s nine developments. As to one of these projects, Madi-
{ son, however, the Company has never questioned the necessity
of a FPC license; the Company admits that that project
NEL I EL I EIR ELIE IOP SH AIS te Bac ARNO Ys meat acts
3
hydroelectric developments which the Company
owns and operates in the watershed of the upper
Missouri River (R. 99-105).?
In so far as here pertinent, the Commission in
its order held that the 263 mile reach of the Mis-
souri River between Fort Benton (mile 2212 *)
and Three Forks (mile 2475) both in the State of
Montana, on which six of the developments here
involved (Morony (mile 2245), Ryan (mile 2249),
Rainbow (mile 2254), Black Eagle (mile 2258),
Holter (mile 2351), Hauser (mile 2380)) * were
located, constituted ‘‘navigable waters’”’ as defined
in Section 3(8) of the Federal Power Act, infra,
occupies public land without a permit (R. 79) and had applied
to the Commission for a license therefor (R. 60). The remain-
ing project, Canyon Ferry, was purchased from the Com-
pany by the United States in 1949, subsequent to the filing of
petition for review; the remand below of that phase of the
ease to the Commission for further consideration in light of
: these changed circumstances, the Company concedes (Pet. 2),
is not a ground for certiorari although the Company does
reserve the question should certiorari be granted (Pet. 2).
, ? The proceedings leading up to the issuance of this order
were begun by a show cause order issued by the Commission
on July 27, 1943, why the Company should not apply for
appropriate authorization for these developments (R. 12-14).
Extensive hearings were held before a Trial Examiner and
the Company was permitted to file exceptions to his report
and orally to argue the case before the Commission (R. 61).
3“*Fort Benton (mile 2212)’’ indicates that Fort Benton
is 2212 miles from the mouth of the Missouri River, that is,
from where the Missouri River joins the Mississippi River
above St. Louis, Missouri.
*Each of these developments includes a dam across the
River, a reservoir, a powerhouse and incidental works (R. 55).
RGN aaa AILS ae n earn avekear micas “che generat ail
—
4
p. 35 (R. 101-104, 61-78), and that since the Com-
pany made no claim to authorization so to obstruct
the River,’ licenses therefor were required (R.
105). Further, as to the Hauser project and the
seventh development here involved, Hebgen, which
is located on the non-navigable Madison River,®
the Commission rejected the Company’s claim that
by virtue of permits issued to its predecessors in
interest by the Secretaries of Agriculture and In-
terior prior to 1920, but never transferred to it
in accordance with applicable regulations, its oc-
cupancy of public lands at these developments was
“‘under and in accordance with the terms of a
Pe NE ee ee
° Before the Commission and the court below, the Company
claimed as to Holter that the permit which had been issued to ;
a predecessor in interest under the Act of February 15, 1901 ;
(31 Stat. 790), a publie land right-of-way statute (infra,
- pp. 37-38) and which, the Commission found had been validly
transferred to it (R. 81-82) authorized it also to oceupy naviga-
ble waters. Both the Commission and the court below rejected
that contention (compare the 1901 Act with River and Harbor
Act of March 3, 1899 (30 Stat. 1121, 1151; United States v.
Arizona, 295 U.S. 174) and the Company has now apparently
abandoned that claim. In its petition, however, the Company
attempts to reserve a question as to statutory authorization
for Holter to occupy navigable waters (Pet. 17, fn. 8), but this
reservation comes too late; the Company had not raised this ;
issue in its application for rehearing before the Commission :
(R. 106, 126-130) or in its Petition for Review (R. 2, 7).
Section 313(b) of the Federal Power Act; ef. Panhandle
Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 324
U.S. 635, 649.
® Hebgen consists of a dam and reservoir but no generating
facilities and is located about 110 miles up the Madison River,
which joins the Gallatin and Jefferson Rivers at Three Forks,
Montana, to form the Missouri River (R. 59).
—
5
permit or valid existing right-of-way granted prior
to June 10, 1920” (Section 23(b) of the Act, infra,
pp. 35-36) ; the Commission, accordingly, held that
these projects were not exempt from the licensing
provisions of the Act (R. 103-104, 82-92). The
Commission finally held, as an additional basis for
requiring licensing, that the Company’s develop-
ments, particularly when they were operated as
an integrated unit, affected the navigable capacity
of the Missouri River below Fort Benton (R. 104-
105, 93-98).
The Court below affirmed the Commission’s
order, holding (1) that the Missouri River above
Fort Benton constituted ‘‘navigable waters’? and
(2) that the Company did not have authorizations
to occupy public land at Hauser and Hebgen ex-
empting thera from the licensing requirements of
the Act (R. 1671-1676). The facts relevant to these
issues, as found by the Commission, which in most
respects are undisputed, may be summarized as
follows:
A. Navigability of the River: The Missouri
River is formed by the confluence of the Madison,
Jefferson and Gallatin Rivers at Three Forks
(mile 2475) in southwestern Montana (R. 64).
Generally, it flows northeasterly to a point about
30 miles beyond Fort Benton, and thence easterly
to southeasterly to its confluence with the Missis-
sippi River near St. Louis (R. 64). From Three
Forks to Stubbs Ferry (mile 2390) the River runs
6
for about 85 miles with a tolerably uniform fall
averaging five feet per mile (R. 1387). At Stubbs
Ferry the Missouri enters ‘‘a nearly continuous
canyon section’’ (R. 1387) which extends for 74
miles to Cascade (mile 2316) with an average fall
of 3.8 feet per mile; in this reach are the Hauser
and Holter Dams (R. 71). This is followed by the
Long Pool ‘‘a name descriptive of its character”’
(R. 1388) with a fall of 0.5 feet per mile, having
a length of 55 miles and ending at the mouth of
Sun River (mile 2261) (R. 71). For the next 17
miles to the mouth of Belt Creek (mile 2244) the
River drops 520 feet in passing through the Great
Falls of the Missouri, in which are located the
Company’s Black Eagle, Rainbow, Ryan and
Morony Dams (R. 65, 55). For the 32 miles below
- Belt Creek to Fort Benton, the average fall is 5
feet per mile (R. 71).
Actual Use: For the steamboats which came up
the River from St. Louis, the Great Falls pre-
sented a natural barrier (R. 65). As a result, Fort
Benton was sometimes labelled the ‘‘head of navi-
gation,’’ and until 1888, when the advent of the
railroads curtailed the demand for water trans-
portation, steamboat traffic up to Fort Benton
flourished (R. 64-65, 543-558, 1014-15, 1434). The
record shows, however, that three steamboats from
Fort Benton successfully navigated the River to
points more than 30 miles upstream from Fort
Benton and back (R. 65, 215-216, 1013, 1141-1142,
7
1207, 1450). Similarly, steamboats operating above
the Great Falls were confined there, portages be-
ing made around the Falls only with smaller craft;
for this upper part of the River, the “‘foot of
navigation”? was sometimes placed just above the
Falls (R. 1207; Ex. 17(a) (1880), p. 1474).
Before 1900, there was considerable use of the
263-mile reach of the River above Fort Benton,
the Falls always requiring a portage around them.
A number of exploratory and Government survey
trips were made in manually-powered crafts of
various sizes, notably the 1805 expedition under
Lewis and Clark, whose party made a successful
ascent to Three Forks and beyond (R. 64-65, 1357-
1383, 1549-1575). In 1872, Thomas P. Roberts, an
engineer for the Northern Pacific Railroad, in the
course of a survey of this part of the River, de-
scended the River from Three Forks to Fort Ben-
ton in a skiff (R. 66, 1147-1208).” In addition,
Hubert Howe Bancroft’s (1890) ‘History of the
Pacifie States’’ records the use of the River be-
tween Stubbs Ferry (mile 2390), about 85 miles
below Three Forks, and Fort Benton for the trans-
portation of large numbers of miners returning to
* Roberts concluded that the River above Fort Benton
could be relied upon for navigation without improvement
and his report supported a plan for a steamboat link between
Fort Benton and Three Forks, trans-shipping freight around
the Falls (R. 66, 1195-99). The Roberts’ report was regarded
as so useful that the Secretary of War approved its publica-
tion for use of the Army Engineers (R. 1147).
8
the States following the 1864 discovery of gold
where Helena is now located; according to Ban-
croft, a stage line was established to carry pas-
sengers from Helena to a point on the River
whence was operated a line of mackinaw boats
carrying passengers to Fort Benton, portaging
around the Falls (R. 66-67, 1415-1419).° This use
of the River apparently started soon after the 1864
discovery of gold in Helena, probably diminished
soon after 1868 when most of the gold had been
extracted, and ceased around 1870 when the placers
were exhausted ; clearly, however, the business was
lively around 1866-1867 (R. 67).°
Between 1867 and 1900, there was extensive in-
trastate use of the River between Stubbs Ferry
and Great Falls for the downstream transporta-
tion of loose logs and large rafts of lumber (R. 66,
417-418, 1142-1146, 1209, 1224-1228, 1263-1265,
1328-1329). Also, several small steamboats were
placed on the River above the Falls, for the most
part in the period after the close of the navigation
era below Benton (R. 66). This operation con-
8 Although no description of these boats is available, it seems
certain that they were manually-powered and probably were
—_— large sharpens, vbateaux (R. 67).
® Bancroft’s aecount is confirmed (1) by advertisements
of the boat service in contemporary Helena newspapers (R. 67,
1417, 1139-1141, 1210), and (2) by an 1867 legislative grant
of an exclusive privilege for a portage-toll road to the Mis-
souri River Falls Wagon Road Company (Mont. Laws, Terri-
tory, 1867, 4th Reg. Sess., p. 109.) (R. 67)
pertewyeca shea Nee pe oo ke “p 2s a =
a a PR ROR ee ee
es ek ts a a
9
tinued until around 1900 and was confined prin-
cipally to the 55-mile stretch known as ‘‘Long
Pool,’’ located immediately above the Great Falls
(R. 66, 391-397, 563-564, 1313-1315, 1323-1327,
1343, 1354, Ex. 17(b) (1892) p. 1906, (1895) p.
2227, (1898) p. 1850). Some steamboats were en-
gaged in the local, commercial carrying of freight
and passengers (R. 66).’°
Suitability for Use: From Three Forks to Fort
Benton, except in the Falls section, there was a
sufficient quantity and depth of water during most
of the navigation season, beginning about April 15
and ending about November 1, to support the light-
draft navigation formerly customary on the upper
reaches of Western Rivers (R. 70; Item F, p. 671,
733).
As to the adequacy of the channel, the Commis-
sion noted that between Three Forks and Stubbs
Ferry, the River varied in width from 250 to 600
feet ; between Stubbs Ferry and Great Falls, from
200 to 1000 feet (R. 70, 1182-1197, 1193-1195).
From Three Forks to Great Falls, there existed a
low water depth of not less than 2.5 feet, except in
15 places of which only five were below two feet
(R. 70), the least low-water depth found was 1.4
7°The Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers for the
Year 1901 (Ex. 17(b)) combining figures for traffic between
Great Falls and Cascade with those for traffic between Cascade
and Stubbs Ferry shows a total of 2,528 tons of freight and
11,175 passengers carried (p. 2394).
CaaS So ESI Ctl 8 ay Hate eh RL BE OE EMER
10
feet (R. 70, 1182-1193). As to the reach between the
Falls and Fort Benton, Roberts, in his survey
(supra, p. 7), found no depth less than two feet
and Captain Maguire of the Army Engineers re-
ported in 1883 that it might be navigated although
its slope would render navigation difficult (R. 70-
71; Ex. 17(a) (1883), p. 1342).
The Commission found that, outside of the Falls
section, the average slope did not exceed five feet
per mile (see p. 6, supra). In addition, while the
eurrent was swift at points between Fort Benton
and Three Forks, it was not so excessive as to pre-
clude navigation (R. 71) ; War Department exam-
inations revealed the swiftest current to be no more
- than five miles per hour (R. 71, Ex. 17(a) (1880),
p. 1474), less than at points in the Ohio River.”
The only serious obstructions between Fort Benton
and Three Forks, excepting the Falls section, were
Half-Breed and Beartooth Rapids and while there
are many accounts of actual passage through these
Rapids, no boat met with disaster here—a marked
contrast with the numerous wrecks which occurred
11 Roberts in his report compared conditions with those
on the Ohio River, saying:
At but few points is the current as swift as it
is in Glass-House Ripple, below Pittsburgh, where it
is over seven miles an hour at times, or as swift as it
is at Letart’s Falls, two hundred and thirty-two miles
below Pittsburgh. [R. 71, 1203-1204.]
ne a Rn ee
11
in the clearly navigable lower Missouri River (R.
71-72, 1008-1013).
The Commission further found that the charac-
teristics of the River were such that relatively
little improvement would be required to obtain
an unobstructed 2.5 foot channel permitting light-
draft navigation from Fort Benton to Belt Creek
below the falls and from the mouth of the Sun
River above the falls to Three Forks (R. 72). An
1880 War Department plan for improvement above
Great Falls would have provided a channel three
feet deep at low water from Great Falls to Cas-
cade and a 2.5 foot channel thence to Stubbs
Ferry; as finally revised in 1898, the cost of the
project of 130 miles was estimated as $213,646.50
(R. 72, Ex. 17(c) (1915), pp. 1896-1897). Simi-
larly, Roberts’ 1872 proposal for a narrow-gauge
rail link, including the cost of two steamers above
the Falls, was estimated at $247,800 (R. 72, 1195-
1199).
Improvements Above Fort Benton: In 1880,
Army Engineers expended about $15,000 for rock
removal and construction of wing dams at and
near Beartooth and Half-Breed Rapids (R. 73,
Ex. 17(a) (1881), pp. 1671-1672).’* Later, by the
River and Harbor Act of August 18, 1894 (28
12 Earlier, in 1878-1879, private operations by The Montana
Navigation Company had accomplished some removal of rocks
and construction of wing dams (Ex. 17(a) (1881), p. 1671;
R. 1250-1251).
12
Stat. 338, 358), Congress extended the upper
limits of the River under improvement to Stubbs
Ferry, directing that $20,000 be expended between
the Falls and Stubbs Ferry (R. 73-74). Between
1895 and 1899, $65,933.73 was expended in remov-
ing obstructions and constructing wing and closing
dams (R. 74, Ex. 17(c) (1915), pp. 1896-1897).
Operations were suspended in 1899 because of lack
of funds and absence of incentive to further im-
provement (R. 74, Ex. 17(c) (1915), p. 1897). Ap-
propriations for work above the Falls ceased with
the Act of June 3, 1896 (29 Stat. 202, 231-232)
(R. 74).
Congressional Assertion of Jurisdiction: Con-
gress authorized and directed surveys and exami-
nations of the River between Fort Benton and
Three Forks, and the resulting reports of the
Army Engineers consistently reflected its naviga-
ble status (R. 75, 1883-1393, Ex. 17(b) (1891), pp.
3733 et seq.; Ex. 17(b) (1894), p. 1780; Ex. 17(a)
(1880), pp. 1473-1474). Also in the River and Har-
bor Act of July 13, 1892 (27 Stat. 88), Congress
directed the War Department to make an exami-
nation of the River from Three Forks to Canyon
Ferry to determine at what points, if any, use
might be made of water power for manufacturing
or other purposes, ‘‘without unreasonably im-
pairing the navigability of that portion of said
river.’’ (R. 75) Furthermore, as already men-
tioned, supra, this page, Congress extended the up-
NE
e
13
per limits for improvement of the River to Stubbs
Ferry and appropriated funds for use in making
improvements (R. 75). In addition, Congress re-
peatedly recognized the Missouri River as a navi-
gable water of the United States in authorizations
for construction of dams at various points all the
way from Fort Benton to Three Forks, and in
each instance it made express provision for pro-
tection of interests of navigation.
B. Claimed Authorizations to Occupy Public
Lands. (a) Hauser: The Company’s claimed
authorization to oceupy public lands at Hauser
is based on two permits issued in 1907 to Helena
Power Transmission Company (Helena), the com-
pany which began construction of the Hauser Dam
in 1905 (R. 83). One permit was issued to Helena
in January 1907 by the Secretary of the Interior
for a right-of-way over certain of the public lands
involved ‘‘in accordance with the provisions of the
act of February 15, 1901—31 Stat. 790—and the
regulations present or future thereunder’’ (R. 83).
This permit contains no provision allowing its
transfer or assignment but in regulations ap-
proved by the Secretary of the Interior on Au-
gust 24, 1912 (41 L.D. 150, 170), it was provided
that a permit may be transferred upon conditions
there specified ‘‘and not otherwise’’ (R. 84). The
18 Act of February 20, 1907 (34 Stat. 912) ; Act of April 12,
1906 (34 Stat. 111) ; Act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat. 570) ; Act
of June 8, 1894 (28 Stat. 91) ; Act of June 3, 1896 (29 Stat.
202, 231-232).
RSET Py Ee
14
second permit was for the other public lands at
Hauser and was issued to Helena in March 1907
by the Department of Agriculture.’* This permit
on its face states that it ‘‘shall not be transferable’’
and is ‘‘terminable at the discretion of the For-
ester’? (R. 83). Succession to another’s benefits
under this permit required surrender of the origi-
nal permit whereupon the Agriculture Secretary
in his discretion might issue a new permit for the
remainder of the term (Regulation L-16. Use
Book, Department of Agriculture (1911) pp. 32-
33) (R. 85).
The Company acquired possession of these
permits in the following manner: In 1909, Helena
was merged with United Missouri River Power
Company which in 1906 had acquired all of its
capital stock (R. 83). Through a foreclosure sale
all of the assets of the United Missouri River
Power Company was acquired by the Missouri
River Electric and Power Company whose capital
stock was shortly thereafter in turn acquired by
the Butte Electric and Power Company (R. 83).
On December 12, 1912, the latter company and its
several wholly-owned subsidiaries, including Mis-
souri River Electric and Power Company, were
merged into The Montana Power Company, which
had been formed for that purpose (R. 83). In
14The Act of February 1, 1905 (33 Stat. 628) transferred
to the Secretary of Agriculture authority under the 1901
statute to issue such permits for use of lands within forest
reserves, See 36 L.D. 579, 581; 32 Op. A. G. 525, 527.
15
neither case was any effort made by the Company
to obtain the transfer of these permits to it in its
own name. Neither permit has been cancelled or
revoked; and the Company has paid the annual
rentals due on the Agriculture permit since its
organization in 1912, and on the Interior permit
since 1930, when such payments were first required
(R. 989-990).
(b) Hebgen: The Company’s claimed authoriza-
tion to occupy public lands at Hebgen is based on
two permits issued by the Secretary of Agriculture
in 1914 and 1915 respectively to the Montana Res-
ervoir and Irrigation Company (Reservoir Com-
pany) which had been organized in 1906 for the
purpose of constructing and operating Hebgen.
One permit issued to Reservoir Company under
the 1901 land-permit statute supra, p. 13, infra, pp.
37-38, was a Final Power Permit covering 13,415.5
acres of public land flooded by the Hebgen Res-
ervoir (R. 91-92); Article 4 of this permit ex-
pressly allows its transfer under conditions therein
specified ‘‘and not otherwise’’; no transfer could
be made without the prior approval of the Sec-
retary to whom was reserved the power to impose
upon the transferee ‘‘new and additional condi-
tions’’ (R. 92)."* The second Agriculture permit
15 The full text of Article 4 reads:
This Permit and the permission granted hereunder
to oceupy and use National Forest lands may be trans-
ferred to a new Permittee under the following condi-
tions, and not otherwise : The proposed transferee shall
- 16
was granted to Reservoir Company in October
1915 and covered an additional 84.5 acres of public
land occupied by a ‘‘camp site.’’ This permit
specifically provided that it ‘‘is not transferable”’
(R. 92). The Company acquired possession of
these permits in May 1934, when it acquired all of
Reservoir Company’s property in exchange for
the latter’s outstanding stock which the Company
had held since as early as 1916 (R. 92). Neither
of these permits has been revoked or cancelled,
nor has the Company sought or obtained the ap-
proval of the Secretary of Agriculture for their
transfer (R. 92). The Company, however, has
since 1935 paid the annual rentals due under the
Final Power Permit (R. 989).
ARGUMENT
1. (a) The Commission’s holding that the por-
tion of the Missouri River here involved is a
file with the District Forester of the District in which
the lands to be occupied are situated the decree, execu-
tion of judgment, will, proposed contract of sale, or
other written instrument upon which the proposed
transfer is based, or a properly certified copy thereof,
also an application by the proposed transferee in the
form of a stipulation binding the proposed transferee
to the performance of such new and additional condi-
tions expressed therein as the Secretary may deem
necessary ; and thereupon the Secretary may, in his
discretion, approve in writing the proposed transfer,
and after such approval the transferee shall succeed
to all the rights and obligations of the Permittee,
subject, however, to such new and additional condi-
tions as shall have been embodied in such stipulation
and so approved. [R. 1101-1102.]
Bracesenrse ew SRI ARE RE ie RNR te cae Sep RIO PLES LOLITE PRC L ELM SIGHT Sra tt i ae Bis ee
17
‘“‘navigable water’’ as defined in Section 3(8) of
the Act fully satisfies, we submit, the criteria for
determining navigability which are there set out
and which have been judicially applied prior to, as
well as in, United States v. Appalachian Power
Co., 311 U.S. 377. Clearly, even the upper Mis-
souri River is more navigable than portions of
the New River involved in the Appalachian case.
Section 3(8) of the Federal Power Act defines
‘navigable waters’’ as follows:
(8) ‘‘navigable waters’’ means those
parts of streams or other bodies of water
over which Congress has jurisdiction under
its authority to regulate commerce with
foreign nations and among the several
States, and which either in their natural or
improved condition notwithstanding inter-
ruptions between the navigable parts of
; such streams or waters by falls, shallows, or
rapids compelling land carriage, are used
I or suitable for use for the transportation
of persons or property in interstate or for-
eign commerce, including therein all such
interrupting falls, shallows, or rapids, to-
gether with such other parts of streams as
shall have been authorized by Congress for
; improvement by the United States or shall
have been recommended to Congress for
such improvement after investigation under
its authority;
As was stated in the Appalachian case, ‘‘use of
a stream long abandoned by water commerce is
ears eRe AoE EE PE OT prey YOSROLENS SEC tag am Binge ntconih Dt wy
18
difficult to prove by abundant evidence.’’ United
States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377,
416. The Commission however did find—and these
findings are supported by substantial evidence and
hence conclusive here (Section 313(b) of the Act)
—that the River was used for through transporta-
tion by Lewis and Clark in 1805 (supra, p. 7),
by Roberts, the Northern Pacific engineer, in 1872
(supra, p. 7), and by a commercial company
carrying gold miners back to the States from
Helena in the late 1860’s (supra, pp. 7-8).** The
16 The Company attacks the Commission’s finding as to the
use of the River for transportation of miners because based
principally on a historical treatise and contemporaneous disin-
terested newspaper advertisements, which, the Company
asserts, is inadmissible hearsay (Pet. 8-9; 29). But in recog-
nition of the great difficulty of proving ancient facts (cf.
United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377), this
Court has permitted the relaxation of common law rules of
evidence to permit the introduction of such trustworthy his-
torical materials. The Montello, 20 Wall. 430, 440-442 (his-
torical treatise and newspaper advertisements relied on to
establish ancient use of the River) ; Economy Light Co. v.
United States, 256 U.S. 118, 117; Arizona v. California, 283
U.S. 423, 453, fn. 3; 5 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd Ed.) Sees.
1422, 1597, 1598. Moreover, even if these materials were inad-
missible under the technical rules of evidence, the Commission
was not precluded from admitting such evidence (see Section
308(b) of the Act, 16 U.S.C. 825g(b) ; ef. Consolidated Edison
Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197, 229-230)
and from placing some reliance upon such evidence in arriving
at its conclusions when, as here, the Commission finds it to
be of substantial and probative value. Cf. Opp Cotton Mills v.
Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 155; Pennsylvania Water &
Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 123 F.2d 155
(C.A. D.C.), certiorari denied, 315 U.S. 806 ; Wisconsin Public
19
Commission also found that above the Great Falls
there had been substantial use of the River both
for commercial and pleasure boats as well as for
floating logs and lumber, and that below the Falls,
several steamboats had sailed almost up to the
Falls. These findings fully support the Commis-
sion’s finding of navigability based on actual use
(R. 67-68) for it is settled that the actual use of a
stream by any kind of vessel (The Montello, 20
Wall. 430, 442) or even for the floating of logs may
serve to establish its status as a navigable water
of the United States. United States v. Appalach-
tan Power Co., supra, at 405; Wisconsin Public
Service Corp. v. Federal Power Commission, 147
F, 2d 743, 747 (C.A. 7), certiorari denied, 325 U. S.
880. The fact that the River’s use for such trans-
portation was for but a short period of time and
has long since ceased is immaterial (Economy
Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U. 8. 113,
118, 123-4; Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 423,
453-4; United States v. Appalachian Power Co.,
supra, at 408), particularly where, as here, the use
of the River ceased because of the advent of the
railroads. United States v. Appalachian Power
Co., supra, at 413.
Also supporting the Commission’s conclusion
that the River was navigable is the finding that the
Service Corp. v. Federal Power Commission, 147 F.2d 743
(C.A. 7), certiorari denied, 325 U.S. 880; Georgia Power
Company v. Federal Power Commission, 152 F.2d 908
(C.A. 5).
20
River was suitable for use in interstate commerce
both in its natural and improved condition—the
second criterion of navigability set out in Section
3(8), supra, p. 17. This test is much broader than
“the actual use’’ test and embraces susceptibility
or capability of use for transportation and com-
merce whether or not there has been any actual
use. United States v. Utah, 283 U. &. 64, 82-3;
Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States,
supra, at 122, 123; The Montello, supra, at 441-3.
Here, the Commission considered the physical
characteristics of the River, set forth in the state-
ment (pp. 5-6, 9-11, supra), and pointed to a War
Department plan, finally revised in 1898, for pro-
viding a channel of not less than 2.5 feet deep at a
cost of $213,646.50, together with an inexpensive
narrow-gauge rail link around the falls (supra, p.
11). These findings, together with the finding
as to actual use of the River both above and below
the Falls, even assuming arguendo that use to have
been purely intrastate and non-commercial,”
clearly support the Commission’s conclusion
that with a land carriage around the Falls, the
River was suitable for use for purposes of com-
merce in a natural state or with reasonable low cost
17 “Nor is lack of commercial traffic a bar to a conclusion
of navigability where personal or private use by boats dem-
onstrates the availability of the stream for the simpler types
of commercial navigation.’’ United States v. Appalachian
Power Co., supra, at 416.
21
improvements (R. 72).’* Cf. The Montello, supra;
United States v. Appalachian Power Co., supra,
at 417-419.”
(b) The Company claims that since the Great
Falls preclude literal through use of the River and
thus prevent it from forming an unbroken high-
way, the portion of the River here involved could
not be a ‘‘navigable water’’ of the United States
(Pet. 3, 22). But while no stream can by itself con-
18 The Company suggests that the only useful improvement
would cost $1,300,000,000 and that at present such an under-
taking would be unjustified (Pet. 21-22). This project would
involve the improvement of the River from Sioux City, Iowa
(mile 768) to Three Forks to a commercial depth of nine feet
(see R. 73) which the Company’s experts characterized as
‘‘fantastie’’ (R. 661), ‘‘ridiculous’’ (R. 828), and ‘‘prepos-
terous’’ (R. 857). But, as pointed out in the text no such
elaborate improvement is necessary to make the portion of the
River here involved more easily usable by light-draft boats.
Moreover, the determination whether a navigation improve-
ment is justified is not restricted to an evaluation of
eurrent or prospective economic considerations and commer-
cial conditions, it being requircd only that there be a balance
between cost and need ‘‘at a time when the improvement would
be useful.’’ United States v. Appalachian Power Co., supra, at
407-408.
1 Also supporting the Commission’s conclusion is the evi-
dence of navigability in the authorizations by Congress for
improvements (supra, p. 12); Section 3(8) includes as
navigable waters:
* * * such other parts of streams as shall have been
authorized by Congress for improvement by the United
States or shall have been recommended to Congress
for such improvement after investigation under its
authority
The Commission’s reference to these authorizations to support
its conclusion is not, as the Company claims (Pet. 26), con-
22
stitute an unbroken highway if at any point a land
carriage or portage is necessary, such a condition
is not a prerequisite to a finding of navigability.
This is clear from the Act’s definition of ‘‘naviga-
ble waters’’ which expressly includes ‘‘all falls,
shallows, or rapids compelling land carriage’”’
where the stream is used or suitable for use de-
spite such interruptions between the navigable
parts. And this definition is in accord with estab-
lished principles. In The Montello, 20 Wall. 430,
this Court rejected the lower court holding that the
Fox River was not navigable by reason of ‘‘several
rapids and falls’’ and concluded that it had always
been navigable in fact, saying (20 Wall. at 442-
443):
the rule laid down by the district judge
as a test of navigability cannot be adopted,
for it would exclude many of the great
rivers of the country which were so inter-
rupted by rapids as to require artificial
means to enable them to be navigated with-
out break. Indeed, there are but few of our
fresh-water rivers which did not originally
present serious obstructions to an uninter-
rupted navigation.
In the Economy Light Co. case, the Court stated
that (256 U.S. at 122):
navigability, in the sense of the law, is
trary to Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574. Here, unlike
Oklahoma v. Texas, the inference of navigability from the im-
provements is not ‘‘overcome by the actual conditions disclosed
in the course of the work’’ (258 U.S. at 590) or, indeed, by
the other findings of the Commission.
esecrcriees Spe ae CARS NNER poe wail
be
23
not destroyed because the watercourse is in-
terrupted by occasional natural obstructions
or portages * * *.
And the Appalachian case declares that (311 U.S.
at 408-9) ‘‘There never has been doubt that the
navigability referred to in the cases was naviga-
bility despite the obstruction of falls, rapids, sand
bars, carries, or shifting currents.’’
In the instant case, the interrupting Falls cover
a 17-mile section, never navigated in fact, and
require a portage of about 18 miles (R. 69). But,
as shown supra, pp. 7-8, many trips along the River
were made via portage around the Falls. Such
an interruption does not sever the upper 214 miles
of the Missouri from the lower 2,244, but rather
is merely an obstruction notwithstanding which
the River was used as a continued highway in
interstate commerce at least as far upstream as
Stubbs Ferry. Cf. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557,
563; Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Federal
Power Commission, 123 F.2d 155, 161 (C.A.D.C.),
certiorari denied, 315 U.S. 806. It follows that the
presence of the Falls does not destroy the River’s
status as a navigable water of the United States.”
20 Even if the Act’s definition of navigable waters does not
fully correspond with established judicial criteria, Congress
clearly has the power, and the legislative history plainly indi-
cates that it intended to exercise it (H. Rep. No. 910, 66th
Cong., 2d Sess., p. 7), to regulate waters in such an interrupt-
ing reach of a navigable stream. Otherwise, its admitted power
to regulate lower navigable portions of the stream could be
destroyed through the location of obstructions in the inter-
rupting reach.
24
(¢) The Company finally claims that Congress
abandoned navigability of the upper Missouri
River when it passed the River and Harbor Act of
1935 (49 Stat. 1028) authorizing the construction
of the Fort Peck Dam located at mile 1869, about
375 miles below the Company’s lowermost develop-
ment, ‘‘in accordance with the plans recommended
in” H. Doe. No. 238, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. and
“subject to the conditions set forth in such docu-
ments’’ (49 Stat. 1028, 1034). The document re-
ferred to contained the District Engineer’s report,
which expressed opinions, upon which petitioner
relies, to the effect that the reservoir at Fort Peck
would render the section of the river from the Fort
Peck Reservoir site to Fort Benton, Montana, non-
navigable. House Doc. No. 238, 73rd Cong., 2d
Sess., pp. 268, 269 (Pet. pp. 5, 27).?"
But the congressional authorization adopted
only the plans and conditions specified in the
House Document, not the opinions of the District
Engineer, which apparently are not shared by his
superiors,” and which subsequent events have
21 The Company also points to the later authorization by
Congress of the ‘‘Pick-Sloan’’ plan, providing for additional
dams downstream; as these are constructed, the Company
argues, the head of navigation will be pushed farther down-
stream (Pet. 5).
2 The Chief of Engineers in concurring with the District
Engineer’s ‘‘general plan of improvement,’’ recommended
that ‘‘the reservoir at the site of Fort Peck be built to the
“=
25
shown to be incorrect.** The congressional au-
thorization to construct Fort Peck thus clearly
does not contain any explicit legislative declara-
tion which has traditionally been regarded as nec-
essary for surrendering sovereign authority in
regard to a matter of public concern. Brown v.
Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 195; Belmont Bridge v.
Wheeling Bridge, 138 U.S. 287, 292-293 ; Louisville
& Nashville R.R. v. Kentucky, 161 U.S. 677, 685-
686. When Congress has intended to declare a
stream not navigable in the past, it has done so
explicitly. Cf. Act of March 23, 1900, ¢. 88, 31
Stat. 50, and Act of February 27, 1915, c. 68, 38
Stat. 816, and other statutes collected in 33 U.S.C.
21-55.
Nor has the mere presence of a dam, although
without locks, prevented the courts from holding
maximum practicable capacity; and be operated primarily
for navigation.’’ House Doe. No. 238, supra, p. 12. In addition,
in the course of the Commission hearing, the Chief of Engi-
neers advised the Commission that, in the view of the Corps
of Engineers, the Missouri River is a navigable water of the
United States from Stubbs Ferry—if not Three Forks—to
its mouth, and that the construction of Fort Peck Dam had
not affected the jurisdiction of the War Department with
respect to the navigable status of the Missouri River above
that dam (R. 1648-1649).
23 The map contained in the petition (p. 10) shows that the
Fort Peck Dam has created a reservoir many miles in length
which may well have improved navigation above the dam. As
late as 1947, the Department of the Army reported that
“‘depths which will accommodate large boats are available
on the Fort Peck Reservoir and drafts of 22 inches are prac-
ticable from the reservoir to Fort Benton’’ (Ann. Rep. Chief
of Engineers (1947), p. 1541).
26
a stream to be navigable at and above the site of the
dam (Wisconsin Public Service Corp. v. Federal
Power Commission, 147 F.2d 743 (C.A. 7), certi-
orari denied, 325 U.S. 880; Pennsylvania Water
& Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 123
F.2d 155 (C.A.D.C.), certiorari denied, 315 U.S.
806), and the presence downstream of a barrier,
even if it be a licensed dam, has not barred the
conclusion that an upstream dam is located in a
navigable water (id. at 161). Interstate freight
may be carried on a dammed-up portion of a navi-
gable stream whether or not an uninterrupted
through passage on the river is possible. Cf. The
Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557. Moreover, Congress
has power to provide subsequently for passage
of boats or freight around the dam—or for that
matter to remove the dam—should future trans-
portation circumstances provide justification.
The dam thus does not deprive the stream of its
navigable status.
2. The Commission, we submit, properly held
that the Company’s occupancy of public lands at
its Hauser and Hebgen developments was not
“funder and in accordance with the terms of a per-
mit or valid right-of-way granted prior to June
10, 1920,’’ and hence not exempted, by the excep-
tion in Section 23(b), from the licensing require-
ments of the Act. Although permits sanctioning
the occupancy of these lands were issued by the
Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior prior to
— _
June 10, 1920,* these permits were issued not to
the Company but to the Company’s predecessors
in interest. Supra, pp. 14-16. Since these permits
were personal to the permittee [see Act of Feb-
ruary 15, 1901 (31 Stat. 790) (authorizing the
issuance of these permits); 36 L.D. 579, 580, 41
L.D. 150, 152; 532, 534 (Interior regulations) ; In
re Southern California Edison Company, 7 F.P.C.
Ann. Rep. (1927) 142, 147], as is plainly shown
on their face, supra, pp. 14-16, they could be trans-
ferred, if at all,”* to the Company only upon due
24 The Company’s claim that the Commission was without
power to pass upon these permits in the absence of the Secre-
taries of Agriculture and Interior (Pet. 6, 8) misconstrues
the Commission’s action. The Commission’s order does not
invalidate the permits but rather merely holds that in the
circumstances of this case the Company’s possession of these
permits does not operate to exempt these projects now operated
by it, rather than by the original permittees, from the licensing
requirements of the Act. Cf. National Labor Relations Board
v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261, 271;
National Incorice Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 309
U.S. 350. Moreover, although copies of the order fixing the
date of hearing as well as subsequent orders were sent to the
departmental Secretaries, no one from their Departments
sought to participate in the proceedings. Finally, as the court
below points out, ‘‘the Commission * * * adequately repre-
sented the United States therein. The Secretaries were at most
proper parties. Their failure to participate does not invalidate
the order.’’ (R. 1676.) Cf. Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310
U.S. 381, 403.
25 Although the Hauser-Agriculture permit stated on its
face that it ‘‘shall not be transferable’’ (see supra, p. 14),
the regulations of the Department of Agriculture permitted
succession, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Agri-
RRM aS tars MEO an Ese at
compliance with the procedure prescribed by the
issuing Secretaries. See, e.g., Section 19 of the
Interior Regulations, 41 L.D. 150, 170; 2° Forest
Service Use Book 1907, p. 43; 1908, p. 55, and 1911,
pp. 32, 33.*7 In these circumstances the Company’s
admitted failure to comply with the terms of the
permits by refusing to seek the approval of the
departmental Secretaries for such transfers (R.
culture. See fn. 27, infra. The Hebgen “‘camp site’’ permit
was not transferable, supra, p. 16.
6 Regulation 19 (41 L.D. 150, 170) provided a complete
mechanism of the transfer from one party to another:
A final permit may be transferred to a new per-
mittee under the following conditions and not other-
wise: The proposed transferee shall file with the
Director of the Geological Survey, Washington, D. C.,
the decree, execution of judgment, will, proposed
contract of sale, or other written instrument upon
which the proposed transfer is based, or a properly
certified copy thereof, also an application by the
proposed transferee in the form of an agreement bind-
ing the proposed transferee to the performance of
such new and additioral conditions expressed therein
as the Secretary may deem necessary ; and thereupon
the Secretary may, in his discretion, approve in writ-
ing the proposed transfer, and after such approval
the transferee shall succeed to all the rights and
obligations of the permittee, subject, however, to such
new and additional conditions as shall have been
embodies in such agreement and so approved.
27 Regulation L-16 of the Use Book, Department of Agri-
culture (1911) pp. 32-33, provided that:
Upon the presentation to the Secretary of Agri-
culture of certified copies of sale, lease, assignment,
execution of judgment, or other form of transfer of
29
1491)”* fully supports the Commission’s ruling
that the Company’s possession of these permits
does not operate to exempt its occupancy of public
lands at these developments from the licensing re-
quirements of the Act.
In addition, there is no merit to the Company’s
contention that since it had been closely affiliated
the properties or other right of the permittee in and
to the works constructed under a water-power permit
and of the water or other rights necessary to the
enjoyment of the use of said works, the said Secretary
may, in his discretion, upon the formal surrender of
the original permit and the filing of a stipulation
satisfactory to the said Secretary by the purchasers,
transferees, executors, successors, lessees, or assigns of
the original permittee, issue a new permit for the
unexpired term of the original permit to such pur-
chasers, transferees, executors, successors, lessees, or
assigns, authorizing him, it, or them to occupy and
use the lands of the United States specified in the
original permit for the purposes named in the
original permit.
See also supra, p. 15, fn. 15.
28 The reason for the Company’s failure to apply for the
transfer of these permits to it when it was organized in 1912
appears to have been that it desired to avoid ‘‘bringing the
company under new regulations promulgated in August 1912,
by the Secretary of the Interior, which Kelley [counsel for
one of the organizers] considered absurd and objectionable.
He stated that they required a permittee, at the request of
the Secretary of the Interior, to surrender the permit to the
United States or transfer it to such State or municipality as
the Secretary might designate. According to Kelley, compen-
sation to the company would be so limited as to exclude ‘going
concern,’ ‘contract’ and ‘undeveloped power site’ value.’’
(Re Montana Power Company, 4 F.P.C. 213, 228.)
Pande itd I ay Ak eter Ctctet hee Te eee Nae Sete
ra Se PLM Taek PES |
PRUNE PAER MIDE iL: —— y ee
30
with the permittees, it was beneficial owner of the
permits and hence, since it acquired the permits
by merger in the case of Hauser and by dissolution
of the permittee in the case of Hebgen, no transfer
requiring compliance with the departmental regu-
lations was involved. But the Company, having
evolved these corporate arrangements for its own
purposes, was not free to disregard them when it
suited its convenience and thereby to avoid com-
pliance with the departmental regulations. Cf.
Schenley Corp. v. United States, 326 U.S. 432, 437 ;
Moline Properties v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436;
Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 414. Furthermore,
the chain of possession of the Hauser permits in-
volved an acquisition by foreclosure which unques-
tionably involved a transfer (R. 998-999), supra, p.
14. Similarly, the acquisition of the Hebgen permit
was by way of exchange of the permittee’s prop-
erty for its outstanding property, which likewise
involved a formal transfer, supra, p. 16. Moreover,
the Company’s contention overlooks the personal
nature of the permits noted supra, p. 27, and the
broad scope of definition of transfer contained in
the regulations (supra, fn. 26, p. 28; fn. 27, pp. 28-
29). In re Southern California Edison Company, 7
F.P.C. Ann. Rep. (1927), pp. 142-149.
Nor is the Company’s position aided by cases
such as Seaboard Air Line Railway v. United
States, 256 U.S. 655 (Pet. 28), and Novo Trading
Corp. v. Comtmissioner of Internal Revenue, 113
Sa ee ee ee
31
F.2d 320 (C.A. 2) (Pet. 28), involving validity of
transfers of claims against the Government under
Rev. Stat. 3477. These cases do not hold that the
acquisition of a claim by merger does not involve a
transfer but merely that such a transfer is ex-
empted from the prohibitions of Rev. Stat. 3477.
Moreover, there is a fundamental distinction be-
tween the prohibition against transfer of claims
against the United States contained in Rev. Stat.
3477 and the regulation of a transfer of the privil-
ege granted by the departmental permits. That
privilege, conferring, as it does, substantial and
important benefits upon the named permittee, re-
quires in return, the undertaking of certain duties
and obligations for the fulfillment of which the
named permittee is looked to. To protect the public
interest and to insure the proper discharge of these
obligations, the departmental Secretaries certainly
are free to scrutinize every transfer of these per-
mits regardless how achieved.”®
Finally, the Company claims that the depart-
mental Secretaries recognized it as owner of the
permits and hence waived compliance with their
29 It is interesting to note that in the one instance (Holter)
in which the Company applied to the departmental Secretaries
for the transfer to it of the public land permit originally
issued to its predecessor in interest, the terms and conditions
of the permit then issued on April 22, 1920 (R. 1090) were
substantially more comprehensive than those in the permits
issued to its predecessor and reflected the public awareness of
the desirability of more complete control of hydroelectric
development upon the public domain (Ex. 6, R. 1072-1091).
-
i
32
regulations (Pet. 27-28). This claim is apparently
predicated on the Company’s payments of the
annual rentals due under the permits (Pet. 7-8).
Only in the case of the Hauser-Agriculture permit,
however, did the Company pay rentals prior to
June 10, 1920. Those payments were made to sub-
ordinate regional employees of the Agriculture
Department (R. 1542-1543), and there is no show-
ing that these employees were authorized to waive
compliance. United States v. City and County
of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 31-32; United States
v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 40. Petitioner paid
annual rentals on the Hauser-Interior permit only
after 1929 (supra, p. 15) and on the Hebgen
Final Power permit only after 1934 when it ac-
quired possession of this permit from the Res-
ervoir Company (supra, p. 16). By that time the
departmental Secretaries no longer had authority
to approve transfers of permits since that author-
ity had been withdrawn by the Federal Water
Power Act on June 10, 1920 (32 Op. A.G. 525) ;
hence the Secretaries’ acceptance of the Company’s
rental payments could not have operated as a
recognition of the Company as the permittee.
33
CONCLUSION
The holdings of the Commission are supported
by substantial evidence and are in accordance with
applicable law. There is no conflict of decisions.
The petition for a writ of certiorari should there-
fore be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
Puiiip B. PERLMAN,
Solicitor General.
NEWELL A. CLapp,
Acting Assistant
Attorney General.
Pau A. SWEENEY,
MELVIN RIcHTER,
HERMAN Marcuse,
Attorneys.
BRADFORD WF. Ross,
General Counsel.
WiLLarp W. GaTcHELL,
Assistant General Counsel.
Bernarp A. Foster, JR.,
Special Counsel.
FEDERAL PowEerR ComMMISSION.
Fepruary, 1951.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.