Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Borg-Warner Corp. v. United States
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1950
No. 475
BORG-WARNER CORPORATION, tw Its Own Ricur anv
As Successor TO THE Marvet Carspureter Company,
Petitioner,
THE UNITED STATES
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS
Cuarwes D. THamMet,
Lee |. Park,
FE. Weaver Myers,
CLareNcE F. RorHensure,
Counsel for Petitioner.
Hame., Park & SauNDERS,
Of Counsel.
INDEX
Suspsecr INpex
Petition for writ of certiorari
Opinion below and basis for suit
Summary statement of the matter involved
Jurisdictional statement
Question presented
Specification of errors to be urged
Reasons relied on for the allowance of the writ
1. The Lower Court ignored the clear man-
date of the Congress to determine the
amount ‘ Mquitably due.’’
2. The opinion of the lower court is in direct
conflict with all of the authorities on
‘Contracts Implied in Law.”’
(a) The law of ‘‘contraets implied in
law’’, (‘‘Quasi Contracts’’)
(b) The Court of Claims did not ap-
ply the principles of ‘*Con-
tracts implied in law.’’
(c) That the Court failed to apply
the principles of contracts im-
plied in law is evident from
numerous conclusions in the
opinion
Appendix A—Jurisdictional Act
Appendix B—House Report No. 890—76th Congress
TABLE oF Cases CITED
Altman’s Will, In re, 266 N.Y.S. 773
American LaFrance & Foamite Industries vy. Arling-
ton County, 192 S. BE. 758
American LaFrance Fire Engine Co. v. Borough of
Shenandoah, 115 F. 2d 866
Armstrong v. Weiss, 168 Mise. 653, 7 N.Y.S. 2d 26
Bicknell v. Garrett, 96 P. 2d 592
—2154
fn.
fn.
fn.
fn.
fn.
14
14
16
16
16
il
INDEX
Blue Creek Development Co. v. Howell, 101 W. Va.
748,
133 8 S. E. 699
Board of Com’rs of Decatur County v. Greensburg
Times, 19 N. E. 2d 459...
Board of Highway Com’rs v. C ity of Bloomington,
253 Ill. 164, 97 N. KE. 280
Brown’s Estate vy. Stair, 25 Colo. App. 140, 136 P.
— man V. Inde pe nde nt Se hool Dist. No.
City of Pella v.
1003
- S
Cameron v. idk 3 A. 2d 423...
Cascaden v. Magryta, 247 Mich, 267, 225 N. W. 511
734
Dysart v. Remington Rand, 32 F. Supp. 477
Edwards
o34,
30 P. 2d 225
Farmers State Bank of Amherst, In re, 289 N. W.
French v. Lewis and Clark County, 87 Mont. 448,
P. 4
Geo. B. Holman & Co. v. Graham, 165 Mise.
LS. 850
N.Y
i)
Fowler, 215 lowa 90, 244 N. W.
v. Surety Finance Co. of Seattle, 176 Wash.
io
Goodall vy. Warden's Adm’r, 280 Ky. 6382, 133 8S. W.
2d §
Graf v.
519,
M44
» 200
288
389, 300
Neith Coop. Dairy Products Ass'n, 216 Wis.
257 N. W. 618
Bards v. Burroughs, 251 Mich. 578, 232 N. W. 200
Hermann v. Gleason, 126 F. 2d 936
Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. St. (5 Casey) 465
Hylan v. Dewey, 73 P. 2d 1088
La - son V.
245 N. W. 627.
Mose s v. Macfarlan, 2 Burr. 1005
Olsen v. Independent and Consolidated School Dist.
No.
50, 220 N. W. 606. .
Towle-Jamieson Inv. Co., 187 Minn.
Philpott v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 2d 512, 36 P.
635
Porter Const. Co. v. Be rry, 1 36 Or. 80, 298 P. 179
Royal Indemnity Co. v. Sol Lustbader, Inc., 26 N.Y.S.
2d
298
368,
2d
Page
fn.
fn.
fn.
fn.
fn.
fn.
fn.
fn.
fn.
fn.
fn.
fn.
fn.
fn.
fn.
fn.
fn.
fn.
fn.
fn.
fn.
fn.
fn.
fn.
16
16
16
16
16
16
17
17
16
16
16
17
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
17
14
16
16
17
16
INDEX lil
Page
Schenley Distillers Corp. v. Kinsey Distilling Corp.,
136 I. 2d 350 . _ fn. 16
Snuth v. Cheboygan Stete Sav. Bank, 293 Mich. 131,
291 N. W. 249 fn. 16
Union Central Life Ins. Co. vy. Glasscock, ‘ 270 Ky. 750,
110 8S. W. 2d 681 fn. 16
United States v. Minnesota Mutual Investment Co.,
271 U. S. 212, 70 L. Ed. 911 ; fn. 16
Weatherly v. American Agr. Chemical Co., 16 Tenn.
App. 618, 65S. W. 2d 592... . fn. 17
Wilkes v. Stacy Williams Co., 179 So. 245 fn. 16
SratTuTes Cirep
Private Act No, 127, 76th Congress, approved August
4, 1939 ve 2
28 U.S.C. § 1255 Deno a . 9, fn. 9
Oruer AuTHorities Crrep
Ames, History of Assumpsit, 2 Harv. L. Rev. 64
(1888-89) fn. 16
17 Corpus Juris Secundum, Contracts, See. 6 (1939) fn. 16
45 TLL.R. 1383, ** Change of Position”’ fn. 17
Keener, Law of Quasi Contracts 16 (1893) fn. 16
1 Mo. Law 223, ‘‘Scope of Restitution and Unjust En-
richment’’ . fn. 17
Restatement of the Law of Contracts, See. 5 (1932) — fn. 16
Thurston, Cases on Restitution fn. 16
Williston on Contracts (Rev. Ed. Williston and
Thompson) See. 3 (1936) fn. 16
eyes “The Law of Quasi Contracts’’ (1913)
(See. 4(2)) _. 15
Wright ‘*The Study of Law”’, 54 Law icine Rev.
185 at 195 fn. 16
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1950
No. 475
BORG-WARNER CORPORATION, ty Its Own Ricur anp
AS Successor To THE Marven Carsureter Company,
in Petitioner,
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS
To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court of the United States:
The petitioner prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to
review the judgment of the United States Court of Claims
which was entered in the above cause on May 1, 1950, and
became final by the denial of a motion for new trial on
November 2, 1950.
Opinion Below and Basis for Suit
The Opinion of the Court of Claims (R. 11 to 39) is
reported in 117 Ct. Cls. 1, 89 Fed. Supp. 1013. Suit was
SARITA A LTA TG Mie le
2
brought under Private Act No. 127, 76th Congress, approved
August 4, 1939."
Summary Statement of the Matter Involved
Petitioner is an Illinois corporation, incorporated May
9, 1928. Marvel Carbureter Company was incorporated
under the laws of Illinois on May 14, 1927, as the suecessor
in interest of an Indiana corporation of the same name
which had been incorporated on November 8, 1908. On
June 5, 1928, all of Marvel’s stock was acquired by peti-
tioner and on July 24, 1936, petitioner acquired all of
Marvel’s assets and assumed all of its liabilities (R. 11,
12).
Marvel’s principal business was the manufacture and
sale of carburetors on a mass production basis (R. 15).
In 1926, Marvel and one Chandler, who had a patent for
a fuel pump or injector (hereinafter sometimes referred
to as the Chandler injector) entered into a contract which
provided for Chandler’s employment by Marvel and gave
Marvel a license under Chandler’s patent (R. 14, 15). In
the early spring of 1927, Marvel terminated this agreement
with Chandler by giving him thirty days’ notice in writing
(R. 17). Shortly prior thereto, a representative of the
United States Air Corps at MeCook Field, Dayton, Ohio,
had visited the Marvel plant at Flint, Michigan, and had
been shown the Chandler injector. Accordingly, when
Marvel decided to discontinue the development work on the
injector, its Chief Engineer advised the Air Corps as fol-
lows (R. 17):
‘“‘We are writing to advise that we have decided to
discontinue the development work on the fuel injection
1A complete copy of the Act is attached as Appendix A, and a copy of
the report of the Committee on Claims of the House of Representatives on
the Act, (to which is appended the Senate Report on the Act), is attached
as Appendix B. (See R. 13.)
3
device that the writer showed you at the time of your
visit to our plant some six or eight weeks ago.
‘It occurred to the writer that your department
might be interested in making some arrangement with
Mr. M. G. Chandler, who is now at liberty to consider
something of this character as he has been uncondi-
tionally released from the arrangement with us.’’
Chandler met with the Air Corps’ representatives at
MeCook Field on June 28, 1927. He went there on his own
behalf and not on behalf of Marvel. His objective was to
interest the Air Corps in building fuel injection devices
that. he would undertake to design but found that the Air
Corps was interested only in developing sources of supply
for such devices. Capt. T. E. Tillinghast, Chief of the
Power Plant Branch at MeCook Field, in turn requested
Chandler to secure the cooperation of Marvel in such a
project (R. 17).
Marvel cooperated by reemploying Chandler and deliv-
ering a device in August 1927. In November 1927 the
device was subjected to bench tests with satisfactory re-
sults (R. 18).
By November 1929 the Air Corps considered the device
of such importance that on November 28, 1929, it wrote
Marvel as follows (R. 18, 19, and Appendix B, pp. 28, 36):
‘1. With regard to the above development, it is
the desire of the Division to impress on the Marvel
Carbureter Company the desire or demand for develop-
ing this project with the utmost haste.
‘*4. The object of this letter is to advise Marvel Car-
bureter Company of the extreme importance at this
time of the fuel metering pump development and to
request that, if possible, this project be given first
priority in your experimental work.”’ (Italics supplied.)
goer NPE OIRLE TH
4
From the early part of 1930 through February 1936,
great interest was shown in this development by engine
manufacturers, airplane companies, foreign governments
and their agents, brokers, ete. (R. 31). .
On October 29, 1930, the Air Corps wrote Marvel’s presi-
dent in confirmation of agreements reached at a prior
conference which included, among other things, the fol-
lowing (R. 19, 20, and Appendix B, pp. 28, 37, 38):
‘*(a) That from a financial and development stand-
point, the Materiel Division has been largely involved
in the general development of the fuel charger, and
that the Division’s future plans and policies in con-
nection with new engine development are obviously
dependent, to a great extent, on the satisfactory com-
pletion of this equipment ;
‘*(b) That in view of the above the Division feels
that the Marvel Carbureter Company owes its first
allegiance to the Division in such development, man-
ufacture and deliveries;
‘*(e) That development and manufacture of equip-
ment for the Wright R-1820 and the Curtiss Vee engines
be given priority over any other project, and that this
work be expedited with all possible speed;
‘“(d) That no other work in this connection be under-
taken which could curtail the above development in
any sense of the word;
‘“(e) That foreign or domestic development or sales
be delayed until such time as the Army agrees that
they will not affect procurement necessary for the
Air Corps needs ;’’ (Italics supplied).
A few months later, however, the Air Corps apparently
decided that this agreement with Marvel was not enough
protection. By letter dated March 21, 1931, Brigadier Gen-
eral Pratt, who had complete authority over the Wright
5
Field procurement division, notified Marvel as follows (R.
20; also Appendix B, pp. 28, 29, 38, 39):
‘“* * * the Division, therefore, has classified all
documents, technical data, reports and devices per-
taining to this development as ‘Secret’, which precludes
demonstration and/or manufacture of it abroad. It
also limits the commercial use of this device in the
United States to specific applications which meet with
the approval of the War Department. The Materiel
Division undertook this development with this under-
standing.’’? (Italics supplied.)
In imposing these restrictions, however, General Pratt
also apparently recognized that prolonged restriction could
seriously injure Marvel because the same notice, after call-
ing attention to the general policy with respect to restrict-
ing sales of equipment of military value, said: (R. 21, and
Appendix B, p. 39)
“* * * Tn this particular case, however, it is
believed that the Air Corps will be compensated for
its support of this development if the release is with-
he'd until the completion of a satisfactory Service
Test.’’ (Italics supplied)
Such a Service Test appears to have been completed some
time prior to August 8, 1934, because an Air Corps’ report
of a conference on that date stated (R. 22, 23, and Appendix
B, pp. 29):
*In September 1933 the “Secret” classification was removed from cor-
respondence, telegrams, ete. but left applicable to “drawings, technical re-
‘ports, specifications” ete. (R. 21); in April 1934 the “Seeret” status on
“specifications, drawings and reports” was changed to “Confidential” with
“secrecy” still applicable to “foreign and domestic sales” (R. 22); in
January 1936 the Air Corps advised Marvel that “this development is
still classified as a seceret project in this Division” (R. 29); in Deeem-
ber 1937 the Assistant Secretary of War advised Marvel that the develop-
ment of this injector by the Air Corps was no longer in a “secret status”
(BR. SE).
6
‘3. In response to an inquiry as to what their pro-
cedure should be relative to the further developmen‘
of this device for use on the 14-cylinder engine, it was
suggested that the project be reconsidered and that
the Air Corps would prefer to work through the engine
manufacturers. This is particularly true in view of
the fact that service tests and the development thus
far had definitely established a military characteristic
for the fuel charger; * * *.’’® (Italics supplied)
But despite the completion of the service test the release
was not fortheoming.t The reason apparently was that the
injector was too valuable to the Air Corps. Under date of
January 14, 1935, the Chief of the Air Corps wrote to the
Chief of the Materiel Division of the Air Corps as follows
(R. 27, also Appendix B, pp. 31, 42):
‘1. In the light of such information as has been
forwarded the Chief of Air Corps, the Marvel fuel
injection system and its application to aviation is a
marked advance. It is superior to any similar effort
that has come to his attention. Its possession promises
to be of great advantage to the Army Air Corps. In
case of an emergency the utilization of this device may
contribute greatly to the superiority of Army equip-
ment over that of an aggressor. It, therefore, is desir-
able that this important device be held for the exclu-
sive use of the armed forces of the United States as
long as such an advantage can be enjoyed. Release for
domestie and export sales cannot be granted at this
time.’’*® (Italics supplied)
3 It will be noted, however, from the Appendix B, p. 36, that a 14 eylinder
injector was ordered from Marvel on June 29, 1935.
4 Although many times requested (R. 24, 28).
5 The Materiel Division of the Air Corps had recognized, in an inter-
office communication, the unfairness to Marvel of the continued restric-
tions. In a letter dated October 3, 1934, to the Chief of the Air Corps,
the Division said (R. 25, 26, Appendix B, pp. 30, 31, 41):
“4. The present status of the fuel injector, insofar as this Division
is concerned, is that the Marvel Carbureter Company has the only
7
Concurrently the great value of the injector to the War
Department, and its continued interest therein, were evi-
denced by the publication of its plans for much greater use
of the injector in its airplane engines. Under date of
December 21, 1934, the War Department published a report
which stated, among other things: (R. 26, 27)
‘It has been tentatively planned that all engines
procured after July 1, 1935, for single engined air-
planes, will be equipped with fuel injection accom-
plished to meet the requirements of Specification
28169,”" *
cs * " The services rendered by Mr. M. G.
Chandier, the inventor of the injector which was de-
veloped and promoter of many valuable related ideas,
and his co-worker, Mr. W. J. Cooke, were beyond
evaluation in assuring the success of this project.’’
Marvel received no orders from the government for
injectors atfer June 1935 (Appendix B, p. 36)® and having
injector which can be approved for installation on Air Corps equip-
ment at this time. However, it is anticipated that within a year or
so, Eclipse Aviation Corporation, and possibly United American Boseh
Corporation and Wright Aeronautical Corporation, will have devel-
oped their injectors to the point where they will be satisfactory.
* * * * * * *
“7, * * © From the above it is apparent that one of two things
should be done in eases of this kind: (a) Allow the manufacturer to
eel his product when he wishes, (b) Pay full development costs.
°*
*8 Also prior to August 31, 1934, the Air Corps had advised engine
manufacturers as follows (R. 24, 25):
“1. It is contemplated that for F.Y. 1936, all engine designs for
single-engine tactical airplanes shall incorporate fuel injection ©s an
integral part. At the present time, an approved type of fuel injector is
manufactured by the Marvel Carbureter Company of Flint, Michi-
gan.”
® Subsequent orders were for parts and services (R. 30, 31).
_—————
8
completed all of its contracts with or for the government,
Marvel was compelled to close down the Chandler project at
the end of 1936 (R. 30, 31).
While Marvel’s device was subject to security restric-
tions, which prevented Marvel from exploiting it commer-
cially, the so-called floatless carburetor’’ was perfected.
This device eliminated the difficulties formerly existing in
carburetors and superseded fuel injection systems (R. 33).
T, United States received valuable benefits from the
development. Such benefits included the ‘*know-how’’ of
fuel injection systems used for aeronautical purposes (R.
33), and the basic data necessary for the formulation of per-
formance specifications for fuel injection systems which were
available for, and were used in obtaining, fuel injection
devices used on the famous b-29 airplanes during World
War Il. In addition, the Army Air Corps received a fur-
ther indirect but extremely valuable benefit through the
stimulation given to the carbuetor manufacturing concerns,
(Appendix B, pp. 32, 43) as a result of which they were able
to overcome the difficulties inherent in the conventional
carburetor when used for aviation purposes and to perfect
the so-called ‘‘floatless carburetor.’’ In the meantime, it
had the great benefit of maximum security in that it had the
exclusive possession of a device which was superior to any
similar effort that it knew about and which it thought
would ‘contribute greatly to the superiority of army equip-
ment over that of an aggressor’? (R. 27). In addition,
respondent saved development costs by having the develop-
ment work done by Marvel.
The lower Court did not find the amount of petitioner’s
loss but, for the purpose of its decision, apparently assumed
7 Although the projeet was closed down, Marvel still had to furnish re-
placement parts for, and service certain devices which had been deliv-
ered prior to 1937. The parts were on hand when the project was closed
down (R. 31).
ail
9
that Marvel expended a sum ‘‘largely in excess of the
amount received from the Air Corps and the Navy”’ (R. 36).
It is petitioner’s contention that these facts establish
a contract implied in law in that respondent ‘‘received a
benefit’? the retention of which, without restitution, would
be inequitable.
Jurisdictional Statement
The judgment of the Court of Claims was entered on
May 1, 1950 (R. 38). A Motion for New Tria! was filed on
May 22, 1950, and denied on October 2, 1950 (R. 39). The
jurisdiction of the Court is invoked under the Special Juris-
dictional Act, under which this suit was brought, and See-
tion 1255 of Title 28 U.S.C. That Jurisdictional Act pro-
vides for review ‘‘as in the ease of claims over which such
Court has jurisdiction under Section 145 of the Judicial
Code, as amended.’’ *
Question Presented
The fundamental question in this ease is whether or not
the Court of Claims, after it had been delegated jurisdic-
tion by the Congress to determine the amount equitably due,
notwithstanding any limitation on its jurisdiction with
respect to claims upon contracts implied in law, ean never-
theless ignore the mandate of the Congress and refuse to
apply equitable principles applicable to contracts implied
in law.
*See Appendix A. Effective June 30, 1926, the Congress consolidated
and codified the general and permanent laws of the United States in force
on December 7, 1925. Sueh laws ineluded Section 145 of the Judicial
Code which provided for jurisdiction of the Court of Claims and the
Act of February 13, 1925, whieh provided for review on certiorari of
cases over whieh the Court of Claims had jurisdiction. In the said eon-
solidation and codifieation, Section 145 of the Judicial Code and the Act
of February 13, 1925, were eodified as Sections 250 and 288, respectively,
of Title 28 U.S.C. Under Chapter 646 of Publie Law 773, 80th Con-
gress, 2nd Session, the said Sections 250 and 288 were enacted into law
as Sections 1491 and 1255, respectively, of Title 28 U.S.C.
EES SEIS BO AIP H.
Cae
10
The Jurisdictional Act authorized the Court of Claims
to ‘render judgment in such amount as it deems may be
equitably due, notwithstanding
upon the jurisdiction of such court with respect to claims
upon any contract implied in law, upon the claim of’’ peti-
tioner in its own right and as successor to Marve ‘‘against
the United States in connection with the development of
fuel injection systems for use on military aircraft; pro-
vided, however, that such damages shall not exceed the
actual moneys expended by the said Borg-Warner Corpora-
tion and the Marvel Carbureter Company in connection
with this said development during the calendar years 1927
to 1936 inclusive.’’®
* * any limitation
Suit was brought under this Act and petitioner submits
that the lower Court erred in failing and refusing to deter-
mine the amount ‘‘equitably due’’ without regard to any
limitation on the Court’s jurisdiction with respect to claims
‘‘upon any contract implied in law.’’
Specification of Errors to Be Urged
The Court of Claims erred:
1. In completely ignoring the mandate of the Congress to
determine the amount ‘‘equitably due”’
Jurisdictional Act.
2. In failing and refusing to determine the amount
‘equitably due’’ without regard to ‘‘any limitation upon the
jurisdiction of such Court with respect to claims upon any
contract implied inlaw * * ®.”’
3. In considering the matter only from the standpoint
of the legal rights and remedies of the parties arising from
their contractual relations as distinguished from equitable
rights, contrary to the obvious intent of the Congress in
passing the Jurisdictional Act.
as provided in the
®See Appendix A,
11
4. In deciding the issue in this case upon the basis of
principles applicable in cases involving contracts expressed
or implied in fact, and in failing and refusing to apply the
well-established principles of ‘‘quasi contracts’? or ‘‘con-
tracts implied in law.”’
9. In failing to consider whether, under all the facts,
respondent had received a benefit the retention of which,
without restitution, would be inequitable.
6. In concluding that respondent was not liable because
‘there was no representation by the Air Corps that it would
reimburse the Marvel Company for its loss in case it did not
sell enough of the devices to cover the cost of develop-
s910
ment, a proper basis for the denial of a contract in fact
but not a contract ‘implied in law.”’
7. In concluding that respondent was not liable because
‘nothing was done from which the Marvel Company had
any right to conelude that the Air Corps would reimburse
it for any loss it might ineur,’’' a proper basis for the
denial of a contract in fact but not a contract ‘implied
in law.’’
8. In concluding that respondent was not liable because
‘‘there was never an intimation that it [the Air Corps |
would guarantee the company against loss,’?™ a proper
basis for the denial of a contract in fact but not a contract
‘implied in law.’’
9. In concluding that respondent was not liable because
it ‘*did not expressly or impliedly promise to continue to
purchase these devices if a better one became available, nor
did it delude plaintiff into believing it would,’ ™ a proper
basis for the denial of a contract in fact but not a contract
‘implied in law.”’
10'Op. RB. 36.
11Qp. R. 36.
2 Op. R. 36.
Op. R. 37.
a be ‘
ead eas dite aetna EOE a
Sie ARR ad)
& ASN RAISES ie AAS RITA Spe REL Ee
12
Reasons Relied On for the Allowance of the Writ
1. THE LOWER COURT IGNORED THE CLEAR MANDATE OF
THE CONGRESS TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT “EQUI-
TABLY DUE.”
It is clear from the Committee Reports, that a fairly
complete record of the dealings between the pa rties and the
War Department’s inter-office communications with re-
spect to the Chandler Fuel Injector project was submitted
to the Congress in a letter dated March 28, 1939, from the
Secretary of War to the Chairman of the Committee on
Claims, United States Senate. This letter is incorporated
in and made a part of the Report which states:
“The facts are fully set forth in the following let-
ter from the Secretary of War which is appended hereto
and made a part of this report’? (See Appendix B,
p. 33).
The original Bill in the Senate included a provision which
would have authorized the Court to render judgment for
such sum as it might have found to be equitably due for
the ‘“‘taking and impounding’’ under the Espionage Act
of all matters pertaining to the development of fuel injee-
tion systems for use on military aircraft (Appendix B, p.
43). The Secretary of War objected to this provision but
did not object to a determination that the government was
‘morally and equitably liable.’’ After a detailed recita-
tion of the facts, the Secretary summed up the position of
the War Department as follows:
““So far as the War Department is informed, the
Marvel Carbureter Co. did everything in its power
to maintain secreey concerning the fuel-injector de-
velopment. In other words, it did not violate the
Espionage Act. But it is the view of the War Depart-
ment that a compliance with a criminal statute should
not create a claim against the Government. Under
the Neutrality Act a license must be secured from the
13
Secretary of State to export certain implements of
war. Would the Congress recognize a claim for lost
profits occasioned by the refusal to grant a license to
export implements of war?) The recognition of such
a claim would appear to be contrary to public policy.
So in this case it is the view of the War Department
that the claim should not be based upon any alleged tak-
ing or impounding under the Espionage Act.
‘*The only question is whether, under all of the facts,
the Government is morally and equitably liable for
money expended by the Marvel Carbureter Co. in the
development of fuel chargers which has not been re-
covered by the sale of the developed product.
‘*As so limited the War Department has no objection
to the reference of the matter to the Court of Claims
for determination.’’ (Italics supplied.)
The Congress accordingly eliminated the provision to
which the Secretary objected and directed the Court of
Claims to render judgment in ‘‘such amounts as it deems
ete. and, for the purpose of this
%°9
may be equitably due
case, removed the limitation on the jurisdiction of the
Court with respect to claims on ‘‘contracts implied in law.*’
The War Department had considered petitioner’s claim
only from the standpoint of legal rights and remedies.
Without the Jurisdictional Act, petitioner obviously had no
remedy in equity or on a contract implied in law because
the United States had not consented to be sued in any Court
on such a cause of action. The Congress took note of this
situation, as evidenced by the following quotation from
Senate Report No. 314 (Appendix B, p. 33):
“The War Department held the claim untenable, con-
sidering the matter only from the standpoint of legal
rights and remedies of the parties arising from their
contractual relations as distinguished from equitable
rights.’’
A Rhu SSF ee hte CREE EH
14
It is clear from the above that the Congress must have
felt that the government was ‘‘morally and equitably liable’’
and that it intended to give the Court a mandate to de-
termine the amount, if any, by which the money expended
by Marvel exceeded its sales ‘‘of the developed product.’’
The lower Court not only failed to determine the amount
of such excess but also, like the War Department had done
before the Jurisdictional Act was passed, considered ‘‘the
matter only from the standpoint of legal rights and remedies
of the parties arising from their contractual relations as
distinguished from equitable rights.’’ The entire rationale
of the lower Court’s Opinion is devoted to the question of
the legal rights and remedies of the parties arising from
their contractual relations. Nowhere in the Opinion are
any moral or equitable considerations mentioned, Petitioner
respectfully submits, therefore, that the lower Court ig-
nored the clear mandate of the Congress.
2, THE OPINION OF THE LOWER COURT IS IN DIRECT CON-
FLICT WITH ALL OF THE AUTHORITIES ON “CON-
TRACTS IMPLIED IN LAW.”
(a) The law of ‘‘contracts implied in law,”’ (‘Quasi Con-
tracts’’)
Lord Mansfield’s opinion in the ease of Moses v. Macfar-
lan, 2 Burr. 1005, decided by the Court of King’s Bench in
1760 may be said to mark the emergence of ‘‘quasi con-
tract’’ or ‘‘contract implied in law’’ as a distinct species
of common law obligation which have been enforced ever
since. He said:
“* * * But it lies for money paid by mistake; or
upon a consideration which happens to fail; or for
money got through imposition (express, or implied) ;
or extortion; or oppression; or an undue advantage
taken of the plaintiff’s situation, contrary to laws made
15
for the protection of persons under those circumstances.
In one word the gist of this kind of action is, that the
defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged
by the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the
money.’ (Italies supplied.)
More recently the principles of quasi contracts and their
origin were succinctly summarized by Professor Woodward
in his book ‘*The Law of Quasi Contracts’’ (1913) (See.
4(2)):
“Quasi contracts distinguished from contracts.—
Only within the last generation have quasi contractual
obligations been commonly so called. They were
formerly regarded as a species of contract, and to
distinguish them from express contracts, and con-
tracts implied in fact, i. e. contracts in which a promise
is inferred from conduct, were called contracts implied
inlaw. Since, like contracts proper, they were enforeed
by means of the action of assumpsit, it is not surpris-
ing that in a period when more importance was at-
tached to the forms of legal remedies than to the nature
of substantive rights, the essential dissimilarity of the
two obligations was not observed. The persistent fail-
ure to recognize it, however, has resulted in confusion
and error, and in many cases has wrought serious in-
justice. It cannot be too strongly emphasized, there-
fore, that quasi contracts are in no sense genuine con-
tracts. The contractor’s obligation is one that he has
voluntarily assumed. He is bound because he has
made a promise or undertaking that the law will en-
force. And the only difference between an express
contract and a contract implied in fact is that in the
former the promise or undertaking is verbal, while
in the latter it is an implication of the promisor’s
conduct. But quasi contractual obligations are im-
posed without reference to the obligor’s promise—it
may be that he has explicitly refused to promise—but
So Wise at haere,
3 RG OO Re NAL at Oe
16
because he has received a benefit the retention of which
would be inequitable.’’** (Italics supplied.)
(b) The Court of Claims did not apply the principles of
‘Contracts implied in law”’
Petitioner submits that the Court of Claims failed to
observe in this case ‘‘the essential dissimilarity of the two
obligations’’ and, in so doing, ‘thas wrought serious injus-
tice.’’
The Court starts its Opinion by noting that the Juris-
dictional Act in this case is different from the Jurisdic-
tional Acts in other exceptional cases in that it gave the
14 See also Williston on Contracts (Rev. Ed. Williston and Thompson)
Sec. 3 (1936); Restatement of the Law of Contracts, See. 5 (1932);
Keener, Law of Quasi Contracts 16 (1893), Ames, History of Assumpsit,
2 Harv. L. Rev. at 64 (1888-89); Thurston, Cases on Restitution; 17 Cor-
pus Juris Secundum, Contraets, See. 6 (1939); Wright “The Study of
Law,” 54 Law Quarterly Rev. 185 at 195; United States v. Minnesota
Mutual Investment Co., 271 U. S. 212 at 217, 70 L. ed. 911, 913; Schen-
ley Distillers Corp. v. Kinsey Distilling Corp., 136 F. 2d 350; Philpott
v. Superior Court (Sup. Ct. Cal.), 1 Cal. 2d 512, 36 P. 2d 635; Hermann
v. Gleason, 126 F. 2d 936; American LaFrance Fire Engine Co. v. Bor-
ough of Shenandoah, 115 F. 2d 866; Olsen v. Independent and Consoli-
dated School Dist. No. 50 of St. Louis County (Sup. Ct. Minn.), 220
N. W. 606; Board of Highway Com’rs. Bloomington Tp. v. City of Bloom-
ington, 253 Ill. 164, 97 N. E. 280; Brown’s Estate v. Stair, 25 Colo. App.
140, 136 P. 1003; In re Farmers State Bank of Amherst, 289 N. W. 75;
Goodall v. Warden’s Adm’r, 280 Ky. 632, 133 S. W. 2d 944; Bruggeman
v. Independent School District No. 4, Union Tp., Mitchell County, 289
N. W. 5; Board of Com’rs of Decatur County v. Greensburg Times, 19
N. E. 2d 459; rehearing denied 20 N. FE. 2d 647; Bicknell v. Garrett, 96
P. 2d 592; Hardy v. Burroughs, 251 Mich. 578, 232 N. W. 200; Geo. B.
Holman & Co. v. Graham, 165 Mise. 389, 300 N.Y.S. 850; Union Central
Life Ins. Co. vy. Glasscock, 270 Ky. 750, 110 S. W. 2d 681; Wilkes v.
Stacy Williams Co., 179 So, 245; American LaFrance d Foamite Indus-
tries v. Arlington County, 192 8S. E. 758; Hyland vy. Dewey, 73 P. 2d
1038; Armstrong v. Weiss, 168 Mise. 653, 7 N.Y.S. 2d 26; Cameron, to
Use of Cameron v. Eynon, 3 A. 2d 423; Royal Indemnity Co. vy. Sol Lust-
bader, Inc., 26 N.Y.S. 2d 328; Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. St. (5 Casey)
465; Smith v. Cheboygan State Sav. Bank, 293 Mich. 131, 291 N SY. 249;
Dysart v. Remington Rand, 32 F. Supp. 477; Graf v. Neith Coop. Dairy
Products Ass'n, 216 Wis. 519; 257 N. W. 618; Blue Creek Development
Co. v. Howell, 101 W. Va. 748; 133 S. E. 699; Edwards v. Surety Finance
17
Court ‘‘jurisdiction to render judgment on any contract
‘implied in law’ between plaintiff and defendant.’’ The
Court then says: (R. 35)
‘‘This is the issue: Was there a contract implied in
law?”?
But the context of the Opinion from there on clearly
indicates that the Court fell into the error against which
Professor Woodward warned (see page 15, supra) because
despite its correct statement of the question, the Opinion
appears to be concerned primarily with the following ques-
tions:
1. Whether respondent had promised to “reimburse
the Marvel Company for its loss’’ (R. 36).
2. Whether there was any intimation that the govern-
ment would ‘‘guarantee the company against loss”
(R. 36).
3. Whether the government expressly or impliedly
promised ‘‘to continue to purchase these devices if a
better one became available’? or ‘‘deluded plaintiff
into believing it would’’ (R. 37).
4. Whether a ‘‘contract implied in law can arise
from the designation of this device, documents and
data, as seeret. (R. 37).
The first three bear on whether there was a contract ex-
pressed or implied in fact. They have no bearing whatsoever
on the question involved herein, namely, whether there was
a “quasi contract’? or a ‘‘contract implied in law’ for as
all of the authorities agree such ‘obligations are imposed
Co. of Seattle, 176 Wash. 534, 30 P. 2d 225; Weatherly v. American Agr.
Chemical Co., 16 Tenn. App. 613, 65 S. W. 2d 592; Porter Const. Co. v.
Berry, 136 Or. 80, 298 P. 179; In re Altmann’s Will, 266 N.Y.S. 773;
French v. Lewis and Clark County, 87 Mont. 448, 288 P. 455; Lamson v.
Towle-Jamieson Inv. Co., 187 Minn. 368, 245 N. W. 627; Cascaden v.
Magryta, 247 Mich. 267, 225 N. W. 511; City of Pella v. Fowler, 215
Iowa 90, 244 N. W. 734; see also, Article on Quasi Contracts “Change of
Position,” 45 H.L.R. 1333; Article on “Seope. of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment,” 1 Mo, Law 223.
serie
18
without reference to the obligor’s promise—it may be that
he has explicitly refused to promise—but because he has
received a benefit the retention of which would be inequi-
table.’’ See pp. 15, 16, supra.
The fourth reason for the Court’s conclusion as listed
above, is simply a restatement of the position taken by the
Secretary of War in objecting to the provision in the origi-
nal Bill authorizing the Court to render judgment for a
‘‘taking and impounding’’ under the Espionage Act of all
matters pertaining to the development of the Chandler fuel
injector. This provision was eliminated in the final Bill.
(See page 13, supra) Consequently, no claim could be, or
ever was, predicated upon the imposition of the security
restrictions by the War Department. The basis for claim
under the Jurisdictional Act is that respondent received a
benefit for which, in view of the circumstances, it should
make restitution.
The security restrictions represented one of the cireum-
stances but, without express Congressional authority, could
not constitute a basis for a cause of action. Had the origi-
nal Bill been passed, the cause of action would have been for
the taking of plaintiff’s property without regard to the ben-
efit to the respondent. The present action is based upon the
benefit to respondent and petitioner’s out-of-pocket loss is
merely a limitation on the amount of recovery. The two are
separate and distinct concepts. The Secretary of War
expressly recognized that the elimination of the provision
with respect to ‘taking and impounding”? still left the ques-
tion of whether the government was ‘‘morally and equitably
liable for money expended by the Marvel Carbureter Com-
pany in the development of fuel chargers which had not
been recovered by the sale of the developed product,’’ and
the Congress accordingly directed the Court of Claims to
render judgment on such basis.
19
It should be particularly noted that not a single authority
or case on the law of quasi contracts is mentioned or re-
ferred to in the Court’s Opinion. True, the Opinion gives
lip service to some of the elements found in quasi contract
cases such as ‘‘fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake’’ but
the Court’s commingling of these with the principles of
contracts expressed or implied in fact and its conclusions
show that it was not actually applying the fundamental law
of quasi contracts in this case but, on the cont ‘ary, was
simply applying the principles applicable in the cases of
contracts expressed or implied in facet. For example, the
following is illustrative: (R. 37)
‘In the absence of any promise, express or implied,
on the part of the Government to pay plaintiff its losses,
or of fraud, misrepresentation or mistake, or the like,
no contract implied in law ean arise.’
Petitioner has never claimed that respondent ever actu-
ally, or by implication, promised to pay petitioner’s losses.
Furthermore, while the absence of such a promise might
negative a contract in fact it obviously has no bearing on
the question of whether there was a contract implied in
law. Fraud, misrepresentation and mistake may be ele-
ments—but not the exclusive elements—of quasi contracts,
but the commingling by the lower Court of such elements
with the basic elements of a contract in fact indicates that
the Court was thinking of ‘‘fraud, misrepresentation or
mistake’? as a basis for inferring an actual promise to repay
petitioner’s losses, something plaintiff has never claimed.
This appears to be corroborated by the sentence in the
Opinion immediately following the above-quoted sentence:
(R. 37)
“* * * The Government certainly did not expressly
or impliedly promise to continue to purchase these
devices if a better one became available, nor did it
delude plaintiff into believing it would.”
20
The above merely negatives an actual or implied promise
to purchase—the basic element of a contract in fact but
not of a contract implied in law with which we are here con-
cerned.
Petitioner has never claimed that there was any inten-
tional fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the United
States or that any representation was ever made upon which
petitioner had a legal right to rely. But it does claim that
it reasonably misrelied, to its detriment and to respond-
ent’s great benefit, on reasonable inferences from state-
ments made by respondent’s agents with respect to timely
release from the security restrictions and respondent’s
plans. for exclusive use of the device on certain types of
airplane engines.
As early as March 1931, Brigadier General H. C. Pratt,
in charge of the Air Corps at Wright Field, indicated in a
letter to petitioner that the Chandler injector development
would be released upon ‘‘the completion of a satisfactory
service test.’? In August 1934 the Air Corps said the
‘service tests and the development thus far had definitely
established a military characteristic for the fuel charger’’
(R. 22, 23). In January 1935 the Chief of the Air Corps
decided that ‘‘this important device”’ should ‘‘be held for
the exclusive use of the armed forces of the United States
as long as such an advantage can be enjoyed’? (R. 27).
Marvel, however, was encouraged to continue by state-
ments, particularly by letters to engine manufacturers
(R. 24, 25) that the device was to be used exclusively on cer-
tain types of airplane engines for the fiscal year 1936. But
no orders for injectors were received after June 1935 (see
Appendix B, p. 36) and at the end of 1936 Marvel had to
close down the plant because orders had completely dried
up. A new device which had been developed while the
Chandler injector was under restrictions was apparently
21
ready. The Air Corps and everybody else wanted this
new device. No one then wanted the Chandler device per
se, although the government continued to enjoy the intan-
gible benefits of the development (even through World
War II when it used them on the B-29s). In other words,
the Aif Corps got everything it wanted at Marvel’s expense
—namely, such security as this ‘‘important device” fur-
nished against potential ‘‘aggressors’’ and the continuing
intangible benefits of ‘‘know-how’’ and established speci-
fications which proved so valuable in connection with the
famous B-29s in World War II.
Such, petitioner submits, are the facts and circumstances
which the lower Court should have considered, not whether
respondent ever promised to pay or guarantee or purchase
any particular quantities of devices. In turning its decision
on whether there was an actual promise, therefore, the
lower Court is squarly in conflict with all of the authorities
and cases on quasi contracts.
(ec) That the Court failed to apply the principles of con-
tracts implied in law is evident from numerous conclusions
in the Opinion.
After a brief recitation of some of the facts, the Court’s
Opinion says (R. 36):
‘‘However, there was no representation by the Air
Corps that it would reimburse the Marvel Company
for its loss in ease it did not sell enough of the devices
to cover the cost of development. There was no fraud
practiced, there was no misrepresentation, there was
no mistake; nothing was done from which the Marvel
Company had any right to conclude that the Air Corps
would reimburse it for any loss it might incur.’’
This begs the question of whether there was a contract
implied in law. That question is whether respondent
received a benefit, the retention of which, without restitu-
22
tion, would be inequitable or, as stated by the Secretary
of War, ‘‘Whether under all of the facts, the government
is morally and equitably liable for money expended by the
Marvel Carbureter Co. in the development of fuel chargers
which has not been recovered by the sale of the developed
product.’”’
The next paragraph of the Opinion says (R. 36):
‘Tt is true that after Chandler had been reemployed
the Air Corps continued to press the Marvel Company
to proceed with the development of the device as rapidly
as it was possible for them to do so, but there was
never an intimation that it would guarantee the com-
pany against loss.’’ (Italics supplied.)
Again the conclusion has no bearing on the question of a
contract implied in law. If there had been any such intima-
tion as suggested by the Court there would have been a
contract implied in fact and no need for the Jurisdictional
Act.
The Court concludes that the facts do not make out a
case of unjust enrichment because (R. 37):
‘o* * *
The Government purchased from plaintiff
or its predecessor about a quarter of a million dollars
worth of these devices, and no doubt would have made
further purchases, except for the fact that the trouble
with carburtors for gas engines had been eliminated,
making the fuel-injector device no longer desirable.
This was a risk that plaintiff ran and which it must
have known it was running when it made its expendi-
tures for the development of the device.”’
This treats the case as though it simply involved the
formal contracts for the sale and purchase of specific
devices. That, of course, would involve simply a question
of contracts expressed or implied in fact and would be well
enough if this case involved nothing more or less than such
23
formal contracts for the purchase of specific devices.”
But this was not the case. It is quite obvious from the
record that what the government wanted primarily was
not just the mechanical devices but, as the Court finds:
‘‘Definite information as to the design of fuel injec-
tion systems and their advantages and limitations.’’
so that it could
‘‘Formulate performance specifications for fuel in-
jection systems.’’
The Air Corps made this clear from the beginning when
it emphasized its ‘‘desire or demand for developing this
project with the utmost haste’? (R. 18) and that Marvel
‘‘owes its first allegiance to the Division in such develop-
ment, manufacture and deliveries’’ and should not under-
take any other work ‘‘ which could curtail the above develop-
ment in any sense of the word; * * *’’ (Italics supplied)
(R. 20).**
Respondent asked Marvel to incur the expense of this
development from which it obtained the definite informa-
tion it wanted. This Marvel did in the reasonable expecta-
tion either that it would be timely released or receive
enoagh business from the government to amortize its costs.'*
The consideration which Marvel expected failed and Marvel
was left with a loss. But respondent reaped great benefits
1 The Committee Report listed all the formal sales contracts and dis-
posed of this point when it said (Appendix B, p. 33):
“The War Department held the claim untenable, considering the
matter only from the standpoint of legal rights and remedies of the
parties arising from their contractual relations as distinguished from
equitable rights.”
16 For additional evidence of respondent’s emphasis on “development”
see R. 18, 19.
17 Tn a letter dated October 3, 1934, the Materiel Division of the Air
Corps said that Marvel “obviously expected to make up this deficit on
sales of this device to the government during the next few years.” (R. 25).
eer STREET TEES
129 Sane WAR AS a REN ROE Cr
24
and, therefore, should make restitution to plaintiff at least
to the extent of plaintiff’s out-of-pocket loss.
We have already referred to the statement in the Opinion
that the government:
‘*Did not expressly or impliedly promise to continue
to purchase these devices if a better one became avail-
able, nor did it delude plaintiff into believing it would.’’
Obviously, if these things had been done there would
have been an actual contract to purchase these devices.
But the government made no such promise and did not
delude petitioner into believing that the government would
purchase such devices if a better one became available. It
did, however, indicate to petitioner (undoubtedly in all good
faith at the time) that there was a large potential business
in the Air Corps itself and that it would therefore be to
its advantage to continue the development work. Peti-
tioner does not contend that defendant relied upon any
promise that plaintiff would receive such business but that
defendant, having received a benefit under such cireum-
stances, is obligated to make restitution for the benefit,
limited, however, under the Jurisdictional Act, to petition-
er’s out-of-pocket loss.
The Opinion says, in referring to respondent?s call in
1934 for competitive bidding on engines supplied with a
fuel injector (R. 38):
‘cw * 6This, however, is no cause for complaint
because plaintiff knew other companies were working
on the device, and there was no agreement on defend-
ant’s part that it would purchase only plaintiff’s device
even if a better one had been developed by someone
else.’’
It is true that there was no such agreement. Again, the
conclusion merely disposes of the question of a contract
in fact and does not consider the question of whether under
Te a a
a ta et tii
25
all of the circumstances defendant received a benefit for
which it should make restitution.
The foregoing, it is submitted, clearly shows that the
lower Court’s Opinion is in conflict with all the authorities
on quasi contracts and that it did nothing more than the
War Department had done before the Jurisdictional Act was
passed, namely, consider the matter ‘‘only from the stand-
point of legal rights and remedies of the parties arising
from their contractual relations as distinguished from
equitable rights’? ) Appendix, p. 33). The effect of its Opin-
ion is to treat the Jurisdictional Act as a nullity. Peti-
tioner is entitled to have its claim adjudicated under that
Act.
Respectfully submitted,
: Bora-Warner Corporation,
By Cuarves D. Hamet,
Lee I. Park,
I’. Weaver Myers,
CLARENCE F. Roruensura.
Hamer, Park & Saunnpers,
Of Counsel.
BA nel pecan a Mi De
ap gid
tthe Lip
PEMA a ihe CDA LG
APPENDIX A
Aw Act
To Confer Jurisdiction Upon the Court of Claims to Hear,
Determine, and Render Judgment Upon the Claim of the
Borg-Warner Corporation
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon the
Court of Claims to hear, determine, and render judgment
in such amount as it deems may be equitably due, notwith-
standing the lapse of time, or any statute of limitations,
or any limitation upon the jurisdiction of such court with
respect to claims upon any contract implied in law, upon
the claim of the Borg-Warner Corporation, in its own right
and as suecessor to the Marvel Carbureter Company (for-
merly a wholly owned subsidiary of the Borg-Warner Cor-
poration), against the United States in connection with
the development of fuel-injection systems for use on mili-
tary aircraft: Provided, however, That such damages shall
not exceed the actual moneys expended by the said Borg-
Warner Corporation and the Marvel Carbureter Com-
pany in connection with this said development during the
calendar years 1927 to 1936, inclusive.
See. 2. Such claim shall be instituted by or on behalf
of the Borg-Warner Corporation within one year after
the date of the enactment of this Act. Proceedings in any
suit before the Court of Claims under this Act, and review
thereof and payment of any judgment therein, shall be had
as in the case of claims over which such court has jurisdie-
tion under section 145 of the Judicial Code, as amended.
Approved, August 4, 1939.
Se Ep Oe eee
APPENDIX B
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Report No. 890
76th Congress, 1st Session
Borc-WakNER CorPORATION
June 21, 1939.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole
House and ordered to be printed.
Mr. Keogh, from the Committee on Claims, submitted
the following
REpPorRT
[To accompany S. 755]
The Committee on Claims, to whom was referred the bill
(S. 755) to confer jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims to
hear, determine, and render judgment upon the claim of
the Borg-Warner Corporation, having considered the same,
report favorably thereon without amendment and recom-
mend that the bill do pass.
The purpose of the proposed legislation is to confer
jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims to hear, determine,
and render judgment upon the claim of the Borg-Warner
Corporation against the United States “for just compensa-
tion for the damages inflicted and the losses sustained by the
taking and impounding by the War Department, by virtue
of the provisions of the Espionage Act (U.S. C., title 50,
ch. 4, see. 31), of all matters pertaining to the development
of fuel-injection systems for use on military aircraft,”
such damages not to exceed actual moneys expended by
the said company and its previously wholly owned sub-
sidiary, the Marvel Carbureter Co., in connection with said
development from 1927 through 1936.
This committee concurs in the recommendation of the
Senate, and appended hereto is Senate Report No. 314,
Seventy-sixth Congress, first session, which carries a
detailed description of the facts.
28
[S. Rept. No. 314, 76th Cong., 1st sess.]
As amended, the War Department has no objection to
the enactment of the bill.
In 1925 the Air Corps began development of a mechanical
metering device to overcome difficulties encountered in use
of carburetors during aerial tactical maneuvers. Two years
later M. G. Chandler, who had entered the employ of the
Marvel Co. under agreement for development of his patented
‘fluid distributing mechanism,’’ presented for the Marvel
Co. a design for fuel injector. On August 18, 1927, the
Air Corps ordered from the Marvel Co. one fuel injector
for a test engine. As development work progressed addi-
tional orders were placed with the Marvel Co. from 1927
through 1937.
November 26, 1929, the Matériel Division of the War
Department wrote the Marvel Co. it was ‘the desire of the
Division to impress on the Marvel Carburetor Co. the
desire or demand for developing this project with the
utmost haste.’’ The stated object of the letter was to advise
the Marvel Co. ‘‘of the extreme importance at this time
of the fuel-metering pump development and to request
that, if possible, this project be given first priority’’ in the
company’s experimental work.
With reference to a conference between representatives
of the Marvel Co. and the Matériel Division, the latter
wrote the company on October 29, 1930, that the Division
had been largely involved in the general development of the
fuel charger from a financial and development standpoint
and the Division’s future plans for new engine develop-
ment depended largely upon completion of the equipment.
Hence, “The Division feels that the Marvel Carburetor Co.
owes its first allegiance to the Division in such development,
manufacture, and deliveries,’’ and ‘‘that no other work in
this connection be undertaken which could curtail the
above development in any sense of the word; that foreign
or domestic development or sales be delayed until such
time as the Army agrees that they will not affect procure-
ment necessary for the Air Corps needs.’’
On March 21, 1931, the Matériel Division wrote the Mar-
vel Co.:
29
“Tt is believed that the release of information which
would enable a foreign manufacturer to parallel the de-
velopment and application of the Marvel-Chandler fuel
charger to aircraft engines, would not be to the best interests
of the Air Corps at this time. The Division, therefore, has
classified all documents, technical data, reports, and devices
pertaining to this development as ‘‘secret,’? which pre-
eludes demonstration and/or manufacture of it abroad. It
also limits the commercial use of this device in the United
States to specific applications which meet with the approval
of the War Department. The Matériel Division undertook
this development with this understanding.’’
The secret classification and matters relating to the
development, except drawings, technical reports, and speci-
fications, was removed September 12, and the information
conveyed to the Marvel Co. September 28, 1933.
April 21, 1934, the Air Corps advised the Marvel Co. of
change in status of the development project from ‘‘secret’’
to ‘‘confidential,’’ except it was to remain ‘‘seeret’’ in con-
nection with foreign and domestic sale. The Air Corps
could not then favorably consider release of the equipment
for foreign sale, but authorized divulgence to the Pan
American-Grace Airways of such technical information as
would enable them to determine the merits of the equip-
ment and permit them to initiate negotiations regarding
possible purchase for domestic use only. Negotiations for
sale were not to be closed without Government approval,
and the Division could not assure the company authority
would be given for domestic sale.
The Matériel Division’s report of a conference regard-
ing the Marvel fuel charger on August 8, 1934, stated that
in further development of the device for 14-cylinder
engines, it was suggested the Air Corps would prefer to
work through the engine manufacturers. The report con-
tinued:
‘‘This is particularly true in view of the fact that service
tests and the development thus far had definitely established
a military characteristic for the fuel charger; that under
the present development policy of the Matériel Division,
[Qo ee ee
—
eu
Pras
Dram bee
—
Lisa
30
further expenditures for engineering and indirect costs
were not warranted; that as a general rule in the procure-
ment of accessories for engines or aircraft, the Matériel
Division would prefer to procure a physical article and not
endeavor to cooperate in the development of the article in
the same manner as had been following in connection with
the development of the Marvel fuel charger.’
August 18, 1934, the Marvel Co. wrote the Matériel
Division the device should be given complete release from
secrecy to permit the company to recoup its development
losses through general foreign and domestic sales, or such
losses should be amortized through sales to the Govern-
ment. The Division on October 3, 1934, wrote the Chief
of the Air Corps as follows:
‘*The enclosed copy of letter from Marvel Carburetor Co.,
Flint, Mich., brings up a problem which the Air Corps must
face in connection with strick adherence to the procedure of
securing all production items of equipment through com-
petitive bidding and for which it is apparent that a definite
policy should be established for the guidance of this Divi-
sion and in fairness to the manufacturers of aircraft, air-
craft engines, and aeronautical equipment.
‘*}From the enclosed letter, it may be seen that the Marvel
Carburetor Co. has expended approximately $500,000
during the past 8 years to bring their fuel injector up to the
point where it is considered satisfactory for adoption by the
Air Corps. In addition to this amount of money, it should
be borne in mind that the Air Corps has also spent a con-
siderable sum of money in the development of this article.
The manufacturer has received from sales to the Govern-
ment approximately one-third of the amount of money he
claims to have expended in this development and has
obviously expected to make up this deficit on normal profits
un sales of this device to the Government during the next
few years.
‘‘There are one or two other manufacturers entering
the field of fuel injection and there is now on test at the
Division a 9- and a 14-cylinder fuel injector manufactured
by the Eclipse Aviation Corporation of East Orange, N. J.
31
While it is not the policy of this Division to reveal the
engineering principles of one manufacturer to any of the
others, it is quite evident that the manufacturer who enters
the field last will benefit greatly by the advice of Division
engineers by eliminating many of the mistakes made in the
original development, thereby producing an article with
much less engineering cost than was necessary for the
original inventor and manufacturer. * * *
“This matter is being brought to the attention of the
Chief of the Air Corps for the purpose of emphasizing the
necessity for a definite policy to be followed in the develop-
ment and procurement of such devices as fuel injectors,
fuel pumps, vacuum pumps, and all other devices for which
a functional service test is necessary before they can be
standarized and for which development costs are neces-
sarily high. From the above it is apparent that one or two
things should be done in cases of this kind: (a) Allow the
manufacturer to sell his produet when he wishes; (b) pay
full development costs.’’
After obtaining further information on the status of
fuel-injector development, the Chief of the Air Corps on
January 24, 1935 advised the Matériel Division as follows:
“In the light of such information as has been forwarded
the Chief of Air Corps, the Marvel fuel-injection system and
its application to aviation is a marked advance. It is
superior to any similar effort that has come to his attention.
Its possession promises to be of great advantage to the
Army Air Corps. In case of an emergency the utilization
of this device may contribute greatly to the superiority of
Army equipment over that of an aggressor. It, therefore,
is desirable that this important device be held for the
exclusive use of the armed forces of the United States as
long as such an advantage can be enjoyed. Release for
domestic and export sales cannot be granted at this time.’’
In submitting the matter to The Adjutant General on May
15, 1935, the Assistant Chief of the Air Corps requested
authority to negotiate a license with the Marvel Co., and
further stated:
cause i
32
‘“‘The case in question is typical of the handicap which
may devolve upon a contractor who undertakes development
for the Air Corps.
‘‘The Marvel Co. has, over a considerable period of time,
been developing a fuel-injection system.
‘‘At the time the development was undertaken no other
promising development was in view.
‘‘The cost and time of development has greatly exceeded
all estimates.
‘*The development was important enough to be declared
secret.
‘‘There still is, according to the Marvel Co., a sum in
the order of $500,000 which the Air Corps has not reim-
bursed the Marvel Co.
‘*The device is still so important that it should not be
exported.
‘Other similar devices still not satisfactory to the Air
Corps are being produced and are to be exported.
‘‘At the present, it is proposed to buy fuel-injection
systems from an approved list established through pass-
ing Government requirements.
‘*The volume of business involved, however, will not take
care of the entire amortization in the case of the Marvel Co.
‘‘At some future date, the company feels that it has a
case against the Government for damages.’’
Subsequently the Chief of the Air Corps was authorized
to negotiate a license and same was offered by the Marvel
Co. for $900,000. The offer was not accepted.
The result of the development work was to produce a
fuel injector which functioned very satisfactorily on a
9-cylinder engine, but by the time this was completed the
9-cylinder engine had been superseded by 12-, 14-, and
18-eylinder engines. Experimental work continued for
some time in an attempt to develop a fuel injector that
would produce satisfactory results with the larger engines.
In the meantime other concerns were working on the same
problem. The possibility of substituting the fuel injector
for the carbureter stimulated development in the latter
art. Asa result the Air Corps adopted a poliey of com-
bining this development with engine development. This
72 Set oT)
errs
33
course was required inasmuch as the Air Corps could not
secure fuel injectors to supply engine contractors for in-
stallation on completed engines.
In letter of January 27, 1938, the claimant corporation
made demand on the War Department for money, labor,
and material actually expended in development of fuel
injectors in the amount of $506,320.75, claimed to represent
the difference between total cost of development work from
1926 through 1936, less the amount received from sales.
The War Department held the claim untenable, consider-
ing the matter only from the standpoint of legal rights and
remedies of the parties arising from their contractual rela-
tions as distinguished from equitable rights.
Tn his report on 8. 755 the Secretary of War suggests the
bill should not be based on the Espionage Act, which is a
criminal statute to augment the national defense through
prohibition of certain acts. It is the view of the War
Department that compliance with a criminal statute should
not create a claim against the Government. As so limited
the War Department has no objection to enactment of the
bill.
The facts are fully set forth in the following letter from
the Secretary of War, which is appended hereto and made
a part of this report.
War Department,
Washington, March 28, 1939.
Hon. M. M. Logan Chairman, Committee on Claims United
t ’ ’ ’
States Senate.
Dear Senator Locan:
Careful consideration has been given to the bill (S. 755,
76th Cong., Ist sess.) to confer jurisdiction upon the Court
of Claims to hear, determine, and render judgment upon
the claim of the Borg-Warner Corporation, which you
transmitted to the War Department under date of January
18, 1989, with a request for information and the views of
the Department relative thereto.
The bill authorizes the court to render judgment in such
amount as may be equitably due as just compensation for
34
damages inflicted and losses sustained by the taking and
impounding by the War Department, by virtue of the pro-
visions of the Espionage Act, of all matters pertaining to
the development of fuel-injection systems for use on mili-
tary aircraft, notwithstanding the lapse of time, or any stat-
ute of limitations, or any limitation upon the jurisdiction
of the court with respect to claims upon any contract im-
plied in law. The bill provides a maximum amount which
may be found to be equitably due by prescribing that dam-
ages shall not exceed the actual moneys expended by the
Borg-Warner Corporation and the Marvel Carbureter Co.,
in connection with said development during the calendar
years 1927 to 1936, inclusive.
In a letter dated January 27, 1938, the Borg-Warner Cor-
poration made demand on the War Department for money,
labor, and materials actually expended in the development
of fuel injectors in the amount of $506,320.75. This sum is
claimed to represent the difference between the total cost of
development work for the years 1926 to 1936, inclusive, less
the amount received from sales.
In reply to this demand the War Department advised the
Borg-Warner Corporation that the claim was deemed to be
untenable. In taking this position the War Department con-
sidered the matter from the standpoint of the legal rights
and remedies of the parties arising from their contractual
relations as distinguished from equitable rights. In the
case of United States v. Minnesota Mutual Investment Com-
pany (271 U.S. 212), decided May 24, 1926, the Supreme
Court held that:
‘*An implied contract in order to give the Court of Claims
or a district court under the Tucker Act jurisdiction to give
judgment against the Government must be one implied in
fact and not one based merely on equitable considerations
and implied in law.’’
The War Department has expressed no opinion upon the
existence of any equities which may not form the basis of a
claim against the Government under present law. In other
words, it is an open question whether the Government
should, by special legislation, authorize a court to pass upon
35
the equitable liability of the Government arising out of the
facts in this case.
In 1925, the Air Corps began the development of a me-
chanical metering device to overcome difficulties encoun-
tered in the use of carburetors during aerial tactical ma-
neuvers. In 1927, Mr. M. G. Chandler presented for consid-
eration a design for a fuel injector. It appears that Mr.
Chandler entered into an agreement on July 22, 1926, with
the Marvel Carbureter Co., relating to United States Letters
Patent No. 1,121,976, entitled ‘‘Fluid Distributing Me-
chanism,’’ and upon the execution of this agreement he en-
tered the employ of the Marvel Carbureter Co. for the
purpose of completing the development of the fluid-dis-
tributing mechanisms and making improvements thereon.
The design presented by Mr. Chandler appeared to have
desirable performance characteristics for metering and dis-
tributing fuel. On August 18, 1927, the Air Corps placed
an order (purchase order No. 28-598) with the Marvel Car-
bureter Co. for one fuel injector for a single cylinder test
engine. No formal written agreement was entered into at
any time concerning the payment of any devciopmental
costs by the Government. As development work progressed,
additional orders were placed with the Marvel Carbureter
Co. The dates, numbers, and articles ordered are as fol-
lows:
Number Date Description
28-608. ......... Aug. 18, 1927 Single cylinder fuel injector and parts.
Yt. June 27, 1928 Fuel-injector parts.
es oe Nov. 26, 1928 9-cylinder fuel injector and parts.
29-2828.......... Jan. 5, 1929 Fuel-injector parts for Curtiss D-12 engine.
30-4224.......... Apr. 9, 1930 Fuel-injector parts.
OO-6241.......... i 28, 1930 Modification of fuel-injector parts.
30-5329.......... June 3, 1930 Fuel injectors and parts for Curtiss V-1570
and 2 each Pratt & Whitney SR-1340-
C engines.
31-6006.......... June 4, 1931.. Fuel-injector parts.
UR es vache ris ter fe eR Fuel injector and parts for 1 each Pratt &
Whitney R-1340-C engine.
$2-105........... July 3, 1931 Reworking 2 fuel injectors.
32-1082.......... Sept. 11, 1931 Fuel injectors and parts for 4 each Curtiss
V-—1570 engines.
$2-1083.......... PMNS sachs Fuel injectors and parts for 4 each Pratt &
Whitney SR-1340-E engines.
32-1084......... bear Fuel injectors and parts for 5 each Wright
R-1820-E engines.
32-2266.......... Nov. 7, 1931 Fuel injector parts.
33-1095.......... Sept. 13, 1932 Do.
33-2850.......... Jan. 4, 1933 Do.
%
pa
i
He
b
et
ny
S
¢
BRrwresunr ee:
36
Number Date Description
35-152........... July 20, 1934 Handbook of instructions for Q-2 fuel
injector.
35-786........... Sept. 15, 1934 Overhaul tools.
35-1532.......... Nov. 28, 1934 Fuel-injector parts.
35-2978.......... Mar. 26, 1935 Do.
35-3862.......... Apr. 25, 1935 Fuel-injector tool.
35-4534.......... June 7, 1935 Fuel-injector parts.
35-4766.......... June 29, 1935 T-1 fuel injector for 14-cylinder, 2-row
radial air-cooled engine and S—2 fuel in-
jector for 12-cylinder liquid-cooled en-
gine.
36-1091.......... Sept. 14, 1935 Repair of Q-2 fuel injector.
36-4510.......... Mar. 25, 1936 Fuel-injector parts.
36-5571.......... May 15, 1936 Do.
38-887 !... pt. 9, 1937
svn ss TNS Do.
W-535 AC-4305.. June 23, 1931 7 each type E-250 fuel injectors and parts
for Pratt & Whitney SR-1340-C engines
and 8 each type E-330 fuel injectors and
parts for Wright R-1750-E engines.
W-535 AC-6069.. June 28, 1933 37 each type M-5 (Air Corps designation
Q-2) fekd indectens for Pratt & Whitney
YR-1340-33 engines (increased to 39
quantity by change order No. 1).
W-535 AC-7625.. June 17, 1935 25 Q-2 fuel injectors for Pratt & Whitney
YR-1340-33 engines (designation changed
to Q-3 by change order No. 1).
' Corporate name changed to Marvel-Schebler Carbureter Division.
On November 26, 1929, the Matériel Division wrote to the
Marvel Carbureter Co. as follows:
‘1, With regard to the above development, it is the desire
of the Division to impress on the Marvel Carbureter Co. the
desire or demand for developing this project with the ut-
most haste.
‘*2. The Air Corps has specified a new engine of super-
performance in which a device of this type would be of in-
estimable advantage if tests, now proposed, indicate that
the operation of this device is as satisfactory as is hoped at
the present time.
‘*3. With the development in the nature of design pro-
ceeding as rapidly as it now is, it will be imperative to know
definitely, within a short time, whether this device is feasi-
ble or not, and unless considerable test work ean be done in
the near future, a normal carburetor and manifolding sys-
tem will necessarily be used, purely for lack of information
on the fuel-metering system.
‘*4, The object of this letter is to advise Marvel Car-
a
37
bureter Co. of the extreme importance at this time of the
fuel-metering pump development and to request that, if pos-
sible, this project be given first priority in your experi-
mental work.’’
On October 18, 1930, the Marvel Carbureter Co. wrote:
‘“‘The writer had expected to receive from you a letter
covering the details of our discussion concerning the fuel-
charger situation, but to date this is not at hand.
‘‘We would appreciate a letter from you confirming the
various matters presented to the writer at our conference.
‘‘We would also like to receive from you an outline that
clearly defines your requirements with respect to Army pri-
ority considerations. This will be necessary as a means to
guide our procedure and avoid misunderstanding. Also we
will be interested to know just what latitude you will regard
as equitable with respect to our conducting development
tests of the fuel charger elsewhere on testing equipment
that we do not have.”’
In response to the above letter the Matériel Division ad-
vised the Marvel Carbureter Co. as follows, on October 29,
1930:
“1. With reference to the above conference between Mr.
Taft of the Marvel Carburetor Co. and Captain Page of the
Matériel Division, the agreements as outlined below were
reached and are now submitted for your consideration: (a)
That from a financial and development standpoint, the Ma-
tériel Division has been largely involved in the general de-
velopment of the fuel charger, and that the Division’s
future plans and policies in connection with new engine de-
velopment are obviously dependent, to a great extent, on
the satisfactory completion of this equipment; (b) that in
view of the above the Division feels that the Marvel Car-
bureter Co. owes its first allegiance to the Division in such
development, manufacture, and deliveries; (c) that develop-
ment and manufacture of equipment for the Wright R-1820
and the Curtiss V engines be given priority over any other
project, and that this work be expedited with all possible
ERAT OL SALMON IIL YS LTR 9
&
z
A
gett S Rise Pasi
rae
38
speed; (d) that no other work in this connection be under-
taken which could curtail the above development in any
sense of the word; (e) that foreign or domestic development
or sales be delayed until such time as the Army agrees that
they will not affect procurement necessary for the Air Corps
needs; (f) that authority to build in foreign countries in
order to protect foreign patents will be granted at such time
as the Marvel Carbureter Co. advises the Division of the
necessity; (g) that as soon as the Army development is sat-
isfactory and guarantee of deliveries can be made on the
part of the Marvel Carbureter Co., a release for general
manufacture will be granted by the Army Air Corps.
“69. As regards priority in connection with work on hand
for the Army Air Corps, the following should govern: (1)
Completion of the 9-cylinder fuel charger for the Pratt &
Whitney SR-1340-C engine and the accompanying gear
reduction housing and assembly; (2) completion of the
9-eylinder fuel charger for the Wright R-1820 engine; (3)
design and submit for approval a 12-cylinder fuel charger
for use on the Curtiss V-1570 engine and after approval of
the above design, immediate construction thereof.’’
On March 21, 1931, the Matériel Division after consider-
ing the importance of the fuel-injector development to the
national defense wrote the Marvel Carburetor Co. as
follows:
“1. Reference is made to telephone conversation between
Mr. Chandler and a representative of the Division on March
20, regarding the release of technical data pertaining to
the fuel charger now under development.
‘9 Tt is believed that the release of information which
would enable a foreign manufacturer to parallel the de-
velopment and application of the Marvel-Chandler fuel
charger to aircraft engines, would not be to the best inter-
ests of the Air Corps at this time. The Division, therefore,
has classified all documents, technical data, reports and de-
vices pertaining to this development as ‘secret,’ which pre-
cludes demonstration and/or manufacture of it abroad. It
also limits the commercial use of this device in the United
States to specific applications which meet with the approval
ote Bete
39
of the War Department. The Matériel Division undertook
this development with this understanding.
“3 It is the policy of both the War and Navy Depart-
ments to restrict the sale of articles of equipment that are
of particular military value until they have been in produc-
tion as standard articles for a period of approximately 1
year. In this particular case, however, it is believed that
the Air Corps will be compensated for its support of this
development if the release is withheld until the completion
of a satisfactory service test. With this in view, every
effort will be made to expedite experimental work now in
progress and to incorporate the fuel charger on a limited
number of engines for use in standard type airplanes as
soon as the testing at the Division warrants it.
“4 Tt is further desired to state that there is no objec-
tion to your company proceeding with negotiations for the
manufacture or licensing for manufacture, provided such
negotiations do not violate the policy stated above relative
to the release of any data or information that will enable
duplication of the equipment now being tested, or incorpora-
tion of any of the principles pertaining to it.
“5. This cancels and supersedes all previous instructions
from the Matériel Division pertaining to this development
which are at variance with the foregoing.”’
On September 12, 1933, the Air Corps removed corres-
pondence, telegrams, purchase orders, and contracts relat-
ing to fuel chargers from the secret classification. Fur-
ther secrecy was required in respect of drawings, technical
reports, and specifications. This information was con-
veyed to the Marvel Carbureter Co. by letter dated Sep-
tember 28, 1933, as follows:
“4. Effective immediately, the ‘secret’ classification, in-
sofar as correspondence, telegrams, ete., are concerned, is
removed from the project covering fuel chargers and related
equipment, and purchase orders and contracts pertaining to
this project.
“9 The ‘secret’ classification, however, will still apply
to drawings, technical reports, and specifications.’’
Re a OL ney
PAE AE RIE ESR BON ARR BRR Nt in RADARS
eo TS
40
On April 21, 1934, the Marvel Carbureter Co. was advised
of a further change in the status of the development and
the position of the Air Corps concerning domestic and
foreign sales. This letter is as follows:
‘*1, Receipt is acknowledged of your communication of
April 10, requesting information with respect to change in
status of fuel injectors being made for the Government and
also as to what information you may release to the Pan
American-Grace Airways, Inc., pertaining to this equipment.
‘*9. Effective at once, the status of the subject project is
changed from ‘secret’ to ‘confidential’, with the provision
that it be continued on ‘secret’ status insofar as the policy
relative to foreign and domestic sale is concerned. Specifiea-
tions, drawings, and reports will be of ‘confidential’ status
and marked accordingly.
**3. Documents marked ‘confidential’ will be prepared
for transmission in the same manner as prescribed for
‘secret’ documents except that the inner cover will contain a
receipt form only when the sender deems it necessary, and
that the inner cover may be opened by some responsible
person other than the persons addressed when so authorized.
‘“4. As set forth in policy covering ‘Sale of Aeronautical
Equipment abroad, a copy of which has previously been
furnished to you, it is the policy of the War and Navy De-
partments to encourage American aeronautical industry in
developing foreign business. The policy also quotes the
following statement: ‘No negotiations for the sale abroad
of aeronautical equipment which has been developed for
or with the assistance or direct encouragement of the War
or Navy Department or whose usefulness is primarily or
exclusively military, should be initiated without the per-
mission of the Department interested.’ While the Govern-
ment cannot favorably at this time consider the release of
this equipment for foreign sale, it feels that if you are not
permitted to release technical data on this equipment and
enter into preliminary negotiations for domestic sale of the
equipment that it will be creating a trade disadvantage due
to the fact that other manufacturers have marketed similar
devices.
i ae
oe ao S| ae eT
41
“5, The Government accordingly authorizes you to di-
vulge to the Pan American-Grace Airways, Ine. such techni-
eal information as will enable them to determine the merits
of this equipment and permit them to initiate negotiations
regarding possible purchase for domestic use only. This
authority is granted with the understanding that ‘negotia-
tions for the sale of this equipment will not be closed with-
out approval of the Government. While the Matériel Di-
vision cannot assure you at this time that authority will be
given for the domestic sale of this equipment, we feel sure
that authority for domestic sale will be granted by the Gov-
ernment. No steps, however, will be taken to obtain this
approval until this Division is further advised in the mat-
ter with respect to your negotiations with the Pan Ameri-
ean Airways, Ine.’
On August 8, 1934, a conference was held at Wright Field,
regarding the Marvel fuel charger. A report of this con-
ference was made and is enclosed herewith, marked ‘‘En-
closure No. 1.’’ On August 18, 1934, the Marvel Carbureter
(‘o. addressed a letter to the Air Corps at Wright Field in
which it expressed its position in reference to amortizing
its developmental costs. A copy of this letter is enclosed
and marked ‘‘ Enclosure No. 2.’’
On August 31, 1934, the Matériel Division advised the
Marvel Carbureter Co. of its policy concerning domestic
and foreign sales. (See enclosure No. 3.)
On October 3, 1934, the Matériel Division wrote to the
Chief of the Air Corps enclosing a copy of the Marvel
Carbureter Co.’s letter of August 18, 1934. (See enclosure
No. 4.)
On October 12, 1934, the Office of the Chief of the Air
Corps addressed the following letter to the Matériel Di-
vision:
‘1. In order that General Foulois may take up this mat-
ter of foreign sale of Marvel fuel injectors with higher
authority, it is requested that the following be furnished:
(a) A brief statement of the advantages of fuel injectors
over present-type carburetors; (b) a report on the service
test of the 12 Marvel fuel injectors referred to in paragraph
ar ae
aati each aaa 2a ae
42
5 of your letter of October 3, 1934; (c) a report on changes
required in present-type engines if fuel injection is specified
for 1936 procurement, and effect on future cost per engine
(d) a report on steps already taken by the Division com-
mitting the Air Corps to fuel injection for 1936 procure-
ment; (e) report on steps taken to install fuel-injector en-
eines on P-26 airplanes.”’
After receiving the information required the Office of the
Chief of the Air Corps advised the Matériel Division by
first endorsement dated January 24, 1935, as follows:
‘“1. In the light of such information as has been for-
warded the Chief of Air Corps, the Marvel fuel-injection
system and its application to aviation is a marked ad-
vanee. It is superior to any similar effort that has come to
his attention. Its possession promises to be of great advan-
tage to the Army Air Corps. In case of an emergency the
utilization of this device may contribute greatly to the supe-
rioity of Army equipment over that of an aggressor. It,
therefore, is desirable that this important device be held
for the exclusive use of the armed forces of the United States
as long as such an advantage can be enjoyed. Release for
domestie and export sales cannot be granted at this time.
‘‘9. Competition is desirable. Efforts should be exerted
to obtain such competition through the establishment of a
policy for the procurement of fuel-injection systems fol-
lowing the principles outlined in policy No. 164, dated Jan-
uary 22, 1935.”’
On March 16, 1935, the Marvel Carburetor Co. again
brought Bo the matter of recouping its losses. (See en-
closure No. 5.) The Air Corps’ reply dated May 18, 1935,
is enclosed, marked ‘‘Enclosure No. 6.”’
On April 22, 1935, the Matériel Division in a letter to the
Chief of the Air Corps first raised the question of requesting
the State Department to prohibit the export of injection de-
vices for non-Diesel-type engines. In submitting the mat-
ter to The Adjutant General, authority was requested to
negotiate a license with the Marvel Carburetor Co. (See
Enclosure No. 7.)
On May 31, 1935, the office of The Assistant Secretary of
43
War authorized the Chief of the Air Corps to negotiate for
a license under the Marvel patents. In a letter dated July
98, 1936, the Marvel Carbureter Co. offered to grant a li-
cense for $900,000. This offer was not accepted.
The result of the development work was to produce a fuel
injector which functioned very satisfactorily on a 9-cylinder
engine, but by the time this was completed the 9-cylinder en-
vine had been superseded by 12-, 14-, and 18-cylinder en-
vines. Experimental work continued for some time in an
attempt to develop a fuel injector that would produce satis-
factory results with the larger engines. In the meantime
other concerns were working on the same problem. The
possibility of substituting the fuel injector for the ecarbu-
retor stimulated development in the latter art. As a result
the Air Corps adopted a policy of combining this develop-
ment with engine development. This course was required
inasmuch as the Air Corps could not secure fuel injectors
to supply engine contractors for installation on completed
engines.
As stated heretofore, the War Department has not com-
mnitted itself on the question of liability from an equitable
standpoint for the expenditure made by the Marvel Carbu-
reter Co. on the fuel-charger project. If the Congress sees
fit to have this question presented to the Court of Claims
for determination, the War Department has no objection to
such procedure. Objection is raised, however, to the basis
upon which the present bill predicates the claim. That is,
the bill authorizes the court to render judgment for such
sum as may be found to be equitably due for the taking and
impounding under the Espionage Act of all matters per-
taining to the development of fuel-injection systems for
use on military aircraft.
The War Department believes that it should be contrary
to publie policy to use the Espionage Act to create a claim
agaimst the Government. The Espionage Act is a criminal
statute which prohibits the doing of the acts enumerated
therein. It is an act to augment the national defense.
So far as the War Department is informed, the Marvel
Carbureter Co. did everything in its power to maintain
secrecy concerning the fuel-injector development. In other
—
LP Nea NS Ti AP nd Teil ED BAR A
Ee SRLS Done
PR CAA Ret WC ti TOMAR NI Fes VM ee
44
words, it did not violate the Espionage Act. But it is the
view of the War Department that a compliance with a
criminal statute should not create a claim against the Gov-
ernment. Under the Neutrality Act a license must be se-
cured from the Secretary of State to export certain imple-
ments of war. Would the Congress recognize a claim for
lost profits occasioned by the refusal to grant a license to
export implements of war?) The recognition of such a claim
would appear to be contrary to public policy. So in this
case it is the view of the War Department that the claim
should not be based upon any alleged taking or impound-
ing under the Espionage Act.
The only question is whether, under all of the facts, the
tovernment is morally and equitably liable for money ex-
pended by the Marvel Carburetor Co. in the development
of fuel chargers which has not been recovered by the sale of
the developed product.
As so limited the War Department has no objection to the
reference of the matter to the Court of Claims for determi-
nation.
Sincerely yours,
Harry H. Wooprina,
Secretary of War.
(2154)
NEC OB thre OVI TR IY
INDEX
Page a a
SNNRERE IRN NN iets bet os Ne he ge ee SETA 1
Ch creche EE SEEN SOS Ll ae RA 1
IR, NN oa cn ei eamsigniorspvonctinbelacsilasadbsabonsenens 2
RUDGE NN RMON fe Js a 3
cyanate AT RESIS OES eNO alert ees oe eT ce
RRR ee Araiaret ces eee aOR thks Ee 8
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CITATIONS
CASEs:
Bailis v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 128 F.2d 857 10
Chandler v. Washington Toll Bridge Authority, 17 Wash.
2G Gs 10 Ja": a re ee 11
Coos Bay Indian Tribe v. United States, 87 Ct. Cls. 143,
certiorar: Genied, 306 U.S. 663 _............. | 13
Federal Royalty Co. v. Knox, 114 F.2d 78 ___... 12
Gothwaite v. United States, 102 Ct.Cls. 400 __.. ss st—idYYd:
Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458. 11
Iowa Tribe of Indians v. United States, 68 Ct.Cls. 585 _._ 13
"RR ERP BATE EN TNT LINE
Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 _...-. 11
Mergenthaler v. Dailey, 136 F.2d 182 _.._ 12
Patverson V. entucky, 97 U.S. S01 11
Sac and Fox Indians, The, 220 U.S. 481 __._ 13
Sickelco v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 111 F.2d 746. s—éid2:2d
Standard Accident Insurance Company v. United States,
103 Ct. Cls. 607, certiorari denied, 326 U.S. 729 sd
Tilison v. United States, 100 U.S. 43 _................—s«43g
United States v. Mille Lac Chippewas, 229 U.S. 498 _____- 13
STATUTES:
Espionage Act, 40 Stat. 217, 50 U.S.C. 31 et seq. 6
Private Law 126, 76th Congress, Ist Sess., 53 Stat. 1491__2, 8, 14
MISCELLANEOUS:
Restatement of Restitution:
SII AIT ldots cde biisbedel ceidentlseideeatoasunsas 11
IIE es hrc sasstdiv chgabdesstdeebdesseonndes eietiaeinibicoeds 12
IIE TD Sci hersansnidice sce ccilagts ia setbainnesemeibieiieeaschenic 12
Pi BMPR Cher alk oe Dew,
2
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the Court of Claims erred in holding
that the facts of this case did not give rise to a con-
tract implied in law, a category to which the court’s
jurisdiction was here extended by a special juris-
dictional act, between petitioner and the United
States.
STATUTE INVOLVED
The special jurisdictional act (Private Law 126,
76th Congress, Ist Session, 53 Stat. 1491), pursu-
ant to which petitioner brought this action in the
court below, reads as follows:
&
‘
en
An AcT
Biase at NIN ee ee ee ees
To confer jurisdiction upon the Court of
Claims to hear, determine, and render
judgment upon the claim of the Borg-
Warner Corporation
; Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of Amer-
ica in Congress assembled, That jurisdiction
is hereby conferred upon the Court of Claims
: to hear, determine, and render judgment in
i such amount as it deems may be equitably due,
notwithstanding the lapse of time, or any
statute of limitations, or any limitation upon
the jurisdiction of such court with respect to
claims upon any contract implied in law, upon
the claim of the Borg-Warner Corporation, in
3
its own right and as successor to the Marvel
Carbureter Company (formerly a_ wholly
owned subsidiary of the Borg-Warner Corpo-
ration), against the United States in connec-
tion with the development of fuel-injection
systems for use on military aircraft: Pro-
vided, however, That such damages shall not
exceed the actual moneys expended by the said
Borg-Warner Corporation and the Marvel
Carbureter Company in connection with this
said development during the calendar years
1927 to 1936, inclusive.
See. 2. Such claim shall be instituted by or
on behalf of the Borg-Warner Corporation
within one year after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act. Proceedings in any suit be-
fore the Court of Claims under this Act, and
review thereof and payment of any judgment
therein, shall be had as in the case of claims
over which such court has jurisdiction under
section 145 of the Judicial Code, as amended.!
STATEMENT
Petitioner, Borg-Warner Corporation, is the
successor in interest to the Marvel Carbureter
Company of Illinois, which in turn was the succes-
sor in interest to an Indiana corporation also bear-
ing the title of Marvel Carbureter Company (R.
11-12). This is a suit by petitioner, in its own
1 Section 145 of the Judicial Code has been reenacted as
28 U.S. C. 1255.
AUR
4
right and as successor to Marvel,’ to recover for
expenditures incurred in the development of fuel-
injection systems for use on military aircraft.
In December, 1914, one Milford Chandler was
granted a United States patent on a ‘‘ Fluid-dis-
tributing Mechanism’’ (R. 14). The Chandler in-
jector system, designed to eliminate carburetors
on gas engines and to inject the fuel directly into
the cylinders of engines, was peculiarly adaptable
to aircraft engines (R. 13). In July, 1926, Chan-
dler and Marvel, whose principal business was the
manufacture and sale of carburetors, entered into
an arrangement for the further development of
Chandler’s device (R. 14). Under the agreement
the company was granted the exclusive right to
manufacture and sell the device, and Chandler was
paid a salary to carry on further experimental
work (R. 14-15). After approximately ten months,
Marvel decided to discontinue the project and ter-
minated its contract with Chandler (R. 17). The
company then wrote a letter to the Air Corps sug-
gesting that it enter into some sort of arrange-
ment with Chandler for the further development
of his invention (R. 17). Chandler, on his own be-
half, then conferred with Air Corps representa-
tives in an effort to induce them to develop and
build injector systems which he would design (R.
17). The Air Corps was not interested, however.
?'We shall use the name ‘‘Marvel’’ to refer to either or
both Marvel Carburetor Company of Illinois and Marvel Car-
buretor Company of Indiana.
5
It told Chandler that it was interested only in de-
veloping sources of supply for such a device, and
advised him to induce Marvel to resume its efforts
to perfect the device, with his help (R. 17). Ac-
cordingly, Marvel reemployed Chandler and ex-
perimental work on the injector system was re-
sumed (R. 18).
A short time later, the Air Corps purchased an
injector mechanism from Marvel, and, after mak-
ing bench tests of it, suggested to Marvel certain
improvements to be included in future devices (R.
18). Between 1927 and 1936, Marvel worked on
the device with the aid and cooperation of the Air
Corps. During this time it sold the Air Corps and
the United States Navy fuel injectors and parts in
the total sum of $248,736.78 (R. 18). Marvel did
not sell any fuel injection systems to the Air Corps
after 1936 (R. 30). Meanwhile the carburetor
manufacturers perfected the ‘‘floatless carbure-
tor,’’ a mechanism which eventually superseded
fuel injection systems, since it eliminated the dif-
ficulties formerly inherent in carburetors used for
aviation purposes (R. 33).
During the development period, the Air Corps
considered the development of Chandler’s inven-
tion of great importance. It wrote Marvel that it
wished ‘‘to impress on the Marvel Carbureter Com-
pany the desire or demand for developing this
project with the utmost haste’? (R.18). In March,
1931, the Wright Field Procurement Division
See Ay ae NRT
6
wrote Marvel that in the interest of security and
in order to preclude a foreign manufacturer from
developing a similar injection system it had ‘‘clas-
sified all documents, technical data, reports and
devices pertaining to this development as ‘Secret,’
which precludes demonstration and/or manufac-
ture of it abroad. It also limits the commercial
use of this device in the United States to specific
applications which meet with the approval of the
War Department.’’ (R. 20.) In November, 1932,
and subsequently, the Air Corps called attention to
the fact that unauthorized disclosure of informa-
tion so classified was subject to fine and imprison-
ment under the Espionage Act, 40 Stat. 217, 50
U.S.C. 31 et seq. (R. 21).
In August, 1934, a conference was heid between
representatives of Marvel and the Mateviel Divi-
sion of the Air Corps (R. 22). Prior to this date
the Government had procured fuel injectors by di-
rect purchase from the company. At this confer-
ence the Air Corps representatives indicated that
thereafter procurement of fuel injectors would be
obtained through engine manufacturers on the ba-
sis of competitive bidding. (R. 22.) Marvel pro-
tested this by letter of August 18, 1934, to the Air
Corps, stating that ‘‘we have a large investment in
this project and have not had, due to your depart-
ment having impounded same as an Army secret,
an opportunity to do any manufacturing on a pro-
duction basis’’ (R. 23-24). The letter further asked
for a release from secrecy, stating that ‘‘this re-
—
7
quest for a complete release from secret develop-
ment is forced upon us at this time by the Govern-
ment asking us to compete on price before we have
had an opportunity to amortize our present out-
standing deficit’? (R. 24). In October, 1934, the
Air Corps informed Marvel that its letter had
‘‘been forwarded to higher authority since it is a
matter that relates to the general policy of releas-
ing equipment for foreign sales’? (R. 26). Anoth-
er conference was held in January, 1935, at Wright
Field and the company was advised that procure-
ment of fuel injectors for 1935 and 1936 would be
thrown open to competitive bidding (R. 27), Mar-
vel made further protests under letters of March
16, 1935 (R. 27-28), and May 19, 1936 (R. 29-30),
and again requested that the device be released
from secrecy. The War Department, in December,
1937, advised petitioner, as the successor to Marvel,
that the development was no longer considered to
be in a secret status (R. 31).
Petitioner’s final protest to the War Depart-
ment was made on January 27, 1938. After making
reference to the secrecy status under which Marvel
had to operate and its consequent inability to ne-
gotiate for outside business, petitioner made de-
mand on the War Department for the payment of
$506,320.75 allegedly due for money, labor and ma-
terials expended on the development, over and
above the money received from the Government
for the injectors supplied the Government under
its purchase orders and contracts (R. 31-32). The
28 PRATER
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War Department rejected this claim, being of the
opinion that it was ‘‘wholly untenable”’ (R. 32).
Petitioner then brought this action, pursuant to
the special jurisdictional act of August 4, 1939, su-
pra, pp. 2-38 (R. 12). Contending that it had in-
curred net expenditures of $735,526.28 in develop- |
ment work on the injector system, petitioner filed a |
claim for that amount in the court below (R. 1-9).
Petitioner alleged that the Government ‘‘received
through such experimental and development work,
among other invaluable benefits, the design and
development of said device; the great and invalu-
able benefit involved in the determination that said
fluid distributing mechanism constituted a marked |
advance over carburetion for military aircraft and |
the availability of the mechanism for use on mili- |
tary aircraft used in National Defense.’’ (R. 7). |
The Court of Claims dismissed the petition (R. 38),
holding that there was no contract implied in fact
or in law between the parties since there was no
promise, express or implied, to pay petitioner its
losses and no fraud, misrepresentation, mistake or
the like had been shown. (R. 37, 38).
ARGUMENT |
1. The special jurisdictional act pursuant to
which petitioner brought this action conferred ju-
risdiction upon the Court of Claims ‘‘to hear, de-
termine, and render judgment in such amount as
it deems may be equitably due, notwithstanding
* * * any limitation upon the jurisdiction of such
9
court with respect to claims upon any contract im-
plied in law, upon the claim of [petitioner] * * *
against the United States in connection with the
development of fuel-injection systems for use on
military aircraft * * *’’, supra, pp. 2-3 (R. 12).
The principal issne here, as both the court below
(R. 35) and petitioner (Pet. 9, 19, 21) recognize,
is whethe: the proof established a contract implied
in law between the parties. The Court of Claims
found that the dealings between the parties gave
rise to no such implied contract. We submit that
that determination, based in the main on factual
considerations, is plainly correct and does not war-
rant review.
Petitioner contends (Pet. 9, 18, 21, 24) that the
Government was unjustly enriched as a result of
its experimental work on fuel-injection systems.*
ae
* As petitioner recognizes (Pet. 18), the measure of any
recovery would be the benefit to the Government. Petitioner’s
alleged out-of-pocket loss is, in accordance with the terms
of the special act, not the measure of but a limitation on
the amount of recovery. Thus petitioner no longer presses
the claim of $735,526.28, the sum claimed in the court below
(R. 7-8) as representing its net loss on the project. Moreover,
it seems doubtful that Marvel suffered any out-of-pocket loss.
The court below found that ‘‘equal benefits inured to the
Marvel Company from the Marvel-Chandler project insofar
as the ‘know how’ of fuel-injection systems was concerned”?
(R. 33); that ‘‘the Marvel Company received an additional
benefit in that during the experimental or development period
it built up a patent situation or monopoly’? (R. 33); that
“when the Marvel Company offered to license the Government
under its patents on July 28, 1936 * * * it placed a value of
$900,000 on such license’’ (R. 34).
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10
Petitioner states (Pet. 8, 21) that the benefits re-
ceived by the Government from the development
program were the ‘‘know-how”’ of fuel injection
systems, the basic data necessary for the formula-
tion of performance specifications for such sys-
tems, increased national security which the device
furnished against potential aggressors, the saving
of development costs, and the indirect benefit re-
sulting from the stimulation given to carburetor
manufacturers when fuel-injection systems ap-
peared as a threat to their industry.*| We think it
highly doubtful that any such intangible advan-
tages could be considered an enrichment of the
United States, as that term is used in the law of
quasi contracts. Assuming, however, that such
nebulous benefits constituted an enrichment, and
apart from the extreme difficulty of evaluating
such benefits, the Government is under no duty to
make restitution. The mere fact that a person has
been benefited is not enough, It must also be shown
that the retention of such benefit is unjust. Bailis
* Petitioner also alleges that the Air Corps used a fuel-in-
jection system, not manufactured or sold by petitioner or
Marvel, on its B-29 airplanes during the war, and that
this device was manufactured and supplied in accordance
with the preformance specifications resulting from the Marvel-
Chandler development work. The conclusive answer to this is,
as noted by the court below (R. 38), that the complaint did
not ‘‘allege that the system used infringed plaintiff’s patents.
** * No claim for an infringement of the Chandler patent
having been made, we are unable to see how any liability arises
by reason of the fact that some non-infringing device was
used on these airplanes.’’
11
v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 128 F. 2d
857 (C.A. 3) ; Chandler v. Washington Toll Bridge
Authority, 17 Wash. 2d 591, 137 P. 2d 97; Restate-
ment of Restitution, § 1, comment e.
It is clear that the benefits allegedly conferred
on the Government were not conferred as the re-
sult of mistake, or of misrepresentation, fraud or
coercion on the part of the Government, and peti-
tioner does not so contend. Nor does the Govern-
ment’s imposition of secrecy on the project and
the consequent inability of Marvel to sell the device
in the open market on a mass production basis cre-
ate any basis for liability. The imposition of se-
crecy restrictions was an exercise of the sovereign
power of the Government, authorized by the Es-
pionage Act (R. 20, 21). The United States is
plainly'not liable for losses resulting from such an
exercise of government power. Horowitz v. United
States, 267 U. 8. 458; Lynch v. United States, 292
U.S. 571, 579; Gothwaite v. United States, 102 Ct.
Cls. 400; Standard Accident Insurance Company
v. United States, 103 Ct. Cls. 607, certiorari denied,
326 U.S. 729. Compare Patterson v. Kentucky,
97 U.S. 501, sustaining a state statute which pre-
vented the assignee of a patent from recouping his
original investment on commercial sales of a prod-
uct which had been commercially developed under
the patent. See also Chandler v, Washington Toll
Bridge Authority, supra. Even assuming, there-
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12
fore, that there was some benefit to the Govern-
ment, it cannot be argued that the retention of the
benefit was unjust.
Petitioner’s protestations to the contrary, there
is nothing particularly novel about the situation
presented here. Any expenditures made by peti-
tioner were incurred in a project which was under-
taken in the hope of securing large orders from the
War Department and thereby reaping considerable
profits. For purposes of the law of quasi-con-
tracts, such expenditures are not to be viewed as
conferring a benefit on the Government for they
are primarily made in petitioner’s own behalf.
“The contingent remuneration expected was large
enough to induce [petitioner] to render [its] serv-
ices purely in tie hope of receiving it and [ peti-
tioner] must have known that payment was con-
tingent on success.’’ Federal Royalty Co. v. Know,
114 F. 2d 78, 80 (C. A. 5). Accordingly, the law
consistently denies recovery for work done and
expenses incurred in anticipation of entering into
a contract. Mergenthaler vy. Dailey, 136 F. 2d 182
(C. A. 2); Sickelco v. Union Pacific R. R, ¢ 'o., 111
F. 2d 746, 750 (C. A. 9); Restatement of Restitu-
tion, §§ 56, comment e, and 57, comment b.
2. Petitioner makes the secondary argument
(Pet. 12-14) that the lower court ignored the clear
mandate of the Congress to determine the amount
“equitably due.’’? Petitioner states that “the Con-
gress must have felt that the government was ‘mor-
13
ally and equitably liable’ and that it intended to
give the Court a mandate to determine the amount,
if any, by which the money expended by Marvel ex-
ceeded its sales ‘of the developed product’ ’’. (Pet.
14). This is the argument, often made in connec-
tion with special jurisdictional acts, that the act
conceded the liability of the Government, and that
all that remained for the Court of Claims to do
was to assess petitioner’s net loss. This argument
is inconsistent with petitioner’s main conten-
tion that the basis for recovery is not thé
net loss to it but the asserted benefit to the
Government: ‘‘the basis for claim under the
Jurisdictional Act is that respondent received
a benefit for which, in view of the circumstances,
it should make restitution,’’ that ‘“‘the present ac-
tion is based upon the benefit to respondent * * *”
(Pet. 18). Moreover, it is well settled that special
acts conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Claims
to render judgment on claims ‘‘equitably’’ due do
not concede liability on the part of the defendant,
but merely provide a forum for the presentation
and adjudication of the case according to applica-
ble legal principles. United States v. Mille Lac
Chippewas, 229 U. S. 498, 500; The Sac and Fox
Indians, 220 U. 8S. 481, 489; Tillson v. United
States, 100 U. 8. 48, 46; Coos Bay Indian Tribe v.
United States, 87 Ct. Cls. 143, 153, certiorari de-
nied, 306 U. S. 653; Iowa Tribe of Indians vy.
United States, 68 Ct. Cls, 585, 605. That this was
the intention of Congress is perfectly plain from
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the title of the Act (supra, p. 2) which states
that its purpose is ‘‘to confer jurisdiction upon
the Court of Claims to hear, determine, and render
judgment upon the claim of the Borg-Warner Cor-
poration,’’ and from its legislative history. (See
pp. 33 and 43 of the Appendix to petitioner’s brief).
CONCLUSION
The decision of the court below is clearly correct
and there is no conflict of decisions. The petition
for a writ of certiorari should therefore be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
Puitie B. PERLMAN,
Solicitor General.
NEWELL A. Capp,
Acting Assistant Attorney General.
SAMUEL D. SLApE,
RicHarp P. WILLIAMS, IIT
Attorneys,
’
Marcu 1951
W U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1951—931942/P.0. 588
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