Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Borg-Warner Corp. v. United States

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1950

No. 475

BORG-WARNER CORPORATION, tw Its Own Ricur anv

As Successor TO THE Marvet Carspureter Company,

Petitioner,

THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS

Cuarwes D. THamMet,

Lee |. Park,

FE. Weaver Myers,

CLareNcE F. RorHensure,

Counsel for Petitioner.

Hame., Park & SauNDERS,

Of Counsel.

INDEX

Suspsecr INpex

Petition for writ of certiorari

Opinion below and basis for suit

Summary statement of the matter involved

Jurisdictional statement

Question presented

Specification of errors to be urged

Reasons relied on for the allowance of the writ

1. The Lower Court ignored the clear man-

date of the Congress to determine the

amount ‘ Mquitably due.’’

2. The opinion of the lower court is in direct

conflict with all of the authorities on

‘Contracts Implied in Law.”’

(a) The law of ‘‘contraets implied in

law’’, (‘‘Quasi Contracts’’)

(b) The Court of Claims did not ap-

ply the principles of ‘*Con-

tracts implied in law.’’

(c) That the Court failed to apply

the principles of contracts im-

plied in law is evident from

numerous conclusions in the

opinion

Appendix A—Jurisdictional Act

Appendix B—House Report No. 890—76th Congress

TABLE oF Cases CITED

Altman’s Will, In re, 266 N.Y.S. 773

American LaFrance & Foamite Industries vy. Arling-

ton County, 192 S. BE. 758

American LaFrance Fire Engine Co. v. Borough of

Shenandoah, 115 F. 2d 866

Armstrong v. Weiss, 168 Mise. 653, 7 N.Y.S. 2d 26

Bicknell v. Garrett, 96 P. 2d 592

—2154

fn.

fn.

fn.

fn.

fn.

14

14

16

16

16

il

INDEX

Blue Creek Development Co. v. Howell, 101 W. Va.

748,

133 8 S. E. 699

Board of Com’rs of Decatur County v. Greensburg

Times, 19 N. E. 2d 459...

Board of Highway Com’rs v. C ity of Bloomington,

253 Ill. 164, 97 N. KE. 280

Brown’s Estate vy. Stair, 25 Colo. App. 140, 136 P.

— man V. Inde pe nde nt Se hool Dist. No.

City of Pella v.

1003

- S

Cameron v. idk 3 A. 2d 423...

Cascaden v. Magryta, 247 Mich, 267, 225 N. W. 511

734

Dysart v. Remington Rand, 32 F. Supp. 477

Edwards

o34,

30 P. 2d 225

Farmers State Bank of Amherst, In re, 289 N. W.

French v. Lewis and Clark County, 87 Mont. 448,

P. 4

Geo. B. Holman & Co. v. Graham, 165 Mise.

LS. 850

N.Y

i)

Fowler, 215 lowa 90, 244 N. W.

v. Surety Finance Co. of Seattle, 176 Wash.

io

Goodall vy. Warden's Adm’r, 280 Ky. 6382, 133 8S. W.

2d §

Graf v.

519,

M44

» 200

288

389, 300

Neith Coop. Dairy Products Ass'n, 216 Wis.

257 N. W. 618

Bards v. Burroughs, 251 Mich. 578, 232 N. W. 200

Hermann v. Gleason, 126 F. 2d 936

Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. St. (5 Casey) 465

Hylan v. Dewey, 73 P. 2d 1088

La - son V.

245 N. W. 627.

Mose s v. Macfarlan, 2 Burr. 1005

Olsen v. Independent and Consolidated School Dist.

No.

50, 220 N. W. 606. .

Towle-Jamieson Inv. Co., 187 Minn.

Philpott v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 2d 512, 36 P.

635

Porter Const. Co. v. Be rry, 1 36 Or. 80, 298 P. 179

Royal Indemnity Co. v. Sol Lustbader, Inc., 26 N.Y.S.

2d

298

368,

2d

Page

fn.

fn.

fn.

fn.

fn.

fn.

fn.

fn.

fn.

fn.

fn.

fn.

fn.

fn.

fn.

fn.

fn.

fn.

fn.

fn.

fn.

fn.

fn.

fn.

16

16

16

16

16

16

17

17

16

16

16

17

16

16

16

16

16

16

16

17

14

16

16

17

16

INDEX lil

Page

Schenley Distillers Corp. v. Kinsey Distilling Corp.,

136 I. 2d 350 . _ fn. 16

Snuth v. Cheboygan Stete Sav. Bank, 293 Mich. 131,

291 N. W. 249 fn. 16

Union Central Life Ins. Co. vy. Glasscock, ‘ 270 Ky. 750,

110 8S. W. 2d 681 fn. 16

United States v. Minnesota Mutual Investment Co.,

271 U. S. 212, 70 L. Ed. 911 ; fn. 16

Weatherly v. American Agr. Chemical Co., 16 Tenn.

App. 618, 65S. W. 2d 592... . fn. 17

Wilkes v. Stacy Williams Co., 179 So. 245 fn. 16

SratTuTes Cirep

Private Act No, 127, 76th Congress, approved August

4, 1939 ve 2

28 U.S.C. § 1255 Deno a . 9, fn. 9

Oruer AuTHorities Crrep

Ames, History of Assumpsit, 2 Harv. L. Rev. 64

(1888-89) fn. 16

17 Corpus Juris Secundum, Contracts, See. 6 (1939) fn. 16

45 TLL.R. 1383, ** Change of Position”’ fn. 17

Keener, Law of Quasi Contracts 16 (1893) fn. 16

1 Mo. Law 223, ‘‘Scope of Restitution and Unjust En-

richment’’ . fn. 17

Restatement of the Law of Contracts, See. 5 (1932) — fn. 16

Thurston, Cases on Restitution fn. 16

Williston on Contracts (Rev. Ed. Williston and

Thompson) See. 3 (1936) fn. 16

eyes “The Law of Quasi Contracts’’ (1913)

(See. 4(2)) _. 15

Wright ‘*The Study of Law”’, 54 Law icine Rev.

185 at 195 fn. 16

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1950

No. 475

BORG-WARNER CORPORATION, ty Its Own Ricur anp

AS Successor To THE Marven Carsureter Company,

in Petitioner,

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS

To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of

the Supreme Court of the United States:

The petitioner prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to

review the judgment of the United States Court of Claims

which was entered in the above cause on May 1, 1950, and

became final by the denial of a motion for new trial on

November 2, 1950.

Opinion Below and Basis for Suit

The Opinion of the Court of Claims (R. 11 to 39) is

reported in 117 Ct. Cls. 1, 89 Fed. Supp. 1013. Suit was

SARITA A LTA TG Mie le

2

brought under Private Act No. 127, 76th Congress, approved

August 4, 1939."

Summary Statement of the Matter Involved

Petitioner is an Illinois corporation, incorporated May

9, 1928. Marvel Carbureter Company was incorporated

under the laws of Illinois on May 14, 1927, as the suecessor

in interest of an Indiana corporation of the same name

which had been incorporated on November 8, 1908. On

June 5, 1928, all of Marvel’s stock was acquired by peti-

tioner and on July 24, 1936, petitioner acquired all of

Marvel’s assets and assumed all of its liabilities (R. 11,

12).

Marvel’s principal business was the manufacture and

sale of carburetors on a mass production basis (R. 15).

In 1926, Marvel and one Chandler, who had a patent for

a fuel pump or injector (hereinafter sometimes referred

to as the Chandler injector) entered into a contract which

provided for Chandler’s employment by Marvel and gave

Marvel a license under Chandler’s patent (R. 14, 15). In

the early spring of 1927, Marvel terminated this agreement

with Chandler by giving him thirty days’ notice in writing

(R. 17). Shortly prior thereto, a representative of the

United States Air Corps at MeCook Field, Dayton, Ohio,

had visited the Marvel plant at Flint, Michigan, and had

been shown the Chandler injector. Accordingly, when

Marvel decided to discontinue the development work on the

injector, its Chief Engineer advised the Air Corps as fol-

lows (R. 17):

‘“‘We are writing to advise that we have decided to

discontinue the development work on the fuel injection

1A complete copy of the Act is attached as Appendix A, and a copy of

the report of the Committee on Claims of the House of Representatives on

the Act, (to which is appended the Senate Report on the Act), is attached

as Appendix B. (See R. 13.)

3

device that the writer showed you at the time of your

visit to our plant some six or eight weeks ago.

‘It occurred to the writer that your department

might be interested in making some arrangement with

Mr. M. G. Chandler, who is now at liberty to consider

something of this character as he has been uncondi-

tionally released from the arrangement with us.’’

Chandler met with the Air Corps’ representatives at

MeCook Field on June 28, 1927. He went there on his own

behalf and not on behalf of Marvel. His objective was to

interest the Air Corps in building fuel injection devices

that. he would undertake to design but found that the Air

Corps was interested only in developing sources of supply

for such devices. Capt. T. E. Tillinghast, Chief of the

Power Plant Branch at MeCook Field, in turn requested

Chandler to secure the cooperation of Marvel in such a

project (R. 17).

Marvel cooperated by reemploying Chandler and deliv-

ering a device in August 1927. In November 1927 the

device was subjected to bench tests with satisfactory re-

sults (R. 18).

By November 1929 the Air Corps considered the device

of such importance that on November 28, 1929, it wrote

Marvel as follows (R. 18, 19, and Appendix B, pp. 28, 36):

‘1. With regard to the above development, it is

the desire of the Division to impress on the Marvel

Carbureter Company the desire or demand for develop-

ing this project with the utmost haste.

‘*4. The object of this letter is to advise Marvel Car-

bureter Company of the extreme importance at this

time of the fuel metering pump development and to

request that, if possible, this project be given first

priority in your experimental work.”’ (Italics supplied.)

goer NPE OIRLE TH

4

From the early part of 1930 through February 1936,

great interest was shown in this development by engine

manufacturers, airplane companies, foreign governments

and their agents, brokers, ete. (R. 31). .

On October 29, 1930, the Air Corps wrote Marvel’s presi-

dent in confirmation of agreements reached at a prior

conference which included, among other things, the fol-

lowing (R. 19, 20, and Appendix B, pp. 28, 37, 38):

‘*(a) That from a financial and development stand-

point, the Materiel Division has been largely involved

in the general development of the fuel charger, and

that the Division’s future plans and policies in con-

nection with new engine development are obviously

dependent, to a great extent, on the satisfactory com-

pletion of this equipment ;

‘*(b) That in view of the above the Division feels

that the Marvel Carbureter Company owes its first

allegiance to the Division in such development, man-

ufacture and deliveries;

‘*(e) That development and manufacture of equip-

ment for the Wright R-1820 and the Curtiss Vee engines

be given priority over any other project, and that this

work be expedited with all possible speed;

‘“(d) That no other work in this connection be under-

taken which could curtail the above development in

any sense of the word;

‘“(e) That foreign or domestic development or sales

be delayed until such time as the Army agrees that

they will not affect procurement necessary for the

Air Corps needs ;’’ (Italics supplied).

A few months later, however, the Air Corps apparently

decided that this agreement with Marvel was not enough

protection. By letter dated March 21, 1931, Brigadier Gen-

eral Pratt, who had complete authority over the Wright

5

Field procurement division, notified Marvel as follows (R.

20; also Appendix B, pp. 28, 29, 38, 39):

‘“* * * the Division, therefore, has classified all

documents, technical data, reports and devices per-

taining to this development as ‘Secret’, which precludes

demonstration and/or manufacture of it abroad. It

also limits the commercial use of this device in the

United States to specific applications which meet with

the approval of the War Department. The Materiel

Division undertook this development with this under-

standing.’’? (Italics supplied.)

In imposing these restrictions, however, General Pratt

also apparently recognized that prolonged restriction could

seriously injure Marvel because the same notice, after call-

ing attention to the general policy with respect to restrict-

ing sales of equipment of military value, said: (R. 21, and

Appendix B, p. 39)

“* * * Tn this particular case, however, it is

believed that the Air Corps will be compensated for

its support of this development if the release is with-

he'd until the completion of a satisfactory Service

Test.’’ (Italics supplied)

Such a Service Test appears to have been completed some

time prior to August 8, 1934, because an Air Corps’ report

of a conference on that date stated (R. 22, 23, and Appendix

B, pp. 29):

*In September 1933 the “Secret” classification was removed from cor-

respondence, telegrams, ete. but left applicable to “drawings, technical re-

‘ports, specifications” ete. (R. 21); in April 1934 the “Seeret” status on

“specifications, drawings and reports” was changed to “Confidential” with

“secrecy” still applicable to “foreign and domestic sales” (R. 22); in

January 1936 the Air Corps advised Marvel that “this development is

still classified as a seceret project in this Division” (R. 29); in Deeem-

ber 1937 the Assistant Secretary of War advised Marvel that the develop-

ment of this injector by the Air Corps was no longer in a “secret status”

(BR. SE).

6

‘3. In response to an inquiry as to what their pro-

cedure should be relative to the further developmen‘

of this device for use on the 14-cylinder engine, it was

suggested that the project be reconsidered and that

the Air Corps would prefer to work through the engine

manufacturers. This is particularly true in view of

the fact that service tests and the development thus

far had definitely established a military characteristic

for the fuel charger; * * *.’’® (Italics supplied)

But despite the completion of the service test the release

was not fortheoming.t The reason apparently was that the

injector was too valuable to the Air Corps. Under date of

January 14, 1935, the Chief of the Air Corps wrote to the

Chief of the Materiel Division of the Air Corps as follows

(R. 27, also Appendix B, pp. 31, 42):

‘1. In the light of such information as has been

forwarded the Chief of Air Corps, the Marvel fuel

injection system and its application to aviation is a

marked advance. It is superior to any similar effort

that has come to his attention. Its possession promises

to be of great advantage to the Army Air Corps. In

case of an emergency the utilization of this device may

contribute greatly to the superiority of Army equip-

ment over that of an aggressor. It, therefore, is desir-

able that this important device be held for the exclu-

sive use of the armed forces of the United States as

long as such an advantage can be enjoyed. Release for

domestie and export sales cannot be granted at this

time.’’*® (Italics supplied)

3 It will be noted, however, from the Appendix B, p. 36, that a 14 eylinder

injector was ordered from Marvel on June 29, 1935.

4 Although many times requested (R. 24, 28).

5 The Materiel Division of the Air Corps had recognized, in an inter-

office communication, the unfairness to Marvel of the continued restric-

tions. In a letter dated October 3, 1934, to the Chief of the Air Corps,

the Division said (R. 25, 26, Appendix B, pp. 30, 31, 41):

“4. The present status of the fuel injector, insofar as this Division

is concerned, is that the Marvel Carbureter Company has the only

7

Concurrently the great value of the injector to the War

Department, and its continued interest therein, were evi-

denced by the publication of its plans for much greater use

of the injector in its airplane engines. Under date of

December 21, 1934, the War Department published a report

which stated, among other things: (R. 26, 27)

‘It has been tentatively planned that all engines

procured after July 1, 1935, for single engined air-

planes, will be equipped with fuel injection accom-

plished to meet the requirements of Specification

28169,”" *

cs * " The services rendered by Mr. M. G.

Chandier, the inventor of the injector which was de-

veloped and promoter of many valuable related ideas,

and his co-worker, Mr. W. J. Cooke, were beyond

evaluation in assuring the success of this project.’’

Marvel received no orders from the government for

injectors atfer June 1935 (Appendix B, p. 36)® and having

injector which can be approved for installation on Air Corps equip-

ment at this time. However, it is anticipated that within a year or

so, Eclipse Aviation Corporation, and possibly United American Boseh

Corporation and Wright Aeronautical Corporation, will have devel-

oped their injectors to the point where they will be satisfactory.

* * * * * * *

“7, * * © From the above it is apparent that one of two things

should be done in eases of this kind: (a) Allow the manufacturer to

eel his product when he wishes, (b) Pay full development costs.

°*

*8 Also prior to August 31, 1934, the Air Corps had advised engine

manufacturers as follows (R. 24, 25):

“1. It is contemplated that for F.Y. 1936, all engine designs for

single-engine tactical airplanes shall incorporate fuel injection ©s an

integral part. At the present time, an approved type of fuel injector is

manufactured by the Marvel Carbureter Company of Flint, Michi-

gan.”

® Subsequent orders were for parts and services (R. 30, 31).

_—————

8

completed all of its contracts with or for the government,

Marvel was compelled to close down the Chandler project at

the end of 1936 (R. 30, 31).

While Marvel’s device was subject to security restric-

tions, which prevented Marvel from exploiting it commer-

cially, the so-called floatless carburetor’’ was perfected.

This device eliminated the difficulties formerly existing in

carburetors and superseded fuel injection systems (R. 33).

T, United States received valuable benefits from the

development. Such benefits included the ‘*know-how’’ of

fuel injection systems used for aeronautical purposes (R.

33), and the basic data necessary for the formulation of per-

formance specifications for fuel injection systems which were

available for, and were used in obtaining, fuel injection

devices used on the famous b-29 airplanes during World

War Il. In addition, the Army Air Corps received a fur-

ther indirect but extremely valuable benefit through the

stimulation given to the carbuetor manufacturing concerns,

(Appendix B, pp. 32, 43) as a result of which they were able

to overcome the difficulties inherent in the conventional

carburetor when used for aviation purposes and to perfect

the so-called ‘‘floatless carburetor.’’ In the meantime, it

had the great benefit of maximum security in that it had the

exclusive possession of a device which was superior to any

similar effort that it knew about and which it thought

would ‘contribute greatly to the superiority of army equip-

ment over that of an aggressor’? (R. 27). In addition,

respondent saved development costs by having the develop-

ment work done by Marvel.

The lower Court did not find the amount of petitioner’s

loss but, for the purpose of its decision, apparently assumed

7 Although the projeet was closed down, Marvel still had to furnish re-

placement parts for, and service certain devices which had been deliv-

ered prior to 1937. The parts were on hand when the project was closed

down (R. 31).

ail

9

that Marvel expended a sum ‘‘largely in excess of the

amount received from the Air Corps and the Navy”’ (R. 36).

It is petitioner’s contention that these facts establish

a contract implied in law in that respondent ‘‘received a

benefit’? the retention of which, without restitution, would

be inequitable.

Jurisdictional Statement

The judgment of the Court of Claims was entered on

May 1, 1950 (R. 38). A Motion for New Tria! was filed on

May 22, 1950, and denied on October 2, 1950 (R. 39). The

jurisdiction of the Court is invoked under the Special Juris-

dictional Act, under which this suit was brought, and See-

tion 1255 of Title 28 U.S.C. That Jurisdictional Act pro-

vides for review ‘‘as in the ease of claims over which such

Court has jurisdiction under Section 145 of the Judicial

Code, as amended.’’ *

Question Presented

The fundamental question in this ease is whether or not

the Court of Claims, after it had been delegated jurisdic-

tion by the Congress to determine the amount equitably due,

notwithstanding any limitation on its jurisdiction with

respect to claims upon contracts implied in law, ean never-

theless ignore the mandate of the Congress and refuse to

apply equitable principles applicable to contracts implied

in law.

*See Appendix A. Effective June 30, 1926, the Congress consolidated

and codified the general and permanent laws of the United States in force

on December 7, 1925. Sueh laws ineluded Section 145 of the Judicial

Code which provided for jurisdiction of the Court of Claims and the

Act of February 13, 1925, whieh provided for review on certiorari of

cases over whieh the Court of Claims had jurisdiction. In the said eon-

solidation and codifieation, Section 145 of the Judicial Code and the Act

of February 13, 1925, were eodified as Sections 250 and 288, respectively,

of Title 28 U.S.C. Under Chapter 646 of Publie Law 773, 80th Con-

gress, 2nd Session, the said Sections 250 and 288 were enacted into law

as Sections 1491 and 1255, respectively, of Title 28 U.S.C.

EES SEIS BO AIP H.

Cae

10

The Jurisdictional Act authorized the Court of Claims

to ‘render judgment in such amount as it deems may be

equitably due, notwithstanding

upon the jurisdiction of such court with respect to claims

upon any contract implied in law, upon the claim of’’ peti-

tioner in its own right and as successor to Marve ‘‘against

the United States in connection with the development of

fuel injection systems for use on military aircraft; pro-

vided, however, that such damages shall not exceed the

actual moneys expended by the said Borg-Warner Corpora-

tion and the Marvel Carbureter Company in connection

with this said development during the calendar years 1927

to 1936 inclusive.’’®

* * any limitation

Suit was brought under this Act and petitioner submits

that the lower Court erred in failing and refusing to deter-

mine the amount ‘‘equitably due’’ without regard to any

limitation on the Court’s jurisdiction with respect to claims

‘‘upon any contract implied in law.’’

Specification of Errors to Be Urged

The Court of Claims erred:

1. In completely ignoring the mandate of the Congress to

determine the amount ‘‘equitably due”’

Jurisdictional Act.

2. In failing and refusing to determine the amount

‘equitably due’’ without regard to ‘‘any limitation upon the

jurisdiction of such Court with respect to claims upon any

contract implied inlaw * * ®.”’

3. In considering the matter only from the standpoint

of the legal rights and remedies of the parties arising from

their contractual relations as distinguished from equitable

rights, contrary to the obvious intent of the Congress in

passing the Jurisdictional Act.

as provided in the

®See Appendix A,

11

4. In deciding the issue in this case upon the basis of

principles applicable in cases involving contracts expressed

or implied in fact, and in failing and refusing to apply the

well-established principles of ‘‘quasi contracts’? or ‘‘con-

tracts implied in law.”’

9. In failing to consider whether, under all the facts,

respondent had received a benefit the retention of which,

without restitution, would be inequitable.

6. In concluding that respondent was not liable because

‘there was no representation by the Air Corps that it would

reimburse the Marvel Company for its loss in case it did not

sell enough of the devices to cover the cost of develop-

s910

ment, a proper basis for the denial of a contract in fact

but not a contract ‘implied in law.”’

7. In concluding that respondent was not liable because

‘nothing was done from which the Marvel Company had

any right to conelude that the Air Corps would reimburse

it for any loss it might ineur,’’' a proper basis for the

denial of a contract in fact but not a contract ‘implied

in law.’’

8. In concluding that respondent was not liable because

‘‘there was never an intimation that it [the Air Corps |

would guarantee the company against loss,’?™ a proper

basis for the denial of a contract in fact but not a contract

‘implied in law.’’

9. In concluding that respondent was not liable because

it ‘*did not expressly or impliedly promise to continue to

purchase these devices if a better one became available, nor

did it delude plaintiff into believing it would,’ ™ a proper

basis for the denial of a contract in fact but not a contract

‘implied in law.”’

10'Op. RB. 36.

11Qp. R. 36.

2 Op. R. 36.

Op. R. 37.

a be ‘

ead eas dite aetna EOE a

Sie ARR ad)

& ASN RAISES ie AAS RITA Spe REL Ee

12

Reasons Relied On for the Allowance of the Writ

1. THE LOWER COURT IGNORED THE CLEAR MANDATE OF

THE CONGRESS TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT “EQUI-

TABLY DUE.”

It is clear from the Committee Reports, that a fairly

complete record of the dealings between the pa rties and the

War Department’s inter-office communications with re-

spect to the Chandler Fuel Injector project was submitted

to the Congress in a letter dated March 28, 1939, from the

Secretary of War to the Chairman of the Committee on

Claims, United States Senate. This letter is incorporated

in and made a part of the Report which states:

“The facts are fully set forth in the following let-

ter from the Secretary of War which is appended hereto

and made a part of this report’? (See Appendix B,

p. 33).

The original Bill in the Senate included a provision which

would have authorized the Court to render judgment for

such sum as it might have found to be equitably due for

the ‘“‘taking and impounding’’ under the Espionage Act

of all matters pertaining to the development of fuel injee-

tion systems for use on military aircraft (Appendix B, p.

43). The Secretary of War objected to this provision but

did not object to a determination that the government was

‘morally and equitably liable.’’ After a detailed recita-

tion of the facts, the Secretary summed up the position of

the War Department as follows:

““So far as the War Department is informed, the

Marvel Carbureter Co. did everything in its power

to maintain secreey concerning the fuel-injector de-

velopment. In other words, it did not violate the

Espionage Act. But it is the view of the War Depart-

ment that a compliance with a criminal statute should

not create a claim against the Government. Under

the Neutrality Act a license must be secured from the

13

Secretary of State to export certain implements of

war. Would the Congress recognize a claim for lost

profits occasioned by the refusal to grant a license to

export implements of war?) The recognition of such

a claim would appear to be contrary to public policy.

So in this case it is the view of the War Department

that the claim should not be based upon any alleged tak-

ing or impounding under the Espionage Act.

‘*The only question is whether, under all of the facts,

the Government is morally and equitably liable for

money expended by the Marvel Carbureter Co. in the

development of fuel chargers which has not been re-

covered by the sale of the developed product.

‘*As so limited the War Department has no objection

to the reference of the matter to the Court of Claims

for determination.’’ (Italics supplied.)

The Congress accordingly eliminated the provision to

which the Secretary objected and directed the Court of

Claims to render judgment in ‘‘such amounts as it deems

ete. and, for the purpose of this

%°9

may be equitably due

case, removed the limitation on the jurisdiction of the

Court with respect to claims on ‘‘contracts implied in law.*’

The War Department had considered petitioner’s claim

only from the standpoint of legal rights and remedies.

Without the Jurisdictional Act, petitioner obviously had no

remedy in equity or on a contract implied in law because

the United States had not consented to be sued in any Court

on such a cause of action. The Congress took note of this

situation, as evidenced by the following quotation from

Senate Report No. 314 (Appendix B, p. 33):

“The War Department held the claim untenable, con-

sidering the matter only from the standpoint of legal

rights and remedies of the parties arising from their

contractual relations as distinguished from equitable

rights.’’

A Rhu SSF ee hte CREE EH

14

It is clear from the above that the Congress must have

felt that the government was ‘‘morally and equitably liable’’

and that it intended to give the Court a mandate to de-

termine the amount, if any, by which the money expended

by Marvel exceeded its sales ‘‘of the developed product.’’

The lower Court not only failed to determine the amount

of such excess but also, like the War Department had done

before the Jurisdictional Act was passed, considered ‘‘the

matter only from the standpoint of legal rights and remedies

of the parties arising from their contractual relations as

distinguished from equitable rights.’’ The entire rationale

of the lower Court’s Opinion is devoted to the question of

the legal rights and remedies of the parties arising from

their contractual relations. Nowhere in the Opinion are

any moral or equitable considerations mentioned, Petitioner

respectfully submits, therefore, that the lower Court ig-

nored the clear mandate of the Congress.

2, THE OPINION OF THE LOWER COURT IS IN DIRECT CON-

FLICT WITH ALL OF THE AUTHORITIES ON “CON-

TRACTS IMPLIED IN LAW.”

(a) The law of ‘‘contracts implied in law,”’ (‘Quasi Con-

tracts’’)

Lord Mansfield’s opinion in the ease of Moses v. Macfar-

lan, 2 Burr. 1005, decided by the Court of King’s Bench in

1760 may be said to mark the emergence of ‘‘quasi con-

tract’’ or ‘‘contract implied in law’’ as a distinct species

of common law obligation which have been enforced ever

since. He said:

“* * * But it lies for money paid by mistake; or

upon a consideration which happens to fail; or for

money got through imposition (express, or implied) ;

or extortion; or oppression; or an undue advantage

taken of the plaintiff’s situation, contrary to laws made

15

for the protection of persons under those circumstances.

In one word the gist of this kind of action is, that the

defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged

by the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the

money.’ (Italies supplied.)

More recently the principles of quasi contracts and their

origin were succinctly summarized by Professor Woodward

in his book ‘*The Law of Quasi Contracts’’ (1913) (See.

4(2)):

“Quasi contracts distinguished from contracts.—

Only within the last generation have quasi contractual

obligations been commonly so called. They were

formerly regarded as a species of contract, and to

distinguish them from express contracts, and con-

tracts implied in fact, i. e. contracts in which a promise

is inferred from conduct, were called contracts implied

inlaw. Since, like contracts proper, they were enforeed

by means of the action of assumpsit, it is not surpris-

ing that in a period when more importance was at-

tached to the forms of legal remedies than to the nature

of substantive rights, the essential dissimilarity of the

two obligations was not observed. The persistent fail-

ure to recognize it, however, has resulted in confusion

and error, and in many cases has wrought serious in-

justice. It cannot be too strongly emphasized, there-

fore, that quasi contracts are in no sense genuine con-

tracts. The contractor’s obligation is one that he has

voluntarily assumed. He is bound because he has

made a promise or undertaking that the law will en-

force. And the only difference between an express

contract and a contract implied in fact is that in the

former the promise or undertaking is verbal, while

in the latter it is an implication of the promisor’s

conduct. But quasi contractual obligations are im-

posed without reference to the obligor’s promise—it

may be that he has explicitly refused to promise—but

So Wise at haere,

3 RG OO Re NAL at Oe

16

because he has received a benefit the retention of which

would be inequitable.’’** (Italics supplied.)

(b) The Court of Claims did not apply the principles of

‘Contracts implied in law”’

Petitioner submits that the Court of Claims failed to

observe in this case ‘‘the essential dissimilarity of the two

obligations’’ and, in so doing, ‘thas wrought serious injus-

tice.’’

The Court starts its Opinion by noting that the Juris-

dictional Act in this case is different from the Jurisdic-

tional Acts in other exceptional cases in that it gave the

14 See also Williston on Contracts (Rev. Ed. Williston and Thompson)

Sec. 3 (1936); Restatement of the Law of Contracts, See. 5 (1932);

Keener, Law of Quasi Contracts 16 (1893), Ames, History of Assumpsit,

2 Harv. L. Rev. at 64 (1888-89); Thurston, Cases on Restitution; 17 Cor-

pus Juris Secundum, Contraets, See. 6 (1939); Wright “The Study of

Law,” 54 Law Quarterly Rev. 185 at 195; United States v. Minnesota

Mutual Investment Co., 271 U. S. 212 at 217, 70 L. ed. 911, 913; Schen-

ley Distillers Corp. v. Kinsey Distilling Corp., 136 F. 2d 350; Philpott

v. Superior Court (Sup. Ct. Cal.), 1 Cal. 2d 512, 36 P. 2d 635; Hermann

v. Gleason, 126 F. 2d 936; American LaFrance Fire Engine Co. v. Bor-

ough of Shenandoah, 115 F. 2d 866; Olsen v. Independent and Consoli-

dated School Dist. No. 50 of St. Louis County (Sup. Ct. Minn.), 220

N. W. 606; Board of Highway Com’rs. Bloomington Tp. v. City of Bloom-

ington, 253 Ill. 164, 97 N. E. 280; Brown’s Estate v. Stair, 25 Colo. App.

140, 136 P. 1003; In re Farmers State Bank of Amherst, 289 N. W. 75;

Goodall v. Warden’s Adm’r, 280 Ky. 632, 133 S. W. 2d 944; Bruggeman

v. Independent School District No. 4, Union Tp., Mitchell County, 289

N. W. 5; Board of Com’rs of Decatur County v. Greensburg Times, 19

N. E. 2d 459; rehearing denied 20 N. FE. 2d 647; Bicknell v. Garrett, 96

P. 2d 592; Hardy v. Burroughs, 251 Mich. 578, 232 N. W. 200; Geo. B.

Holman & Co. v. Graham, 165 Mise. 389, 300 N.Y.S. 850; Union Central

Life Ins. Co. vy. Glasscock, 270 Ky. 750, 110 S. W. 2d 681; Wilkes v.

Stacy Williams Co., 179 So, 245; American LaFrance d Foamite Indus-

tries v. Arlington County, 192 8S. E. 758; Hyland vy. Dewey, 73 P. 2d

1038; Armstrong v. Weiss, 168 Mise. 653, 7 N.Y.S. 2d 26; Cameron, to

Use of Cameron v. Eynon, 3 A. 2d 423; Royal Indemnity Co. vy. Sol Lust-

bader, Inc., 26 N.Y.S. 2d 328; Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. St. (5 Casey)

465; Smith v. Cheboygan State Sav. Bank, 293 Mich. 131, 291 N SY. 249;

Dysart v. Remington Rand, 32 F. Supp. 477; Graf v. Neith Coop. Dairy

Products Ass'n, 216 Wis. 519; 257 N. W. 618; Blue Creek Development

Co. v. Howell, 101 W. Va. 748; 133 S. E. 699; Edwards v. Surety Finance

17

Court ‘‘jurisdiction to render judgment on any contract

‘implied in law’ between plaintiff and defendant.’’ The

Court then says: (R. 35)

‘‘This is the issue: Was there a contract implied in

law?”?

But the context of the Opinion from there on clearly

indicates that the Court fell into the error against which

Professor Woodward warned (see page 15, supra) because

despite its correct statement of the question, the Opinion

appears to be concerned primarily with the following ques-

tions:

1. Whether respondent had promised to “reimburse

the Marvel Company for its loss’’ (R. 36).

2. Whether there was any intimation that the govern-

ment would ‘‘guarantee the company against loss”

(R. 36).

3. Whether the government expressly or impliedly

promised ‘‘to continue to purchase these devices if a

better one became available’? or ‘‘deluded plaintiff

into believing it would’’ (R. 37).

4. Whether a ‘‘contract implied in law can arise

from the designation of this device, documents and

data, as seeret. (R. 37).

The first three bear on whether there was a contract ex-

pressed or implied in fact. They have no bearing whatsoever

on the question involved herein, namely, whether there was

a “quasi contract’? or a ‘‘contract implied in law’ for as

all of the authorities agree such ‘obligations are imposed

Co. of Seattle, 176 Wash. 534, 30 P. 2d 225; Weatherly v. American Agr.

Chemical Co., 16 Tenn. App. 613, 65 S. W. 2d 592; Porter Const. Co. v.

Berry, 136 Or. 80, 298 P. 179; In re Altmann’s Will, 266 N.Y.S. 773;

French v. Lewis and Clark County, 87 Mont. 448, 288 P. 455; Lamson v.

Towle-Jamieson Inv. Co., 187 Minn. 368, 245 N. W. 627; Cascaden v.

Magryta, 247 Mich. 267, 225 N. W. 511; City of Pella v. Fowler, 215

Iowa 90, 244 N. W. 734; see also, Article on Quasi Contracts “Change of

Position,” 45 H.L.R. 1333; Article on “Seope. of Restitution and Unjust

Enrichment,” 1 Mo, Law 223.

serie

18

without reference to the obligor’s promise—it may be that

he has explicitly refused to promise—but because he has

received a benefit the retention of which would be inequi-

table.’’ See pp. 15, 16, supra.

The fourth reason for the Court’s conclusion as listed

above, is simply a restatement of the position taken by the

Secretary of War in objecting to the provision in the origi-

nal Bill authorizing the Court to render judgment for a

‘‘taking and impounding’’ under the Espionage Act of all

matters pertaining to the development of the Chandler fuel

injector. This provision was eliminated in the final Bill.

(See page 13, supra) Consequently, no claim could be, or

ever was, predicated upon the imposition of the security

restrictions by the War Department. The basis for claim

under the Jurisdictional Act is that respondent received a

benefit for which, in view of the circumstances, it should

make restitution.

The security restrictions represented one of the cireum-

stances but, without express Congressional authority, could

not constitute a basis for a cause of action. Had the origi-

nal Bill been passed, the cause of action would have been for

the taking of plaintiff’s property without regard to the ben-

efit to the respondent. The present action is based upon the

benefit to respondent and petitioner’s out-of-pocket loss is

merely a limitation on the amount of recovery. The two are

separate and distinct concepts. The Secretary of War

expressly recognized that the elimination of the provision

with respect to ‘taking and impounding”? still left the ques-

tion of whether the government was ‘‘morally and equitably

liable for money expended by the Marvel Carbureter Com-

pany in the development of fuel chargers which had not

been recovered by the sale of the developed product,’’ and

the Congress accordingly directed the Court of Claims to

render judgment on such basis.

19

It should be particularly noted that not a single authority

or case on the law of quasi contracts is mentioned or re-

ferred to in the Court’s Opinion. True, the Opinion gives

lip service to some of the elements found in quasi contract

cases such as ‘‘fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake’’ but

the Court’s commingling of these with the principles of

contracts expressed or implied in fact and its conclusions

show that it was not actually applying the fundamental law

of quasi contracts in this case but, on the cont ‘ary, was

simply applying the principles applicable in the cases of

contracts expressed or implied in facet. For example, the

following is illustrative: (R. 37)

‘In the absence of any promise, express or implied,

on the part of the Government to pay plaintiff its losses,

or of fraud, misrepresentation or mistake, or the like,

no contract implied in law ean arise.’

Petitioner has never claimed that respondent ever actu-

ally, or by implication, promised to pay petitioner’s losses.

Furthermore, while the absence of such a promise might

negative a contract in fact it obviously has no bearing on

the question of whether there was a contract implied in

law. Fraud, misrepresentation and mistake may be ele-

ments—but not the exclusive elements—of quasi contracts,

but the commingling by the lower Court of such elements

with the basic elements of a contract in fact indicates that

the Court was thinking of ‘‘fraud, misrepresentation or

mistake’? as a basis for inferring an actual promise to repay

petitioner’s losses, something plaintiff has never claimed.

This appears to be corroborated by the sentence in the

Opinion immediately following the above-quoted sentence:

(R. 37)

“* * * The Government certainly did not expressly

or impliedly promise to continue to purchase these

devices if a better one became available, nor did it

delude plaintiff into believing it would.”

20

The above merely negatives an actual or implied promise

to purchase—the basic element of a contract in fact but

not of a contract implied in law with which we are here con-

cerned.

Petitioner has never claimed that there was any inten-

tional fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the United

States or that any representation was ever made upon which

petitioner had a legal right to rely. But it does claim that

it reasonably misrelied, to its detriment and to respond-

ent’s great benefit, on reasonable inferences from state-

ments made by respondent’s agents with respect to timely

release from the security restrictions and respondent’s

plans. for exclusive use of the device on certain types of

airplane engines.

As early as March 1931, Brigadier General H. C. Pratt,

in charge of the Air Corps at Wright Field, indicated in a

letter to petitioner that the Chandler injector development

would be released upon ‘‘the completion of a satisfactory

service test.’? In August 1934 the Air Corps said the

‘service tests and the development thus far had definitely

established a military characteristic for the fuel charger’’

(R. 22, 23). In January 1935 the Chief of the Air Corps

decided that ‘‘this important device”’ should ‘‘be held for

the exclusive use of the armed forces of the United States

as long as such an advantage can be enjoyed’? (R. 27).

Marvel, however, was encouraged to continue by state-

ments, particularly by letters to engine manufacturers

(R. 24, 25) that the device was to be used exclusively on cer-

tain types of airplane engines for the fiscal year 1936. But

no orders for injectors were received after June 1935 (see

Appendix B, p. 36) and at the end of 1936 Marvel had to

close down the plant because orders had completely dried

up. A new device which had been developed while the

Chandler injector was under restrictions was apparently

21

ready. The Air Corps and everybody else wanted this

new device. No one then wanted the Chandler device per

se, although the government continued to enjoy the intan-

gible benefits of the development (even through World

War II when it used them on the B-29s). In other words,

the Aif Corps got everything it wanted at Marvel’s expense

—namely, such security as this ‘‘important device” fur-

nished against potential ‘‘aggressors’’ and the continuing

intangible benefits of ‘‘know-how’’ and established speci-

fications which proved so valuable in connection with the

famous B-29s in World War II.

Such, petitioner submits, are the facts and circumstances

which the lower Court should have considered, not whether

respondent ever promised to pay or guarantee or purchase

any particular quantities of devices. In turning its decision

on whether there was an actual promise, therefore, the

lower Court is squarly in conflict with all of the authorities

and cases on quasi contracts.

(ec) That the Court failed to apply the principles of con-

tracts implied in law is evident from numerous conclusions

in the Opinion.

After a brief recitation of some of the facts, the Court’s

Opinion says (R. 36):

‘‘However, there was no representation by the Air

Corps that it would reimburse the Marvel Company

for its loss in ease it did not sell enough of the devices

to cover the cost of development. There was no fraud

practiced, there was no misrepresentation, there was

no mistake; nothing was done from which the Marvel

Company had any right to conclude that the Air Corps

would reimburse it for any loss it might incur.’’

This begs the question of whether there was a contract

implied in law. That question is whether respondent

received a benefit, the retention of which, without restitu-

22

tion, would be inequitable or, as stated by the Secretary

of War, ‘‘Whether under all of the facts, the government

is morally and equitably liable for money expended by the

Marvel Carbureter Co. in the development of fuel chargers

which has not been recovered by the sale of the developed

product.’”’

The next paragraph of the Opinion says (R. 36):

‘Tt is true that after Chandler had been reemployed

the Air Corps continued to press the Marvel Company

to proceed with the development of the device as rapidly

as it was possible for them to do so, but there was

never an intimation that it would guarantee the com-

pany against loss.’’ (Italics supplied.)

Again the conclusion has no bearing on the question of a

contract implied in law. If there had been any such intima-

tion as suggested by the Court there would have been a

contract implied in fact and no need for the Jurisdictional

Act.

The Court concludes that the facts do not make out a

case of unjust enrichment because (R. 37):

‘o* * *

The Government purchased from plaintiff

or its predecessor about a quarter of a million dollars

worth of these devices, and no doubt would have made

further purchases, except for the fact that the trouble

with carburtors for gas engines had been eliminated,

making the fuel-injector device no longer desirable.

This was a risk that plaintiff ran and which it must

have known it was running when it made its expendi-

tures for the development of the device.”’

This treats the case as though it simply involved the

formal contracts for the sale and purchase of specific

devices. That, of course, would involve simply a question

of contracts expressed or implied in fact and would be well

enough if this case involved nothing more or less than such

23

formal contracts for the purchase of specific devices.”

But this was not the case. It is quite obvious from the

record that what the government wanted primarily was

not just the mechanical devices but, as the Court finds:

‘‘Definite information as to the design of fuel injec-

tion systems and their advantages and limitations.’’

so that it could

‘‘Formulate performance specifications for fuel in-

jection systems.’’

The Air Corps made this clear from the beginning when

it emphasized its ‘‘desire or demand for developing this

project with the utmost haste’? (R. 18) and that Marvel

‘‘owes its first allegiance to the Division in such develop-

ment, manufacture and deliveries’’ and should not under-

take any other work ‘‘ which could curtail the above develop-

ment in any sense of the word; * * *’’ (Italics supplied)

(R. 20).**

Respondent asked Marvel to incur the expense of this

development from which it obtained the definite informa-

tion it wanted. This Marvel did in the reasonable expecta-

tion either that it would be timely released or receive

enoagh business from the government to amortize its costs.'*

The consideration which Marvel expected failed and Marvel

was left with a loss. But respondent reaped great benefits

1 The Committee Report listed all the formal sales contracts and dis-

posed of this point when it said (Appendix B, p. 33):

“The War Department held the claim untenable, considering the

matter only from the standpoint of legal rights and remedies of the

parties arising from their contractual relations as distinguished from

equitable rights.”

16 For additional evidence of respondent’s emphasis on “development”

see R. 18, 19.

17 Tn a letter dated October 3, 1934, the Materiel Division of the Air

Corps said that Marvel “obviously expected to make up this deficit on

sales of this device to the government during the next few years.” (R. 25).

eer STREET TEES

129 Sane WAR AS a REN ROE Cr

24

and, therefore, should make restitution to plaintiff at least

to the extent of plaintiff’s out-of-pocket loss.

We have already referred to the statement in the Opinion

that the government:

‘*Did not expressly or impliedly promise to continue

to purchase these devices if a better one became avail-

able, nor did it delude plaintiff into believing it would.’’

Obviously, if these things had been done there would

have been an actual contract to purchase these devices.

But the government made no such promise and did not

delude petitioner into believing that the government would

purchase such devices if a better one became available. It

did, however, indicate to petitioner (undoubtedly in all good

faith at the time) that there was a large potential business

in the Air Corps itself and that it would therefore be to

its advantage to continue the development work. Peti-

tioner does not contend that defendant relied upon any

promise that plaintiff would receive such business but that

defendant, having received a benefit under such cireum-

stances, is obligated to make restitution for the benefit,

limited, however, under the Jurisdictional Act, to petition-

er’s out-of-pocket loss.

The Opinion says, in referring to respondent?s call in

1934 for competitive bidding on engines supplied with a

fuel injector (R. 38):

‘cw * 6This, however, is no cause for complaint

because plaintiff knew other companies were working

on the device, and there was no agreement on defend-

ant’s part that it would purchase only plaintiff’s device

even if a better one had been developed by someone

else.’’

It is true that there was no such agreement. Again, the

conclusion merely disposes of the question of a contract

in fact and does not consider the question of whether under

Te a a

a ta et tii

25

all of the circumstances defendant received a benefit for

which it should make restitution.

The foregoing, it is submitted, clearly shows that the

lower Court’s Opinion is in conflict with all the authorities

on quasi contracts and that it did nothing more than the

War Department had done before the Jurisdictional Act was

passed, namely, consider the matter ‘‘only from the stand-

point of legal rights and remedies of the parties arising

from their contractual relations as distinguished from

equitable rights’? ) Appendix, p. 33). The effect of its Opin-

ion is to treat the Jurisdictional Act as a nullity. Peti-

tioner is entitled to have its claim adjudicated under that

Act.

Respectfully submitted,

: Bora-Warner Corporation,

By Cuarves D. Hamet,

Lee I. Park,

I’. Weaver Myers,

CLARENCE F. Roruensura.

Hamer, Park & Saunnpers,

Of Counsel.

BA nel pecan a Mi De

ap gid

tthe Lip

PEMA a ihe CDA LG

APPENDIX A

Aw Act

To Confer Jurisdiction Upon the Court of Claims to Hear,

Determine, and Render Judgment Upon the Claim of the

Borg-Warner Corporation

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

tives of the United States of America in Congress

assembled, That jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon the

Court of Claims to hear, determine, and render judgment

in such amount as it deems may be equitably due, notwith-

standing the lapse of time, or any statute of limitations,

or any limitation upon the jurisdiction of such court with

respect to claims upon any contract implied in law, upon

the claim of the Borg-Warner Corporation, in its own right

and as suecessor to the Marvel Carbureter Company (for-

merly a wholly owned subsidiary of the Borg-Warner Cor-

poration), against the United States in connection with

the development of fuel-injection systems for use on mili-

tary aircraft: Provided, however, That such damages shall

not exceed the actual moneys expended by the said Borg-

Warner Corporation and the Marvel Carbureter Com-

pany in connection with this said development during the

calendar years 1927 to 1936, inclusive.

See. 2. Such claim shall be instituted by or on behalf

of the Borg-Warner Corporation within one year after

the date of the enactment of this Act. Proceedings in any

suit before the Court of Claims under this Act, and review

thereof and payment of any judgment therein, shall be had

as in the case of claims over which such court has jurisdie-

tion under section 145 of the Judicial Code, as amended.

Approved, August 4, 1939.

Se Ep Oe eee

APPENDIX B

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Report No. 890

76th Congress, 1st Session

Borc-WakNER CorPORATION

June 21, 1939.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole

House and ordered to be printed.

Mr. Keogh, from the Committee on Claims, submitted

the following

REpPorRT

[To accompany S. 755]

The Committee on Claims, to whom was referred the bill

(S. 755) to confer jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims to

hear, determine, and render judgment upon the claim of

the Borg-Warner Corporation, having considered the same,

report favorably thereon without amendment and recom-

mend that the bill do pass.

The purpose of the proposed legislation is to confer

jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims to hear, determine,

and render judgment upon the claim of the Borg-Warner

Corporation against the United States “for just compensa-

tion for the damages inflicted and the losses sustained by the

taking and impounding by the War Department, by virtue

of the provisions of the Espionage Act (U.S. C., title 50,

ch. 4, see. 31), of all matters pertaining to the development

of fuel-injection systems for use on military aircraft,”

such damages not to exceed actual moneys expended by

the said company and its previously wholly owned sub-

sidiary, the Marvel Carbureter Co., in connection with said

development from 1927 through 1936.

This committee concurs in the recommendation of the

Senate, and appended hereto is Senate Report No. 314,

Seventy-sixth Congress, first session, which carries a

detailed description of the facts.

28

[S. Rept. No. 314, 76th Cong., 1st sess.]

As amended, the War Department has no objection to

the enactment of the bill.

In 1925 the Air Corps began development of a mechanical

metering device to overcome difficulties encountered in use

of carburetors during aerial tactical maneuvers. Two years

later M. G. Chandler, who had entered the employ of the

Marvel Co. under agreement for development of his patented

‘fluid distributing mechanism,’’ presented for the Marvel

Co. a design for fuel injector. On August 18, 1927, the

Air Corps ordered from the Marvel Co. one fuel injector

for a test engine. As development work progressed addi-

tional orders were placed with the Marvel Co. from 1927

through 1937.

November 26, 1929, the Matériel Division of the War

Department wrote the Marvel Co. it was ‘the desire of the

Division to impress on the Marvel Carburetor Co. the

desire or demand for developing this project with the

utmost haste.’’ The stated object of the letter was to advise

the Marvel Co. ‘‘of the extreme importance at this time

of the fuel-metering pump development and to request

that, if possible, this project be given first priority’’ in the

company’s experimental work.

With reference to a conference between representatives

of the Marvel Co. and the Matériel Division, the latter

wrote the company on October 29, 1930, that the Division

had been largely involved in the general development of the

fuel charger from a financial and development standpoint

and the Division’s future plans for new engine develop-

ment depended largely upon completion of the equipment.

Hence, “The Division feels that the Marvel Carburetor Co.

owes its first allegiance to the Division in such development,

manufacture, and deliveries,’’ and ‘‘that no other work in

this connection be undertaken which could curtail the

above development in any sense of the word; that foreign

or domestic development or sales be delayed until such

time as the Army agrees that they will not affect procure-

ment necessary for the Air Corps needs.’’

On March 21, 1931, the Matériel Division wrote the Mar-

vel Co.:

29

“Tt is believed that the release of information which

would enable a foreign manufacturer to parallel the de-

velopment and application of the Marvel-Chandler fuel

charger to aircraft engines, would not be to the best interests

of the Air Corps at this time. The Division, therefore, has

classified all documents, technical data, reports, and devices

pertaining to this development as ‘‘secret,’? which pre-

eludes demonstration and/or manufacture of it abroad. It

also limits the commercial use of this device in the United

States to specific applications which meet with the approval

of the War Department. The Matériel Division undertook

this development with this understanding.’’

The secret classification and matters relating to the

development, except drawings, technical reports, and speci-

fications, was removed September 12, and the information

conveyed to the Marvel Co. September 28, 1933.

April 21, 1934, the Air Corps advised the Marvel Co. of

change in status of the development project from ‘‘secret’’

to ‘‘confidential,’’ except it was to remain ‘‘seeret’’ in con-

nection with foreign and domestic sale. The Air Corps

could not then favorably consider release of the equipment

for foreign sale, but authorized divulgence to the Pan

American-Grace Airways of such technical information as

would enable them to determine the merits of the equip-

ment and permit them to initiate negotiations regarding

possible purchase for domestic use only. Negotiations for

sale were not to be closed without Government approval,

and the Division could not assure the company authority

would be given for domestic sale.

The Matériel Division’s report of a conference regard-

ing the Marvel fuel charger on August 8, 1934, stated that

in further development of the device for 14-cylinder

engines, it was suggested the Air Corps would prefer to

work through the engine manufacturers. The report con-

tinued:

‘‘This is particularly true in view of the fact that service

tests and the development thus far had definitely established

a military characteristic for the fuel charger; that under

the present development policy of the Matériel Division,

[Qo ee ee

—

eu

Pras

Dram bee

—

Lisa

30

further expenditures for engineering and indirect costs

were not warranted; that as a general rule in the procure-

ment of accessories for engines or aircraft, the Matériel

Division would prefer to procure a physical article and not

endeavor to cooperate in the development of the article in

the same manner as had been following in connection with

the development of the Marvel fuel charger.’

August 18, 1934, the Marvel Co. wrote the Matériel

Division the device should be given complete release from

secrecy to permit the company to recoup its development

losses through general foreign and domestic sales, or such

losses should be amortized through sales to the Govern-

ment. The Division on October 3, 1934, wrote the Chief

of the Air Corps as follows:

‘*The enclosed copy of letter from Marvel Carburetor Co.,

Flint, Mich., brings up a problem which the Air Corps must

face in connection with strick adherence to the procedure of

securing all production items of equipment through com-

petitive bidding and for which it is apparent that a definite

policy should be established for the guidance of this Divi-

sion and in fairness to the manufacturers of aircraft, air-

craft engines, and aeronautical equipment.

‘*}From the enclosed letter, it may be seen that the Marvel

Carburetor Co. has expended approximately $500,000

during the past 8 years to bring their fuel injector up to the

point where it is considered satisfactory for adoption by the

Air Corps. In addition to this amount of money, it should

be borne in mind that the Air Corps has also spent a con-

siderable sum of money in the development of this article.

The manufacturer has received from sales to the Govern-

ment approximately one-third of the amount of money he

claims to have expended in this development and has

obviously expected to make up this deficit on normal profits

un sales of this device to the Government during the next

few years.

‘‘There are one or two other manufacturers entering

the field of fuel injection and there is now on test at the

Division a 9- and a 14-cylinder fuel injector manufactured

by the Eclipse Aviation Corporation of East Orange, N. J.

31

While it is not the policy of this Division to reveal the

engineering principles of one manufacturer to any of the

others, it is quite evident that the manufacturer who enters

the field last will benefit greatly by the advice of Division

engineers by eliminating many of the mistakes made in the

original development, thereby producing an article with

much less engineering cost than was necessary for the

original inventor and manufacturer. * * *

“This matter is being brought to the attention of the

Chief of the Air Corps for the purpose of emphasizing the

necessity for a definite policy to be followed in the develop-

ment and procurement of such devices as fuel injectors,

fuel pumps, vacuum pumps, and all other devices for which

a functional service test is necessary before they can be

standarized and for which development costs are neces-

sarily high. From the above it is apparent that one or two

things should be done in cases of this kind: (a) Allow the

manufacturer to sell his produet when he wishes; (b) pay

full development costs.’’

After obtaining further information on the status of

fuel-injector development, the Chief of the Air Corps on

January 24, 1935 advised the Matériel Division as follows:

“In the light of such information as has been forwarded

the Chief of Air Corps, the Marvel fuel-injection system and

its application to aviation is a marked advance. It is

superior to any similar effort that has come to his attention.

Its possession promises to be of great advantage to the

Army Air Corps. In case of an emergency the utilization

of this device may contribute greatly to the superiority of

Army equipment over that of an aggressor. It, therefore,

is desirable that this important device be held for the

exclusive use of the armed forces of the United States as

long as such an advantage can be enjoyed. Release for

domestic and export sales cannot be granted at this time.’’

In submitting the matter to The Adjutant General on May

15, 1935, the Assistant Chief of the Air Corps requested

authority to negotiate a license with the Marvel Co., and

further stated:

cause i

32

‘“‘The case in question is typical of the handicap which

may devolve upon a contractor who undertakes development

for the Air Corps.

‘‘The Marvel Co. has, over a considerable period of time,

been developing a fuel-injection system.

‘‘At the time the development was undertaken no other

promising development was in view.

‘‘The cost and time of development has greatly exceeded

all estimates.

‘*The development was important enough to be declared

secret.

‘‘There still is, according to the Marvel Co., a sum in

the order of $500,000 which the Air Corps has not reim-

bursed the Marvel Co.

‘*The device is still so important that it should not be

exported.

‘Other similar devices still not satisfactory to the Air

Corps are being produced and are to be exported.

‘‘At the present, it is proposed to buy fuel-injection

systems from an approved list established through pass-

ing Government requirements.

‘*The volume of business involved, however, will not take

care of the entire amortization in the case of the Marvel Co.

‘‘At some future date, the company feels that it has a

case against the Government for damages.’’

Subsequently the Chief of the Air Corps was authorized

to negotiate a license and same was offered by the Marvel

Co. for $900,000. The offer was not accepted.

The result of the development work was to produce a

fuel injector which functioned very satisfactorily on a

9-cylinder engine, but by the time this was completed the

9-cylinder engine had been superseded by 12-, 14-, and

18-eylinder engines. Experimental work continued for

some time in an attempt to develop a fuel injector that

would produce satisfactory results with the larger engines.

In the meantime other concerns were working on the same

problem. The possibility of substituting the fuel injector

for the carbureter stimulated development in the latter

art. Asa result the Air Corps adopted a poliey of com-

bining this development with engine development. This

72 Set oT)

errs

33

course was required inasmuch as the Air Corps could not

secure fuel injectors to supply engine contractors for in-

stallation on completed engines.

In letter of January 27, 1938, the claimant corporation

made demand on the War Department for money, labor,

and material actually expended in development of fuel

injectors in the amount of $506,320.75, claimed to represent

the difference between total cost of development work from

1926 through 1936, less the amount received from sales.

The War Department held the claim untenable, consider-

ing the matter only from the standpoint of legal rights and

remedies of the parties arising from their contractual rela-

tions as distinguished from equitable rights.

Tn his report on 8. 755 the Secretary of War suggests the

bill should not be based on the Espionage Act, which is a

criminal statute to augment the national defense through

prohibition of certain acts. It is the view of the War

Department that compliance with a criminal statute should

not create a claim against the Government. As so limited

the War Department has no objection to enactment of the

bill.

The facts are fully set forth in the following letter from

the Secretary of War, which is appended hereto and made

a part of this report.

War Department,

Washington, March 28, 1939.

Hon. M. M. Logan Chairman, Committee on Claims United

t ’ ’ ’

States Senate.

Dear Senator Locan:

Careful consideration has been given to the bill (S. 755,

76th Cong., Ist sess.) to confer jurisdiction upon the Court

of Claims to hear, determine, and render judgment upon

the claim of the Borg-Warner Corporation, which you

transmitted to the War Department under date of January

18, 1989, with a request for information and the views of

the Department relative thereto.

The bill authorizes the court to render judgment in such

amount as may be equitably due as just compensation for

34

damages inflicted and losses sustained by the taking and

impounding by the War Department, by virtue of the pro-

visions of the Espionage Act, of all matters pertaining to

the development of fuel-injection systems for use on mili-

tary aircraft, notwithstanding the lapse of time, or any stat-

ute of limitations, or any limitation upon the jurisdiction

of the court with respect to claims upon any contract im-

plied in law. The bill provides a maximum amount which

may be found to be equitably due by prescribing that dam-

ages shall not exceed the actual moneys expended by the

Borg-Warner Corporation and the Marvel Carbureter Co.,

in connection with said development during the calendar

years 1927 to 1936, inclusive.

In a letter dated January 27, 1938, the Borg-Warner Cor-

poration made demand on the War Department for money,

labor, and materials actually expended in the development

of fuel injectors in the amount of $506,320.75. This sum is

claimed to represent the difference between the total cost of

development work for the years 1926 to 1936, inclusive, less

the amount received from sales.

In reply to this demand the War Department advised the

Borg-Warner Corporation that the claim was deemed to be

untenable. In taking this position the War Department con-

sidered the matter from the standpoint of the legal rights

and remedies of the parties arising from their contractual

relations as distinguished from equitable rights. In the

case of United States v. Minnesota Mutual Investment Com-

pany (271 U.S. 212), decided May 24, 1926, the Supreme

Court held that:

‘*An implied contract in order to give the Court of Claims

or a district court under the Tucker Act jurisdiction to give

judgment against the Government must be one implied in

fact and not one based merely on equitable considerations

and implied in law.’’

The War Department has expressed no opinion upon the

existence of any equities which may not form the basis of a

claim against the Government under present law. In other

words, it is an open question whether the Government

should, by special legislation, authorize a court to pass upon

35

the equitable liability of the Government arising out of the

facts in this case.

In 1925, the Air Corps began the development of a me-

chanical metering device to overcome difficulties encoun-

tered in the use of carburetors during aerial tactical ma-

neuvers. In 1927, Mr. M. G. Chandler presented for consid-

eration a design for a fuel injector. It appears that Mr.

Chandler entered into an agreement on July 22, 1926, with

the Marvel Carbureter Co., relating to United States Letters

Patent No. 1,121,976, entitled ‘‘Fluid Distributing Me-

chanism,’’ and upon the execution of this agreement he en-

tered the employ of the Marvel Carbureter Co. for the

purpose of completing the development of the fluid-dis-

tributing mechanisms and making improvements thereon.

The design presented by Mr. Chandler appeared to have

desirable performance characteristics for metering and dis-

tributing fuel. On August 18, 1927, the Air Corps placed

an order (purchase order No. 28-598) with the Marvel Car-

bureter Co. for one fuel injector for a single cylinder test

engine. No formal written agreement was entered into at

any time concerning the payment of any devciopmental

costs by the Government. As development work progressed,

additional orders were placed with the Marvel Carbureter

Co. The dates, numbers, and articles ordered are as fol-

lows:

Number Date Description

28-608. ......... Aug. 18, 1927 Single cylinder fuel injector and parts.

Yt. June 27, 1928 Fuel-injector parts.

es oe Nov. 26, 1928 9-cylinder fuel injector and parts.

29-2828.......... Jan. 5, 1929 Fuel-injector parts for Curtiss D-12 engine.

30-4224.......... Apr. 9, 1930 Fuel-injector parts.

OO-6241.......... i 28, 1930 Modification of fuel-injector parts.

30-5329.......... June 3, 1930 Fuel injectors and parts for Curtiss V-1570

and 2 each Pratt & Whitney SR-1340-

C engines.

31-6006.......... June 4, 1931.. Fuel-injector parts.

UR es vache ris ter fe eR Fuel injector and parts for 1 each Pratt &

Whitney R-1340-C engine.

$2-105........... July 3, 1931 Reworking 2 fuel injectors.

32-1082.......... Sept. 11, 1931 Fuel injectors and parts for 4 each Curtiss

V-—1570 engines.

$2-1083.......... PMNS sachs Fuel injectors and parts for 4 each Pratt &

Whitney SR-1340-E engines.

32-1084......... bear Fuel injectors and parts for 5 each Wright

R-1820-E engines.

32-2266.......... Nov. 7, 1931 Fuel injector parts.

33-1095.......... Sept. 13, 1932 Do.

33-2850.......... Jan. 4, 1933 Do.

%

pa

i

He

b

et

ny

S

¢

BRrwresunr ee:

36

Number Date Description

35-152........... July 20, 1934 Handbook of instructions for Q-2 fuel

injector.

35-786........... Sept. 15, 1934 Overhaul tools.

35-1532.......... Nov. 28, 1934 Fuel-injector parts.

35-2978.......... Mar. 26, 1935 Do.

35-3862.......... Apr. 25, 1935 Fuel-injector tool.

35-4534.......... June 7, 1935 Fuel-injector parts.

35-4766.......... June 29, 1935 T-1 fuel injector for 14-cylinder, 2-row

radial air-cooled engine and S—2 fuel in-

jector for 12-cylinder liquid-cooled en-

gine.

36-1091.......... Sept. 14, 1935 Repair of Q-2 fuel injector.

36-4510.......... Mar. 25, 1936 Fuel-injector parts.

36-5571.......... May 15, 1936 Do.

38-887 !... pt. 9, 1937

svn ss TNS Do.

W-535 AC-4305.. June 23, 1931 7 each type E-250 fuel injectors and parts

for Pratt & Whitney SR-1340-C engines

and 8 each type E-330 fuel injectors and

parts for Wright R-1750-E engines.

W-535 AC-6069.. June 28, 1933 37 each type M-5 (Air Corps designation

Q-2) fekd indectens for Pratt & Whitney

YR-1340-33 engines (increased to 39

quantity by change order No. 1).

W-535 AC-7625.. June 17, 1935 25 Q-2 fuel injectors for Pratt & Whitney

YR-1340-33 engines (designation changed

to Q-3 by change order No. 1).

' Corporate name changed to Marvel-Schebler Carbureter Division.

On November 26, 1929, the Matériel Division wrote to the

Marvel Carbureter Co. as follows:

‘1, With regard to the above development, it is the desire

of the Division to impress on the Marvel Carbureter Co. the

desire or demand for developing this project with the ut-

most haste.

‘*2. The Air Corps has specified a new engine of super-

performance in which a device of this type would be of in-

estimable advantage if tests, now proposed, indicate that

the operation of this device is as satisfactory as is hoped at

the present time.

‘*3. With the development in the nature of design pro-

ceeding as rapidly as it now is, it will be imperative to know

definitely, within a short time, whether this device is feasi-

ble or not, and unless considerable test work ean be done in

the near future, a normal carburetor and manifolding sys-

tem will necessarily be used, purely for lack of information

on the fuel-metering system.

‘*4, The object of this letter is to advise Marvel Car-

a

37

bureter Co. of the extreme importance at this time of the

fuel-metering pump development and to request that, if pos-

sible, this project be given first priority in your experi-

mental work.’’

On October 18, 1930, the Marvel Carbureter Co. wrote:

‘“‘The writer had expected to receive from you a letter

covering the details of our discussion concerning the fuel-

charger situation, but to date this is not at hand.

‘‘We would appreciate a letter from you confirming the

various matters presented to the writer at our conference.

‘‘We would also like to receive from you an outline that

clearly defines your requirements with respect to Army pri-

ority considerations. This will be necessary as a means to

guide our procedure and avoid misunderstanding. Also we

will be interested to know just what latitude you will regard

as equitable with respect to our conducting development

tests of the fuel charger elsewhere on testing equipment

that we do not have.”’

In response to the above letter the Matériel Division ad-

vised the Marvel Carbureter Co. as follows, on October 29,

1930:

“1. With reference to the above conference between Mr.

Taft of the Marvel Carburetor Co. and Captain Page of the

Matériel Division, the agreements as outlined below were

reached and are now submitted for your consideration: (a)

That from a financial and development standpoint, the Ma-

tériel Division has been largely involved in the general de-

velopment of the fuel charger, and that the Division’s

future plans and policies in connection with new engine de-

velopment are obviously dependent, to a great extent, on

the satisfactory completion of this equipment; (b) that in

view of the above the Division feels that the Marvel Car-

bureter Co. owes its first allegiance to the Division in such

development, manufacture, and deliveries; (c) that develop-

ment and manufacture of equipment for the Wright R-1820

and the Curtiss V engines be given priority over any other

project, and that this work be expedited with all possible

ERAT OL SALMON IIL YS LTR 9

&

z

A

gett S Rise Pasi

rae

38

speed; (d) that no other work in this connection be under-

taken which could curtail the above development in any

sense of the word; (e) that foreign or domestic development

or sales be delayed until such time as the Army agrees that

they will not affect procurement necessary for the Air Corps

needs; (f) that authority to build in foreign countries in

order to protect foreign patents will be granted at such time

as the Marvel Carbureter Co. advises the Division of the

necessity; (g) that as soon as the Army development is sat-

isfactory and guarantee of deliveries can be made on the

part of the Marvel Carbureter Co., a release for general

manufacture will be granted by the Army Air Corps.

“69. As regards priority in connection with work on hand

for the Army Air Corps, the following should govern: (1)

Completion of the 9-cylinder fuel charger for the Pratt &

Whitney SR-1340-C engine and the accompanying gear

reduction housing and assembly; (2) completion of the

9-eylinder fuel charger for the Wright R-1820 engine; (3)

design and submit for approval a 12-cylinder fuel charger

for use on the Curtiss V-1570 engine and after approval of

the above design, immediate construction thereof.’’

On March 21, 1931, the Matériel Division after consider-

ing the importance of the fuel-injector development to the

national defense wrote the Marvel Carburetor Co. as

follows:

“1. Reference is made to telephone conversation between

Mr. Chandler and a representative of the Division on March

20, regarding the release of technical data pertaining to

the fuel charger now under development.

‘9 Tt is believed that the release of information which

would enable a foreign manufacturer to parallel the de-

velopment and application of the Marvel-Chandler fuel

charger to aircraft engines, would not be to the best inter-

ests of the Air Corps at this time. The Division, therefore,

has classified all documents, technical data, reports and de-

vices pertaining to this development as ‘secret,’ which pre-

cludes demonstration and/or manufacture of it abroad. It

also limits the commercial use of this device in the United

States to specific applications which meet with the approval

ote Bete

39

of the War Department. The Matériel Division undertook

this development with this understanding.

“3 It is the policy of both the War and Navy Depart-

ments to restrict the sale of articles of equipment that are

of particular military value until they have been in produc-

tion as standard articles for a period of approximately 1

year. In this particular case, however, it is believed that

the Air Corps will be compensated for its support of this

development if the release is withheld until the completion

of a satisfactory service test. With this in view, every

effort will be made to expedite experimental work now in

progress and to incorporate the fuel charger on a limited

number of engines for use in standard type airplanes as

soon as the testing at the Division warrants it.

“4 Tt is further desired to state that there is no objec-

tion to your company proceeding with negotiations for the

manufacture or licensing for manufacture, provided such

negotiations do not violate the policy stated above relative

to the release of any data or information that will enable

duplication of the equipment now being tested, or incorpora-

tion of any of the principles pertaining to it.

“5. This cancels and supersedes all previous instructions

from the Matériel Division pertaining to this development

which are at variance with the foregoing.”’

On September 12, 1933, the Air Corps removed corres-

pondence, telegrams, purchase orders, and contracts relat-

ing to fuel chargers from the secret classification. Fur-

ther secrecy was required in respect of drawings, technical

reports, and specifications. This information was con-

veyed to the Marvel Carbureter Co. by letter dated Sep-

tember 28, 1933, as follows:

“4. Effective immediately, the ‘secret’ classification, in-

sofar as correspondence, telegrams, ete., are concerned, is

removed from the project covering fuel chargers and related

equipment, and purchase orders and contracts pertaining to

this project.

“9 The ‘secret’ classification, however, will still apply

to drawings, technical reports, and specifications.’’

Re a OL ney

PAE AE RIE ESR BON ARR BRR Nt in RADARS

eo TS

40

On April 21, 1934, the Marvel Carbureter Co. was advised

of a further change in the status of the development and

the position of the Air Corps concerning domestic and

foreign sales. This letter is as follows:

‘*1, Receipt is acknowledged of your communication of

April 10, requesting information with respect to change in

status of fuel injectors being made for the Government and

also as to what information you may release to the Pan

American-Grace Airways, Inc., pertaining to this equipment.

‘*9. Effective at once, the status of the subject project is

changed from ‘secret’ to ‘confidential’, with the provision

that it be continued on ‘secret’ status insofar as the policy

relative to foreign and domestic sale is concerned. Specifiea-

tions, drawings, and reports will be of ‘confidential’ status

and marked accordingly.

**3. Documents marked ‘confidential’ will be prepared

for transmission in the same manner as prescribed for

‘secret’ documents except that the inner cover will contain a

receipt form only when the sender deems it necessary, and

that the inner cover may be opened by some responsible

person other than the persons addressed when so authorized.

‘“4. As set forth in policy covering ‘Sale of Aeronautical

Equipment abroad, a copy of which has previously been

furnished to you, it is the policy of the War and Navy De-

partments to encourage American aeronautical industry in

developing foreign business. The policy also quotes the

following statement: ‘No negotiations for the sale abroad

of aeronautical equipment which has been developed for

or with the assistance or direct encouragement of the War

or Navy Department or whose usefulness is primarily or

exclusively military, should be initiated without the per-

mission of the Department interested.’ While the Govern-

ment cannot favorably at this time consider the release of

this equipment for foreign sale, it feels that if you are not

permitted to release technical data on this equipment and

enter into preliminary negotiations for domestic sale of the

equipment that it will be creating a trade disadvantage due

to the fact that other manufacturers have marketed similar

devices.

i ae

oe ao S| ae eT

41

“5, The Government accordingly authorizes you to di-

vulge to the Pan American-Grace Airways, Ine. such techni-

eal information as will enable them to determine the merits

of this equipment and permit them to initiate negotiations

regarding possible purchase for domestic use only. This

authority is granted with the understanding that ‘negotia-

tions for the sale of this equipment will not be closed with-

out approval of the Government. While the Matériel Di-

vision cannot assure you at this time that authority will be

given for the domestic sale of this equipment, we feel sure

that authority for domestic sale will be granted by the Gov-

ernment. No steps, however, will be taken to obtain this

approval until this Division is further advised in the mat-

ter with respect to your negotiations with the Pan Ameri-

ean Airways, Ine.’

On August 8, 1934, a conference was held at Wright Field,

regarding the Marvel fuel charger. A report of this con-

ference was made and is enclosed herewith, marked ‘‘En-

closure No. 1.’’ On August 18, 1934, the Marvel Carbureter

(‘o. addressed a letter to the Air Corps at Wright Field in

which it expressed its position in reference to amortizing

its developmental costs. A copy of this letter is enclosed

and marked ‘‘ Enclosure No. 2.’’

On August 31, 1934, the Matériel Division advised the

Marvel Carbureter Co. of its policy concerning domestic

and foreign sales. (See enclosure No. 3.)

On October 3, 1934, the Matériel Division wrote to the

Chief of the Air Corps enclosing a copy of the Marvel

Carbureter Co.’s letter of August 18, 1934. (See enclosure

No. 4.)

On October 12, 1934, the Office of the Chief of the Air

Corps addressed the following letter to the Matériel Di-

vision:

‘1. In order that General Foulois may take up this mat-

ter of foreign sale of Marvel fuel injectors with higher

authority, it is requested that the following be furnished:

(a) A brief statement of the advantages of fuel injectors

over present-type carburetors; (b) a report on the service

test of the 12 Marvel fuel injectors referred to in paragraph

ar ae

aati each aaa 2a ae

42

5 of your letter of October 3, 1934; (c) a report on changes

required in present-type engines if fuel injection is specified

for 1936 procurement, and effect on future cost per engine

(d) a report on steps already taken by the Division com-

mitting the Air Corps to fuel injection for 1936 procure-

ment; (e) report on steps taken to install fuel-injector en-

eines on P-26 airplanes.”’

After receiving the information required the Office of the

Chief of the Air Corps advised the Matériel Division by

first endorsement dated January 24, 1935, as follows:

‘“1. In the light of such information as has been for-

warded the Chief of Air Corps, the Marvel fuel-injection

system and its application to aviation is a marked ad-

vanee. It is superior to any similar effort that has come to

his attention. Its possession promises to be of great advan-

tage to the Army Air Corps. In case of an emergency the

utilization of this device may contribute greatly to the supe-

rioity of Army equipment over that of an aggressor. It,

therefore, is desirable that this important device be held

for the exclusive use of the armed forces of the United States

as long as such an advantage can be enjoyed. Release for

domestie and export sales cannot be granted at this time.

‘‘9. Competition is desirable. Efforts should be exerted

to obtain such competition through the establishment of a

policy for the procurement of fuel-injection systems fol-

lowing the principles outlined in policy No. 164, dated Jan-

uary 22, 1935.”’

On March 16, 1935, the Marvel Carburetor Co. again

brought Bo the matter of recouping its losses. (See en-

closure No. 5.) The Air Corps’ reply dated May 18, 1935,

is enclosed, marked ‘‘Enclosure No. 6.”’

On April 22, 1935, the Matériel Division in a letter to the

Chief of the Air Corps first raised the question of requesting

the State Department to prohibit the export of injection de-

vices for non-Diesel-type engines. In submitting the mat-

ter to The Adjutant General, authority was requested to

negotiate a license with the Marvel Carburetor Co. (See

Enclosure No. 7.)

On May 31, 1935, the office of The Assistant Secretary of

43

War authorized the Chief of the Air Corps to negotiate for

a license under the Marvel patents. In a letter dated July

98, 1936, the Marvel Carbureter Co. offered to grant a li-

cense for $900,000. This offer was not accepted.

The result of the development work was to produce a fuel

injector which functioned very satisfactorily on a 9-cylinder

engine, but by the time this was completed the 9-cylinder en-

vine had been superseded by 12-, 14-, and 18-cylinder en-

vines. Experimental work continued for some time in an

attempt to develop a fuel injector that would produce satis-

factory results with the larger engines. In the meantime

other concerns were working on the same problem. The

possibility of substituting the fuel injector for the ecarbu-

retor stimulated development in the latter art. As a result

the Air Corps adopted a policy of combining this develop-

ment with engine development. This course was required

inasmuch as the Air Corps could not secure fuel injectors

to supply engine contractors for installation on completed

engines.

As stated heretofore, the War Department has not com-

mnitted itself on the question of liability from an equitable

standpoint for the expenditure made by the Marvel Carbu-

reter Co. on the fuel-charger project. If the Congress sees

fit to have this question presented to the Court of Claims

for determination, the War Department has no objection to

such procedure. Objection is raised, however, to the basis

upon which the present bill predicates the claim. That is,

the bill authorizes the court to render judgment for such

sum as may be found to be equitably due for the taking and

impounding under the Espionage Act of all matters per-

taining to the development of fuel-injection systems for

use on military aircraft.

The War Department believes that it should be contrary

to publie policy to use the Espionage Act to create a claim

agaimst the Government. The Espionage Act is a criminal

statute which prohibits the doing of the acts enumerated

therein. It is an act to augment the national defense.

So far as the War Department is informed, the Marvel

Carbureter Co. did everything in its power to maintain

secrecy concerning the fuel-injector development. In other

—

LP Nea NS Ti AP nd Teil ED BAR A

Ee SRLS Done

PR CAA Ret WC ti TOMAR NI Fes VM ee

44

words, it did not violate the Espionage Act. But it is the

view of the War Department that a compliance with a

criminal statute should not create a claim against the Gov-

ernment. Under the Neutrality Act a license must be se-

cured from the Secretary of State to export certain imple-

ments of war. Would the Congress recognize a claim for

lost profits occasioned by the refusal to grant a license to

export implements of war?) The recognition of such a claim

would appear to be contrary to public policy. So in this

case it is the view of the War Department that the claim

should not be based upon any alleged taking or impound-

ing under the Espionage Act.

The only question is whether, under all of the facts, the

tovernment is morally and equitably liable for money ex-

pended by the Marvel Carburetor Co. in the development

of fuel chargers which has not been recovered by the sale of

the developed product.

As so limited the War Department has no objection to the

reference of the matter to the Court of Claims for determi-

nation.

Sincerely yours,

Harry H. Wooprina,

Secretary of War.

(2154)

NEC OB thre OVI TR IY

INDEX

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Ch creche EE SEEN SOS Ll ae RA 1

IR, NN oa cn ei eamsigniorspvonctinbelacsilasadbsabonsenens 2

RUDGE NN RMON fe Js a 3

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CITATIONS

CASEs:

Bailis v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 128 F.2d 857 10

Chandler v. Washington Toll Bridge Authority, 17 Wash.

2G Gs 10 Ja": a re ee 11

Coos Bay Indian Tribe v. United States, 87 Ct. Cls. 143,

certiorar: Genied, 306 U.S. 663 _............. | 13

Federal Royalty Co. v. Knox, 114 F.2d 78 ___... 12

Gothwaite v. United States, 102 Ct.Cls. 400 __.. ss st—idYYd:

Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458. 11

Iowa Tribe of Indians v. United States, 68 Ct.Cls. 585 _._ 13

"RR ERP BATE EN TNT LINE

Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 _...-. 11

Mergenthaler v. Dailey, 136 F.2d 182 _.._ 12

Patverson V. entucky, 97 U.S. S01 11

Sac and Fox Indians, The, 220 U.S. 481 __._ 13

Sickelco v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 111 F.2d 746. s—éid2:2d

Standard Accident Insurance Company v. United States,

103 Ct. Cls. 607, certiorari denied, 326 U.S. 729 sd

Tilison v. United States, 100 U.S. 43 _................—s«43g

United States v. Mille Lac Chippewas, 229 U.S. 498 _____- 13

STATUTES:

Espionage Act, 40 Stat. 217, 50 U.S.C. 31 et seq. 6

Private Law 126, 76th Congress, Ist Sess., 53 Stat. 1491__2, 8, 14

MISCELLANEOUS:

Restatement of Restitution:

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IIE TD Sci hersansnidice sce ccilagts ia setbainnesemeibieiieeaschenic 12

Pi BMPR Cher alk oe Dew,

2

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Court of Claims erred in holding

that the facts of this case did not give rise to a con-

tract implied in law, a category to which the court’s

jurisdiction was here extended by a special juris-

dictional act, between petitioner and the United

States.

STATUTE INVOLVED

The special jurisdictional act (Private Law 126,

76th Congress, Ist Session, 53 Stat. 1491), pursu-

ant to which petitioner brought this action in the

court below, reads as follows:

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‘

en

An AcT

Biase at NIN ee ee ee ees

To confer jurisdiction upon the Court of

Claims to hear, determine, and render

judgment upon the claim of the Borg-

Warner Corporation

; Be it enacted by the Senate and House of

Representatives of the United States of Amer-

ica in Congress assembled, That jurisdiction

is hereby conferred upon the Court of Claims

: to hear, determine, and render judgment in

i such amount as it deems may be equitably due,

notwithstanding the lapse of time, or any

statute of limitations, or any limitation upon

the jurisdiction of such court with respect to

claims upon any contract implied in law, upon

the claim of the Borg-Warner Corporation, in

3

its own right and as successor to the Marvel

Carbureter Company (formerly a_ wholly

owned subsidiary of the Borg-Warner Corpo-

ration), against the United States in connec-

tion with the development of fuel-injection

systems for use on military aircraft: Pro-

vided, however, That such damages shall not

exceed the actual moneys expended by the said

Borg-Warner Corporation and the Marvel

Carbureter Company in connection with this

said development during the calendar years

1927 to 1936, inclusive.

See. 2. Such claim shall be instituted by or

on behalf of the Borg-Warner Corporation

within one year after the date of the enact-

ment of this Act. Proceedings in any suit be-

fore the Court of Claims under this Act, and

review thereof and payment of any judgment

therein, shall be had as in the case of claims

over which such court has jurisdiction under

section 145 of the Judicial Code, as amended.!

STATEMENT

Petitioner, Borg-Warner Corporation, is the

successor in interest to the Marvel Carbureter

Company of Illinois, which in turn was the succes-

sor in interest to an Indiana corporation also bear-

ing the title of Marvel Carbureter Company (R.

11-12). This is a suit by petitioner, in its own

1 Section 145 of the Judicial Code has been reenacted as

28 U.S. C. 1255.

AUR

4

right and as successor to Marvel,’ to recover for

expenditures incurred in the development of fuel-

injection systems for use on military aircraft.

In December, 1914, one Milford Chandler was

granted a United States patent on a ‘‘ Fluid-dis-

tributing Mechanism’’ (R. 14). The Chandler in-

jector system, designed to eliminate carburetors

on gas engines and to inject the fuel directly into

the cylinders of engines, was peculiarly adaptable

to aircraft engines (R. 13). In July, 1926, Chan-

dler and Marvel, whose principal business was the

manufacture and sale of carburetors, entered into

an arrangement for the further development of

Chandler’s device (R. 14). Under the agreement

the company was granted the exclusive right to

manufacture and sell the device, and Chandler was

paid a salary to carry on further experimental

work (R. 14-15). After approximately ten months,

Marvel decided to discontinue the project and ter-

minated its contract with Chandler (R. 17). The

company then wrote a letter to the Air Corps sug-

gesting that it enter into some sort of arrange-

ment with Chandler for the further development

of his invention (R. 17). Chandler, on his own be-

half, then conferred with Air Corps representa-

tives in an effort to induce them to develop and

build injector systems which he would design (R.

17). The Air Corps was not interested, however.

?'We shall use the name ‘‘Marvel’’ to refer to either or

both Marvel Carburetor Company of Illinois and Marvel Car-

buretor Company of Indiana.

5

It told Chandler that it was interested only in de-

veloping sources of supply for such a device, and

advised him to induce Marvel to resume its efforts

to perfect the device, with his help (R. 17). Ac-

cordingly, Marvel reemployed Chandler and ex-

perimental work on the injector system was re-

sumed (R. 18).

A short time later, the Air Corps purchased an

injector mechanism from Marvel, and, after mak-

ing bench tests of it, suggested to Marvel certain

improvements to be included in future devices (R.

18). Between 1927 and 1936, Marvel worked on

the device with the aid and cooperation of the Air

Corps. During this time it sold the Air Corps and

the United States Navy fuel injectors and parts in

the total sum of $248,736.78 (R. 18). Marvel did

not sell any fuel injection systems to the Air Corps

after 1936 (R. 30). Meanwhile the carburetor

manufacturers perfected the ‘‘floatless carbure-

tor,’’ a mechanism which eventually superseded

fuel injection systems, since it eliminated the dif-

ficulties formerly inherent in carburetors used for

aviation purposes (R. 33).

During the development period, the Air Corps

considered the development of Chandler’s inven-

tion of great importance. It wrote Marvel that it

wished ‘‘to impress on the Marvel Carbureter Com-

pany the desire or demand for developing this

project with the utmost haste’? (R.18). In March,

1931, the Wright Field Procurement Division

See Ay ae NRT

6

wrote Marvel that in the interest of security and

in order to preclude a foreign manufacturer from

developing a similar injection system it had ‘‘clas-

sified all documents, technical data, reports and

devices pertaining to this development as ‘Secret,’

which precludes demonstration and/or manufac-

ture of it abroad. It also limits the commercial

use of this device in the United States to specific

applications which meet with the approval of the

War Department.’’ (R. 20.) In November, 1932,

and subsequently, the Air Corps called attention to

the fact that unauthorized disclosure of informa-

tion so classified was subject to fine and imprison-

ment under the Espionage Act, 40 Stat. 217, 50

U.S.C. 31 et seq. (R. 21).

In August, 1934, a conference was heid between

representatives of Marvel and the Mateviel Divi-

sion of the Air Corps (R. 22). Prior to this date

the Government had procured fuel injectors by di-

rect purchase from the company. At this confer-

ence the Air Corps representatives indicated that

thereafter procurement of fuel injectors would be

obtained through engine manufacturers on the ba-

sis of competitive bidding. (R. 22.) Marvel pro-

tested this by letter of August 18, 1934, to the Air

Corps, stating that ‘‘we have a large investment in

this project and have not had, due to your depart-

ment having impounded same as an Army secret,

an opportunity to do any manufacturing on a pro-

duction basis’’ (R. 23-24). The letter further asked

for a release from secrecy, stating that ‘‘this re-

—

7

quest for a complete release from secret develop-

ment is forced upon us at this time by the Govern-

ment asking us to compete on price before we have

had an opportunity to amortize our present out-

standing deficit’? (R. 24). In October, 1934, the

Air Corps informed Marvel that its letter had

‘‘been forwarded to higher authority since it is a

matter that relates to the general policy of releas-

ing equipment for foreign sales’? (R. 26). Anoth-

er conference was held in January, 1935, at Wright

Field and the company was advised that procure-

ment of fuel injectors for 1935 and 1936 would be

thrown open to competitive bidding (R. 27), Mar-

vel made further protests under letters of March

16, 1935 (R. 27-28), and May 19, 1936 (R. 29-30),

and again requested that the device be released

from secrecy. The War Department, in December,

1937, advised petitioner, as the successor to Marvel,

that the development was no longer considered to

be in a secret status (R. 31).

Petitioner’s final protest to the War Depart-

ment was made on January 27, 1938. After making

reference to the secrecy status under which Marvel

had to operate and its consequent inability to ne-

gotiate for outside business, petitioner made de-

mand on the War Department for the payment of

$506,320.75 allegedly due for money, labor and ma-

terials expended on the development, over and

above the money received from the Government

for the injectors supplied the Government under

its purchase orders and contracts (R. 31-32). The

28 PRATER

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War Department rejected this claim, being of the

opinion that it was ‘‘wholly untenable”’ (R. 32).

Petitioner then brought this action, pursuant to

the special jurisdictional act of August 4, 1939, su-

pra, pp. 2-38 (R. 12). Contending that it had in-

curred net expenditures of $735,526.28 in develop- |

ment work on the injector system, petitioner filed a |

claim for that amount in the court below (R. 1-9).

Petitioner alleged that the Government ‘‘received

through such experimental and development work,

among other invaluable benefits, the design and

development of said device; the great and invalu-

able benefit involved in the determination that said

fluid distributing mechanism constituted a marked |

advance over carburetion for military aircraft and |

the availability of the mechanism for use on mili- |

tary aircraft used in National Defense.’’ (R. 7). |

The Court of Claims dismissed the petition (R. 38),

holding that there was no contract implied in fact

or in law between the parties since there was no

promise, express or implied, to pay petitioner its

losses and no fraud, misrepresentation, mistake or

the like had been shown. (R. 37, 38).

ARGUMENT |

1. The special jurisdictional act pursuant to

which petitioner brought this action conferred ju-

risdiction upon the Court of Claims ‘‘to hear, de-

termine, and render judgment in such amount as

it deems may be equitably due, notwithstanding

* * * any limitation upon the jurisdiction of such

9

court with respect to claims upon any contract im-

plied in law, upon the claim of [petitioner] * * *

against the United States in connection with the

development of fuel-injection systems for use on

military aircraft * * *’’, supra, pp. 2-3 (R. 12).

The principal issne here, as both the court below

(R. 35) and petitioner (Pet. 9, 19, 21) recognize,

is whethe: the proof established a contract implied

in law between the parties. The Court of Claims

found that the dealings between the parties gave

rise to no such implied contract. We submit that

that determination, based in the main on factual

considerations, is plainly correct and does not war-

rant review.

Petitioner contends (Pet. 9, 18, 21, 24) that the

Government was unjustly enriched as a result of

its experimental work on fuel-injection systems.*

ae

* As petitioner recognizes (Pet. 18), the measure of any

recovery would be the benefit to the Government. Petitioner’s

alleged out-of-pocket loss is, in accordance with the terms

of the special act, not the measure of but a limitation on

the amount of recovery. Thus petitioner no longer presses

the claim of $735,526.28, the sum claimed in the court below

(R. 7-8) as representing its net loss on the project. Moreover,

it seems doubtful that Marvel suffered any out-of-pocket loss.

The court below found that ‘‘equal benefits inured to the

Marvel Company from the Marvel-Chandler project insofar

as the ‘know how’ of fuel-injection systems was concerned”?

(R. 33); that ‘‘the Marvel Company received an additional

benefit in that during the experimental or development period

it built up a patent situation or monopoly’? (R. 33); that

“when the Marvel Company offered to license the Government

under its patents on July 28, 1936 * * * it placed a value of

$900,000 on such license’’ (R. 34).

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Petitioner states (Pet. 8, 21) that the benefits re-

ceived by the Government from the development

program were the ‘‘know-how”’ of fuel injection

systems, the basic data necessary for the formula-

tion of performance specifications for such sys-

tems, increased national security which the device

furnished against potential aggressors, the saving

of development costs, and the indirect benefit re-

sulting from the stimulation given to carburetor

manufacturers when fuel-injection systems ap-

peared as a threat to their industry.*| We think it

highly doubtful that any such intangible advan-

tages could be considered an enrichment of the

United States, as that term is used in the law of

quasi contracts. Assuming, however, that such

nebulous benefits constituted an enrichment, and

apart from the extreme difficulty of evaluating

such benefits, the Government is under no duty to

make restitution. The mere fact that a person has

been benefited is not enough, It must also be shown

that the retention of such benefit is unjust. Bailis

* Petitioner also alleges that the Air Corps used a fuel-in-

jection system, not manufactured or sold by petitioner or

Marvel, on its B-29 airplanes during the war, and that

this device was manufactured and supplied in accordance

with the preformance specifications resulting from the Marvel-

Chandler development work. The conclusive answer to this is,

as noted by the court below (R. 38), that the complaint did

not ‘‘allege that the system used infringed plaintiff’s patents.

** * No claim for an infringement of the Chandler patent

having been made, we are unable to see how any liability arises

by reason of the fact that some non-infringing device was

used on these airplanes.’’

11

v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 128 F. 2d

857 (C.A. 3) ; Chandler v. Washington Toll Bridge

Authority, 17 Wash. 2d 591, 137 P. 2d 97; Restate-

ment of Restitution, § 1, comment e.

It is clear that the benefits allegedly conferred

on the Government were not conferred as the re-

sult of mistake, or of misrepresentation, fraud or

coercion on the part of the Government, and peti-

tioner does not so contend. Nor does the Govern-

ment’s imposition of secrecy on the project and

the consequent inability of Marvel to sell the device

in the open market on a mass production basis cre-

ate any basis for liability. The imposition of se-

crecy restrictions was an exercise of the sovereign

power of the Government, authorized by the Es-

pionage Act (R. 20, 21). The United States is

plainly'not liable for losses resulting from such an

exercise of government power. Horowitz v. United

States, 267 U. 8. 458; Lynch v. United States, 292

U.S. 571, 579; Gothwaite v. United States, 102 Ct.

Cls. 400; Standard Accident Insurance Company

v. United States, 103 Ct. Cls. 607, certiorari denied,

326 U.S. 729. Compare Patterson v. Kentucky,

97 U.S. 501, sustaining a state statute which pre-

vented the assignee of a patent from recouping his

original investment on commercial sales of a prod-

uct which had been commercially developed under

the patent. See also Chandler v, Washington Toll

Bridge Authority, supra. Even assuming, there-

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12

fore, that there was some benefit to the Govern-

ment, it cannot be argued that the retention of the

benefit was unjust.

Petitioner’s protestations to the contrary, there

is nothing particularly novel about the situation

presented here. Any expenditures made by peti-

tioner were incurred in a project which was under-

taken in the hope of securing large orders from the

War Department and thereby reaping considerable

profits. For purposes of the law of quasi-con-

tracts, such expenditures are not to be viewed as

conferring a benefit on the Government for they

are primarily made in petitioner’s own behalf.

“The contingent remuneration expected was large

enough to induce [petitioner] to render [its] serv-

ices purely in tie hope of receiving it and [ peti-

tioner] must have known that payment was con-

tingent on success.’’ Federal Royalty Co. v. Know,

114 F. 2d 78, 80 (C. A. 5). Accordingly, the law

consistently denies recovery for work done and

expenses incurred in anticipation of entering into

a contract. Mergenthaler vy. Dailey, 136 F. 2d 182

(C. A. 2); Sickelco v. Union Pacific R. R, ¢ 'o., 111

F. 2d 746, 750 (C. A. 9); Restatement of Restitu-

tion, §§ 56, comment e, and 57, comment b.

2. Petitioner makes the secondary argument

(Pet. 12-14) that the lower court ignored the clear

mandate of the Congress to determine the amount

“equitably due.’’? Petitioner states that “the Con-

gress must have felt that the government was ‘mor-

13

ally and equitably liable’ and that it intended to

give the Court a mandate to determine the amount,

if any, by which the money expended by Marvel ex-

ceeded its sales ‘of the developed product’ ’’. (Pet.

14). This is the argument, often made in connec-

tion with special jurisdictional acts, that the act

conceded the liability of the Government, and that

all that remained for the Court of Claims to do

was to assess petitioner’s net loss. This argument

is inconsistent with petitioner’s main conten-

tion that the basis for recovery is not thé

net loss to it but the asserted benefit to the

Government: ‘‘the basis for claim under the

Jurisdictional Act is that respondent received

a benefit for which, in view of the circumstances,

it should make restitution,’’ that ‘“‘the present ac-

tion is based upon the benefit to respondent * * *”

(Pet. 18). Moreover, it is well settled that special

acts conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Claims

to render judgment on claims ‘‘equitably’’ due do

not concede liability on the part of the defendant,

but merely provide a forum for the presentation

and adjudication of the case according to applica-

ble legal principles. United States v. Mille Lac

Chippewas, 229 U. S. 498, 500; The Sac and Fox

Indians, 220 U. 8S. 481, 489; Tillson v. United

States, 100 U. 8. 48, 46; Coos Bay Indian Tribe v.

United States, 87 Ct. Cls. 143, 153, certiorari de-

nied, 306 U. S. 653; Iowa Tribe of Indians vy.

United States, 68 Ct. Cls, 585, 605. That this was

the intention of Congress is perfectly plain from

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the title of the Act (supra, p. 2) which states

that its purpose is ‘‘to confer jurisdiction upon

the Court of Claims to hear, determine, and render

judgment upon the claim of the Borg-Warner Cor-

poration,’’ and from its legislative history. (See

pp. 33 and 43 of the Appendix to petitioner’s brief).

CONCLUSION

The decision of the court below is clearly correct

and there is no conflict of decisions. The petition

for a writ of certiorari should therefore be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

Puitie B. PERLMAN,

Solicitor General.

NEWELL A. Capp,

Acting Assistant Attorney General.

SAMUEL D. SLApE,

RicHarp P. WILLIAMS, IIT

Attorneys,

’

Marcu 1951

W U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1951—931942/P.0. 588

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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