Brief for the United States — Kalmia Realty & Insurance v. United States
Supreme Court brief1950
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CITATIONS
Cases:
Baltimore Shipbuilding Co. v. Baltimore, 195 U.S. 375. .
Clallam County v. United States, 263 U. S. 341........
Cleveland v. United States, 323 U. S. 329..............
Lee v. Osceola Imp. Dist., 268 U. S. 643...............
New Brunswick v. United States, 276 U. 8. 547.........
United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U. 8. 174.......
United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19...............
United States v. Oregon, 295 U. S.1..................
Utah Power ¢ Light Co. v. United States, 243 U. S.
BE. Se CRS NSE RS as a aed ba had es hie ek tee Ae
Van Brocklin v. State of Tennessee, 117 U. 8. 151.......
West v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 334 U. 8. 717.......
(1)
AMNIANAAaAs
ND
Yuthe Supreme Court of the Winited States
OcToBER TERM, 1950
No. 247
Katmia ReAaLtty & INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
Vv.
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH
CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals (R. 444) is
reported in 181 F. 2d 598.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was en-
tered May 15, 1950 (R. 445). The petition for a
writ of certiorari was filed August 12, 1950. The
jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U. 8. C. see. 1254(1). :
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether in a suit brought by the United States
to quiet its title to land, it was rightly held that
(1)
2
neither the Government’s grantor nor a purchaser
at a sale for delinquent state and county taxes had
any interest therein.
STATEMENT
The United States brought this suit against
Kalmia Realty & Insurance Company and Tom
Hendrix, petitioners here, to quiet title to Missis-
sippi land conveyed to it by Kalmia by two deeds
made December 29, 1933, and a third deed made No-
vember 13, 1941 (KR. 2-26).
The first 1933 deed covered 481 acres in Jones
County (R. 7-11). The second deed of the same
date conveyed approximately 19,587.54 acres in
Wayne County (R. 18-26). The 1941 deed em-
braced 119.3 acres in Jones County (R. 12-17).
Each 1933 deed provided (R. 8-9, 22-23) :
Reserving, however, to the Kalmia Realty
and Insurance Company, its successors and
assigns, for a period of Ten (10) years from
December 24, 1933, with extensions as here-
inafter provided, all oil, gas and other valu-
able minerals deposited in, on or under said
tracts of land, * * *
Provided: That if at the termination of the
said ten year period of reservation it is found
that such oil, gas, and other valuable minerals,
mineral] rights and interests are being operated
or have been operated at any time during the
preceding five years, to commercial advantage,
then and in that event, the said right to mine
and remove said oil, gas, and other valuable
3
minerals, shall extend for a further period of
five years, and further: That the right to mine
and remove oil, gas, and other valuable min-
erals shall extend in periods of five (5) years
whenever operation during the preceding five
years has been for an average of 120 days per
year throughout the period.
* * * * *
Provided: That at the termination of the
ten year period, if not extended, or at the ter-
mination of any extended period, in case the
operation has been carried on for the number
of days and under conditions stated, the right
to mine and remove oil, gas and other valu-
able minerals shall terminate and a complete
fee in the land become vested in the United
Rte ati
The 1941 deed contained a similar reservation
which unless extended, would terminate July 1,
1949 (R. 13-14).
So far as concerns Kalmia, the trial court found
and held (R. 391-399, 421-423) :
Kalmia asserted that Raymond M. Conarro, who
represented the Secretary of Agriculture in the .
negotiations resulting in the 1933 conveyances,
falsely told its representatives that the Secretary
could not permit a reservation of mineral rights
for more than 10 years, and that therefore the 1933
deeds were procured by fraud. But Kalmia had
failed to establish that Mr. Conarro made the state-
ment. (Fdg. 7, R. 394-395.) In any event, since
Kalmia could ascertain the Secretary’s statutory
4
power, it could not rely on any legal representa-
tions made on his behalf (R. 423).
Kalmia further asserted that the lands conveyed
in 1933 were operated to commercial advantage
during the five years immediately preceding De-
cember 24, 1943, and hence that the reservation did
not terminate on that date (Fdg. 5, R. 393). While
Kalmia itself did not prospect for minerals, it
made mineral leases from which it received $15,000
or $16,000. However, its lessees did not produce
oil in commercial quantities, as required by the
deeds, and accordingly the reservation did end on
December 24, 1943. (Fdg. 10, R. 396; Concl. 2,
R. 397.)
So far as concerns Hendrix, the facts were stipu-
lated (R. 400-402) as follows:
For the year 1941 the State of Mississippi and
Wayne County taxed the mineral interest in the
19,587.54 acres conveyed by the second 1933 deed.
The taxes were not paid and Hendrix purchased
at tax sales. Neither he, nor anyone acting for
him, operated the mineral interest to commercial
advantage. The United States has been in ex-
clusive possession of the lands since December 24,
1943, and has granted to others oil and gas leases
thereto.
Upon the basis of the stipulation, the trial court
held (R. 407-412): The State and County could
tax only the interest in the lands which Kalmia
reserved by the 1933 deed. Consequently, the tax
deeds conveyed to Hendrix only that limited in-
terest. Since neither Kalmia nor Hendrix had ever
5
operated the mineral interest to commercial ad-
vantage, the interest had expired on December 24,
1943.
On May 12, 1949, the trial court entered judg-
ment that the United States is the owner in fee
simple of the lands described in the 1933 deeds and
that it is the owner of the land described in the
1941 deed ‘‘subject only to the reservations, excep-
tions, terms and conditions of that deed’’.’ Peti-
tioners, and all claiming under them, were perma-
nently enjoined from asserting to the contrary.
(R. 419-421.)
The Court of Appeals affirmed per curiam (R.
444) saying: ‘‘From the standpoint of both reason
and result, we think that the decision and judg-
ment of the Court below were correct.’’
ARGUMENT
The decisions below are plainly correct, and peti-
tioners present no questions calling for further re-
view. Since the Government’s title depends en-
tirely upon the deeds it obtained from Kalmia, it
is obvious that the question as to the validity and
extent of the Government’s interest can be com-
letely determined by its suit against Kalmia and
lf{endrix, whose interest is derived from Kalmia.
United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 12, 24; United
States v. California, 332 U. S. 19, 22-23. There is
1 Since the termination date of the reservation in the 1941
deed, July 1, 1949, had not been reached when the judgment
was rendered on May 12, 1949, the judgment quieting the
Government’s title to the land covered by that deed had to be
“subject” to the reservation.
6
therefore no warrant for petitioners’ contention
(Pet. 20-25) that those to whom the Government,
as the fee-owner, has leased the mineral interests
are indispensable parties.
The judgment against Kalmia is clearly right.
There is no basis in the record for its contention
(Pet. 14-15, 76-78) that the 1933 deeds were in-
duced vy the false statement of a government em-
ployee. For, as the trial court found (R. 394),
Kalmia could not show that the alleged statement
was made. The lower court’s interpretation of
operation to ‘‘commercial advantage’’ under the
reservation (R. 396-7) is also plainly correct.
Equally correct is the injunction against claims
by Hendrix to an interest in the 19,587.54 acres
sold for 1941 delinquent State and County taxes.
Subject to the reservation of mineral rights,
Kalmia conveyed to the United States its entire
right, title and interest in these lands. Upon ex-
piration of the reservation, the United States was
to acquire ‘‘a complete fee in the land”’ (R. 9, 23).
Supra, p. 3. The State and County could not tax
the reversionary interest of the United States.
Van Brocklin v. State of Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151,
179-180; Clallam County v. United States, 263
U.S. 341, 345; Lee v. Osceola Imp. Dist., 268 U.S.
643, 645; United States v. Allegheny County, 322
U.S. 174, 188-189; Cleveland v. United States, 323
U.S. 329, 333. Cf. Utah Power & Light Co. v.
United States, 243 U.S. 389, 403-404. In other
words, they taxed—and subsequently sold to Hen-
7
drix—only Kalmia’s balance of the ten-year term
and the right to have it extended if minerals were
produced in commercial quantities. New Bruns-
wick v. United States, 276 U.S. 547, 556; Baltimore
Shipbulding Co. v. Baltimore, 195 U.S. 375, 382.
Since, as Hendrix stipulated (R. 401), there was
no such production, the reservation expired on
December 24, 1943, and Hendrix no longer had an
interest in the property.
Hendrix’s contention (Pet. 25-73) that there is
question whether the decisions just cited have been
overruled is patently erroneous. West v. Okla-
homa Tax Commission, 334 U.S. 717, 723.?
CONCLUSION
The judgment below is correct and the case does
not warrant review. The petition for a writ of
certiorari should therefore be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
Puiuie B. PERLMAN,
Solicitor General.
A. Devitt VANECH,
Assistant Attorney General.
JOHN F. Corrter,
Attorney.
SEPTEMBER 1950.
2 Contrary to petitioner’s contention (Pet. 43-53), the Weeks
Act does not even hint at a consent by the United States to
state taxation of property acquired by the United States under
its provisions.
YT U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1950 906536 163
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.