Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Hygienic Products Co. v. Judson Dunaway Corp.

Supreme Court brief1950

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SUBJECT INDEX.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI ........

Summary and Short Statement ....................

The Complaint and Subject Matter in Suit ........

REORS OF TIOWOE COUT oo. cease vecesccees

Petitioner’s History and Activities ..............

Defendant’s History and Activities ..............

Products of Parties Are Same and Sold for Same

ir eee en SELLS aSCMER OE PONDS ON ETT OS

CAI ee OT EL PT ee ery ee

NN IID iiss in sd eR Rah Mewes ome anee

Reasons Relied Upon for the Grant of a Writ ......

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT

er COP OURMME Mec adee enue pecs essed Kesweldas

Opinions of the Courts Below ..................

ns On GERONOE i i coss Cees dss seu Renee baheas

IE einai 4b 6a KARE ak meee Wen hh hc ORO

Point I. Petitioner’s Valuable Good Will Rights in

Its Unique and Distinctive Trade-Mark, First

Adopted and Used Exclusively by Petitioner

for Over Thirty-Five Years and Registered by

It, Should Not Be So Strictly Construed as to

Entitle Petitioner to Protection Only Against

Eee” CUE a Aha canes KehaeaE SOO NS

Typical Infringing or Confusingly Similar Pic-

we Re ree eres rer

Point II. Defendant Is Guilty of Trade-Mark In-

fringement by Use, in Connection With the Sale

of Its Product, of Pictorial Representations

Which Have the Same Essential Ensemble and

Prominent Characteristic as Petitioner’s Picture

UE ie woo 45.566 Ok asa eh Re

12

16

——

Point III. Defendant is Guilty of Unfair Competi-

TE 6 Sas Seu eke oie Sheba aeea ss Seba R ERA 24

Point IV. The Findings of the District Court as to

Defendant’s Infringement and Unfair Competi-

tion Were Correct and Not Clearly Erroneous

and Hence Under Rule 52(a) Should Not Have

Been Disturbed by the Court of Appeals ...... 27

NE RSS icin SC cuaawies nuk bn eda Knee Vn seppaNs van 29

ge ee ee re ee 31

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.

Cases.

Adamson v. Gilliland, 242 U. S. 350 ................ 28

Aunt Jemima v. Blair, 50 App. D. C. 28 ............ 17

Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Kirkland Distributing Co.,

48 App. D. C. 248 (1919 C. D. 162) ............ 17, 18

Beckwith v. Commissioner of Patents, 252 U.S. 538. ..22, 2

B. F. Sturtevant Co. v. Massachusetts Hair and Felt

ee Wee Se Pe COMED oda pach eed aweNwdewe 28

Butte & Superior Copper Co. v. Clark-Montana Realty

aE PG oi ea huh cole ki kay rane ened 28

Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, 162 F. 2d 280

Me EE oe boi bond Cicn wd indeds oo wksn 24, 29

District of Columbia v. Pace, 320 U. 8. 698 .......... 28

Dwinnell-Wright Co. v. National Fruit Products Co.,

ae | eres Cry ray er 29

Enoch Morgan’s Sons Co. v. Ward, 152 Fed. 690 (C.

Sees ED cin. ss wh dS oe 15, 16, 17, 18, 21

Food Fair Stores v. Food Fair, 177 F. 2d 177 (C. C. A.

re ere rere eee 15

Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403

coer eee eee ee eee er eee eee seer ereeeeeeeeeee

International Latex Corporation vs. I. B. Kleinert

pe ee Se ee ee errerr eT eros

_——_

Jansen Knitting Mills v. Herlich et al., 24 T. M. Rep.

48, D. C. E. D. Pa. 1934 ...... 66. e eee eee eee ees 18

Jansen Knitting Mills v. Spokane Knitting Mills, Inc.,

44 F. 2d 656, D. C. E. D. Wash. N. D. 1930 ........ 18

Kassman & Kessner, Inc. v. Rosenberg Co., 10 F. 2d

904 (App. D. C. 1926) ........ceeeeeeeeeeeeees 21

Lawson v. United States Mining Co., 207 U.S.1..... 28

McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245 (1877) .........--- 15

Mishawaka Mfg. Co. v. Kresge Co., 316 U. S. 203 (1942) 29

Mishawaka R. & W. Mfg. Co. v. Panther-Panco Rub.

Ce, 168 F. Bah OU noc os cd ce ccctvessesewesses 11

Northam Warren Corp. v. Universal Cosmetic Co., 18

F. 98 774 (C.-C. A. J, WBBE), 2... cccvcceccencces 21

Pro-Phy-Lac-Tic Brush Co. v. Jordan Marsh Co., 165

A 3 8h. | eenrerere rey err reer TTT 22

Sierra Chemical Co. v. Berettini, 33 F. 2d 397 (C. C. A.

UI 5 nibs oid Vee Rava aweansdewcke ceayee ees 22

Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids Mfg. Co., 233 U. S. 461

CTOGRD sia a cia da akg nKesins eines eae 15

United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U.S.

ices eS Ge eee 28

Walling v. General Industries Co., 330 U. 8S. 545 (1947) 28

Walter Baker & Co. v. Puritan Pure Food Co., 139 Fed.

fF Be ee | error rte re 16, 18

Statutes.

15 U.S. C. Sees. 85 and 96 (Trade-Mark Act of 1905). .7, 14

15 U.S. C. Sees. 1051-1127 (Trade-Mark Act of 1946) 7

28 U.S. C. Sees. 41 (1) and 41 (7) .........cceceeees 7

. £e Se hee eee er Tee Cees er 7

96'U. B. C.. Bate BERR Ge Tae oo anv s keen ec cacccites 7

Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 52(a)

_—

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1949.

THE HYGIENIC PRODUCTS COMPANY,

Petitioner,

vs.

JUDSON DUNAWAY CORPORATION,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To the United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit.

To the Honorable Chief Justice and

Associate Justices of the Supreme

Court of the United States:

Your petitioner, The Hygienic Products Company, re-

spectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review, in

part, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals

for the First Circuit entered December 15, 1949 (R. 285)

and reported in 178 F. 2d 461.

A transcript of the record of the case, including pro-

ceedings in said Cqurt of Appeals, is furnished herewith

in accordance with the Rules of this Court.

SUMMARY AND SHORT STATEMENT.

The Complaint and Subject Matter in Suit.

Petitioner, The Hygienic Products Company, through

its Complaint filed May 31, 1947 (R. 2) in the United States

District Court for the District of New Hampshire, charged

Judson Dunaway Corporation, the defendant, respondent

here, with infringement of petitioner’s trade-mark registra-

2

tions of its picture trade-mark, comprising the picture of

a maid or woman pouring from a can into a toilet bowl, and

also charged defendant with unfair competition in trade,

all by defendant’s use of certain advertising material as-

serted to display, in connection with the sale of defendant’s

like competing goods, infringing and deceptively similar

pictorial representations.'

For convenience, we have appended to the back cover

a folded-in chart upon which we have reproduced the marks

appearing in several of petitioner’s fully identified regis-

trations, defendant’s pictori-l representations complained

of, and other illustrations which will be referred to later.

Holdings of Lower Courts.

The District Court held in its opinion (R. 216 to 234,

reported in 81 F. Supp. 935) that petitioner’s picture trade-

mark and the several registrations thereof were valid, that

they had been infringed by defendant’s pictorial representa-

tions appearing on the chart and that defendant was guilty

of unfair competition by the use thereof.

The Court of Appeals in its opinion (R. 285, reported

in 178 F. 2d 461) held with the District Court as to the

issues bearing on the validity of petitioner’s picture mark

and registrations, but reversed the District Court on the

issues of infringement and unfair competition on the

ground, in substance, that defendant’s accused pictorial

10n June 13, 1947 petitioner filed an amendment. to its

Complaint (R. 31) charging defendant with infringement by rea-

son of the use of newspaper publications containing the picture

of a hand pouring from a can into a water closet bowl. The

District Court, as well as the Court of Appeals, upon petitioner’s

cross-appeal, found that this picture did not infringe upon

petitioner’s picture mark or registrations and that defendant was

not guilty of unfair competition with respect to the same (R. 234,

293). Petitioner does not. seek to have this Court review the

judgments of the lower courts with respect to defendant’s picture

of a hand pouring from a can into a water closet bowl.

—

—

3

representations differ in detailed respects from vetitioner’s

and that defendant’s advertising, viewed as a whole, does

not so closely resemble petitioner’s marks as to be likely

to confuse the defendant’s product with that of petitioner.

Petitioner’s History and Activities.

Continuously since April 1911, petitioner has been

engaged in manufacturing and selling throughout the United

States and foreign countries a powdered chemical com-

pound, also known under its ‘‘Sani-Flush’’ trade-mark, for

cleaning by chemical reaction between the compound and

water. During that entire period petitioner’s compound has

been sold for cleaning toilet bowls and since 1922 it has also

been sold for cleaning automobile radiators. Petitioner

pioneered this industry and has long been a leader in it,

notwithstanding that since 1911 it has had well over 100

competitors marketing similar compounds (R. 64, 73, 101,

, 217).

Upon entering into this business in 1911 petitioner

composed the picture of a maid or woman pouring from a

can into a water closet bowl as its trade-mark, to indicate

the origin of its pioneer product. There is no dispute that

petitioner was the very first to adopt and use this picture

as a trade-mark for a cleaning compound, or for that mat-

ter, for any goods. It is equally well established that

petitioner has continuously and exclusively for over 35

years used such trade-mark on and in connection with the

sale of its product, as well as in connection with its ad-

vertising thereof (R. 64, 70, 99, 100, 217, 221). With re-

spect to petitioner’s registered trade-marks and typical

examples of illustrations used in its advertising, ready ref-

erence may be had to the appended chart.

Petitioner has manufactured and sold over 400,000,000

cans of its product, representing a sales value to the con-

sumer in excess of $80,000,000 (R. 101,218). Its product

has been marketed by direct sales and through jobbers to

ee

retail merchants including general stores, grocery stores

and drug stores. Petitioner has also continuously exploited

its picture trade-mark in its advertising which has been of

national scope and has been largely done through the

medium of magazines, newspapers, display cards and leaf-

lets (R. 218). Petitioner spent about $8,000,000 in ad-

vertising its product, always in connection with its picture

trade-mark (R. 76, 218).

Petitioner’s business and good will are worth many

millions of dollars (R. 83).

For over 35 years since petitioner’s adoption of its

picture trade-mark, petitioner has always asserted its

right to the exclusive use of its picture trade-mark to in-

dicate origin of its products and all violations by others of

petitioner’s picture trade-mark were discontinued after

protest or action taken by petitioner. Petitioner’s picture

trade-mark has at all times been associated exclusively

with petitioner’s product and has been recognized and re-

spected by the trade. The trade-mark is of great good will

value to petitioner (R. 83, 109, 110, 112, 131, 147, 218, 230).

Defendant’s History and Activities.

The defendant, Judson Dunaway Corporation, is com-

paratively a newcomer in the field as it did not begin to

manufacture and sell its product, which is the same as pe-

titioner’s, until 1937. The label on defendant’s container

(Physical Exh. L, R. 94, 274) has continuously displayed a

stream of material flowing from the bottom of the letter ‘‘i’’

in the word ‘‘Vanish”’ into a water closet bowl. For ap-

proximately ten years defendant competed with petitioner

and built up a prosperous business by manufacturing and

selling its product under the registered trade-mark ‘‘ Van-

ish’’ without any endeavor to simulate petitioner’s picture

trade-mark of a maid pouring from a can into a toilet bowl

(R. 196, 218, 219, 231). During this first ten years of the

sale of its product, defendant published advertisements such

_—

5

as those reproduced on our chart. Defendant’s president

admitted that he thought that these were advertising de-

fendant’s products as well as defendant could (R. 195, 196).

Petitioner made no complaint with respect to the labels on

defendant’s cans or with respect to this earlier advertising.

During this ten year period defendant’s president had

full knowledge of petitioner’s picture trade-mark and

recognized that petitioner had exclusively used that mark

and that it was of great value to petitioner (R. 196, 219).

Late in 1946 or early in 1947, defendant adopted for use in

its advertising the pictorial representation of a woman

pouring from a can into a toilet bowl (R. 219).

Defendant’s accused representations are reproduced

on our chart.

The newspaper advertisement (Exh. KE, R. 253, 57) and

the display cards (Physical Exh. K, R. 93, 274) do not in

any way display defendant’s name. The back of defend-

ant’s can carries defendant’s name but when the can is

placed in the opening of the display card defendant’s name

is not visible to persons looking at the display. The leaf-

lets (Exh. C, R. 248, 249, 57) do not display defendant’s

name except in very small type on the back page, com-

pletely disassociated from the picture complained of.

Defendant’s president admitted that defendant ‘‘did

use the symbol or picture of a girl pouring the product into

a toilet bowl in connection with the sale of’’ defendant’s

‘‘nroduct in order to increase’’ defendant’s ‘‘sales of that

product’’ (R. 197, 198, 231). No attorney was consulted

(R. 199).

Products of Parties Are Same and Sold for Same Uses.

Both petitioner’s and defendant’s products are in

powdered form and are sold in cans, carrying different

labels and the trade-marks ‘‘Sani-Flush’’ and ‘‘Vanish’’

respectively. There is no dispute that the products are

substantially the same and that they are sold for the same

a

6

uses. Petitioner has not complained about defendant’s

labels nor defendant’s use of the name ‘‘ Vanish.’’

Neither petitioner’s nor defendant’s product accom-

plishes the desired cleaning result in water closet bowls or

in automobile radiators, except in the presence of water

which is essential to produce the necessary chemical clean-

ing reaction. Petitioner has always and defendant has for

years printed explicit directions on their respective con-

tainers (Physical Exh. G-1 and L, R. 71, 94, 273, 274) de-

tailing the successive steps which must be taken in order

that their products may accomplish their purpose. The

directions on defendant’s container are quite similar to

those which had long appeared on petitioner’s, and we quote

defendant’s directions with respect to cleaning toilet bowls

and radiators:

“TO CLEAN TOILET BOWLS—Flush toilet, then pour

VANISH into bowl and around sides in direct contact

with discolored parts. Allow to stand until all bubbling

stops. With brush or swab, swish off discoloration

loosened by VANISH’s chemical action. Then flush.

For a badly discolored bow] repeat, allowing the solu-

tion to remain in bow! 15 mins. or longer.’’ (R. 166.)

“TO CLEAN AUTO RADIATORS—While radiator is

warm and motor running pour in very slowly one-half

of this can. Run engine 15 minutes, then drain. For

large trucks, use entire can. THOROUGHLY FLUSH

WITH CLEAN WATER BEFORE REFILLING. Do

not allow to touch paint or finish.’’ (R. 167.)

The text of defendant’s leaflet, Exhibit C (R. 248) con-

tains the same instructions for cleaning radiators ad-

jacent the slogan ‘‘A HANDY TIP FOR HUSBANDS”’

(R. 248).

7

JURISDICTION.

The District Court had jurisdiction under what was

at the time the action commenced, Section 24 of the Judi-

cial Code (28 U. S. C. Sees. 41 (1) and 41 (7)), the sub-

stance of which is now found in U. S. Code, Title 28, Sees.

1332 and 1338.

With respect to the trade-mark registrations, the per-

tinent provisions of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905 (15 U. S.

C. Sees. 85 and 96) apply rather than the Trade Mark Act

of 1946 (15 U. S. C. Sees. 1051-1127), as the latter did not

become effective until after the present action was filed.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Section

1254 of Title 28—United States Code, the date of the

judgment sought to be reviewed being December 15, 1949.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.

1. Are petitioner’s valuable good will rights in its

unique and distinctive picture trade-mark, first adopted

and used exclusively by petitioner for over thirty-five years

and registered by it, to be so strictly construed as to en-

title petitioner to protection only against ‘‘Chinese’’ copy-

ing?

2. Is the defendant guilty of trade-mark infringement

by use in connection with the sale of its product, of pictorial

representations which have the same essential ensemble

and prominent characteristics as petitioner’s trade-mark,

registered by petitioner and used in its advertising?

3. Is defendant guilty of unfair competition?

4. Were the Findings of the District Court as to in-

fringement and unfair competition by defendant ‘‘clearly

erroneous’’? (Rule 52 (a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.)

8

REASONS RELIED UPON FOR THE GRANT OF A WRIT.

1: The questions, and particularly questions 1, 2 and 3,

presented by the decision of the Court of Appeals in this

action are of great importance to trade-mark owners and

to the general public.

2. The precise questions, and particularly questions 1,

2 and 3, presented by the decision of the Court of Appeals

in this action have not been specifically passed upon by this

Court.

3. There is divergence of views expressed in the

opinions below on questions 1, 2 and 3, and the decision of

the Court of Appeals on all the questions is in conflict with

applicable decisions of this and other Federal Courts.

WHEREFORE, we submit that this Petition for Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit

should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Harry W. Linpsey, Jr.,

Harry FREAszE,

JOsEPH FREAsE,

Frank J. Suttoway,

RanpotpeH C. RIcHARDsON,

Counsel for Petitioner.

Washington, D. C.

March 14, 1950.

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9

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR

WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

The opinion of the District Court and Court of Appeals

below are reported respectively in 81 F. Supp. 935 and 178

F, 2d 461; and the grounds on which jurisdiction of this

Court is invoked and a statement of the case appear com-

mencing respectively in pages 7 and 1 of the foregoing

Petition.

OPINIONS OF THE COURTS BELOW.

The opinion of the District Court, Judge Connor, will

be found at R. 216 and is reported at 81 F. Supp. 935. The

opinion was rendered after a full trial and upon briefs and

oral arguments. The opinion includes well considered

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The more per-

tinent facts, set forth in our Petition, are stated even more

fully by the District Court in its opinion, and will not be

repeated here.

The District Court essentially found that petitioner

had adopted its pictorial representation of a woman pour-

ing from a can into a toilet bowl as a unique symbol or

device to indicate the origin of its manufacture, that this

picture mark and the registrations were not descriptive,

as asserted by the defendant, that the registered marks

had not been abandoned, as contended by defendant, that

there ‘‘is ample authority to the effect that leaflets, display

cards and newspaper advertising will support a claim of

infringement’’ (citing cases) (R. 228), that there was likeli-

hood of confusion in the trade and that defendant was

guilty of trade-mark infringement and unfair competition

in trade.

The District Court, after comparing plaintiff’s picture

mark and the accused picture representations of defendant,

said, in part, with respect to the matter of defendant’s in-

fringement and unfair competition:

TT

10

‘‘Thus considered, the advertising material must

be characterized as a colorable imitation of the plain-

tiff’s trade-marks. Concededly there are variations,

and this would necessarily be so if exact reproduction

was to be avoided; but the differences are minor, such

as the apparent age and attire of the respective maids.

In two of the display cards used by the defendant was

a cut-out wherein was placed for display a can of its

product, with a large part of the card given over to a

picture of a young woman in the act of pouring a can

of material into a toilet bowl. Such would readily

tend to confuse a prospective customer in the pur-

chase of this type of product.’’ (R. 228)

‘‘Having in mind the test by which the defendant’s

complained of conduct is to be measured, I am of the

opinion that the mode of advertising which the defend-

ant has adopted would likely be misleading and result

in consumer confusion, and, as such, was an infringe-

ment on the plaintiff’s right to the exclusive use of the

trade-mark.’’ (R. 229)

* * * * *

‘“‘The motive prompting the defendant to use the ob-

jected to advertisements was to increase its sales, and

hence it could be inferred that it sought to divert some

of the plaintiff’s trade profits thereby. Both forms of

advertising would probably result in consumer confu-

sion, and would differ only in degree, with the display

cards containing the insert likely to be the most effec-

tive.’’ (R. 231)

* * * * *

‘<Tt is difficult to believe that the adoption of this design,

so similar to that of the plaintiff, was solely a coin-

cidence, and this despite the defendant’s knowledge

that the plaintiff had used this symbol for many years.”’

‘*In these circumstances, intent may reasonably be

inferred.’’ (R. 231)

The opinion of the Court of Appeals will be found

at R. 285, and is reported at 178 F. 2d 461. The Court of

11

Appeals likewise found (R. 290) that petitioner’s picture

trade-mark and registrations are valid and ‘‘are not merely

descriptive but are original, arbitrary and fanciful’’, that

none of the registered marks had been abandoned and that

it was assumed that one may infringe by advertising matter,

citing Mishawaka R. € W. Mfg. Co. v. Panther-Panco Rub.

Co., 153 F. 2nd 662.

The Court of Appeals found, however, that the defend-

ant did not infringe and was not guilty of unfair competi-

tion, seemingly on the theories that petitioner’s trade-

mark protection must be strictly confined to the exact form,

dress and appearance of the women shown in petitioner’s

registrations and that defendant’s advertisements, unlike

petitioner’s trade-mark registrations, carry slogans or

words and background for its accused illustrations of a

woman pouring from a can into a toilet bowl. For con-

venience we quote here what the Court of Appeals said, in

part, on this matter (R. 291):

‘Of course, the defendant cannot represent its product

in use in such a setting, or in such a way, as to render

it likely that the purchasing public will confuse its

product with that of the plaintiff. But this does not

mean that the defendant is relegated to advertising its

product by showing it in use by an old crone in a mother

hubbard with a scowl on her face. Clearly in advertis-

ing, to quote from the current musical play ‘South

Pacific,’ ‘There is nothing like the frame of a dame,’

and we cannot see why the defendant is not as much

entitled to take commercial advantage of pulchritude

as the plaintiff.

‘‘We mention these matters at some length for it

seems to us that the District Court’s conclusion of in-

fringement, with which we feel constrained to disagree,

could only have rested upon the defendant’s use in its

advertising of the foregoing elements which we think

it was free to use, because, aside from those elements,

the defendant’s advertising bears little or no resem-

blance to the plaintiff’s marks.’’

SPECIFICATION OF ERRORS.

The errors which petitioner will urge if the petition

for writ of certiorari is granted are that the United States

Court of Appeals for the First Circuit erred:

(1) In not affirming the judgment of the District

Court that defendant infringed petitioner’s picture

trade-mark and registrations, comprising the picture

of a woman pouring from a can into a toilet bowl.

(2) In not affirming the judgment of the District

Court that defendant was guilty of unfair competition

by reason of defendant’s use of its pictorial represen-

tations of a woman pouring from a can into a toilet

bowl.

ARGUMENT.

The Argument will follow the ‘‘Questions Presented,’’

as stated on page 7 of the Petition.

POINT I.

Petitioner’s Valuable Good Will Rights in Its Unique and

Distinctive Trade-Mark, First Adopted and Used Ex-

clusively by Petitioner for Over Thirty-Five Years

and Registered by It, Should Not Be So Strictly Con-

strued as to Entitle Petitioner to Protection Only

Against ‘‘Chinese’’ Copying.

The following essential facts are not only clearly estab-

lished by the record in this case as we have shown in the

petition, but were specifically found by the District Court

and recited in large measure by the Court of Appeals in its

decision. In 1911 petitioner adopted its picture trade-

mark comprising a woman pouring from a can into a

toilet bowl. It has sold hundreds of millions of cans of its

product having a value of many millions of dollars. The

product has been sold for use for cleaning automobile

radiators and toilet bowls. Millions of dollars have been

12

—————

13

spent by petitioner in nationally advertising its product

through virtually all mediums. Its picture representation

was adopted with the intent of using it as a trade-mark,

and has been exclusively used by petitioner, except for de-

fendant’s asserted infringing use. All of petitioner’s ad-

vertising has displayed a picture of its can with its regis-

tered picture trade-mark prominently appearing on the

label on the can. Much of defendant’s advertising material

carried very similar pictorial representations having the

same motif, that is, the same essential ensemble of elements

and prominent characteristics.

The District Court said, in part:

**The plaintiff adopted and used a pictorial representa-

tion as a unique symbol or device to indicate the origin

of the goods of its manufacture and to distinguish

them from goods of the same general nature which

might be manufactured by others.’’ (R. 221.)

and

“‘The long, continued, and exclusive use of the

symbol has come to denote origin, and distinguishes

the goods of the plaintiff from those of others’’ * * *

(R. 222.)

The Court of Appeals did not quarrel with these findings.

In fact it stated that ‘‘plaintiff’s marks are valid’’ and are

‘‘original, arbitrary and fanciful’’ (R. 290).

Along with such picture trade-marks as the girl carry-

ing an umbrella and a pouring can for salt, the muscular

arm and hammer for baking soda, the ‘‘Gold Dust’’ twins

for cleaning powder, the Dutch Girl with a stick for clean-

ing powder, and the phonograph and dog for ‘‘Victrolas”’

and television sets, plaintiff’s picture mark is one of the

best and most universally recognized picture marks, known

by the housewife and the trade and public generally includ-

ing the automobile mechanic who uses petitioner’s products

for cleaning auto radiators.

a

14

The very fact that petitioner in its trade-mark regis-

trations and advertising pictorial representations has kept

up with current fashions and made slight and inevitable

changes in style and dress, while retaining at all times the

essential ensemble of elements and prominent characteris-

tics of its picture trade-mark, is cogent evidence that peti-

tioner has always intended to and has asserted that its

trade-mark comprises that ensemble and those prominent

characteristics. The ensemble and characteristics include

the combination of the toilet bowl, a container in position

over the bowl, material flowing from the can in a stream

into the bowl, and a woman standing beside the toilet in a

graceful poise and holding the can with one outstretched

hand.

This is petitioner’s exclusive trade-mark, recognized

in the home and automobile repair and service shops, and

by the trade and the public generally by its essential fea-

tures and characteristics, which petitioner has always and

consistently retained.

We submit that petitioner’s trade-mark should not be

restricted to every detail of the toilet, the can or the woman,

and that protection should not be limited to ‘‘Chinese’’

copying, which seems to be the basis of the decision of the

Court of Appeals.

Section 16 of the Trade Mark Act of 1905, as amended,

(15 U.S. C. See. 96) is quoted in part in the footnote.* It is

specifically noted that any person who shall ‘‘colorably

imitate’’ a trade-mark is guilty of infringement.

*** Any person who shall, without the consent of the owner

thereof, reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate any such

trade mark and affix the same to merchandise of substantially the

same descriptive properties as those set forth in the registration,

or to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, or receptacles in-

tended to be used upon or in connection with the sale of mer-

chandise of substantially the same descriptive properties as those

set forth in such registration, . . . shall be liable to an action for

damages therefor at the suit of the owner thereof; .. .’’

EEE

15

‘Difficulty frequently arises in determining the

question of infringement; but it is clear that exact

similarity is not required, as that requirement would

always enable the wrong-doer to evade responsibility

for his wrongful acts.’’ (Emphasis supplied.) McLean

v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245, 255, (1877).

‘*Not only exact reproduction, but a ‘colorable imita-

tion’ is within the statute; otherwise, the trade-mark

would be of little avail as by shrewd simulation it could

be appropriated with impunity.’’ Thaddeus Davids

Co. v. Davids Mfg. Co., 233 U. S. 461, 469 (1914).

‘“‘The infringer rarely has the hardihood to make

a Chinese copy.’’ Enoch Morgan’s Sons Co. v. Ward,

152 Fed. 690, 693, (C. C. A. 7, 1907).

‘*A trade-mark is not to be resolved into its com-

ponent parts and each part analyzed separately in

cases of this sort.’’ Food Fair Stores v. Food Fair, 177

F, 2d 177, 185. (C. C. A. 1, Sept. 21, 1949; Woodbury,

C. J.)

At the top of the following page we reproduce the

picture marks for rubber panties for babies involved in

International Latex Corporation vs. I. B. Kleinert Rubber

Co., 104 F. 2d 382, 383, decided by the Court of Customs and

Patent Appeals in June 1939. The Examiner of Inter-

ferences had found that the two marks, when placed side by

side, were easily distinguishable but the Commissioner of

Patents had reversed the Examiner. The Court affirmed

the Commissioner stating that the baby’s posture in the

two marks ‘‘is substantially the same,’’ that the side by

side ‘‘comparison is not the test to be applied in consider-

ing the question of confusing similarity of the marks,’’

that there was likelihood of confusion and that any reason-

able ‘‘doubt must be resolved against the newcomer in

the field.’’

———eaEOO rr S™t—C™——SC‘“€F8’']

aicaahcabeianeane

” —

16

TYPICAL INFRINGING OR CONFUSINGLY

SIMILAR PICTURE TRADE-MARKS

Confusingly Similar

Picture

Registered Picture

International v. Kleinert, 104 F. 2d 382

Plaintiff ’s picture infringed by Defendant’s picture

Enoch Morgan’s v. Ward, 152 F. 690

17

Registered Picture Confusingly Similar

Picture

Aunt Jemima v. Kirkland, 48 App. D. C. 248

Registered Picture Confusingly Similar

Picture

Aunt Jemima v. Blair, 50 App. D. C. 28

For convenience, we also have summarized pictorially

above, the Enoch Morgan’s Sons case, supra, and several

additional cases out of many, which are exactly in point

here. The illustrations and legends speak amply for them-

ie,

18

selves, and detailed discussion of them here is unnecessary.*

We content ourselves by quoting from three of these cases.

‘‘Despite the differences in colors and direction in

which the figures face, I have reached the conclusion

that defendant’s trade-mark adapted and used by it

is in similitude of that of complainant; that confusion

is likely to arise, and the goods of defendant be pur-

chased in the belief that they are those of complain-

ant.’’ Walter Baker & Co. v. Puritan Pure Food Co.,

139 Fed. 680, 683 (S. D. N. Y. 1905).

‘In the pictorial marks there is no difference, ex-

cept that appellee has substituted a young woman’s

face for a young man’s.’’ Enoch Morgan’s Sons case

(p. 693).

““Tt would be difficult to imagine a more flagrant

violation of the statute than the one here presented.

The red core of the watermelon with its seed spots,

held under the chin of the negro, is a good reproduc-

tion of the red bandana with its spots, tied around the

neck of the negress. A mere glance at the marks is

convincing. No evidence of confusion is necessary, nor

can any amount of fine-spun discrimination withdraw

the case from the direct operation of the statute.’’

Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Kirkland Distributing Co., 48

App. D. C. 248, 249, 250 (1919 C. D. 162).

It is clear that it is well established that the test of

trade-mark infringement and unfair competition is likeli-

hood of consumer confusion, resulting from memory and not

from a side-by-side visual comparison. Chinese copying is

not necessary to find infringement.

* Jansen Knitting Mills v. Herlich et al., 24 T. M. Ren A®,

D. C. E. D. Pa. 1934, referred to by the Court of Appeals (Ree.

291) and having to do with the famous Jansen ‘‘ Diving Girl’’ reg-

istered for swimming suits, is directly in conflict with Jansen

Knitting Mills v. Spokane Knitting Mills, Inc., 44 F. 2d 656, D. C.

E. D. Wash. N. D. 1930.

19

POINT II.

Defendant Is Guilty of Trade-Mark Infringement by Use,

in Connection With the Sale of Its Product, of Pic-

torial Representations Which Have the Same Essential

Ensemble and Prominent Characteristics as Petition-

er’s Picture Trade-Mark.

The District Court (Rec. 228) found that defendant’s

accused advertisements ‘‘have definite points of similarity

with the trade-mark of plaintiff’’ and said:

‘“‘Thus considered, the advertising material must be

characterized as a colorable imitation of the plaintiff’s

trade-marks. Concededly there are variations, and this

would necessarily be so if exact reproduction was to

be avoided;.. .’’

We submit that the fact findings of the District Court

on the matter of infringement are correct as is clear from

a mere inspection of our Chart showing petitioner’s picture

trade-mark, with petitioner’s slight variations, and defend-

ant’s accused picture illustrations.

The Court of Appeals apparently failed to duly con-

sider petitioner’s picture trade-mark as a whole and the

marked similarities between the characteristics of that

mark and defendant’s accused illustrations. On the con-

trary, the Court of Appeals, by a side-by-side comparison,

dissected petitioner’s mark into individual parts and gave

undue consideration to minor details in the parts, and also

to defendant’s background, slogans and trade-mark ‘‘Van-

ish,’’ appearing on the accused advertisements; all in con-

flict with decisions of this Court as well as of lower Federal

Courts.

The Court of Appeals said (R. 291) :

‘*Clearly in advertising, to quote from the current

musical play ‘South Pacific,’ ‘There is nothing like

the frame of a dame,’ and we cannot see why the de-

fendant is not as much entitled to take commercial ad-

vantage of pulchritude as the plaintiff.’’

—

20

Petitioner is not seeking a trade-mark monopoly on

pulchritude but is seeking to protect its long exclusively

used and famous picture trade-mark with its essential en-

semble and its prominent characteristics. One portion of

defendant’s Exhibit C advertisement (p. 249) shows the

head and shoulders of a young smiling girl and petitioner

has made no complaint with respect to that pictorial rep-

resentation. The Court of Appeals refers generally (R.

292-3) to other pictures used at times in some of petitioner’s

advertising, every piece of which, however, also shows pe-

titioner’s container with the registered mark on the label

prominently displiyed. Some of these other pictures, to

which petitioner makes no exclusive claim, show women

divorced from the essential ensemble of petitioner’s regis-

tered trade-mark and in a very different pose or position

from that shown in petitioner’s mark. The Court of Ap-

peals failed to note or say that these other sporadic pic-

tures were not imitated or copied by defendant. That Court

also disregarded in its opinion the fact that the District

Court found (R. 231) that ‘‘The motive prompting the

defendant to use the objected to advertisements was to in-

crease its sales, and hence it could be inferred that it sought

to divert some of plaintiff’s trade profits thereby.’’; defend-

ant having ‘‘knowledge that the plaintiff had used this

symbol for many years.’’ Defendant deliberately imitated

petitioner’s registered trade-mark, not, for example, the

picture of the little girl, under the Caption ‘‘We don’t

talk about toilets!’’, to which the Court of Appeals specifi-

eally refers (R. 293).

Petitioner concedes that defendant may show in its

advertising as many pictures of women in various poses,

as it may desire, so long as the pictures do not ‘‘colorably

imitate’’ petitioner’s ensemble picture mark and defendant

does not seek ‘‘to divert some of the plaintiff’s trade profits

thereby’’ (R. 231).

. 21

‘¢* * * the field from which a person may select a trade-

mark is practically unlimited, and hence there is no

excuse for impinging upon or even closely approaching

the mark of a business rival.’’ Kassman & Kessner,

Inc. v. Rosenberg Co., 10 F. 2d 904, 905 (App. D. C.

1926).

‘‘One entering a field of endeavor already occupied by

another should, in the selection of a trade-name or

trade-mark, keep far enough away to avoid all possible

confusion.’’ Northam Warren Corp. v. Universal Cos-

metic Co., 18 F. 2d 774, 775 (C. C. A. 7, 1927).

The Court of Appeals also says (R. 291):

**In the first place the plaintiff’s marks are all on

a plain background whereas the defendant’s advertis-

ing usually showed a bathroom setting, including a

bath tub, shower curtain, tiled walls, ete. In the sec-

ond place the defendant in all its advertising promi-

nently displayed its trade-mark ‘Vanish’ which is not

at all similar to plaintiff’s name ‘Sani-Flush’.’’

The Court cites no authorities. However, it is well estab-

lished that a registered trade-mark is infringed when it

is colorably imitated, regardless of defendant’s ‘‘back-

ground’’ or the use by the defendant of additional marks.

It hardly could be contended seriously that defendant

would have the right to use petitioner’s word mark ‘‘Sani-

Flush”’ in its advertising if defendant used entirely differ-

ent backgrounds and illustrations.

“** * * Tt is insisted that because appellant adopted the

two marks in connection with one article, appellee may

lawfully use either alone. Appellant’s marks were

adopted and registered separately. They have been

used separately in the advertisements. The word mark

has always been employed for denoting the compound,

the pictorial mark for stating a characteristic. We

are of the opinion that appellant acquired and has

maintained a separate property right in each mark,

which was not dependent upon a conjoint use.’’ Enoch

Morgan’s Sons Co. v. Ward, 152 Fed. 690, 693, supra.

22

‘‘The Sapolio Case, supra [the Enoch Morgan’s

Sons case], is authority in this court to sustain the

proposition that mere differences in the package or

dress will not prevent infringement of a registered

mark, if it is in fact colorably imitated.’’ Sierra Chem-

ical Co. v. Berettini, 33 F. 2d 397, 399, C. C. A. 7

(1929).

The Court of Appeals in its decision in the instant case

(R. 291-2) next said:

‘*And in the third place the human female figures in the

defendant’s advertising are by no means strikingly

similar to the ones used by the plaintiff in any of its

marks. The plaintiff’s earlier marks showed women

dressed as housemaids, and its later ones showed a

woman dressed conservatively as a matronly middle-

aged housewife. The defendant, on the other hand,

never used a housemaid in its advertising, but showed

therein a very slim young housewife, perhaps a bride,

ultra-fashionably dressed, i.e. in a very short skirt,

wearing an elaborate apron, and standing in an exag-

geratedly graceful bending posture pouring into a

watercloset bowl with an expression of almost ecstatic

delight upon her face. This contrasts sharply with the

more conservative dress, staid posture, and expression

of restrained joy on the faces of the women in all the

plaintiff’s trade marks, to say nothing of the rather

buxom figure of the woman appearing in its later

ones.”’

This side-by-side comparison, with its minutiae of de-

tailed differences—unwittingly exaggerated we think—is

in direct conflict with the proper test reiterated by this

Court in Beckwith v. Commissioner of Patents, 252 U. S.

538, 545, 546, as follows:

‘‘The commercial impression of a trade-mark is de-

rived from it as a whole, not from its elements sepa-

rated and considered in detail.’’

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, speaking

through Circuit Judge Woodbury, in Pro-Phy-Lac-Tic

Brush Co. v. Jordan Marsh Co., 165 F. 2d 549, 552 (1948),

"one

23

stated that in determining likelihood of consumer confu-

sion it is not enough ‘‘to make merely a side by side visual

comparison’’ and then said:

‘‘Purchasers undoubtedly often compare a mark which

they see when making a purchase with their memory of

a mark which they have seen on some previous occa-

sion. That is to say, they compare their memory of a

mark which they have seen in the past with their visual

impression of a mark which they presently see.’’

The Court of Appeals’ statements are contrary to the

fact findings of the District Court, because we respectfully

submit, the Appellate Court applied an improper test and

then spelled out differences, some of which are vague and

nebulous, if not inaccurate. What is the distinction be-

tween a housemaid and a housewife? Each of defendant’s

accused representations shows a woman wearing an apron.

We think this Court can take judicial notice of the fact that

there are many slim and young and attractive housemaids.

Do petitioner’s later marks actually show a ‘‘matronly

middle-age housewife”’’ or a ‘‘buxom figure’’? We doubt

it. Why is a woman ‘‘ultra-fashionably dressed’’ simply

because she wears a short skirt and an elaborate apron?

Is petitioner’s protection to be limited to long skirts and

the plainest apron, even though petitioner’s marks show

different length skirts and aprons with some decorations?

As to the Court’s ‘‘expression of almost ecstatic delight,’’

we think, with all due respect to that Court, that this is

somewhat rhetoric. Certainly the expression on the face

of the woman in defendant’s accused advertisement, Ex-

hibit C, shows no more delight than is portrayed on the

faces of the woman in petitioner’s marks. We think it is

very clear that the postures are substantially the same in

petitioner’s marks and defendant’s accused representa-

tions. Indeed the postures are almost identical, and we

doubt if this Court can visually reconcile the Appellate

Court’s comment that the postures in defendant’s adver-

- —

24

tisements are ‘‘exaggeratedly graceful’’ and those in plain-

tiff’s marks are ‘‘staid.’’

Obviously the Court of Appeals did not apply the test

of infringement prescribed by its decisions and those of

this Court in numerous decisions including Beckwith v.

Commissioner of Patents, supra; that is to say, the Court

of Appeals instead of considering the ‘‘commercial impres-

sion of’’ plaintiff’s picture trade-mark ‘‘as a whole,’’ er-

roneously considered the purchaser’s impression as though

it was derived ‘‘from its elements separated and considered

in detail.’’ The District Court on the other hand, after

considering the ‘vial testimony and reviewing the proofs

and authorities in point applied the proper ‘‘purchaser’s

assumed memory’’ test and found as a matter of fact (R.

229) :

««* * * that the mode of advertising which the defend-

ant has adopted would likely be misleading and result

in consumer confusion, and, as such, was an infringe-

ment on the plaintiff’s right to the exclusive use of

the trade-mark.”’

We submit that in reversing the District Court’s judg-

ment the Court of Appeals committed such manifest error

in fact and in law, as to warrant a review by this Court.

POINT III.

Defendant is Guilty of Unfair Competition.

The legal test of unfair competition is the same as

that of trade-mark infringement, that is, the likelihood of

consumer confusion as to the source of the goods.

Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403,

413 (1916) ;

Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, 162 F. 2d

280, 283, C. C. A. 1 (1947).

We submit that the District Court properly applied

this test in finding defendant guilty of unfair competition,

a

25

and that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the

District Court.

The District Court found, in substance, the following:

For thirty-five years petitioner had used continuously and

exclusively its picture mark or symbol ‘‘to indicate the

origin of’’ petitioner’s goods. Millions of units of such

goods had been sold at retail since adoption of the mark

by petitioner. Hence the mark is ‘‘of great value’’ to

petitioner and ‘‘is entitled to protection.’’ The defendant

‘‘a relatively new competitor in the field’’ had successfully

marketed its product for ten years by means of advertising

of its own design before it adopted the accused pictures

in its advertising (R. 230-1). ‘‘The defendant’s news-

paper advertisements and display cards do not in any way

display the defendant’s name, nor do the leaflets except in

very small type on the back page * * *’’ (R. 220). ‘‘The

motive. prompting the defendant to use the objected to ad-

vertisements was to increase its sales [as admitted by

defendant’s president (R. 197-8)], and hence it could be

inferred that it sought to divert some of the plaintiff’s

trade profits thereby.’’ Defendant had ‘‘knowledge that

the plaintiff had used this symbol for many years’’ and the

adoption by defendant of a similar design ‘‘solely’’ as ‘‘a

coincidence’’ was ‘‘difficult to believe,’’ and under the

‘‘cireumstances, intent may reasonably be inferred’’ (R.

231).

We invite this Court to examine again our Chart at

the back of this brief as it so plainly confirms pictorially

the findings of the District Court.

The Court of Appeals in its opinion does not refer

to the above findings of the District Court, nor to the find-

ing (R. 221) that petitioner ‘‘adopted and used a pictorial

representation as a unique symbol or device to indicate

the origin of the goods of its manufacture.’’ The Court of

Appeals for the most part merely says (R. 292) that ‘‘it

does not appear that plaintiff has developed any unique

— me ——

26

style or pattern of advertising peculiarly its own,’’ ap-

parently because plaintiff used additional pictures in some

of its advertising. Obviously the Court of Appeals over-

looked the fact that plaintiff’s trade-mark or symbol, which

the Court found to be a good and valid trade-mark, appears

on every piece of petitioner’s advertising and that some of

petitioner’s further pictures, such as the three appearing

on our Chart, plainly have the same general ‘‘distinctive

style, format and juxtaposition of elements’’—quoting

from the language of the Court of Appeals (R. 292). We

trust that this Court compares these three pictures with

defendant’s three accused illustrations which likewise are

reproduced on the Chart.

The Court of Appeals cites no case and we know of

none which holds that a picture mark or symbol, employed

for years by the owner on all of its own goods and in all

of its own advertising, may be used by any competitor in

the latter’s advertising, merely because some of the owner’s

advertising includes additional illustrations, words or back-

ground.

Again the Court of Appeals failed to apply the proper

test of unfair competition and its decision is in conflict

with the decisions of this and lower Federal Courts. Fur-

thermore, petitioner submits that the District Court’s above

decisive findings on the unfair competition issue are amply

supported by substantial evidence and that the Court of

Appeals disregarded and in effect set aside these findings

contrary to Rule 52(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure,

and the cases decided by this Court and other Courts with

respect to that Rule.

27

POINT IV.

The Findings of the District Court as to Defendant’s In-

fringement and Unfair Competition Were Correct and

Not Clearly Erroneous and Hence Under Rule 52(a)

Should Not Have Been Disturbed by the Court of

Appeals.

Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provides in part as follows:

‘*Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly

erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the op-

portunity of the trial court to judge the credibility

of the witnesses.”’

At a full trial before the District Court, oral testi-

mony was given by Mr. Raymond M. Schlabach, petitioner’s -

treasurer and general manager, and a stipulation as to

what other of petitioner’s witnesses would testify to was

read in open Court and forms part of the Record here

(R. 55 to 126, 130 to 146, 203). The court also heard the

oral testimony of two witnesses for defendant, including

that of Mr. Dunaway, defendant’s president (R. 148 to

203). Many exhibits were offered in evidence.

As we already have shown, the District Court made

careful, full and explicit findings of fact. Among its ulti-

mate findings were that defendant’s accused ‘‘advertising

material must be characterized as a colorable imitation of

the plaintiff’s trade-marks,’’ that from the facts of record

and the admissions of defendant ‘‘it could be inferred’’

that defendant had deliberately ‘‘sought to divert some of

the plaintiff’s trade profits’? and that defendant’s accused

advertisement ‘‘would likely be misleading and result in

consumer confusion’”’ (R. 228 to 231).

The findings of the District Court are supported by

substantial evidence, and hence are not ‘‘clearly erro-

neous.’’ The Court of Appeals practically disregarded

them. Instead of giving due effect to these factual deter-

“ aT

28

minations of the Trial Court, the Court of Appeals, in

effect, set them aside by indirection and silence, and sub-

stituted its own judgment of the facts or the application of

legal doctrines only to facts contrary to those found by the

Trial Court, in violation of Rule 52(a) and contrary to

decisions of this Court and of Appellate Federal Courts,

including the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. We

quote here from several of such decisions, which are

clearly in point.

This Court in Walling v. General Industries Co., 330

U.S. 545 (1947), after reviewing the findings and inferences

drawn by the District Court, said at page 550:

‘*At the least, we think that in drawing such in-

ferences the Court was not clearly wrong, and con-

clude that the findings should therefore have been left

undisturbed.’’

and in the footnote cited Rule 52(a) and Lawson v. United

States Mining Co., 207 U.S. 1,12; Butte &€ Superior Copper

Co. v. Clark-Montana Realty Co., 249 U. S. 12, 30; District

of Columbia v. Pace, 320 U. S. 698, 701; Adamson v. Gilli-

land, 242 U.S. 350; United States v. United Shoe Machinery

Co., 247 U. S. 32, 37, 38, 41.

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, speaking

through Judge Woodbury in each instance, expressly said:

‘‘This question of infringement [of a patent] is also

one of fact (citing cases). As such the conclusion of

the master and the court below [on that question] is

not to be disturbed by us unless clearly erroneous.”’

(Emphasis supplied.) B. F. Sturtevant Co. v. Massa-

chusetts Hair and Felt Co., 122 F. 2d 900, 914, (1941) ;

and,

‘‘Thus the ultimate question of infringement [of a

trade mark] is one of the type ordinarily classified as

one of fact (citing cases), and as such it is one primarily

for the fact-finding tribunal—in this case the district

KO

_ geen

29

court—reviewable here only for clear error under

Rule 52(a).’’ Dwinnell-Wright Co. v. National Fruit

Products Co., 140 F. 2d 618, 623 (1944) ;

and also,

‘‘And we have held in this Circuit that this ultimate

question of the likelihood of consumer confusion as to

source is one of fact.’’ Coca-Cola v. Snow Crest

Beverages, 162 F. 2d 280, 283, supra.

Manifestly, the District Court was bound by the rule

stated and reiterated in the above decisions of the Court

of Appeals for the First Circuit as well as in decisions

of this Court. The District Court followed that rule and

made detailed findings of fact and the ultimate findings

of fact that there was likelihood of consumer confusion as

to source. Clearly, the Court of Appeals in reversing the

judgment of the Trial Court did so in conflict, not only

with the decisions of this Court, but with its own decisions

which the Trial Court so carefully followed.

'

x

CONCLUSION.

Each of the questions presented is of prime importance

to the protection of the purchasing public generally, as

well as to trade-mark and trade-name owners. We have

shown, we believe, that the Court of Appeals in answering

each of those questions in the negative runs counter to

the decisions of this Court, its own decisions and the deci-

sions of other Federal Appellate Courts and District

Courts. Thus there is a serious conflict of decisions in the

present instance.

The general principles which are clearly applicable

here are so ably and aptly expressed in the language of

Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Mishawaka Mfg. Co. v. Kresge

Co., 316 U. S. 203, 205 (1942), that we quote some of the

language in part here:

‘‘The protection of trade-marks is the law’s recog-

nition of the psychological function of symbols. If it is

30

true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that

we purchase goods by them. A trade-mark is a mer-

chandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to |

select what he wants, or what he has been led to be-

lieve he wants. The owner of a mark exploits this

human propensity by making every effort to impreg-

nate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing

power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the means

employed, the aim is the same—to convey through the

mark, in the minds of potential customers, the desir-

ability of the commodity upon which it appears. Once

this is attained, the trade-mark owner has something

of value. If another poaches upon the commercial

magnetism of the symbol he has created, the owner

can obtain legal redress. And in this case we are

called upon to ascertain the extent of the redress af-

forded for infringement of a mark registered under

the Trade-Mark Act of 1905.

‘‘The ‘right to be protected against an unwarranted

use of the registered mark has been made a statutory

right’ by that Act. Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids

Mfg. Co., 233 U. S. 461, 471.’

For the reasons stated in this brief and petition, peti-

tioner respectfully requests that a writ of certiorari be

issued to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals for

the First Circuit, in this action.

Respectfully submitted,

Harry W. Linpsey, JR.,

Harry FReEAsE,

JOSEPH F'REASE,

Frank J. SuLtoway,

RanpotpH C. RicHarpson,

Counsel for Petitioner.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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