Opposition Brief — Bornhurst v. United States
Supreme Court brief1948
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
j
i,
INDEX
Page
Opinions below. . .....--...-------------2--e2-------- 225. 1
PE ct nrctctnnctuknwamddGunensinsinhachenampusiein 1
Question presented... ...---.-..-.------------------------ 2
PD So. GasclccbosswekWesLedisivesewcascnsunbnaghan 2
PINGS. coe cnencencnsccuudbsycduvavessenenewonen en =
Ds io ice ave ctnkg ented aah m wala ome kee ha Sie pie 10
CITATIONS
Cases:
.. American Stevedores v. Porello, 330 U. 8. 446_.....----,-- 8
3 Just v. Chambers, 312 U. 8. 383... -.---------------- nal x
Kreste v. United States, 158 F. 2d 575__....------------- ~
: Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co., 321 U. 8. 96...---------- 8
3 McGhee v. United States, C. C. A. 2, No. 77, decided
& peeeinet S LOR . bcc ois to casera pQuadnen daca deeiges 8
4 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. 8. 85_.------------ a
‘Statute:
:. Jones Act, 38 Stat. 1185, 41 Stat. 1007 (46 U. 8. C. 688)_- 3
' Miscellaneous:
4 War Shipping Administration Form GAA 44-42, 7 Fed.
DE PON sii ccce Koncnne cone be gh ase ee meaner nnoion 3
LTD RET EM Ee IR ER Pd ME) ES
779318—4S
Inthe Supreme Court of fhe Bnited Stats
OctToBER TERM, 1947
No. 574
CiypE Burperre Born#urst, By IsaBeL Born-
HURST, His GUARDIAN aD LITEM, PETITIONER
v.
THe Unirep States or AMERICA
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
of the District Court of the United States for the
Southern District of California (R. 17-20) have
not been officially reported. The opinion of the
United States Cireuit Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Cireuit (R. 218-220) is reported at 164
F. 2d 789.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was en-
tered on December 4, 1947 (R. 221). The petition
(1)
ee ae ee ee
2
for a writ of certiorari was filed on February 5,
1948. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under Section 240 (a) of the Judicial Code, as
amended by the Act of February 13, 1925.
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the concurrent findings of the two
lower courts that the vessel aboard which peti-
tioner received injuries, and the particular appli-
ance involved, were at all times seaworthy and
properly maintained, are correct.
STATEMENT
Petitioner, a wiper in the engine department
of the oil tanker S. S. Puente Hills, initially
brought suit in admiralty against the United
States, the War Shipping Administration, Los
Angeles Tanker Operators, Inc., and two John Doe
defendants to recover damages in the sum of
$50,000, plus an unascertained amount for future
wages lost, on account of an injury suffered by
him on board the vessel in May, 1945, when the
top of a storage tank fell and struck his hands,
while the vessel was in port at Finschaven, New
Guinea (R. 2-7). Petitioner’s original libel,
designated a ‘‘seaman’s action for unseaworthi-
ness’ (R. 2), was laid solely under the general
maritime law, and alleged (1) that the respondent
had failed to provide and maintain a seaworthy
ship in that the operating gears used to raise and
lower the tank top which fell on petitioner’s
3
hands were improperly constructed and main-
tained (R. 4), and (2) ‘‘that as a direct and
proximate result of the unseaworthiness of said
vessel as aforesaid,’”’ the libelant suffered grave
and permanent injuries to his hands (R. 4-5).
The answer of the United States denied the
charges of unseaworthiness (R. 8), and addition-
ally averred that the injuries were proximately
caused by petitioner’s own negligence and curios-
ity in leaning over and looking into the tank,
voluntarily and not in the course of any duty,
while other seamen were working on the tank top
(R. 8-10). Before trial, libelant dismissed the
action as to all respondents except the United
States (R. 10).
Both parties presented testimony at the trial
(R. 30-216), and the district court made and filed
written findings of fact and conclusions of law
(R. 17-20). From the evidence it appeared, and
the district judge found (R. 18-19), that on the
morning of the accident petitioner commenced
work, shortly after 8 o’clock, cleaning the engine
room department’s crew quarters, as it was his
duty to do that day; sometime between 8: 25 a. m.
* The Puente Hills was owned and operated by the United
States through the War Shipping Administration (R. 7, 18).
Los Angeles Tanker Operators, Inc., was the ship’s husband
or general agent appointed by the United States, under the
standard form GAA 44-42 agreement (7 F. R. 7561), to
manage the accounting and certain other shoreside business
of the vessel,
4
(R. 169) and 9: 00 a. m. (R. 63) he left this work,
before it was finished, to get a rest because it was
dusty in the forecastle, and went on deck to get
some air (R. 41-42, 63-64). Two seamen were
engaged in raising a tank top, and petitioner
stopped at that tank, leaned over the edge of the
partially open tank, and peered inside, admittedly
out of curiosity, since he had never previously
seen an open tank on the ship (R. 64-65). Though
petitioner testified that he could not remember
whether he had noticed the two seamen working
on the tank top (R. 66, 68, 70), it is clear that, at
the least, he should have known, from the top’s
position, that it was in the process of being raised
(R. 67-68), and should have seen the men at work
(R. 67, 199-200, 208) ; and the district court found
that petitioner ‘“‘had knowledge that two other
seamen were performing work with reference to
said tank top’’ and that it was “‘obvious to any
person observing the same’’ that the tank top was
a ‘“‘heavy, movable and moving device’’ (R. 20).
Almost immediately after petitioner assumed this
position, the tank top started to fall, someone
shouted ‘‘look out!’’, and petitioner pulled back
his head and shoulders but was unable to remove
his hands from the tank’s rim before the top
clamped down, causing the severe injuries to his
hands for which he sues (R. 19, 68).
There was conflicting testimony as to the con-
dition of the tank top mechanism, and the possible
=
t)
causes for the cover’s falling. Petitioner’s wit-
nesses—seamen aboard the Puente Hills—testified
that the working parts of the mechanism were
‘“‘hadly rusted”’ or ‘‘frozen up’’ at the time of the
accident (R. 98, 121, 131, 133), and at the begm-
ning of the voyage (R. 101-102) ; that, after the
accident, what appeared to be a flaw was discov-
ered in the jack screw, the breaking of which was
the immediate cause of the top’s falling (R. 125-
129); and that the maintenance man had previ-
ously asked permission to repair the mechanisms
of the various tank tops, by overtime work, but
was refused (R. 132-133).2 Respondent’s wit-
ness—the third mate, in charge of deck work in-
cluding the tank top mechanisms (R. 164, 170-
171)—+testified that No. 8 tank top was not in bad
or poor condition before the accident (R. 171);
that the corrosion on certain exposed parts was
the normal and unavoidable consequence of a
twenty or thirty day sea voyage (R. 172, 180-181),
but that the jack screw itself was neither corroded
(R. 172-173) nor defective (R. 186); and that it
was neither customary nor possible to clean the
rust and corrosion during a cargo-laden voyage,
such as that which had just ended at Finschaven
(R. 177, 181). In his view, confirmed by experi-
ments with other tank tops after the accident, the
? However, Binder, the maintenance man, was not certain
whether the mechanism on No. 8 tank, the one here in ques-
tion, was corroded or rusted (R. 138-139).
<A AA ARINC 0 8
6
mechanism broke and the top fell because of the
continued pressure applied on the wrench by the
seamen raising the top (R. 185-186).
On the basis of the evidence, the district court
found that respondent had provided petitioner
with a seaworthy ship and tank top; that respond-
ent had taken reasonable means to insure the
seaworthiness of both ship and tank top during
the voyage; that the tank top mechanism was not
improperly constructed; that petitioner’s injuries
were not proximately caused by any unseaworthi-
ness of the vessel; and that petitioner’s own negli-
gence in carelessly placing himself, purely out
of curiosity, in a position of obvious danger, was
the sole proximate cause of his injuries (R. 19-
20). The court added that ‘‘By placing his hands
upon the rim of said tank while work was being
done with reference to the tank top, the [peti-
tioner] voluntarily and unnecessarily, and not in
the performance of any duty of any kind or char-
acter, assumed the risk of injury which might
ensue from the position which he assumed and
from the fact that other seamen were performing
work with reference to said heavy, movable and
moving tank top’”’ (R. 20). The final decree dis-
missed the libel on the merits (R. 21-22).
’ At the conclusion of the trial, petitioner, whose original
libel concededly stated only a claim for unseaworthiness
under the general maritime law and not for negligence under
the Jones Act, 38 Stat. 1185; 41 Stat. 1007 (46 U. S. C.
688) (R. 32), moved for permission to file an amended
libel alleging negligence, for the first time (R. 11-
7
The Cireuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed both the district court’s findings
of fact and its conclusion-that the libel should be
dismissed. It held that the proof showed that
petitioner’s injuries were caused by his own negli-
gence and not by unseaworthiness of the vessel or
tank top, nor by any negligence of the respondent.
(R. 218-220.) The court below specifically re-
frained, however, from any affirmance of the state-
ment of the trial court, quoted above, respecting
petitioner’s assumption of the risk of his injury
(R. 220).
ARGUMENT
The question of law stated by the petition (Pet.
7-9, 12-13, 15-16) is not presented by this record.
That question, said to be important and open, is
whether a shipowner is liable for indemnity to a
seaman injured by an unseaworthy appliance
‘during a time when the seaman was not perform-
ing the particular tasks assigned to him and was
resting from his work’’ (Pet. 7-8). But both
lower courts have held that in this case the par-
ticular appliance, the tank top mechanism, was
not unseaworthy, and that petitioner’s injuries
17). The motion was denied by the district court primarily
because of the time when it was made (R. 206-208). The cir-
cuit court of appeals affirmed this denial (R. 220). The peti-
tion raises no question whatever as to the propriety of the
motion’s denial, but rests wholly on the original libel. In any ;
case, both lower courts found no negligence on the part of
respondent or its agents. R. 19-20, 220.
did not result from any unseaworthiness of the
Puente Hills or its equipment (R. 19-20; 218-
220). This holding was not a legal conclusion
resulting directly from application of a rule of
law, as in Mahnich v. Southern 8. S. Co., 321
U. S. 96, 98-99, but a purely factual finding, on
the basis of varying evidence (supra, pp. 4-6), that
there were no defects in the tank top mechanism
or its maintenance. Such a finding of seaworthi-
ness is one of fact, substantially supported by the
record, and under the established rule, this Court
will not review the concurrent findings of the two
courts below. Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co.,
supra; Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 385. The
legal issue petitioner attempts to present is there-
fore not reached in this case.‘
Petitioner asserts, however, that the ‘‘formal’’
findings of the courts below—admittedly precisely
* Even if (a) the concurrent findings of seaworthiness were
overturned and (b) the respondent were held liable for in-
juries suffered, in consequence of an unseaworthy appliance,
while a seaman was resting and not performing the particular
tasks assigned to him, and (c) the proximate cause of peti-
tioner’s injury were held to be the appliance’s unsea worthiness
rather than his own negligence, petitioner’s recovery would,
at best, doubtless be severely minimized, under the doctrine
of proportionate fault probably applicable under the general
maritime law (cf. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. 8.
85, 94; American Stevedores v. Porello, 330 U. S. 446, 458;
Kreste v. United States, 158 F.2d 575, 580 (C. C. A. 2);
McGhee v. United States, C. C. A. 2, No. 77, decided December
8, 1947), by his own extreme contributory negligence, as
found by the lower courts (R. 19-20, 219-220) , and shown by
the record.
factual in their terms, and ‘‘absolving of the ship
from blame or fault’’ (Pet. 23)—‘‘do not cor-
rectly represent the views of those courts’’ but
conceal a legal holding that the shipowner is not
liable, even for unseaworthiness, to a seaman who
is not in the performance of duties at the time
of injury (Pet. 23). The detailed findings were
duly made, after a full trial, by the district judge;
they find ample support in the record; and on re-
view they were expressly confirmed by the cir-
cuit court of appeals. Such specific findings of
fact have a standing which petitioner cannot brush
aside merely by referring to extracts (Pet. 23-
25) from a colloquy between court and counsel in
the course of a discussion directed solely to points
of law (R. 208-216). The views of the law there
expressed by the trial judge may or may not have
been correct, but they were legal opinions, uttered
in the course of counsel’s legal argument, and
have no bearing on the explicit factual findings
which the court later made,’ and which, if sus-
> The quotations from the colloquy relied upon in the peti-
tion (Pet. 23-25) indicate no more than that (a) the district
court may have been assuming unseaworthiness arguendo in
order to test counsel’s position on the applicable law, or (b)
in assuming that a seaman peering into the tank in the course
of performing actual duties could recover (R. 210, 214, 216),
the district court may well have believed that in such a case
the owner would be liable, no matter how properly constructed
or maintained the tank top mechanism, because the inherent
danger in placing one’s head beneath a 600-pound cover,
“good or bad” (R. 208), would by itself make that spot an
unsafe place to work.
10
tained, even petitioner concedes to be decisive
against him. Moreover, the circuit court of ap-
peals grounded its affirmance solely upon the dis-
trict court’s findings of fact as to seaworthiness,
which it found to be supported by substantial
evidence and not clearly erroneous (R. 220). The
appellate court expressly withheld its approval
of the trial court’s language as to ‘‘assumption
of risk’’, in which action petitioner sees the main
legal error of the case (R. 220).
CONCLUSION
The concurrent findings of fact of the lower
courts, which are decisive of the case, .are correct
and do not warrant review. It is, therefore, re-
spectfully submitted that the petition for a writ
of certiorari should be denied.
Puitie B. PERLMAN,
Solicitor General.
H. G. Morison,
A ssistant Attorney General.
Pavut A. SWEENEY,
Oscar H. Davis,
Attorneys.
Marcu 1948.
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1948
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.