Opposition Brief — Bornhurst v. United States

Supreme Court brief1948

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CITATIONS

Cases:

.. American Stevedores v. Porello, 330 U. 8. 446_.....----,-- 8

3 Just v. Chambers, 312 U. 8. 383... -.---------------- nal x

Kreste v. United States, 158 F. 2d 575__....------------- ~

: Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co., 321 U. 8. 96...---------- 8

3 McGhee v. United States, C. C. A. 2, No. 77, decided

& peeeinet S LOR . bcc ois to casera pQuadnen daca deeiges 8

4 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. 8. 85_.------------ a

‘Statute:

:. Jones Act, 38 Stat. 1185, 41 Stat. 1007 (46 U. 8. C. 688)_- 3

' Miscellaneous:

4 War Shipping Administration Form GAA 44-42, 7 Fed.

DE PON sii ccce Koncnne cone be gh ase ee meaner nnoion 3

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779318—4S

Inthe Supreme Court of fhe Bnited Stats

OctToBER TERM, 1947

No. 574

CiypE Burperre Born#urst, By IsaBeL Born-

HURST, His GUARDIAN aD LITEM, PETITIONER

v.

THe Unirep States or AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH

CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

of the District Court of the United States for the

Southern District of California (R. 17-20) have

not been officially reported. The opinion of the

United States Cireuit Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Cireuit (R. 218-220) is reported at 164

F. 2d 789.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Circuit

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was en-

tered on December 4, 1947 (R. 221). The petition

(1)

ee ae ee ee

2

for a writ of certiorari was filed on February 5,

1948. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked

under Section 240 (a) of the Judicial Code, as

amended by the Act of February 13, 1925.

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the concurrent findings of the two

lower courts that the vessel aboard which peti-

tioner received injuries, and the particular appli-

ance involved, were at all times seaworthy and

properly maintained, are correct.

STATEMENT

Petitioner, a wiper in the engine department

of the oil tanker S. S. Puente Hills, initially

brought suit in admiralty against the United

States, the War Shipping Administration, Los

Angeles Tanker Operators, Inc., and two John Doe

defendants to recover damages in the sum of

$50,000, plus an unascertained amount for future

wages lost, on account of an injury suffered by

him on board the vessel in May, 1945, when the

top of a storage tank fell and struck his hands,

while the vessel was in port at Finschaven, New

Guinea (R. 2-7). Petitioner’s original libel,

designated a ‘‘seaman’s action for unseaworthi-

ness’ (R. 2), was laid solely under the general

maritime law, and alleged (1) that the respondent

had failed to provide and maintain a seaworthy

ship in that the operating gears used to raise and

lower the tank top which fell on petitioner’s

3

hands were improperly constructed and main-

tained (R. 4), and (2) ‘‘that as a direct and

proximate result of the unseaworthiness of said

vessel as aforesaid,’”’ the libelant suffered grave

and permanent injuries to his hands (R. 4-5).

The answer of the United States denied the

charges of unseaworthiness (R. 8), and addition-

ally averred that the injuries were proximately

caused by petitioner’s own negligence and curios-

ity in leaning over and looking into the tank,

voluntarily and not in the course of any duty,

while other seamen were working on the tank top

(R. 8-10). Before trial, libelant dismissed the

action as to all respondents except the United

States (R. 10).

Both parties presented testimony at the trial

(R. 30-216), and the district court made and filed

written findings of fact and conclusions of law

(R. 17-20). From the evidence it appeared, and

the district judge found (R. 18-19), that on the

morning of the accident petitioner commenced

work, shortly after 8 o’clock, cleaning the engine

room department’s crew quarters, as it was his

duty to do that day; sometime between 8: 25 a. m.

* The Puente Hills was owned and operated by the United

States through the War Shipping Administration (R. 7, 18).

Los Angeles Tanker Operators, Inc., was the ship’s husband

or general agent appointed by the United States, under the

standard form GAA 44-42 agreement (7 F. R. 7561), to

manage the accounting and certain other shoreside business

of the vessel,

4

(R. 169) and 9: 00 a. m. (R. 63) he left this work,

before it was finished, to get a rest because it was

dusty in the forecastle, and went on deck to get

some air (R. 41-42, 63-64). Two seamen were

engaged in raising a tank top, and petitioner

stopped at that tank, leaned over the edge of the

partially open tank, and peered inside, admittedly

out of curiosity, since he had never previously

seen an open tank on the ship (R. 64-65). Though

petitioner testified that he could not remember

whether he had noticed the two seamen working

on the tank top (R. 66, 68, 70), it is clear that, at

the least, he should have known, from the top’s

position, that it was in the process of being raised

(R. 67-68), and should have seen the men at work

(R. 67, 199-200, 208) ; and the district court found

that petitioner ‘“‘had knowledge that two other

seamen were performing work with reference to

said tank top’’ and that it was “‘obvious to any

person observing the same’’ that the tank top was

a ‘“‘heavy, movable and moving device’’ (R. 20).

Almost immediately after petitioner assumed this

position, the tank top started to fall, someone

shouted ‘‘look out!’’, and petitioner pulled back

his head and shoulders but was unable to remove

his hands from the tank’s rim before the top

clamped down, causing the severe injuries to his

hands for which he sues (R. 19, 68).

There was conflicting testimony as to the con-

dition of the tank top mechanism, and the possible

=

t)

causes for the cover’s falling. Petitioner’s wit-

nesses—seamen aboard the Puente Hills—testified

that the working parts of the mechanism were

‘“‘hadly rusted”’ or ‘‘frozen up’’ at the time of the

accident (R. 98, 121, 131, 133), and at the begm-

ning of the voyage (R. 101-102) ; that, after the

accident, what appeared to be a flaw was discov-

ered in the jack screw, the breaking of which was

the immediate cause of the top’s falling (R. 125-

129); and that the maintenance man had previ-

ously asked permission to repair the mechanisms

of the various tank tops, by overtime work, but

was refused (R. 132-133).2 Respondent’s wit-

ness—the third mate, in charge of deck work in-

cluding the tank top mechanisms (R. 164, 170-

171)—+testified that No. 8 tank top was not in bad

or poor condition before the accident (R. 171);

that the corrosion on certain exposed parts was

the normal and unavoidable consequence of a

twenty or thirty day sea voyage (R. 172, 180-181),

but that the jack screw itself was neither corroded

(R. 172-173) nor defective (R. 186); and that it

was neither customary nor possible to clean the

rust and corrosion during a cargo-laden voyage,

such as that which had just ended at Finschaven

(R. 177, 181). In his view, confirmed by experi-

ments with other tank tops after the accident, the

? However, Binder, the maintenance man, was not certain

whether the mechanism on No. 8 tank, the one here in ques-

tion, was corroded or rusted (R. 138-139).

<A AA ARINC 0 8

6

mechanism broke and the top fell because of the

continued pressure applied on the wrench by the

seamen raising the top (R. 185-186).

On the basis of the evidence, the district court

found that respondent had provided petitioner

with a seaworthy ship and tank top; that respond-

ent had taken reasonable means to insure the

seaworthiness of both ship and tank top during

the voyage; that the tank top mechanism was not

improperly constructed; that petitioner’s injuries

were not proximately caused by any unseaworthi-

ness of the vessel; and that petitioner’s own negli-

gence in carelessly placing himself, purely out

of curiosity, in a position of obvious danger, was

the sole proximate cause of his injuries (R. 19-

20). The court added that ‘‘By placing his hands

upon the rim of said tank while work was being

done with reference to the tank top, the [peti-

tioner] voluntarily and unnecessarily, and not in

the performance of any duty of any kind or char-

acter, assumed the risk of injury which might

ensue from the position which he assumed and

from the fact that other seamen were performing

work with reference to said heavy, movable and

moving tank top’”’ (R. 20). The final decree dis-

missed the libel on the merits (R. 21-22).

’ At the conclusion of the trial, petitioner, whose original

libel concededly stated only a claim for unseaworthiness

under the general maritime law and not for negligence under

the Jones Act, 38 Stat. 1185; 41 Stat. 1007 (46 U. S. C.

688) (R. 32), moved for permission to file an amended

libel alleging negligence, for the first time (R. 11-

7

The Cireuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit affirmed both the district court’s findings

of fact and its conclusion-that the libel should be

dismissed. It held that the proof showed that

petitioner’s injuries were caused by his own negli-

gence and not by unseaworthiness of the vessel or

tank top, nor by any negligence of the respondent.

(R. 218-220.) The court below specifically re-

frained, however, from any affirmance of the state-

ment of the trial court, quoted above, respecting

petitioner’s assumption of the risk of his injury

(R. 220).

ARGUMENT

The question of law stated by the petition (Pet.

7-9, 12-13, 15-16) is not presented by this record.

That question, said to be important and open, is

whether a shipowner is liable for indemnity to a

seaman injured by an unseaworthy appliance

‘during a time when the seaman was not perform-

ing the particular tasks assigned to him and was

resting from his work’’ (Pet. 7-8). But both

lower courts have held that in this case the par-

ticular appliance, the tank top mechanism, was

not unseaworthy, and that petitioner’s injuries

17). The motion was denied by the district court primarily

because of the time when it was made (R. 206-208). The cir-

cuit court of appeals affirmed this denial (R. 220). The peti-

tion raises no question whatever as to the propriety of the

motion’s denial, but rests wholly on the original libel. In any ;

case, both lower courts found no negligence on the part of

respondent or its agents. R. 19-20, 220.

did not result from any unseaworthiness of the

Puente Hills or its equipment (R. 19-20; 218-

220). This holding was not a legal conclusion

resulting directly from application of a rule of

law, as in Mahnich v. Southern 8. S. Co., 321

U. S. 96, 98-99, but a purely factual finding, on

the basis of varying evidence (supra, pp. 4-6), that

there were no defects in the tank top mechanism

or its maintenance. Such a finding of seaworthi-

ness is one of fact, substantially supported by the

record, and under the established rule, this Court

will not review the concurrent findings of the two

courts below. Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co.,

supra; Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 385. The

legal issue petitioner attempts to present is there-

fore not reached in this case.‘

Petitioner asserts, however, that the ‘‘formal’’

findings of the courts below—admittedly precisely

* Even if (a) the concurrent findings of seaworthiness were

overturned and (b) the respondent were held liable for in-

juries suffered, in consequence of an unseaworthy appliance,

while a seaman was resting and not performing the particular

tasks assigned to him, and (c) the proximate cause of peti-

tioner’s injury were held to be the appliance’s unsea worthiness

rather than his own negligence, petitioner’s recovery would,

at best, doubtless be severely minimized, under the doctrine

of proportionate fault probably applicable under the general

maritime law (cf. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. 8.

85, 94; American Stevedores v. Porello, 330 U. S. 446, 458;

Kreste v. United States, 158 F.2d 575, 580 (C. C. A. 2);

McGhee v. United States, C. C. A. 2, No. 77, decided December

8, 1947), by his own extreme contributory negligence, as

found by the lower courts (R. 19-20, 219-220) , and shown by

the record.

factual in their terms, and ‘‘absolving of the ship

from blame or fault’’ (Pet. 23)—‘‘do not cor-

rectly represent the views of those courts’’ but

conceal a legal holding that the shipowner is not

liable, even for unseaworthiness, to a seaman who

is not in the performance of duties at the time

of injury (Pet. 23). The detailed findings were

duly made, after a full trial, by the district judge;

they find ample support in the record; and on re-

view they were expressly confirmed by the cir-

cuit court of appeals. Such specific findings of

fact have a standing which petitioner cannot brush

aside merely by referring to extracts (Pet. 23-

25) from a colloquy between court and counsel in

the course of a discussion directed solely to points

of law (R. 208-216). The views of the law there

expressed by the trial judge may or may not have

been correct, but they were legal opinions, uttered

in the course of counsel’s legal argument, and

have no bearing on the explicit factual findings

which the court later made,’ and which, if sus-

> The quotations from the colloquy relied upon in the peti-

tion (Pet. 23-25) indicate no more than that (a) the district

court may have been assuming unseaworthiness arguendo in

order to test counsel’s position on the applicable law, or (b)

in assuming that a seaman peering into the tank in the course

of performing actual duties could recover (R. 210, 214, 216),

the district court may well have believed that in such a case

the owner would be liable, no matter how properly constructed

or maintained the tank top mechanism, because the inherent

danger in placing one’s head beneath a 600-pound cover,

“good or bad” (R. 208), would by itself make that spot an

unsafe place to work.

10

tained, even petitioner concedes to be decisive

against him. Moreover, the circuit court of ap-

peals grounded its affirmance solely upon the dis-

trict court’s findings of fact as to seaworthiness,

which it found to be supported by substantial

evidence and not clearly erroneous (R. 220). The

appellate court expressly withheld its approval

of the trial court’s language as to ‘‘assumption

of risk’’, in which action petitioner sees the main

legal error of the case (R. 220).

CONCLUSION

The concurrent findings of fact of the lower

courts, which are decisive of the case, .are correct

and do not warrant review. It is, therefore, re-

spectfully submitted that the petition for a writ

of certiorari should be denied.

Puitie B. PERLMAN,

Solicitor General.

H. G. Morison,

A ssistant Attorney General.

Pavut A. SWEENEY,

Oscar H. Davis,

Attorneys.

Marcu 1948.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1948

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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