Reply Brief — Tinkoff v. Campbell

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JUN 6 1947

| CHARLES ELMORE GROPLEY

CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Paysorr TinKorr, )

Plaintiff-Appellant, |

vs. No. 1263.

Nice, D. Campset, etc., e¢ al.,

Defendant-A ppellee.

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF.

Paysorr Trnkorr, Pro Se,

6353 N. Clark Street,

Chicago, Illinois,

Plammtiff-Appellant.

Phone Hol. 5533-4

UNITED STATES LAW PRINTING CO., PHONE LAKEVIEW 6581, CHICAGO. ILL

INDEX.

PAGE

I. Failure of Appellee to Directly Answer Questions

Raised Herein 1-4

II. The Appellant’s Constitutional Rights of Liberty,

Property and the Pursuit of Happiness Have

Been Violated .... 4-6

III. Other Matters Raised by Appellant, Not Waived

Herein ........ . 67

IV. Conclusion ..

AUTHORITIES AND CITATIONS.

Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U. S. 567.... Ree PP 2

Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers

Co-Op Marketing Ass’n, 276 U. S. 71, 97... 5

Matthews v. People, 202 Ill. 389, 401-000 6

Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399... 5,6

Munn y. Illinois, 94 U. 8. (4 Otto) 113; 24 L. Ed. 77,

SO idethistalicelbas raped i ek Se ee 5

Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539, 615.. 2,3

So. Pac. R. R. Co. v. U. S., 38 Fed. 55, 57............... 2,3

West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 392... 5

Sec. 322, Internal Revenue Code.. 2

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

}

Paysorr TrnKorr, )

‘Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs. No. 1263.

NiceL D. CaMPBELL, etc., et al.,

Defendant-Appellee.

.

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF.

)

Now comes Paysoff ‘Tinkoff, appearing pro se, and does

herewith file his Reply Brief to the Brief of the Appellee

in opposition, filed in this Court.

I,

Failure of Appellee to Directly Answer the Questions

Raised Herein.

A careful reading of the Appellee’s Brief, in the opinion

’ of the Appellant, shows that the Appellee has failed to spe-

ance teneertee neemt

2

cifically answer the principal contention of the Appellant

that a ‘‘Taxpayer’’ is a person, separate and distinct from

a ‘‘Claimant’’, and that the two words as used in the In-

ternal Revenue Code, and also in the Act of July 7, 1884,

and in Circular 230, are not similar and interchangeable;

and further that Appellant’s constitutional rights have been

grossly violated.

The Appellant has shown that this Court in the case of

Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U. 8S. 567 held that ‘‘a claim is a

right to demand money from the United States,’’ and a

Claimant must be a person who is the possessor of that

right.

A Taxpayer has no right to demand money from the

United States, but his duty is to pay money to the United

States pursuant to Statute.

A Taxpayer becomes a Claimant only when the Taxpayer

has overpaid the taxes lawfully due from the Taxpayer to

the Government, and filed a Claim for Refund on Form 843,

and other documents seeking its return and recovery, pur-

suant to the administrative provisions of the Internal Rev-

enue Code, Sec. 322, and the Regulations promulgated there-

under.

The Appellee on pages 9 and 10 of his Brief says that

the word ‘‘Claim’’ is sometimes used in a broad sense, and

is not always limited to ‘‘claims for the return of money,”’

citing Prigg v. Penna., 16 Pet. 539, 619; So. Pac. R. R. Co.

v. U.'S., 3 8Fed. 55, 56.

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Tin eR A SY

3

This Court in the case of Prigg v. Penna. in 16 Pet. 539,

on page 615, says:

‘‘What is a claim? It is, in a just juridical sense,

a demand of some matter as of right made by one per-

son upon another, to do or to forbear to do some act

or thing as a matter of duty.’’

The Court in the case of So. Pac. R. R. Co. v. U. S., 38

Fed. 55, on page 57, said:

‘*Indeed, money demands, except perhaps in the

Treasury Department, constitute but a small fraction

of the ‘claims’ or ‘matters’ pending in the Executive

Department.’’ (Italics supplied.)

In this case, the Court specifically said that in the Treasury

Department ‘‘a claim is a money demand,’’ when the Court

said ‘‘Indeed, money demands, except perhaps in the Treas-

ury Department”’ constitute a small fraction of the claims,

in other Executive Departments.

The Appellant admits that a ‘‘claim’’ can inelude a right

for the return of property, as well as the return of money,

as stated in the cases aforementioned: but the word ‘‘Claim-

ant,’’ as used in the Act of July 7, 1884, empowering the

Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate regulations re-

garding attorneys and agents representing ‘‘claimants,’’

can only mean ‘‘one who has overpaid monies to the United

States Treasury in excess of that lawfully due the United

States Treasury.’” '

Therefore, the Secretary of the Treasury has jurisdiction

over representatives of ‘‘Claimants’’, seeking return of re-

funds from the United States Treasury; and has no juris-

diction over ‘‘Taxpayers”’ or their representatives, when

seeking to show that their tax return, as filed, is true and

correct.

a

4

I.

The Appellant’s Constitutional Rights of Liberty, Property

and the Pursuit of Happiness Have Been Violated.

The Appellee has wholly ignored the Appellant’s con-

tention that his constitutional rights, as guaranteed by the

Fifth Amendment of the Consitution, to-wit, ‘No person

shall be * * * deprived of life, liberty or property without j

due process of law’’; and that ‘‘life, liberty and the pursuit }

of happiness are inalienable rights guaranteed by the Dec- :

laration of Independence.’’

The record shows that Appellant’s contracts have been

breached by the various Taxpayers, due to threats and

statements made to the Taxpayers by the Appellee—the

Collector of Internal Revenue—and that the Taxpayer’s

present vocation as a ‘‘Tax Accountant’’ is one guaran-

teed by the Constitution of the United States, and is not

subject to regulation, State or Federal, as not being af-

fected with public interest; and that the Appellant’s busi-

ness, as a ‘“T'ax Accountant”’, has been and is greatly im- )

paired, due to the conduct and acts of the Appellee; and

that Appellant has been unable to enforce his contracts with

the Taxpayers, because the Appellee specifically denies the

Appellant the right to represent the Taxpayers,—before

the Office of the Collector—solely to show that the Tax-

payers’ Tax Return, as filed, is true and correct.

—_—_ a

The Appellant’s right to use his faculties to make a living,

and to support his family and himself, has been greatly

impaired by the acts of the Appellee; and if such acts of

Appellee are continued, Appellee will be deprived of his

opportunity to use his faculties to earn a livelihood, Mc of

violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of ’

5

the United States, that ‘‘no person shall be deprived of

life, liberty or property, without due process of law.’’

This Court, in the case of Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. (4

Otto) 113; 24 L. Ed. 77, on page 90, in the Dissent of Mr.

Justice Field, in defining liberty, says as follows:

‘‘By the term ‘liberty,’ as used in the provision,

something more is meant than mere freedom from

physical restraint or the bounds of a prison. It means

freedom to go where one may choose, and to act in

such manner, not inconsistent with the equal rights of

others, as his judgment may dictate for the promotion

of his happiness; that is to pursue such callings and

avocations as may be most suitable to develop his ca-

pacities, and give to them their highest enjoyment.’’

(Italics supplied.)

This Court in the case of West Coast Hotel Company v.

Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, on page 392 said:

‘Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint,

not immunity from reasonable regulations and pro-

hibitions imposed in the interest of the community.’’

This Court in the case of Liberty Warehouse Company

v. Burley Tobacco Growers Co-Op Marketing Association,

276 U. S. 71, on page 97, said:

‘‘The liberty of contract guaranteed by the Consti-

tution is freedom from arbitrary restraint—not im-

munity from reasonable regulation to safeguard the

. public interest.’’ (Italics supplied.)

This Court in the case of Meyer v. State of Nebraska,

262 U. S. 390, on page 399, said:

‘‘Without doubt, it (meaning liberty) denotes not

merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the

right of the individual to contract, to engage im any

of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful

knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up

6

children, to worship God according to the dictates of

his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privi-

leges long recognized at common law as essential to

the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.’’ (Italics

supplied.)

The Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of Matthews

v. People, 202 Ill. 389, on page 401, said:

‘<Tt is now well settled that the privilege of contract-

ing is both a liberty, and a property right. Liberty

includes the right to make and enforce contracts, be-

cause the right to make and enforce contracts is in-

cluded in the right to acquire property. Labor is prop-

erty. To deprive the laborer and the employer of this

right to contract with one another is to violate section

2 of article 2 of the constitution of Illinois, which pro-

vides that ‘no person shall be deprived of life, liberty

or property without due process of law.’ It is equally

a violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments of

the constitution of the United States, which provide

that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or

property without due process of law, ‘nor deny to any

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of

the laws.’ ’’ (Italics supplied.)

These constitutional rights, Appeliant submits, have been

denied to Appellant, and have been grossly violated by

the Appellee, in this proceeding.

ITI.

The Other Matters Raised by Appellant, Not Waived

Herein.

The Appellant in this proceeding had the Briefs filed

below, certified as part of the Record to this Court, and

is submitting to this Court as Exhibits A, B and C of this

7

Reply Brief, to be distributed to the Justices of this Court,

a copy of the three (3) Briefs filed below, and presented

and argued before the Court below, to show this Court

that the questions presented on page 3 of the Appellant’s

present Petition for Certiorari, was wholly ignored by the

Court below, and are not waived by the Appellant herein.

IV.

Conclusion.

The Appellant respectfully submits that he is entitled

to have the Circuit Court of Appeals specifically answer

the questions raised before that Court, decided by that

Court; and further that the Circuit Court of Appeals was

in error, as a matter of law, in holding that a ‘‘Taxpayer”’

is a ‘‘Claimant’’ under the Act of July 7, 1884, and in

Circular 230, promulgated by the Secretary of the Treas-

ury under the Act aforementioned.

The above is

Respectfully submitted,

Paysorr TINKOFF,

Appellant, Pro Se.