Opposition Brief — John J. Casale, Inc. v. Skidmore

Supreme Court brief1947

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

ae Not FF £224

APR 17 1947

CHARLES CLAORE one

' & OLER

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1946.

No. 1225.

JOHN J. CASALE, INC.,

Petitioner,

AGAINST

LOREN SKIDMORE, et al., .

Respondents.

JOHN J. CASALE, INC.,

Petitioner,

AGAINST

JOSEPH MOONEY, e¢ al.,

Respondents.

Respondents’ Brief in Opposition to Petition

For Writ of Certiorari.

i Harotp R. Korey,

] Attorney for Respondents.

EMANUEL TACKER,

Of Coumsel on the Brief.

Lopge AppgaL Press, Ino., 65-67 Duane St., N. Y. O., Tel. WOrth-2-0689

INDEX.

Statement of Matter Involved ...............++5+

Summary of Basic Proved Facts ..............--

Comment on Questions Raised by Petitioner ......

Port I.—It is well settled that it is enough if an

employee, to be covered under the Fair Labor

Standards Act, shows that his work activity is

so closely tied to interstate commerce as to be

in contemplation of law a part of it ..........

Pornt I1.—Plaintiffs working directly upon the ve-

hicles that were used in interstate commerce

regularly and recurrently—are engaged in com-

SD nun cence cccncennececeas eeneseebaseueus

Pornt I1I.—The record contains overwhelming proof

that each of the employees worked in interstate

commerce each and every week regularly and

FOGUTTOMEY 2.0. cc cccccccccccccccccccccccccce

13

15

16

i

INDEX.

CASES CITED.

PAGE

Boutell v. Walling, 327 U. S. 463 ................ 15

Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517 ............ 13, 14

Lewis v. Florida Power and Light Co., 154 F. 2d 751 14

Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U. 8. 178 14

Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 325 U. S.

McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U. 8. 491 ............... 15

Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U. S. 125... 13,15

Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 128 F. 2d 450 ... 14

Pedersen v. J. F. Fitzgerald Co., 318 U. S. 740 ... 13,14

Roland Electrical Co. v. Walling, 326 U. S. 657 ... 13

Schwartz v. Witwer Grocer Co., 49 F. Supp. 1003.. 17

Super-Cold Southwest Co. v. McBride, 124 F.2d 90 17

Warren Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 317 U.S.88 13

a» ES RR DB Perret

Supreme Court of the United States

Omoser Term, 1946.

Joun J. Casaz, Ino.,

Petitioner,

AGAINST

Loren Sxipmore, et al.,

Respondenis.

No. 1225.

Joun J. Casarz, Ino.,

Petitioner,

AGAINST

JosrrH Mooney, et al.,

Respondents.

Respondents’ Brief in Opposition to Petition

Por Writ of Certiorari.

Statement of Matter Involved.

The petition for certiorari outlines the facts in a frag-

mentary manner, and in certain respects distorts the con-

tents of the appeal record. We believe a more compre-

hensive, yet succinct, presentation will assist materially

in the consideration of the application.

Summary of the Basic Facts Proved on the Trial.

(1) John J. Casale Inc. owned a number of trucks,

each housed every night after its run, in one of several

2

garages maintained by the Casale Company in New York

City, three in Manhattan, two in Brooklyn, one in Long

Island City.

(2) Each of the trucks, so returned to the garage

each night was, each night—inspected, washed, gassed,

greased, oiled, tested for tire, clutch, transmission, en-

gine and electrical ignition trouble, had minor repairs

done, was placed for easy egress in the morning—and

supervised for proper starting in the morning—which was

all done during the night time and the early morning

hours by

(a) Washers,—who washed the trucks, inside and out

(R. 299-301),

(b) Floormen,—who gassed the trucks, checked them

in, shifted and placed them, cleaned the wind-

shields and door windows, and made them ready

for easy despatch in the morning (R. 293-299),

(ec) Greasers,—who checked water and oil and tires,

greased the trucks, oiled the generators (R. 307),

(d) Night Mechanics——who inspected the trucks as

they came in, tuned motors, fixed brakes and

clutches and lights, straightened bumpers, and

did other minor repairs, and inspected trucks that

were going out of the state on long trips; their

duties included standing by in the morning to su-

pervise their going out and to help them get

started in case starting trouble developed (R. 216,

222-223, 281-283, 288-289, 292, 424).

(3) At the 21st St. (Manhattan) garage, the Casale

company housed many of its trucks; also it maintained

there an overhaul shop, to which each truck (from all

garages) was sent after it had gone 14,000 miles (R. 26,

—

<a

215). Here were employed mechanics and mechanics’

helpers (referred to hereafter as ‘‘daytime mechanics”’

as distinguished from the nighttime mechanics). These

daytime mechanics did overhaul work. In addition, they

performed the following duties:

3

(a) They did ‘‘road work’’—that is, they were sent

out on the road to repair trucks that had broken

down. Included were repair jobs on trucks that

had

(1) Broken down outside of New York State,—

mostly in New Jersey

(2) Broken down at steamship piers or railroad

yards, while delivering goods for out-of-State

transshipment, or receiving goods originating

out-of-State

(3) Come in from the Hoboken (N. J.) garage

of the Casale company, for minor adjust-

ments, made necessary because there was no

mechanic at that garage.

(b) Two of the plaintiffs, speaking for the daytime

mechanics, testified: one, that he went out on road

calls to New Jersey at least once a week and as

often as four times a day while at the same time

he went out on road calls to steamship piers and

freight yards at least once a week (R. 275): the

other, that he went out on road calls to steamship

piers and freight yards constantly, at least once

a week, and sometimes four times a day, and on

road calls to New Jersey, as often as four times

a, day (R. 217, 218): that the trucks on which

they worked thus came from all of the Casale

garages, not merely those that were housed at the

21st St. garage (R. 275).

(ec)

(d)

(4)

4

The daytime mechanics also did minor repairs

on the Bethlehem Steel Co. trucks that came in

from the Hoboken (N. J.) garage—sometimes two

or three a day, sometimes five or six during the

day (R. 219, 226, 228).

Four times during the year, for a period of one

month, these daytime mechanics were required

to come in at 6 a.m. instead of 8 a.m., to super-

vise the starting out of the trucks from the 21st

St. garage, of the trucks housed there, and to do

any minor repairs required to get them started

(R. 216, 217)—made necessary because ‘‘there

were no night mechanics on from six to nine, and

in case anything developed, you had to be there

in order to take care of it’’ (R. 216).

The work of the employees was performed on or

directed to the trucks hauling goods in interstate com-

merce during the course of each week and in fact, during

the course of each day:

(a)

(b)

(c)

The washers did their work in pairs and they

washed each truck each and every night (includ-

ing all the trucks that during that day hauled

goods in interstate commerce)—(R. 300).

The floorman performed his work on each and

every one of the trucks each night, (including all

the trucks that during the day had hauled goods

in interstate commerce )—(R. 294).

The greaser did his work ‘‘with respect to each

vehicle’? and his task was a ‘‘continuous day-to-

day maintenance of the vehicles’’—(including all

the trucks that during the day had hauled goods

in interstate commerce)—(R. 421).

5

(d) The nighttime mechanic ‘‘did work on all the

trucks’? (R. 424) and he imspected each truck as

it came in (R. 424): his duties required him to be

present in the early morning hours to supervise

the going out of the trucks, and to help get them

started in case of difficulty (including the trucks

that during the day had hauled goods in inter-

state commerce)—(R. 216).

(e) The daytime mechanics, in addition to their over-

haul work, worked each and every week and

sometimes each and every day, on trucks that at

the time of repair was in actual haulage of goods

for interstate commerce (see Paragraph 3-b su-

pra).

(5) Of the plaintiffs concerned, two of each work

category testified on the trial—and it was stipulated that

the testimony of those who testified apply to all of the

plaintiffs in the same categories (R. 219, 303-305, 310-312).

(6) The Casale company carried on its business with

full knowledge that its trucks were being used for haulage

of goods interstate, and derived its income and profits

from a business that contemplated such interstate haul-

age of goods in its trucks:

(a) The contract between the Casale company and its

customers provided (Plffs.’ Ex. 2, See. 8):

‘‘VIII.—That the Lessor (Casale) shall at all

times, and at its own cost and expense, have

each vehicle registered, licensed and maintained

in operating condition to comply with all traf-

fic and highway laws and/or regulations of the

States of New York, New Jersey and Connectt-

cut.’’ (Emphasis supplied.)

aa

(b) All gas used by the trucks was furnished by the

Casale company at the garages: if a truck ran

out of gas—which happened when the truck trav-

elled long distances—the chauffeur would buy

gas and pay for it, and Casale company would

reimburse the chauffeur. Casale company kept a

record of such reimbursements, and the records

show that Casale made such reimbursements regu-

larly and often for gas so purchased in New Jer-

sey and Connecticut (R. 32-35, Plffs.’ Exhibits

7 and 8).

(c) It maintained a regular day-by-day practice of

sending its mechanics on ‘‘road calls’’ to New

Jersey and Connecticut and to steamship piers

and railroad yards, to repair trucks then engaged

in haulage of goods in interstate commerce (see

3b, supra).

6

(d) The Casale company sent out a questionnaire to

its customers to determine the extent to which

the customers hauled their goods in the Casale

trucks in interstate commerce, and as a result

of the replies, ascertained that their trucks were

being used in interstate commerce to the extent

of 23% (R. 42, 43).

(e) The Casale company admitted to definite knowl-

edge that at least 34 of its 70 customers were

using the Casale trucks in haulage of goods inter-

state (R. 157-161).

(f) In a previous case in which the Casale company

was involved, the Casale company admitted that

the use of its trucks by its customers im inter-

state haulage of goods was approximately 30%

(R. 155).

7

(7) The value, in dollars, of the goods that were

hauled each week by customers of the Casale company in

the Casale trucks, was considerable; and annually it ran

into the millions:

(a) R. C. Williams Co., wholesale grocers, whose

Casale trucks were housed at 21st St., Manhattan,

sent each week, thirty truckloads of goods to its

New Jersey customers in Casale trucks: weekly,

this amounted to $50,000—and annually it

amounted to $2,600,000.00 (R. 263).

(b) Hoffman & Mayer, dealers in poultry, whose

trucks were housed at the 21st St., Manhattan

garage, sent its Casale trucks to deliver to its

New Jersey customers several times a week,

amounting annually to $600,000.00 in value: In

fact, it brought in its iced poultry from Delaware

each morning, and instantly the poultry was

transferred to the Casale trucks, thus constitut-

ing continuous interstate shipment, even to its

New York City customers: accordingly, the Casale

trucks were used 100% of the time in interstate

commerce, and the annual value of its deliveries

in the Casale trucks, inclusive of New York City,

was between $3,000,000.00 and $5,000,000.00 (R.

249).

(c) Liggett Drug Co., whose Casale trucks were

housed at 21st St., Manhattan, maintained a cen-

tral warehouse in Manhattan, from which it de-

livered its goods, in Casale trucks, to its constitu-

ent stores: it sent the Casale trucks to its New

Jersey stores four times each week, and to its

Connecticut stores twice a week: the value of the

goods hauled thus to these stores amounted an-

nually to approximately $100,000.00; however,

—e 7

(d)

(e)

8

because it maintained the warehouse for the pur-

pose of servicing its constituent stores, haulage

of their goods to their New York City stores was

haulage in interstate commerce: on this basis, it

used Casale trucks in interstate commerce 100%

of the time, and the annual value of this haul-

age wonld be figured at $470,000.00 (R. 255-262,

Plffs.’ Ex. 15).

Jacob Ruppert, brewers, whose Casale trucks

were housed at the 93rd St. garage (Manhattan)

sent at least 11 trucks each day to deliver goods

to its New Jersey customers in Casale trucks; the

annual value of goods so shipped amounted to

approximately $1,000,000.00 (R. 246).

Austin Nichols Co., importers and rectifiers of

spirits, whose trucks were housed in the Brook-

lyn garage, used the Casale trucks to pick up im-

ports at piers in New York and New Jersey,

““sometimes once a week, sometimes twice, and

sometimes every day in the week’’ (R. 91). Also

the Casale trucks were used to make deliveries

in New Jersey and Connecticut, once, twice or

three times each week. The value of one truck-

load was $15,000. The annual value of goods

merely delivered in the Casale trucks interstate

in New Jersey and Connecticut was $1,000,000.00,

not considering the value of goods picked up at

the piers (R. 91, 116).

(f) J. M. Huber Co., whose Casale trucks were housed

at the Brooklyn garage, were manufacturers of

printing inks: its trucks were used 50% of the

time, week after week, daily, making deliveries

of its products in Casale trucks to New Jersey

customers and to freight forwarders and rail-

road terminals for shipment extra-State (R. 103).

(g)

(h)

(i)

9

V. LaRosa & Sons, manufacturers of macaroni,

housed its Casale trucks at the Brooklyn gar-

age, serviced 1,000 customers in New Jersey, and

sent between five and fifteen Casale truckloads

to New Jersey each week, on the average one or

two truckloads each day: it also sent two truck-

loads to Pennsylvania each week: the annual vol-

ume of goods shipped interstate in Casale trucks

was over $1,000,000.00 (R. 48).

Dannemiller Coffee Co., coffee importers and

roasters, housed its trucks in the Brooklyn gar-

age. It used the Casale trucks to pick up green

coffee at the piers; one truck was used 90% of

the time in picking up imports deliveries to rail-

road terminals were made daily: it was testified

‘“‘There was always coffee on the piers and we

could find a job for them (the Casale trucks)’’

(R. 73).

Benjamin Dorman, wholesale grocers, housed

the Casale trucks in the Brooklyn garage: it

used the Casale trucks daily to pick up goods

consigned to them from out-of-State at the Kast-

ern District rail yards: carloads came in twice a

week, and two or three truckloads came off each

carload: the Casale trucks were also used to de-

liver to customers in New Jersey, two or three

truckloads each week: the average truckload had

a value of between $2,000.00 and $2,500.00 (R. 60).

(j) John Morrell & Son, branch house of the Na-

tional Packing Company, housed the Casale

trucks at the Brooklyn garage: 10% of its prod-

ucts processed in its Brooklyn plant was carried

in Casale trucks to its customers in New Jersey

and Connecticut: the Casale trucks were sent to

New Jersey twice each week (R. 360).

(k)

(1)

(m)

(n)

10

Pabst Sales Co., New York branch of the na-

tional brewery bearing the same name, shipped

beer to the Pullman Company for use in Pull-

mans, 95% of which went interstate: Casale

trucks were used three times each week to make

these deliveries (R. 335).

Atlantic Macaroni Co., manufacturers of maca-

roni products, housed the Casale trucks in the

Long Island City garage: each week it sent two

or three truckloads in Casale trucks to New Jer-

sey: the goods thus shipped interstate in the

Casale trucks had an annual value of $131,000.00

(R. 206).

Jones & Laughlin Steel Service Co., housed its

trucks at the Long Island City garage: Casale

trucks were sent each day to its New Jersey cus-

tomers; this company had a policy of servicing

its customers within a 30 mile radius of New

York City, which necessarily included much of

New Jersey and Connecticut; this company used

the Casale trucks to earry goods to railroad ter-

minals of goods consigned to other out-of-State

customers. It produced delivery receipts for a

representative period August 1 to August 15,

1942—which showed 47 shipments to New Jersey

customers of finished fabricated steel products,

for a total of 77,000 pounds, shipments made

in Casale trucks on 10 different days during a

fourteen-day period (R. 231).

Edw. & John Burke, Ltd., manufacturer of soft

drinks, and exclusive sales agent of E. & J. Burke

Ltd., brewers, used the Casale trucks to deliver

its products to the Pullman Company, for use

on the Pullman trains, using the Casale trucks

two or three times each and every week for such

; 11

purpose (R. 164,—Plffs.’ Ex. 11) and made sim-

ilar deliveries in the Casale trucks to the Penn-

sylvania and New York Central Railroads, once

or twice each week (R. 172).

{o) The above recitals are indicative of the general

picture disclosing the interstate haulage of goods

in the Casale trucks; the parade of Casale cus-

tomers to the witness stand was halted on the in-

sistence of defendant’s counsel,—who, in order to

bring this about,—consented to a stipulation that

the haulage of goods in interstate commerce by

the Casale trucks was substantial (R. 379, fol.

1137—Opinion of Court R. 489, fols. 1466-7).

(8) From the facts shown, it is clear that there was

overwhelming proof that the Casale trucks hauled goods

in interstate commerce regularly, each day or several

times each week, and recurrently, each and every week,

in very substantial volume.

(9) The record shows that many of the Casale com-

pany customers were engaged in production for commerce,

thus affording the basis for a contention that the Casale

employees were engaged in an occupation necessary for

production for commerce, and therefore, covered by the

Act, on the second ground of coverage,—. e., engaged

in production for commerce; but neither in the District

Court nor in the Circuit Court did plaintiffs make an

issue of this, for coverage is so clear on the principle

that the plaintiffs were engaged in commerce—that to

assert additional coverage on the theory of production

would be merely cumulative.

Questions Raised By Petitioner.

The first question propounded by Petitioner, although

differenty phrased by petitioner’s counsel, is

ee

12

If an employee shows that his work activity

is so directly tied to interstate commerce as to

be in contemplation of law a part of it—must the

employee, in addition, show, by independent evi-

dence, that, on some other theory, the employer

is engaged in commerce, in order to be covered

by the Fair Labor Standards Act?

The short answer is (a) this Court has time and again

said ‘‘No’’ to the question and (b) there is and can be

no divergence of opinion on the point in the Circuit Courts

(see Point I, post).

The second question propounded by Petitioner, al-

though differently phrased, is

Where an employer is engaged in the business

of generally maintaining and repairing vehicles used

by other concerns in interstate commerce, may its

employees working on such vehicles be deemed

engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning

of the Fair Labor Standards Act?

The short answer is, that this Court has said ‘‘Yes’’

definitely to the exact question propounded, and has also

answered the question in the affirmative by decisions

closely analogous (see Point II, post).

The third question propounded by the Petitioner is

May an employee recover under the Fair Labor

Standards Act without showing that ‘during any

particular workweek he did actually perform his

labor upon’ trucks which hauled goods in interstate

commerce?

The short answer to this question is (a) that there is

no principle of law involved for the proof in the case

13

overwhelmingly shows that each employee continuously

performed his work upon trucks which hauled goods in

interstate commerce regularly, each and every week, in-

deed every day during the week, and recurrently, week

after week, and (b) there is and can be no divergence of

opinion in the Cireuit Courts (see Point III, post).

POINT I.

It is well settled that it is enough if an employee, to be

covered under the Fair Labor Standards Act, shows

that his work activity is so closely tied to interstate com-

merce as to be in contemplation of law a part of it.

In a number of cases decided by this Court, it has been

definitely decided that

(A) It is not necessary for an employee to show that

the employer is engaged in commerce or in pro-

duction for commerce, aliwnde a showing that the

employee himself is engaged in an activity closely

connected with commerce or production for com-

merce and

(B) Where it is shown that an employee is engaged

in commerce or in production for commerce—the

employer is thereby deemed to be engaged in

commerce or in production for commerce.

Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517;

Warren Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 317 U. 8.

88;

Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U. S. 125;

Pedersen v. J. F. Fitzgerald Co., 318 U. S. 740;

Roland Electrical Co. v. Walling, 326 U. S. 657;

Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 325

U. S. 849.

14

The argument of Petitioner is the same that was used

by the employer in the Overstreet case (supra)—the

United States Cireuit Court of Appeals (C. C. A. 5) hold-

ing with the employer (128 F. 2nd 450)—but on appeal

to the Supreme Court, the argument being raised again,

it was rejected.

In the Kirschbaum case, this Court ruled (316 U. 8.

517, 524), that

‘“To the extent that his employees are ‘engaged

in commerce or in production for commerce’ the

employer is himself so engaged.”’

The same precise question was raised in the New York

State Courts in the case of Pedersen v. J. F. Fitzgerald

Co., supra (see history recital of this case R. 558-562),

and in those courts answered favorably to the employer

—but the Supreme Court reversed the New York Court

of Appeals, adverting to the Overstreet decision.

Petitioner cites the case of Mabee v. White Plains

Publishing Co., 327 U. S. 178—the case is not in point;

all that was involved in that case was the question whether

the de minimis doctrine was applicable to cases under the

Fair Labor Standards Act.

On the question of conflict of decisions, the Petitioner

has cited the case of Lewis v. Florida Power & Light Co.,

154 F. 2nd 751 (C. C. A. 5) as holding that an employee

is bound to show that an employer is ‘‘engaged in com-

merce’’ regardless of other testimony that the employee’s

activity is so closely tied to commerce as to be in con-

templation of law a part of it. The case does not so hold.

The Circuit Court was merely passing on a finding of the

District Court (based not upon a trial but upon plead-

ings and a stipulation which recited the business of the

employer, but not the work activities of the employees)

that the stipulated facts did not show that the employer

was engaged in commerce; the Circuit Court reversed the

15

District Court and held that some of the facts stipulated

did in fact show the employer was engaged in commerce,

and sent the case back for proof by the plaintiffs of the

nature of their work.

The second case on the question of conflict, cited by

Petitioner is Wilson v. R. F. C., 158 F. 2nd 564—but the

case is clearly not in point. The case is the simple case

of an employee’s activities being so remote from the com-

merce involved, that there was no coverage,—(McLeod v.

Threlkeld, 319 U. S. 491—cited by that Court).

Clearly, then, there is no conflict on the point,—as in-

deed there cannot be, this Court having said the last

word.

_ POINT II.

Plaintiffs working directly upon the vehicles that were

used in interstate commerce regularly and recurrently—are

engaged in commerce.

In the case of Boutell v. Walling, 327 U. S. 463, this

Court held that employees of a company maintaining and

repairing trucks used by another company to haul goods

in interstate commerce were well within the coverage of

the Fair Labor Standards Act.

In Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U. S. 125, this

Court held that employees of a toll road company, over

which flowed vehicles, some of which later completed their

journey by means of an interstate highway, were engaged

in commerce within the meaning of the Fair Labor Stand-

ards Act.

Applying the theory of the Overstreet case, this Court

in the Pedersen case, reversed a determination of the New

York Court of Appeals (that a laborer employed by a con-

tractor engaged in working on a right of way of a rail-

road, over which some trains ran interstate was not en-

ee ann

16

gaged in commerce) and held that the laborer was engaged

in ecommeree—although the contractor was an independ-

ent contractor, and did his work locally.

The Pedersen case is closely analogous to the instant

ease, because the employees in question performed their

work on instrumentalities of commerce. The Overstreet

ease is likewise analogous, for the same reason—even more

authoritative, because recovery there was accorded a toll

road ticket taker, whose duties were not quite as closely |

related to commerce as were those of the repairman in

the Overstreet case, and the maintenance employees in

the instant case. The Boutell case is practically on all

fours with the instant case—there is hardly a semblance

of difference between the underlying facts in the Boutell |

case and this case.

POINT III.

The record contains overwhelming proof that each of

the employees worked in interstate commerce each and

every week regularly and recurrently.

There is really no law question involved here: the

Petitioner asserts that (Petition, p. 10)

‘‘The reeord so clearly shows that * * * there

was no inherent reason why as to any particular

employee there should have been any interstate la-

bor by him during any one or another of any par-

ticular week’’

and further asserts that from the evidence adduced by the

plaintiffs

‘“‘Tt would not follow that any individual one of

these suing employees even so much as touched in

17

the course of any particular week any one or more

vehicles so used in interstate commerce by some

one or another lessee.’’

It is upon this assumption that the third question

posed to this Court is predicated. But, the evidence is

contrary to the assumed hypothesis—for the record is re-

plete with evidence that each employee, each night, each

week worked upon all the vehicles, those which that day

were engaged in haulage of goods interstate as well as

the others,—that many Casale trucks hauled goods inter-

state each day, week after week, regularly, recurrently—

in tremendous volume: that at least 34 out of the 70 cus-

tomers used Casale trucks to haul goods in interstate com-

merce: that the extent of the interstate commerce use of

the Casale trucks was generally between 23% and 30%

and in some cases 100%. The United States Circuit Court

of Appeals for the Second Circuit was correct in holding

that no quarrel can be had with the Trial Court in in-

ferring that the employees spent a substantial amount of

time on trucks used in interstate commerce.

Cases have been cited by Petitioner in an attempt to

build an argument of conflict on the point. In the two

eases cited, it was held merely that the suing employees

spent time on interstate work ‘‘occasionally’’, ‘‘sporadi-

eally’’, and failed to produce proof as to when precisely

they performed such work in commerce, making it impos-

sible for the Trial Court to compute the amount of re-

covery.

In those cases, Schwartz v. Witwer Grocer Co., 49 F.

Supp. 1003 and Super-Cold Southwest Co. v. McBride, 124

F. 2d 90—the questions decided were purely procedural.

No principle was cited that is in conflict with any prin-

ciple of law applicable to the facts in the instant case.

- —_—

18

CONCLUSION.

The Petition Should Be Denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Harotp R. Korey,

Attorney for Respondents.

EmanveEn TAOKER,

Of Counsel,

On the Brief.

(18601)

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.