Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Swalley v. Addressograph-Multigraph Corp.

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Olas ~ Suscrme Oourt, UL

FILAD

FEB 27 1947

IN THE

CRARLES CLuort

OROPLEY

OLERK

Supreme Court of the Unitec

October Term, 1946.

“No. 1072

E. E. SWALLEY,

Petitioner,

vs.

ADDRESSOGRAPH-MULTIGRAPH CORPORATION,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF AP-

PEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF

\ HARRY B. COHEN,

A. BERKOWITZ.

Birmingham, Alabama,

Counsel for Petitioner.

Qos SWALLEY PRINTING CO., BIRMINGHAM 8, ALA.

—

SUBJECT INDEX

Page

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF AP-

PEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT__.. 1

Summary Statement of Matters Involved. 2

Jurisdictional Statement 8

The Questions Presented 8

Reasons Relied on for Allowance of the Writ... 10

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT

OF CERTIORARI 13

Opinions of the Courts Below 13

Jurisdiction 13

Statement of the Case 13

Specification of Errors —

Argument 16

Summary of Argument 16

Point I. The Law of Ohio, which Admittedly

Governs the Interpretation of the Written

Contract in Question, and the Decisions of the

United States Supreme Court and of Other

Circuit Courts of Appeal Require Affirm-

ance of the District Court Judgment in Fav-

or of Plaintiff Swalley ie 17

Point II. The Practical Construction of the

Contract by the Parties Requires Affirmance

of the District Court Judgment in Favor of

Plaintiff Swalley 21

Point III. The Bulletin of the Defendant Com-

o pany Relied Upon by the Circuit Court of

Appeals Did Not In Fact Apply to the Trans-

actions in Question and Did Not Constitute

a Practical Construction of the Contract ro

erative in This Case ‘os 26

Point IV. The Decision of the Circuit Court of

Appeals Cannot Properly Be Predicated Upon

Modification of the Written Contract, for the

Defendant Company Failed to Plead Modifi-

ee

cation in Accordance with the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, the Case Was Not Tried

on that Issue, and Plaintiff Swalley Did Not

Have an Opportunity to Introduce Evidence

on That Point. 28

Point V. There Was No Effectual Modifica-

tion of the Written Contract Applicable to

the Case at Bar 31

Point VI. Plaintiff Swalley Acquired Vested

Rights to the Commissions in Question Which

Could Not be Adversely Affected by a Later

Purported Modification of the Agency Con-

tract 36

Conclusion 43

aa

TABLE OF CASES CITED

Page

Abrams vs. George E. Keith Company, 30 Fed. (2d)

90 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1929) 33

Albright vs. Kalbitzer, 2 Fed. Supp. 815 (D.C. Pa.,

1945) 39

Atkinson vs. The New Britain Machine Co., 154 Fed.

(2d) 895, 901 (C.C.A. 7th, 1946) 39

Bach vs. Friden Calculating Machine Co., 165 Fed. (2d)

361 (C.C.A. 6th, 1946) 41

Berwick Hotel Co. vs. Vaughn, 300 Pa. 389, 150 Atl.

613, 616, 71 A.L.R. 1340 (1930) 33

Brown vs. Kennedy (Ohio App.) 49 N.E. (2d) 417,

418 (1942), aff'd 141 Ohio St. 457, 48 N.E. (2d)

857, 860 (1943)____ 19

Buell vs. Indian Refining Company, 62 Ohio App. 108,

23 N.E. (2d) 329, 331... 20

Calderon vs. Atlas S. §. Co., 170 U.S. 272, 18 Sup. Ct.

588, 42 L. Ed. 1033 (1898) 19

Charles Behlen Sons’ Company vs. Ricketts, 30 Ohio

App. 167, 164 N.E. 436 18

Coe vs. Suburban Light and Power Company, 32 Ohio

App. 158, 167 N.E. 693 18

Crawford vs. Wick, 18 Ohio St. 190, 98 Am. Dec.

103 36

Crowe vs. Trickey, 204 U.S. 228, 27 Sup. Ct. 275,

51 L. Ed 454 41

Cuneo Press vs. Clayborn Corporation, 90 Fed. (2d)

233 (C.C.A. 7th, 1937 32

Dibble vs. Dimick, 143 N. Y. 549, 38 N.E. 724. 39

Dildine vs. Ford Motor Company, 159 Mo. App. 410,

140 S.W. 627 (1911) 40

Emerson vs. Slater, 22 How. (U.S.) 28,16 L.Ed. 360_. 36

S.E. 706. 42

Ferguson vs. Laux, 57 Ohio App. 495, 15 N.E. (2d)

167, 169____ 18

Fichter vs. Milk Wagon Drivers’ Union, 382 Ill. 91,

95-99, 46 N.E. (2d) 921, 924 (1943). 42

Fire Association of Philadelphia vs. Agresta, 115 Ohio

St. 426, 154 N.E. 723 18

a

TABLE OF CASES CITED—(Continued)

Grace vs. American Century Insurance Company, 109

U. S. 278, 3 Sup. Cr. 207, 27 L. Ed. 932 (1883) __

Jacquin vs. Boutard, 89 Hun. 437, 35 N.Y. Supp. 496

(1895), aff'd 167 N.Y. 686, 51 N.E. 1091 (1898)

Manhattan Life Insurance Co. vs. Buck, 93 U.S. 24,

23 L. Ed. 789

Marshall vs. Ames, 11 Ohio Cir. Ct. 363, 5 Oh. Cir. Dec.

403

Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Company of New

York vs. Banks, 76 Fed. (2d) 68 (C.C.A. 3rd,

1935)

Mount Vernon Refrigerating Company vs. Fred W.

Wolf Company, 188 Fed. 164 (C.C.A. 6th, Ohio,

1911)

Noonan vs. Bradley, 76 U.S. 394, 9 Wall. 394, 19 L. Ed.

757 (1870) :

Ohio Marble Co. vs. Byrd, 65 Fed. (2d) 98 (C.C.A.

6th, 1933)

Oil Workers’ International Union Local No. 463 vs.

Texoma Natural Gas Company, 146 Fed. (2d) 62,

64 (C.C.A. Sth, 1945), cert. den. 324 U.S. 872,

65 Sup. Ct. 1017, 89 L. Ed. 1426

Order of United Commercial Travelers of America vs.

Sevier, 121 Fed. (2d) 650 (C.C.A. 8th, 1941).

Parish vs. Haynes, 62 Fed. (2d) 105 (C.C.A. Sth).

Peoria Life Insurance Company vs. Poynor (Tex. Civ.

App.), 297 S.W. 788_.

R. K. LeBlond Machine Tool Company vs. Humboldt

Fire Insurance Company, 6 Ohio App. 313, aff’d

92 Ohio St. 541, 112 N.E. 1084

Schnerb vs. Caterpillar Tractor Company, 43 Fed. (2d)

920, cert. den. 282 U.S. 898, 75 L. Ed. 791_____.

Sigman vs. Wurlitzer, 57 Ohio App. 4, 11 N.E. (2d)

878 mt

Singer Sewing Machine Co. vs. Brewer, 78 Ark 202,

8 a ae eee

Southern Railway Company vs. Coca-Cola Bottling

Company, 145 Fed. (2d) 304 (C.C.A. 4th, 1944)

Swain vs. Seamens, 9 Wall. (U.S.) 254, 19 L. Ed. 554.

Page

19

40

42

32

19

19

19

39

34

19

36

38

18

39

18

40

19

CO AN, MI EN!

NT ee ia ee ne oe eet ae

TABLE OF CASES CITED— (Continued)

Page

Tahir Erk vs. Glenn L. Martin Co., 116 Fed. (2d) 855

(C.C.A. 4th, 1941) 41

Thurston vs. Ludwig, 6 Ohio St. 1, 67 Am. Dec. 328... 32

Williams vs. Fortlage, 17 Ohio Cir. Ct. N.S. 242... 32

Wilcox & Gibbs Sewing Machine Company vs. Ewing,

141 U. S. 627, 637, 12 Sup. Ct. 94, 35 L. Ed. 882

(1891) 40

TABLE OF STATUTES CITED

Judicial Code, Sec. 240 (a), as amended by Act of Feb-

ruary 13, 1925, Chap. 229 (28 U.S.C.A. Sec.

347 (a))_. 8

Ohio Statute of Frauds, Throckmorton’s Annotated

Code of Ohio (1930), Sec. 8621. i

Rules of Civil Procedure for Federal District Courts

Rule 8 (c) “Affirmative Defenses”... 29

Rule 12 (h) “Waiver of Defenses”... 29

Throckmorton’s Annotated Code of Ohio (1930), Sec.

8621 (Ohio Statute of Frauds) 34

28 U.S.C.A. following sec. 723 (c), note 21 and US.

C.A. 1947 Special Pamphlet, p. 172 et seq... 29

TABLE OF TEXTBOOKS AND ENCYCLOPEDIAS

; CITED

A.L.I. Restatement on Agency, Sec. 436, comment (a) 39

2 Am. Jur. “Agency”, Sec. 50

ga

‘ IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1946

No.

E. E. SWALLEY, Petitioner and Appellee below,

vs.

ADDRESSOGRAPH-MULTIGRAPH CORPORATION,

Respondent and Appellant below.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF AP-

PEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT AND

BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF

To the Honorable, the Chief Justice and Associate Justices

of the Supreme Court of the United States:

Your Petitioner respectfully prays for a writ of certi-

orari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for

the Seventh Circuit to review the judgment of that Court

(per Minton, J.) entered in this case on October 31, 1946

(R. 376), reversing the judgment of the United States

District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, East-

ern Division (per Igoe, J.) in favor of the Plaintiff-Pe-

titioner E. E. Swalley in the sum of $77,328.65 and re-

manding the cause to the District Court for proceedings

in accordance with the opinion of the Circuit Court of

Appeals.

A petition for rehearing was filed by Petitioner Swalley

in the Circuit Court of Appeals, with leave of the Court,

on November 22, 1946 (R. 386), and was denied by the

Court on November 29, 1946 (R. 386).

nee —

2 Petition for Writ of Certiorari

A certified transcript of the record in this case, in-

cluding the proceedings in the Circuit Court of Appeals,

is furnished herewith in compliance with Rule 38 of this

Court.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF MATTERS

INVOLVED

This is an action to recover commissions due under a

written contract between the parties hereto, effective March

6th, 1941, wherein Plaintiff-Petitioner E. E. Swalley was

appointed exclusive sales agent of the Multigraph Division

of the Defendant-Respondent Company for the entire State

of Alabama and certain Counties in the State of Florida.

The written contract is a printed form contract that

was prepared by the Defendant Company, and the Plain-

tiff Swalley did not participate in drafting it (R. 16,

par. 6).

The controlling provision of the contract is paragraph

8 (R. 248), which reads as follows:

“Commission on Sales in Other Territories:

8. Sales Agent shall not enter any territory other

than hereinabove specified, for the purpose of selling

the products of Company for use either within or out-

side of the above specified territory without first se-

curing consent in writing of Sales Agent in said other

territory, or of Company. On orders for machines or

attachments, with or without supplies, secured by Sales

Agent in the above territory for use in other than the

above specified territory, Sales Agent shall receive 25%

of the total commission to be paid on any such sales.

When under like circumstances any other authorized

Sales Agent of Company shall sell machines or attach-

ments, with or without supplies, to be used in the terri-

tory specified in this contract, Sales Agent under this

contract shall receive 75% of the authorized commis-

sciiseeisidiniiaimmasiciieaameaae

Petition for Writ of Certiorari 3

sion to be paid on any such sales. In the event that

new or used equipment is transferred from one terri-

tory to another within ninety (90) days from date of

shipment by Sales Agent or Company, the commis-

sion on such equipment, including supplies specified

on original order, shall be readjusted on a basis of 75%

of total commission to Sales Agent in whose territory

the equipment was transferred, and 25% of total com-

mission to Sales Agent who made the sale. On orders

for or sales of supplies only, total commission will be

paid to Sales Agent in whose territory the supplies are

to be used, except that this does not apply to re-ship-

ment of supplies by a customer to its subsidiaries or

branches. These commissions stated in Clause 8, are

to be subject to the same liability to be charged back

against Sales Agent’s account in case of non-payment

by the purchaser, as in other cases specified in Clause

6 of this Contract.”

The terms “use”, “for use”, and “to be used” are not

defined in the contract, nor does the contract mention the

word “storage” or seek to draw any distinction between

“use” and “storage”.

The Commission Schedule of the contract (R. 241)

provided for a commission of 35% on the sale of machines

and attachments of the types involved in this suit.

Paragraph 5 of the contract provided that commis-

sions will be credited to the agent’s commission account

on the Company’s books when shipment of goods is made.

(R. 247).

The closing paragraph of the contract (R. 253-254)

provided as follows:

“(a) This contract may be terminated at any time

at the option of either party by and upon the giving

of written notice addressed to and mailed, or delivered

to the last known address of the other party; further

that Company at any time may alter and change the

4 Petition for Writ of Certiorart

boundaries of the territory covered by this contract.

(b) This contract shall become binding upon

the signature of Addressograph-Multigraph Corpora-

tion, Multigraph Division being thereto attached at

Euciid Post Office, Cleveland, Ohio and said contract

shall be deemed and held by the parties hereto as exe-

cuted under and to be construed, governed and in-

terpreted pursuant to the laws of the State of Ohio.

(c) This contract covers and contains any and

all agreements between Sales Agent and Company, all

other contracts or promises of any kind, either written

or verbal, being hereby annulled and cancelled, and

this contract shall not be varied or added to in any man-

ner except in writing signed by the duly authorized

officer of Company.”

The Company’s Sales Agent, Gray, at Dayton, Ohio,

procured three (3) purchase orders from the Air Corps

for machines and attachments, in accordance with the Com-

pany’s formal proposal, said orders being numbered and

dated as follows:

Order No. (535) 42-15979 dated March 31, 1942

Order No. (535) 42-19531-P dated May 18, 1942

Order No. (535) 42-19532-P dated May 20, 1942

(R. 281, 289, 295)

These purchase orders were embodied in standard Gov-

ernment contract forms, designated as War Department

Air Corps Form No. 98.

The first order covered Multigraph and Multilith non-

portable, duplicating machines, and contained a monthly de-

livery schedule requiring that delivery of all items shall be-

gin on or before July 1st, 1942 and shall be completed by

June 30th, 1943 (R. 285). The other two orders covered

attachments for use with the machines listed in the first

order, and directed that they should be delivered with the

machines (R. 293-297).

sail

Petition for Writ of Certioravi $

Each of said orders contained shipping instructions spe-

cifically directing that a certain number of the machines

and attachments be consigned to Mobile Air Depot, Mobile,

| Alabama, which was included in the exclusive territory of

| Plaintiff Swalley (R. 287, 291, and 297), and each item

| was required to be labeled “Property Air Force United States

Army (R. 287, 295). The orders did not specify what use

was to be made of the machines. After the machines were

shipped the Defendant Company had no control over them

(R. 326, 22).

Prior to the purchase orders in question, the parties had

adopted a practical construction of the contract whereby

paragraph 8 was construed to mean that where machines

were sold by Agent A for shipment into Agent B’s territory,

Agent A was entitled to receive 25% of the 35% commission

and Agent B was entitled to receive 75% of the commission,

the commissions being paid or credited to the agents at the

time of shipment; that this arrangement was subject, how-

ever, to a condition subsequent, viz., that in the event that

the machines that were shipped into Agent B’s territory

were later transferred to Agent C’s territory within ninety

days from date of shipment, there would be a readjustment

of the commission which had already been paid or credited

| to Agent B and that the commission would be split between

| Agent A and Agent C on a 25-75% basis; that this condi-

| tion subsequent would not become operative to divest

Agent B of his commission unless and until the machines

were transferred out of his territory within ninety days,

and that if they remained in his territory for a period

of ninety days, even if they were merely stored and

were not actually used during that period, the condi-

tion subsequent would not become operative and

Agent B would not be divested of his split commission.

(R. 265-266,259-260).

6 Petition for Writ of Certiorari

Both parties acted in reliance upon this interpretation

of the contract, and this interpretation was in force and in

effect not only at the time that the purchase orders in ques-

tion were accepted by the company, but also continued to

be given force and effect after the company had already

made substantial deliveries pursuant to the purchase orders,

and until the present controversy arose.

In the present suit Defendant Company admitted (R.

24) that the agency contract entitled Plaintiff Swalley to

commissions on all machines shipped “for storage” (this is

the Company’s version) into the Mobile Air Depot, pur-

suant to the Air Corps contracts in question, which were

subsequently installed and “used,” but contended that he is

not entitled to commissions on those machines which were

not installed and “used.” The Defendant Company failed

to offer any proof, however, from the records in its posses-

sion (R. 191), that any of the machines or attachments in

suit had been re-shipped out of Plaintiff Swalley’s territory

within 90 days; that is, the Company failed to prove that

the split commissions that had accrued to Swalley at the

time of the purchase contracts had become divested by op-

eration of the condition subsequent of the 90-day clause of

Paragraph 8 (R. 248).

The case was tried without a jury. (R. 50).

The District Court found, as a matter of fact (R. 328),

that the machines and attachments shipped to the Mobile

Air Depot pursuant to the three purchase orders in question

remained in Plaintiff Swalley’s territory more than ninety

days beyond the date of delivery, and so far as the record

shows, are still there, and that the Defendant Company has

not paid any agent any commissions upon the same, except

the commission of 25% of the total 35% commission pro-

vided for in the Dayton Agent’s Contract, which was identi-

cal in terms with Swalley’s Contract, and except for the

Petition for Writ of Certiorari 7

sum of $6,324.94 paid to the Plaintiff Swalley.

The District Court further found, as a matter of fact

(R. 329), that the Defendant Company had received from

the War Department the total sum of $291,899.87 under

the three purchase orders, and that the full 35% commission

amounted to the sum of $102,164.95. The Court concluded

that Plaintiff Swalley is entitled to recover 75% of the full

commission, which amounts to the sum of $77,328.65, after

allowing proper credits and adding interest.

The District Court (per Igoe, J.) pointed out that the

word “use” was not given a restricted meaning in the agen-

cy contract prepared by the Defendant Company; that there

is no mention of “storage” in the contract; that the Air

Corps purchase orders do not specify the intended use of

the machines; that when the machines were delivered to the

Air Corps, the Defendant Company divested itself com-

pletely of all ownership and control over same, and the Air

Corps became vested with legal title and could make such

use of the machines as it saw fit, and, if it so desired, could

use the machines for the purpose of maintaining a liberal in-

ventory in the Mobile Air Depot (R. 326-327).

The District Court further pointed out that any other

interpretation would be unreasonable because an agent in

Swalley’s position would thereby be deprived of his com-

missions altogether, notwithstanding the fact that the sell-

ing agent had already received his share of the split com-

mission under an identical agency contract.

On appeal by the Defendant Company, the Circuit

Court of Appeals (per Minton, J.), completely disregarding

the practical construction of the contract by the parties

themselves (Record 265-266, 259-269), held, on the basis

of certain dictionary definitions and tax cases, that the word

“use”, as employed in the contract drafted by the Defendant

Company, should be interpreted in the Company’s favor, to

ie

exclude “storage”. The Court also proceeded to find a

modification of the contract to exclude “storage” in a cer-

tain bulletin of the Company dated October 31, 1941 (Rec-

ord 309), which in fact was wholly inapplicable to the trans-

action, and which Plaintiff Swalley had never assented to

and which the record indicates he had never received (R.

111-112), and notwithstanding the absence of a new con-

sideration, the failure of Defendant Company to affirma-

tively plead modification as required by the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, and its invalidity under the Statute of

Frauds of Ohio. |

8 Petition for Writ of Certiorari

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

It is contended that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction

to review the judgment herein in question under and by vir-

tue of Section 240 (a) of the Judicial Code, as amended by

the Act of February 13, 1925, Chap. 229 (28 U.S.C.A. Sec-

tion 347 (a)).

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit was entered on October 31, 1946 (Record

376), and the petition for rehearing was denied on Novem-

ber 29, 1946 (Record 386).

THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. May the Circuit Court of Appeals properly disregard

and override decisions of the United States Supreme Court

applicable to and governing the facts of this case?

2. May the Circuit Court of Appeals properly deny full

faith and credit to the statutes, laws and decisions of the

State of Ohio, which admittedly control the validity and in-

terpretation of the contract in question?

3. May the Circuit Court of Appeals properly fail to

accord comity to the statutes, laws and decisions of the State

_

Petition for Writ of Certiorari 9

of Ohio which admittedly control the validity and interpre-

tation of the contract in question?

4. May the Circuit Court of Appeals properly disregard

the Rules of Civil Procedure for Federal District Courts,

promulgated by the United States Supreme Court?

5. May the Circuit Court of Appeals reverse a judg-

ment for the Plaintiff on certain points not raised by the

pleadings as required by the Rules of Civil Procedure for

Federal District Courts, promulgated by the United States

Supreme Court, and thereby preclude the Plaintiff from

challenging the Defendant on said issues?

6. May the Circuit Court of Appeals properly disregard

the decisions of other Circuit Courts of Appeal applicable

to the facts of this case?

7. May the Circuit Court of Appeals, in interpreting

the written agency contract prepared by Defendant Com-

| pany, properly construe ambiguous words therein in favor

of the Company, despite established rules of judicial con-

struction, despite the practical construction of the parties,

and despite the Company’s own admission in its pleadings

in favor of Plaintiff Swalley’s interpretation?

8. May the Circuit Court of Appeals, in interpreting

the written agency contract prepared by Defendant Com-

pany, properly construe the word “use” therein to exclude

“storage”, despite established rules of judicial construction,

despite the practical construction of the parties, and despite

the Company’s own admission in its pleadings that “use”

includes “storage”?

9. May the Circuit Court of Appeals, in interpreting

a standard form government contract, properly read into

said contract the term “for storage” which does not appear

therein?

10 Petition for Writ of Certiorari

10. May the Circuit Court of Appeals properly con-

clude that there was a modification of a contract, in the ab-

sence of any assent thereto by Plaintiff Swalley, in the ab-

sence of a new consi“ *ration, and where it affirmatively ap-

pears that the purported modification was embodied in a

so-called bulletin of the Defendant Company which was not

signed by Plaintiff Swalley, the party to be charged, as re-

quired by the Statute of Frauds of Ohio?

11. May the Circuit Court of Appeals properly deprive

Plaintiff Swalley of commissions which he had already

earned and of rights which had already accrued and become

vested?

12. May the Circuit Court of Appeals properly impair

the sanctity of a written contract by rewriting a new con-

tract for the parties?

13. May the Circuit Court of Appeals properly dis-

regard the controlling facts of this case and base its decision

on certain judicial principles not applicable thereto?

REASONS RELIED ON FOR ALLOWANCE OF

THE WRIT

1. The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals is in

conflict with decisions of the United States Supreme Court.

2. The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit is in conflict with decisions of other Cir-

cuit Courts of Appeal.

3. The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeal fails to

give full faith and credit to the statutes, laws and decisions

of the State of Ohio, which admittedly control the validity

and interpretation of the written contract in question.

4. The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals fails

to accord comity to the statutes, laws and decisions of the

Petition for Writ of Certiorari 11

State of Ohio, which admittedly control the validity and in-

terpretation of the written contract in question.

§. The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals over-

rides the Rules of Civil Procedure for the Federal District

Courts, promulgated by the United States Supreme Court.

6. The Circuit Court of Appeals decided an important

question of local law in conflict with applicable local de-

cisions.

7. The Circuit Court of Appeals based its decision on

certain points not presented by the litigants and which Pe-

titioner Swalley was not given an opportunity to meet by

the production of evidence.

8. The Circuit Court of Appeals has so far departed

from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings

as to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of

supervision.

PRAYER

Wherefore, your Petitioner, E. E. Swalley, prays that

a writ of certiorari issue under the seal of this Court, directed

to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,

commanding said Court to certify and send to this Court a

full and complete transcript of the record and of the pro-

ceedings of the said Circuit Court of Appeals had in the

case numbered and entitled on its docket Number 8842,

E. E. Swalley, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. Addressograph-Multi-

graph Corporation, Defendant-Appellant, to the end that

this cause may be reviewed and determined by this Court

as provided for by the statutes of the United States, and

that the judgment herein of said Circuit Court of Appeals

be reversed and the judgment of the District Court be af-

firmed by this Court, and your Petitioner prays for such

12 Petition for Writ of Certiorari

other and further relief as to this Court may seem proper.

Dated this the 18th day of February, 1947.

Harry B. CoHEN,

A. BERKOWITZ,

Birmingham, Alabama,

Counsel for Petitioner E. E. Swalley.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT

OF CERTIORARI

Opinions of the Courts Below

The opinion of the United States District Court for

the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, written

by Judge Michael L. Igoe, appears on Pages 325-329 of the

Record. It does not yet appear in the Federal Supplement.

The opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit (Circuit Judges Kerner and Minton, and

District Judge Briggle), written by Judge Minton, appears

on Pages 376-381 of the Record, and is reported in 158 Fed.

(2d) 51 (Advance Sheet No. 1).

Jurisdiction

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Section

240 (a) of the Judicial Code, as amended by the Act of

February 13, 1925 (28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 347 (a)).

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit was entered on October 31, 1946 (R. 376)

and the petition for rehearing was denied on November 29,

1946 (R. 386).

Statement of the Case

To avoid unnecessary repetition, the petitioner respect-

fully directs the attention of this Court to the Summary

Statement of Matters Involved on Pages 2-8 of the Pe-

tition for Certiorari, which is annexed hereto and made a

part hereof.

Specification of Errors

It is respectfully submitted that the Circuit Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit erred in the following par-

ticulars, separately and severally:

(13)

i

14 Brief in Support of Petition

1. The Court erred in reversing the judgment of the

District Court.

2. The Court erred in so construing the term “use” in

the written contract as to exclude “storage”.

3. The Court erred in failing to give force and effect

to the practical construction of the contract by the parties

themselves (R. 265-266, 259-260).

4. The Court erred in failing to interpret the written

contract prepared by Defendant Company most strongly

against the Company and in favor of Plaintiff Swalley.

5. The Court erred in failing to give full faith and

credit to the statutes, laws and decisions of the State of Ohio,

which admittedly control the validity and interpretation

of the contract in question.

6. The Court erred in failing to accord comity to the

statutes, laws and decisions of the State of Ohio, which ad-

mittedly control the validity and interpretation of the con-

tract in question.

7. The Court erred in holding that a certain bulletin

of the Defendant Company dated October 31, 1941 (R.

309) applied to the transactions in question and constituted

a practical construction of the contract by the parties.

8. The Court erred in basing its decision on the legal

theory of modification of the written contract, where the

Defendant Company did not plead modification in accord-

ance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure promulgated

by the United States Supreme Court, the case was not tried

on that issue, and Plaintiff Swalley had no opportunity to

introduce evidence on that point.

9. The Court erred in holding that the written contract

of the parties was modified by a certain bulletin of the De-

Brief in Support of Petition 15

fendant Company dated October 31, 1941, which in fact

did not apply to the transactions in question.

10. The Court erred in holding that Plaintiff Swalley

accepted the terms proposed in the bulletin of the Defendant

Company dated October 31, 1941.

11. The Court erred in holding that the contract was

terminable at will and could be modified at any time by

either party unilaterally as a condition of its continuance.

12. The Court erred in holding that the bulletin of

the Company dated October 31, 1941, was submitted to

Plaintiff Swalley as a condition of the continuance of the

contract.

13. The Court erred in holding, in effect, that the De-

fendant Company had the right to partially terminate

the contract.

14. The Court erred in holding that Plaintiff Swalley

is bound by a so-called “modification” of the contract em-

bodied in a certain bulletin of the Company dated October

31, 1941, which was not signed by Plaintiff Swalley, the

party to be charged, as required by the Statute of Frauds of

the State of Ohio, the controlling law of the case.

15. The Court erred in holding that the Company’s

bulletin of October 31, 1941, constituted a modification of

the written contract in the absence of any assent or approval

by Plaintiff Swalley.

16. The Court erred in holding that the Company’s

bulletin dated October 31, 1941, constituted a modification

of the written contract in the absence of a new considera-

tion moving to Plaintiff Swalley.

17. The Court erred in depriving Plaintiff Swalley of

his commissions which he had already earned under the con-

tract in question.

er

16 Brief in Support of Petition

18. The Court erred in depriving Plaintiff Swalley of

his vested and accrued rights under the contract in question.

19. The Court erred in impairing the sanctity of the

written contract between the parties.

20. The Court erred in rewriting a new and different

contract for the parties, contrary to the terms of the writ-

ten contract and contrary to the practical construction of

the contract by the parties themselves.

21. The Court erred in failing to affirm the judgment

of the District Court in favor of Plaintiff Swalley for the

sum of $77,328.65 and costs of court.

Argument

Summary of Argument

The law of Ohio, which admittedly governs the in-

terpretation of the written contract in question, and the

decisions of the United States Supreme Court and of other

Circuit Courts of Appeal require affirmance of the District

Court judgment in favor of Plaintiff Swalley, because the

contract was drafted by the Defendant Company, and

ambiguous words therein must be construed against it.

The parties adopted a practical construction of the

contract whereby the word “use” includes “storage”.

The bulletin of the Defendant Company dated Oc-

tober 31, 1941, upon which the Circuit Court of Appeals

relied, did not, in fact, apply to the transactions in question

and did not constitute a practical construction of the con-

tract operative in this case.

The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals cannot

propetly be predicated upon the theory of modification of

the contract, for Defendant failed to plead modification in |

accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the

case was not tried on that issue, and Plaintiff Swalley did \

'

Brief in Support of Petition 17

not have an opportunity to introduce evidence on that point.

There was no effectual modification of the written

contract applicable to the case at bar, because the Company

bulletin in question did not, in fact, apply to the transac-

tions in suit, there was no assent by Plaintiff Swalley, there

was no new consideration moving to him, there is no factual

basis for application of the rule that a contract terminable

at will may be modified at any time by either party as a

condition of its continuance, and the purported modifica-

tion is invalid under the Ohio Statute of Frauds.

Plaintiff Swalley acquired vested rights to the com-

missions in question which could not be adversely affected

by a later purported modification of the agency contract.

His commissions accrued when the sale contracts were made,

and were payable when the machines were shipped. The fact

that the machines were delivered in instalments, and the

purchase price paid on delivery, did not defer the accrual

of his right to the commissions, and any intervening effort

by Defendant Company to modify the contract could not

deprive Plaintiff Swalley of those commissions which had

already accrued. The bad faith and unjust enrichment on

the part of Defendant Company require affirmance of the

District Court judgment in favor of Plaintiff Swalley.

I. THE LAW OF OHIO, WHICH ADMITTED-

LY GOVERNS THE INTERPRETATION OF THE

WRITTEN CONTRACT IN QUESTION, AND THE

DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME

COURT AND OF OTHER CIRCUIT COURTS OF

APPEAL REQUIRE AFFIRMANCE OF THE DIS-

TRICT COURT JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAIN-

TIFF SWALLEY.

By agreement of the parties embodied in the agency

contract, the law of Ohio is the law that governs the interpre-

18 Brief in Support of Petition

tation of the contract (R. 254). It is admitted that the

written agency contract in question was prepared by De-

fendant Company and that Plaintiff Swalley did not par-

ticipate in drafting it (R. 16, 7).

In Sigman vs. Wurlitzer, 57 Ohio App. 4, 11 N.E. (2d)

878, the law of Ohio was stated as follows.

“The inducement having been accepted by ap-

pellee, the writing of appellant must be strictly con-

strued against it for it could have restricted the exist-

ing implications by proper words of limitation. The

appellee is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable in-

ferences applicable to the words used.

“In the case of any ambiguity, the law of Ohio is,

as stated in Knight vs. New England Mutual Life In-

surance Company, 57 N.E. (2d) 131, as follows: “That

he who writes must extend his opponent the most favor-

able, reasonable interpretation of the language implied,

where ambiguity appears in what is written, is now ac-

cepted as a rule of construction of contracts.’”

This rule of construction has been reaffirmed and ap-

plied by Ohio courts in numerous cases, including the

following:

Fire Association of Philadelphia vs. Agresta, 115

Ohio St. 426, 154 N.E. 723;

Ferguson vs. Laux, 57 Ohio App. 495, 15 N.E.

(2d) 167, 169;

Coe vs. Suburban Light and Power Company, 32

Ohio App. 158, 167 N.E. 693;

Charles Beblen Sons’ Company vs. Ricketts, 30

Ohio App. 167, 164 N.E. 436;

R. K. LeBlond Machine Tool Company vs. Hum-

boldt Fire Insurance Company, 6 Ohio App. 313, aff’d

92 Ohio St. 541, 112 N.E. 1084.

The United States Supreme Court and the various

Circuit Courts of Appeal throughout the country have

consistently and uniformly held that ambiguities in a writ-

Brief in Support of Petition 19

ten contract must be resolved against the party who drafted

the contract and selected its terminology. See, for example:

Grace vs. American Century Insurance Company,

109 U.S. 278, 3 Sup. Ct. 207, 27 L.Ed. 932 (1883);

Noonan vs. Bradley, 76 U.S. 394, 9 Wall. 394, 19

L.Ed. 757 (1870) ;

Calderon vs. Atlas S. §. Co., 170 U. S. 272, 18 Sup.

Ct. 588, 42 L.Ed. 1033 (1898);

Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Company of

New York vs. Banks, 76 Fed. (2d) 68 (C.C.A. 3d,

1935);

Southern Railway Company vs. Coca-Cola Bot-

tling Company, 145 Fed. (2d) 304 (C.C.A. 4th, 1944) ;

Mount Vernon Refrigerating Company vs. Fred

W. Wolf Company, 188 Fed. 164 (C.C.A. 6th, Ohio,

1911);

Order of United Commercial Travelers of America

vs. Sevier, 121 Fed. (2d) 650 (C.C.A. 8th, 1941).

This is also the undisputed law throughout the United

States. 17 C.J.S. “Contracts”, Section 324, Page 751 et seq.

The Ohio Courts have had occasion to define the term

“use” and “using” and the decisions support the contention

of Plaintiff Swalley in this case.

In Brown vs. Kennedy (Ohio App.) 49 N.E. (2d) 417,

418 (1942), aff'd 141 Ohio St. 457, 48 N.E. (2d) 857

(1943), the Ohio Court of Appeals, considering the meaning

of the words “use” and “using” in an automobile liability

insurance policy, and holding the insurance company liable

thereon, declared:

“The general rule is, that language used in a pol-

icy of insurance being selected by the insurer should be

construed most favorably to the insured, giving the

language used its fair and reasonable meaning. 5 Am.

Jur. 806, section 534; Couch on Insurance, Section

1175, Vol. 5, p. 4175; 22 Ohio Juris. 339, 340, sec-

tions 184, 185; Duncan v. John Hancock Mutual Life

ar

20 Brief in Support of Petition

Ins. Co., 137 Ohio St. 441, 445, 31 N.E. 2d 88.

“This rule as applied to a case where the insurer

claims a limited interpretation of the terms ‘use’ or

‘using’ would seem to mean that where the terms ‘use’

or ‘using’ are employed in the policy, and there are in-

cluded within their fair definition and interpretation

words or meanings which would attach liability or de-

feat it, the terms employed should be given the recog-

nized fair and reasonable meaning which causes liability

under the policy to attach.

“In the instant case the terms in question are ‘use’

and ‘using.’ Now a car would be used by a person,

| whether it was operated personally or through the serv-

ices of another. If the insurer meant that liability

should only attach when it was being operated or driven

by the owner or some one with his consent, and it is

claimed the word ‘used’ includes the term ‘operated’

—then the insurer should have employed the word

carrying in its meaning the narrower limitation of li-

ability.

“The word ‘use’ is defined as the ‘Purpose served

—a purpose, object or end for useful or advantageous

nature.’ (Oxford English Dictionary.) ”

On appeal the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the

decision of the Ohio Court of Appeals and stated at Page

860 of 48 N.E. (2d) as follows:

“We agree with the Court of Appeals that the

words ‘using,’ ‘used,’ and ‘actual use’ do not have the

limited meaning of ‘operating,’ ‘operated,’ or ‘actual

operation.’ The defense that Bennett White was driv-

ing does not negative the fact that Dorothy Kennedy

was using the automobile.”

In Buell vs. Indian Refining Company, 62 Ohio App.

108, 23 N.E. (2d) 329, 331, the Ohio Court of Appeals

pointed out that the word “use” is one of the most com-

prehensive words in our language and is capable of

being used in many senses.

a

Brief in Support of Petition 21

A search for definitions of the word “use” in diction-

aries, in “Words and Phrases”, and in 66 C.J. “Use”, at

p. 65 et seq., reveals that the term is suspectible of many

shades of meaning. In Webster’s New International Dic-

tionary (2nd Ed. 1935), one of the definitions of the noun

“use” is as follows:

“6. Quality of being suitable for employment,

capability of being used or of serving to promote

an end * * *.”

In view of the fact that the written contract in ques-

tion was a regular printed form contract drafted by the

Defendant Company, and in view of the fact that the word

“use” employed therein is susceptible of different meanings,

and can reasonzbly be construed in favor of Plaintiff Swalley,

it is submitted that such construction should prevail and

that the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals is in di-

rect conflict with the decisions of the United States Supreme

Court and other Circuit Courts of Appeal throughout the

country, and also with the law of Ohio and other States.

II. THE PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION OF

THE CONTRACT BY THE PARTIES REQUIRES

AFFIRMANCE OF THE DISTRICT COURT

JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF SWAL-

LEY.

In its opinion the Circuit Court of Appeals declared

(R. 380):

“No sounder guide to the contracts’ meaning can

be found than the interpretation of the parties them-

selves.”

In applying this familiar legal principle, however, the

Court overlooked the all-important and decisive fact that

the Defendant Company itself had already actually inter-

22 Brief in Support of Petition

preted the split-commission clause of the contract in ac-

cordance with the contention of Plaintiff Swalley in the

case at bar, and that both parties had acted in reliance

thereon.

The attention of this Court is respectfully directed to

an exchange of letters between the parties, the letter from

Swalley to the Company being dated May 10, 1941 (R. 265-

266), and the letter in reply from the Company to Swalley

being dated May 26, 1941 (R. 259-260), These letters are

not even referred to in the opinion of the Circuit Court

of Appeals and were apparently not considered by the

Court in arriving at its conclusions.

It will be noted from Swalley’s letter that he claimed

commissions on certain machines and attachments (like

those involved in the present suit) which had been stored in

their original packing crates at Barksdale Air Field, Shreve-

port, Louisiana (located in the territory of another agent),

and which had later been transferred to Selma Air Field,

Selma, Alabama (located in Swalley’s territory). In its

reply, the Company expressly denied Swalley’s right to

the commissions on the ground that the machines and attach-

ments which had been shipped direct from the factory to

Barksdale Field had not been transferred to Swalley’s terri-

tory until after they had remained at Barksdale Field for

more than ninety days, and the Company made it clear

that it is wholly immaterial that the equipment had

not, in fact, been “used” but had been merely stored

while it remained at Barksdale Field.

The pertinent parts of the Company’s letter are as fol-

lows (R. 259-260):

“When that equipment was sold, the Dayton

Multigraph Agency received its split sale share for ob-

taining the order and the remaining commission was

credited to Mr. Carter who was then Multigraph Agent

Brief in Support of Petition 23

at Dallas in whose territory Shreveport is located.

“From this it will be seen that equipment was

moved from Shreveport into Selma, Alabama, consid-

erably after the 90 day period expired. By that is

meant the time limit that is placed on equipment trans-

ferred from one territory to another which are to be

considered as bonus orders or split sales. In that con-

nection, we would refer you to the Manual Section 11,

Paragraph 28, which contains the regulations on deals

of this kind.

“Although an equipment after being shipped from

the Factory into one territory and it remains in that

territory even though it may not be used, and if that

equipment is transferred to another territory after 90

days from date of sale, under the regulations there

would be no split sale or adjustment of commissions or

quota. We wish to add, too, that the vacuum frame

and whirler were sold as open market items with those

two items being shipped to the Government forces in

the San Antonio area and from there it was re-shipped

to Shreveport. This only indicates that with the Gov-

ernment, it can be expected that there will be more or

less moving of their equipment.

“Now if the reverse were true and the Class 1200

Multilith you sold for delivery to them at Selma, last

April was shipped out by them after 90 days from

date of sale, you of course would be entitled to retain

the full commission and quota credit on the deal you

received. (Boldface supplied.) (Selma was located in

Plaintiff Swalley’s territory. )

The Defendant Company and Plaintiff Swalley acted

in reliance upon that interpretation of the contract, and

continued to do so until the present controversy arose (R.

113). The main purchase order in question was placed on

March 31, 1942 (R. 281) and the other two orders were

placed pursuant to requisitions dated May 6, 1942 (R. 289

and 295). On May 7 and 8, 1942, the Defendant Company,

—

24 Brief in Support of Petition

in a spirit of elation, sent Plaintiff Swalley four congratu-

latory telegrams regarding his early election to the 1943

Hundred Club because he had already exceeded his agency

quota for the year (R. 261 and 262). The Company thereby

recognized and acknowledged that Swalley’s rights to the

commissions had already accrued for his quota credits in-

cluded the commissions claimed in this suit.

When Plaintiff Swalley was about to enter the military

service, the Defendant Company sent its special representa-

tive, T. H. White, to make certain arrangements. The Record

(125-126) shows that White inserted the following para-

graph in a letter to the Company dated March 18, 1943,

about the machines and attachments involved in this suit

(R. 257):

“The equipment mentioned was delivered to

Mobile Air Depot within the limits of the territory

described in our contract, has been fully paid for, and

has remained beyond the ninety-day period as required

by contract”.

The Company’s answer (R. 258) did not deny that

statement.

In its pleadings in the present suit (R. 24) Defendant

Company averred that Plaintiff Swalley “was entitled to

receive, and was paid, seventy-five per cent of the com-

mission on machines shipped into the Mobile Air Depot for

storage under Purchase Order No. (535) 42-15979 which

were subsequently placed in use by the Defendant in the

territory described in the contract between the Plaintiff and

the Defendant.” Hence the Company admits that the

words “to be used” in the contract include “for stor-

age.” As Swalley’s rights to the commissions in question

accrued at the time that the sale contracts were made, and

could not be divested except by operation of the condition

Brief in Support of Petition 25

subsequent of the 90-day clause, it is, of course, immaterial

whether the equipment was ultimately placed in operation.

The fact that the 90-day clause (R. 249-250) states

that in the event of the named contingency, viz, transfer of

equipment from one territory to another within 90 days,

the commission “‘shall be readjusted”, and the fact that the

Company’s letter of May 26, 1941 (R. 259-260) points out

that if this contingency does not occur the agent may

“retain” his commission clearly indicate that the 90-day

clause presupposes that the split commission has already been

paid pursuant to the preceding sentence. Thus the 90-day

clause is a condition subsequent, and it is obvious that the

parties so construed it, especially in view of the fact that

commissions were paid or credited at the time of shipment

(R. 247, 113).

Moreover, the fact that the 90-day clause contains the

words “new or used equipment’ is cogent proof that the

parties contemplated that some equipment might be trans-

ferred within 90 days while still brand-new or unused, that

is, while still in storage. As the clause applies to both new

and used equipment its only effect is to set a 90-day time

limit for operation of the condition subsequent, viz, transfer

to another territory. This is exactly the way the Company

itself construed the contract (R. 259-260).

In view of the clear, unmistakable and unequivocal in-

terpretation and practical construction of the written con-

tract by the parties inter se, it is respectfully submitted that

recourse to judicial construction or to lexicographers was un-

warranted to determine the intention of the parties in re-

gard to the transactions in suit, and the conclusion is in-

escapable that Plaintiff Swalley is entitled to recover the

commissions awarded by the District Court.

26 Brief in Support of Petition

Ill. THE BULLETIN OF THE DEFENDANT

COMPANY RELIED UPON BY THE CIRCUIT

COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT IN FACT APPLY

TO THE TRANSACTIONS IN QUESTION AND

DID NOT CONSTITUTE A PRACTICAL CON-

STRUCTION OF THE CONTRACT OPERATIVE

IN THIS CASE.

The Circuit Court of Appeals relied strongly on a

certain bulletin issued by Defendant Company on October

31, 1941 (R. 309). Examination of the bulletin in ques-

tion will conclusively show that it has nothing at all to do

with the facts of the instant case, that it does not even pur-

port to interpret the written contract in question as to the

particular transactions involved in this suit, and that it does

not adversely affect the right of Plaintiff Swalley to recover

his commissions earned under the contract.

(a) In the first place, it should be noted that the sub-

ject matter of the bulletin is “Mobile Army Units”. It does

not purport to cover any other subject and it is expressly re-

stricted to that one subject by the printed instructions on

the face of the bulletin: “Identify subject in space provided.

Write on one subject only and sign the letter.” The con-

tents of the bulletin repeatedly refer to “combat units”

and it is obvious that the subject “Mobile Army Units” has

no reference to the City of Mobile, Alabama, where the

Mobile Air Depot is located in the Plaintiff’s territory, but

to a certain type of Army unit of the U. S. Engineers.

(b) It should be noted further that the bulletin refers

solely to Multilith equipment for use of the U. S. Engi-

neers. As a matter of fact, most of the machines which are

involved in this suit were not Multilith equipment but

Multigraph machines, and only one particular type or model

of Multilith was ever used in mobile Army units or trailers.

aaa

Brief in Support of Petition 27

Moreover, the machines and attachments involved in this

case were not for the use of the U. S. Engineers, but for

the use of the Air Corps, an entirely different branch of

the military service.

(c) This Court’s attention is also directed to the fact

that the bulletin states: ““When equipment is shipped from

the Factory to an Army General Depot, it is considered as

‘in transit’.” Thus, the bulletin expressly restricts itself

to:shipments from the factory to Army General Depots

and has nothing at all to do with shipments to other depots,

like the Mobile Air Depot, which are not in fact Army

General Depots.

(d) It should be noted that the bulletin refers to

purchases by the War Department procured by a Wash-

ington representative of the Company, whereas the purchases

of the machines involved in this suit were made by the Air

Corps at Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio, and the orders were

procured by the Company’s agent, Gray, in Ohio, accord-

ing to the Company’s own admission (R. 17-21).

(e) It is apparent that the Defendant Company itself

did not regard the bulletin of October 31, 1941, as appli-

cable to or controlling in situations like that in the case at

bar, for the Company found it necessary or advisable to is-

sue a bulletin on September 21, 1942 (R. 302), which pur-

ported to cover the situation precisely, but which came too

late to affect Plaintiff Swalley’s rights to the commissions

in question. Issuance of the second bulletin was recognition

by the Defendant Company of the fact that the first bul-

letin was inapplicable and ineffectual, either as an inter-

pretation of the written contract with respect to the pur-

chase orders in question, or as a purported modification

of the written contract.

(f) Further cogent proof of the fact that the Com-

pany itself did not intend for the bulletin of October 31,

a

28 Brief in Support of Petition

1941 to apply to the transactions in question lies in the

acts and conduct of the parties subsequent thereto. See

supra, pp. 23-25.

(g) The record is devoid of any evidence that the par-

ties hereto had acted in reliance on that bulletin, or had

adopted a new construction of the contract in conflict with

their previous construction (R. 265-266, 259-260). The

Middletown transaction does not support the decision of

the Circuit Court of Appeals because it does not appear from

the record that the machine had remained at Middletown,

Pennsylvania for the required period of 90 days.

In view of these circumstances, therefore, the Company

bulletin of October 31, 1941, should be completely dis-

regarded in deciding this case. The bulletin amounted to

nothing more than a special arrangement for splitting com-

missions in a certain narrow and restricted situation entirely

foreign to the circumstances of this case. Since the bul-

letin was narrowly limited by its own terms and, since it

was prepared by the Defendant Company itself, it must

be strictly construed against the Company and confined

to its own narrow field of operation. In giving to this lim-

ited bulletin the effect of overriding the provisions of Para-

graph 8 of the contract (R. 248) and the practical con-

struction thereof by the parties, the decision of the Circuit

Court of Appeals is in conflict with rules of judicial con-

struction recognized generally by courts throughout the

country.

IV. THE DECISION OF THE CIRCUIT COURT

OF APPEALS CANNOT PROPERLY BE PREDI-

CATED UPON MODIFICATION OF THE WRIT-

TEN CONTRACT, FOR THE DEFENDANT COM-

PANY FAILED TO PLEAD MODIFICATION IN

ACCORDANCE WITH THE FEDERAL RULES OF

Brief in Support of Petition 29

CIVIL PROCEDURE, THE CASE WAS NOT TRIED

ON THAT ISSUE, AND PLAINTIFF SWALLEY

DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO INTRO-

DUCE EVIDENCE ON THAT POINT.

The Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts

of the United States were promulgated by the United States

Supreme Court. Rule 8 deals with “General Rules of Plead-

ings”. Subdivision (c) entitled “Affirmative Defenses”

provides:

“In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall

set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbi-

tration and award, assumption of risk, contributory

negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel,

failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by

fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res

julicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver,

and any other matter constituting an avoidance or af-

firmative defense * * *”

Rule 12 (h) provides that a party waives all defenses

and objections which he does not present either by motion

or in his answer or reply.

Numerous Federal cases have applied and enforced

these requirements. See 28 U.S.C.A. following Sec. 723 (c),

note 21, and U.S.C.A. 1947 Special Pamphlet, p. 172 et seq.

Since modification of a contract is clearly a matter

constituting “an avoidance or affirmative defense,” it must

be set forth affirmatively. This the Defendant Com-

pany failed to do, as an examination of the pleadings will

show. The only references to the bulletin of October 31,

1941, appear in Paragraphs 8 and 10 of Defendant’s Answer

(R. 18 and 21). Paragraph 8 purported to answer Para-

graph 6 of the Complaint, which alleged that Plaintiff had

sold certain machines, and the bulletin was referred to by

the Defendant to show that Plaintiff had not sold the ma-

— —

chines. Paragraph 10 purported to answer Paragraph 8

of the Complaint, which dealt only with attachments, and

not the machines (R. 9).

Nowhere in its pleadings does the Defendant Company

use the word “modification” or aver facts to show that the

original contract was modified. The Defendant was ob-

viously trying to plead practical construction of the contract

and not modification.

Paragraph 7 of the Complaint (R. 8-9) alleged that

pursuant to the agency contract and the Air Corps pur-

chase orders in question, the Defendant delivered to the

Mobile Air Depot 75 Multigraph models and 86 Multi-

lith models, for which the Defendant received $357,886.90.

Paragraph 10 of the Complaint (R. 9 and 11) claimed the

sum of $85,244.46 under the agency contract and the main

purchase order in question. It is significant that in its an-

swers thereto, the Defendant Company did not even men-

tion the bulletin in question or endeavor to show a modifi-

cation of the contract. As a matter of fact, in its answer

to Paragraph 7 of the Complaint (R. 19-20), Defendant

Company referred to the contract, marked Plaintiff’s Ex-

hibit “A,” as “being Plaintiff’s contract with the Defend-

ant”; and in its answer to Paragraph 10 of the Complaint

(R. 23-24), the Defendant set out and relied upon Para-

graph 8 of the contract.

At the trial of this case Plaintiff’s evidence was sub-

mitted by deposition as he was then on the high seas with

the U. S. Navy. Due to the fact that Defendant Company

did not plead modification of the contract and Plaintiff was

not duly apprised of such defense, and due to the fact that

the case was not tried on that issue, Plaintiff Swalley did not

have an opportunity to meet that point by introducing

evidence. Plaintiff respectfully submits, therefore, that the

decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals, predicated upon a

iiccinsenetassiepnaounanseniaeal

30 Brief in Support of Petition

cat

EEE

Brief in Support of Petition 31

so-called “‘modification” constitutes an injustice toward

him, for he was thereby deprived of an opportunity to be

heard, which is the essence of due process. If he had been

duly apprised that the Defendant or the Circuit Court of

Appeals would rely upon a so-called “modification” of the

contract, he would have offered to prove, inter alia, that the

Company had actually paid him a commission on a June 6,

1942 invoice where the machine had been shipped pursuant

to one of the purchase orders in question and had remained

in his territory more than 90 days, even though it was not

in fact installed or used during that period; and, further,

that he had regularly twice a month submitted to the

Company, in compliance with its rules, certain “I and E”

(Income and Expense) reports in which he claimed credit

for commissions on all the machines that were required to

be shipped to Mobile Air Depot under the three purchase

orders in question, and the Company never disputed the

correctness of nor made any complaint about said reports.

V. THERE WAS NO EFFECTUAL MODIFI-

CATION OF THE WRITTEN CONTRACT AP-

PLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.

(a) The Defendant’s bulletin of October 31, 1941,

upon which the Circuit Court of Appeals based a so-called

modification of the contract, did not, in fact, apply to the

transactions in question for the reasons stated on pages 26-28

of this Brief.

(b) There was no evidence showing that Plaintiff

Swalley had assented to or acquiesced in the proposed terms

of the Company set forth in the bulletin, nor was there any

evidence of acts or conduct of the parties in reliance thereon

which might afford a basis for modification.

(c) There was no new consideration moving to

Plaintiff Swalley. It is well-established that since a modifi-

.

32 Brief in Support of Petition

cation of a contract is a N€W contract, a consideration is

necessary to support the new agreement, and this is the law

of Ohio, which governs the contract in question: Thurston

vs. Ludwig, 6 Ohio St. 1, 67 Am. Dec. 328; Marshall vs.

Ames, 11 Ohio Cir. Ct. 363, 5 Oh. Cir. Dec. 403; Williams

vs. Fortlage, 17 Oh. Cir. Ct. N.S. 242. This rule has also

been recognized and applied by the Federal Courts, Cuneo

Press vs. Clayborn Corporation, 90 Fed. (2d) 233 (C.C.A.

7th, 1937), and is the prevailing law throughout the coun-

try, 17 C.J.S. “Contracts”, Sec. 376, p. 861 et seq.

As no new consideration was shown, the purported

modification lacks legal validity and cannot support the de-

cision of the Circuit Court of Appeals.

(d) There is no factual basis for application by the

Circuit Court of Appeals of the rule that a contract, termin-

able at will, may be modified at any time by either party

as a condition of its continuance.

It should be noted that the contract provided that it

may be terminated at any time at the option of either party

by and upon the giving of written notice (R. 253).

As stated in 17 C.J.S. “Contracts” Sec. 402, p. 892:

“Notice of termination is essential to the ex-

ercise of an option to terminate a contract. * * *

Notice to terminate a contract, under a provision

therein must be reasonable, clear and unequivocal,

and in accordance with the terms of the contract.

* 8 #9

There was no effort by Defendant Company to termi-

nate the contract and there was no evidence that continu-

ation of the contract was conditioned upon acceptance by

Plaintiff Swalley of the terms of the bulletin. The fact

that Defendant Company finally exercised its option to

terminate the contract by written notice dated March Sth,

1943, when Plaintiff Swalley entered the military service

(R.

that

give

Brief in Support of Petition 33

255, 257) proves that the Company itself recognized

in order to terminate the contract it was necessary to

written notice to that effect.

Williston on Contracts (Rev. Ed. 1938) Sec. 1027A,

p. 2854 fn, points out the distinction between (1) a privil-

ege to terminate a contract “at will” and (2) a privilege

to terminate a contract at any time which requires a par-

ticular manifestation of its exercise, such as written notice.

In Abrams vs. George E. Keith Company, 30 Fed. (2d)

90 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1929), the Court stated:

613,

“This contract was perfectly good in law. Being

indefinite as to its terms, either party might terminate

it on reasonable notice. No such notice was given

here. The plaintiff treated the contract as wholly

invalid, arbitrarily sought to terminate it without no-

tice, and insists on its rights so to do here. The case was

clearly one for the jury to determine what the facts

were. If the facts were as the counterclaim avers, the

plaintiff was guilty of a breach of the contract, and

defendants were entitled to recover such damages in

its counterclaim as the evidence warranted.”

In Berwick Hotel Co. v. Vaughn, 300 Pa. 389, 150 Atl.

616, 71 A.L.R. 1340 (1930), the Court declared:

“To be effective, a notice for the rescision or termi-

nation of a contract must be clear and unambiguous,

conveying an unquestionable purpose to insist on the

cancellation. And where the conduct of one having

the right to rescind a contract is ambiguous and it is

not clear whether he has rescinded it or not, he will

be deemed not to have done so. Under this rule, a

mere threat to cancel the contract is not sufficient

as a notice of rescision. 3 Black on Rescision and

Cancellation, Section 574.” (Boldface supplied.)

It should be noted that the termination clause of the

contract (R. 253) provided that the Company, at any

34 Brief in Support of Petition

time, may change the boundaries of Plaintiff’s territory.

Is this not cogent proof that a modification of other terms

of the contract, such as the commission arrangement, could

not be effected by the Company unilaterally by written

notice?

The bulletin amounted to nothing more than a mere

proposal by the Company for a new commission arrange-

ment in certain special instances. To hold that it consti-

tuted notice of termination of the contract not only does

violence to the facts, but also brings the case within the op-

eration of the rule of law which precludes partial termi-

nation of a contract. 17 C.J.S. “Contracts”, Sec. 403, p.

893.

In Oil Workers International Union Local No. 463 vs.

Texoma Natural Gas Company, 146 Fed. (2d) 62, 64

(C.C.A. Sth, 1945) cert. den. 324 U.S. 872, 65 Sup. Ct.

1017, 89 L.Ed. 1426, the Court held:

“A party to an agreement may exercise his option

to cancel it, but he may not, when unauthorized by

the agreement and in the absence of consent of the other

party, cancel it in part.” (Boldface supplied.)

Thus, even considered as a notice of termination, the

bulletin is a legal anomaly and has no validity.

(e) The purported modification of the written con-

tract was invalid under the Statute of Frauds because it was

not in writing signed by Plaintiff Swalley, “the party to be

charged therewith.”

The Ohio Statute of Frauds, embodied in Sec. 8621 of

Throckmorton’s Annotated Code of Ohio (1930), provides

as follows:

“No action shall be brought whereby to charge

the defendant * * * upon an agreement that is not to

be performed within one year from the making thereof;

unless the agreement upon which such action is brought,

Brief in Support of Petition 35

or some memorandum or note thereof, is in writing, and

signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some

other person thereunto by him lawfully authorized.”

Examination of the agency contract with respect to

expenses (R. 250), insurance, (R. 250), purchase or lease

of machines (R. 251) and the two-year no-competition

clause (R. 252) leaves no room for doubt that the parties

contemplated a permanent arrangement reasonably requir-

ing more than a year for performance, and hence the con-

tract was required to be in writing under the line of cases

supporting the following text in 37 C.J.S., “Statute of

Frauds”, Sec. 52, pp. 567-568:

“ * * Where from the nature and terms of the

contract it is manifest that the parties intended to en-

ter into a permanent arrangement, or that they did not

contemplate a complete performance within a year,

the contract is within the Statute, although no time

for performance is specified, and even though there

is a mere possibility of performance within a year.

* * * The fact that one or both of the parties have

the privilege of terminating the agreement before the

expiration of the year does not take the contract out

of the Statute”.

As the original contract was required to be in writing,

the purported modification was also required to be in writ-

ing, signed by Plaintiff Swalley. In 49 Am. Jur. “Statute

of Frauds”, Sec. 301, p. 609, the rule is stated as follows:

“* * * The broad general doctrine as announced

by most authorities is that a contract required by the

statute of frauds to be in writing cannot be validly

changed or modified as to any material condition therein

by subsequent oral agreement so as to make the original

written agreement as modified by the oral one an en-

forceable obligation. To state the rule differently,

where an original agreement comes within the provisions

——

36 Brief in Support of Petition

of the statute of frauds requiring certain agreements

to be in writing, the statute of frauds renders invalid

and ineffectual a subsequent oral agreement changing

the terms of the written agreement.”

This is the law of Ohio and the Federal courts. Craw-

ford vs. Wick, 18 Ohio St. 190, 98 Am. Dec. 103; Swain

vs. Seamens, 9 Wall (U. S.) 254, 19 Law Ed. 554; Emerson

vs. Slater, 22 How. (U. S$.) 28, 16 Law Ed. 360; Parish vs.

Haynes, 62 Fed. (2d) 105 (C.C.A. Sth).

Moreover, the fact that the bulletin required fulfill-

ment of the Company’s one-year guarantee from date of }

future delivery or installation (R. 311, 24), shows that the

purported modification itself was not to be performed

within one year, and hence is invalid under the Statute of

Frauds, because not executed by Plaintiff Swalley, the party

to be charged therewith.

VI. PLAINTIFF SWALLEY ACQUIRED VEST-

ED RIGHTS TO THE COMMISSIONS IN QUES-

TION WHICH COULD NOT BE ADVERSELY AF-

FECTED BY A LATER PURPORTED MODIFICA-

TION OF THE AGENCY CONTRACT.

The Circuit Court of Appeals relied solely on the bul-

letin of October 31, 1941 (R. 309) to support its theory of

modification, but for the reasons stated above, pp. 31-36,

that bulletin did not create a valid modification of the writ-

ten contract. In recognition of this fact, the Company

issued a second bulletin dated September 21, 1942 (R. 302).

As the second bulletin obviously came too late to affect

Plaintiff Swalley’s right to recover the commissions in ques-

tion, the Circuit Court of Appeals did not even refer to it.

The same grounds which vitiate the first bulletin

(supra, pp. 31-36) also vitiate the later bulletin, but there

Brief in Support of Petition 37

are additional factors which render it a legal nullity as to

the transactions in question.

In the first place, it purports to cover only one of the

three purchase orders involved in this suit (R. 302).

It is important to bear in mind that the agency contract

was entered into March 25, 1941 (R. 254), that the 90-day

clause was interpreted in Swalley’s favor by the Company

itself in the letter of May 26, 1941 (R. 259-260), that the

Air Corps contracts for the machines in question were

made on March 31, 1942, May 18, 1942, and May 20, 1942

(R. 281, 289, 295), that shipments were commenced prior

to July 1, 1942, and that Swalley’s rights to commissions on

the machines to be shipped to Mobile Air Depot had already

accrued before the bulletin of September 21, 1942, was is-

sued (R. 302).

We urge the Court to note that each of said orders

contained shipping instructions directing that a cer-

tain number of the particular type of machines de-

scribed therein be shipped to Mobile Air Depot, at the

prices stipulated, in accordance with the monthly delivery

schedule beginning on or before July 1, 1942. The Com-

pany had entered into a binding contract with the Air

Corps in regard to the machines and attachments in question

and had actually made shipments and deliveries as required.

The commissions were earned and Swalley’s rights accrued

at the time the sale contracts were made, and, in fact,

commissions were paid to Swalley at the time the machines

were Shipped from the Factory, until the present controversy

arose (R. 247). The Company did not wait for the ma-

chines to be installed or used before collecting the purchase

price from the Government, nor did the Company wait for

the machines to be installed or used before paying Swalley’s

commissions, until the controversy of this suit arose.

Therefore, Swalley had an accrued right and in-

38 Brief in Support of Petition

terest in the War Department contracts in question,

and the Company was legally impotent to modify the

agency contract in so far as those accrued rights were

concerned.

In the law of agency, it is well-established that an agency,

coupled with an interest, is not revocable by the princi-

pal, and in the field of contracts, it is equally well-estab-

lished that, although a contract terminable at will can be

modified at any time by either party as a condition of its

continuance, nevertheless, such modification must look to

the future and cannot affect the past and, consequently,

where an agent has already earned his commission or the

company is already under a legal obligation to pay him his

commission, it cannot be changed without his consent or

without a new consideration.

As stated in 3 C.J.S. “Agency”, Sec. 187, p. 88:

“The rule that the agent is entitled to recover for

services rendered before his discharge is particularly ap-

plicable where contract of agency is severable. Accord-

cordingly, an agent, selling goods on a commis-

sion is entitled to a commission on goods sold by

him during the continuation of the agency, al-

though the goods were not delivered or paid for,

or even where the orders were not received by the

principal, until after the termination of the re-

lationship—” (Boldface supplied.)

To the same effect is 2 Am. Jur., “Agency,” Sec. 50.

In Peoria Life Insurance Company vs. Poynor (Tex.

Civ. App.), 297 S.W. 788, the Court declared that irres-

pective of an agreement that the agent would abide by the

rules of the company, the principal, by changing its rules,

cannot alter the compensation fixed by the contract of

agency, for an agent’s vested rights under an express contract

cannot be changed by rules and regulations of the principal.

Brief in Support of Petition 39

This same principle was recognized in Schnerb vs. Cat-

erpillar Tractor Company, 43 Fed. (2d) 920, cert. den. 282

U. S. 898, 75 Law Ed. 791 wherein the Court stated that al-

though a manufacturing company, under an agreement giv-

ing an agent exclusive territory without fixing the term

of duration, could cancel their obligation thereunder at any

time by notice, such termination would not affect busi-

ness already in negotiation.

It is highly significant that, by its own admissions, the

Company set aside certain sums of money in a special fund

to cover the commission on the machines in question and

the money was carried on the books of the Company as a

liability (R. 157, 193). Thus the Corapany itself recog-

nized that the right to the commissions had accrued and

that it was simply a matter of disbursing the funds.

In Atkinson vs. The New Britain Machine Co., 154

Fed. (2d) 895, 901 (C.C.A. 7th, 1946), the Court said:

“We are of the view that unless there is an agree-

ment clearly providing to the contrary, a person selling

on a commission basis is entitled to a commission when

a sale is made irrespective of when shipment takes

place.”

To the same effect is Dibble vs. Dimick, 143 N. Y.

549, 38 N.E. 724, where the commissions were not payable

until the delivery of the goods. See also A.L.I. Restatement

on Agency, Sec. 436, comment (a).

In Ohio Marble Co. vs. Byrd, 65 Fed (2d) 98 (C.C.A.

6th, 1933) the Court held that an agent was entitled to

recover Commissions upon shipments made pursuant to sales

contract, even though said shipments occurred subsequent

to the termination of his agency, and the commissions did

not become due until after the agency terminated.

In Albright vs. Kalbitzer, 2 Fed. Supp. 815 (D.C. Pa.,

1945), the Court held that under a manufacturer’s contract

i

40 Brief in Support of Petition

to pay commissions to a distributor on “sales”, delivery and

passing of title were not necessary to existence of a “sale”

on which a commission would be due.

In Jacquin vs. Boutard, 89 Hun. 437, 35 N. Y. Supp.

496 (1895) affirmed in 167 N.Y. 686, 51 N.E. 1091 (1898),

it was held that the agent could recover commissions which

he would have earned up to the end of the six-month termi-

nation period, including those on sales for future de-

livery.

In Dildine vs. Ford Motor Company, 159 Mo. App. 410,

140 S.W. 627 (1911), the Court held that a dealer could |

recover his 15% commission on a car that he had ordered, |

where the manufacturer agreed to ship the car but later

returned the deposit and refused to ship the car, even though

the contract expressly gave the manufacturer the right to

change prices and the dealer the right to cancel the order in

the event of such change.

In Singer Sewing Machine Co. vs. Brewer, 78 Ark. 202,

93 S.W. 755 (1906), it was held that an agent is entitled

to commissions for sales upon which installments remained

unpaid at the time the agency contract was terminated,

where the sales were largely on an installment basis, and the

agent was not limited to commissions on installments actu-

ally paid at the time of the termination.

In Wilcox & Gibbs Sewing Machine Company vs. Ew-

ing, 141 U. S. 627, 637, 12 Sup. Ct. 94, 35 Law Ed. 882

(1891), the United States Supreme Court declared:

“Of course, the revocation by the principal of the

agent’s authority could not injuriously affect the con-

tracts made by the latter under the power originally

conferred upon him.”

Hence, the fact that some of the machines and attach-

ments under the three purchase orders in question were

shipped by the Company to Mobile Air Depot after issuance

irteieacteineninsemecrecomumnnitl

Brief in Support of Petition 41

of the bulletin of September 21st, 1942, and after termina-

tion of the agency contract on March 18, 1943 (R. 255,

257, 280), cannot lawfully deprive Plaintiff Swalley of

his commissions which accrued at the time of the sale.

It is ironical, indeed, that although the commissions

sued for were set aside by the Company in a special fund

and carried on the Company’s books as a liability (R. 157,

193), and the purchase price of the machines paid by the

Government undoubtedly included Plaintiff Swalley’s com-

missions, said commissions have not in fact been paid

by the Company. It is submitted that such conduct on

the part of the Company constitutes bad faith not only

toward Plaintiff Swalley and the other agents, but also

toward the United States Government, which should not

be countenanced by this Court.

In Tahir Erk vs. Glenn L. Martin Co., 116 Fed. (2d)

855 (C.A.A. 4th, 1941), the Court held, in an agent’s action

for breach of a military airplane sales agency contract, that

notwithstanding a mutual revocation clause in the contract,

the complaint stated a good cause of action on the theory

that the principal cancelled the agency in bad faith for

the purpose of depriving the agent of his commissions.

In Bach vs. Friden Calculating Machine Co., 165 Fed.

(2d) 361 (C.C.A. 6th, 1946), where the manufacturer of

calculating machines required its distributors to buy an in-

ventory of obsolete machines in a bad state of repair which

the distributors did not want and could not use, and the

distributors were required to build up a business of their own

as independent purveyors of the machines in a certain terri-

tory, the Court held that the contract was not terminable

at the will of the manufacturer.

The requirement of good faith was recognized by

the United States Supreme Court in Crowe vs. Trickey, 204

U. S. 228, 27 Sup. Ct. 275, 51 Law Ed. 454.

ae

42 Brief in Support of Petition

The doctrine of unjust enrichment has also been in-

voked by courts to protect an agent against the arbitrary

exercise by his principal of an option to terminate the

agency “at will”. Erskine vs. Chevrolet Motors Co., 185

N. C. 479, 117. S.E. 706, citing Manhattan Life Ins. Co. vs.

Buck, 93 U.S. 24, 23 Law Ed. 789.

The fact that the Company actually received from the

Government the sum of $291,899.87 on the machines and

attachments in question, which included the agents’ full :

35% commissions of $102,164.95, yet the Company paid

Swalley only $6,324.94 of his share (75%) of the com-

missions, and refused to pay Agent Gray of Dayton, Ohio,

any of his share (25%) until after he sued for same (R. 329,

192, 193)—these facts are devastating proof of the bad

faith and unjust enrichment on the part of the Company.

As stated in Fichter vs. Milk Wagon Drivers’ Union, 382 Ill.

91, at pp. 95-99, 46 N.E. (2d) 921, 924 (1943):

> ste ARR

“We have been referred to no case and we believe

none can be cited which authorizes one party to a con-

tract which is in the course of performance to create

a situation which changes the vested rights of the par-

ties and then contend that the situation thus brought

about creates the bona fide dispute which will au-

thorize the payment of a lesser sum in satisfaction of

a greater.”

In view of the facts of this case and in view of the fore-

going legal authorities, it is, therefore, clear that Plaintiff

Swalley acquired vested rights to the commissions in ques-

tion at the time of the sale of the machines and attach-

ments, and that under the agency contract he could not

thereafter be deprived of his commissions except by opera-

tion of the condition subsequent contained in the 90-day

clause of Paragraph 8 (R. 248-249). As the District Court

found, as a fact, that the machines and attachments had re-

Brief in Support of Petition 43

mained in his territory over 90 days and had been fully

paid for, and that the commissions in suit have not been paid

to anyone else, it is respectfully submitted that justice and

adherence to sound legal principles applicable to the un-

disputed facts of this case require affirmance of the District

Court judgment in favor of Plaintiff Swalley.

Conclusion

As the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals is

clearly erroneous and in conflict with the controlling law of

Ohio and decisions of the United States Supreme Court and

other Circuit Courts of Appeal, and as it overrides the prac-

tical construction of the contract by the parties them-

selves, disregards the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and

can find no legal support in the theory of contract modifica-

tion, your Petitioner E. E. Swalley humbly prays that the

grievous error of the Circuit Court of Appeals be rectified

and that the judgment of the District Court in his favor

be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

Harry B. CoHEN,

A. BERKOWITZ,

Birmingham, Alabama

Counsel for Petitioner,

E. E. SwALLey.

Birmingham, Alabama,

February 18, 1947.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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