Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Bowers v. Remington Rand, Inc.

Supreme Court brief1947

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: Petition for writ of certiorari.................... 1

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Specification of errors to be urged............. 6

Reasons for granting the writ................. 7

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Appendix—Statutory provisions involved ..... 9

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1946

No. 995

CLAUDE BOWERS, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

vs.

REMINGTON RAND, INC.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH

CIRCUIT

The petitioners, Claude Bowers and 54 others, who were

plaintiffs and intervening plaintiffs, pray that a writ of cer-

tiorari issue to review the judgment of the Circuit Court of

Appeals in the above-entitled cause.

Opinions Below

The opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit (R. 113) is reported in 6 Wage Hour Cases

496. The remarks of the District Court (R. 74) are re-

ported in 64 F. Supp. 621.

Jurisdiction

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit was entered on December 10, 1946 (R. 117).

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Section

240(a) of the Judicial Code, as amended by the Act of

February 13, 1925.

Question Presented

Whether the hours which petitioners, firemen, though per-

mitted to sleep, were required as part of the employer’s

fire protection system to spend on the employer’s premises,

were part of the workweek within the meaning of the Fair

Labor Standards Act.

Statute Involved

The relevant provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act

of 1938 are set forth in the Appendix.

Statement

The petitioners were plaintiffs and intervening plaintiffs

in this suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act to recover

unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages and at-

torney’s fees, with respect to their employment on and after

February 7, 1944.

Petitioners were employed as firemen in the fire depart-

ment maintained by respondent in its operation of the

Sangamon Ordnance Plant, where it was engaged in loading

and assembling ammunition for the Army. The plant re-

quired continuous 24-hour fire protection. Until February

7, 1944, ihe fire department was operated on a three-shift

basis, each shift working 8 hours. In 1943, respondent gave

consideration to the adoption of a two-platoon system. A

notice to employees containing that proposal (Defendant’s

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Exhibit 1, R. 70) was submitted to the firemen, for signa-

ture in the event of approval (R. 82-83).

The two-platoon system, with two shifts of 24 hours each,

was begun on February 7, 1944. From 8:30 a. m. to 4:30

p. m. the men carried on routine duties, e. g. cleaning the

equipment and the stations, inspections, drilling and prac-

tice runs. During the 4:30 p. m. to 12:30 a. m. period there

were occasional practice runs and some special assignments

to keep grass fires under observation. During this period

the men were permitted recreational activities. From 12:30

a. m. to 8:30 a. m. the men went to bed, except for their

duties in the morning and a man on the telephone watch

(R. 84).

The men were paid at the rate of 76 cents per hour, with

time and a half for all hours over 40 during the week. They

were not paid for time between 12:30 a. m. to 8:30 a. m.

unless they were out on emergency calls. There were

very few emergency calls (R. 86). The number of personnel

employed in the fire department was reduced one-third by

the intreduction of the two-platoon system and the saving in

wages paid was approximately one-third as the result

of the reduction in personnel (R. 52).

In the installation of the two-platoon system it was neces-

sary for respondent to obtain the approval of two-thirds of

the firemen, according to instructions of the Ordnance De-

partment. Out of 122 firemen, 95 signed documents like

Defendant’s Exhibit 1 (R. 58). The documents were

gathered up the same night they were distributed (R. 44).

All but three of the petitioners employed before February

7, 1944, signed such documents. Fifteen who were em-

ployed after the plan was adopted did not sign the same

(R. 51).

There was testimony that when the document was under

consideration the Fire Captain told the men they would not

4

last long if they did not sign it (R. 50).* Of the 27 firemen

who did not sign the document, 3 were kept on at their

request and the employment of the other 24 was terminated

in the fire department (R. 58). The District Court sus-

tained an objection by respondent when petitioners offered

to prove by a fire chief that Mr. Mahoney, the Director of

Protection, ‘‘stated that the two-platoon system was going

to be instituted and it had to be put over, and that any of

the men who refused to sign an instrument such as defend-

ant’s Exhibit No. 1 would be fired’’ (R. 69).

There was testimony that the men, in discussing the two-

platoon system, did not have in mind working 8 hours out

of 24 without pay (R. 49). Shortly after the two-platoon

system was instituted the men talked to the Captain about

their claim for overtime (R. 41). This suit was filed July

14, 1944 (R. 5).

The plant required continuous fire protection 24 hours a

day (R. 82). The men were required to stay on the

premises during the 12:30 a. m. to 8:30 a. m. period. The

District Court found that those in charge of the fire

department were liberal in excusing absences at any time,

until May 18, 1945, when a bulletin informed the firemen

that absenteeism on the third shift would be permitted only

in the emergency of sickness or death (R. 87). That was

issued because too many men were asking to be excused at

12:30 a. m. and those in charge could not permit such an

impairment in the efficiency of the fire department (R. 65).

There was conflicting evidence on whether living condi-

tions were generally satisfactory (R. 51, 66-67), and the

District Court found they were suitable (R. 86).

A telephone watch was maintained throughout the 24

hours. The nature and rotation of this watch was ar-

*The reference, at R. 50, to Defendant’s Exhibit V should read De-

fendant’s Exhibit 1.

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ranged at each station by the captain. Prior to October 2,

1944, the station captain was not required to assign a

specific 8-hour rest period for the man who stood this

watch (R. 85-86). This suit was filed July 14, 1944 (R.

5). In September 1944, the plant officials became aware that

the telephone watch system was not in accordance with the

two-platoon plan which had been set forth by respondent,

and the change was made (R. 57). The District Court

found that it does not appear that any petitioner who stood

this watch on any day in the 12:30 to 8:30 a. m. shift failed

to take or was prevented from taking a consecutive 8-hour

period for sleeping some time prior to 12:30 a. m. (R. 86).

There was testimony by petitioners that they took the

telephone watch in that period before provision had been

made for an 8-hour rest period, and did not have such a

rest period (R. 36, 40, 44; see also R. 46).

There was evidence that in the morning, under the two-

platoon system, the station was cleaned, if it needed

cleaning, beds were made up and put away, about half the

men had breakfast, and the equipment was taken off the

-trucks. There was testimony that these activities required

from one-half to three-quarters of an hour (R. 35), and

other testimony that putting away the bed linen and cloth-

ing took only five minutes (R. 66). Under the three-shift

system, the men on the 12:30 a. m. to 8:30 a. m. shift cleaned

the station and equipment, put the equipment on the trucks,

some men went out on inspection and after that the men

played cards and some slept. All the work was done by

2 a.m. (R. 35).

The District Court entered judgment for respondent.

It found that the contract of employment consisted of

defendant’s Exhibit 1, which set forth the general terms of

the contract, that in practice there were no variations in

substance from this contract, and that respondent did not

6

cause or permit any of petitioners to be deprived of the

8-hour sleeping period without paying compensation or

according other suitable periods for rest and sleeping (R.

87). In its conclusions of law, the court stated that where

an employee receives a normal period of consecutive hours

for sleep, those hours are not hours worked, and a contract

to leave such hours uncompensated is valid (R. 89-90).

The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that

petitioners had contracted to wait to be engaged (R. 113).

Specification of Errors To Be Urged

The Circuit Court of Appeals erred :

1. In failing to reverse the District Court for not con-

sidering and taking due account of the factors showing

that the hours were spent on the premises of the employer

pursuant to the employer's requirement and predominantly

for the benefit to the employer, including protection against

fire due to the presence of qualified firemen on the scene;

2. In treating the written consent of some petitioners to

the two-platoon plan proposed by respondent, and the

silence of others, as the equivalent of a contract of em-

ployment to settle doubtful issues as to the scope of the

workweek ;

3. In failing to take account of the evidence as to the

circumstances in which the employees consented to the two-

platoon plan, including the evidence that respondent’s

officials informed the employees that they would not last

long if they did not consent to the plan;

4. In failing to reverse the District Court’s exclusion of

evidence that an official of the respondent stated that em-

ployees would be fired if they did not consent to the two-

platoon plan;

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7

5. In giving undue effect and significance to a contract of

employment to settle activity to be included in the work-

week, assuming one to exist.

6. In affirming the judgment of the District Court.

Reasons For Granting the Writ

This petition raises substantially the same questions as

the petition in No. 993, Bell v. Porter, and should be granted

for the reasons stated in pvints 1, 2, 4 and 5 of that petition.

The District Court concluded as a matter of law that

hours on the employer’s premises constituting a normal

period of sleep are not working time. It erred in failing to

consider all the factors outlined in the Bell petition, point

1, showing that those hours, in circumstances like these,

are spent on the employer’s premises predominantly for the

benefit of the employer. Under respondent’s two-platoon

system when the firemen asked to be excused during the

night hours, respondent issued instructions limiting such

permitted absences to emergencies of sickness or death,

in the interest of maintaining the efficiency of the protec-

tion of its fire department (R. 65, 87), which was necessary

24 hours a day (R. 82).

The District Court’s judgment was predicated in part on

the contract of employment, and the Circuit Court of Ap-

peals rested solely on that agreement. This ruling should

be reviewed and reversed for the reasons stated in point 4

of the Bell petition. The situation in this case cannot be

given even the dignity or effect of a contract to settle

doubtful issues as to the activity or non-activity to be in-

cluded in work. Defendant’s Exhibit 1 was not subject

to discussion but was presented on the flat basis that the

hours from 12:30 a. m. to 8:30 a. m. would be uncompen-

sated. It was not an offer which bound the respondent

8

upon acceptance. Not all the petitioners signed it (R. 51).

The documents were distributed to the employees for sig-

natures of consent and approval and were collected the

same day without copies left behind (R. 44). More sig-

nificant is the employer pressure which vitiates the signifi-

cance of the consents. The courts below did not even refer

to the testimony that the documents were distributed with

statements that the men would not last long if they did not

sign it (R. 50). The District Court excluded the testimony

that respondent’s director of protection stated that the two-

platoon system was going to be instituted and it had to be

put over, and that any of the men who refused to sign the

document, Defendant’s Exhibit 1, would be fired (R. 69).

Conclusion

For the reasons stated in this petition, including the in-

corporation by reference of the reasons stated in the peti-

tion in No. 993, Bell v. Porter, the petition for a writ of

certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Haroip LEVENTHAL,

Washington, D.C.;

James B. Martin,

Springfield, Illinois;

JosrepH A. LonprRIGAN,

Springfield, Illinois;

LeLtanp SIMPKINS,

Mt. Pulaski, Illinois,

Attorneys for Petitioners.

February, 1947.

od

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APPENDIX

Statutory Provisions Involved

The pertinent provisions of the Fair Labor Standards

Act of 1938 (c. 676, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U. S. C., sec. 201) read

as follows:

Sec. 3. As used in this Act——

(d) ‘‘Employer’’ includes any person acting di-

rectly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in

relation to an employee but shall not include the

United States or any State or political subdivision of

a State, or any labor organization (other than when

acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the ca-

pacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.

(e) ‘‘Employee’’ includes any individual employed

by an employer.

(g) ‘‘Employ’’ includes to suffer or permit to

work.

See. 7 (a). No employer shall, except as otherwise

provided in this section, employ any of his employees

who is engaged in commerce or in the production of

goods for commerce——

(1) for a workweek longer than forty-four hours

during the first year from the effective date of this

section,

(2) for a workweek longer than forty-two hours

during the second year from such date, or

(3) for a workweek longer than forty hours after

the expiration of the second year from such date,

unless such employee receives compensation for his

employment in excess of the hours above specified at a

rate not less than one-half times the regular rate at

which he is employed.

(9002)

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Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Bowers v. Remington Rand, Inc. · 331 U.S. 864 | Frix