Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Rokey v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc.

Supreme Court brief1947

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INDEX

PETITION FOR REVIEW ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Page

I. Statement of the Matter Involved 1

Il. Basis for Jurisdiction 4

Ill. The Question Presented 4

IV. Reasons Relied on for Issuance of Writuu0 5

BRIEF AND ARGUMENT

Reference to Official Report 7

Grounds for Jurisdiction 7

Statement of the Case 8

Specification of Errors 1l

Argument 11

Appendix 18

CITATIONS OF STATUTES

U. S. Compiled Statutes, Section 1217 4

28 U. S. C. A., Section 347 4

Section 203(g) and Section 207, Title 29 U. S. C. A. 1,18

CASE CITATIONS

Anderson vs. Mt. Clemens Pottery Company, 90 L.

Ed. 1114 14

Armour and Company vs. Wantock, 323 U. S. 126,

133, 65 S. Ct. 165, 168, 89 L. Ed. 120 17

Brooklyn Savings Bank vs. O’Neil, 324 U. S. 697,

704 et seq., 65 S. Ct. 895, 1100 et seq., 89 L. Ed.

1296 12

Johnson vs. Dierks Lumber and Coal Company, 130

Fed. 2nd 115, 118 12, 15

Skidmore vs. Swift and Company, 323 U. S. 134, 65

S. Ct. 161, 89 L. Ed. 125 12,17

Supreme Court of the United States

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_

ve

WILLIAM F. ROKEY (PLAINTIFF) AND HAROLD

McGOWND, ET AL. (INTERVENORS),

+

Petitioners,

vs.

DAY & ZIMMERMANN, INC.,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR REVIEW ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_

v

I.

STATEMENT OF THE MATTER INVOLVED

William F. Rokey, for himself and in behalf of other

employees similarly situated, brought this action in the

District Court of the United States for the Southern

District of Iowa against the respondent, Day & Zimmer-

mann, Inc., under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U. S.

C. A. Section 201 et seq., to recover overtime, liquidated

damages and attorneys’ fees, Nine employees, claim-

ing to be similarly situated, intervened. On motion, one

Ms ae

2

of the intervenors dismissed without prejudice. The case

was tried to a jury upon demand of respondent and at

the close of all the evidence, both parties moved for a

directed verdict. The motion of petitioners was over-

ruled and that of respondent sustained, resulting in a

judgment for respondent against petitioners, from which

an appeal was taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals for

the Eighth Circuit.

Respondent, Day & Zimmermann, Inc., was at all times

in question the operator of the Iowa Ordnance Plant near

Burlington, Iowa. It maintained a fire fighting force in

which petitioners were employed. Petitioners worked two

to four shifts a week, each shift being of twenty-four

hours duration, commencing at 8:00 A. M. when the men

punched in on a time clock and ending at 8:00 A. M.

the following morning, when they punched out. They

were never on duty two consecutive shifts. Respondent

- required them to be at the fire station for the full twenty-

four hour period of their shift except as they might be

called out on fire alarm or for other duties.

Petitioners were paid at hourly rate for sixteen hours,

viz., from 8:00 A, M. to 12:00 midnight and were not

paid for the time between midnight and the check out

time at 8:00 in the morning unless they were called out

and actually left the fire station to answer an alarm or

for stand-by work during such period. This action is upon

a demand of petitioners for compensation for the addi-

tional period of eight hours in each shift which were

called by respondent ‘‘sleeping time.”’

The period for which unpaid compensation is de-

manded began on September 5, 1943, when a so-called

3

“two platoon’? system became effective. Prior to that

time petitioners had been employed under an operating

plan in which there were three shifts of eight hours each

in each twenty-four hour period, each fireman being on

duty one shift of eight hours per day for some five or

six days per week. Under that plan they were paid over-

time for all hours over forty in which they were on shift

in each work week. Sometime prior to September 5,

1943, the plan known as the “‘two platoon’’ system was

placed before the firemen for vote. The men voted ‘‘yes’’

for its adoption, feeling, as petitioners testify, that if

they wanted to continue to hold their jobs they were re-

quired to so vote (R. 23, 34, 40, 49, 50, 54, 55).

Respondent furnished in each station eating facilities,

including electric refrigerators and stoves, so that fire-

men might prepare their meals, although they provided

their own food. There was a recreation room where they

were allowed, while on shift, and at such times as they

were not performing prescribed duties, to play dominoes,

ecards, read or listen to the radio. Bunks and bedding

were furnished and the men were permitted to go to

bed in the dormitory any time after 10:00 P. M., subject

to being called out for night alarm or other work.

The men were not paid for that portion of each

shift which consisted of the eight hour period between

midnight and 8:00 A. M. except for such time during

such period as they were actually away from the station

in response to an alarm.

If the men punched out or left before eight o’clock

in the morning they were docked for the time they were

not there in the twenty-four hour period (R. 19, 26, 29,

30, 47).

4

Respondent admits in its answer that petitioners were

engaged in the production of goods for commerce (R. 4)

and entitled to the benefits of the Fair Labor Standards

Act for such hours as they worked. The only issue in

the case is whether, under that statute, the petitioners

are entitled to pay for the full eight hour period between

midnight and 8:00 A. M., during which time they were

required to be on respondent’s premises.

ti

v

II.

BASIS FOR JURISDICTION

Authority for the jurisdiction of this court appears

in U. S. Compiled Statutes, Sec. 1217; 28 U. 8. C. A.

Sec. 347; Judicial Code Sec. 240 as amended.

o.

vv

Iil.

THE QUESTION PRESENTED

Are members of a fire fighting force, to whose em-

ployment the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 is ad-

mittedly applicable, entitled to compensation (including

overtime pay and liquidated damages) for time during

which they were required to be on the employer’s premises

for the purpose of fire protection, even though during

a portion of such time they were permitted to sleep, sub-

ject at all times to respond to an alarm?

Ee ee ee

5

IV.

REASONS RELIED ON FOR THE ALLOWANCE

OF THE WRIT

1. The Circuit Court of Appeals has in this case

decided an important question of federal law which has

not been, but should be settled by this Court.

2. The Circuit Court of Appeals has decided in this

case a federal question in a way probably in conflict with

applicable decisions of this Court.

Wherefore, your petitioners pray this Honorable

Court to require by writ of certiorari that this cause

be certified to the Supreme Court for determination by

it as provided by statute.

J. L. THomas,

Burlington, Lowa,

JouNn HALE,

Burlington, Iowa,

J. C. Pryor,

Burlington, Lowa,

Attorneys for Petitioners.

7

Supreme Court of: the United States

v

WILLIAM F. ROKEY (PLAINTIFF) AND HAROLD

McGOWND, ET AL. (INTERVENORS),

Petitioners,

vs.

DAY & ZIMMERMANN, INC.,

Respondent.

v

BRIEF AND ARGUMENT OF PETITIONERS

REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL REPORT

The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the

Eighth Circuit in this case is reported in 157 Federal

2nd., page 734.

GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT

1. The Circuit Court of Appeals has in this case

decided an important question of federal law which has

not been, but should be settled by this Court.

2. The Circuit Court of Appeals has decided in this

case a federal question in a way probably in conflict with

applicable decisions of this Court.

v

8

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The facts essential to recovery by the petitioners

herein are undisputed. It is admitted that the petitioners

were employed by the respondent in its fire department;

that the employer-employee relationship contemplated by

the Fair Labor Standards Act was present; that the

provisions of said Act are applicable to the employment

in question (R. 4). There is an agreement as to the hour-

ly rate of pay (R. 4), the number of shifts (periods)

of twenty-four hours each that the men were stationed

at the fire station during each work week and the amount

of pay received by each employee involved herein (Ex-

hibit A; R. 57-83).

There is no question that the men were required to

be on the premises of respondent during the full twenty-

four hour period of each shift and yet were paid for only

sixteen hours; for the period from midnight to 8:00 A.

M. they received no pay except during the time they

were actually away from the fire station in response to

an alarm or on stand-by duty (R. 31, 32, 36, 44, 47, 54).

If they left the premises or punched out before 8:00 A.

M. they were docked for all the time thus taken from

the twenty-four hour shift (R. 19, 26, 29, 30, 47).

It is true that during the eight hour period in ques-

tion petitioners were permitted to sleep, subject to the

performance of certain duties, and subject to numerous

disturbances incident to the particular location and the

character of the work being carried on there. As illus-

trative of the duties required by them during the so-

called ‘‘sleeping time’’ for which they received no pay,

they were required to answer stand-by calls or fire

alarm (for which they received pay only when away

_ ie

from the station) (R. 25, 26); radio detail (R. 20, 24,

35); roll up the bedding and put it in place (R. 19, 32,

41, 43, 44); clean up quarters (R. 41, 43); clean up equip-

ment, apparatus and trucks (R. 36, 41, 43, 51); relief

duty for men on stand-by work (R. 94); go to other

stations for reports (R. 20, 94) or to pick up stand-by

men (R. 93, 94); to clean the boiler room and fire the

furnace (R. 51); to attend a fire close to the plant, clean

the trucks and reload (R. 94). They were required to

get up at 7:00 A. M. (R. 44).

There is no dispute about the fact that the men were

subject to orders at all times (R. 33) for which they

received no pay except while away from the station (R.

32, 43, 44); that they furnished fire protection to the

plant during the eight hours in question just the same

as during the sixteen hour period for which they were

paid (R. 44, 54, 133); that they were required to be at

the station at all times (R. 31, 32, 36, 41, 44, 47); that

during said eight hour period, when an alarm sounded,

although they arose, dressed and made ready to respond

to the alarm, they were not paid unless they actually left

the station to fight the fire (R. 31, 32, 36, 38, 48, 141).

Among the things otherwise disturbing and interrupting

sleep were such noises as were made by Diesel engines

on a nearby railroad switch track, the noise incident to

the operation of the trucks in and out of the transporta-

tion building adjacent to the fire station and traffic on

the main road into the plant, upon which road the sta-

tion abutted (R. 32, 41).

The ‘‘two platoon’? system became effective Septem-

ber 5, 1943 after the employees had indicated by ‘‘yes’’

10

or ‘‘no” their approval thereof. However, the record

shows that all of the petitioners voted ‘‘yes,’’ with the

thought that they must do so if they wanted to continue

to hold their jobs (R. 23, 34, 40, 49, 50, 54, 55).

Over the objection of petitioners, respondent offered

and there was admitted in evidence Interpretative Bul-

letin Number 13 of the United States Department of La-

bor with particular reference to paragraphs 6 and 7

thereof (R. 156) and a letter from William R. McComb,

Deputy Administrator, United States Department of La-

bor, Wage and Hour and Public Contracts Divisions (R.

119, 124).

It appears that respondent had submitted the “two

platoon’? plan to the Wage and Hour Division of the

Department of Labor and the letter from McComb just

mentioned had responded as follows:

‘From the facts given I can advise you that the

Administrator would not question the adoption of

the two-platoon system and the payment to em-

ployees for 16 of the 24 hours they are on the com-

pany premises, provided that for the 8 hours when

the employees are not to be regarded as working

they are free to sleep, and provided, of course, that

employees will be paid for any time during those

8 hours that they may be required for fire calls or

fire fighting purposes, and provided that the arrange-

ment is mutually satisfactory to the employer and

the employees.’’

It is undisputed that the submission of the matter

to the Department of Labor was ex parte and that neither

petitioners herein nor any other members of the fire

department participated therein.

ll

It is undisputed that the Respondent was able under

the ‘‘two platoon”? system, to dispense with the services

of some of its firemen. The effect of the adoption of the

system, was, according to the testimony of the fire chief,

a witness for Respondent, that ‘‘This new system would

require fewer men than the other system. It would

take from seventeen to nineteen less men.’’ (R. 138.)

—

v

SPECIFICATION OF ERRORS

1. The Circuit Court of Appeals erred in finding

that the trial court was without error in overruling the

motion of Plaintiffs (Petitioners here) and sustaining

that of Defendant (Respondent here) for a directed ver-

dict.

U

ARGUMENT

It appears to have been the theory of the Respondent

that the trial court should direct a verdict because (1)

the time in question, during at least a portion of which

the Petitioners were permitted to sleep, was not working

time and therefore not compensable time; (2) the so-

called ‘‘two platoon’? system had the approval of the

Deputy Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division

of the United States Department of Labor; and (3) the

Petitioners had agreed to that arrangement.

It is our contention that if the time from midnight

to 8:00 A. M. was compensable time under the provisions

of the statute, Plaintiffs (Petitioners here) were entitled

See ee

to recover regardless of anything the Administrator may

have said about the ‘‘two platoon’’ system or whether or

not Petitioners had agreed to that arrangement.

It is by this time well settled that contracts between

employers and employees subject to the Act and incon-

sistent with its provisions are illegal and void. (Brooklyn

Savings Bank vs. O’Neil, 324 U. S. 697, 704 et seq., 65

S. Ct. 895, 1100 et seq., 89 L. Ed. 1296, Johnson vs.

Dierks Lumber and Coal Company, 130 Fed. 2nd 115,

118, and cases cited.) We do not believe the Respondent

would seriously dispute the right of Petitioners to re-

cover if, under the statute, the time in question is com-

pensable time, even though they had attempted to waive

their rights.

In support of its theory that the time in question

was not compensable, Respondent urged upon the court

what is designated as Interpretative Bulletin Number 13

issued by the Wage and Hour Division. It was claimed

that paragraphs 6 and 7 (R. 147-148) of that Bulletin

sets out and interprets in the light of the statute ‘‘situa- _.

tions as in the instant case.’’ However, in Skidmore vs.

Swift & Company, 323 U. S. 134, 139, 65 S. Ct. 161, 164,

89 L. Ed. 125, where it was dealing with facts somewhat

analogous to those in this case, this court said:

‘‘The facts of this case do not fall within any

of the specific examples given, * * *. There are

no statutory provisions as to what, if any, defer-

ence courts should pay to the Administrator’s con-

clusions. And, while we have given them notice,

we have had no occasion to try to prescribe their

influence. The rulings of this Administrator are not

ee |

5 SRR eeaes

13

reached as a result of hearing adversary proceed-

ings in which he finds facts from evidence and

reaches conclusions of law from findings of fact.

They are not, of course, conclusive, even in the cases

with which they directly deal, much less in those

to which they apply only by analogy. They do not

constitute an interpretation of the Act or a standard

for judging factual situations which binds a district

court’s processes as an authoritative pronouncement

of a higher court might do. * * *.’’

Doubtless recognizing the factual differences between

the situations suggested in the Bulletin and the situation

under the ‘‘two platoon’? system in the instant case, Re-

spondent urged upon the court the binding effect of the

letter from William R. McComb, Deputy Administrator

(R. 119-122), which had been obtained ex parte by Re-

spondent in response to a letter from it. In the McComb

letter, the Deputy Administrator said:

‘“‘From the facts given I can advise you that

the Administrator would not question the adoption

of the two platoon system and the payment to em-

ployees * ° *.”’

Respondent apparently regarded this statement of the

Deputy Administrator as an approval of the plan and

authority for its inauguration and maintenance. It is

submitted that the most the Deputy Administrator intend-

ed was an assurance that the Department would not in-

terfere by way of injuctive proceedings if the system

which was outlined in the letter to him were put into ef-

fect.

We come now to the question of whether or not

the time between midnight and 8:00 A. M. was working

time within the meaning of the Act and therefore com-

14

pensable. The occupation of these Petitioners was that

of firemen or fire fighters. As is well known, the duties

incident to this occupation are not confined to fire fight-

ing. Perhaps mor: important are the duties incumbent

upon firemen to be at their posts at all times in anticipa-

tion of and prepared for an alarm. It is because of the

performance of these duties that persons in other oc-

cupations can go about their work with assurance of

safety or, during their sleeping time, rest in peace and

without fear. It is without dispute in the record here

that Petitioners were required by the Respondent to re-

main at their posts in the fire station on the premises

at all times during their twenty-four hour shift, there

being no distinction in this respect between the period

from 8:00 A. M. to midnight and the period from mid-

night to 8:00 A. M. The record shows that the rule was

that Petitioners were docked if they left the premises

at any time prior to 8:00 A. M.

This court in the case of Anderson vs. Mt. Clemens

Pottery Company, 90 L. Ed. 1114, ....... U. @ n-, BR

given a definition of what is meant in the law by the

term ‘‘statutory work week.’’ In other words this court

has defined what is compensable time under the statute.

We quote the definition:

‘Since the statutory work week includes all time

during which an employee is necessarily required to

be on the employer’s premises, on duty or at a pre-

scribed work place, the time spent in these activities

must be accorded appropriate compensation.’’

In the instant case there was no question of time

required for employees to put themselves in readiness

for work as there was in the Mt. Clemens case. The Pe-

15

titioners here were required at all times during their

twenty-four hour shift to be ready for work. For this

purpose, they were required to be at the fire house on

Respondent’s premises at all times. There is no room for

the contention here, such as was made in the Mt. Clemens

case, that the amount of recovery sought is uncertain

and speculative. The time devoted by Petitioners to

their jobs is in the record in detail and is undisputed.

There is no conflict here, as in the Mt. Clemens ease,

between the claim made and the time clock records. There

is no suggestion here of the application of the de mini-

mis rule discussed in the Mt. Clemens case. The primary

purpose of the employment of Petitioners was the serv-

ice of fire protection to a huge ordnance plant. That

service was furnished by the Petitioners twenty-four

hours at a stretch. Throughout the entire twenty-four

hour shift, whether performing physical labor or not,

they were serving their employer by providing fire pro-

tection to the plant. They were at all times at their

posts of duty under the mandate of their employer.

The Cireuit Court of Appeals in the instant case

(Rokey vs. Day & Zimmermann, 157 Fed. 2nd 734, 737)

relies upon quotations from a specially coneurring opin-

ion of Judge Stone in the case of Johnson vs. Dierks

Lumber and Coal Company, 130 Fed. 2nd 120, which con-

tained statements inconsistent with the definition of com-

pensable or working time as stated by this court in the

Mt. Clemens case (supra). The Circuit Court of Appeals

apparently adopted these views of the specially con-

curring opinion in the Dierks case, although it is clear

enough that that was not the opinion of the same Circuit

16

Court of Appeals, but only the opinion of the specially

concurring judge. He refers to the statement which we

contend is inconsistent with this court’s definition as

‘‘my view.’’ If we turn to the decision of that same court

in the Dierks case, we find that the opinion of the ma-

jority of the court contains this language:

‘‘We do not think the Act means that an em-

ployer may claim all an employee’s time and compen-

sate him for only part of it. An agreement to pay

for only a part of the hours which an employee is

required to serve is invalid.’’

We submit that if employees are entitled. to recover

under the circumstances involved in the Mt. Clemens

case, certainly the right of these Petitioners to com-

pensation for time which they were required to spend at

their posts of duty on the premises of the employer

cannot be denied such right, particularly where it is

without question that the employer profited by the in-

auguration of the system under which this service was

rendered.

This is not a ‘‘Portal to Portal’’ case. It is far

stronger than that. It deals with an occupation which

requires men to live apart from their families on the

premises of their employer and at a particular spot there-

on, alert and ready at all times to go into dangerous action

for the protection of the employer’s property and the

lives of its thousands of employees. By their remaining

there for a full twenty-four hour period they enabled

their employer to dispense with the services of others in

the same occupation. There was no difference during the

twenty-four hour shift between one time and another, in

respect to performance of the primary duty, viz., fire pro-

tection. That there should be drawn across their schedule

17

an arbitrary line, resulting in compensation to these men

on one side and none on the other, is unconscionable,

whether viewed in reference to the statute and the in-

terpretative Mt. Clemens case or not.

The decision of the Court of Appeals, denying these

men pay for a portion of the time spent in performing

the duties of their occupation, is not in accord with the

terms of the Act as defined by this court in the Mt.

Clemens case. While this court dealt to some extent in

the cases of Skidmore vs. Swift and Company’, 323 U. 8S.

134, 65 S. Ct. 161, 89 L. Ed. 125; and Armour and Com-

pany vs. Wantock, 323 U. S. 126, 133, 65 S. Ct. 165, 168,

89 L. Ed. 120, with situations somewhat similar, there

has been no decision as to the precise issue involved here.

The question of the effect of the statute upon the so-called

‘‘two platoon’? system in the operation of a fire depart-

ment is an important question of federal law which should

be determined by this court.

1. This court there said: “Whether in a concrete case such (waiting) time

falls within or without the Act is a question of fact to be resolved by

appropriate findings of the trial court.” It is to be noted that in the in-

stant jury tried case application of this rule was precluded by reason

of direction of the trial court to the jury to return a verdict for the De-

fendant, resulting in no findings being made, The record presents no dis-

pute as to the fact that the time in question here was time during which

Petitioners were “engaged to wait.” This court made it clear in the

Skidmore case that compensation for waiting time, and in a situation as

is here involved, cannot be denied as a matter of law. On the other hand,

the Court of Appeals in sustaining the trial court holds that waiting time

does not fall within the Act as a matter of law.

J. L. THomas,

Burlington, Iowa,

Joun HAts,

Burlington, Iowa,

J. C. Pryor,

Burlington, Iowa,

Attorneys for Petitioners.

18

APPENDI£X

PERTINENT STATUTE

Fair Labor Standards Act (1938).

Section 203(g), Title 29 U. S. C. A., provides:

‘¢ ‘Employ’ includes to suffer or permit to work.’’

Section 207, Title 29 U. S. C, A., provides:

‘‘No employer shall * * * employ any of his

employees who is engaged in commerce, or in the

production of goods for commerce * * * (3) for a

work week longer than forty hours * * * unless such

employee receives compensation for his employment

in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not

less than one and one-half times the regular rate at

which he is employed.’’

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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