Petitioners Brief — Winding Gulf Collieries v. Board of Education

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION.

OPINIONS BELOW.

One opinion was delivered by the District Court (R. 80).

It was written by District Judge, Honorable Ben Moore,

and filed the 9th day of April, 1945. It appears on page 80

of the record and is reported in 60 F. Sup. 68. The opinion

of the Circuit Court of Appeals was written by Honorable

Morris A. Soper, Circuit Judge, and concurred in by Hon-

orable Armistead M. Dobie, Circuit Judge, and Honorable

Johnson J. Hayes, District Judge, and was filed and an-

nounced on the 12th day of December, 1945, and appears

on page 137 of the record, and is reported in 152 F. (2d)

382.

JURISDICTION.

The jusisdiction of this Court is invoked under Section

240 (a) of the Judicial Code as amended by the Act of Feb-

ruary 13, 1925 (28 U. S. C. A., See. 347). The judgment of

the Cireuit Court of Appeals was entered on the 12th day

of December, 1945 (R. 145). The petition for rehearing was

filed on the 10th day of January, 1946 (R. 165). The final

order denying rehearing was entered on the 5th day of

February, 1946 (R. 165). The order staying the mandate

for sixty days was entered on the 8th day of February,

1946, granting extension for filing petition for certiorari,

the same being granted by Circuit Judge, Honorable Armi-

stead M. Dobie (R. 165).

(17)

ee ee ee a ee re

18 Brief in Support of Petition

NATURE AND CHARACTER OF THE PROCEEDING.

This was an action brought by the Allemannia Fire Insur-

ance Company of Pittsburgh, of the State of Pennsylvania,

against The Board of Education of the County of Raleigh,

of the State of West Virginia, and Winding Gulf Collieries

a corporation, of the State of West Virginia, convening the

defendants to that bill for the purpose of determining the

proper distribution of the indemnity arising out of a ma-

tured fire insurance policy, the amount of which had there-

tofore been ascertained, and was paid into the registry of

the District Court of the United States for the Southern

District of West Virginia, to abide the decision of that

Court. The District Court awarded the fund to petitioner

(R. 76). Appeal was taken by The Board of Education of

the County of Raleigh to the Cirevit Court of Appeals,

Fourth Circuit, and the decree of the District Court was

reversed by that Court (R. 145). Petition for rehearing

was filed in due course, and rehearing was denied (R. 165).

FOREWORD.

The facts have been set out sufficiently in the petition

to fairly present the case and it would serve no good pur-

pose to restate them here, yet such facts as may be neces-

sary to present our position will be stated throughout the

course of this brief. We will sometimes hereinafter refer

to The Board of Education of the County of Raleigh, West

Virginia, as The Board, and generally refer to Winding

Gulf Collieries, as petitioner.

Brief in Support of Petition 19

ARGUMENT.

At the very outset of this argument, to properly develop

the questions presented by the petition, it is necessary that

we direct the Court’s attention specifically to the pertinent

parts of the Statutes of West Virginia, printed in the Ap-

pendix to this brief.

The Statutory Standard Form of West Virginia

Fire Insurance Contract.

In the exercise of its power of regulation, the Legisla-

ture of West Virginia enacted Section 7, of Article 4, of

Chapter 33 of the Official Code of West Virginia (see stat-

ute in Appendix), prescribing the standard form of fire

insurance policy, which can lawfully be used in West Vir-

ginia, and expressly prohibiting the use of any other form.

The pertinent provision is in the following language:

‘‘No fire insurance company, its officers or agents,

shall make, issue or deliver for use any policy,

against loss by fire only, or the renewal of any such

policy, on property in this State other than such as

shall conform in all particulars as to blanks, size of

type, context, provisions, agreements and conditions

as set forth herein.’’

Immediately following this enacting clause, there is set

out in the statute a complete form for a fire insurance con-

tract. The applicable paragraph of the permissible form

with which we are concerned is in the following words:

‘‘This entire policy shall be void, unless otherwise

provided by agreement in writing added hereto,

Ownership, ete. (a) if the interest of the insured

20

Brief in Support of Petition

be other than unconditional and sole ownership; or

(b) if the subject of insurance be a building on

ground not owned by the insured in fee simple; * * *

or (d) if any change, other than by the death of an

insured, take place in the interest, title or posses-

sion of the subject of insurance (except change of

occupants without increase of hazards); or (e) if

this policy be assigned before a loss.’’

The Enabling Section of the Statute.

Insurers having less than the sole and unconditional own-

ership of the subject of insurance, or in case of a building,

non owners of the fee simple title of the land on which the

building stands, can only insure within the scope of the

enabling provisions of Section 8, of Article 4, of Chapter 33

of the Code of West Virginia (see statute in Appendix),

which provides:

‘‘No other or different provision, agreement, con-

dition or clause shall be in any manner made a part

of such contract or policy or indorsed thereon or

added thereto or delivered therewith, except as fol-

lows, to-wit:

(a) *es8

(b) ** *

(c) There may be printed in the space indicated

by the words ‘space for description of property,’ or

added to the policy at such space by agreement in

writing thereon or by rider attached thereto the

following: (1) Descriptions and specifications, by

schedule or otherwise, of the property covered by

the policy; (2) The extent of the application of m-

Brief in Support of Petition 21

surance under the policy; * * * (4) Any other mat-

ter necessary clearly to express all the facts and

conditions of insurance on any particular risk. Pro-

vided, however, That no such agreement or rider

shall be inconsistent with or a waiver of any of the

conditions or provisions of the standard fire insur-

ance policy hereby established, except that in the

case of a mortgagee not named in the policy as the

insured, such provisions may be added as shall not

be inconsistent with or a waiver of any of the pro-

visions of the said standard policy relating to mort-

gage interests, but if so added, shall include the pro-

visions of a standard rider or indorsement relating

to such interest the form of which shall have been

approved by the insurance commissioner and filed

in his office as hereinafter provided;’’

(Emphasis our own)

The Statute of West Virginia Prescribing the Standard Form of

Fire Insurance Policy is a Remedial Statute, Founded on

Public Policy, and Those to Whom It Applies Will Not Be

Permitted to Waive Its Provisions. The Statute Becomes

a Part of the Contract and Prevails Over Stipulations of

the Parties.

This statute adopts in West Virginia what has become

generally and commonly known throughout the country as

the New York Standard Form of Policy. It is of general

and wide use and adopted by the Legislatures of the most

of the states of the union, and where it has been adopted

its use has uniformly been held to be compulsory, permit-

ting such changes only as are authorized by the statute.

It is the only form of fire insurance contract which may

22 Brief in Support of Petition

lawfully be used in states so adopting the same, and while

the statutory form does not prohibit the contracting par-

ties from inserting in or attaching to the policy, terms or

conditions, not found in the standard form, yet such terms

or conditions cannot lawfully be inserted which are incon-

sistent with, or a waiver of any of the provisions of such

standard form prescribed by the statute. So far as the

conditions and provisions of the form go they are con-

trolling and may not be omitted, changed or waived. The

provisions of the standard form not only constitute the

only permissible contract between the parties, but it is the

law between the parties. The statute is founded on public

policy. These statutes are universally construed to be

remedial statutes, and mandatory in their provisions and

they are liberally construed to compel performance with

their provisions.’

The West Virginia Statute was in full force when the

1 Heim v. American Alliance Co. of N. Y.,

(Minn.) 180 N. W. 225.

Wild Rice Lumber Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 99

Minn. 190, 108 N. W. 871.

Hronish v. Home Ins. Co., 33 S. D. 428, 146

N. W. 588.

Lawver v. Globe Mutual Ins. Co., 25 S. D. 549,

127 N. W. 615.

Hamilton v. Royal Ins. Co., 156 N. Y. 327, 50

N. E. 863, 42 L. R. A. 485.

Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. School District

No. 62 of Jackson County, (Okla.) 174 P. 513.

Palatine Ins. Co. v. Commercial Trust Co.,

(Okla.) 175 P. 930.

Northern Assurance Co. v. Grand View Bldg. Asso.,

180 U. S. 308, 46 L. Ed. 213.

26 C. J., ‘‘Fire Insurance—Statutory Forms,’’

See. 49, p. 57.

Brief m Support of Petition 23

contract of insurance now in controversy was effected, and

it clearly affects the construction and validity, as well as

the permissible contracting provisions. These statutes be-

come a part of the contract of insurance as fully and com-

pletely as if they had been written into the contract.’

Interpretation Sole Ownership Clause.

This form of policy has for many years been of general

use throughout the United States. The sole ownership

clause has frequently been drawn to the attention of the

courts. In Cooley’s Briefs on Insurance, Volume 3, at page

2171, the reason for this clause in an insurance policy is

stated as follows:

‘‘The purpose in requiring the insured to have

the sole and unconditional ownership of the insured

property is to give protection only to those upon

whom the loss insured against would inevitably fall,

but for the insurance, and to avoid taking risks for

those whose lack of interest, or whose contingent

interest in the property might tend to encourage

* Shinn v. West Virginia Insurance Co., 104

W. Va. 353, 140 S. E. 61.

State v. Wotring, 56 W. Va. 394, 49 S. E. 365.

Hicks v. Randich, 106 W. Va. 109, 144 S. E. 887.

Thomas v. Matthiessen, 232 U. S. 221, 58 L. Ed.

577.

State for use, ete. Finley Bros. Co. v. Freshwater,

107 W. Va. 210, 148 S. E. 6.

Tug River Lumber Co. v. Smithey, 107 W. Va. 482,

148 S. E. 850.

29 Am. Jur., ‘‘Insurance,’’ Sec. 180, p. 197.

29 Am. Jur., ‘‘Insurance,’’ Sec. 190, p. 206.

26 C. J., ‘‘Fire Insurance,’’ See. 78, p. 81.

24 Brief in Support of Petition

carelessness or wrongdoing in its use or preserva-

tion * * *; and to prevent one who has an undivided

or contingent, but insurable iterest im property

from appropriating to his own use the proceeds of

the policy taken on the valuation of the entire and

unconditional title, as if he were the sole owner, and

to remove from him the temptation to perpetrate

fraud and crime * * *.” (Emphasis our own)

This statute has been frequently enforced by the Supreme

Court of West Virginia in a multiplicity of circumstances

attending contracts of insurance.”

The Status of the Title and Ownership in the Instant Case.

The status of the title to the property involved in the

instant case brings us squarely within the purview of the

prohibited circumstances contemplated by the statute, and

the paragraph of the standard form of policy quoted above.

Every reason assigned for the statute by Mr. Cooley ap-

plies to our circumstances here with great force. The most

that could be said for the title of The Board of Education

for the County of Raleigh, to the insured building, in the

instant case, is, that it held under its deed an exclusive

right to the possession of the property, yet a limited ex-

elusive right, a naked right to use the property for a spe-

cific purpose and none other. The Board could not convey

the property, could not lease the property, nor could it

* Tyree v. Virginia Ins. Co., 55 W. Va. 63, 46

S. E. 706.

Kirk et al v. Queens Ins. Co., 126 W. Va. 213,

27 S. E. (2d) 596.

Hamlet v. American Fire Ins. Co., 107 W. Va.

687, 150 S. E. 7.

Brief in Support of Petition 25

devote it to any use other than public free school purposes;

the mere naked right to possession for the limited purpose

as specified is all the right The Board had. All other rights

to this property, including the right of reversion and the

right to control the use of the property, was in petitioner;

this was certainly the dominant title and estate, and it

controlled the use and other attributes of ownership. Under

such circumstances it is patent and apparent that The

Board of Education could not lawfully, under these stat-

utes, insure for its sole benefit, the whole title to the build-

ing destroyed. Under such circumstances it became neces-

sary for the contracting parties to utilize the enabling see-

tion of the statute to render the policy a valid contract,

indeed to enable them to effect any valid fire insurance upon

the building for any indemnity at all.

Contracting Parties Presumed to Act Lawfully.

These statutes presented the limitation within which the

contracting parties were compelled to contract, else their

contract would be utterly and totally void. It is certainly

not a violent presumption to presume that the contracting

parties used language which they, at any rate, thought

would conform with the statute. They were trying to make

a lawful contract or to purposely and intentionally evade

the statute. The latter intention will not be attributed to

them unless the facts leave no other fair and rational con-

clusion; unless the language used will bear no other reas-

onable interpretation, they will be presumed to have in-

tended to obey the Jaw.‘ This is especially true as to the

. Chambers v. Cline. 60 W. Va. 588, 55 S. FE. 909.

Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Delmar Co., 283 U.

686, 75 L. Ed. 1349.

Ewing et al v. Howard, 7 Wallace 499, 19 L. Kd.

293.

26 Brief in Support of Petition

action of The Board of Education, its membership being

sworn public officers.’ It is a fair presumption also that

they solemnly, carefully and advisedly selected words to

serve their purpose, to make their contract both certain

and lawful; this is what they were in fact trying to do, with-

out evasion or attempted circumvention of the statute,

within the scope of which they were contracting, and this is

what they did.

Intention to Insure the Whole Title and Indemnify All

Interested Parties—Analysis of the Contract.

The language used in the insurance contract by the con-

tracting parties, must be construed in harmony with the

statute, if it is susceptible of such construction.’ At the

very inception of the contract the assured is described as

‘The Board of Education of the County of Raleigh and

legal representatives.’’ It was apparent to the contracting

parties that such a policy, simply naming The Board and

legal representatives and covering buildings, ‘*occupied

for educational purposes * * * while located on premises

* * * occupied, leased or used by the assured in Raleigh

County, West Virginia,’ of which building The Board

was not the sole and unconditional owner and did not own

the land in fee simple, on which the building stood, as in

the instant case, would be in conflict with the statute and

totally and completely void. They were confronted with the

*> Board of Education of Hancock County v. Hart-

ford Fire Ins. Co., 124 W. Va. 163, 19 S. E. (2d)

448.

Knox County v. National Bank City of N. Y., 147

U. 8S. 90, 37 L. Ed. 93.

20 Am. Jur., ‘‘Evidence,’’ Sec. 187, p. 182.

* See authorities under Footnotes 1 and 2.

Brief in Support of Petition 27

statutes with which they had to conform. The contracting

parties realizing the contract would not be enforcible with

the description of the assured as ‘‘The Board of Kduca-

tion of the County of Raleigh and legal representatives”’

alone, under the attending circumstances of the instant

case, inserted a rider, as they could lawfully do under the

statute and to accomplish this purpose, which rider was in

the following words: ‘‘Assured The Board of Education

of the County of Raleigh as is now or may hereafter be con-

stituted for account of whom it may concern.’’ (R. 26.) It

is apparent that this rider was inserted in this contract

pursuant to the West Virginia Statute and pursuant to

the statute was intended to describe the scope and extent of

the insurance as was required by the statute. The term used

in the rider, ‘‘The Board of Education of the County of

Raleigh as is now or may hereafter be constituted,”’ did

not materially change the scope and extent of the insur-

ance from the original designation, ‘‘The Board of Kduca-

tion of the County of Raleigh and legal representatives.’’

These phrases upon final analysis have substantially the

same meaning. In the rider additional words were used.

The words, ‘‘for account of whom it may concern,’’ were

inserted, and they must be given their meaning.’ These

™Henderson Development Co. v. United Fuel Gas

Co., 121 W. Va. 284, 3S. E. (2d) 217.

Clayton et al v. Nicely et al, 116 W. Va. 460,

182 S. E. 569.

City Service Gas Co. v. Kelly-Dempsey & Co.,

111 F. (2d) 247.

E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Claiborne-

Reno Co., 64 F. (2d) 224, 89 A. L. R. 238.

Ehbnes v. Hronis et ux, 127 N. J. L. 551, 23 A. (2d)

592.

Barbarsol Co. v. Leggett, (Ind.) 19 N. E. (2d) 481.

12 Am. Jur., ‘‘Contracts,’’ See. 241, p. 772.

A SEARO

we

yee

epee

PART STS IER PIMC OE

RL

28 Brief in Support of Petition

are words having a definite legal meaning and effect.* They

are of ancient origin and frequent use in the insurance

business. No better history of their origin or of the mean-

ing attributed to them, can be found than that established

by this Court in the case of Hagan v. Scottish Union &

National Insurance Company. Since the decision in the

Hagan case, it seems to have met with general approval

and has become firmly established and followed by the text

writers on insurance and the court generally. No author-

ity, so far as we have been able to ascertain, has found fault

or criticized that decision. Where words or terms, having

a previously definite determined legal meaning and effect

are knowingly and solemnly used in a written instrument,

the parties thereto will be presumed to have intended such

words or terms to have such previously determined mean-

* Murdock v. Franklin Ins. Co., 33 W. Va. 407,

10 S. E. 777.

Hagan v. Scottish Union & Nat. Ins. Co., 186 U.S.

423, 46 L. Ed. 1229, affirming same v. same, 95

F. 129.

New Orleans & Southern American S. 8S. Co. v.

Grace & Co., 26 F. (2d) 967, 969, certiorari de-

nied 49 S. Ct. 33, 278 U. S. 636, 73 L. Ed. 552.

Hooper v. Robinson & Cox, 25 L. Ed. 318.

1 Phillips, Insurance, See. 385.

2 Duer, Marine Insurance, p. 28.

29 Am. Jur., ‘‘Insurance,’’ See. 205, p. 214.

Cooley’s Briefs on Insurance, Vol. 3, p. 2171.

Vance on Insurance, p. 421.

Joyce on Insurance, (2d) Vol. 2, Sees. 964, 966,

p. 2053.

LE GOL PREM TERA NN IE ENT EPH OU ENE RANA BEEN MNS RE RE CHO snare

Brief in Support of Petition 29

ing and effect.’ It is apparent that the Circuit Court of

Appeals attributed to the words, ‘‘for account of whom it

may concern,’’ no meaning and gave to the contract no more

or different meaning than it would have, had the words,

“The Board of Education of the County of Raleigh and

legal representatives,’’ or the words, “The Board of Ed-

ueation of the County of Raleigh as is now or may here-

after be constituted,’ alone, been used to deseribe the

assured. This presents a parallel question of interpretation

to that which was presented in the Hagan case, concerning

it this Court said:

“There is no doubt, and the district court so found,

that Hagan intended by the policy to secure the in-

surance upon the entire title; and he therefore in-

tended thereby to protect that title during the run-

ning of the policy, and when the clause is added in

writing that it was issued on account of whom it may

concern, it shows that he intended that such title

should be protected in the hands of any person to

whom he might transfer the same or any portion

thereof. If otherwise, and the intention were only

* Marguerite Coal Co. et al v. Meadow River Lumber

Co., 98 W. Va. 698, 127 S. E. 644.

Langley v. Owen, 52 Fla. 302, 42 So. 457, 11 Ann.

Cas. 247.

Rothchild v. Winthel, 191 Ind. 85, 181 N. KB. 917.

In re American Steel Supply Syndicate, 256 F. 876,

879.

Heist et al v. Dunlap & Co., et al, 193 Ga. 462, 18

S. KB. (2d) 887.

Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Lowenstein,

97 F. 17.

12 Am. Jur., ‘‘Contraets,’? See. 238, p. 764.

26 C. J., ‘Fire Insurance,’’ See. 76, p. 79.

30 Brief in Support of Petition

to protect his own interest, the policy, as stated by

the district judge, would naturally have been taken

out in his own name, omitting the qualifying phrase,

on account of whom it may concern. This phrase

was put in for some purpose and such purpose was,

as it seems to us, to protect the whole title without

making it necessary to notify the company and ob-

tain its consent to any transfer of interest.’’

The Words, “For Account of Whom It May Concern,”

Create a Trust Relationship.

The courts, both before and since the Hagan case, gener-

ally recognized that the phrase, ‘‘for account of whom it

may concern,’’ or words of like import, when used in a fire

insurance policy, create a trust relationship between the

named assured and the insurer and any other person hold-

ing an insurable interest in the subject of insurance. The

Supreme Court of West Virginia recognizes this principle

and has authoritatively declared it.° It is perhaps most

clearly stated in Cooley’s Briefs on Insurance, Volume 2,

page 1265. Mr. Cooley, upon analysis of the principles

enunciated in the Hagan case, so interprets that case and

states the principle in the following language:

‘*Principles similar to those controlling the insur-

ance of property ‘held in trust’ govern also insur-

ance ‘for account of whom it may concern.’ Such a

policy will not be confined to the interest of the in-

sured, but may cover the interests of the owners,

and may be adopted by them, even after the loss.’’

* Murdock v. Ins. Co., 33 W. Va. 407, 10 S. E. 777.

Sheppard v. Peabody Ins. Co., 21 W. Va. 368.

Lueas v. Ins. Co., 23 W. Va. 258.

—,

Brief in Support of Petition 31

Prohibitive Statutory Provisions Prevail Over Conflicting

Contractual Stipulation.

We are not unmindful of other special provisions in the

contract of insurance in controversy, which were stressed

by the Circuit Court of Appeals. We recognize the fact

that in the rider heretofore discussed, this language ap-

pears: ‘‘Loss, if any, under this policy shall be adjusted

with and held payable to The Beard of Edueation of the

County of Raleigh.’’ Other provisions under the title,

‘*Special Provisions,’’ quoted and relied upon by the Cir-

cuit Court of Appeals in its decision, are:

* * * The Board of Education of the County of

Raleigh as is now or may hereafter be constituted

shall be deemed the owner of the property herein

named, described and covered by this policy, and no

defect in the title to such property shall invalidate

this policy in whole or in part.

Should any of the within deseribed property be

situate on lands not owned by the assured in fee sim-

ple, this insurance shall not be affected thereby.”’

If the contracting parties, by use of this language, have

attempted to enter into a contract of insurance, pursuant

to which the interest only of the Board of Education was

insured, and none other, then this language can have no

force or effect for the reason that it would contravene the

express prohibitive statute.

Section 8, of Article 4, of Chapter 33 of the Code of

West Virginia, in subdivision (c)-(4), prescribes ‘‘that no

such agreement or rider shall be inconsistent with or a

waiver of any of the conditions or provisions of the stand-

ard fire insurance policy hereby established.’’

32 Brief in Support of Petition

It is perfectly patent that if it were not for the saving

clause, ‘‘for account of whom it may concern,’’ the above

quoted language of the contract, standing alone, would be

in direct conflict with the paragraph of the standard form

of policy prescribed by the West Virginia Statute, herein-

before quoted, thereby invalidating the whole policy for the

reason that the assured was not the sole and unconditional

owner of the subject of insurance and which subject of in-

surance stood on lands not owned by the named assured in

fee simple.

Under such circumstances, it is axiomatic that the exist-

ing and statutory provisions enter into and ferm a part

of the contract of insurance and are applicable as fully as

if such provisions were written into the contract, and that

the statute will prevail and have precedence over the lan-

guage used by the contracting parties. If the words, ‘‘for

account of whom it may concern,’’ are ignored, it is clear

that the whole contract of insurance is in conflict with the

statute and for that reason totally and completely void.

The words, ‘‘for account of whom it may concern,’’ must

be given full force and effect, they must be given the defi-

nite legal meaning which the authorities attribute to them.

When used in the insurance policy, in the juxtoposition in

which they are placed in the instant case, they mean, The

Board of Education of the County of Raleigh, ‘‘as well in

its own name as for and in the name (without specification )

of all and every other person and persons to whom the

same (the property insured) doth, may, or shall appertain

in part or in all.’ Hagan v. Scottish Union & National

Insurance Company, supra. If these words are given this

meaning, or meaning of like import, then the above quoted

language can be given lawful force and effect to clearly

demonstrate an intention to insure the whole title to the

Brief in Support of Petition 33

destroyed building and to protect every specie of property

therein and every person having an insurable interest

therein, and thereby render this contract of insurance a

lawful contract, and in complete compliance with this

statute.

The Opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals Overrides Both the

Statute and the True Legal Meaning of the Language

Used in the Contract.

The Cireuit Court of Appeals gave to the words, ‘‘for

account of whom it may concern,’’ no meaning whatsoever.

The construction of the contract adopted by the Circuit

Court of Appeals, reads these words out of the policy. The

Court, in the course of its opinion, says:

“‘The phrase, ‘for account of whom it may con-

cern,’ was doubtless used in the policy to make dou-

bly certain that in case of loss the proceeds of in-

surance would be payable to the public authorities

charged with the maintenance of the schools, who-

ever they might be and by whatever name they might

then be known.’’

The public authorities were limited under the law to one

of two things, (a) to insure and limit the indemnity to the

interest alone which it had in the subject of insurance, or

(b) to insure, as it did, the whole title and constitute itself

a trustee of the indemnity for account of whom it might

concern. Neither the named publie authority or the sup-

posed public authority, referred to by the Circuit Court of

Appeals, owned in fee simple the land on which the subject

of insurance was built, nor were they the sole owners of the

subject of insurance. Simply because the named assured,

or its successors, were public authorities, did not enable

JOD Re WOPR MP eO

34 Brief in Support of Petition

them to violate the statute. If the Cireuit Court of Appeals

has correctly stated the object and purpose of the contract-

ing parties, according to the true intent, spirit and mean-

ing of their contract, then we submit, in the light of the

statute, that the effect of that decision is to give force and

effect to a contract unlawfully made and which the con-

tracting parties were expressly forbidden to make, thus

ignoring both the statute and the words used in the con-

tract.

In this connection, we submit that the construction given

to the contract by the Circuit Court of Appeals establishes

a meaning for the contract the same as if the words, ‘‘for

account of whom it may concern,’’ had not been used at all.

The named assured in this contract, as we have heretofore

pointed out, was ‘‘The Board of Education of the County

of Raleigh and legal representatives.’’ The named assured

in the rider to the policy was ‘‘The Board of Education of

the County of Raleigh as is now or may hereafter be con-

stituted.’’? We submit that these two deseriptions of the

named assured, used in this contract of insurance, fully

comprehend, by plain and unmistakable language, ‘‘the pub-

lic authorities charged with the maintenance of schools,

whoever they might be and by whatever name they might

then be known.’? Why were the words, ‘‘for account of

whom it may concern,”’ used at all? They are in the con-

tract, they have legal meaning, as we have seen, will not

this legal meaning be attributed to them, or are these words’

to mean absolutely nothing? Is no intention to be attrib-

uted to the contracting parties from the use of these words,

when they are of such frequent and ancient use and to

which such uniform meaning has heretofore been given to

them by the courts of this land, and especially by the high-

est judicial tribunal in the nation? We cannot but feel that

Brief in Support of Petition 35

to so construe this contract is arbitrary and without justi-

fication in the light of the law and facts attending the con-

tracting parties at the time the contract was made.

The Circuit Court of Appeals Adopted Erroneous Factual

Premise—The Authorities Relied On Do Not Apply.

We challenge the factual premise on which the Circuit

Court of Appeals based its decision. Its decision, as we

have endeavored to demonstrate, fails to take cognizance

of the Statutes of West Virginia and the material provi-

sions of the instant contract and the facts and cireum-

stances attending its execution and having done so relied

and bottomed its decision on authorities having no applica-

tion to the instant case."' We find no fault with the prin-

ciple of law enunciated in these cases, they are cases of the

general rule of insurance contracts, with a single named

assured, with nothing appearing in the contract indicating

an intention to protect any other person. Cooley’s Briefs

on Insurance, Volume 2, page 1282, expresses the general

rule and its exception in this language:

“The general rule is that a policy made in the

name of a particular person will not protect the in-

terest of any other person, unless the words ‘‘for

whom it may concern,’’ or their equivalent, indicate

that it is intended that the interest of some other

person be covered.’’

Thompson v. Gearheart, 137 Va. 427, 119 S. E. 67.

Harrison v. Pepper, 166 Mass. 288, 44 N. E. 222.

Clements v. Clements, 167 Va. 223, 188 S. E. 154.

In re Gorman’s Estate, 321 Pa. 292, 184 Atl. 86.

36 Brief in Support of Petition

The Words, ‘For Account of Whom It May Concern,” Used in

An Insurance Contract, Are Technical in Their Meaning

And Comprehend Every Species of Property Held in the

Res or Subject of Insurance, and When the Subject of In-

surance is Real Estate, These Words Convert the Policy

Into a Covenant Real and the Indemnity Follows the Title.

In the instant case the form of the policy used by

the contracting parties was designed to cover every specie,

title or interest held by all persons in the property covered

by the policy, and to constitute The Board a trustee of the

funds over and above its own indemnity, payable under it,

for the benefit of all persons having any insurable interest

in the property covered by the policy. The policy, as thus

written, has two aspects. It establishes a legal status be-

tween The Board and the insurance company on the one

part, and an equitable relation between The Board and the

associate owner of the insured property on the other. The

contract, when so construed, is enforceable against the in-

surance company for the whole value of the destroyed prop-

erty, regardless of title or ownership, and as so construed,

conforms to and is in complete harmony with the Statutes

of the State of West Virginia. Such a construction saves

this contract of insurance from invalidity on account of its

being a speculative policy and on account of its violation of

the principles of indemnity firmly fixed by the Statutes of

West Virginia and the decisions of its highest court. This

construction prevents this contract from being a mere

gambling contract. That such a contract, construed as the

Cireuit Court of Appeals construed it, violates public pol-

icy and is void in its entirety, is demonstrated by the very

language of the statute. The words, ‘‘for account of whom

it may concern,’’ were advisedly used in this policy for

the very purpose of avoiding illegality or violating the

Brief in Support of Petition 37

statute and the public policy of the State of West Virginia.

With this language and this construction the policy re-

mains a contract of indemnity, indemnity to The Board

and indemnity to all persons having title or insurable inter-

est in the subject covered by the policy. The contract of

insurance having accomplished the purpose intended, by

denying the insurance company of its legal defense under

the sole ownership paragraph of the standard form, thus

compelling the insurance company to pay the whole cash

value of the destroyed building into court, should now be

enforeed, and The Board should be estopped from denying

its trusteeship in the fund. According to the true intent,

spirit and meaning of this contract, as construed by the

highest courts in this nation, the indemnity now stands in

the place of the building and follows in its distribution the

title to the property destroyed.”

* Hagan v. Scottish Union & National Ins. Co., 186

U. S. 423, 22 S. Ct. 862, 46 L. Ed. 1229.

Miltenberger v. Beacom, 9 Pa. St. 198.

Clyburn v. Reynolds, (S. C.) 9 8S. E. 973.

Green v. Green, (S. C.) 27 S. E. 952.

Haxall’s Ex’ors. v. Shippen, (Va.-1839) 10 Leigh

536, 34 Am. R. 745.

Culbertson v. Cox, 29 Minn. 309, 43 Am. R. 204,

13 N. W. 177.

Brough v. Higgins, 2 Gratt. 408, 19 Va. R. A. 423.

Crisp Co. Lumber Co. v. Lee Bridges, 187 Ga. 484,

200 S. E. 777.

Clark v. Leverett, 159 Ga. 487, 126 S. E. 258.

Welch v. London Assurance Corp. (Pa.) 151 Pa.

St. 607, 25 Atl. 142.

Sampson v. Grogan, (R. 1.) 42 Atl. 712, Opinion of

the Court, 717.

Joyce on Insurance, (2d) Vol. 2, Sees. 964, 966,

p. 2053.

Vance on Insurance, See. 148, p. 421.

38 Brief in Support of Petition

Where Real Estate is Insured in the Comprehensive Terms Used

in the Instant Policy and the Property is Involuntarily De-

stroyed, and the Policy Matures, Equity Will Reconvert the

Indemnity Into Realty to Protect the Interests of the Dif-

ferent Owners of the Subject Insured, and the Money Will

Stand in the Place of the Building and Be Held by Each

Owner as of His Former Estate.

This principle is well recognized throughout the United

States and is as old, and yet beneficial, in its operation as

the jurisdiction of courts of equity. It has been utilized in

every conceivable involuntary conversion of real estate

into personal property, whether the involuntary conver-

sion be under a decree of a court, the administration of

estates under power of personal representatives, sales

under trust deeds or trespass to real estate.’* Some of

these are cases of constructive trust, but here we have a

case of express trust, expressed by the very language used

18 Findley v. Findley, 42 W. Va. 372 ( conversion ju-

dicial sale), 26 S. EK. 443.

Hawes v. Lathrop, 38 Cal. 493 (conversion of

insurance fund).

Chase v. Swayne, 88 Tex. 218, 53 Am. St. R. 742,

(homestead destroyed by fire).

McCoy v. Ferguson, 249 Ky. 334, 60 S. W. (2d) 931

(condemnation conversion).

Green v. Green, 50 S. C. 514, 27 S. E. 952 (conver-

sion fire loss).

Brough v. Higgins, (Va.) 2 Gratt. 408.

Haxall’s Ex’ors. v. Shippen, (Va.-1839) 10 Leigh

536, 34 Am. R. 745 (conversion fire loss).

19 Am. Jur., ‘‘Equitable Conversion,”’ Sec. 19,

p. 18.

4 Pomeroy’s Kq. Jur., (5th Ed.) See. 1168, pp.

499-500.

Brief in Support of Petition 39

in the contract of insurance.’* It is not infrequent in its

application to indemnity arising out of matured fire insur-

ance policies, in cases where the language of the policy will

warrant it. Thus where the policy is payable to the named

assured, his heirs or personal representatives and the pol-

icy matures after death of the named assured and by will

the insured estate is split,’* and in the case of reversioner

not in possession who insures the whole estate, his own in-

terest, as well also as the life estate, a trust in the indemnity

arises for the use and benefit of the whole estate.’ Still

other cases in jurisdictions recognizing the doctrine of trust

relationship between the life tenant and the remainderman,

and either insures the whole estate, the indemnity is re-

converted into realty and becomes a trust.'’ Where prop-

erty is conveyed to trustees for a particular purpose, with

reversion upon failure of use, and the purpose fails, after

the trustees erect the building, and the property in the

meantime is destroyed by fire, the money will be converted

into realty and follow the title upon reversion.'* The lan-

'*Cooley’s Briefs on Insurance, Vol. 2, p. 1265.

2 Barton’s Chancery Practice, (2d) See. 290,

p. 958.

Haxall’s Ex’ors. v. Shippen, (Va.-1839) 10 Leigh

536, 34 Am. Rep. 745.

Culbertson v. Cox, 29 Minn. 309, 13 N. W. 177.

‘* Brough v. Higgins, et al, (Va.-1846) 2 Gratt. 408.

'? Clyburn v. Reynolds, (S. C.) 9 8. E. 973.

Green v. Green, (S. C.) 27 S. E. 952.

Crisp Co. Lumber Co. v. Lee Bridges, 187 Ga. 484,

200 S. E. 777.

Clark v. Leverett, 159 Ga. 487, 126 S. E. 258.

** Hawes v. Lathrop, 38 Cal. 493.

40 Brief in Support of Petition

guage in the instant policy or contract of insurance is clear

and unmistakable, when read in the light of the attending

circumstances at its execution, and by previous judicial

determination, by this Court, the words used undoubtedly

constitute the indemnity a trust fund for the benefit of

whomsoever the loss insured against, would inevitably fall,

but for the insurance, and thus avoid one having but a mere

right to possession for a special purpose appropriating to

its sole use the proceeds of the policy as if taken in its

name alone, on the valuation of the entire and unconditional

title as if it were the sole owner, and by so doing convert

a catastrophe into a blessing.

CONCLUSION

Your petitioner respectfully submits that the final de-

termination by this Court of the questions of law involved

in the interpretation of insurance contracts, is of the ut-

most importance to the rights of contracting parties in rela-

tion to insurance, so frequently and necessarily contracted

in the form utilized in the instant case; as a practical mat-

ter such contracts are universally made upon forms, with

riders attached, couched in previously determined legal

meaning and decisions of this Court so construing such

riders tends to establish a uniformity of construction

throughout the United States.

The decision of the Cireuit Court of Appeals herein is

not only contrary to the law, as announced by this Court

in its earlier decisions, and the holdings of the Supreme

Court of West Virginia, but it is contrary to the express

Statutes of West Virginia, applicable to cases of this char-

acter, and gives to the contract a construction and meaning

Brief in Support of Petition 41

which it was the clear intent, spirit and purpose of the

statutes to prohibit and avoid.

Unless the error in this decision be corrected by this

Court, the effect will be to create widespread and regret-

table confusion, arising out of the conflict of this decision

with applicable statutes of West Virginia and the similar

statutes of other states, which have adopted the New York

Standard Form of Fire Insurance Policy, which contracts

are so frequently and generally used and necessary to the

proper conduct of modern commerce in general, and which

are of the utmost importance in the proper administration

of insurance business generally.

Respectfully submitted,

J. W. MAXWELL,

Counsel for Petitioner.

J. W. Maxwetu,

Beckley, West Virginia.

Fioyp M. Sayre,

Beckley, West Virginia.

G. Berx Lyncu,

Beckley, West Virginia.

Of Counsel for Petitioner.

3

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.

APPENDIX

The pertinent provisions of the West Virginia Statute,

Sections 7 and 8, of Article 4, of Chapter 33, of the Official

Code of West Virginia, (Michie’s Code, Serial Sections

3366 and 3367), which we deem to be helpful to the Court

in arriving at a conclusion in this case, are as follows:

“See, 3366. (7) Form of Fire Policies—No fire insur-

ance company, its officers or agents, shall make, issue or

deliver for use any policy against loss by fire only, or the

renewal of any such policy, on property in this State other

than such as shall conform in all particulars as to blanks,

size of type, context, provisions, agreements and condi-

tions as set forth herein.

(Space for insertion of name of company or companies is-

suing the policy and other matter permitted to be stated at

the head of the policy.)

po eee BR an seAknen Premium $..........

In consideration of the stipulations herein named and of

eee aaeR dollars premium does insure.........++++++5

and legal representatives, to the extent of the actual cash

value (ascertained with proper deductions for depreciation)

of the property at the time of loss or damage, but not ex-

ceeding the amount which it would cost to repair or replace

the same with material of like kind and quality within a

reasonable time after such loss or damage, without allow-

ance for any increased cost of repair or reconstruction by

reason of any ordinance or law regulating construction or

repair and without compensation for loss resulting from

interruption of business or manufacture, for the term of

(43)

44 Appendix

its winene kt ee | 7k ener ee Ae

noon, to the........ ge eee , 19..., at noon,

against all direct loss and damage by fire and by removal

from premises endangered by fire, except as herein pro-

vided, to an amount not exceeding..................65.

dollars to the following described property while located

and contained as described herein, or pro rata for five days

at each proper place to which any of the property shall

necessarily be removed for preservation from fire, but not

elsewhere, to-wit:

(Space for description of property.)

This policy is made and accepted subject to the foregoing

stipulations and conditions, and to the stipulations and con-

ditions printed on the back hereof, which are hereby made

a part of this policy, together with such other provisions,

stipulations and conditions as may be indorsed hereon or

added hereto as herein provided.

In Witness Whereof, this company has executed and at-

tested these presents.

(Space for date and for signatures and titles of officers

and agent.)

. This entire policy shall be void if the

Fraud, misrepre- | . :

sentation, ete. insured has concealed or misrepresented

any material fact or circumstance con-

cerning this insurance or the subject thereof; or in case

of any fraud or false swearing by the insured touching any

matter relating to this insurance or the subject thereof,

whether before or after a loss.

: This policy shall not cover accounts,

pe peel bills, currency, deeds, evidences of debt,

property. money, notes or securities; nor, unless

v Pare eR re RRs ON A OR er LOSER OEP | USO PO ge OR ee ee DN es La rons

Appendia 45

specifically named heron in writing, bullion, manuscripts,

mechanical drawings, dies or patterns.

Scnsin ui This Company shall not be liable for

covered. loss or damage caused directly or indi-

rectly by invasion, insurrection, riot, civil

war or commotion, or military or usurped power, or by

order of any civil authority; or by theft; or by neglect of

the insured to use all reasonable means to save and pre-

serve the property at and after a fire or when the property

is endangered by fire in neighboring premises.

This entire policy shall be void, unless otherwise pro-

vided by agreement in writing added here-

Ownership, ete. to, (a) if the interest of the insured be

other than unconditional and sole owner-

ship; or (b) if the subject of insurance be a building on

ground not owned by the insured in fee simple; or (ce) if,

with the knowledge of the insured, foreclosure proceedings

be commenced or notice given of sale of any property in-

sured hereunder by reason of any mortgage or trust deed;

or (d)-if any change, other than by the death of an insured,

take place in the interest, title or possession of the subject

of insurance (except change of occupants without increase

of hazard) ; or (e) if this policy be assigned before a loss.

Unless otherwise provided by agreement in writing added

hereto this Company shall not be liable for loss or damage

oesurring, (a) while the insured shall have

any other contract of insurance, whether

valid or net, on property covered in whole

Other insurance.

Increase of or in part by this policy; or (b) while the

hazard. hazard is increased by any means within

the control or knowledge of the insured;

Repairs, etc. or (c) while mechanics are employed in

46 Appendix

building, altering or repairing the described premises

beyond a period of fifteen days; or (d)

Explosives, while illuminating gas or vapor is gen-

gas, etc. erated on the described premises; or

while (any usage or custom to the con-

trary notwithstanding) there is kept, used or allowed

on the described premises fireworks, greek fire, phos-

phorus, explosives, benzine, gasoline, naphtha or any other

petroleum product of greater inflammability than kerosene

oil, gunpowder exceeding twenty-five pounds, or ker-

Factories. osene oil exceeding five barrels; or (e) if

the subject of insurance be a manufactur-

ing establishment while operated in whole

or in part between the hours of ten P. M. and five A. M.,

or while it ceases to be operated beyond a period of ten

days; or (f) while a described building,

Unoccupancy. whether intended for occupancy by owner

or tenant, is vacant or unoccupied beyond

Explosion, a period of ten days; or (g) by explosion

Lightning. or lightning, unless fire ensue, and, in that

event, for loss or damage by fire only.

Unless otherwise provided by agree-

Chattel : Ne :

mortgage. ment in writing added hereto this Com-

pany shall not be liable for loss or dam-

age to any property insured hereunder while encumbered

bv a chattel mortgage, and during the time of such encum-

b-ance this Company shall be liable only for loss or damage

to any other property insured hereunder.

If a building, or any material part

Fall of

building. thereof, fall except as the result of fire,

all insurance by this policy on such build-

ing or its contents shall immediately cease.

NERD DT RGA ONS ENTRY ATPL IL RIP ITA LE PT —

bY, en al ay .

Appendix 47

Added The extent of the application of insur-

Clauses. ance under this policy and of the contri-

bution to be made by this Company in ease of loss or dam-

age, and any other agreement not inconsistent with or a

waiver of any of the conditions or provisions of this policy,

may be provided for by agreement in writing added hereto.

Waiver. No one shall have power to waive any

provision or condition of this policy except

such as by the terms of this policy may be the subject of

agreement added hereto, nor shall any such provision or

condition be held to be waived unless such waiver shall

be in writing added hereto, nor shall any provisions or con-

dition of this policy or any forfeiture be held to be waived

by any requirement, act or proceeding on the part of this

Company relating to appraisal or to any examination here-

in provided for; nor shall. any privilege or permission

affecting the insurance hereunder exist or be claimed by

the insured-uhless granted herein or by rider added hereto.

This policy shall be cancelled at any time

at the request of the insured, in which case

the Company shall, upon demand and sur-

render of this policy, refund the excess of paid premium

above the customary short rates for the expired time. This

policy may be cancelled at any time by the Company by

giving to the insured a five days’ written notice of ean-

cellation with or without tender of the excess of paid pre-

mium above the pro rata premium for the expired time,

which excess, if not tendered, shall be refunded on demand.

Notice of cancellation shall state that said excess premium

(if not tendered) will be refunded on demand.

Cancellation

of policy.

This Company shall not be liable for a

Pro rata ‘ ‘

liability. greater proportion of any loss or damage

% SEE LE MOVES SS NT ROTI EE ETON TET PINTS PTET STS

Biter ocr RES TAs SFR SR ¥

SF .y Be

PRETENCE 952 RRS EE IEE PTE IER AN” ERS EL ERB I

48 Appendix

than the amount hereby insured shall bear to the whole

insurance covering the property, whether valid or not and

whether collectible or not.

The word ‘‘noon’’ herein means noon

Noon. : ,

Mertgage of standard time at the place of loss or

interests. damage. If loss or damage is made pay-

able, in whole or in part, to a mortgagee

not named herein as the insured, this policy may be can-

celled as to such interest by giving to such mortgagee a ten

days’ written notice of cancellation. Upon failure of the

insured to render proof of loss such mortgagee shall, as if

named as insured hereunder, but within sixty days after

notice of such failure, render proof of loss and shall be

subject to the provisions hereof as to appraisal and times

of payment and of bringing suit. On payment to such mort-

gagee of any sum for loss or damage hereunder, if this

Company shall claim that as to the mortgagor or owner,

no liability existed, it shall, to the extent of such payment

be subrogated to the mortgagee’s right of recovery and

claim upon the collateral to the mortgage debt, but with-

out impairing the mortgagee’s right to sue; or it may pay

the mortgage debt and require an assignment thereof and

of the mortgage. Other provisions relating to the interests

and obligations of such mortgagee may be added hereto

by agreements in writing.

‘ The insured shall give immediate no-

Requirements “wea ir :

in case of loss. tice in writing, to this Company, of any

loss or damage, protect the property from

further damage, forthwith separate the damaged and un-

damaged personal property, put it in the best possible

order, furnish a complete inventory of the destroyed, dam-

aged and undamaged property, stating the quantity and

cost of each article and the amount claimed thereon; and,

Appendix 49

the insured shall, within sixty days after the fire, unless

such time is extended in writing by this Company, render

to this Company a proof of loss, signed and sworn to by

the insured, stating the knowledge and belief of the insured

as to the following: The time and origin of the fire, the

interest of the insured and of all others in the property,

the cash value of each item thereof and the amount of loss

or damage thereto, all encumbrances thereon, all other

contracts of insurance, whether valid or not, covering any

of said property, any changes in the title, use, occupation,

location, possession, or exposures of said property since

the issuing of this policy, by whom and for what purpose

any building herein described and the several parts thereof

were occupied at the time of fire; and shall furnish a copy

of all the descriptions and schedules in all policies and if

required, verified plans and specifications of any building,

fixtures or machinery destroyed or damaged. The insured,

as often as may be reasonably required, shall exhibit to

any person designated by this Company all that remains

of any property herein described, and submit to examina-

tions under oath by any person named by this Company,

and subscribe the same; and, as often as may be reasonably

required, shall produce for examination all books of ac-

count, bills, invoices, and other vouchers, or certified copies

thereof, if originals be lost, at such reasonable time and

place as may be designated by this Company or its repre-

sentative, and shall permit extracts and copies thereof to

be made.

Appraisal. In case the insured and this Company

shall fail to agree as to the amount of loss

or damage, each shall, on the written demand of either,

select a competent and disinterested appraiser. The ap-

praisers shall first select a competent and disinterested

50 Appendix

umpire; and failing for fifteen days to agree upon such

umpire then, on request of the insured or this Company,

such umpire shall be selected by a judge of a court of rec-

ord in the state in which the property insured is located.

The appraisers shall then appraise the loss and damage

stating separately sound value and loss or damage to each

item; and failing to agree, shall submit their differences

only, to the umpire. An award in writing, so itemized, of

any two when filed with this Company shall determine the

amount of sound value and loss or damage. Each appraiser

shall be paid by the party selecting him and the expenses

of appraisal and umpire shall be paid by the parties equally.

- It shall be optional with this Company

Company’s ; ‘

options. to take all, or any part, of the articles at

the agreed or appraised value, and also

to repair, rebuild, or replace the propert y lost or damaged

with other of like kind and quality within a reasonable time,

on giving notice of its intention so to do within thirty days

after the receipt of the proof of loss here-

in required; but there can be no abandon-

ment to this Company of any property.

Abandonment.

The amount of loss or damage for which

When loss this C wn alate tos Math cha hs cae

payable. us Company may be liable shall be pay-

able sixty days after proof of loss, as

herein provided, is received by this Company and ascer-

tainment of the loss or damage is made either by agree-

ment between the insured and this Company expressed in

writing or by the filing with this Company of an award as

herein provided.

Suit No suit or action on this poliey, for the

recovery of any claim, shall be sustain-

able in any court of law or equity unless all the require-

Appendix 51

ments of this policy shall have been complied with, nor

unless commenced within twelve months next after the

fire.

Subrogation. This Company may require from the

insured an assignment of all right of re-

covery against any party for loss or damage to the extent

that payment therefor is made by this Company.

Standard Fire Insurance Policy of the State of West

Virginia

MND fax Cwaweihaen vEREKRCS hobo Ee. ok

ROE An akadead RiniaWL Rech oeeehitlko

Amount - - - ELT OTS Peete cEeeere

Premium - - - Bikacucayenpaneceees $

PREP MAAS AROS ROARED EDO DEO MA Oe ee ee We be Ss bes &

It is important that the written portions of all policies

covering the same property read exactly alike. If they do

not they should be made uniform at once. (1907, c. 77, sec.

68; Code 1923, ¢. 34, sec. 68; 1923, ¢. 18, see. 68.)

Sec. 3367. (8) Additional Matter Which May Be In-

serted In Fire Policy—No other or different provision,

agreement, condition or clause shall be in any manner

made a part of such contract or policy or indorsed thereon

or added thereto or delivered therewith, except as follows,

to-wit:

(a) There may be printed at the head of said policy in

the space indicated by the words ‘‘space for insertion of

name of company or companies issuing the policy and other

matter permitted to be stated at the head of the policy’’

the name of the company, or companies, issuing the policy;

52 A ppendiz

the location and place of business thereof; the date of in-

corporation or organization thereof ; whether said company,

or companies, are stock or mutual corporations; and such

device or devices as the company, or companies, issuing

said policy shall desire;

_(b) There may be printed at the end of the first page

of said policy in the space indicated therefor by the words

““space for date and for signatures and titles of officers and

agent,’’ the names and titles of the officers executing and

attesting the policy and the words ‘“‘but this policy shall

not be valid until countersigned by the duly authorized

agent of the company at............ ’” (or the ‘‘manager’’

in place of the word ‘‘agent’’?) and the words ‘‘counter-

GN Bk Okan cei kwih WOE ec sis Be SR Ee pe te Meg

followed by a blank space for the signature of such duly

authorized agent or manager, and the word ‘‘agent’”’? or

‘‘manager’’;

(ec) There may be printed in the space indicated by the

words ‘‘space for description of property,’’ or added to

the policy at such space by agreement in writing thereon

or by rider attached thereto the following: (1) Deserip-

tions and specifications, by schedule or otherwise, or the

property covered by the policy; (2) The extent of the appli-

cation of insurance under the policy; (3) The extent of the

contribution to be made under the policy in ease of loss or

damage; (4) Any other matter necessary clearly to express

all the facts and conditions of insurance on any particular

risk. Provided, however, That no such agreement or rider

shall be inconsistent with or a waiver of any of the con-

ditions or provisions of the standard fire insurance policy

hereby established, except that in the case of a mortgagee

not named in the policy as the insured, such provisions may

be added as shall not be inconsistent with or a waiver of

Appendix 53

any of the provisions of the said standard policy relating

to mortgage interests, but if so added, shall include the pro-

visions of a standard rider or indorsement relating to such

interest the form of which shall have been approved by the

insurance commissioner ard filed in his office as herein-

after provided;

(d) There may be added to the policy, with the approval

of the insurance commissioner, any provision which any

company issuing a policy is required by law to insert in its

policies, not in conflict wth the provisions of such ‘stand-

ard fire insurance poliey.’’ All such provisions shall be

printed in a group apart from the other provisions, agree-

ments or conditions of the poliey under separate title as

follows: ‘*Provisions required by law to be stated in this

policy’’;

(e) If the policy be made by a mutual or other com-

pany having special regulations lawfully applicable to its

organization, membership, policies or contracts of insur-

ance, such regulations may, with the approval of the insur-

ance commissioner, be written or printed upon, attached or

appended to the policy, upon the third page of such stand-

ard policy, but shall be preceded by the words ‘This pol-

icy is issued by a mutual company having special regula-

tions lawfully applicable to its organization, membership,

policies or contracts of insurance of which the following

shall apply to and form a part of this poliey’’;

(tf) Contracts for temporary insurance may be made

for a period not exceeding fifteen days, which shall be

deemed to inelude all of the provisions of the standard

policy with such agreements and riders in writing added

thereto as may be necessary to effeet valid insurance of the

described property and such other agreements not incon-

RANE OEP