Petition for A Writ of Certiorari — All Service Laundry Corp. v. Phillips
Supreme Court brief1946
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OcroBer Term, 1945.
Xo 200
AuL Service Launpry Corporation, Petitioner,
Vv.
Liuian Mavup Puruiirs, as Adninistratrix of the goods,
chattels and credits of Cuirrorp R. Puiurps, deceased,
JosepH Bonura, Tony Zummo, Tony Satapino, CHARLES
Sauapino, Puiu Pern, Atserr Jert, Danny Faro,
Tuetma Doveras, Apa Berkey, individually and on
behalf of all other employees of defendant similarly
situated.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.
Srantey I. Posner,
Counsel for Petitioner,
213 Standard Oil Building,
Washington 1, D.C.
Of Counsel:
Henry J. Fox,
Avert EF. Arent.
August, 1945,
Passes or Brzon 8. Apaus, Waakiworon, D.C
> a
INDEX.
Page
i enc kcbebacehsenbua NOCGR SOS “<) Ae
ee ee cent ade ded Heck eeeeweus stneansee 2
QuESTIONS PRESENTED ... 2.2.0.0... . cece ee cece ween 2
Srarutory Provisions INVOLVED .............000000% 2
NE ATS ere tees eee ee ee Ee eee eT ee 3
Reasons For GRANTING THE WRIT ..............0.05- 5
I. The Cireuit Court of Appeals has erroneously de-
cided important questions of Federal law which
have not been, but should be, settled by this Court 5
1.The scope of the ‘‘service establishment’’ ex-
IN ik kg eax dnd enccnsccasannoncnacsacce 5
2.The significance of the exclusion of ‘‘goods
after their delivery into the actual physical pos-
session of the ultimate consumer’’ ...........
3. Non-applicability of the Fair Labor Standards
Act to businesses essentially local in character 9
=~!
II. The decision of the Court below conflicts in prin-
ciple with the decisions of the Cireuit Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Cireuit in Lonas v. Na-
tional Linen Service Corporation, 136 F. 2d 433,
cert. den. 320 U. S. 785, and in Martino v. Michigan
Window Cleaning Co., 145 F. 2d 163, as to which
this Court granted certiorari on June 18, 1945... 11
nT PUTTTTT CTT CeTT LETTE 13
CITATIONS.
Cass:
Boutell v. Walling, 148 F. 2d 329 ................ S
Brown v. Tracy Bottling Co., 6 Labor cases, Par.
DR 4s Ces iakneivsten dec kOERADAN bes 50048 10
Goldberg v. Worman, 37 F. Supp. 778 ..........-- 10
Lamb v. Quality Baking Co., Inc., 3 Labor Cases,
10
———
ii Index Continued.
Page
Lonas v. National Linen Service Corporation, 136
F, 2d 433, cert. den. 320 U. S. 785 ........ 11, 12,13
Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 145 F.
EE LE es aaa chee shhh cede khceee kad 11, 12,13
McDaniel v. Clavin, 128 Pac. 2d 821, aff’d 136 Pac.
GOST 210) cok 6 ka 60 004 88 04 8068 .ok Nh KOO 10
Morrow v. Lee Baking Co., 4 Labor Cases Par.
ee ain ga kick bnneta cbabene 10
New Mexico Public Service Co. v. Engel, 145 F. 2d
DEEL E RTS Oks Nhe Rapes Giebee Viekanse he’s 10
Southern California Freight Lines v. McKeown,
PTE 44 Neen cAinaacne da des Sha Reen sch 10
10 East 40th Street Building, Inc. v. Callus, 324
CE ON Ahh iia Lad Calas he koe. 044 C400S AH 9
Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U. 8S.
Ce Geter ch ec Lark ase hbaneve seu ses ens ics 6, 9, 10
Walling v. Roland Electrical Co., 146 F. 2d 745. 8, 12
Whitsitt v. Enid Ice & Fuel Co., 6 Labor Cases,
a ee rank rey nearer eee rere 10
STaTuTEs:
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060,
Oe ae Us ee U, BU OB ORG cca nc cen sasnsaccs 2
EN OS hea or’ eee 2,3,4,7,8
TE Se ida gg aed wins seu (hed cab ence ¥ 10
< 2° 2. ers 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12
aah ah een aN hina wana ec ans ihe 3
Judicial Code, Sec. 240 (a) as amended by Act of
EE ei oa et hate eiaexsthen than 2
MISCELLANEOUS:
Wage and Hour Field Operations Bulletin, Vol. II,
a cn kG ARRAN A OK4 65 0000/8 7
Wage and Hour Interpretative Bulletin No. 6 ... 5,9
Wage and Hour Opinion Letter of September 20,
BE See tN EAS SES AR OK KAR Se tae ese aanens 7
Wage and Hour Opinion Letter of June 3, 1942 . 7
Wage and Hour Release of September 26, 1941 . 7
Letter of July 2, 1942 from Administrator ‘of Wage
and Hour Division, ong. Ree. Vol. 89, P. A1024,
hh s.ds cas sean ea ence vadans 11
-
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Gnited States
Ocroser Term, 1945.
ALL Service Launpry Corporation, Petitioner,
Vv.
Lituian Maup Puuuips, as Administratrix of the goods,
chattels and credits of CLirrorp R. Pures, deceased,
JosepH Bonura, Tony ZumMo, Tony SaLapino, CHARLES
Sanapino, Puiiiie Perri, ALBerr Jerr, Danny Fano,
THetma Dovetas, Ava Berkevey, individually and on
behalf of all other employees of defendant similarly
situated.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.
All Service Laundry Corporation (hereinafter referred
to as ‘All Service’’) prays that a writ of certiorari issue
to review the judgment of the United States Cireuit Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in this case.
ORAL SNS RTE MEME SYN LS EAM AT HP PLEA BEET EIR FHM A OTT
9
ne
OPINIONS BELOW.
The opinion of the District Court (R. 18-20) is reported
in 55 F. Supp. 238. The opinion of the Cireuit Court of
Appeals (R. 47-54) has not yet been reported.
JURISDICTION.
The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals was en-
tered on June 2, 1945 (R. 60). The jurisdiction of this Court
is invoked under Section 240(a) of the Judicial Code, as
amended by the Act of February 13, 1925.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED.
1. Whether a laundry whose principal customer is a com-
pany which supplies laundry service to persons employed
in commerce and industry is a ‘‘service establishment”’
within the exemption provided by Sec. 13 (a) (2) of the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.
2. Whether garments laundered for return to their pre-
vious users constitute ‘‘goods’’ under Sec. 3(i) of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, which defines that term as not in-
cluding ‘‘goods after their delivery into the actual physical
possession of the ultimate consumer thereof other than
a producer, manufacturer or processor thereof.’’
3. Whether the Fair Labor Standards Act applies to
employees of a laundry all of whose customers and business
transactions are within the State of New York, where 4%
of the laundered garments ultimately moves in interstate
commerce.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED.
The statutory provisions involved are Sections 3 (i) and
13 (a) (2) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ¢. 676,
52 Stat. 1060, 29 U. S. C. see. 201, et seq., which read as
follows:
ii . v ere ET PERI SS — we
3
Sec. 3. As used in this Act—
* * * *« * *
(i) ‘*Goods’’ mean goods (including ships and ma-
rine equipment), wares, products, commodities, mer-
chandise, or articles or subjects of commerce of any
character, or any part of ingredient thereof, but does
not include goods after their delivery into the actual
physical possession of the ultimate consumer thereof
other than a producer, manufacturer, or processor
thereof.
* * * * .
Sec. 13 (a) The provisions of sections 6 and 7 shall
not apply with respect to * * * (2) any employee en-
gaged in any retail or service establishment the greater
part of whose selling or servicing is in intrastate com-
merce; * * *
STATEMENT.
This suit was initiated on October 15, 1942, in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, under Section 16 (b) of the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1069, 29 U. S. C. see. 216(b), to re-
cover for the plaintiffs, and for others similarly situated,
overtime compensation and liquidated damages. The orig-
inal defendant was Star Overall Dry Cleaning Laundry
Company, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as ‘‘Star’’), but
upon trial All Service was by stipulation made a party de-
fendant. At the trial a written stipulation of facts was filed
(R. 15, 16) and additional facts were stipulated orally (R.
10-14). No further testimony was taken.
The facts may be summarized as follows (R. 15, 16):
All Service is engaged in the laundry business, with all
of its customers located within the State of New York.
During the period in question 80% of its work of cleaning,
pressing, and laundering overalls, slacks, coats, union suits,
pants and hoovers was performed for Star. Both corpora-
tions have their principal place of business in Brooklyn,
New York.
PERLE IL ESRI EEE LO IIIB AE LEE IAM SRL MACAO AY RPT TAN
——
4
Star was engaged in the business of collecting soiled
linens, overalls, slacks, coats, pants, union suits and hoovers,
and of having them laundered or otherwise cleaned. It then
returned them to its customers and was paid a fee for the
service. During the period in question 95% of its busi-
ness was with people within the State of New York and 5%
with people outside the State of New York. Its business
was done with individuals to the extent of 82% and 18%
was ‘‘bulk,’’ a term meaning that the soiled clothes were
received in larger bundles than those collected from indi-
viduals (R. 13). Its customers were persons employed in
various kinds of industrial, business and professional es-
tablishments.
The complaint was dismissed as to Star upon a finding
that the plaintiffs were not its employees (R. 23). Judg-
ment was entered against All Service in favor of each plain-
tiff for stipulated amounts without interest and for a stipu-
lated attorney’s fee (R. 24-25).
The defendants appealed from the judgment of the Dis-
trict Court (R. 26) and the plaintiffs took a cross appeal
(R. 34) because of the disallowance of interest, an issue
which they subsequently abandoned. After hearing argu-
ment, the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District
Court and dismissed the complaint (R. 36-42) on the ground
that the garments on which the plaintiffs worked were not
‘“goods’’ within the Fair Labor Standards Act since that
term as defined in Section 3(i) ‘‘does not inelude goods af-
ter their delivery into the actual physical possession of the
ultimate consumer thereof other than the producer, manu-
facturer or processor thereof.’’ Plaintiffs filed a petition for
rehearing (R. 42-46), after which the court withdrew its
original opinion and rendered a new decision affirming the
judgment of the District Court (R. 47-54). Thereupon de-
fendant petitioned for a rehearing (R. 55-58), which peti-
tion was denied (R. 59).
_—
5
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.
I.
The Circuit Court of Appeals has erroneously decided
important questions of Federal law which have not been, but
should be, settled by this Court.
1. The scope of the *‘service cstablishment’’ exemption.
Although taking it for granted that a laundry is a typical
example of a service establishment, the Court below held
that the employees of All Service did not come within the
exemption of Sec. 13 (a) (2) because they would not have
been exempt if employed by Star in the same capacity (R.
53). The Court does not explain why Star is not to be re-
garded as a service establishment, except to say that it was
engaged in ‘‘production’’ rather than ‘‘servicing’’ (R. 53).
Star’s ‘‘production’’ consisted of supplying laundry
service to persons working in commercial and indus-
trial establishments (R. 15, 16). The decision below thus
directly raises the question whether such activities make
Star a ‘‘retail or service establishment’’ within the mean-
ing of See. 13 (a) (2).
Prior to this decision it was generally accepted that busi-
nesses like Star’s were service establishments since they
qualified as such under the following provision in para-
graph 27 of Interpretative Bulletin No. 6 of the Wage and
Hour Division (CCH Labor Law Service, par. 32, 106) :
‘‘The cleaning of garments such as uniforms worn by
industrial workers will not alter the character of the
establishment as a service establishment, if the work is
performed at the normal price charged to private cus-
tomers or if the transaction does not involve a quantity
of goods materially larger than the normal quantity
serviced for private customers.”’
Star even meets the Administrator’s definition of retail
service establishment, since under paragraph 18 of Inter-
pretative Bulletin No. 6 nonretail sales which constitute
6
less than 25% of total gross receipts are not deemed suffici-
ently substantial to deprive the establishment of its retail
character. The stipulation of facts reveals that 82% of
Star’s business was with private individuals (R. 16). More-
over, only 5% of Star’s business was with customers outside
of New York State (R. 15). Star is, therefore, one of
‘those retailers located near the state lines and making
some interstate sales’’ for whom the exemptior. in See. 13
(a) (2) was intended. Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co.,
317 U.S. 564, 571.
The indirect approach adopted by the Court below should
not obscure the basic question, which is whether All Service,
rather than Star, is a service establishment. This raises a
question which has been troubling the Administrator and
the courts for several years, namely, whether the exemption
for ‘‘retail or service establishments’? is to be restricted
in its application to retail establishments alone. The con-
flicts which have arisen over this question in the Circuit
Courts of Appeals are discussed below in Section IT.
If the exemption should be construed as limited to estab-
lishments of a retail character, two important questions will
remain as to what constitutes a retail service establishment.
First, does a laundry cease to be retail because its customers
use the cleaned garments in connection with their work in
commercial or industrial establishments? As _ indicated
above, the Administrator has heretofore regarded laun-
deries as nonretail only if their sales were made to com-
mercial or industrial firms, not when made to individual
employees.
Second, does a laundry cease to be a retail service estab-
lishment because sales and deliveries to the ultimate con-
sumers are made by another company? The Wage and
Hour Division has consistently held that the interven-
tion of such a company does not alter the retail character
of the service performed by the primary establishment. This
policy is set forth in the following official statement :
aright abe ee Ft RAEN OA TETAS SP
7
‘Work performed by a central cleaning plant on the
garments of private individuals will be considered work
of an exempt type for purposes of Section 13 (a) (2)
exemption even though the goods may be received
through a branch or independent shop.’’ Wage and
Hour Field Operations Bulletin, Vol. I1, No. 2, Septem-
ber 22, 1941 (2 C. C. H. Labor Law Service, par. 25,
9091.831).!
Thus it appears that with respect to both Star and All
Service the decision below reaches conclusions contrary to
official interpretations of the Wage and Hour Division and
adds to the confusion which has always existed concerning
the proper application of Sec. 13 (a) (2).
2. The significance of the exclusion of ‘goods after their
delivery into the actual physical possession of the ultimate
consumer,”’
The plaintiffs worked on garments which had been sent
out for laundering by persons who had worn and soiled
them. They were regularly returned to the same users, who
were thus the ‘‘ultimate consumer[s] thereof.’’?? Articles
cease to be ‘*goods’’ within the definition of Section 3(i) of
the Act ‘‘after their delivery into the actual physical pos-
session of the ultimate consumer thereof.’’ Hence the plain-
tiffs were not engaged in the production of goods for com-
merce and were not covered by the Act.
1See also Wage and Hour opinion letter, September 20, 1940,
holding that a local cleaning and dyeing establishment which does
work for independent tailor shops in other states is exempt under
See. 13 (a) (2) where the bulk of its business is intrastate (2
C. C. H. Labor Law Service, par. 25, 551.83). See similar Wage
and Hour opinion letter: June 3, 1942. re watch repairing (ibid
par. 25, 551.886) ; also Wage and Hour release September 26, 1941
(ibid par. 25, 551.8875).
* The record is silent as to who owned the garments. Since, how-
ever, the Cireuit Court of Appeals made assumptions as to facts
not in the record which are contrary to the actual facts, it is neces-
sary to point out that the majority of the garments were the prop-
erty of their users and that even the rented garments were regular-
ly returned to the same users until they were worn out.
SS CEPT Eerie RE ro eS oA
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The Court below adopted this view in its first opinion but
reversed itself on rehearing on the basis of the erroneous
assumption that ‘‘a large part, if not all,’’ of the garments
were rented and ‘‘very likely’’ were not rented to the same
customers each time after cleaning. The stipulation of facts
states:
“The defendant, Star Overall Dry Cleaning Laundry
Company, Inc., during the period mentioned in the com- |
plaint was engaged in the business of collecting soiled
linens, overalls, slacks, coats, pants, union suits, and
hoovers, having the same laundered or cleaned and re-
turned for a fee.’’ (emphasis supplied) (R. 15.)
The use of the word ‘‘returned”’ establishes that the gar-
ments were repeatedly used by the same persons. Such
users, it is submitted, are, in the common understanding and
within the meaning of Section 3(i), the ‘‘ultimate con-
sumer[s] thereof’’.
The Cireuit Court of Appeals erroneously treated Star
as the ultimate consumer and compared the work done by
the plaintiffs with that performed by employees who repair
machinery, stating, ‘‘Indeed, this recurrent cleaning and
pressing was so like repairs for use that cases dealing with
the effect of the statute upon employees engaged in making
such repairs are in point.’’ On June 18, 1945, this Court
granted certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in Walling v. Roland Electrical Co., 146 F.
2d 745, and to the Cireuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Cireuit in Boutell v. Walling, 148 F. 2d 329, both of which
involve the question of the application of the Act to such
repairmen. If the analogy drawn in the opinion below is
sound, the decision of this Court in those cases may have
a substantial bearing upon the instant case.
—_— S
9
3. Non-applicability of the Fair Labor Standards Act to
businesses essentially local in character.
All Service dea!t only with customers located within New
York State and engaged in no transactions of which any ele-
ment took place outside the State. Its principal customer,
however, accounting for 80% of its business, made 5% of
its sales to persons outside of the State (R. 15). There is
nothing in the record to indicate whether or not these par-
ticular plaintiffs worked upon the garments which ulti-
mately were transported across the State line. Assuming,
however, that they did, such garments constituted only 4%
of their output.
Thus, the facts show that All Service remained at all
times essentially a local business and, as this Court de-
clared in Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U. S. 564,
570,
sae ° *
we cannot be unmindful that Congress in en-
acting this statute plainly indicated its purpose to
leave local business to the protection of the States."’
In its recent decision in 10 East 40th Street Building v.
Callus, 324 U.S. , this Court said:
‘*Renting office space in a building exclusively set aside
for an unrestricted variety of office work spontane-
ously satisfies the common understanding of what is
local business and makes the employees of such a build-
ing engaged in local business.’’
The same can be said for an enterprise like All Service,
which conducts every element of its business transactions
in New York State* and approaches the sphere of inter-
*The Wage and Hour Administrator has ruled that ‘‘in deter-
mining the applicability of the section 13 (a) (2) exemption, the
selling or servicing of the establishment will be considered in intra-
state commerce in all cases in which all the elements of the sale or
— take place within the State in which the establishment is
located, irrespective of the source of the goods and the retail or
nonretail character of the transaction’’. Interpretative Bulletin
No. 6, par 46, 2 C. C. H. Labor Law Service, Par. 32,106.
10
state commerce only through the fact that its principal
customer does 5% of its business outside of the State.
If, under these circumstances, the activities of All Serv-
ice employees constitute ‘‘the production of goods for com-
merce’? within the meaning of Section 7 of the Act, 52 Stat.
1067, 29 U. S. C. see. 207, then such production must be
deemed so insubstantial as to justify the application of the
maxim de minimis non curat lex This Court intimated in
the Jacksonville Paper Co. case (page 572) that a substan-
tial part of an employee's activities must relate to goods
moving in the channels of interstate commerce in order to
bring into play the coverage of the Act.
The question of what constitutes a substantial part of an
employee's activities for this purpose has repeatedly arisen
and calls for clarification by this Court. See, for example,
Southern California Freight Lines v. McKeown, 148 F. 2d
890 (C. C. A. 9, 1945); New Mexico Public Service Co. v.
Engel, 145 F. 2d 636 (C. C. A. 10, 1944), and eases cited
therein; Goldberg v. Worman, 37 F. Supp. 778 (S. D.-Fla.
1941); Whitsitt v. Enid Ice & Fuel Co., 6 Labor Cases par.
61,226 (D. C. Okla, 1942); Brown v. Tracy Bottling Co., 6
Labor Cases par. 61,109 (D. C. Minn. 1942); McDaniel v.
Clavin, 128 Pac. (2d) 821 (Cal. App. Ct. 1942), aff'd 136
Pac. (2d) 559: Morrow v. Lee Baking Co., 4 Labor Cases,
par. 60,701 (N. D. Ga. 1941); Lamb v. Quality Baking Co..
Inc., 3 Labor Cases, par. 60,042 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1940).
It is submitted that the test should be whether the employ-
ment remains essentially local in its character and its ef-
fect upon commerce.
11
II.
The decision of the Court below conflicts in principle with
the decisions of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit in Lonas v. National Linen Service Corporation, 136
F. 2d 433, cert. den. 320 U. S. 785, and in Martino v. Mich-
igan Window Cleaning Co., 145 F. 2d 163, as to which this
Court granted certiorari on June 18, 1945.
The conflict which exists among the decisions of the Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals over the meaning of the ‘‘retail or
service establishment’? exemption was summarized in the
opinion below as follows:
‘*Tt has been held that despite the disjunctive ‘or’ be-
tween retail and servicing in subdivision (a) (2) of §13,
the legislative history, coupled with other considera-
tions taken te be persuasive, makes the proper con-
struction of .2is subdivision one of the limitation of
servicing to retail servicing, i.e., to the selling of serv-
ices, instead of goods, at retail. Some of these cases
are Biacey v. Luray, supra; Guess v. Montague, 140
F. (2) 500; Walling v. Roland Electrical Co., 146 F.
(2) 745; Walling v. Sandok, 132 F. (2) 77; and Rey-
nolds v. Salt Rwer Valley Water Users Association,
143 F. (2) 863. The contrary view was taken in Lonas
v. National Linen Service Corporation, 136 F. (2) 483.
See also Martino v. Michiqan Window Cleaning Co., 145
F. (2) 163; Stucker v. Roselle, 37 F. Supp. 864.’’ (R.
52.)
Although the Court by reason of its erroneous assumption
as to the character of Star avoided a direct holding on this
issue, it makes quite clear its own preference for the theory
that ‘‘retail or service establishment’’ should be construed
to mean ‘‘retail service establishment’? (R. 52, 53).
This construction ignores the plain language used by
Congress to express its intention and misinterprets the leg-
islative history of Section 13(a) (2).* It creates an artifi-
*In a letter dated July 2, 1942 the Administrator of the Wage
and Hour Division wrote to Representative Fred A. Hartley, Jr.,
who was ranking member of the House Labor Committee which
——
12
cial and illogical distinction between a retail laundry and a
nonretail laundry, both of which are essentially localized
community services, employing the same type of workers,
using the same type of equipment, performing similar func-
tions and competing for the same business. No such dis-
tinction is made by other governmental agencies, Federal or
State, which uniformly treat all branches of the laundry
trade as a single category.°
On June 18, 1945 this Court granted certiorari in the Ro-
land Electrical Co. case ana the Michigan Window Cleaning
Co. case, cited by the Second Circuit as representing con-
flicting views. The existence of conflict among the circuits
on this question was recognized by counsel for the Wage and
Hour Administrator in his memorandum in response to the
petition for a writ of certiorari in the Roland Electrical Co.
case. This memorandum also pointed out that ‘The diver-
gency of judicial opinion as to the meaning of ‘retail or serv-
ice’ in See. 13 (a) (2) has produced a difficulty in the admin-
istration of this portion of the statute’’.
Counsel for the petitioner contend that the instant case
should have been decided in favor of the petitioner upon the
authority of Lonas v. National Linen Service Corporation
handled the Act as well as a member of the Conference Committee
which drafted the final language of Section 13 (a) (2), as follows:
“*T am very much inclined to the view that all laundries, regardless
of whether they do so-called commercial work or not, were in-
tended by the Congress to be exempt, as you definitely state * * *.”’
Cong. Ree. Vol. 89, p. A1024, 78th Cong. 1st Session.
In the card catalog of the U. S. Department of Labor Library
are nearly one hundred references to the laundry trades and work-
ing conditions therein. An examination of these references re-
vealed unanimity in description of the laundry trades as service
industries. There is not a single instance of an effort to distinguish
between wholesale and retail laundries. The same is true of the
minimum wage orders issued by the various states. See C. C. H.
Labor Law Service, par. 45,501 under name of each state. The
orders in Massachusetts, Ohio, and a number of other states spe-
cifically include in their definition of laundry trade or occupation
“‘the collecting, sale, resale or distribution at retail or wholesale of
laundry services.’’
13
and Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., supra. Since
the principle involved in both cases will be passed upon by
this Court during the next term, it is essential that this peti-
tion be granted so that the rights of the petitioner may be
preserved.
None of the cases in which certiorari has been granted in-
volves the laundry industry. Nevertheless, the disposition
of these cases has a direct bearing upon the Lonas decision,
in reliance upon which members of the laundry industry
have assumed that they were exempt from the coverage of
the Fair Labor Standards Act. It is, therefore, important
that a case involving the laundry industry be before this
Court when it has under examination the principle estab-
lished in the Lonas decision.
CONCLUSION.
This case involves important questions of Federal law
which have not been, but should be, settled by this Court.
The decision below leaves a large segment of the laundry in-
dustry in great confusion as to its status under the Fair
Labor Standards Act. The conflicts which exist among the
cireuit courts of appeals concerning the scope of the service
establishment exemption and the importance of this question
in the administration of the Act have been recognized by
this Court in the granting of certiorari in three cases to be
heard at the coming term. It is appropriate that while this
issue is before the Court the status of the laundry industry
under the Act be clarified.
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that this petition
should be granted.
STANLEY I. POSNER,
Cownel for Petitioner,
213 Standard Oil Building,
Of Counsel : Washington 1, D.C.
HENRY J. FOX
ALBERT E. ARENT
August, 1945.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.