Petition for A Writ of Certiorari — All Service Laundry Corp. v. Phillips

Supreme Court brief1946

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcroBer Term, 1945.

Xo 200

AuL Service Launpry Corporation, Petitioner,

Vv.

Liuian Mavup Puruiirs, as Adninistratrix of the goods,

chattels and credits of Cuirrorp R. Puiurps, deceased,

JosepH Bonura, Tony Zummo, Tony Satapino, CHARLES

Sauapino, Puiu Pern, Atserr Jert, Danny Faro,

Tuetma Doveras, Apa Berkey, individually and on

behalf of all other employees of defendant similarly

situated.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.

Srantey I. Posner,

Counsel for Petitioner,

213 Standard Oil Building,

Washington 1, D.C.

Of Counsel:

Henry J. Fox,

Avert EF. Arent.

August, 1945,

Passes or Brzon 8. Apaus, Waakiworon, D.C

> a

INDEX.

Page

i enc kcbebacehsenbua NOCGR SOS “<) Ae

ee ee cent ade ded Heck eeeeweus stneansee 2

QuESTIONS PRESENTED ... 2.2.0.0... . cece ee cece ween 2

Srarutory Provisions INVOLVED .............000000% 2

NE ATS ere tees eee ee ee Ee eee eT ee 3

Reasons For GRANTING THE WRIT ..............0.05- 5

I. The Cireuit Court of Appeals has erroneously de-

cided important questions of Federal law which

have not been, but should be, settled by this Court 5

1.The scope of the ‘‘service establishment’’ ex-

IN ik kg eax dnd enccnsccasannoncnacsacce 5

2.The significance of the exclusion of ‘‘goods

after their delivery into the actual physical pos-

session of the ultimate consumer’’ ...........

3. Non-applicability of the Fair Labor Standards

Act to businesses essentially local in character 9

=~!

II. The decision of the Court below conflicts in prin-

ciple with the decisions of the Cireuit Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Cireuit in Lonas v. Na-

tional Linen Service Corporation, 136 F. 2d 433,

cert. den. 320 U. S. 785, and in Martino v. Michigan

Window Cleaning Co., 145 F. 2d 163, as to which

this Court granted certiorari on June 18, 1945... 11

nT PUTTTTT CTT CeTT LETTE 13

CITATIONS.

Cass:

Boutell v. Walling, 148 F. 2d 329 ................ S

Brown v. Tracy Bottling Co., 6 Labor cases, Par.

DR 4s Ces iakneivsten dec kOERADAN bes 50048 10

Goldberg v. Worman, 37 F. Supp. 778 ..........-- 10

Lamb v. Quality Baking Co., Inc., 3 Labor Cases,

10

———

ii Index Continued.

Page

Lonas v. National Linen Service Corporation, 136

F, 2d 433, cert. den. 320 U. S. 785 ........ 11, 12,13

Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 145 F.

EE LE es aaa chee shhh cede khceee kad 11, 12,13

McDaniel v. Clavin, 128 Pac. 2d 821, aff’d 136 Pac.

GOST 210) cok 6 ka 60 004 88 04 8068 .ok Nh KOO 10

Morrow v. Lee Baking Co., 4 Labor Cases Par.

ee ain ga kick bnneta cbabene 10

New Mexico Public Service Co. v. Engel, 145 F. 2d

DEEL E RTS Oks Nhe Rapes Giebee Viekanse he’s 10

Southern California Freight Lines v. McKeown,

PTE 44 Neen cAinaacne da des Sha Reen sch 10

10 East 40th Street Building, Inc. v. Callus, 324

CE ON Ahh iia Lad Calas he koe. 044 C400S AH 9

Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U. 8S.

Ce Geter ch ec Lark ase hbaneve seu ses ens ics 6, 9, 10

Walling v. Roland Electrical Co., 146 F. 2d 745. 8, 12

Whitsitt v. Enid Ice & Fuel Co., 6 Labor Cases,

a ee rank rey nearer eee rere 10

STaTuTEs:

Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060,

Oe ae Us ee U, BU OB ORG cca nc cen sasnsaccs 2

EN OS hea or’ eee 2,3,4,7,8

TE Se ida gg aed wins seu (hed cab ence ¥ 10

< 2° 2. ers 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12

aah ah een aN hina wana ec ans ihe 3

Judicial Code, Sec. 240 (a) as amended by Act of

EE ei oa et hate eiaexsthen than 2

MISCELLANEOUS:

Wage and Hour Field Operations Bulletin, Vol. II,

a cn kG ARRAN A OK4 65 0000/8 7

Wage and Hour Interpretative Bulletin No. 6 ... 5,9

Wage and Hour Opinion Letter of September 20,

BE See tN EAS SES AR OK KAR Se tae ese aanens 7

Wage and Hour Opinion Letter of June 3, 1942 . 7

Wage and Hour Release of September 26, 1941 . 7

Letter of July 2, 1942 from Administrator ‘of Wage

and Hour Division, ong. Ree. Vol. 89, P. A1024,

hh s.ds cas sean ea ence vadans 11

-

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

Ocroser Term, 1945.

ALL Service Launpry Corporation, Petitioner,

Vv.

Lituian Maup Puuuips, as Administratrix of the goods,

chattels and credits of CLirrorp R. Pures, deceased,

JosepH Bonura, Tony ZumMo, Tony SaLapino, CHARLES

Sanapino, Puiiiie Perri, ALBerr Jerr, Danny Fano,

THetma Dovetas, Ava Berkevey, individually and on

behalf of all other employees of defendant similarly

situated.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.

All Service Laundry Corporation (hereinafter referred

to as ‘All Service’’) prays that a writ of certiorari issue

to review the judgment of the United States Cireuit Court

of Appeals for the Second Circuit in this case.

ORAL SNS RTE MEME SYN LS EAM AT HP PLEA BEET EIR FHM A OTT

9

ne

OPINIONS BELOW.

The opinion of the District Court (R. 18-20) is reported

in 55 F. Supp. 238. The opinion of the Cireuit Court of

Appeals (R. 47-54) has not yet been reported.

JURISDICTION.

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals was en-

tered on June 2, 1945 (R. 60). The jurisdiction of this Court

is invoked under Section 240(a) of the Judicial Code, as

amended by the Act of February 13, 1925.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.

1. Whether a laundry whose principal customer is a com-

pany which supplies laundry service to persons employed

in commerce and industry is a ‘‘service establishment”’

within the exemption provided by Sec. 13 (a) (2) of the

Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.

2. Whether garments laundered for return to their pre-

vious users constitute ‘‘goods’’ under Sec. 3(i) of the Fair

Labor Standards Act, which defines that term as not in-

cluding ‘‘goods after their delivery into the actual physical

possession of the ultimate consumer thereof other than

a producer, manufacturer or processor thereof.’’

3. Whether the Fair Labor Standards Act applies to

employees of a laundry all of whose customers and business

transactions are within the State of New York, where 4%

of the laundered garments ultimately moves in interstate

commerce.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED.

The statutory provisions involved are Sections 3 (i) and

13 (a) (2) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ¢. 676,

52 Stat. 1060, 29 U. S. C. see. 201, et seq., which read as

follows:

ii . v ere ET PERI SS — we

3

Sec. 3. As used in this Act—

* * * *« * *

(i) ‘*Goods’’ mean goods (including ships and ma-

rine equipment), wares, products, commodities, mer-

chandise, or articles or subjects of commerce of any

character, or any part of ingredient thereof, but does

not include goods after their delivery into the actual

physical possession of the ultimate consumer thereof

other than a producer, manufacturer, or processor

thereof.

* * * * .

Sec. 13 (a) The provisions of sections 6 and 7 shall

not apply with respect to * * * (2) any employee en-

gaged in any retail or service establishment the greater

part of whose selling or servicing is in intrastate com-

merce; * * *

STATEMENT.

This suit was initiated on October 15, 1942, in the United

States District Court for the Southern District of New

York, under Section 16 (b) of the Fair Labor Standards

Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1069, 29 U. S. C. see. 216(b), to re-

cover for the plaintiffs, and for others similarly situated,

overtime compensation and liquidated damages. The orig-

inal defendant was Star Overall Dry Cleaning Laundry

Company, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as ‘‘Star’’), but

upon trial All Service was by stipulation made a party de-

fendant. At the trial a written stipulation of facts was filed

(R. 15, 16) and additional facts were stipulated orally (R.

10-14). No further testimony was taken.

The facts may be summarized as follows (R. 15, 16):

All Service is engaged in the laundry business, with all

of its customers located within the State of New York.

During the period in question 80% of its work of cleaning,

pressing, and laundering overalls, slacks, coats, union suits,

pants and hoovers was performed for Star. Both corpora-

tions have their principal place of business in Brooklyn,

New York.

PERLE IL ESRI EEE LO IIIB AE LEE IAM SRL MACAO AY RPT TAN

——

4

Star was engaged in the business of collecting soiled

linens, overalls, slacks, coats, pants, union suits and hoovers,

and of having them laundered or otherwise cleaned. It then

returned them to its customers and was paid a fee for the

service. During the period in question 95% of its busi-

ness was with people within the State of New York and 5%

with people outside the State of New York. Its business

was done with individuals to the extent of 82% and 18%

was ‘‘bulk,’’ a term meaning that the soiled clothes were

received in larger bundles than those collected from indi-

viduals (R. 13). Its customers were persons employed in

various kinds of industrial, business and professional es-

tablishments.

The complaint was dismissed as to Star upon a finding

that the plaintiffs were not its employees (R. 23). Judg-

ment was entered against All Service in favor of each plain-

tiff for stipulated amounts without interest and for a stipu-

lated attorney’s fee (R. 24-25).

The defendants appealed from the judgment of the Dis-

trict Court (R. 26) and the plaintiffs took a cross appeal

(R. 34) because of the disallowance of interest, an issue

which they subsequently abandoned. After hearing argu-

ment, the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District

Court and dismissed the complaint (R. 36-42) on the ground

that the garments on which the plaintiffs worked were not

‘“goods’’ within the Fair Labor Standards Act since that

term as defined in Section 3(i) ‘‘does not inelude goods af-

ter their delivery into the actual physical possession of the

ultimate consumer thereof other than the producer, manu-

facturer or processor thereof.’’ Plaintiffs filed a petition for

rehearing (R. 42-46), after which the court withdrew its

original opinion and rendered a new decision affirming the

judgment of the District Court (R. 47-54). Thereupon de-

fendant petitioned for a rehearing (R. 55-58), which peti-

tion was denied (R. 59).

_—

5

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.

I.

The Circuit Court of Appeals has erroneously decided

important questions of Federal law which have not been, but

should be, settled by this Court.

1. The scope of the *‘service cstablishment’’ exemption.

Although taking it for granted that a laundry is a typical

example of a service establishment, the Court below held

that the employees of All Service did not come within the

exemption of Sec. 13 (a) (2) because they would not have

been exempt if employed by Star in the same capacity (R.

53). The Court does not explain why Star is not to be re-

garded as a service establishment, except to say that it was

engaged in ‘‘production’’ rather than ‘‘servicing’’ (R. 53).

Star’s ‘‘production’’ consisted of supplying laundry

service to persons working in commercial and indus-

trial establishments (R. 15, 16). The decision below thus

directly raises the question whether such activities make

Star a ‘‘retail or service establishment’’ within the mean-

ing of See. 13 (a) (2).

Prior to this decision it was generally accepted that busi-

nesses like Star’s were service establishments since they

qualified as such under the following provision in para-

graph 27 of Interpretative Bulletin No. 6 of the Wage and

Hour Division (CCH Labor Law Service, par. 32, 106) :

‘‘The cleaning of garments such as uniforms worn by

industrial workers will not alter the character of the

establishment as a service establishment, if the work is

performed at the normal price charged to private cus-

tomers or if the transaction does not involve a quantity

of goods materially larger than the normal quantity

serviced for private customers.”’

Star even meets the Administrator’s definition of retail

service establishment, since under paragraph 18 of Inter-

pretative Bulletin No. 6 nonretail sales which constitute

6

less than 25% of total gross receipts are not deemed suffici-

ently substantial to deprive the establishment of its retail

character. The stipulation of facts reveals that 82% of

Star’s business was with private individuals (R. 16). More-

over, only 5% of Star’s business was with customers outside

of New York State (R. 15). Star is, therefore, one of

‘those retailers located near the state lines and making

some interstate sales’’ for whom the exemptior. in See. 13

(a) (2) was intended. Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co.,

317 U.S. 564, 571.

The indirect approach adopted by the Court below should

not obscure the basic question, which is whether All Service,

rather than Star, is a service establishment. This raises a

question which has been troubling the Administrator and

the courts for several years, namely, whether the exemption

for ‘‘retail or service establishments’? is to be restricted

in its application to retail establishments alone. The con-

flicts which have arisen over this question in the Circuit

Courts of Appeals are discussed below in Section IT.

If the exemption should be construed as limited to estab-

lishments of a retail character, two important questions will

remain as to what constitutes a retail service establishment.

First, does a laundry cease to be retail because its customers

use the cleaned garments in connection with their work in

commercial or industrial establishments? As _ indicated

above, the Administrator has heretofore regarded laun-

deries as nonretail only if their sales were made to com-

mercial or industrial firms, not when made to individual

employees.

Second, does a laundry cease to be a retail service estab-

lishment because sales and deliveries to the ultimate con-

sumers are made by another company? The Wage and

Hour Division has consistently held that the interven-

tion of such a company does not alter the retail character

of the service performed by the primary establishment. This

policy is set forth in the following official statement :

aright abe ee Ft RAEN OA TETAS SP

7

‘Work performed by a central cleaning plant on the

garments of private individuals will be considered work

of an exempt type for purposes of Section 13 (a) (2)

exemption even though the goods may be received

through a branch or independent shop.’’ Wage and

Hour Field Operations Bulletin, Vol. I1, No. 2, Septem-

ber 22, 1941 (2 C. C. H. Labor Law Service, par. 25,

9091.831).!

Thus it appears that with respect to both Star and All

Service the decision below reaches conclusions contrary to

official interpretations of the Wage and Hour Division and

adds to the confusion which has always existed concerning

the proper application of Sec. 13 (a) (2).

2. The significance of the exclusion of ‘goods after their

delivery into the actual physical possession of the ultimate

consumer,”’

The plaintiffs worked on garments which had been sent

out for laundering by persons who had worn and soiled

them. They were regularly returned to the same users, who

were thus the ‘‘ultimate consumer[s] thereof.’’?? Articles

cease to be ‘*goods’’ within the definition of Section 3(i) of

the Act ‘‘after their delivery into the actual physical pos-

session of the ultimate consumer thereof.’’ Hence the plain-

tiffs were not engaged in the production of goods for com-

merce and were not covered by the Act.

1See also Wage and Hour opinion letter, September 20, 1940,

holding that a local cleaning and dyeing establishment which does

work for independent tailor shops in other states is exempt under

See. 13 (a) (2) where the bulk of its business is intrastate (2

C. C. H. Labor Law Service, par. 25, 551.83). See similar Wage

and Hour opinion letter: June 3, 1942. re watch repairing (ibid

par. 25, 551.886) ; also Wage and Hour release September 26, 1941

(ibid par. 25, 551.8875).

* The record is silent as to who owned the garments. Since, how-

ever, the Cireuit Court of Appeals made assumptions as to facts

not in the record which are contrary to the actual facts, it is neces-

sary to point out that the majority of the garments were the prop-

erty of their users and that even the rented garments were regular-

ly returned to the same users until they were worn out.

SS CEPT Eerie RE ro eS oA

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) |

The Court below adopted this view in its first opinion but

reversed itself on rehearing on the basis of the erroneous

assumption that ‘‘a large part, if not all,’’ of the garments

were rented and ‘‘very likely’’ were not rented to the same

customers each time after cleaning. The stipulation of facts

states:

“The defendant, Star Overall Dry Cleaning Laundry

Company, Inc., during the period mentioned in the com- |

plaint was engaged in the business of collecting soiled

linens, overalls, slacks, coats, pants, union suits, and

hoovers, having the same laundered or cleaned and re-

turned for a fee.’’ (emphasis supplied) (R. 15.)

The use of the word ‘‘returned”’ establishes that the gar-

ments were repeatedly used by the same persons. Such

users, it is submitted, are, in the common understanding and

within the meaning of Section 3(i), the ‘‘ultimate con-

sumer[s] thereof’’.

The Cireuit Court of Appeals erroneously treated Star

as the ultimate consumer and compared the work done by

the plaintiffs with that performed by employees who repair

machinery, stating, ‘‘Indeed, this recurrent cleaning and

pressing was so like repairs for use that cases dealing with

the effect of the statute upon employees engaged in making

such repairs are in point.’’ On June 18, 1945, this Court

granted certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Circuit in Walling v. Roland Electrical Co., 146 F.

2d 745, and to the Cireuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Cireuit in Boutell v. Walling, 148 F. 2d 329, both of which

involve the question of the application of the Act to such

repairmen. If the analogy drawn in the opinion below is

sound, the decision of this Court in those cases may have

a substantial bearing upon the instant case.

—_— S

9

3. Non-applicability of the Fair Labor Standards Act to

businesses essentially local in character.

All Service dea!t only with customers located within New

York State and engaged in no transactions of which any ele-

ment took place outside the State. Its principal customer,

however, accounting for 80% of its business, made 5% of

its sales to persons outside of the State (R. 15). There is

nothing in the record to indicate whether or not these par-

ticular plaintiffs worked upon the garments which ulti-

mately were transported across the State line. Assuming,

however, that they did, such garments constituted only 4%

of their output.

Thus, the facts show that All Service remained at all

times essentially a local business and, as this Court de-

clared in Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U. S. 564,

570,

sae ° *

we cannot be unmindful that Congress in en-

acting this statute plainly indicated its purpose to

leave local business to the protection of the States."’

In its recent decision in 10 East 40th Street Building v.

Callus, 324 U.S. , this Court said:

‘*Renting office space in a building exclusively set aside

for an unrestricted variety of office work spontane-

ously satisfies the common understanding of what is

local business and makes the employees of such a build-

ing engaged in local business.’’

The same can be said for an enterprise like All Service,

which conducts every element of its business transactions

in New York State* and approaches the sphere of inter-

*The Wage and Hour Administrator has ruled that ‘‘in deter-

mining the applicability of the section 13 (a) (2) exemption, the

selling or servicing of the establishment will be considered in intra-

state commerce in all cases in which all the elements of the sale or

— take place within the State in which the establishment is

located, irrespective of the source of the goods and the retail or

nonretail character of the transaction’’. Interpretative Bulletin

No. 6, par 46, 2 C. C. H. Labor Law Service, Par. 32,106.

10

state commerce only through the fact that its principal

customer does 5% of its business outside of the State.

If, under these circumstances, the activities of All Serv-

ice employees constitute ‘‘the production of goods for com-

merce’? within the meaning of Section 7 of the Act, 52 Stat.

1067, 29 U. S. C. see. 207, then such production must be

deemed so insubstantial as to justify the application of the

maxim de minimis non curat lex This Court intimated in

the Jacksonville Paper Co. case (page 572) that a substan-

tial part of an employee's activities must relate to goods

moving in the channels of interstate commerce in order to

bring into play the coverage of the Act.

The question of what constitutes a substantial part of an

employee's activities for this purpose has repeatedly arisen

and calls for clarification by this Court. See, for example,

Southern California Freight Lines v. McKeown, 148 F. 2d

890 (C. C. A. 9, 1945); New Mexico Public Service Co. v.

Engel, 145 F. 2d 636 (C. C. A. 10, 1944), and eases cited

therein; Goldberg v. Worman, 37 F. Supp. 778 (S. D.-Fla.

1941); Whitsitt v. Enid Ice & Fuel Co., 6 Labor Cases par.

61,226 (D. C. Okla, 1942); Brown v. Tracy Bottling Co., 6

Labor Cases par. 61,109 (D. C. Minn. 1942); McDaniel v.

Clavin, 128 Pac. (2d) 821 (Cal. App. Ct. 1942), aff'd 136

Pac. (2d) 559: Morrow v. Lee Baking Co., 4 Labor Cases,

par. 60,701 (N. D. Ga. 1941); Lamb v. Quality Baking Co..

Inc., 3 Labor Cases, par. 60,042 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1940).

It is submitted that the test should be whether the employ-

ment remains essentially local in its character and its ef-

fect upon commerce.

11

II.

The decision of the Court below conflicts in principle with

the decisions of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit in Lonas v. National Linen Service Corporation, 136

F. 2d 433, cert. den. 320 U. S. 785, and in Martino v. Mich-

igan Window Cleaning Co., 145 F. 2d 163, as to which this

Court granted certiorari on June 18, 1945.

The conflict which exists among the decisions of the Cir-

cuit Courts of Appeals over the meaning of the ‘‘retail or

service establishment’? exemption was summarized in the

opinion below as follows:

‘*Tt has been held that despite the disjunctive ‘or’ be-

tween retail and servicing in subdivision (a) (2) of §13,

the legislative history, coupled with other considera-

tions taken te be persuasive, makes the proper con-

struction of .2is subdivision one of the limitation of

servicing to retail servicing, i.e., to the selling of serv-

ices, instead of goods, at retail. Some of these cases

are Biacey v. Luray, supra; Guess v. Montague, 140

F. (2) 500; Walling v. Roland Electrical Co., 146 F.

(2) 745; Walling v. Sandok, 132 F. (2) 77; and Rey-

nolds v. Salt Rwer Valley Water Users Association,

143 F. (2) 863. The contrary view was taken in Lonas

v. National Linen Service Corporation, 136 F. (2) 483.

See also Martino v. Michiqan Window Cleaning Co., 145

F. (2) 163; Stucker v. Roselle, 37 F. Supp. 864.’’ (R.

52.)

Although the Court by reason of its erroneous assumption

as to the character of Star avoided a direct holding on this

issue, it makes quite clear its own preference for the theory

that ‘‘retail or service establishment’’ should be construed

to mean ‘‘retail service establishment’? (R. 52, 53).

This construction ignores the plain language used by

Congress to express its intention and misinterprets the leg-

islative history of Section 13(a) (2).* It creates an artifi-

*In a letter dated July 2, 1942 the Administrator of the Wage

and Hour Division wrote to Representative Fred A. Hartley, Jr.,

who was ranking member of the House Labor Committee which

——

12

cial and illogical distinction between a retail laundry and a

nonretail laundry, both of which are essentially localized

community services, employing the same type of workers,

using the same type of equipment, performing similar func-

tions and competing for the same business. No such dis-

tinction is made by other governmental agencies, Federal or

State, which uniformly treat all branches of the laundry

trade as a single category.°

On June 18, 1945 this Court granted certiorari in the Ro-

land Electrical Co. case ana the Michigan Window Cleaning

Co. case, cited by the Second Circuit as representing con-

flicting views. The existence of conflict among the circuits

on this question was recognized by counsel for the Wage and

Hour Administrator in his memorandum in response to the

petition for a writ of certiorari in the Roland Electrical Co.

case. This memorandum also pointed out that ‘The diver-

gency of judicial opinion as to the meaning of ‘retail or serv-

ice’ in See. 13 (a) (2) has produced a difficulty in the admin-

istration of this portion of the statute’’.

Counsel for the petitioner contend that the instant case

should have been decided in favor of the petitioner upon the

authority of Lonas v. National Linen Service Corporation

handled the Act as well as a member of the Conference Committee

which drafted the final language of Section 13 (a) (2), as follows:

“*T am very much inclined to the view that all laundries, regardless

of whether they do so-called commercial work or not, were in-

tended by the Congress to be exempt, as you definitely state * * *.”’

Cong. Ree. Vol. 89, p. A1024, 78th Cong. 1st Session.

In the card catalog of the U. S. Department of Labor Library

are nearly one hundred references to the laundry trades and work-

ing conditions therein. An examination of these references re-

vealed unanimity in description of the laundry trades as service

industries. There is not a single instance of an effort to distinguish

between wholesale and retail laundries. The same is true of the

minimum wage orders issued by the various states. See C. C. H.

Labor Law Service, par. 45,501 under name of each state. The

orders in Massachusetts, Ohio, and a number of other states spe-

cifically include in their definition of laundry trade or occupation

“‘the collecting, sale, resale or distribution at retail or wholesale of

laundry services.’’

13

and Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., supra. Since

the principle involved in both cases will be passed upon by

this Court during the next term, it is essential that this peti-

tion be granted so that the rights of the petitioner may be

preserved.

None of the cases in which certiorari has been granted in-

volves the laundry industry. Nevertheless, the disposition

of these cases has a direct bearing upon the Lonas decision,

in reliance upon which members of the laundry industry

have assumed that they were exempt from the coverage of

the Fair Labor Standards Act. It is, therefore, important

that a case involving the laundry industry be before this

Court when it has under examination the principle estab-

lished in the Lonas decision.

CONCLUSION.

This case involves important questions of Federal law

which have not been, but should be, settled by this Court.

The decision below leaves a large segment of the laundry in-

dustry in great confusion as to its status under the Fair

Labor Standards Act. The conflicts which exist among the

cireuit courts of appeals concerning the scope of the service

establishment exemption and the importance of this question

in the administration of the Act have been recognized by

this Court in the granting of certiorari in three cases to be

heard at the coming term. It is appropriate that while this

issue is before the Court the status of the laundry industry

under the Act be clarified.

It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that this petition

should be granted.

STANLEY I. POSNER,

Cownel for Petitioner,

213 Standard Oil Building,

Of Counsel : Washington 1, D.C.

HENRY J. FOX

ALBERT E. ARENT

August, 1945.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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