Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Airolite Co. v. Fiedler

Supreme Court brief1945

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CHARLES ELMORE CPOPLEY

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1944

No] 4 8

THE AIROLITE COMPANY and THE VENTILOUVRE

COMPANY, INC,,

Petitioners,

agaist

HARRY W. FIEDLER, doing business as AIR CON-

DITIONING UTILITIES COMPANY,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Frepertc P. WarrFIs.p,

Grorese H. Brappocr,

Counsel for Petitioners.

New York, N. Y.

June 18, 1945

Supreme Printinc Company, Law Printers, BArcuay 7-0349

INDEX.

Page

History of petitioners’ business .................. 1-3

Respondent comes into this field for the first time and

conditions under which this happens .......... 3

Respondent’s catalog and specific plans involved .... 4

Respondent’s false swearing as to how he obtained the

information on which he basis his catalog show-

ME ck eKGs cn aee SARKGAMDS O SRS RO RRONU RE RraNeS Shs 4-6

Finding of Fact of District Court as to appropriation

of plans by respondent and his unclean hands... 7

Reasons relied upon for allowance of the writ ..... 7

Holding of the Circuit Court of Appeals herein on

the question of unfair competition is making new

law and it is to the public interest that such be

co dk UE err er rene ye 8-9

This holding in conflict with that of other circuit

courts, for example, citing case in the Seventh

REE ccs Rawus Sa pid phe soba cab Red Ase eae es 9

This holding in conflict with prior ruling in Second

Ree. WN TIS nk v0 hak cc cs hash chante 9

Petition for rehearing in Second Circuit filed and held

for considerable period which indicates lack of

unanimity within the Court .................. 10

Definite restatement of position taken by this Court

in Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices

Corp. necessary in the public interest in view of

the conflict of views as to the interpretation of

the ruling in that case in various courts below .. 11

Citing of Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 2nd Cireuit 11

: SELES GEAR BAP LAO LORE OPIOID RE BE PT ONES Se ROOD

ii

Page

Citing of a case from the 8th Cireuit Court of Appeals 12

Citing of a case from the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals 12

Citing of a case from the C. C. P. A. .............. 13

This uncertainty as to the position of this Court with

respect to the patent system and patent laws

generally is a matter of grave public interest not

only to the courts below and to the bar, but to

the industrial world generally .................. 14

The feeling in the courts, among lawyers, and in in-

dustry as to this Court’s language in the Cuno

Engineering case is believed to be unwarranted

but it is a fact nevertheless and this Court should

now speak again definitely on the point ........ 15

A case from the C. C. P. A. cited as properly in ac-

cordance with the letter and spirit of the Cuno

I MOOR ccc hacictne bea Sawasensce es 15

The subject matter of this case quite definitely within

the rule of this Court in Universal Oil Products

Co. v. Globe Oil Refining Co. .................. 16

On the question of validity, the 2nd Cireuit Court of

pe eee are rere 16-18

The holding of the 2nd Cireuit Court of Appeals on

the question of infringement based on error of

SR SAME AGEA VER EK SECKAS NA GOURD AMKKAAE AR KA G0 9% 19

ili

Table of Cases

Page

Chicago Steel Foundry Co. v. Burnside Steel Foundry

Co. 132 F. (2) 312; 7th Cireuit ............--5- 12

Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp.,

ee SS reper o ees pray yy eat eo 11

Electric Auto-Lite Co. v. P. & D. Mfg. Co., 109 F.

(2) 566; 2nd Circuit ......... 6c eee ee eee eee eee 9

In Re Goessling, 108 F. (2) 266; C. C. P. A. ......-- 15

James Heddon’s Sons v. Millsite Steel & Wire Works,

128 F. (2) 6; 6th Cirenit ........-. eee eee eee 9

Lewis v. Vendome Bags, 108 F. (2) 16; 2nd Cireuit .. 9

Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F. (2) 632; 2nd

‘| RE EA nn ee oP rr Crees cart Lo 11

Saxlehner v. Wagner, 30 S. Ct. 298 ......--++-+++5- 10

Sbicea-Del Mae, Inc., et al. v. Milius Shoe Co., 145 F.

(2) 389; Sth Circuit .......... eee ee eee eee e ees 12

In Re Shortell, 142 F. (2) 292; C. C. P. A. .......-- 13

Sinko, et al. v. Snow-Craggs Corp., 105 F. (2) 450;

es Sr rrr rrr reek rrr tt oer 9

Steiff v. Bing, 215 Fed. 204; 2nd Circuit ..........-. 10

Universal Oil Products Co. v. Globe Oil Refining Co.,

137 F (2) 3 ....c cece cece eee nent e eee eee eees 16

PORE EE NI IT OL WE ETE SE OE NI EN a ee EO ERE) TELL NL EE ems: NLL Sr &

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1944

No.

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Uru

Tue Arrouire Company and THe VENTILOUVRE

Company, INc.,

Petitioners,

against

Harry W. Frepter, doing business as Arr ConpDITIONING

Urmities Company,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

To tHe HonoraBLe THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME

Court or THE UNITED SrateEs:

Summary Statement of Matter Involved.

This case is for patent infringement and unfair com-

petition.

The petitioners, The Airolite Company and its wholly

owned subsidiary The Ventilouvre Company, Inc., have

been in the business of making and selling ventilating

louvers since 1929. Their product is, used in many high

2

class buildings throughout the country, as shown by the

very significant list of hotels, hospitals, universities and

colleges, armories, apartments, nurses homes, Y. M. C. A.’s

and Y.W.C.A.’s, bank buildings, clubs, office and in-

dustrial buildings, theatres, churches, dormitories, schools,

steamships and boats, bomb shelters, and miscellaneous

institutions, appearing on page 148 of the Record. Their

standing with the public and the trade was of the highest.

Their president Mr. Murray testified that the reputation

of his Company and its products with the architects and

the public was ‘‘our most valuable and important asset.”’

(Record page 38.) This was not denied or in any way

limited by respondent.

For the petitioners two witnesses were called, Mr.

Murray, President of the petitioners, and the respondent

Harry W. Fiedler, doing business under the high sound-

ing name of Air Conditioning Utilities Company. For

the respondent the only witness was a mechanical en-

gineer Goodman J. Harris who had been in the employ

of respondent for about three months before he testified

and who had had no experience inthis field prior to that

time. His testimony was wholly from the standpoint of

the patent expert, now fortunately appearing in our courts

less frequently than formerly was the case.

Petitioners’ structure which is the basis of the infringe-

ment side of the case is shown by Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 2,

which was a model used by salesmen in taking orders.

This shows the commercial structure and it follows in

close detail the disclosure and drawings of the patent

in suit. This case, accordingly, differs from most patent

cases in that the patent in suit discloses not only the prin-

ciple of the invention but also the form which was ac-

cepted by the public and widely used.

Testimony of Mr. Murray for petitioners appearing on

page 36 of the Record shows a very substantial business

EERE ENR LE SITE, EES

3

in the structure shown by Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 2 from 1929

to 1943. During those years petitioners’ product here in-

volved had built up a high reputation with the trade and

its rights thereto had not been questioned. This is the

first suit on this patent.

Respondent, hitherto unknown in this field, comes into

the picture in this way. After Pearl Harbor industrial

business in this ventilator ceased so far as new construc-

tion was concerned but a considerable business was de-

veloped for boats being converted by the government into

aireraft carriers and for other governmental vessels.

Petitioners, as a recognized and leading authority in this

field, were asked by the government contractors to advise

on questions of ‘‘weather protection, for blackout, and for

ventilation on aircraft carriers’’, and sent, in April, 1941,

an engineer to the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry-

dock Company for that purpose. The testimony as to this

begins on page 39 of the Record, folio 117. As a result,

ventilators such as those shown by petitioners’ Exhibit 2

were standardized by the Navy Department. The stand-

ardization also covered other features of petitioners’ prod-

uct which are involved in the unfair competition part of

this case but not in the question of patent infringement.

There followed considerable business with the various

contractors for the Navy Department. This involved firms,

such as the Bethlehem Shipbuilding Company and here

in New York the Atlantic Basin Iron Works, Tietjen &

Lang, the Navy Department at the Puget Sound Navy

Yard in Bremerton, Oregon, and the Seattle-Tacoma Ship-

building Company. Then in March 1942, petitioners sub-

mitted a quotation on an order to Ingalls Shipbuilding

Corporation. Thereafter it was found that this order had

been given to some other concern. Petitioners were told

first it was a company at Toledo, Ohio, and after some

difficulty found that it was the present respondent to whom

this business had been given. (See pages 44, 45, and 46 of

POR SSRN: IMCS

4

the Record, folios 131-138.) Thereafter, petitioners found

that respondent was issuing a catalog, printed in the Ree-

ord at page 157, which copied closely some of the show-

ings in petitioners’ catalogs, pages 143 and 149 of the

Record, and also followed closely some of petitioners’

detailed drawings which had been submitted to and stand-

ardized by the Navy Department. Thereatter this suit

was brought for unfair competition and patent infringe-

ment.

The unfair competition side of the case is based on re-

spondent’s showing in his catalog plans 502, 503 and 527.

The testimony for petitioners as to the relation be-

tween these plans and the showing of petitioners’ cata-

log and blueprints from which they were appropriated by

respondent appears as to plan 503 at pages 46 and 47 of

the Record, as to plan 527 at pages 48 and 49 of the

Record, and as to plan 502 at pages 51 and 52 of the

Record.

Under such conditions petitioners were desirous of

ascertaining how and why this concern, coming from no-

where so far as they were concerned, was showing in

its catalog illustrations so closely resembling those of

petitioners’ catalogs as to tend to cause confusion to the

public, tend to take away business from petitioners, and

tend furthermore to injure petitioners’ established repu-

tation and standing with the trade and with the publie by

the use, in this way, of this material, by this respondent.

Interrogatories were submitted accordingly. In sworn

answers to these interrogatories Fiedler made false and

misleading statements. See interrogatory 12 and answer

in the Record at page 163, and interrogatory 8 and answer

in the Record at page 162.

This matter was finally cleared up and then only with

much difficulty when respondent Fiedler was called as a

witness by petitioners under the rule as to hostile wit-

nesses.

5

It has already been noted that the Ingalls Shipbuilding

Corporation order in connection with which respondent

first came into this field dated from March, 1942. On the

question of the date of petitioners’ Exhibit 8, respond-

ent’s catalog, the witness initially would have us under-

stand that this catalog was issued sometime in 1940. His

testimony on this point begins at page 62 of the Record.

He started with the date 1940, went from there to 1941,

and finally ended up with 1942.

On the date of plan 502, Fiedler began with a date 1941

and ended up with ‘‘toward the end of 1941 or early

part of 1942.’’ (Record, page 63.)

As to plans 503 and 527, Fiedler gave the date as 1942,

‘‘probably April.’’? (Record, page 64 and on.)

As to interrogatories 11 and 12 and the answers there-

to, the Court’s attention is called to the testimony of

respondent Fiedler beginning on page 64 and continuing

on down through page 67.

On page 66 the witness was questioned as to the answer

to interrogatory 8 which said that George G. Sharp, Inc.,

so far as he knew had no connection with the supply-

ing of ventilators to Ingalls Shipbuilding Corporation as

admitted in paragraph 8 of respondent’s Answer. The

testimony beginning on page 66 going on down to page

68 shows that this sworn answer to the interrogatory

was a deliberate misstatement of fact.

As to plan 503 on the question of original source of

information, the witness’s testimony is as follows:

Q. I am asking for the original source of informa-

tion, so far as you are concerned, of what you show

in your catalog as Plan 503? A. The original source

of information?

Q. So far as you are concerned, where did you get

the information? A. Do you want me to go through

the entire procedure or just answer your question?

Ree ee ee

6

Q. Just answer my question. A. We got our in-

formation from the American Warming & Ventilat-

ing Company in the form of plans. (Record, page

69.)

The matter was finally summarized in the following

testimony of respondent:

Q. In connection with these interrogatories, first I

understood apparently that you were the source of

this information because you said the draftsmen

made the drawings and they made them in accord-

ance with data furnished by you, and then I under-

stood it comes from the American Warming & Venti-

lating, and I also understood that this was stock ma-

terial, that you were just an innocent bystander, and

that this material was furnished by American Warm-

ing & Ventilating Company just as a hardware store

sells a keg of nails over the counter. This is correct

is it not? A. I would say it is correct.

By the Court:

Q. You made all these answers, didn't yout A.

Yes.

Q. That is what you said in so many words; that

you bought this from the American Warming & Ven-

tilating Company as you would buy a keg of nails

from a hardware store? A. Not necessarily a keg

of nails.

Q. Didn’t you testify the other fellow did this work

under your direction? A. The work I referred to

was making the plans for our catalog.

Q. The tracing you mean. A. That is right. (Ree-

ord, pages 74 and 75.)

It was only finally that we found that the source was

‘“‘Kither from the Ingalls Shipbuilding Corporation or

George Sharp.’’ (Record, page 70.)

ESE Fy, A 8 PN RT HAI WE OPT ORE ENO” IN REET TT a RS —

7

It is clear accordingly that the respondent both in an-

swers to sworn interrogatories and on the stand testified

falsely under oath as to matters vital to the cause at issue

and admitted finally that he had done so.

Under such conditions, the holding of the learned

Judge of the District Court who had the opportunity of

listening to this respondent on the stand was more than

justified,

The Court’s attention is called to all the Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law of tke District Court, ap-

pearing at page 206 of the Record, and especially to para-

graph 4 thereof which we quote:

*“*4. The defendant deliberately appropriated plans

which he knew were designed and originated by

someone else. Even though he might have manufac-

tured the article, if and when its manufacture was

proposed to him, the reckless appropriation by him of

another’s plan and design as an advertising medium

was a wrong to that other. He indulged himself in

ingenious constructions of the interrogatories, and,

although he admitted on the stand that he knew

their purpose, he served answers that were disingeni-

ous and misleading. These acts, coupled with the

manner and matter of his testimony, constitutes un-

clean hands.”’

Reasons Relied Upon for Allowance of the Writ.

The District Court found as a fact on the question of

unfair competition:

**2. The defendant appropriated and published in

his catalog three plans of the plaintiffs which he

found in Navy specifications. He recognized that the

work in the shipyards was Navy work. The uncontra-

dicted evidence of the plaintiff shows and I find as a

| aS PROP LORE ELEN LE ELLE TN I OE a

8

fact that the form and certain characteristics of the

plans marked them as the plaintiffs’ and that the

trade would recognize them as originating with either

of the plaintiffs who are both well known in the trade.

I further find that plaintiffs’ contribution of the plan

to the United States Navy was for the specific pur-

pose of war and was not intended to and did not

constitute a relinquishment of its rights thereto and

therein.’’

The Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, follow-

ing its quotation of this Finding of Fact of the Court be-

low holds:

‘‘Had these drawings of the plaintiffs so ‘appro-

priated’ been copyrighted we will assume, arguendo,

that their use by the defendant would have been a

legal wrong to the plaintiffs but that kind of a tort

has not been proved since there was no copyright.’’

The Circuit Court of Appeals then goes on to hold that

petitioners have not been legally wronged by respond-

ent’s use of such drawings, and again says:

“Moreover, there was nothing about these drawings

to indicate the plaintiffs as the source of them except

the fact that they were accurate drawings of articles

known to the trade to be manufactured and sold by

the plaintiffs.

* -_ . eo *

... unfair competition was not shown merely by the

copying of the uncopyrighted drawings the plaintiffs

had made but had no exclusive right to use. Such

copying is not unfair competition unless the draw-

ings had acquired a secondary meaning which marked

the product they depicted as that of the plaintiffs in

such a way that what the defendant sold would be

bought as the goods of the plaintiffs.’’

RNAS PNT LTS IRE NTN RN ee RORY EE CCM MRE NE nee DATO “P ‘

; , Pease om, DN BREEN NES

9

The Cireuit Court of Appeals cites three cases, James

Heddon’s Sons vy. Millsite Steel € Wire Works, 128 F.

(2) 6; Electric Auto-Lite Co. v. P. d D. Mfg. Co., 2 Cir.

109 F. (2) 566; Lewis v. Vendome Bags, 2 Cir., 108 F.

(2) 16, 18. None of these cases, however, either as to

the facts upon which they rest or the opinions which

they present in any way bear upon the facts of this case

as already shown to this Court.

The Cireuit Court of Appeals is here accordingly mak-

ing new law not in conformity with the established hold-

ings of its own Court and not in conformity with the

established interpretation of the law in various other

Cireuit Courts of Appeal.

We have here accordingly the advancing of a new and

as we stbmit unsound and unwise interpretation of the

law which should in and of itself demand review by this

Court and also specially demands review by this Court

sin.e it is contrary in letter and in spirit to the holding

of other Circuit Courts of Appeal. As to the holding of

other Cireuit Courts of Appeal, for brevity we will cite

only that of the Circuit Court of the 7th Cireuit in Sinko

et al. v. Snow-Craggs Corp., 105 F. (2) 450. This opinion

considers both sides of the question of functional and

non-functional characteristics and holds:

“The law of unfair competition stresses business in-

tegrity, encourages legitimate trading, and protects

good will against spoilation.”’ (Page 452.)

And again:

‘The existence of a right of action depends upon

the peculiar facts of each case, turning on whether

what is done by one person to get the business of an-

other is done unfairly, i.e, by means that involve

fraud or deceit.

10

In other words, equity will protect the honest, and

restrain the dishonest, trader.’’ (Page 452.)

In the Sinko case the final holding was against the plain-

tiff but that even makes more important the statement

of general principles of the law directly applicable here,

directly contrary to the present holding of the Circuit

Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit, in this case, and accord-

ingi; calls more insistently for a review of this holding

in this case by this Court.

On the question of prior ruling in the Cireuit Court of

Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, it should be sufficient to cite

Steiff v. Bing, 215 Fed. 204, in which Judge Hough, then

sitting at District, afterwards one of the great judges of

the 2nd Cireuit Court of Appeals, held at page 206,

‘‘‘Unfair Competition’ consists in selling goods by

means which shock judicial sensibilities; and the Sec-

ond Circuit has long been very sensitive.’’

It appears that the 2nd Circuit, or at least those of its

judges who concurred in the ruling in this case below are

no longer thus sensitive and it is submitted confidently

that this Court should review this holding in order that

a sound and consistent principle may be indicated for

our District and Circuit Courts throughout.

A petition for rehearing of the holding of the Circuit

Court of Appeals in this case was filed on February 13,

1945 and it obviously caused some discussion and com-

ment in the Circuit Court since it was not denied until

March 16, 1945, the record then showing: ‘‘Per Curiam:

Petition for rehearing denied. H. B.C., C.E.C., J.N.F.,

U.S.C. JJ.”

The rule is that petition for rehearing cannot be granted

unless ‘‘a judge who concurred in the judgment desires it

and the majority of the Court so determines.’’ The case

ll

would not have been held so long if there had not been a

difference of opinion.

On the patent side of the case we rely for allowance

of the writ primarily on the fact that the reliance of the

Court below for holding the claims of the patent in suit

invalid was mainly on the ruling of this Court in Cuno

Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S.

84, and the fact that that ruling of this Court is variously

interpreted in various courts of the country, and has

caused confusion and uncertainty in the application of

the patent law by the courts, both district and circuit, to

such an extent that there is imperatively demanded in the

public interest, a ruling by this Court which will quiet

this confusion and advise the various subordinate courts

as to the position of this Court on this vexing point.

We quote from the Cuno Engineering case,

‘*That is to say the new device, however useful it may

be, must reveal the flash of creative genius not mere-

ly the skill of the calling. If it fails, it has not estab-

lished its right to a private grant on the public do-

main.’’

We cite Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F. (2) 632

in which the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 2nd Cir-

cuit held:

‘*. . . We cannot, moreover, ignore the fact that the

Supreme Court, whose word is final, has for a decade

or more shown an increasing disposition to raise the

standard of originality necessary for a patent. In

this we recognize ‘a pronounced new doctrinal trend’

which it is our ‘duty, cautiously to be sure, to follow

not to resist.’ Perkins v. Endicott Johnson Corp., 2

Cir., 128 F. (2) 208. We hold that the claims in suit

are invalid for lack of invention.’’

12

We cite Shicca-Del Mac, Inc., et al. v. Milius Shoe Co.,

145 F. (2) 389, 8h Cireuit. We call the attention of this

Court particularly to that part of the opinion on page 394

which discusses Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, McClaim v. Ort-

mayer, the Cuno Engineering case, the Picard case, and

In Re Shortell, and concludes:

‘‘invention what constitutes the ‘flash of genius’,

that is, ‘more’ than the ‘skill of an ordinary mechanic

acquainted with the business’, must still be deter-

mined without the aid of any statutory or judicial

definition in each particular case, and sometimes by

judges without ordinary skill in the particular art.’’

In this case the ruling of the District Court of invalidity

wes reversed and the patent held valid.

On the question of confusion and uncertainty in the

courts below as to the ‘‘flash of genius’’ holding of this

Court, we cite further Chicago Steel Foundry Co. v. Burn-

side Steel Foundry Co., 132 F. (2) 312, Cireuit Court of

Appeals for the 7th Circuit, January 20, 1943, rehearing

denied February 10, 1943. In this case the ruling of the

District Judge holding the patent invalid was reversed

and we quote:

‘‘We could perhaps successfully wrestle (as we

have with other tests) with the definition of the word

‘genius’ and even apply its definition. But the re-

strictions which rise from the use of the phrase ‘flash

of genius’ make the test more baffling in its uncer-

tainty and exclude the larger portion of those whose

products have heretofore been understood as the

work of an inventor.

‘ rere al eS = i et Se eee Ce mae ee is ra

13

“The test of a ‘flash of genius’ should be rejected

not only because it is incapable of acceptable defi-

nition but because it injects into the statute some-

thing not appearing therein. The Federal decisions

covering a century contain many to the effect that

it is the fact of accomplishment,—novelty appearing,

rather than the method of accomplishment with which

judicial inquiry is concerned.’

We cite further In Re Shortell, 142 F. (2) 292, decided

by the United States Court of Customs and Patent Ap-

peals on April 4, 1944, and quote:

**(5) Much controversy has arisen concerning the

interpretation of certain language in the case of Cuno

Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314

U. S. 84, 534, O. G. 699, wherein, following the cita-

tion of a number of cases, the court said:

*** That is to say, the new device, however useful

it may be, must reveal the flash of genius, not

merely the skill of the calling. If it fails, it has

not established its right to a private grant on the

public domain.

It is interesting to note that all of the cases cited

by the court preceding the above quotation were de-

cided upon the familiar basis of whether the thing

patented involved more than the skill of the art in-

volved. In view of this fact, we are of the opinion

that the use of the term ‘flash of creative genius,’

above quoted, was intended to mean nothing more

than that the thing patented must involve more than

the skill of the art to which it relates.

(6) In the case of Picard v. United Aircraft Corp.,

128 F. (2d) 632, 52 U.S. P.Q. 563, the court said:

BO A LTE GU EAE ET SM SENG MR TS Sls BE LS ETT RES PG TA AR

14

We cannot, moreover ignore the fact that the

Supreme Court, whose word is final, has for a

decade or more shown an increasing disposition to

raise the standard of originality necessary for a

patent. In this we recognize ‘a pronounced new

doctrinal trend’ which it is our ‘duty, cautiously to

be sure, to follow, not to resist.’

While recognizing, of course, that it is the duty of

this court to follow the law as declared by the Su-

preme Court, we do not conceive it to be our duty to

change our basis of decision merely because some

courts assume that there is a ‘new doctrinal trend’

with regard to the standards required for invention.”’

As an additional and controlling reason why certiorari

should be granted in this case and the views of this

should be granted in this case and the views of this Court

again stated as to what the courts below, the bar, and the

public, vitally interested in questions affecting our patent

system, are to understand as to the ruling of this Court in

the Cuno case, we cite the fact, which we take it must, in

many instances at least, have come through to the notice of

the justices of this Court even in their high and to a cer-

tain extent isolated position, that the courts below gener-

ally feel that this Court is, as a matter of fixed policy, ad-

verse to any ruling giving a patentee his constitutional

monopoly under a patent. That this Court is against the

_ patent system and that accordingly, even if the court

should feel that a meritorious patent were involved, there

is no use in sending it up with a holding of validity. That

may well account for the reason why the District Court in

this case, amply impressed by the position of petitioners

and its equitable claim to the Court’s consideration, held

on the patent side that infringement had not been ‘‘satis-

factorily proved.’’

This feeling as to the attitude of this Court toward

patents is also quite prevelant in the industrial world.

~ we .*) ©

Via ik pa eee a Sea i et ee Me Nin AEE aa aia ct PEERS Py ea eS EN eas -

15

Men engaged in legitimate business feel that for the pres-

ent at least it is futile to promote developments in indus-

try and attempt to rely upon patent protection for meri

torious advances in an art. Others, like this respondent,

of questionable character, feel that they can pirate an-

other man’s business and another man’s patented im-

provements with impunity in view of the fact, which

seems to them fixed, that the patent system of the United

States under the rules of this Court is practically becom-

ing a thing of the past, and that the rule now is not that

of promoting the progress of science and the useful arts,

but is ‘‘the good old rule, the ancient plan, that they

shall take, who have the power, and they shall keep who

can.”’

We submit that this very definite feeling, in the Courts,

among lawyers, and in industry, as to what was meant

by this Court’s reference to a flash of genius in the Cuno

Engineering case is an unsound and unwarranted inter-

pretation of the language of that case.

Genius, of course, may be variously defined. To some

it means a high quality of spirit and the ability to trans-

late that spiritual elevation into substance or words

which has characterized the relatively very few great

poets, painters, and sculptors.

Another definition makes genius an infinite capacity for

taking pains.

Another definition holds that genius involves a spiritual

or mental soaring above the heads of the multitude and

the development of something which could not be de-

veloped by the multitude itself, but which, having been

developed by a genius, aids in the spiritual, mental or

otherwise uplifting of the multitude.

We think that the ruling of the Court of Customs and

Patent Appeals In Re Goessling, 108 F. (2) 266, is quite

properly in accordance with the letter and the spirit of

the Cuno case when it says:

<i IT RS OE NP PLAT AE BS IE Oe ORE SE IONS BATS SNS

16

‘¢ | | The patent laws do not contemplate that every

improvement, even though of great utility, should

warrant the improver being given a monopoly upon

the manufacture and sale of the same. One entitled

to a patent must not only obtain novel and useful re-

sults, but his device must be the result of inventive

genius.’’

On the specific question involved in this case as to the

patentability of the patent in suit and of the structure

shown by petitioners’ Exhibit 2, we rely confidently on

the late ruling of this Court in Universal Oil Products

Co. v. Globe Oil Refining Co., 1387 F. (2) 3, decided May

29, 1944, in which the Court held;

‘¢ . , Retrospective simplicity is often a misleading

test of invention where it appears that the patentee’s

conception in fact solved a recognized problem that

had baffled the contemporary art;’’

On the question of validity, the Cireuit Court held

in this case:

‘‘Both the first two claims which are directed to the

structure of the frame and the last two covering the

mechanism for operating the louvers deal only with

minor changes from the prior art which were plainly

so obvious and within the skill of an ordinary de-

signer of the well known louver type ventilator that

there was no invention in making them. The plain-

tiff failed to introduce any evidence of invention to

support the presumption flowing from the grant of

the patent and that was overcome decisively by the

defendant’s evidence.’’

The fact is that the petitioner, in addition to the pre-

sumption flowing from the grant of the patent, intro-

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17

dueed evidence as to the business which it has done under

patent since 1929, the acceptance of this product in the

trade, and its saving in building construction, amount-

ing to $12,600, for illustration, in the case of the Half

Moon Hotel on Long Island, bottom of page 37 of the

Record.

This is certainly evidence of facts tending to support

the presumption flowing from the grant of the patent

and quite in addition te such presumption. The fact is

furthermore although it is ignored by the Court in its

statement as to the presumption flowing from the grant

of the patent being ‘‘overcome decisively by the defend-

ant’s evidence’’, that there was no evidence whatsoever

introduced by the defendant in any way challenging, limit-

ing, qualifying, or otherwise effecting this evidence.

No evidence whatsoever was introduced by defendant

as to the state of the prior art or anything bearing on

the question of invention, save solely the testimony of

Goodman J. Harris, an employee of defendant who had

been in the employ of defendant for about three and one-

half months, who had been familiar with this art only

since his employment with the defendant, as he admits

in his statement, folio 296, page 99 of the Record, and

who testified only as to patents introduced on behalf of

defendant. This is clearly not evidence which in way

qualifies or overcomes the facts as to the evidence of in-

vention supporting the grant of the patent, flowing from

the effect of the patented invention upon the trade, its

acceptance by the trade, its recognition by the trade,

its importance to the trade, its saving of cost in building

construction, and the amount of business done thereunder

by plaintiffs.

On validity the Cireuit Court below held further:

‘*As to the invalidity of claims 1 and 2 there is little

need to go further into the prior art than to the

a PAPEL ALLE III PLN GDM DR WE EINE ID PINES, BIT ITT tah, Weak:

18

patentee’s previous patent No. 1,519,903 over which

the patent in suit was said in the specifications to be

an improvement. There we find diselosed all the

claimed novel features of the patent in suit except the

change from flanges all directed inwardly to the di-

rection outwardly of the flanges on two of the mem-

bers.”’

The Court’s holding in this respect is based on error

of fact. Taking for example claim 1, the Riker patent

No. 1,519,553 does not show the frame having opposite

channel pieces having their marginal portions extending

inwardly of the frame, opposite channel pieces having

their marginal portions extending outwardly of the frame,

which is part of the claimed novel combination. Nor does

it show outer faces of adjacent flanges of the frame being

flush with each other. It should be sufficient to note that

the earlier Riker patent No. 1,519,538, which was an earlier

unsuccessful attempt to improve the art, does not show

the claimed combination or anything which can accom-

plish the objects of the claimed combination, in view of

the showing, supporting the grant of the patent, as to the

effect of the claimed combination exactly as shown and

described in the patent in suit, its recognition by the com-

mercial art and its importance to, and advantages in, the

commercial art.

And yet this Court calls the distinct differences in the

combination as a whole as compared with the earlier un-

successful Riker patent No. 1,519,553 ‘‘this little change’’.

On this record it was the final step to success, even if it

were a ‘‘little change’’, but it was not a ‘‘little change’’.

Tt was an entire reconstruction involving the making of a

new combination with new parts and new results, both

theoretically and practically as shown by the evidence,

PN TNE TURARIES NOTEPAD MENU MO A TREE EM NINAM STII PKS HAN

19

It is submitted that on the record herein, the struc-

ture disclosed in the patent in suit, which has stood the

test of time over a period of more than fifteen years,

which was not in the prior art and which has not been

superseded by anything later developed by this crowded

air conditioning art, should be held to answer the highest

test of patentable invention, and as such to embody a

real flash of inventive genius.

This invention shows decidedly something over and _ be-

yond what was produced, or could have been produced,

by the ordinary worker using the ordinary skill of the

art, and something over and beyond what the workers

skilled in the art or the inventors in the art have been

able to produce since that time, since nothing has taken

its place. If this be not genius then genius has no relation

to the work-a-day affairs of life, but must rest upon some

ectoplasmie or other foree beyond the present known

limits of thought or achievement, something in the nature

of the indicated even root of a negative quantity.

The Cireuit Court made a holding on the question of

infringement in the following language:

‘*Both the claims in suit embody the inward de-

flection of the ends of the top and bottom members

to fit between the flanges of the other members. The

defendant does not do that in the butt-welder con-

struction it employs and so the finding of non-in-

fringement was clearly right.’’

This was, however, just thrown in and should not

affect the question of the allowance of this writ because

it is obviously incorrect as to claim 1 at least. It is true

that claim 2 calls for ‘‘flange offset portions’? which is

what the Cireuit Court means by ‘inward deflection of

the top and bottom members.’’

20

Claim 1, however, does not call for this inward deflec-

tion of the top and bottom members but specifies only

‘the outer faces of adjacent flanges of the frame being

flush with each other.’’ This is exactly what respondent

does in the butt-wélder construction referred to by the

Cireuit Court, and the holding of the Cireuit Court on

this point is accordingly clearly in error and may be

disregarded by ‘this Court up to the point where it may

be very briefly disposed of if this writ is allowed.

Conclusion.

It is in the public interest that this Court should decide

that, under circumstances such as those of this case, the

law of unfair competition will protect petitioners against

the invasion of their rights by respondent.

It is in the public interest that this Court should de-

cide whether what was done by the patentee in develop-

ing the structure of the patent in suit does not constitute

a worthy example of creative inventive genius to be pro-

tected as such.

It is strongly in the public interest that this Court

should end the conflict, confusion, and uncertainty, which

now prevails in the Courts below, and throughout the

public generally, as to the correct interpretation of the

criterion of patentable invention enunciated by this Court

in the Cuno Engineering case; and the case at bar pre-

sents a favorable opportunity for such action.

It is not believed necessary to add to the statement of

facts herein anything in the nature of an argumentative

brief and no supporting brief will be filed.

In the interest of brevity, petitioners at this time do

not set forth all of the points which will be urged at the

argument on the merits of this cause should the writ be

21

granted, nor all of the contentions in support of such

points; but, in order to comply with the rule of this Court

requiring that all issues upon which decision is requested

be presented in the petition for certiorari, petitioners

here refer to and incorporate into this petition all of the

matters presented in the petition for rehearing before

the United States Cireuit Court of Appeals for the See-

ond Cireuit, printed in the additional volume of the ree-

ord herein, with the same force and effect as if herein

set out in full.

Wuererrore your petitioners respectfully pray that a

writ of certiorari be issued out of and under the seal of

this Honorable Court directed to the United States Cir-

cuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, command-

ing that court to certify and to send to this Court for

its review and determination, on a day certain to be

therein named, a transcript of the record and proceed-

ings herein; and that the judgment decreed under the

mandate of the said Cireuit Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit herein be reversed by this Honorable

Court and that the case be remanded with instructions

that respondent was guilty of unfair competition, that

the patent in suit was valid and was infringed by re-

spondent, that judgment be entered accordingly, and

that your petitioners have such other and further relief

in the premises as to this Honorable Court may seem

meet and just.

Freperic P. Warrietp,

Grorer H. Brappock,

Counsel for Petitioners.

New York, N. Y.

June 18, 1945

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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