Brief for the Respondent in Opposition — 42nd St. Foto Shop, Inc., Fotoshop, Incorporated and Sam Marcus, d/b/a Marcus Photo Service and as Fotoshop v. New York State Labor Relations Board

Supreme Court brief1945

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What actually matters in this document.

Text

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MAY 21 1945

CHAMLES ELMORE CROPLEY

ULE RK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocrosper TermM—1944

No. 1216

42ND ST. FOTO SHOP, INC., FOTOSHOP, INCORPO-

RATED and SAM MARCUS, d/b/a MARCUS PHOTO

SERVICE and as FOTOSHOP,

Petitioners,

vs.

NEW YORK STATE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.

. On Petition for Certiorari

BRIEF FOR NEW YORK STATE LABOR

RELATIONS BOARD IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION

Wiriutum E. Grapy, Jr.,

General Counsel,

Puiu FEevpsivoM,

Associate General Counsel,

New York State Labor Relations Board.

_——————— EE)

JvupIciaL PRINTING Co., Inc., 82 BEEKMAN ST., N. ¥.—BARCLaY 7—3648-9 ao 53

INDEX

PAGE

Opinions Below ox no ss cc cccis casas ccieucsereeesass 1

Basia | iin os ok ew wc iNet bs awewascn ches geese 2

Question Presented ...........ccccccccecceececcces 2

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved.... 2

een errrer re errr Trey ts 3

Proceedings Before the Board.............-000000- 3

Proceedings in the Courts.............ceeeeeeeees 3

Summary of Argument ..5.o.0620cs iv avieaniees sans +

Point I—The petition should be dismissed, for it seeks

a writ directed to, and charges errors to, a court

which has not adjudicated the merits of the contro-

ever errr rre ret ey rere eer Pere rr cr rey foe yi 5)

Pornt II—The petition should be denied, for no novel

or even substantial question is presented........... 8

p> S| BOTT E OPT Te TT Tr ren yy rey Toe 9

| er errr Tre er err peers ee 9

The Unfair Labor Practices.................. 11

Free PE canascescandinas ccdenvsddastuneee 13

No Novel or Substantial Question............... 19

ee Peer TTC ete Tee eres oe te ee 20

pS ae PRE Pye yer ee eee rer ey re 21

ii ““s INDEX

CITATIONS

CasEs:

PAGE

Bacon v. State of Texas, 163 U.S. 207...........-05. 7n

Bookman v. City of New York, 200 N.Y. 53.......... 12n

Brink v. Stratton, 176 N. Y. 150........... cece eeees 12n

Chicago & Eastern Illinois R. R. Co. v. Industrial Com-

mission, 264 U. 8, 206... .....sacsiecessenvesspanse 7n

Cuyahoga River Power Co. v. Northern Realty Co., 244

a. errr rrr ere rary user 7n

Davega City Radio v. New York State Labor Relations

Board, 901 N. F. WS. cays csscacteckssccdaneaues 19n

Dept. of Banking, State of Nebraska v. Pink, 317 U.S.

DBE onic cvuwnsachhcene senses) eee kee Senn 7

Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. National Labor Relations

Bderd, 169 F (0) ORR on aac unas Nissans 16, 17, 18n

Elastic Stop Nut Corp. v. National Labor Relations

Board, 142 F’. (2d) S71. 2.0... ccc eneeeseccsnecnns 16

Local +167, Internatl. Bro. ete. v. U. S., 291 U. 8. 298 8n

Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Elliott, 184 U. 8.

BO a vccvivvcnanscsanc tuk wdcewens 66 O06 WR REMEAS 7n

National Labor Relations Board v.

American Tube Bending Co., 184 F. (2d) 993, cert.

den. SO UB. WOR i vakaA ss kasaceua 14, 15, 17n, 18

Glenn L. Martin-Nebraska Co., 141 F. (2d) 371..... 17n

Jahn & Ollier Engrav. Co., 123 F. (2d) 589......... 181

Laister-Kauffmann A, Corp., 144 F. (2d) 9......... 16

Link-Bolt Ca. S11 U.S, S06. 2. vccavaws insane wenn 9

M. E. Blatt Co., 143 F. (2d) 268, cert. der. U.S.

mpi Mie Meer rer er 15

INDEX iil

PAGE

National Labor Relations Board v. (cont’d)

N. Carolina Finishing Co., 121 F. (2d) 994......... 18n

Trojan Powder Co, 135 F. (2d) 387, cert. den. 320

TT PO ci cacdn cxca sks ossexnehecyenase ce 15, 18n

Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U. S. 469, on re-

mand, 44 N. L. R. B. 404, 132 F. (2d) 390, 319 U. S.

OO ck iicin s wake i x NK sn eh KOREENS 13, 18n, 15, 17

New York State Labor Relations Board v. Timen,

264 App. Div. 120 .........ee eee eeee wee eeeneeeen 19n

O’Reilly v. People, 86 N. Y. 154........- essere e ener 12n

Oughton v. National Labor Relations Board, 118 F.

(2d) 486, cert. den. 315 U.S. 797... 6... e eee ee eens 18n

People v. Most, 128 N. Y. 108........-0-seseeeeeeees 12n

Randall v. Board of Commissioners, 261 U. 8. 252..... 7n

Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Watson, 287 U.S. 86..... 8n

Second Natl. Bank v. First Natl. Bank, 242 U.S. 600.. 7m

Stork Restaurant v. Boland, 282 N. Y. 256...... 7n, 13n, 19n

Thomas y, Collins, U.S. , 89 L. Ed. Adv. Op.

| eee reer res wc mme rer oT tesa Sr ats e 17

Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Crovo, 220 U.S. 364.. 7n

Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Priester, 276 U. S.

RD cc cdekt ci anekanaee FENUR CANAD ER ECREs S44ORE « 7n

iv

INDEX

STATUTES:

Judicial Code, See. 237a, 28 U.S. C. 344............

New York State Labor Relations Act, Article 20

of Labor Law of State of New York, Laws of 1937,

443, See, 1.

Chap.

See.

See.

See.

See.

See.

See.

See.

See.

See.

707, sub.

707, sub.

707, sub.

707, sub.

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RE ESR RENE cts SAUCES Fe

ei wink ou cinaLals bee aon ee

OP Sapo Corer eR eR eueRy eatin cL 3, 21

Ricvcua ses viana rae e ee 3, 6, 23

eee ee oe 3, 6, 13, 24

Bee re ee 3, 6,24

PARR hay ge, SILER sae S 3, 6, 24

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Octrosper Term—1944

No. 1216

42xp St. Suop, Inc., Forosnor, Ixcorroratep and Sam

Marcus, d/b/a Marcus Puxoro Service and = as

Forosnopr,

Petitioners,

vs.

New York State Lasor Revations Boarp,

On Petition for Certiorari

BRIEF FOR NEW YORK STATE LABOR

RELATIONS BOARD IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION

Opinions Below

The decision and order of the New York State Labor

Relations Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board) is

reported in 5 8S. L. R. B. (N. Y.) 1850 (R. pp. 1829-1358).

The decision of the Special Term, Supreme Court of the

State of New York, New York County, denying petitioners’

motion to vacate the Board’s order, is not officially re-

ported and appeared in the New York Law Journal (Vol.

109, No. 130, June 5, 1943).

The decision of the Appellate Division, First Judicial

Department, affirming the order made at Special Term,

is reported at 268 App. Div. 759 (case 4). The decision

of the Appellate Division, denying petitioners’ motion for

Aatheys

nee Asem SE ON SE ee ea: » ——

2

leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, is reported at 268

App. Div. 849 (case 6). The decision of the Court of

Appeals of the State of New York, denying petitioners’

motion for leave to appeal to it, is reported in 293 N. Y.

(Weekly Advance Sheet No. 297, Jan. 6, 1945, p. i).

No opinions were written by any of the courts below,

except for the memorandum contained in the short form

order made at Special Term (R. 4).

Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction to entertain this petition is claimed under

the Judicial Code, Section 237(a) amended (28 U.S. C.,

Sec. 344).

Question Presented

The question presented is whether an order of the

Board, directing petitioners to cease and desist from inter-

fering with, restraining and coercing their employees in

violation of the provisions of the New York State Labor

Relations Act, contravenes the constitutional right of free

speech.

Constitutional and Statutory

Provisions Involved

The relevant portions of the Constitution of the United

States are set forth in the Appendix to petitioners’ brief,

page 26.

The sections of the New York State Labor Relations

Act involved, are:

Sections 701 (2), 703, 704 (4), (5) and (10), set

forth in the Appendix to petitioners’ brief, pages

25-6.

Sections 706, 707 (1), (2), (3) and (4), set forth

in the Appendix to this brief, pages 21 to 25.

Statement

The Board is a duly constituted administrative agency

of the State of New York. It operates pursuant to the New

York State Labor Relations Act, Article 20 of the Labor

Law of the State of New York, hereinafter called the Act.

The Act is patterned on, and similar to, the National Labor

Relations Act.

Proceedings Befere the Board

The unfair labor practice proceeding before the Board,

here involved, followed the course prescribed by Section

706 of the Act (Appendix, pp. 21 to 23), that is, complaint,

notice of hearing, answer, hearings before a Trial Ex-

aminer with full opportunity to offer evidence, examine

and cross examine witnesses, issuance of Trial Examiner’s

Intermediate Report, exceptions filed thereto, argument

before the Board, and issuance of the Board’s decision

containing a discussion of the evidence, findings of fact,

conclusions of law and order,

The Board’s order, dated December 30, 1942 (R. 1329-

1358), in substance, directed petitioners to offer reinstate-

ment to, and make whole, two employees discharged be-

cause of their union activities, and to cease and desist

from interfering with, restraining and coercing their em-

ployees in the exercise of their rights to join and assist a

labor organization of their own choosing.

Proceedings in the Courts

Pursuant to Section 707 of the Act (Appendix, pp.

23 to 25), petitioners applied at Special Term of the Su-

preme Court of the State of New York for an order vacating

the Board’s order. At the same time the Board applied

for an order of the Court enforcing the Board’s order.

AR NTE ee ORES, Seyi

4

On June 4, 1943, an order was duly made by the Su-

preme Court of the State of New York, County of New

York, denying petitioners’ motion to vacate the Board’s

order.

On August 18, 1943, an order was duly made by the

Supreme Court, New York County, enforcing the Board’s

order, in whole. Ne appeal has been taken from this order

and the order remains outstanding and unappealed.

Petitioners appealed from the order dated June 4, 1943,

which denied their motion to vacate the Board’s order.

The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State

of New York, First Judicial Department, unanimously

affirmed the order (268 App. Div. 759). The Appellate

Division thereafter denied an application by petitioners

for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals (268 App. Div.

849). A similar motion by the petitioners was also denied

by the Court of Appeals itself (293 N. Y. ; Advance

Sheet +297, Jan. 6, 1945, p. i).

Summary of Argument

Petitioners seek a writ of certiorari to review an order

of the Supreme Court, New York Councy, entered upon

the remittitur of the Court of Appeals of the State of

New York, denying leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

Petitioners’ specification of errors charges the alleged

errors to the Court of Appeals.

The Appellate Division, First Judicial Department, was

the highest court in the State of New York which adjudi-

cated the merits of the controversy here involved. The

Court of Appeals merely denied a motion by petitioners

for leave to appeal.

=) - canes Se RE a ae RR IE gO LG NS: TEE RR ete Cee) a ee ee ne eRe AC ea

-

ov

The writ which petitioners seek, therefore, is directed

to the wrong court, and the errors which they specify are

charged to the wrong court.

Il

The record herein discloses petitioners’ intense hos-

tility to unions, discharge of employees for union activities,

and utterances which were coercive, inherently and in con-

text. The Board’s order, based ‘‘on the entire record’’

(R. 1351, fol. 4052) does not contravene petitioners’ right

of free speech. That right may not be used as a shield for

coercive action in violation of the Act.

The fact that the order which petitioners seek to review

was made by a state labor relations board rather than by

the National Labor Relations Board, raises no novel ques-

tion.

POINT I

The petition should be dismissed, for it seeks a writ .

directed to, and charges errors to, a court which has

not adjudicated the merits of the controversy.

Petitioners herein pray ‘‘that a writ of certiorari issue

to review the final order entered on December 8th, 1944

(R. 1403-4), upon the Remittitur of the Court of Appeals,

the highest court of the State of New York (R. 1402),

denying leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, from an

order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of

the State of New York, First Judicial Department, en-

tered on June 8th, 1943 (R. 4), denying petitioners’ ap-

plication to vacate and set aside the Decision and Order of

the New York State Labor Relations Board dated Decem-

ber 31st, 1942 (R. 1329-59)’’ (Petition, pp. 2-3) (italics

ours).

ore eee TT RNS

REI ROSAS Tay SR IY DEI IETS ES EOE NN GLE IO IEE

6

Petitioners’ Specification of Errors (Petition, p. 30) is

based on the ground that ‘‘the Court of Appeals of the

State of New York erred: * * *.”’

It is respectfully submitted that the Court of Appeals

of the State of New York did not adjudicate the merits of

this case, but merely denied an application by petitioners

for leave to appeal, and, accordingly, that the writ of cer-

tiorari which petitioners seek is addressed to the wrong

court and the petition should be dismissed,

The Board’s order herein was issued on December 31,

1942. Thereafter, pursuant to Section 707 of the Act,

petitioners instituted court proceedings to vacate and set

aside the Board’s order. The Board, simultaneously, insti-

tuted court proceedings for enforcement of its order.

On June 4, 1943, an order was duly made by the Supreme

Court of the State of New York, County of New York,

denying petitioners’ motion to vacate the Board’s order,

On August 18, 1943, an order was duly made by the same

court, enforcing the Board’s order in whole.

Petitioners appealed only from the order dated June 4,

1943, which denied their motion to vacate the Board’s

order. No appeal was taken from the order of August 18,

1943, enforcing the Board’s order, and said order remains

an outstanding, unappealed final order.

The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the

State of New York, First Judicial Department, wnani-

mously affirmed the order of June 4, 1943, denying peti-

tioners’ motion to vacate the Board’s order. Petitioners’ |

motions for leave to appeal were denied by the Appellate

Division on June 9, 1944, and by the Court of Appeals on

November 30, 1944. On December 8, 1944, an order was

entered in the Supreme Court, New York County, on re-

mittitur from the Court of Appeals, making the order

of the Court of Appeals, denying leave to appeal thereto,

the order of the Supreme Court, New York County.

7

Wholly apart from the fact that the final order of the

Supreme Court, New York County, dated August 18, 1944,

enforcing the Board’s order, is outstanding and unappealed,

it is clear that the petition herein is based on erroneous

procedure and that the writ sought is not directed to the

proper court.

The Court of Appeals’ only act was to deny petitioners’

motion for leave to appeal. The order of the Supreme

Court, New York County, dated December 8, 1944, which

petitioners term a ‘‘final order,’? was for the purpose of

taxing costs. It was merely a ministerial act of the lower

court following denial of leave to appeal by the Court of

Appeals (Department of Banking, State of Nebraska v.

Pink, 317 U.S. 264).

The highest court of the State of New York which has

adjudicated the merits of the controversy is the Appellate

Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York,

and it is to that court that the writ of certiorari should

have been direeted. This error in the petition is fatal and

requires its dismissal.’

Moreover, petitioners’ Specification of Errors relates

to alleged errors committed by the Court of Appeals and

speaks of the ‘tholding, in effect by aflirmance * * *”? of

that court. As we have pointed out, however, the Court

of Appeals did not affirm the order of the Appellate Divi-

sion, but merely denied leave to appeal. The alleged errors

which petitioners seek to review, therefore, are not im-

putable to the Court of Appeals, but only to the Appellate

Division, the highest State court which adjudicated the

1. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Crovo, 220 U. 8. 364; Second National

Bank v. First National Bank, 242 U. S. 600; Cuyahoga River Power Co. v.

Northern River Realty Co., 244 U. S. 300; Chicago and Eastern Illinois R.R.

Co. v. Industrial Commission, 284 U. 8S. 296; Missouri Kansas & Texas Ry. Co.

v. Elliott, 184 U. S. 529; Bacon v. State of Texas, 163 U. S. 207; Western

Union Telegraph Co. v. Priester, 276 U. S. 251; Randall v. Board of Commis-

sioners ete., 261 U. S. 252.

8

merits of the controversy. This deficient assignment of

errors by petitioners constitutes additional ground for dis-

missal of the petition.’

It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that the peti-

tion herein should be dismissed on the grounds (a) the

petition seeks a writ addressed to a court which has not

adjudicated the merits of the case, (b) it seeks review of

an order denying leave to appeal, which order is not ap-

pealable, and (c) is based on a Specification of Errors

which is not only lacking in certainty and definiteness, but

which is erroneously charged to the wrong court.

POINT II

The petition should be denied, for no novel or even

substantial question is presented.

Section 704, subdivision 10 of the New York State Labor

Relations Act provides that it shall be an unfair labor prac-

tice for an employer to ‘‘interfere with, restrain or coerce

employees’’ in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Sec-

tion 703 of the Act. The rights guaranteed by Section 703

are: ‘** * * to bargain collectively through representatives

of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities,

for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid

or protection, free from interference, restraint, or coercion

of employers, * * *.’’

The Board found, and the courts below have sustained

the finding, that petitioners ‘‘interfered with, restrained

and coerced their employees in the exercise of the rights

guaranteed by the Act’”’ (R. 1353).

The Board also found, and this finding too has been sus-

tained by the courts below, that petitioners unlawfully dis-

2. Local $167, International Brotherhood etc. v. U. S., 2°1 U. S. 293; Sea-

board Air Line Ry. v. Watson, 287 U.S. 86.

" x ‘. ee ee Wee Sates 5

TMD S TRS A EN RR LO CETL om LAG Sa POR Bu ~ erpEpCRtet

_ recto sec

3

9

charged two employees, Jay Irving and Edwin R. Cohen,

in violation of Section 704, subdivisions 4 and 5 of the Act

(R. 1353).

The Board accordingly directed petitioners to cease in-

terfering with their employees’ exercise of their rights

under the Act and to offer reinstatement to, and make

whole, the two discharged employees upon their return to

civilian life (R. 1355-7).

We shall recount the facts briefly and then show that

under well settled law the right of free speech does not

excuse the coercive actions of petitioners.

THE FACTS

By way of preliminary, we respectfully remind the

Court that an employer’s antipathy to unions and the ex-

istence of other unfair labor practices, prior or concurrent,

are properly to be considered in determining whether the

Act has been violated. As this Court said in N. L. R. B. v.

Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 587, 588:

“The employer’s attitude towards unions is

relevant.’’

Petitioner Sam Marcus, in addition to doing business

as Marcus Photo Service and as Fotoshop, is president of

42nd St. Foto Shop, Ine. and Fotoshop, Incorporated. He

owns and controls all the petitioners’ enterprises (R. 736,

737). The Board found that ‘‘all these undertakings con-

stitute one single enterprise responsible for compliance

with the Act’? (R. 1336).

Background

The record contains uncontradicted testimony that

Marcus and his wife, who took an active part in manage-

ment, were intensely hostile to unions. They and super-

visory employees made numerous remarks calculated to dis-

SONAR NA NY ASE AS! ACP LORD TD GG DAB LP ALLE SG LAE NAGE LIE DIP TERS AR ht EVAL LING BRIE Me PRR TNR pee

10

courage self-organization among their employees. A few

illustrations follow.

Mrs. Marcus told the employees: ‘‘Unions seem to be

created for the purpose of annoying employers’? (R. 572).

During a strike at Gimbel’s Department Store, she said that

‘*she made it a point of going into Gimbel’s every day just

to walk through, whether she bought anything or not, just

to show the pickets’? (R. 422). Irving, one of the dis-

charged employees, testified that when Marcus hired him

he said ‘‘his employees could always come to him with their

problems and there is no necessity of going to unions, and

his employees don’t believe in unions’? (R. 663).

Irving testified that during a strike of photo finishers at

the Mareus Photo Service in the fail of 1941, Mareus called

the striking employees ‘‘a bunch of ingrates who didn’t

know when they were well off and that it was unfortunate

that they will have to lose their jobs because of being mis-

guided by a racketeering union’? (R. 429). Mrs, Marcus

and Andorn, her brother, who was head of the camera de-

partment, made similar comments (R. 428).

During the 1941 strike Irving was asked to sign a state-

ment that the employees had no desire to join the striking

union (R. 431). The statement referred to that union in

derogatory terms (R. 431-2). About the same time a leaflet,

purportedly prepared by the employees but actually pre-

pared by the management, was distributed to customers

(R. 435). It contained the following paragraph (Bd.’s

Exh. 10, printed, R. 1194-5, offered R. 442):

‘““We are emphatic in our desires to remain free

men and not being enslaved by union racketeers. We

have personally, and of our own volition, petitioned

our employers not to sign our liberties away to this

union or any other union, This arrogant attempt of

racketeers to muscle-in on our pay envelopes is a

direct attack on our liberties and livelihood, even

more so than on our employers’’ (Bd.’s Exh. 10, fol.

3581). (Italics ours.)

moo

11

Neither Marcus nor his wife, nor any supervisory official

took the stand to deny the foregoing.

The Unfair Labor Practices

In the early part of January, 1942, Retail Employees

Union, Local 830, C. TI. O., herein called the Union, started

to organize petitioners’ employees. Two employees, Irving

and Cohen, were among the first to join the Union and

most active in its organizational drive. Irving was dis-

charged on January 12, 1942, and Cohen on January 23,

1942. The Board found, and the courts below have sus-

tained the finding, that both Irving and Cohen were dis-

charged because they had joined and assisted the Union

(R. 1353).

On January 24, 1942, the day following the discharge of

Irving, Kaplan, the manager, asked Bordin, one of the

employees, whether he was ‘‘involved in unionization’?

and advised him to ‘‘have nothing to do with the foolish

kids who are trying to unionize the Foto Shops,’’ and

to keep his ‘‘nose clean’? (R. 693-5). Two days later

Kaplan said to Bordin: ‘‘Say, Bob, are you keeping your

nose clean?’’ and asked Bordin who had given him the

Union application card: ‘*Was it anybody who is working

there, or was it Irving or Cohen?’’ (R. 698-700).

As part of the organizing campaign among petitioners’

employees, the Union, on February 2, 1942, distributed a

leaflet to recruit new members (Bd.’s Exh. 9, printed, R.

1192-3, offered, R. 299). The very next day, Mareus called

a meeting of the employees, about forty or fifty in number,

and made a speech* in which he called the Union ‘‘a bunch

of racketeers and gangsters.’’ He threatened to discharge

3. Petitioners advert to the fact that the witness Rafalow was an

‘‘atheist,’’? and, although no federal issue is involved and no error specified,

apparently question the value of his testimony as to the speech made by peti-

tioner Mareus. Rafalow’s testimony was fully corroborated by two other wit-

nesses (R, 332-6, 701-6). The testimony of all three was uncontroverted. Peti-

Ste EI. GANAS ORAS IONS PONS EEE STRANI NONE REIN AAO NEES a

12

the younger employees if the Union obtained a collective

bargaining contract and warned the older employees that

this would mean additional work for them. He suggested

that the employees abandon the ‘‘outside’’ union and form

a company union. ‘‘Why give your money to outside

crooks, have a union among yourselves’? (R, 259-261, 332-6,

706, 1189-91).

Bordin, one of the employees, testified that early in

February, 1942, Marcus had told him that ‘IT should have

nothing to do with unions and I could advance myself like

Mr, Hervich has’’ and that Irving had been let go because

of union activity (R. 708).

Marcus did not testify.

Petitioners at page 29 of their petition make much of

the fact that the witness Rafalow testified that Marcus in

his speech had characterized the Union as ‘ta bunch of

racketeers and gangsters’’ and that those exact words are

not to be found in a statement which Rafalow made a few

days after the meeting at which Mareus spoke (Bd.’s Exh. 8

for Iden.). The statement, however, does contain the fol-

lowing (R. 1190):

“Mr, Mareus then went on to say: ‘Why give your

money to outside crooks, have a union among your-

selves.’ He also said: ‘I have nothing against

unions, but I don’t like to see you giving money

to racketeers.’ ”’

The statement also quotes Marcus as having said (R. 1191):

“Of course, I have no right to discriminate against

anyone in the union. That’s what the leaflet says

the law is. I don’t fire anyone for being a member

oF

of the union. I fire them because of inefficiency.

tioner Marcus did not testify. Actually, Rafalow, who was eighteen years old,

did not know the meaning of the term ‘‘atheist’’ and incorrectly applied it

to himself, At most he was an agnostic (R. 320-2). In any event, he was

‘«first duly sworn’’ on taking the witness stand (R. 255) and knew the penalties

for perjury (R. 320). His testimony was clearly competent and admissible

(N Y. State Constitution, Article I, See. 3; N. Y¥. Civil Practice Act, See, 362;

O'Reilly v. People, 86 N. Y. 154, 159; Bookman v. City of New York, 200 N. Y.

53, 56; Brink v. Stratton, 176 N. Y. 150, 157-8; Peo. v. Most, 128 N. Y. 108;

Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 6, p. 327).

ee

HUA ae Mh Ue SONIA NIL ENO LALLA Dy MIP HSS TIONED Ra SOROS HOOT I NDAD AM REALS R ATMO | PINERS, 2:6 ARADO

13

On the basis of the entire record, the Board found, and

its findings were upheld by the courts below, that petition-

ers had interfered with, restrained and coerced their em-

ployees in the exercise of their right to join or assist a

union of their own choosing. The Board’s findings of fact

were supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, are

conclusive.*

FREE SPEECH

Petitioners’ invocation of the important right of free

speech, in an attempt to excuse their interference with

their employees’ rights, is without merit.

The controlling precedent is the decision of this Court

in NV. L. R. B. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U.S.

469. In that case the National Labor Relations Board

found that the employer had interfered with, restrained

and coerced its employees in violation of the National Act.

Although the employer had engaged in many anti-union

acts, the National Board’s decision did not indicate whether

its finding of interference was based on the whole ‘‘com-

plex’’ of the employer’s activities, or whether the finding

was based solely on certain statements. As there were

grave doubts as to whether the statements, standing alone,

were coercive (314 U. S. at 476, 479), this Court remanded

the matter for clarification by the National Board.’

In the Virginia Electric case, this Court stated (p. 477):

‘«“* * * Tf the total activities of an employer re-

strain or coerce his employees in their free choice,

then those employees are entitled to the protection

of the Act. And in determining whether a course

of conduct amounts to restraint, or coercion, pressure

4. Act, Section 707(2); Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Boland, 282 N. Y. 256.

5. The National Board, after the remand, reissued its order without taking

further evidence and stated that its finding of interference was based on the

employer ’s conduct, as well as on the statements. That order (44 N. L. R. B.

404) was enforced by the Circuit Court of Appeals (133 F. (2d) 390) and by

this Court (319 U. 8. 533).

Ts oe ~ +e Ee ee

14

exerted vocally by the employer may no more be

disregarded than pressure exerted in other ways.

‘Tf the Board’s order here may fairly be said

to be based on the totality of the Company’s activi-

ties during the period in question, we may not con-

sider the findings of the Board as to the coercive

effect of the bulletin and the speeches in isolation

from the findings as respects the other conduct of

the Company. If the Board’s ultimate conclusion

is based upon a complex of activities, such as the

anti-union background of the Company, the activi-

ties of Bishop, Edwards’ warning to the employees

that they would be discharged for ‘messing with the

.1.0.,’ the discharge of Mann, the quick formation

of the Independent, and the part which the manage-

ment may have played in that formation, that con-

clesion would not be vitiated by the fact that the

Board considered what the Company said in con-

junction yith what it did. The mere fact that lan-

euaet*mefees into a course of conduct does not

put thet whele course without the range of other-

wise applicable administrative powers. In deter-

ming whether the Company actually interfered

with, restramed, and coerced its employees the Board

has a right to look at what the Company has said as

well as what it has done.’’ (Italics ours.)

Petitioners’ reliance on N. L. R. B. v. American Tube

Bending Co., 184 F. (2d) 998, 2nd Cir., cert. den, 320 U. 8.

768, is misplaced, for there the situation was whotly dif-

ferent from that at bar. In that case there was no anti-

union background, no discriminatory discharges and no

coercion or intimidation of employees. All that was in-

volved was a letter and a speech made to the employees

by the president of the company. These related to a

pending election in which the employees were to choose

between two unions. The Circuit Court of Appeals pointed

out that (134 F. (2d) 995):

«* * * there is no intimation of reprisal against

those who thought otherwise; quite the opposite. The

ee

15

most that can be gathered from them [the leiter

and the speech] was an argument, temperate in

form, that a union would be against the employees’

interest as well as against the employers’, and that

the continued prosperity of the company depended

on going on as they had been.’’

On the same day that this Court denied certiorari in the

American Tube Bending case, this Court also denied cer-

tiorari in VN. L. R. B. v. Trojan Powder Co., 135 F. (2d) 337,

3rd Cir. In the Trojan Powder case the employer had writ-

ten a series of letters to its employees, which, as the Cireuit

Court of Appeals said (135 F. (2d) at 339), contained ‘‘no

threats’’ and were ‘‘not unusual,’’ in that the company had

customarily written letters to its employees. The Court,

however, went on to point out (p. 339) that a company

foreman had characterized union representatives as ‘‘sabo-

teurs’’ (c.f. the use of ‘‘gangsters’’ and ‘‘racketeers’’ in

the case at bar) and, citing the decision of this Court in the

Virginia Electric case, upheld the Board’s order. This

Court, as we have said, denied certiorari (320 U. S. 768).

In N. L. R. B. v. M. E. Blatt Co., 143 F. (2d) 268, cert.

den. U.S. , 89 L. Ed. Adv. Op. 90, the Cireuit Court

of Appeals, 3rd Circuit, discussing the opinions in the

Virginia Electric and American Tube Bending cases, said

(p. 274): :

‘‘We are of the opinion that the Supreme Court in-

tended to indicate and did indicate that communica-

tions from the employer to the employee might

amount to coercion, but that it was not clear that

the Board had found the existence of coercion on

sufficient evidence in the cited case. The guaranty

of freedom of speech contained in the First Amend-

ment does not guarantee him who speaks immunity

from the legal consequences of his verbal actions.

This is the substance of our ruling in National Labor

Relations Board v. New Era Die Co., 118 F. 2d 500,

505. We reiterated it in the recent contempt pro-

ceeding of Edward G@. Budd Manufacturing Co. v.

National Labor Relations Board, 142 F. 2d 922.”’

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16

In the Budd ease, which was a contempt proceeding, cited

in the above quotation, the Court pointed out (142 F. (2d)

at 927):

‘Whether the constitutionally protected right of

free speech has been abused by an expression of fact

or opinion, so as to render the matter actionable as

a violation of the Wagner Act, comes down to the

question whether the assailed utterances constitute,

or are in furtherance of, employer domination,

coercion or interference in his employees’ exercise

of their legal rights. The inquiry, therefore, in any

relevant connection is whether the challenged state-

ments or opinions contain, or, in the circumstances,

can reasonably be construed as containing, threats

by the employer of discrimination or other coercive

or intimidating action against some employees or an

allurement of favoritism to others according to their

respective labor affiliations or activities. If the utter-

ances do so offend, then they are actionable, for the

Wagner Act is aimed directly at such conduct and

furnishes the effective means for its eradication.”’

Similarly, in Elastic Stop Nut Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 8th

Cir., 142 F. (2d) 371, it was said (p. 378):

“As to petitioner’s argument concerning con-

stitutional privilege. Valnoski’s remarks related to

petitioner’s determination to establish the kind of

labor organization it desired—an independent organi-

zation, and while an expression of opinion on labor

matters may be protected when such utterances do

not constitute coercion under the Act, speech amount-

ing, in connection with other circumstances, to

coercion within the meaning of the Act is not pro-

tected. * * * The determination of the category into

which the remarks fell was a question of fact for the

Board, National Labor Relations Board v. Virginia

Power & Electric Co., supra, and the Board’s finding

on the fact may not be disturbed.”’

Again, in N. L. R. B. v. Laister-Kauffmann A. Corp.,

Sth Cir., 144 F. (2d) 9, the Court declared (pp. 12-13):

17

‘‘Under the facts and circumstances and the in-

ferences to be drawn therefrom the Board was within

its rights in concluding tnder the evidence that re-

spondent had engaged in unfair labor practices in

violation of Section 8(1) of the Act. The acts and

conduct of respondent present a pattern expressive

of management hostility to the rights of its em-

ployees to choose their labor affiliations independ-

ently of management interference; and respondent’s

attempts to discourage the employees from affiliating

with the Union by statement evincing hostility to the

Union, veiled threats of discharge, warnings that the

plant would shut down because of the Union and

interrogation of employees concerning Union affilia-

tion and activities constitute well recognized forms

of interference, restraint, and coercion, in violation

of Section 8(1) of the Act.’’

Thus, it is well established that ‘‘the right of ‘free

speech’ cannot be invoked as a shield for coercion in viola-

tion of the Act.’’* Indeed, the very cases cited by peti-

tioners so hold.’

In the cases at bar, the ‘‘complex of activities’’ revealed

by the record herein, amply supports the finding of the

Board, affirmed by the courts below, that petitioners have

interfered with, restrained and coerced their employees in

the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 703

of the Act. That finding is based upon largely undenied

and uncontraverted testimony as to a long-established anti-

union attitude on the part of the petitioners, the unlawful

discharges of two employees because of their union activ-

ities, the conduct of petitioners in warning employees not

to join or assist the Union, thinly veiled threats of dis-

charges if the Union’s organizational drive were successful,

6. N. L. R. B. v. Glenn L. Martin-Nebraska Co., 141 F. (2d) 371, 373.

7. N. L. R. B. vy. Virginia Electric §& Power Co., 314 U. 8. 469, 477, 478;

N. L. R. B. v. American Tube Bending Co., 134 F, (2d) 993, 994; Edward @G.

ay dennis Co. v. N. L. R. B., 142 F, (2a) 922, 926; Thomas v. Collins, ...

U , 89 L. Ed. Adv. Op. 340, 352,

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18

petitioners’ suggestion that a company union be formed,

and vilification of the Union and its representatives.®

Indeed, the remarks made by Marcus and Kaplan, peti-

tioner’s manager, were inherently coercive and an interfer-

ence with the rights of the employees. Mareus’ threat to

discharge younger employees if the Union were successful,

his characterization of the Union as ‘‘a bunch of racketeers

and gangsters,’ his remark, ‘‘Why give your money to

outside crooks?’’ and his suggested formation of a com-

pany union go far beyond a temperate expression of opin-

ion, such as in N. L. R. B. v. American Tube Bending Co.,

supra, Manager Kaplan’s warning to an employee to

‘‘have nothing to do with the foolish kids who are trying

to unionize Foto Shops’? and to keep his ‘‘nose clean’’

was more than mere advice. And petitioner Marcus’ state-

ment to Bordin that ‘‘ [he] should have nothing to do with

unions and [he] could advance [himself] like Mr. Hervich

has’? was an obvious attempt to induce Bordin to renounce

the Union under promise of future favor.

Petitioners’ statements, therefore, clearly contained

‘“threats by the employer of discrimination or other

coercive or intimidating action against some employees or

an allurement of favoritism to others, according to their

respective labor affiliations or activities,’"” and were not

protected by the constitutional privilege of free speech.

8. Petitioners infer that a cireular distributed by the Union vilified and

libelled them (petition, p. 18; brief, p. 16). Examination of that circular

(Board’s Exh, 9, R. 1192) will disclose that petitioners’ characterization there-

of is wholly without basis. The circular was temperate and factual in character.

Petitioners made no attempt to prove that it was false. Their present attempt

to justify their coercive remarks as a reply to vilification and libel by the Union

is an unwarranted afterthought, not raised before the Board (petitioners’ ex-

ceptions to Intermediate Report of Trial Examiner, R. 1271-1281).

9. Cf. N. L. R. B. v. Trojan Powder Co., 135 F. (2a) 337, 339 (union rep-

resentatives ‘‘sabateurs’’); Oughton Vv. N. L. R. B, 118 F. (2d) 486, 489,

cert. den. 315 U.S. 797 (union ‘<a buneh of communists and reds’’); N.L. R. B.

v. N. Carolina Finishing Co., 121 F. (2d) 954, 955 (union ‘‘a bunch of

racketeers’’); N. L. R. B. v. Jahn & Ollier Engrav. Co., 123 F. (24) 589, 591

(union officials ‘‘don’t want you, but want your dues’’; be wary of ‘‘ poison

peddlers’? and ‘*‘ poison propaganda’’; union employees ‘‘ smart agitators’’).

10. E. G. Budd Co. v. N. L. R. B., 142 F. (2d) 922 at 927.

19

NO NOVEL OR SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION

That the order which petitioners herein seek to review

was made by the New York State Labor Relations Board,

and not by the National Labor Relations Board, does not

make the question presented novel. The New York State

Labor Relations Act and the National Labor Relations

Act ‘‘are not only alike in their provisions but are almost

identical in language,’’ and, hence, Federal decisions are

in point and entitled to ‘‘great weight.’’"" The constitu-

tional right of free speech, of course, is equally applicable

to decisions of State Boards, and the decisions of this

Court are binding on such Boards. As the New York and

National Labor Relations Act are ‘‘almost identical in

language,’’ the questions which petitioners seek to present

are in no respect novel and are fully covered by decisions

of this Court.

The pattern of events at bar contains undenied expres-

sions of hostility towards unions, discharge of two em-

ployees because they applied for membership in and assisted

the Union, and undenied and substantially conceded utter-

ances, which were not only coercive in themselves but were

part of a whole pattern of activity designed to discourage

and prevent the employees from exercising their right to

join a union of their own choosing.

Not one of the cases on which petitioners rely holds

that the right of free speech makes such utterances or

such conduct on the part of an employer any the less inter-

ference with employee rights in violation of the Act.

11. Davega City Radio, ete. v. N. ¥Y. 8S. L. R

Restaurant v. Boland, 282 N. Y. 256, 267; N. ¥. 8.

App. Div. 120, 122.

. B., 281 N. Y. 13, 22; Stork

L. R. B. v. Timen, 264

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Conclusion

The Board’s finding, based ‘‘on the entire record’’ (R.

1351), that petitioners interfered with, restrained and

coerced their employees in violation of the provisions of

the New York State Labor Relations Act, and the order

issued thereon, do not infringe upon the petitioners’ right

of free speech.

We respectfully submit that on the record herein, not

only is there no novel question of law presented, but peti-

tioners fail to present any question of substance whatever.

Respectfully submitted,

Wim E. Grapy, IR.,

General Counsel,

Pump FEeLpstuM,

Associate General Counsel,

New York State Labor Relations Board.

May, 1945.

Ee ee eee

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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