Brief for the Respondent in Opposition — 42nd St. Foto Shop, Inc., Fotoshop, Incorporated and Sam Marcus, d/b/a Marcus Photo Service and as Fotoshop v. New York State Labor Relations Board
Supreme Court brief1945
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Fs LO
MAY 21 1945
CHAMLES ELMORE CROPLEY
ULE RK
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
Ocrosper TermM—1944
No. 1216
42ND ST. FOTO SHOP, INC., FOTOSHOP, INCORPO-
RATED and SAM MARCUS, d/b/a MARCUS PHOTO
SERVICE and as FOTOSHOP,
Petitioners,
vs.
NEW YORK STATE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.
. On Petition for Certiorari
BRIEF FOR NEW YORK STATE LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION
Wiriutum E. Grapy, Jr.,
General Counsel,
Puiu FEevpsivoM,
Associate General Counsel,
New York State Labor Relations Board.
_——————— EE)
JvupIciaL PRINTING Co., Inc., 82 BEEKMAN ST., N. ¥.—BARCLaY 7—3648-9 ao 53
INDEX
PAGE
Opinions Below ox no ss cc cccis casas ccieucsereeesass 1
Basia | iin os ok ew wc iNet bs awewascn ches geese 2
Question Presented ...........ccccccccecceececcces 2
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved.... 2
een errrer re errr Trey ts 3
Proceedings Before the Board.............-000000- 3
Proceedings in the Courts.............ceeeeeeeees 3
Summary of Argument ..5.o.0620cs iv avieaniees sans +
Point I—The petition should be dismissed, for it seeks
a writ directed to, and charges errors to, a court
which has not adjudicated the merits of the contro-
ever errr rre ret ey rere eer Pere rr cr rey foe yi 5)
Pornt II—The petition should be denied, for no novel
or even substantial question is presented........... 8
p> S| BOTT E OPT Te TT Tr ren yy rey Toe 9
| er errr Tre er err peers ee 9
The Unfair Labor Practices.................. 11
Free PE canascescandinas ccdenvsddastuneee 13
No Novel or Substantial Question............... 19
ee Peer TTC ete Tee eres oe te ee 20
pS ae PRE Pye yer ee eee rer ey re 21
ii ““s INDEX
CITATIONS
CasEs:
PAGE
Bacon v. State of Texas, 163 U.S. 207...........-05. 7n
Bookman v. City of New York, 200 N.Y. 53.......... 12n
Brink v. Stratton, 176 N. Y. 150........... cece eeees 12n
Chicago & Eastern Illinois R. R. Co. v. Industrial Com-
mission, 264 U. 8, 206... .....sacsiecessenvesspanse 7n
Cuyahoga River Power Co. v. Northern Realty Co., 244
a. errr rrr ere rary user 7n
Davega City Radio v. New York State Labor Relations
Board, 901 N. F. WS. cays csscacteckssccdaneaues 19n
Dept. of Banking, State of Nebraska v. Pink, 317 U.S.
DBE onic cvuwnsachhcene senses) eee kee Senn 7
Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. National Labor Relations
Bderd, 169 F (0) ORR on aac unas Nissans 16, 17, 18n
Elastic Stop Nut Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 142 F’. (2d) S71. 2.0... ccc eneeeseccsnecnns 16
Local +167, Internatl. Bro. ete. v. U. S., 291 U. 8. 298 8n
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Elliott, 184 U. 8.
BO a vccvivvcnanscsanc tuk wdcewens 66 O06 WR REMEAS 7n
National Labor Relations Board v.
American Tube Bending Co., 184 F. (2d) 993, cert.
den. SO UB. WOR i vakaA ss kasaceua 14, 15, 17n, 18
Glenn L. Martin-Nebraska Co., 141 F. (2d) 371..... 17n
Jahn & Ollier Engrav. Co., 123 F. (2d) 589......... 181
Laister-Kauffmann A, Corp., 144 F. (2d) 9......... 16
Link-Bolt Ca. S11 U.S, S06. 2. vccavaws insane wenn 9
M. E. Blatt Co., 143 F. (2d) 268, cert. der. U.S.
mpi Mie Meer rer er 15
INDEX iil
PAGE
National Labor Relations Board v. (cont’d)
N. Carolina Finishing Co., 121 F. (2d) 994......... 18n
Trojan Powder Co, 135 F. (2d) 387, cert. den. 320
TT PO ci cacdn cxca sks ossexnehecyenase ce 15, 18n
Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U. S. 469, on re-
mand, 44 N. L. R. B. 404, 132 F. (2d) 390, 319 U. S.
OO ck iicin s wake i x NK sn eh KOREENS 13, 18n, 15, 17
New York State Labor Relations Board v. Timen,
264 App. Div. 120 .........ee eee eeee wee eeeneeeen 19n
O’Reilly v. People, 86 N. Y. 154........- essere e ener 12n
Oughton v. National Labor Relations Board, 118 F.
(2d) 486, cert. den. 315 U.S. 797... 6... e eee ee eens 18n
People v. Most, 128 N. Y. 108........-0-seseeeeeeees 12n
Randall v. Board of Commissioners, 261 U. 8. 252..... 7n
Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Watson, 287 U.S. 86..... 8n
Second Natl. Bank v. First Natl. Bank, 242 U.S. 600.. 7m
Stork Restaurant v. Boland, 282 N. Y. 256...... 7n, 13n, 19n
Thomas y, Collins, U.S. , 89 L. Ed. Adv. Op.
| eee reer res wc mme rer oT tesa Sr ats e 17
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Crovo, 220 U.S. 364.. 7n
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Priester, 276 U. S.
RD cc cdekt ci anekanaee FENUR CANAD ER ECREs S44ORE « 7n
iv
INDEX
STATUTES:
Judicial Code, See. 237a, 28 U.S. C. 344............
New York State Labor Relations Act, Article 20
of Labor Law of State of New York, Laws of 1937,
443, See, 1.
Chap.
See.
See.
See.
See.
See.
See.
See.
See.
See.
707, sub.
707, sub.
707, sub.
707, sub.
+ 90 08 SD BOS WO OS 6.5 22.6 C4 ROAD OSES
Bera aoe Sa gig ei,
RE ESR RENE cts SAUCES Fe
ei wink ou cinaLals bee aon ee
OP Sapo Corer eR eR eueRy eatin cL 3, 21
Ricvcua ses viana rae e ee 3, 6, 23
eee ee oe 3, 6, 13, 24
Bee re ee 3, 6,24
PARR hay ge, SILER sae S 3, 6, 24
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
Octrosper Term—1944
No. 1216
42xp St. Suop, Inc., Forosnor, Ixcorroratep and Sam
Marcus, d/b/a Marcus Puxoro Service and = as
Forosnopr,
Petitioners,
vs.
New York State Lasor Revations Boarp,
On Petition for Certiorari
BRIEF FOR NEW YORK STATE LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION
Opinions Below
The decision and order of the New York State Labor
Relations Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board) is
reported in 5 8S. L. R. B. (N. Y.) 1850 (R. pp. 1829-1358).
The decision of the Special Term, Supreme Court of the
State of New York, New York County, denying petitioners’
motion to vacate the Board’s order, is not officially re-
ported and appeared in the New York Law Journal (Vol.
109, No. 130, June 5, 1943).
The decision of the Appellate Division, First Judicial
Department, affirming the order made at Special Term,
is reported at 268 App. Div. 759 (case 4). The decision
of the Appellate Division, denying petitioners’ motion for
Aatheys
nee Asem SE ON SE ee ea: » ——
2
leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, is reported at 268
App. Div. 849 (case 6). The decision of the Court of
Appeals of the State of New York, denying petitioners’
motion for leave to appeal to it, is reported in 293 N. Y.
(Weekly Advance Sheet No. 297, Jan. 6, 1945, p. i).
No opinions were written by any of the courts below,
except for the memorandum contained in the short form
order made at Special Term (R. 4).
Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction to entertain this petition is claimed under
the Judicial Code, Section 237(a) amended (28 U.S. C.,
Sec. 344).
Question Presented
The question presented is whether an order of the
Board, directing petitioners to cease and desist from inter-
fering with, restraining and coercing their employees in
violation of the provisions of the New York State Labor
Relations Act, contravenes the constitutional right of free
speech.
Constitutional and Statutory
Provisions Involved
The relevant portions of the Constitution of the United
States are set forth in the Appendix to petitioners’ brief,
page 26.
The sections of the New York State Labor Relations
Act involved, are:
Sections 701 (2), 703, 704 (4), (5) and (10), set
forth in the Appendix to petitioners’ brief, pages
25-6.
Sections 706, 707 (1), (2), (3) and (4), set forth
in the Appendix to this brief, pages 21 to 25.
Statement
The Board is a duly constituted administrative agency
of the State of New York. It operates pursuant to the New
York State Labor Relations Act, Article 20 of the Labor
Law of the State of New York, hereinafter called the Act.
The Act is patterned on, and similar to, the National Labor
Relations Act.
Proceedings Befere the Board
The unfair labor practice proceeding before the Board,
here involved, followed the course prescribed by Section
706 of the Act (Appendix, pp. 21 to 23), that is, complaint,
notice of hearing, answer, hearings before a Trial Ex-
aminer with full opportunity to offer evidence, examine
and cross examine witnesses, issuance of Trial Examiner’s
Intermediate Report, exceptions filed thereto, argument
before the Board, and issuance of the Board’s decision
containing a discussion of the evidence, findings of fact,
conclusions of law and order,
The Board’s order, dated December 30, 1942 (R. 1329-
1358), in substance, directed petitioners to offer reinstate-
ment to, and make whole, two employees discharged be-
cause of their union activities, and to cease and desist
from interfering with, restraining and coercing their em-
ployees in the exercise of their rights to join and assist a
labor organization of their own choosing.
Proceedings in the Courts
Pursuant to Section 707 of the Act (Appendix, pp.
23 to 25), petitioners applied at Special Term of the Su-
preme Court of the State of New York for an order vacating
the Board’s order. At the same time the Board applied
for an order of the Court enforcing the Board’s order.
AR NTE ee ORES, Seyi
4
On June 4, 1943, an order was duly made by the Su-
preme Court of the State of New York, County of New
York, denying petitioners’ motion to vacate the Board’s
order.
On August 18, 1943, an order was duly made by the
Supreme Court, New York County, enforcing the Board’s
order, in whole. Ne appeal has been taken from this order
and the order remains outstanding and unappealed.
Petitioners appealed from the order dated June 4, 1943,
which denied their motion to vacate the Board’s order.
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State
of New York, First Judicial Department, unanimously
affirmed the order (268 App. Div. 759). The Appellate
Division thereafter denied an application by petitioners
for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals (268 App. Div.
849). A similar motion by the petitioners was also denied
by the Court of Appeals itself (293 N. Y. ; Advance
Sheet +297, Jan. 6, 1945, p. i).
Summary of Argument
Petitioners seek a writ of certiorari to review an order
of the Supreme Court, New York Councy, entered upon
the remittitur of the Court of Appeals of the State of
New York, denying leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners’ specification of errors charges the alleged
errors to the Court of Appeals.
The Appellate Division, First Judicial Department, was
the highest court in the State of New York which adjudi-
cated the merits of the controversy here involved. The
Court of Appeals merely denied a motion by petitioners
for leave to appeal.
=) - canes Se RE a ae RR IE gO LG NS: TEE RR ete Cee) a ee ee ne eRe AC ea
-
ov
The writ which petitioners seek, therefore, is directed
to the wrong court, and the errors which they specify are
charged to the wrong court.
Il
The record herein discloses petitioners’ intense hos-
tility to unions, discharge of employees for union activities,
and utterances which were coercive, inherently and in con-
text. The Board’s order, based ‘‘on the entire record’’
(R. 1351, fol. 4052) does not contravene petitioners’ right
of free speech. That right may not be used as a shield for
coercive action in violation of the Act.
The fact that the order which petitioners seek to review
was made by a state labor relations board rather than by
the National Labor Relations Board, raises no novel ques-
tion.
POINT I
The petition should be dismissed, for it seeks a writ .
directed to, and charges errors to, a court which has
not adjudicated the merits of the controversy.
Petitioners herein pray ‘‘that a writ of certiorari issue
to review the final order entered on December 8th, 1944
(R. 1403-4), upon the Remittitur of the Court of Appeals,
the highest court of the State of New York (R. 1402),
denying leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, from an
order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of
the State of New York, First Judicial Department, en-
tered on June 8th, 1943 (R. 4), denying petitioners’ ap-
plication to vacate and set aside the Decision and Order of
the New York State Labor Relations Board dated Decem-
ber 31st, 1942 (R. 1329-59)’’ (Petition, pp. 2-3) (italics
ours).
ore eee TT RNS
REI ROSAS Tay SR IY DEI IETS ES EOE NN GLE IO IEE
6
Petitioners’ Specification of Errors (Petition, p. 30) is
based on the ground that ‘‘the Court of Appeals of the
State of New York erred: * * *.”’
It is respectfully submitted that the Court of Appeals
of the State of New York did not adjudicate the merits of
this case, but merely denied an application by petitioners
for leave to appeal, and, accordingly, that the writ of cer-
tiorari which petitioners seek is addressed to the wrong
court and the petition should be dismissed,
The Board’s order herein was issued on December 31,
1942. Thereafter, pursuant to Section 707 of the Act,
petitioners instituted court proceedings to vacate and set
aside the Board’s order. The Board, simultaneously, insti-
tuted court proceedings for enforcement of its order.
On June 4, 1943, an order was duly made by the Supreme
Court of the State of New York, County of New York,
denying petitioners’ motion to vacate the Board’s order,
On August 18, 1943, an order was duly made by the same
court, enforcing the Board’s order in whole.
Petitioners appealed only from the order dated June 4,
1943, which denied their motion to vacate the Board’s
order. No appeal was taken from the order of August 18,
1943, enforcing the Board’s order, and said order remains
an outstanding, unappealed final order.
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the
State of New York, First Judicial Department, wnani-
mously affirmed the order of June 4, 1943, denying peti-
tioners’ motion to vacate the Board’s order. Petitioners’ |
motions for leave to appeal were denied by the Appellate
Division on June 9, 1944, and by the Court of Appeals on
November 30, 1944. On December 8, 1944, an order was
entered in the Supreme Court, New York County, on re-
mittitur from the Court of Appeals, making the order
of the Court of Appeals, denying leave to appeal thereto,
the order of the Supreme Court, New York County.
7
Wholly apart from the fact that the final order of the
Supreme Court, New York County, dated August 18, 1944,
enforcing the Board’s order, is outstanding and unappealed,
it is clear that the petition herein is based on erroneous
procedure and that the writ sought is not directed to the
proper court.
The Court of Appeals’ only act was to deny petitioners’
motion for leave to appeal. The order of the Supreme
Court, New York County, dated December 8, 1944, which
petitioners term a ‘‘final order,’? was for the purpose of
taxing costs. It was merely a ministerial act of the lower
court following denial of leave to appeal by the Court of
Appeals (Department of Banking, State of Nebraska v.
Pink, 317 U.S. 264).
The highest court of the State of New York which has
adjudicated the merits of the controversy is the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York,
and it is to that court that the writ of certiorari should
have been direeted. This error in the petition is fatal and
requires its dismissal.’
Moreover, petitioners’ Specification of Errors relates
to alleged errors committed by the Court of Appeals and
speaks of the ‘tholding, in effect by aflirmance * * *”? of
that court. As we have pointed out, however, the Court
of Appeals did not affirm the order of the Appellate Divi-
sion, but merely denied leave to appeal. The alleged errors
which petitioners seek to review, therefore, are not im-
putable to the Court of Appeals, but only to the Appellate
Division, the highest State court which adjudicated the
1. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Crovo, 220 U. 8. 364; Second National
Bank v. First National Bank, 242 U. S. 600; Cuyahoga River Power Co. v.
Northern River Realty Co., 244 U. S. 300; Chicago and Eastern Illinois R.R.
Co. v. Industrial Commission, 284 U. 8S. 296; Missouri Kansas & Texas Ry. Co.
v. Elliott, 184 U. S. 529; Bacon v. State of Texas, 163 U. S. 207; Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Priester, 276 U. S. 251; Randall v. Board of Commis-
sioners ete., 261 U. S. 252.
8
merits of the controversy. This deficient assignment of
errors by petitioners constitutes additional ground for dis-
missal of the petition.’
It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that the peti-
tion herein should be dismissed on the grounds (a) the
petition seeks a writ addressed to a court which has not
adjudicated the merits of the case, (b) it seeks review of
an order denying leave to appeal, which order is not ap-
pealable, and (c) is based on a Specification of Errors
which is not only lacking in certainty and definiteness, but
which is erroneously charged to the wrong court.
POINT II
The petition should be denied, for no novel or even
substantial question is presented.
Section 704, subdivision 10 of the New York State Labor
Relations Act provides that it shall be an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer to ‘‘interfere with, restrain or coerce
employees’’ in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Sec-
tion 703 of the Act. The rights guaranteed by Section 703
are: ‘** * * to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities,
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection, free from interference, restraint, or coercion
of employers, * * *.’’
The Board found, and the courts below have sustained
the finding, that petitioners ‘‘interfered with, restrained
and coerced their employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed by the Act’”’ (R. 1353).
The Board also found, and this finding too has been sus-
tained by the courts below, that petitioners unlawfully dis-
2. Local $167, International Brotherhood etc. v. U. S., 2°1 U. S. 293; Sea-
board Air Line Ry. v. Watson, 287 U.S. 86.
" x ‘. ee ee Wee Sates 5
TMD S TRS A EN RR LO CETL om LAG Sa POR Bu ~ erpEpCRtet
_ recto sec
3
9
charged two employees, Jay Irving and Edwin R. Cohen,
in violation of Section 704, subdivisions 4 and 5 of the Act
(R. 1353).
The Board accordingly directed petitioners to cease in-
terfering with their employees’ exercise of their rights
under the Act and to offer reinstatement to, and make
whole, the two discharged employees upon their return to
civilian life (R. 1355-7).
We shall recount the facts briefly and then show that
under well settled law the right of free speech does not
excuse the coercive actions of petitioners.
THE FACTS
By way of preliminary, we respectfully remind the
Court that an employer’s antipathy to unions and the ex-
istence of other unfair labor practices, prior or concurrent,
are properly to be considered in determining whether the
Act has been violated. As this Court said in N. L. R. B. v.
Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 587, 588:
“The employer’s attitude towards unions is
relevant.’’
Petitioner Sam Marcus, in addition to doing business
as Marcus Photo Service and as Fotoshop, is president of
42nd St. Foto Shop, Ine. and Fotoshop, Incorporated. He
owns and controls all the petitioners’ enterprises (R. 736,
737). The Board found that ‘‘all these undertakings con-
stitute one single enterprise responsible for compliance
with the Act’? (R. 1336).
Background
The record contains uncontradicted testimony that
Marcus and his wife, who took an active part in manage-
ment, were intensely hostile to unions. They and super-
visory employees made numerous remarks calculated to dis-
SONAR NA NY ASE AS! ACP LORD TD GG DAB LP ALLE SG LAE NAGE LIE DIP TERS AR ht EVAL LING BRIE Me PRR TNR pee
10
courage self-organization among their employees. A few
illustrations follow.
Mrs. Marcus told the employees: ‘‘Unions seem to be
created for the purpose of annoying employers’? (R. 572).
During a strike at Gimbel’s Department Store, she said that
‘*she made it a point of going into Gimbel’s every day just
to walk through, whether she bought anything or not, just
to show the pickets’? (R. 422). Irving, one of the dis-
charged employees, testified that when Marcus hired him
he said ‘‘his employees could always come to him with their
problems and there is no necessity of going to unions, and
his employees don’t believe in unions’? (R. 663).
Irving testified that during a strike of photo finishers at
the Mareus Photo Service in the fail of 1941, Mareus called
the striking employees ‘‘a bunch of ingrates who didn’t
know when they were well off and that it was unfortunate
that they will have to lose their jobs because of being mis-
guided by a racketeering union’? (R. 429). Mrs, Marcus
and Andorn, her brother, who was head of the camera de-
partment, made similar comments (R. 428).
During the 1941 strike Irving was asked to sign a state-
ment that the employees had no desire to join the striking
union (R. 431). The statement referred to that union in
derogatory terms (R. 431-2). About the same time a leaflet,
purportedly prepared by the employees but actually pre-
pared by the management, was distributed to customers
(R. 435). It contained the following paragraph (Bd.’s
Exh. 10, printed, R. 1194-5, offered R. 442):
‘““We are emphatic in our desires to remain free
men and not being enslaved by union racketeers. We
have personally, and of our own volition, petitioned
our employers not to sign our liberties away to this
union or any other union, This arrogant attempt of
racketeers to muscle-in on our pay envelopes is a
direct attack on our liberties and livelihood, even
more so than on our employers’’ (Bd.’s Exh. 10, fol.
3581). (Italics ours.)
moo
11
Neither Marcus nor his wife, nor any supervisory official
took the stand to deny the foregoing.
The Unfair Labor Practices
In the early part of January, 1942, Retail Employees
Union, Local 830, C. TI. O., herein called the Union, started
to organize petitioners’ employees. Two employees, Irving
and Cohen, were among the first to join the Union and
most active in its organizational drive. Irving was dis-
charged on January 12, 1942, and Cohen on January 23,
1942. The Board found, and the courts below have sus-
tained the finding, that both Irving and Cohen were dis-
charged because they had joined and assisted the Union
(R. 1353).
On January 24, 1942, the day following the discharge of
Irving, Kaplan, the manager, asked Bordin, one of the
employees, whether he was ‘‘involved in unionization’?
and advised him to ‘‘have nothing to do with the foolish
kids who are trying to unionize the Foto Shops,’’ and
to keep his ‘‘nose clean’? (R. 693-5). Two days later
Kaplan said to Bordin: ‘‘Say, Bob, are you keeping your
nose clean?’’ and asked Bordin who had given him the
Union application card: ‘*Was it anybody who is working
there, or was it Irving or Cohen?’’ (R. 698-700).
As part of the organizing campaign among petitioners’
employees, the Union, on February 2, 1942, distributed a
leaflet to recruit new members (Bd.’s Exh. 9, printed, R.
1192-3, offered, R. 299). The very next day, Mareus called
a meeting of the employees, about forty or fifty in number,
and made a speech* in which he called the Union ‘‘a bunch
of racketeers and gangsters.’’ He threatened to discharge
3. Petitioners advert to the fact that the witness Rafalow was an
‘‘atheist,’’? and, although no federal issue is involved and no error specified,
apparently question the value of his testimony as to the speech made by peti-
tioner Mareus. Rafalow’s testimony was fully corroborated by two other wit-
nesses (R, 332-6, 701-6). The testimony of all three was uncontroverted. Peti-
Ste EI. GANAS ORAS IONS PONS EEE STRANI NONE REIN AAO NEES a
12
the younger employees if the Union obtained a collective
bargaining contract and warned the older employees that
this would mean additional work for them. He suggested
that the employees abandon the ‘‘outside’’ union and form
a company union. ‘‘Why give your money to outside
crooks, have a union among yourselves’? (R, 259-261, 332-6,
706, 1189-91).
Bordin, one of the employees, testified that early in
February, 1942, Marcus had told him that ‘IT should have
nothing to do with unions and I could advance myself like
Mr, Hervich has’’ and that Irving had been let go because
of union activity (R. 708).
Marcus did not testify.
Petitioners at page 29 of their petition make much of
the fact that the witness Rafalow testified that Marcus in
his speech had characterized the Union as ‘ta bunch of
racketeers and gangsters’’ and that those exact words are
not to be found in a statement which Rafalow made a few
days after the meeting at which Mareus spoke (Bd.’s Exh. 8
for Iden.). The statement, however, does contain the fol-
lowing (R. 1190):
“Mr, Mareus then went on to say: ‘Why give your
money to outside crooks, have a union among your-
selves.’ He also said: ‘I have nothing against
unions, but I don’t like to see you giving money
to racketeers.’ ”’
The statement also quotes Marcus as having said (R. 1191):
“Of course, I have no right to discriminate against
anyone in the union. That’s what the leaflet says
the law is. I don’t fire anyone for being a member
oF
of the union. I fire them because of inefficiency.
tioner Marcus did not testify. Actually, Rafalow, who was eighteen years old,
did not know the meaning of the term ‘‘atheist’’ and incorrectly applied it
to himself, At most he was an agnostic (R. 320-2). In any event, he was
‘«first duly sworn’’ on taking the witness stand (R. 255) and knew the penalties
for perjury (R. 320). His testimony was clearly competent and admissible
(N Y. State Constitution, Article I, See. 3; N. Y¥. Civil Practice Act, See, 362;
O'Reilly v. People, 86 N. Y. 154, 159; Bookman v. City of New York, 200 N. Y.
53, 56; Brink v. Stratton, 176 N. Y. 150, 157-8; Peo. v. Most, 128 N. Y. 108;
Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 6, p. 327).
ee
HUA ae Mh Ue SONIA NIL ENO LALLA Dy MIP HSS TIONED Ra SOROS HOOT I NDAD AM REALS R ATMO | PINERS, 2:6 ARADO
13
On the basis of the entire record, the Board found, and
its findings were upheld by the courts below, that petition-
ers had interfered with, restrained and coerced their em-
ployees in the exercise of their right to join or assist a
union of their own choosing. The Board’s findings of fact
were supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, are
conclusive.*
FREE SPEECH
Petitioners’ invocation of the important right of free
speech, in an attempt to excuse their interference with
their employees’ rights, is without merit.
The controlling precedent is the decision of this Court
in NV. L. R. B. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U.S.
469. In that case the National Labor Relations Board
found that the employer had interfered with, restrained
and coerced its employees in violation of the National Act.
Although the employer had engaged in many anti-union
acts, the National Board’s decision did not indicate whether
its finding of interference was based on the whole ‘‘com-
plex’’ of the employer’s activities, or whether the finding
was based solely on certain statements. As there were
grave doubts as to whether the statements, standing alone,
were coercive (314 U. S. at 476, 479), this Court remanded
the matter for clarification by the National Board.’
In the Virginia Electric case, this Court stated (p. 477):
‘«“* * * Tf the total activities of an employer re-
strain or coerce his employees in their free choice,
then those employees are entitled to the protection
of the Act. And in determining whether a course
of conduct amounts to restraint, or coercion, pressure
4. Act, Section 707(2); Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Boland, 282 N. Y. 256.
5. The National Board, after the remand, reissued its order without taking
further evidence and stated that its finding of interference was based on the
employer ’s conduct, as well as on the statements. That order (44 N. L. R. B.
404) was enforced by the Circuit Court of Appeals (133 F. (2d) 390) and by
this Court (319 U. 8. 533).
Ts oe ~ +e Ee ee
14
exerted vocally by the employer may no more be
disregarded than pressure exerted in other ways.
‘Tf the Board’s order here may fairly be said
to be based on the totality of the Company’s activi-
ties during the period in question, we may not con-
sider the findings of the Board as to the coercive
effect of the bulletin and the speeches in isolation
from the findings as respects the other conduct of
the Company. If the Board’s ultimate conclusion
is based upon a complex of activities, such as the
anti-union background of the Company, the activi-
ties of Bishop, Edwards’ warning to the employees
that they would be discharged for ‘messing with the
.1.0.,’ the discharge of Mann, the quick formation
of the Independent, and the part which the manage-
ment may have played in that formation, that con-
clesion would not be vitiated by the fact that the
Board considered what the Company said in con-
junction yith what it did. The mere fact that lan-
euaet*mefees into a course of conduct does not
put thet whele course without the range of other-
wise applicable administrative powers. In deter-
ming whether the Company actually interfered
with, restramed, and coerced its employees the Board
has a right to look at what the Company has said as
well as what it has done.’’ (Italics ours.)
Petitioners’ reliance on N. L. R. B. v. American Tube
Bending Co., 184 F. (2d) 998, 2nd Cir., cert. den, 320 U. 8.
768, is misplaced, for there the situation was whotly dif-
ferent from that at bar. In that case there was no anti-
union background, no discriminatory discharges and no
coercion or intimidation of employees. All that was in-
volved was a letter and a speech made to the employees
by the president of the company. These related to a
pending election in which the employees were to choose
between two unions. The Circuit Court of Appeals pointed
out that (134 F. (2d) 995):
«* * * there is no intimation of reprisal against
those who thought otherwise; quite the opposite. The
ee
15
most that can be gathered from them [the leiter
and the speech] was an argument, temperate in
form, that a union would be against the employees’
interest as well as against the employers’, and that
the continued prosperity of the company depended
on going on as they had been.’’
On the same day that this Court denied certiorari in the
American Tube Bending case, this Court also denied cer-
tiorari in VN. L. R. B. v. Trojan Powder Co., 135 F. (2d) 337,
3rd Cir. In the Trojan Powder case the employer had writ-
ten a series of letters to its employees, which, as the Cireuit
Court of Appeals said (135 F. (2d) at 339), contained ‘‘no
threats’’ and were ‘‘not unusual,’’ in that the company had
customarily written letters to its employees. The Court,
however, went on to point out (p. 339) that a company
foreman had characterized union representatives as ‘‘sabo-
teurs’’ (c.f. the use of ‘‘gangsters’’ and ‘‘racketeers’’ in
the case at bar) and, citing the decision of this Court in the
Virginia Electric case, upheld the Board’s order. This
Court, as we have said, denied certiorari (320 U. S. 768).
In N. L. R. B. v. M. E. Blatt Co., 143 F. (2d) 268, cert.
den. U.S. , 89 L. Ed. Adv. Op. 90, the Cireuit Court
of Appeals, 3rd Circuit, discussing the opinions in the
Virginia Electric and American Tube Bending cases, said
(p. 274): :
‘‘We are of the opinion that the Supreme Court in-
tended to indicate and did indicate that communica-
tions from the employer to the employee might
amount to coercion, but that it was not clear that
the Board had found the existence of coercion on
sufficient evidence in the cited case. The guaranty
of freedom of speech contained in the First Amend-
ment does not guarantee him who speaks immunity
from the legal consequences of his verbal actions.
This is the substance of our ruling in National Labor
Relations Board v. New Era Die Co., 118 F. 2d 500,
505. We reiterated it in the recent contempt pro-
ceeding of Edward G@. Budd Manufacturing Co. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 142 F. 2d 922.”’
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16
In the Budd ease, which was a contempt proceeding, cited
in the above quotation, the Court pointed out (142 F. (2d)
at 927):
‘Whether the constitutionally protected right of
free speech has been abused by an expression of fact
or opinion, so as to render the matter actionable as
a violation of the Wagner Act, comes down to the
question whether the assailed utterances constitute,
or are in furtherance of, employer domination,
coercion or interference in his employees’ exercise
of their legal rights. The inquiry, therefore, in any
relevant connection is whether the challenged state-
ments or opinions contain, or, in the circumstances,
can reasonably be construed as containing, threats
by the employer of discrimination or other coercive
or intimidating action against some employees or an
allurement of favoritism to others according to their
respective labor affiliations or activities. If the utter-
ances do so offend, then they are actionable, for the
Wagner Act is aimed directly at such conduct and
furnishes the effective means for its eradication.”’
Similarly, in Elastic Stop Nut Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 8th
Cir., 142 F. (2d) 371, it was said (p. 378):
“As to petitioner’s argument concerning con-
stitutional privilege. Valnoski’s remarks related to
petitioner’s determination to establish the kind of
labor organization it desired—an independent organi-
zation, and while an expression of opinion on labor
matters may be protected when such utterances do
not constitute coercion under the Act, speech amount-
ing, in connection with other circumstances, to
coercion within the meaning of the Act is not pro-
tected. * * * The determination of the category into
which the remarks fell was a question of fact for the
Board, National Labor Relations Board v. Virginia
Power & Electric Co., supra, and the Board’s finding
on the fact may not be disturbed.”’
Again, in N. L. R. B. v. Laister-Kauffmann A. Corp.,
Sth Cir., 144 F. (2d) 9, the Court declared (pp. 12-13):
17
‘‘Under the facts and circumstances and the in-
ferences to be drawn therefrom the Board was within
its rights in concluding tnder the evidence that re-
spondent had engaged in unfair labor practices in
violation of Section 8(1) of the Act. The acts and
conduct of respondent present a pattern expressive
of management hostility to the rights of its em-
ployees to choose their labor affiliations independ-
ently of management interference; and respondent’s
attempts to discourage the employees from affiliating
with the Union by statement evincing hostility to the
Union, veiled threats of discharge, warnings that the
plant would shut down because of the Union and
interrogation of employees concerning Union affilia-
tion and activities constitute well recognized forms
of interference, restraint, and coercion, in violation
of Section 8(1) of the Act.’’
Thus, it is well established that ‘‘the right of ‘free
speech’ cannot be invoked as a shield for coercion in viola-
tion of the Act.’’* Indeed, the very cases cited by peti-
tioners so hold.’
In the cases at bar, the ‘‘complex of activities’’ revealed
by the record herein, amply supports the finding of the
Board, affirmed by the courts below, that petitioners have
interfered with, restrained and coerced their employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 703
of the Act. That finding is based upon largely undenied
and uncontraverted testimony as to a long-established anti-
union attitude on the part of the petitioners, the unlawful
discharges of two employees because of their union activ-
ities, the conduct of petitioners in warning employees not
to join or assist the Union, thinly veiled threats of dis-
charges if the Union’s organizational drive were successful,
6. N. L. R. B. v. Glenn L. Martin-Nebraska Co., 141 F. (2d) 371, 373.
7. N. L. R. B. vy. Virginia Electric §& Power Co., 314 U. 8. 469, 477, 478;
N. L. R. B. v. American Tube Bending Co., 134 F, (2d) 993, 994; Edward @G.
ay dennis Co. v. N. L. R. B., 142 F, (2a) 922, 926; Thomas v. Collins, ...
U , 89 L. Ed. Adv. Op. 340, 352,
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18
petitioners’ suggestion that a company union be formed,
and vilification of the Union and its representatives.®
Indeed, the remarks made by Marcus and Kaplan, peti-
tioner’s manager, were inherently coercive and an interfer-
ence with the rights of the employees. Mareus’ threat to
discharge younger employees if the Union were successful,
his characterization of the Union as ‘‘a bunch of racketeers
and gangsters,’ his remark, ‘‘Why give your money to
outside crooks?’’ and his suggested formation of a com-
pany union go far beyond a temperate expression of opin-
ion, such as in N. L. R. B. v. American Tube Bending Co.,
supra, Manager Kaplan’s warning to an employee to
‘‘have nothing to do with the foolish kids who are trying
to unionize Foto Shops’? and to keep his ‘‘nose clean’’
was more than mere advice. And petitioner Marcus’ state-
ment to Bordin that ‘‘ [he] should have nothing to do with
unions and [he] could advance [himself] like Mr. Hervich
has’? was an obvious attempt to induce Bordin to renounce
the Union under promise of future favor.
Petitioners’ statements, therefore, clearly contained
‘“threats by the employer of discrimination or other
coercive or intimidating action against some employees or
an allurement of favoritism to others, according to their
respective labor affiliations or activities,’"” and were not
protected by the constitutional privilege of free speech.
8. Petitioners infer that a cireular distributed by the Union vilified and
libelled them (petition, p. 18; brief, p. 16). Examination of that circular
(Board’s Exh, 9, R. 1192) will disclose that petitioners’ characterization there-
of is wholly without basis. The circular was temperate and factual in character.
Petitioners made no attempt to prove that it was false. Their present attempt
to justify their coercive remarks as a reply to vilification and libel by the Union
is an unwarranted afterthought, not raised before the Board (petitioners’ ex-
ceptions to Intermediate Report of Trial Examiner, R. 1271-1281).
9. Cf. N. L. R. B. v. Trojan Powder Co., 135 F. (2a) 337, 339 (union rep-
resentatives ‘‘sabateurs’’); Oughton Vv. N. L. R. B, 118 F. (2d) 486, 489,
cert. den. 315 U.S. 797 (union ‘<a buneh of communists and reds’’); N.L. R. B.
v. N. Carolina Finishing Co., 121 F. (2d) 954, 955 (union ‘‘a bunch of
racketeers’’); N. L. R. B. v. Jahn & Ollier Engrav. Co., 123 F. (24) 589, 591
(union officials ‘‘don’t want you, but want your dues’’; be wary of ‘‘ poison
peddlers’? and ‘*‘ poison propaganda’’; union employees ‘‘ smart agitators’’).
10. E. G. Budd Co. v. N. L. R. B., 142 F. (2d) 922 at 927.
19
NO NOVEL OR SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION
That the order which petitioners herein seek to review
was made by the New York State Labor Relations Board,
and not by the National Labor Relations Board, does not
make the question presented novel. The New York State
Labor Relations Act and the National Labor Relations
Act ‘‘are not only alike in their provisions but are almost
identical in language,’’ and, hence, Federal decisions are
in point and entitled to ‘‘great weight.’’"" The constitu-
tional right of free speech, of course, is equally applicable
to decisions of State Boards, and the decisions of this
Court are binding on such Boards. As the New York and
National Labor Relations Act are ‘‘almost identical in
language,’’ the questions which petitioners seek to present
are in no respect novel and are fully covered by decisions
of this Court.
The pattern of events at bar contains undenied expres-
sions of hostility towards unions, discharge of two em-
ployees because they applied for membership in and assisted
the Union, and undenied and substantially conceded utter-
ances, which were not only coercive in themselves but were
part of a whole pattern of activity designed to discourage
and prevent the employees from exercising their right to
join a union of their own choosing.
Not one of the cases on which petitioners rely holds
that the right of free speech makes such utterances or
such conduct on the part of an employer any the less inter-
ference with employee rights in violation of the Act.
11. Davega City Radio, ete. v. N. ¥Y. 8S. L. R
Restaurant v. Boland, 282 N. Y. 256, 267; N. ¥. 8.
App. Div. 120, 122.
. B., 281 N. Y. 13, 22; Stork
L. R. B. v. Timen, 264
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Conclusion
The Board’s finding, based ‘‘on the entire record’’ (R.
1351), that petitioners interfered with, restrained and
coerced their employees in violation of the provisions of
the New York State Labor Relations Act, and the order
issued thereon, do not infringe upon the petitioners’ right
of free speech.
We respectfully submit that on the record herein, not
only is there no novel question of law presented, but peti-
tioners fail to present any question of substance whatever.
Respectfully submitted,
Wim E. Grapy, IR.,
General Counsel,
Pump FEeLpstuM,
Associate General Counsel,
New York State Labor Relations Board.
May, 1945.
Ee ee eee
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