Brief for the Respondents in Opposition — Subin v. National Labor Relations Board
Supreme Court brief1940
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VPI ARATE ew
TELS AG ABE eo bog OF RS aoe Me LTD aR Le UAT ate Se ate
INDEX
Page
Opinions below - - - - 1
ee 1
Questions presented _ - 2
Statute involved _ 2
Statement___ 3
Argument_-- - 9
Conclusion _ - - 14
CITATIONS
Cases:
Agwilines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board et al., 87
x Ge Bs acca re Re ee ues ea 10
Burlington Dyeing & Finishing Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 104 F. (2d) 736 10
Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,
95 F. (2d) 390, affirmed, 305 U. 8. 197 10
Hartsell Mills Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board,
11 F. (2d) 291- , 11
M. H. Ritzwoller Co. v. National Labor Relations Board
(C. C. A. 7th), July 16, 1940 13
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,
107 F. (2d) 555_- és : , 10
Mooresville Cotton Mills v. National Labor Relations Board,
110 F. (2d) 179_- 11
National Labor Relations Board vy. Bradford Dyeing Ass'n,
No. 588, October Term, 1939 9
National’ Labor Relations Board vy. Botany Worsted Mills,
106 F. (2d) 263_- 11
National Labor Relations Board v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 99
F. (2d) 533, certiorari denied, 306 U.S. 646 11
National Labor Relations Board v. J. Greenebaum Tanning
Co., 110 F. (2d) 984, pending on petition for certiorari,
J. Greenebaum Tanning Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board, No. 152, present Term_- 13
National Labor Relations Board v. Kentucky Pirebrick Co.,
99 F. (2d) 89-- 10
National Labor Relations Board vy. Leviton Mfg. Co., 111 F.
(2d) 619_--_- 12,13
National Labor Relations Board vy. Lightner Publishing
Corp. (C. C. A. 7th), July 1, 1940 13
National Labor Relations Board v. National Casket Co., 107
F. (2d) 992 13
National Labor Relations Board v. Remington Rand, Inc.,
94 F. (2d) 862, certiorari denied, 304 U.S. 576 10
(I)
254483—40
Il
Cases—Continued.
National Labor Relations Board v. Tovrea Packing Co., 111
FB. (9d) O86... 2-2 + - 5-25 2 2 on enn“
National Labor Relations Board v. Waterman S. S. Co., 309
8S oe en won wen oben = +s sn enn <=
New York Handkerchief M fg. Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board, decided July 11, 1940------------------------
North Whittier Heights Citrus Association v. National Labor
Relations Board, 109 F. (2d) 76, certiorari denied, No.
853, October Term, 1 RE ele Sie Renae ee se eet es
Phelps Dodge Corp. v- National Labor Relations Board
(C. C. A. 2), July 11, 19... ~~ ....<-s.5--+---------
Republic Steel Corp. v- National Labor Relations Board,
No. 14, present Term. -------------------------"--~"
Southern Colorado Power Co. Vv. National Labor Relations
Board, 111 F. (2d) 539------------------------~---""
Stewart Die Casting Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Board (C. C. A. 7th), July 3, RA i a ane
Statute:
National Labor Relations Act (Act of July 5, 1935, ¢. 372,
49 Stat. 449, 29 U. S. C. Supp. V, Sec. 151, et seq.) - ---
10
13
nthe Supreme Court of the Anited States
OcroBER TERM, 1940
No. 280
Davin SusiIn AND BENJAMIN SvuBIN, TRADING AS
ArcaptA Hostery COMPANY, PETITIONERS
v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Boarp
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD
CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court below (R. 991-1001) is
reported in 112 F. (2d) 326. The findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and order of the National La-
bor Relations Board (R. 954-981) are reported in
12.N. L. R. B. 467.
JURISDICTION
The decree of the court below (R. 1001-1002)
was entered on March 30, 1940. A petition for re-
hearing (R. 1003-1026) was denied May 7, 1940
(1)
2
(R. 1039). The petition for a writ of certiorari was
filed on July 25, 1940. The jurisdiction of this
Court is invoked under Section 240 (a) of the Ju-
dicial Code, as amended by the Act of February 13,
1925, and under Section 10 (e) and (f) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether there was substantial evidence to
support the Board’s findings that petitioners dom-
inated, interfered with, and supported a labor or-
ganization of their employees in violation of See-
tion 8 (1) and (2) of the Act and discriminatorily
discharged certain of their employees in violation
of Sections 8 (1) and (3) of the Act.
2. Whether, in the circumstances of this case, it
was permissable for the Board to require petition-
ers to offer reinstatement to Richard Craner, one
of the employees found to have been discrimina-
torily discharged.
3. A further question urged by petitioners, but
which we think is not properly presented in this
case, is whether the Board may require that an em-
ployer pay over to governmental relief agencies
sums equal to the amounts disbursed by those agen-
cies for the employment on work relief projects of
employees discharged by the employer in violation
of the Act.
STATUTE INVOLVED
The pertinent provisions of the National Labor
Relations Act (Act of July 5, 1935, ¢. 372, 49 Stat.
3
449, 29 U.S. C., Supp. V, See. 151, et seq.) are set
forth in the Appendix to the Petition (pp. 39-41).
STATEMENT
Upon the usual proceedings* the Board issued
its findings of fact, conclusions of law and order
(R. 954-981). The facts, as found by the Board
and as shown by the evidence, may be summarized
as follows: *
Beginning in July 1937, a substantial number of
petitioner’s employees joined the American Feder-
ation of Hosiery Workers, Branch No. 67, a labor
organization herein called the Union (R. 957; R.
95, 125, 127). Petitioners at first refused to meet
with the Union’s representatives, but the local
police chief finally succeeded in arranging a meet-
ing (R. 958; R. 56-58, 96, 114). At this meeting,
held August 9, 1937, petitioners would not read or
discuss a proposed contract which the Union sub-
mitted; instead they produced a notice announcing
liquidation of their business and advising their em-
ployees to seek employment elsewhere (R. 958; R.
1These, pursuant to Section 10 of the National Labor
Relations Act, were: charge and amended charge (R. 1-4),
complaint (R. 5-9), answer (R. 10-16), hearing before a
trial examiner at which the Shop Committee, a labor organi-
zation alleged in the complaint to be company-dominated,
intervened (R. 16-17, 23), intermediate report of the trial
examiner (R. 891-924), exceptions thereto by petitioners and
the Shop Committee (R. 925-953), oral argument ( R. 956),
and the filing of briefs before the Board (¢bid.).
2In the following statement, the references preceding the
semicolons are to the Board’s findings and the succeeding
references are to the supporting evidence.
does urls ie
NTE
Sig dg aR pga ac AGL Ga IR OE HN ie
Seeeh hital geet
1
55, 98, 871). At the Union’s urging petitioners
agreed to withhold posting this notice, but warned
that they would post it if the Union caused
“trouble” (R. 958; R. 56, 98-99).
There were sporadic meetings between repre-
sentatives of petitioners and of the Union during
the following months (R. 958-959; R. 115-117).
About December 1, 1937, petitioners received from
the Union, for posting in the plant, a notice re-
questing union members to handle grievances
through the Union shop committee (R. 959; R.
103-105, 283, 287-288, 872). A few days later
Plant Superintendent Weisbecker accosted Hol-
sopple, the Union representative who had delivered
the notice to petitioners, displayed the liquidation
notice which petitioners had shown the Union rep-
resentatives in August, and inquired whether the
liquidation notice ‘“‘would not be a better notice to
hang up than the one you put in the office?”’ (R.
959; R. 290, 700). On the same day the liquida-
tion notice was posted on the plant bulletin board
(R. 959; R. 207, 297). Petitioners did not go out
of business, and the Board found that they had no
intention of doing so, and that the threats of liqui-
dation were intended to frighten the employees
into abandoning the Union (R. 959-960).
During the preceding summer, when the Union
first became active in the plant, an attempt to form
an unaffiliated labor organization had failed for
lack of employee support (R. 960-961; R. 159-
176). Thereafter Minueci, an employee promi-
5
nent in this effort, aud some other employees, con-
sulted with petitioners concerning the desirability
of establishing a so-called ‘‘Nunn-Bush Plan’’ of
representation, of which one of the employees had
read in the newspaper ‘‘Social Justice”’; petition-
ers heartily endorsed this project and encouraged
its advocates (R. 961-962; R. 184-191, 194-195, 197,
201, 203, 666-667).
Shortly after the posting of the liquidation
notice on December 11, David Subin told Minucei
that the business would be liquidated ‘unless
some plan were arranged whereby he could op-
erate in a nice, peaceful way” (R. 963; R. 73-
74). Minucci, in collaboration with some local
businessmen, then prepared a letter for the em-
ployees to sign (R. 962-963 ; 207-211). The letter
stated that the signers were ‘‘sincerely loyal’’ to
petitioners and were attempting ‘‘to relieve condi-
tions which we assume have brought about” the
liquidation notice and that the signers were not
in accord with ‘‘any movement to bring about,
through outside action any labor trouble or disor-
ders which would tend to disrupt the present or
subsequent policy at the Plant’? (R. 962-963;
879). The letter also requested that petitioners
negotiate concerning the proposed liquidation, with
the signers ‘‘either in whole or through such in-
dividuals as you choose to designate”’ (R. 962-963 ;
879). The letter was circulated in the plant by
Minucci and some other employees during working
hours, and was signed by more than 200 employees
(R. 963 ; 211, 226). Minueci and another employee
in sa
Si aey
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itil ta Di 48
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ai
6
presented the signed letter to David Subin and
thereafter collaborated with Subin in drafting the
Shop Committee plan, a plan of employee organi-
zation based on the Nunn-Bush model (R. 963; R.
70, 211-212, 242-246). The resultant draft was
submitted to petitioners’ attorney for revision
(R. 963; R. 212-213, 245, 591).
On December 23, Minucci assembled about 395 se-
lected employees in the plant, calling some of them
from their work; David Subin read the Shop Com-
mittee plan to the gathering and stated that he
would recognize the Committee provided therein
(R. 963-964; R. 213-215, 220, 223, 230, 592). Mi-
nucci presented the names of the five men, includ-
ing himself, whom he had selected to serve as mem-
bers of the Shop Committee, and called for objec-
tions or additions; none were made (R. 964; 218).
On the same day, with petitioners’ permission, a
notice was posted in the plant announcing an em-
ployees’ meeting to be held on the following day at
a local hotel (R. 963; R. 216-217, 228-229). This
meeting was attended by approximately 139 em-
ployees, who voted to adopt the Shop Committee
plan (R. 964; R. 218, 41-42, 857). Under the plan
the five Committeemen were constituted the bar-
gaining agency for all the employees (ibid.).
The Board concluded that the Shop Committee
plan thus established had been foisted upon the
employees by petitioners ; that petitioners had par-
ticipated_in its or ganization “meetings and in the
formulation of its structure; that the employees
7
had not freely accepted the Shop Committee plan
but had submitted to it to avoid liquidation of peti-
tioners’ business and to obtain continued employ-
ment; and that petitioners had dominated, inter-
fered with, and supported the Shop Committee in
violation of Section 8 (1) and (2) of the Act
o. ae v8) a A Sat ont RN
The Board further found that petitioners dis-
criminatorily discharged ten active members of the
Union, including the chairman and vice chairman
of the plant committee (R. 965-976, 978-979).
Four of these were discharged on December 31,
allegedly for reporting late on that day to clean
their machines, a yearly task performed without
pay (R. 965-967; R. 298-300, 340, 391, 425-426,
635, 706-707, 889; 282-283, 336, 378, 384-385, 420-
421, 664). There was no specific hour for report-
ing for this purpose (R. 966; R. 296-297, 325, 327,
339, 352-353, 366, 385-387, 423, 707-708) ; the Su-
perintendent knew that the four employees arrived
at 12:30 p. m. because they had been attending a
Union meeting (R. 966-967; R. 711-712), and his
statement at the time that he intended to close the
plant within an hour, so that it was too late then
for them to clean their machines, was false (R. 967;
R. 300, 678, 682). Two other employees, both
active members and one the wife of the Union’s
committee chairman (R. 969; R. 444-449, 467468,
472, 662), were discharged on January 7, assertedly
for lack of work (R. 969; R. 671, 868) ; nevertheless
other employees of less seniority were retained at
8
the same work (R. 969-970; R. 443, 445, 466-467,
671, 868). A seventh employee, Jackson, vice
chairman of the Union committee (R. 972; R. 517-
518, 664) was laid off “until further notice’ but
was never recalled, although other employees of
lesser seniority doing the same work were retained,
and although two other employees were promoted
to that kind of work subsequent to Jackson’s lay-
off (R. 972-973; R. 524-525, 866). Farrell, too,
was laid off and never recalled, although he applied
and although two positions at his former work were
filled by promotion (R. 973-974; R. 532, 534, 539,
543-544, 658, 662-663, 866-868). Beluch also was
discharged, although he outranked in seniority all
other employees performing like tasks, and al-
though positions similar to his were thereafter
filled by promotion (R. 975-976; R. 563-564, 567,
574, 576, 656, 866-868). Similarly, Klebes was laid
off and was never recalled, although three posi-
tions similar to his were filled by promotion
(R. 974-975; R. 550, 553-554, 655-656, 866-868).
Upon these findings, the Board ordered peti-
tioners to cease and desist from the unfair labor
practices found ; to withdraw recognition from and
disestablish the Shop Committee; to offer rein-
statement with back pay to the ten employees dis-
criminatorily discharged; to pay over to govern-
mental relief agencies sums equal to the amounts
disbursed by those agencies for the employment of
the ten employees on work relief projects; and to
post appropriate notices (R. 979-981).
9
Thereafter, petitioners and the Shop Committee
filed separate petitions in the court below to review
and set aside the Board’s order (R. 982-983, 987-
990). The Board answered, requesting enforce-
ment of its order against petitioners (R. 983-987).
On March 12, 1940, the Court handed down its
opinion (R. 991-1001), enforcing the Board's
order except as to reinstatement and back pay for
one employee and as to back pay for one other
employee.’ A decree was entered accordingly on
March 30, 1940 (R. 1001-1002). A petition for re-
hearing filed by petitioners (R. 1003-1026) was
denied on May 7, 1940 (R. 1039).
ARGUMENT
1. Petitioners’ contention (Pet. 18-32, 34-35)
that the Board’s findings of unfair labor practices
are not supported by substantial evidence presents
no question of general importance. Compare Na-
tional Labor Relations Board v. Waterman S. S.
Co., 309 U. S. 206, 208; National Labor Relations
Board vy. Bradford Dyeing Ass’n, No, 588, last
Term, decided May 20, 1940. Further, the evi-
dence summarized in the Statement (supra, pp.
3-8) affords full support for the challenged find-
’The court found that Klebes was discharged because of
inefficiency and not because of his union activities (R. 999),
and held that Mrs. Holsopple should not be awarded back
pay because “her time following the lay-off was largely
occupied by family duties as a matter of her own choice”
(R. 997).
Bene
10
ings. Petitioners also contend (Pet. 21-28, 30-
31) that in holding that the Board’s findings have
the requisite support the decision below is in con-
flict with other decisions in other circuits ; however,
each of those cases turned upon its own particular
facts.
* Petitioners contend (Pet. 84-35) that the court below
erred in taking into account the seniority status of five of the
employees (R. 997-1000) in approving the Board’s findings
that the purported layoffs of these employees were in fact
discharges because of their union activities. Petitioners as-
sert that there is no evidence that seniority rights were pro-
vided in the “contract of employment” and that “courts are
not permitted to read terms into a contract of employment”
(Pet. 35). The court below, of course, did nothing of the
kind: petitioners conceded that they follow seniority in re-
calling laid off employees (R. 14) and both the Board and
the court considered the failure to observe seniority in regard
to these five employees as evidence that they were in fact dis-
charged, not laid off, and that the discharges were discrimina-
tory. The relevance of noncontractual seniority rights in sit-
uations of this kind has been repeatedly recognized by the
courts. Southern Colorado Power Co. v. National Labor Re-
lations Board, 111 F. (2d) 589, 544 (C. C. A. 10); Burling-
ton Dyeing & Finishing Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 104 F. (2d) 736, 739 (C. C. A. 4). Compare Consoli-
dated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 95 ¥.
(2d) 390, 396 (C. C. A. 2), modified and affirmed, 305 U. S.
197; New York Handkerchief Mfg. Co. v. National Labor Re-
lations Board, decided July 11, 1940 (C. C. A. 7): Agwilines,
Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board et al., 87 F. (2d)
146, 154 (C. C. A. 5); National Labor Relations Board v.
Kentucky Firebrick Co., 99 F. (2d) 89, 93 (C. C. A. 6);
National Labor Relations Board vy. Remington Rand, Inc.,
$4 F. (2d) 862, 871 (C. C. A. 2), certiorari denied, 304 U. S.
576: Montgomery Ward & Co, v. National Labor Relations
Board, 107 F. (2d) 555, 561 (C. C. A. 7).
ll
2. The claim (Pet. 32-34) that the order rein-
stating Craner is invalid because he obtained other
“regular and substantially equivalent employ-
ment’? subsequent to his discharge by petitioners,
is plainly without merit. The subsequent employ-
ment yielded a substantially smaller wage and was
at a considerable distance from Craner’s home (R.
970; 482-483) ; the decisions are uniform that such
considerations adequately support a determination
by the Board that the new employment is not
equivalent to the old. Mooresville Cotton Mills v.
National Labor Relations Board, 110 F. (2d) 179,
97 F. (2d) 959 (C. C. A. 4); National Labor Rela-
tions Board v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 99 F. (2d) 583
(C. C. A. 9), certiorari denied, 306 U. S. 646;
National Labor Relations Board vy. Botany Wor-
sted Mills, 106 F. (2d) 263 (C. C. A. 3); Hartsell
Mills Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board,
111 F. (2d) 291 (C. C. A. 4); Phelps Dodge Corp.
v. National Labor Relations Board, decided July
11, 1940 (C. C. A. 2). Petitioners’ contention (Pet.
33) that any new employment “‘permanent in char-
acter’? must be held to be “‘substartially equiva-
lent” to the former position, is supported by no
authority and is contrary to the cases cited above.
3. Finally, petitioners assert (Pet. 35-37) that
the decree below, insofar as it enforces the pro-
vision (R. 981) of the Board’s order which requires
petitioners to pay over to governmental relief agen-
cies sums equal to the amounts disbursed by those
he a eae RE:
a EO PA, Ne NS gE
12
agencies for the employment on work relief proj-
ects of the employees discriminatorily discharged
by petitioners, is in conflict with National Labor
Relations Board v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 111 F. (2d)
619 (C. C. A. 2), and National Labor Relations
Board v. Tovrea Packing Co., 111 F. (2d) 626
(C. C. A. 9). In the cited cases similar work relief
agency provisions were disapproved and denied
enforcement, and in Republic Steel Corp. v. Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, No. 14, this Term,
this Court granted certiorari, limited to the work
relief agency question. But in the present case peti-
tioners raised no question in the court below con-
cerning the “‘work relief’’ provision ; that provision
was not specifically challenged either in the petition
for review (R. 982-983) or in petitioners’ brief.’
The court below made no mention of the provision,
even in its summary of the Board’s order (R. 992),
and the point was not raised in the petition for
rehearing (R. 1007-1025). Under these circum-
stances, the decision below cannot be taken as an
> Petitioners’ brief below attacked the Board’s findings and
order as not supported by substantial evidence, and asserted
that the disestablishment, reinstatement, and back pay, and
cease and desist portions of the order constituted an abuse
of discretion. It made no mention of the work relief pro-
vision. Brief for petitioners, No. 7092, October Term, 1938,
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
15
adjudication upon the validity of the ‘‘work relief %
provision, and is not in conflict with the Leviton
and Tovrea cases.
6 Prior to their decisions in the Leviton and Tovrea cases,
both the Second and the Ninth Circuits enforced the work-
relief provision in cases where its validity was not chal-
lenged. National Labor Relations Board v. National Casket
Co. 107 F. (2d) 992 (C. C. A. 2) (see 12 N. L. R. B., at
175-176) ; North Whittier Heights Citrus Association v. Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, 109 F. (2d) 76 (C. C. A. 9),
certiorari denied. No. 853, last Term (see 10 N. L. R. B.,
at 1297-1298). In the National Casket case the court said,
“The validity of this provision has not been argued, and we
express no opinion on the point” (107 F. (2d) 998).
The Seventh Cireuit also enforced the work relief provi-
sion in cases where its validity was not challenged, although
it has since, upon specific challenge, held the provision in-
valid. Stewart Die Casting Corp. v. National Labor Rela-
tions Board, decided July 3, 1940 (provision denied enforce-
ment); M. H. Ritewoller Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board, decision upon rehearing, July 16, 1940 (provision
denied enforcement): National Labor Relations Board v.
Lightner Publishing Corp. decided July 1, 1940 ( provision
enforced without discussion); National Labor Relations
Poard v. J. Greenebaum Tanning Co., 110 F. (2d) 984 (pro-
vision enforced without discussion). See also the Brief in
Opposition and the Supplemental Memorandum for the
Board in J. Greenebaum Tanning Co. vy. National Labor
Relations Board, supra, pending on petition for certiorari.
No. 152, this Term.
The normal practice of the circuit courts of appeals is to
enforce provisions of Board orders which are not chal-
lenged, even though their validity has not been specifically
upheld.
14
CONCLUSION
The petition presents no question of general im-
portance, and there is no conflict of decisions. The
petition should therefore be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
Francis BIppLe,
Solicitor General.
Tuomas KE. Harris,
Special Attorney.
CHARLES Faby,
General Counsel,
Rosert B. WATTs,
Associate General Counsel,
LAURENCE A. KNAPP,
Assistant General Counsel,
MortiMer B. WoLr,
FREDERICK M. DAVENPORT,
Attorneys,
National Labor Relations Board.
Avaust 1940.
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1940
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