Petitioners Brief — Noland v. Noland

PT ee er ee a eT eee Ny CEL ME aS

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1939

WILLIAM Doster No.anp,

Petitioner,

VS.

VyoLa Buss Notanp, also known as Vyola Bubb Lough-

man, and WILFRED L. FARRAR,

Respondents.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION.

I.

Opinion of the Court Below.

The opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals is printed

in the record at pages 122 to 128, inclusive, and for

brevity is not repeated here.

PEL RIE NOR REGENCE OE HSE EIEN A STR NS TIM LE MOVES ALA ONDA IL RAIA LAIST PRC MW atm Em. 8

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Jurisdiction.

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals was ren-

dered on April 26, 1940 [R. 129].

The Supreme Court of the United States have jurisdic-

tion under Title 28, Judicial Code and Judiciary, Section

347, subd. (a), (Section 240, Judicial Code, amended ),

Code of Laws of the United States of America, 1934

Edition.

Statement.

A complete statement of the matter and procedure ap-

pears in the petition hereof, in which several federal

questions are involved; more particularly the questions

of full faith and credit, and contract rights as provided

under the Constitution of the United States, and also

fraud as shown in the record, and for brevity the state-

ment is not repeated here.

Specifications of Error.

s

The Circuit Court of Appeals erred, by its decree of

April 26, 1940, in affirming the judgment of the District

Court below entered September 23, 1939, denying leave to

amend.

II.

The Circuit Court of Appeals erred, by its decree of

April 26, 1940, affirming the judgment of the District

Court below entered September 23, 1939, by affirming

with costs in favor of the appellees and against the ap-

pellant, when the judgment of the District Court below

reads, “No costs allowed under Rule 54D.”

Ill.

The Circuit Court of Appeals erred, by its decree of

April 26, 1940, in affirming the judgment of the District

Court below, entered September 23, 1939; impairing the

obligations of contract made and entered into by peti-

tioner and respondent Vyola Bubb Noland, as shown in

the record hereof.

IV.

The Circuit Court of Appeals erred, by its decree of

April 26, 1940, in affirming the judgment of the District

Court below made and entered September 23, 1939, in

denying the full faith and credit provision of the Con-

stitution of the United States.

V.

The Circuit Court of Appeals erred, by its decree of

April 26, 1940, in affirming the judgment of the District

Court below made and entered September 23, 1939, by

rendering a law decree in a proceeding in equity.

Am A Ree We ar

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ARGUMENT.

I.

Rights and Obligations of Contract Impaired Against

Petitioner.

The petitioner William Doster Noland and respondent

Vyola Bubb Noland, also known as Vyola Bubb Lough-

man, made and entered into a contract, for property set-

tlement, on the 13th day of December, 1934, at Las Vegas,

Nevada, two days prior to a Nevada decree of divorce,

by which the property and property rights existing be-

tween the said parties were fully settled for all time to

come, as shown in the record, and regardless of this con-

tract, and disregarding same, the said respondent, Vyola

Bubb Noland, filed a complaint in the Superior Court of

the State of California, in and for Ventura County, seek-

ing judgments on her property and property rights in

violation of her obligations of the said contract, and

fraudulently procured judgment for $1000.00 as attorney's

fees and $50.00 as court costs, when the said contract for

property settlement between the said parties hereof, pro-

hibited said respondent from conducting any such pro-

cedure and obtaining such judgments, and impairing the

said contract, and the District Court below sustained the

said impairing of the obligations of said contract, and the

Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the impairing of the

obligations of said contract as sustained by the said Dis-

trict Court below, all of which procedure has violated and

impaired the obligations of said contract unlawfully against

your petitioner hereof, and the Constitution of the United

states provides:

“No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder,

ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation

of Contracts,

Constitution of United States, Article I, Sec. 10.

9

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And the aforesaid contract between the petitioner and

aforesaid respondent, is a contract which relates to prop-

erty and property rights, of the parties, and the contracts

which the Constitution of the United States protects are

those which relate to property and property rights:

Douglas v. Kentucky, 108 U. S. 488 (1897),

and in the impairment of contract obligations, it is not a

question of degree; the obligation must not be impaired

or diminished at all:

Planters’ Bank ». Sharp, 6 How. 301 (1848),

and in the rulings and decisions of all the courts which

have had this matter before them, namely, the State Courts

of California, the District Court of the United States

and the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States, it

is set forth in the record, that the state’s laws and rulings

have been upheld, and thereby we have the impairment of

the obligations of the aforesaid contract between the peti-

tioner and aforesaid respondent Vyola Bubb Noland, and

when the jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court

is invoked because of the asserted impairment of contract

rights arising from the effect of said state laws and rul-

ings, it is the duty of the Court to exercise independent

judgment as to the nature and scope of the contract:

Board of Liquidation v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 622

(1901).

The Supreme Court can examine the alleged contract to

determine the obligations which inhere in it:

Schenebeck v. McCrary et al., 298 U.S. 36 (1936),

and the Supreme Court will determine for itself the mean-

ing and effect of the contract:

Violet Trapping Co. v. Grace, 297 U. S. 119

(1936),

and whether the obligation has been impaired:

Ingraham v. Hanson, 297 U. S. 378 (1936).

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Il.

The Rights of Full Faith and Credit as Provided by

the Constitution of the United States Are Denied

to Petitioner.

The respondent Vyola Bubb Noland procured a decree

of divorce from the Eighth Judicial District Court of the

State of Nevada, in the County of Clark, and the fore-

going contract conditions were provided in said decree,

but the said respondent refused to comply with the said

Nevada decree of her own making and liking; the peti-

tioner then applied to the Superior Court of the State of

California, in and for the County of Ventura, to compel

said respondent to comply with said Nevada decree, and

the said California Court entirely disregarded the afore-

said contract between petitioner and respondent, and judg-

ment of the said Nevada Court, and thereupon your peti-

tioner applied to the said Nevada Court for an amended

decree of divorce, which was granted by the said Nevada

Court, as shown in the record, and again the said amended

decree of Nevada Court was enjoined by the said Su-

perior Court of California; the said Nevada Court mak-

ing and entering the amended decree on December Z5,

1937, and the said Superior Court of California, on De-

cember 27, 1937, made and entered a temporary restrain-

ing order without notice and without any return date and

served same, and said order is still in effect and has been

at all times, preventing the enforcing of the said amended

decree of divorce rendered by the said Nevada Court, and

thereby in the California State Courts, District Court

of the United States, and the Circuit Court of Appeals

Pes PRATER PLETE?

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of the United States, Ninth Circuit, your petitioner has

been and is now denied his contract rights and the full

faith and credit of the amended decree of divorce as ren-

dered by the said District Court of the State of Nevada,

disregarding the fact that the Constitution of the United

States provides as follows:

“Full faith and credit shall be given in each State

to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of

every other State. And the Congress may by general

laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records

and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect

thereof.”

Constitution of United States, Article IV, Sec. 1.

By the act of March 27, 1804 (2 Stat. 298), Congress

extended the rights under this clause to the public acts,

records, judicial proceedings, etc., of the Territories of

the United States and countries subject to the jurisdiction

thereof :

Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Sowers, 213 U. S.

55 (1909),

And the Courts of the United States are bound to give

to the judgments of the state Courts the same faith and

credit that the Courts of one state are bound to give to

the judgments of the Courts of her sister states:

American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156

(1932),

and the United States Supreme Court has held: under the

full faith and credit clause it declares the attributes and

qualities which judicial proceedings and records of one

=

state shall have when offered in evidence in the Courts of

another, and it implies that they shall be given the same

effect in the Courts of another state as they have by the

laws and usage at home:

Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 119

U. S. 615, 622 (1887),

and no greater effect can be given than is given in the

state where rendered:

Robertson v. Pickrell, 109 U. S. 608, 610 (1883),

and the extent of conclusiveness is that when duly pleaded

and proved, judgments of other states have the effect of

being not merely prima facie evidence but conclusive proof

of the rights thereby adjudicated :

Everett v. Everett, 215 U. S. 203 (1909),

and whoever by virtue of public position under a state

government deprives another of rights granted under the

Constitution, violates the constitutional inhibition:

Georgia Power Co. v. Decatur, 281 U. S. 505, 508

(1930) ;

Constitution of United States, Article XIV, Sec. 1.

And the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the

Constitution of the United States provides that whoever

by virtue of a public position deprives another of property,

life, or liberty, without due process of law, or denies or

takes away equal protection of the laws, violates the con-

stitutional inhibition; and as he acts in the name of the

state, and for the state, and is clothed with state’s power,

his act is that of the state:

Missouri v. Dockery, 191 U. S. 165.

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ITI.

Petitioner Is Denied the Rights of a Ruling in Equity

In An Equity Procedure.

The record shows that the petitioner proceeded in an

equity proceeding in a court of equity, in the United

States Courts, and that the decree was based upon law

decrees of states, regardless of the fact that the jurisdic-

tion and procedure in equity cases in United States Courts

is uniform throughout the whole country regardless of

where the Court of Equity may be sitting:

Venner v. Great Northern R. Co., 153 Fed. 408

(affirmed 209 U. S. 24, 28 Sup. Ct. 328, 52 L.

Ed. 666,

and a Court of Equity of the United States Courts is en-

tirely independent of and cannot be affected by state legis-

lation abolishing the distinction between actions at law and

suits in equity:

Hollins v. Brierfield Coal, etc. Co., 150 U. S. 371,

14 Sup. Ct. 127, 37 L. Ed. 1113,

and the jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Equity cannot

be defeated or impaired by state statutes undertaking to

give exclusive jurisdiction to state Courts:

Hayes v. Pratt, 147 U. S. 557,

and Courts cf Equity may apply their own rule in all

equity cases:

Kirby v. L. S. & M.S. Ry. Co., 120 U. S. 130, 7

Sup. Ct. 430, 30 L. Ed. 569,

RELL LEO IE LOGE EE LST

ities

and a Court of Equity concerns itself only in the protec-

tion of property rights and treats any civil right of a

pecuniary nature as a property right:

In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 210, 8 Sup. Ct. 482,

31 L. Ed. 402,

and the equity jurisdiction of federal Courts is independent

of that conferred upon state Courts, and is not subject

to the rulings of state Courts and state legislatures :

Kendall v. Creighton, 23 Howard (U. S.) 90,

106, 16 L. Ed. 419;

Borer v. Chapman, 119 U. S. 587, 7 Sup. Ct. 342,

30 L. Ed. 532,

and federal Courts of Equity are not subject to interfer-

ence by state Courts, or state legislation :

McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 316,

405, 424 U. S. Rep. 17.

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IV.

Petitioner Is Denied Leave to Amend and Due Process

of Law.

The record shows in the decree of the District Court

below and the Circuit Court of Appeals, that your peti-

tioner was denied leave to amend and denied thereby due

process of law.

As it has been held that it is reversible error to dismiss

a bill in equity without leave to amend; and is a denial

of due process:

Rogers v. Penobscot Mix. Co., 154 Fed. 606, 83

C. C. A. 380;

Kendiq v. Deane, 97 U. S. 423,

and in a proceeding in equity, in the case of

United States v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 220

U. S. 287,

the United States proceeded, both by equity and

mandamus, against certain railroad companies, and Mr.

Chief Justice White delivered the opinion, saying:

“Deciding as we do, that error was committed in

denying leave to file proposed amended bill, the de-

cree below is reversed and the cause remanded with

directions for further proceedings in conformity with

this opinion.”

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V.

Petitioner Is Subjected and Decreed to Pay Costs

Unlawfully.

The Circuit Court of Appeals erred, and decreed, by

affirming costs against your petitioner in the District

Court below, when the said District Court ruled “No

costs allowed under Rule 54D,” and the Supreme Court

may notice errors on appeal, though no assignment of

errors filed:

Benjamin v. Buell, 268 Fed. 792,

and no administrative or judicial action may do what the

laws of the United States forbid:

Penn. R. Co. v. Pol. Ser. Com., 250 U. S. 566,

and since the judgment originally obtained in the State

of California was obtained fraudulently upon false testi-

mony and likewise in the District Court below, and affirmed

by the Circuit Court of Appeals, it is well established that

such fraud is sufficient to undermine such judgments, and

such judgments have been enjoined and set aside in the

Federal Courts:

Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Cali-

cotte (C. C. A. 8), 267 Fed. 799, 16 A. L. R.

386.

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VI.

Petitioner Is Entitled to Justice in Equity.

Petitioner for the purpose of obtaining relief against

fraud must resort to a court of equity:

Burnes v. Scott, 117 U. S. 582, 6 Sup. Ct. 865,

29 L. Ed. 991,

and it is the privilege and duty of a court of equity to

furnish the remedy:

Morgan v. Beloit, 7 Wall. 614,

and whenever the property of a party has been wrong-

fully misapplied, it is a ground upon which a court of

equity will act:

Nat. Bank v. Insurance Co., 104 U. S. 54,

and equity will apply the maxim in order to defeat what

would otherwise operate as fraud:

Williamson v. Krohn, 66 Fed.655, 13 C. C. A. 668,

and by application of the maxim, no matter what formal

and proper proceedings surround a fraud, equity will

disregard them all, if necessary, in order that justice may

prevail:

Wagg v. Herbert, 215 U.S. 546, 30 Sup. Ct. 218,

54 L. Ed. 321, scat

and courts of equity will not only interfere in cases of

fraud to set aside acts done, but they will also, if acts have

Peewee se

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by fraud been prevented from being done by the parties,

interfere and treat the case exactly as if the acts had

been done:

Moore v. Crawford, 130 U. S. 122, 128, 9 Sup.

Ct. 447, 32 L. Ed. 878, 880;

1 Story Eq. Jur., Sec. 187,

and courts of equity have jurisdiction to relieve in all

cases of fraud:

Whitcomb v. Schultz, 223 Fed. 268, 138 C. C. A.

510,

and a court of equity will grant relief in equity upon the

ground of fraud:

Folsom v. Ballard, 70 Fed. 12, 16 C. C. A. 593.

Conclusion.

For the foregoing reasons as set forth in the record,

petition and supporting brief, it is respectfully submitted

that the writ of certiorari should issue in the above en-

titled matter as prayed.

Respectfully submitted,

Catvin S. MAuk,

Solicitor for Petitioner.

Catvin S. MAvuK,

Of Counsel.

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