Amicus Curiae Brief — Hill v. Stone
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CRE
y
Var
3n the os
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1974
JOHN L. HILL, Attorney General of Texas,
. Appellant,
vs.
MICHAEL L. STONE, et al,
Appellees.
On Appeal From The United States District Court
For The Northern District Of Texas
BRIEF OF CITY OF PHOENIX, ARIZONA, AND
CERTAIN BOND COUNSEL, AMICI CURIAE,
RELATING TO BOND ELECTIONS HELD AND
TO BE HELD IN STATES AFFECTED BY
THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT IN
CIPRIANO V. CITY OF HOUMA AND
CITY OF PHOENIX V. KOLODZIEJSKI
JOE R. PURCELL, City Attorney
251 West Washington Street
Phoenix, Arizona 85003
Authorized law officer of the City of Phoenix
111 West Monroe Street
Chicago, Illinois 60603
FRED H. ROSENFELD
GUST, ROSENFELD, DIVELBESS & HENDERSON
3300 Valley Center
201 North Central Avenue
Phoenix, Arizona 85073
HAROLD B. JUDELL
FOLEY JUDELL BECK BEWLEY & LANDWEHR
New Orleans, po 70112
FRANK L. WATSON
FREEMAN, RICHARDSON, WATSON, SLADE,
McCARTHY & KELLY
Barnett Bank Building
112 West Adams Street
Jacksonville, Florida 32202
ROBERT M. JOHNSON
DAWSON, NAGEL, SHERMAN & HOWARD
First National Bank Bldg.
621 17th Street
Denver, Colorado 80202
ROSWELL C. DIKEMAN
SYKES, GALLOWAY & DIKEMAN
120 Broadway
New York, ew York 10005
INDEX
PAGE
Interest of Amici CUTIAG o...cccccccsssesecssssessesssssecssssscessssseeeee 1
PIRWONG opeeccsinccrnseotenreenenscciais su dssuavitewentccopeevaacnsin 4
State Reactions< .
Alaska .o..c.ccccccceceeos icaprenteserisdstensenapneaynseetereceeee 8
PE NBOU. ace eccucsepesnerercectresersatn tees temeresperseacesteincieenetin 8
871) 7 1: (see rere ee a 10
BORO os csscceeccexeepesste sree stresses cewoseorenareentiees 11
Tdaho «0... seogl4c ees teesenneualeceuateroursiesampeermnanneouecteene 12
LOUISIANA ooo... ee ecescsscssescsescececcesescesceceseseesecneseeaeseteeesees 13
TI cscs ccesssencecrncssen ceases napirerecdnsosinteeeneeenesss 14
Montana onneeeecccesccescssseseseesesesesesesesesesesseeeesesees capeenieess 14
ING@VQOQR ceiieceepiceneescsesnstasnumiennuccasseuennuin 15
New MONIC .....ccceccsseseseessseesssceseceseeecassesseaescseseeeenennes 16
DROW NOUR dceristatrarautacuisneonunmnuases 16
CRIB NOTE, soscccsccereerereatsxesncareasdtveersissncem ees enaioncnser 17 /
Rhode Island o..c.ccecssccsscssesessesssesessessessessecsessessesecenessesseaes 17
RORY sesosciereeessse cer ecaee tients srannas sri eaies 18
Wyoming SecausyonssPaapaedsnatsssobiantengaasyateadezqadvatin pasvasassuamsaeanes 18
Summary of Argument .......cccccccccsesecseesesseeeeeceseeeceaeeneees 19
MAODCHAMION wscescescssacesecestcessxsceassntarsrsnnatensvesenssnnenssseaxtsenessnstiens 20
TaBLeE Or AvutHorities CITED
CasEs
Associated Enterprises Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Im-
provement District, 410 U.S. 748, 35 L.Ed. 2d 675,
Be Babs AZO. csrcescensessincscusaunn sees tevsstesennenaescecsemnceezercesesess 4)
i
i
PAGE
Board of Education of the Village of Cimarron v.
Maloney, 82 N.M. 167, 477 P.2d 605 00... 16
Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 23 L.Ed. 2d
G47, 89 S.Ct. 1897 .......:..0...ccscesseesserseenes 4,5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 17
City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 23 L.Ed.
Fd 523, 90 S.Ct. 1990 .......csccecsscsssrcssesecscsersenssesscnesonsasses
seaatpuererieniees 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19
City of Spencer v. Rayburn, Okla., 483 P.2d 730 .......... 17
In re Cohalan, 1972, 71 Mise. 2d 196, 335 N.Y.S. 2d 747,
affirmed 41 A.D. 2d 840, 342 N.Y.S. 2d 153 ............ 16
Hard v. Depaoli, 56 Nev. 19, 41 P 2d 1054 «0... 6
Cypert v. Washington County School District, 24 Utah
Dd 419, 473 P.2d 887 .........eccscsesecccssccessceccsrsesenssensseeseneeerees 18
Hebert v. Police Jury of Vermilion Parish, 258 La. 41,
DA5 SD BAY .u..nrecccceccccccsccccsssecessorsseccscserecsscencnsssssssersesesseees 14
Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621,
93 L.Ed. 2d 583, 89 S.Ct. 1886 ......0......cececcsceesesceceeesenes 17
Light v. MacKenzie, 78 Misc. 2d 315, 356 N.Y.S. 2d 99... 17
Muench v. Paine, 94 Idaho 12, 480 P.2d 196 ....sssss0ss 12
Muench v. Paine, 93 Idaho 473, 463 P.2d 939 .............+ 12
Pike v. School District No. 11 in El Paso County, Colo-
rado, Colo., 474 Pi2d 162 ..eeceeseseseceeseesesreesneneeteneneneee 10
Police Jury of Parish of Vermilion v. Hebert, 404
U.S. 807, 30 L.Ed. 2d 39, 92 S.Ct. 52 ......cecsseeeseseeeees 14
Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 68
Ta 80d.. BOZ, SE BCE, BIE: vis sivccesnssctiesccocenerssssemmnrviernecanine 6
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
District, 410 U.S. 719, 35 L.Ed. 2d 659, 93 S.Ct. 1224 95
School District No. 26 (Bouse Elementary) of Yuma
County v. Strohm, 106 Arizona 7, 469 P.2d 826 ....... 8
Settle v. City of Muskogee, Okla., 462 P.2d 642 ............ 17
ill
PAGE
State v. City of Miami, Fla., 260 8.2d 497 ........ igaconeiee 11
State v. City of Miami Beach, Fla., 245 S.2d 868 ........ 11
State ex rel Voiles v. Johnson County High School,
43 Wyoming 494, 5 P.2d 255 .....ceseseeesseesreseseseeteeneenees 6
State ex rel Ward v. Anderson, 158 Mont.. 279, 491
P.2d 868 eccecceccccceceececssssssesscscssssccecssseesscssseseseeeeessssesssearensenss 14
Stewart v. Parish School Board of St. Charles Parish,
310 F. Supp. 1172 ....cceccsceseessnesesesssesseeessenenensnsseenenseensens
Stewart v. Parish School Board of St. Charles Parish,
400 U.S. 884, 27 L.Ed. 2d 129, 91 S.Ct. 186 ..........-.. 14
Tipton vy. Atchison, Topeka € Santa Fe Railway Co.,
998 U.S. 141, 80 L.Ed. 1091, 56 S.Ct. 715, 104 A.L.R.
BBL ccccccsececececcscscecsceciscsssccsssrecsccesecssenecsscencessssosoneeseserssesencaeess
Tornillo v. Dade County School Board, 458 Fed, 2d 194 1
Wright v. Town Board of Téwn of Carlton, 70 Mise.
2nd 1, 332 N.Y.S. 2d 233; 41 A.D. 2d 290, 34 Nis
94 577: 33 N.Y. 2d 977, 309 N.E. 2d 137... 17
CONSTITUTIONS
United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment ....
6, 7, 9, 19
coc ccc cece cece cece cceccccecoccoceseseccccccoscescceesccosososconsovonsoonsooollel elle ee
Arizona Constitution, Article VII, Section 19 .............. 9,10
Colorado Constitution, Article XI, Sections 6,7 and 8 10
Florida Constitution, Article VII, Section 12 .............. 11
Louisiana Constitution of 1921, Article XIV, Section
YACR) secsnsisnsssssscrssrncsetnsncvers sessannnecenecessnussseecnsnennanasssceenennsesesss 13
Louisiana Constitution of 1974, Article VI, Part II, 3
Section 33 cccccccsccsssscsscssesscccessescssssscssnecersesssesesssssesseetsesssneenees
Michigan Constiution of 1963, Article II, Section 6... 14
Montana Constitution of 1889, Article IX, Section 2 ..14, Lo
AMSEC
Peoree " STRETTON A TINE ERGY PLIABLE EN BT SIS I SM CPT 4A ORNAMENT A AM RLS
lng Choe ¢
iv
Montana Constitution of 1972 .......... * useciuaprntessvevesiwereeesiaes 15
New Mexico Constitution, Article IX, Sections 10, 11
ANG 12 cccccccecseescesssscecccsecssssccssscsseeeesseececessaseessessseneneassren scene 16
Oklahoma Constitution, Article X, Sections 26 and 27 «V7
Rhode Island Constitution,
Amendment No. 29 .....ccccccessssccesesenscneseeeneeeeneceeeeaeeneens 18
Amendment No. 37 ......cccscesscesscssseeescneesteceeeeeeceeseeeeseees 18
Utah Constitution. Article XIV, Section 30... 18
SraTE STATUTES
ALASKA
Alaska Statutes, Section 07.30.010(d) (Supp. (1969) ) 8
Section 29.28.0380 ...........sssscceeeseeseeeesees Gcsesuevessessasucesaneseteunsss 8
Chapter 118, S.L.A. 1972 oes sesssessessseeneeeeeeesssessteesennenees 8
ARIZONA
Chapter 55, Laws of Arizona, 1970 .....sccsesssecssseeseeeeetes 8,9
Chapter 37, Laws of Arizona, 1971 .....-..ceeecs esses
S.C.R. 1003, First Special Session, 1974... 10
FLORIDA
Chapter 70-18, Laws of Florida, 19TO ccuetnene insets 11
IpaHO
Idaho Code, Sections 31-1905, 31-3502, 33-404, 39-1339,
39.1342, 42-3222, 50-1026 and 70-1716 «0... ee 12 |
Chapter 25, Laws of Idaho, 1971... ) rere 12
LovulIsIANA
Act Number 277, Laws of Lotisiana, NI waicicorsacnsessts 13
Vv
PAGE
. MontTANA
Chapter 159, Laws of 1971 .sssssssssssescesetesesseessseseeeeterteees 15
Chapter 234, Laws of 197] .....-ssscsessssseseneeenesseesssteeennnee 15
NEVADA
Nevada Revised Statutes, Sections 350.050 and 350.070 ..4, lo
Chapter 49, Statutes of Nevada, 1971... 15
New YorkK
Town Law, Section 84 ....ssessssesesessseseesessensneenensennenesees 16
Town Law, Section 91 ..scecsessssesseererenerssessensensnserenenseess 17
Village Law, Section 4-402 (prior to 1972) Lessee 16
Laws, 1972, Chapters 887 to 899, INCLUSIVE ..0sse0sss-00-s0000s 16
W YoMING
Wyoming Statutes, Sections 22-1380 et Seq... 4,18
Chapter 240, Session Laws of Wyoming, 1971 «........ 19
Chapter 251, Session Laws of Wyoming, 1973 ............ 19
OTHER AUTHORITIES -
36 Corpus Juris Secundum 401, Federal Courts, Sec-
| 6
tom 171 ccscecececscsscsssesecccssescsssesrsescnencesnssecsenesenenensceseesseensasneegs
SE IMS MN
PROG ATRL REC NRRL Rae IR A IP BLS A HRT Btn cep emaR ne CE a
An peo
ate!
Bere hava) ed ae
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OctToBer TreRM, 1974
No. 73-1723
JOHN L. HILL, Attorney General of Texas,
’ Appellant,
Us.
MICHAEL L. STONE, et al, .
Appellees,
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BRIEF OF CITY OF PHOENIX, ARIZONA, AND
CERTAIN BOND COUNSEL, AMICI CURIAE,
RELATING TO BOND ELECTIONS HELD AND
TO BE HELD IN STATES AFFECTED BY
THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT IN
CIPRIANO V. CITY OF HOUMA AND
CITY OF PHOENIX V. KOLODZIEJSKI
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amiei Curiae comprise (i) the City of Phoenix, Maricopa
County, Arizona, a political subdivision of said state, and
(ii) certain lawyers and laws firms specializing as ‘‘bond
=e— Deane ar
eat A PLAST SIR
—2—
counsel” in the drafting of state laws, the preparation
of proceedings, and the rendition of approving opinions
relating to state and local government bonds and other
instruments of obligation. |
Without arguing for a decision on the merits of the
ease, Amici Curiae urge, if the Court decides to reverse
the decision of the court helow and to declare that the
Equal Protection Clause of, the Fourteenth Amendment.
to the United States Constitution permits a state to
require a two-ballot election for the issuance of bonds
of its political subdivisions (one set of ballots being voted
by taxpayers only and the other by all qualified electors),
that the Court make such decision prospective only so as
not to cast doubt on bonds heretofore issued and hond
elections heretofore held in states other than Texas.
The undersigned City of Phoenix, having heen en-
joined from issuing $173,000,000 bonds (including both
revenue honds and general obligation bonds) voted by
real property taxpayers at an election held in said city
on June 10, 1969, by decision of the Federal District
Court for the District of Arizona, which was affirmed
by the Supreme Court of the United States in City of
Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 23 L.Ed. 2d 523,
90 S.Ct. 1990, has subsequently held elections for the
issuance of $177,400,000 various issues of general ob-
ligation bonds and revenue bonds on August 16, 1970 and
$56,500,000 general obligation bonds on May 8, 1973. Some,
but not all of the bonds voted in 1970 and 1973, have
been issued and purchased in good faith by members of
the investing public. Both of said elections of 1970 and
1973 were open to all qualified electors regardless of
whether they paid a real property tax or not despite the
oR a ei ert ign OI Bet
—3—
express language of Article 7, Section 13 of the Arizona
Constitution, which purports. to limit to real property tax-
payers the right to vote in bond elections. Each of the
undersigned bond counsel regularly approves bonds is-
sued by political subdivisions in one or more of the states
whose laws are discussed below. By long established
custom and practice, approving opinions of bond counsel
regarding the validity and enforceability of bonds are
required in the public market to assure acceptance of
such bonds by underwriters and investors. Because of their
special experience and knowledge in state and local govern-
ment financing, the undersigned bond counsel present
their views to this court as amici curiae on an aspect
of the instant case which is within their special com-
petence. This brief, is filed under Rule 42(4) of the
Revised Rules of the Supreme Court.
a
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ARGUMENT
It is not the purpose of this brief to take a position
upon the merits of the controversy but rather to acquaint
the court with the practices ‘being followed by states
other than Texas in response to the decisions of this
Court in Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 23
L.Ed. 2d 647, 89 S.Ct. 1897, and City of Phoenix v. Kolod-
ztejski, 399 U.S. 204, 23 L.Ed. 2d 523, 90 S.Ct. «1990
(June 23, 1970), and with the possibility that a reversal
of the court below, absent proper precautionary language,
might cast serious doubt upon the validity of billions of
dollars worth of outstanding bonds of political subdivisions
(including Phoenix) voted and issued by political sub-
divisions and purchased by investors in good faith re-
liance upon local interpretations of the Cipriano and
Phoenix decisions, and might make it impossible for
Phoenix to sell the heretofore unsold portions of the
bonds voted by its residents in 1970 and 1973.
At the time of the Cipriano decision, (holding that a
state cannot constitutionally restrict to taxpayers the
right to vote in revenue bond elections) and at the time
of the Phoenix decision (holding that a state cannot
restrict to. taxpayers the right ‘to vote in general ob-
ligation bond elections), fourteen states had constitu-
tional or statutory requirements that did so restrict such
voting in some or all bond elections. In addition, Wyoming
and Nevada had “two-ballot” voting procedures under
which a bond issue, to be successfully voted, must carry
both by vote of the qualified non-taxpaying voters and
by vote of the voters who were taxpayers. Wyoming
Statutes Sections 22-130 et seg., Nevada Revised Stat-
a pom
utes Sections 350.050 and 350.070. The word “taxpayers”
is used herein generically although in some states the
favored group were property owners or people required
to render property for taxation regardless of whether
taxes were paid.
In all of those sixteen states, other than Texas, bond
elections are now open to all qualified voters, with no
special additional election for taxpayers, except as per-
mitted by this Court in the case of certain districts whose -
existence is purely for the improvement of land. Salyer
Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District,
410 U.S. 719, 35 L.Ed. 2d 659, 93 S.Ct. 1224; Associated
Enterprises Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dis-
trict, 410 U.S. 743, 35 L.Ed. 2d 675, 93 S.Ct. 1237. In
some of these states the change in procedure has been
established by virtue of state supreme court decisions
alone, in others by legislative acts; sometimes coupled
with state supreme court decisions, in. others by virtue
of the adoption of new constitutions and in yet others
by the determination of the issuer, upon advice of coun-
sel, that the rule of the Cipriano and Phoenix decisions
was so clear that no further authority was needed to let
all qualified voters vote regardless of their status as tax-
payers. In most instances the changes in procedure were
accomplished in the face of state constitutional or stat-
utory law which would have been violated if valid. If, by
reversing the court below,’ this Court should establish
a precedent to the effect that a two-ballot election satis-
fies the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, such decision might
amount to overruling the determinations by the various
state supreme courts and local bond counsel; this Court
has held that a state courts’ interpretaticn of state law
under compulsion of overriding federal law erroneously
eat IE ot ¢
Drtneiisictetiicn
—6—
inding precedent. Tipton v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 298 U.S. 141, 80 L.Ed.
1091, 56 S.Ct. 715, .L.R. 831; Red Cross Line v.
Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 68 L.Ed. 582, 44 S.Ct.
274; 36 C.J.S. 401, Federal Courts §171. Upon such an
overruling the court of last resort in each state wherein
the taxpayer requirement is still on the books might feel
constrained to hold that its state constitution or statute
retains enough effect under Cipriano and Phoenix to
require a taxpayers’ election if a “free for all” election
is also held on the same question. See the decision of the
understood is not
Supreme Court of Wyoming in State ex rel Voiles v.
Johnson County High School, 43 Wyoming 494, 5 P.2d
255, holding that although state constitutional provisions
requiring all elections to be open, free and equal and also
requiring a vote by the people to approve bonds meant
an election at which all qualified electors could vote, there
was no objection to the legislature’s adding an additional
restriction on the issuance of municipal bonds. Such restric-
tion was that the ballots of taxpayers and non-taxpayers
be counted separately and that a majority of each class
must favor the bonds. before they could be issued. A
similar result was reached by the Nevada Supreme Court
in Hard v. Depaoli, 56 Nev. 19, 41 P.2d 1054.
If the Supreme Court of a state should conclude that
a two-ballot election is required to comply with both
' state law and the Equal Protection Clause, it would be
difficult for that court to conclude that bonds voted only
in a “free for all” election were legally voted. As the
amount of bonds voted and issued in such states since
the Phoentr decision has aggregated billions of dollars,
and most of those bonds are still outstanding, amici curiae
consider it important that no doubt of their validity be
raised as an unintended result of the decision of this
Court in the instant case.
- 2 A DNR BED PRT ERM IR In ORR AC RRNA RNS IN
«
—7— \
For this reason, the undersigned bond counsel amici
curiae, each of whom has approved a substantial amount
of bonds voted and issued in accordance with local in-
terpretations of the Cipriano and Phoenix decisions that
only an election at which all qualified electors may vote is
constitutional, respectfully request that the Court con-
sider making prospective only, as to states other than
Texas, any determination that a two-ballot election satis-
fies the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. The undersigned
City of Phoenix respectfully requests that the Court con-
sider making such prospective application to apply only
to elections hereafter called and held, so that it may
proceed to issue the bonds heretofore voted in 1971 and
1973 without the necessity of calling another election, as
well as making said determination prospective as to bonds
heretofore issued. A basis for such determination of
prospectivity can be found in both the Cipriano and
Phoenix cases wherein this court held that bonds_pre-
viously voted by taxpayers only under laws theretofore in
effect would not be affected by the decisions in those
eases. Of course, if this Court should determine to affirm
the decision of the court below, no such prospective feature
need be included in the courts’ determination, insofar as
bonds of political subdivisions in states other than Texas
are concerned.
To establish the reactions of the various states other
than Texas to the decisions of this Court in the Cipriano
and Phoenix cases, the following paragraphs show, state
by state, the practice followed by each of the states
which previously had taxpayer requirements to vote in
bond elections, together with citations to pertinent sources
of state law: ,
gine.
—gZ—
ALASKA \
At the time of the Phoenix decision, Alaska Statutes
Section 07.30.010(d) (Supp. (1969) ) provided that a home
rule city’s charter could restrict to taxpayers the right
to vote in bond elections. The law governing such elections
has been revised and moved to another portion of the
Statutes by Section 2 of Chapter 118 S.L.A. 1972; the
resulting Section 29.28.030, governing the qualifications for
voters in municipal elections, does not permit any munici-
“pality to restrict the right to vote in bond elections to
taxpayers.
ARIZONA
School District No. 26 (Bouse Elementary) of Yuma
County v. Strohm, 106 Arizona 7, 469 P.2d 826, involved
an issue of bonds of a school district which were ap-
proved by vote of both taxpayers and qualified electors
generally at a two-ballot election held on August 5, 1969,
less than two months following the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in the Cipriano case. The trial
court denied a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel
the Board of Supervisors of the County to issue the
bonds as requested by the School District on the grounds
(1) that the taxpayers’ election violated the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and (2)
there was no authority under Arizona law authorizing a
free-for-all election on school bonds. Pending the ap-
peal of that case the Arizona Legislature adopted Chap-
ter 55, Laws of Arizona, 1970 as emergency legislation
which took effect April 21, 1970. This law authorized,
am other things, a School District to hold simultaneous
elections for bond issues, submitting such issues to tax-
payers and to all qualified voters respectively. The law
also provided that elections held after the date of the
Cipriano decision which would have been valid under the
—9—
Cipriano decision shall be deemed valid for the purpose
of authorizing such bonds. The Arizona Supreme Court
on May 27, 1970 (before the June 23, 1970 decision of
this Court in the Phoenix case) thereupon reversed the
decision of the trial court holding: “If the election at
which only real property taxpayers were permitted to
vote does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the’
Federal Constitution, then the election is legal and valid,
but if the election is void as unconstitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment, then the election at which all
qualified electors of the school district voted is a legal
election, having been retrospectively validated and ratified
by the Arizona Legislature. . . . One or the other of
the elections is valid, and it is immaterial which, for a
lawful proceeding antedates the issuance of the bonds.”
Subsequently, on June 23, 1970 the United States
Supreme Court decided the Phoenix case holding uncon-
. gtitutional the bond election of June 10, 1969 mentioned
above. Since the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in the Phoenix case, both general obligation bonds
and revenue bonds have been issued pursuant to elections
at which all qualified electors have heen permitted to vote
with no separate taxpayers’ election. Pursuant to Chap-
ter 37, Laws of Arizona, 1971, the Arizona Legislature
amended various laws governing the holding of bond elec-
tions to change the designation of who may vote from
“qualified real property taxpayers” to “qualified electors.”
The pertinent section of the Arizona Constitution (Article
VII, Section 13) still contains the phrase “vote of the
real property taxpayers, who shall also in all respects
be qualified electors. . .” Chapter 37, Laws of Arizona,
1971, also repealed those portions of Chapter 55, Laws of
Arizona, 1970, which permitted two-ballot elections on
bonds of school. districts and counties and municipalities.
eee ee en
BINA WAE WY AD Leh AER:
—10—
Thus, there is now no authority under which a two-ballot
bond election ean be held in Arizona to determine the is-
suance of bonds of such political subdivisions. The 1974
Session of the Arizona Legislature, by S.C.R. 1003, First
Special Session, proposed an amendment to Article VII,
Section 13 of the Arizona Constitution which would have
prescribed a minimum number of electors who must vote
at bond elections and would have eliminated the language
appearing in that section which, before the Phoenix case,
restricted to real property taxpayers the right to vote in
bond elections. Said amendment failed of ratification at
the November 5, 1974 general election.
COLORADO
Article XI, Section 6 of the State Constitution dealing
with counties, Section 7 dealing with school districts, and
Section 8 dealing with cities and towns prohibited the
incurring of debt by loan without favorable vote at a
taxpayers’ election, with some exceptions. By amendment
ratified November 3, 1970, effective January 1, 1972, Sec-
tion 6 of said Article governed all political subdivisions
of the state except home rule cities and towns and pro-
hibited debt “unless the question of incurring the same be
submitted to and approved by a majority of the qualified
taxpaying electors voting thereon, as the term ‘qualified
taxpaying elector’ shall be defined by statute.” On August
31, 1970 the Colorado Supreme Court held that the Phoenix
case eliminated the taxpayer requirement from a statute
prescribing the requirement for voting on a proposi-
tion to increase taxes in Pike v. School District No. 11 m
El Paso County, Colorado, 474 P.2d 162. Subsequently all
qualified electors who comply with pertinent registration
laws have been permitted to vote at such bond elections
without distinction between taxpayers and others.
~ f . —11—
FLORIDA
The Florida Constitution, Article VII, Section 12, pro-
vides that counties, school districts, municipalities, special
districts arid local governmental bodies with taxing powers
may issue bonds payable from ad valorem taxes (other
than refunding bonds) ‘only when approved by vote of
the electors who are owners of freeholds therein not
wholly exempt from taxation.” On March 24, 1971 in
State v. City of Miami Beach, 245 8.2d 863, the Florida
Supreme Court affirmed a trial court judgment declaring
valid two bond issues of the City of Miami Beach which
were voted at two-ballot elections, even though there was
no authority at the time for submitting such an election to
a vote of all qualified electors and even despite the un-
favorable freeholders’ vote on one of the propositions at
the election, which was held prior to the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in the Phoenix case. “The
question js settled by Phoenix and related U.S. Supreme
Court cases and we are accordingly mandated to approve
the vote by all qualified electors.and the ensuing City Reso-
lutions thereon.” State yv. City of Miami, 260 S.2d 497
(Florida Supreme Court, Mareh 29, 1972) affirmed a lower
court judgment declaring valid certain bonds which were
voted at a special bond election held June 30, 1970 whereat
‘the propositions to issue the bonds were submitted at —
one election to freeholders only and at an additional
election to all qualified electors pursuant to Chapter 70-
18, Laws of Fiorida, approved May 12, 1970. The statute
provided that a city would have power to issue the bonds
“if the issuance of such bonds shall have been approved
by vote in a bond election of a majority of the qualified.
electors of, together with a majority of the qualified
freeholder electors of, such governmental taxing unit
voting thereon.” In the freeholder election both bond
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propositions failed, but overall they earried. The court
declared: “It is clear that under the Phoenix decision,
supra, general obligation bond elections can no longer be
limited to freeholders. Florida Statutes, Chapter 70-18,
permitting a majority of the freeholders voting to veto
a majority vote of all electors, in effect permit issuance
of ad valorem bonds only when approved by freeholder
vote and is unconstitutional.” This interpretation of the
effect of the Phoenix case on a Florida constitutional pro-
vision requiring that only freeholders vote in an election
to increase ad valorem taxes was recognized by the United
States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, in Tornillo v.
Dade County School Board, 458 Fed. 2d 194 (March 31,
1972).
IDAHO
Idaho Code Sections 31-1905 and 31-3502 governing
county bond elections, 33-404 governing school district
bond elections, Sections 39-1339 and 39-1342 governing
hospital district bond elections, Section 42-3222 governing
water and sewer district bond elections, Section 50-1026
governing city bond elections and Section 70-1716 govern-
ing port district bond elections all contained property tax-
payer requirements until removed by Chapter 25, Laws
of Idaho, 1971, approved and effective February 16, 1971.
On January 25, 1971 the Supreme Court of Idaho in
Muench v. Paine, 94 Idaho 12, 480 P.2d 196, held that its
previous decision on January 16, 1970 in the same case
upholding the taxpayer qualification to vote in bond elec-
tions (Muench v. Paine, 93 Idaho 473, 463 P.2d 939)
would not be amended nor the judgment recalled in view
of the prospective effect of the Phoenix decision five
months later, but nevertheless stated that “general ob-
ligation bonding election statutes of this state whieh
limit the franchise to real property owners must be con-
—13—
sidered as invalid under the pronouncement of the United
States Supreme Court in Phoenix v. K olodziejski, supra.”
Subsequently all qualified electors who comply with per-
tinent registration laws have heen permitted to vote at
such bond elections without distinction between taxpayers
and others.
LOUISIANA
The Louisiana Constitution of 1921, Article XIV, Sec-
tion 14(a) permitted general obligation bonds of political
subdivisions to he issued only “when authorized by vote
of a majority in number and amount of the property tax-
pavers qualified to vote. . .” This > tre has been
superseded hy Article VI, Part IT. Section 33 of the Con-
stitution of the State of Louisiana of 1974, effective
January 1, 1975, declaring that such bonds may be issued
“only after authorization by a majority of the electors
voting on the proposition. . .” In 1970 the Louisiana
Legislature adopted Act Number 277, effective July 13
of that year, declaring that if the provisions of the
Louisiana Constitution or laws which limit to taxpayers
the right to vote are held void hy the U.S. Supreme Court,
then all qualified electors may vote in bond elections. On
February 25, 1970, a three-judge federal district court in
New Orleans held that the taxpayer requirement of the
Louisiana Constitution was void and that the general
election laws should cover bond elections and al! qualified
electors should he permitted to vote regardless of the
amount of their property. Stewart v. Parish School Board
of St. Charles Parish, 310 F. Supp. 1172. This decision
was affimed hy the United States Supreme Court on
November 9, 1970, citing Phoenix, at 400 U.S. 884, 27
L.Ed. 2d 129, 91 S.Ct. 136. Subsequently all qualified
electors who comply with pertinent registration laws have
been permitted to vote at such bond elections without dis-
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tinction between taxpayers and others. In Hebert v. Police
Jury of Vermilion Parish, 258 La. 41, 245 S.2d 349, the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that the Phoenix case did
not apply to an election on bonds of a road district on
the grounds that the road district was established
primarily for the benefit of nearby land. Citing the
Cipriano, Phoenix and Stewart cases, the United States
Supreme Court reversed such decision on October 12,
1971 in Police Jury of Parish of Vermilion v. Hebert,
404 U.S. 807, 30 L. Ed. 2d 39, 92 8. Ct. 52.
MICHIGAN
Michigan Constitution of 1963, Article II, Section 6,
provides that “only electors in, and who have property
assessed for any ad valorem taxes in” the district or
territory affected. or their husbands or wives, may vote
in bond elections. This provision has not been amended
nor has the Michigan Supreme Court decided any case in-
terpreting the effect of the Cipriano and Phoenix cases
thereon. Bonds are generally voted by all qualified elec-
tors in Michigan political subdivisions on the theory that
the Cipriano and Phoenix cases, as well as the decisions
of courts in other states, clearly have the effect of excising
the property taxpayer requirement.
MONTANA
The Montana Constitution: of 1889, Article IX. Section 2
provided that if a question submitted at an election con-
cerned the creation of any debt or liability a person, to
vote, “must also be a taxpayer whose name appears on
the last preceding completed assessment roll... .” In. State
on rel Ward v. Anderson, 158 Mont. 279, 491 P.2d 868,
decided November 23, 1971, the Montana Supreme Court
recognized that the Phoenix and Cipriano cases had the
i
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effect of excising the taxpayer requirement. “These deci-
sions make it clear that that portion of Article IX, See-
tion 2, of the Montana Constitution, quoted above, is in-
valid. The Montana Legislature reeognized this by en-'
acting Chapter 234, Laws of 1971, which allows all quali-
fied electors to vote on local bond issues, and by voting to
submit a proposed amendment to Article IX, Section 2,
which will, if approved by the voters, delete the invalid
requirement. Chapter 159, Laws of 1971.” Subsequently
all qualified electors who comply with pertinent registra-
tion laws have been permitted to vote at such, bond elec-
tions without distinction between taxpayers and others.
The amendment proposed hy Chapter 159 of the Laws of
1971 was rejected at the general election in November,
1972, after the people of Montana ratified a new Constitu-
tion on June 6, 1972, effective July 1, 1973, which con-
tains no provision limiting the right to vote in bond elec-
tions to taxpayers.
NEVADA
Nevada Revised Statutes Sections 350.050 and 350.070,
at the time of the Phoenix case, provided for a two-ballot
election; one set of ballots, printed on colored paper, were
supplied to the qualified voters who were owners or
spouses of owners of real property and the other set,
printed on white paper, were supplied to all other quali-
fied electors. The election was required to carry on
each set of ballots before the bonds could be issued.
The law was amended pursuant to Chapter 49, Sta-
tutes of Nevada, 1971, pages 91 et seq., to eliminate
all requirements for separate ballots and ballot boxes.
’ Subsequently all qualified electors who comply with per-
tinent registration laws have been permitted to vote at
such bond elections without distinction between taxpayers
and others.
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NEW MEXICO
New Mexico Constitution, Article IX, Section 10, re-
stricts voters in county bond elections to those “who
paid a property tax therein during the preceding year;”
Section 11 of the same Article restricts the right to vote
in school bond elections to “owners of real estate within
the school district” and Section 12 of the same Article
restricts the right to vote on city, town or village bonds
to those who “have paid a property tax therein during the
preceding year.” These provisions have not been amended ;
on December 7, 1970 the Supreme Court of New Mexico
in Board of Education of the Village of Cimarron v.
Maloney, 82 N.M. 167, 477 P.2d 605, held that the effect
of the Phoenix case was to excise the property ownership
requirement from Section 11 and bonds have generally
been issued since then under Sections 10 and 12 as well
pursuant to vote of all qualified electors.
NEW YORK
The New York Town Law, Section 84, prohibits any-
one from voting upon a proposition for the spending
of money or the incurring of any town liability unless
he or she is an owner of property “assessed upon the
last preceding town assessment roll.” A similar provision
previously appeared in Section 4.402 of the Village Law
but has been omitted by the recodification of the Village
Law pursuant to Laws, 1972, Chapters 887 to 895, in-
elusive. On August 28, 1972 In re Cohalan, 1972, 71 Mise.
od 196, 335 N.Y.S. 2d 747, affirmed 41 A.D. 2d 840, 342
NYS. 2d 153, held that the Town Law restriction was
unconstitutional in a proceeding to declare invalid a peti-
tion for a referendum on a proposed acquisition of real
estate by the Town of Islip. Enough of the signers of the
petition were non-property owners so that without their
signatures the petition would be insufficient, but, citing
saps BF cee
Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 23
L.Ed. 2d 583, 89 S.Ct. 1886, as well as Phoenix and
Cipriano, the court held that their signatures were valid
under Section 91 of the Town Law. Section 91 provides
that only those qualified to vote on a proposition to spend
money may sign such a petition. Subsequently all qualified
electors who comply with pertinent registration laws have
been permitted to vote at such elections without dis-
tinction between taxpayers and others. This practice has
been upheld in Wright v. Town Board of Town of Carlton,
70 Mise. 2d 1, 332 N.Y.S. 2d 233 affirmed as modified
on other grounds 41 A.D. 2d 290, 342 N.Y.S. 2d 577,.
affirmed 33 N.Y.2d 977, 309 N.E.2d 137 regarding an
election on the creation of a water district and in Light
v. MacKenzie, 78 Misc. 2d 315, 356 N.Y.S. 2d 99 respecting
a fire district bond issue.
OKLAHOMA
Oklahoma Constitution, Article X, Section 27, provides
that a city or town may “by a majority of the qualified
property taxpaying voters of such city or town, voting
at an election to be held for that purpose,” become in-
debted in excess of the debt limit prescribed by Section
26 of that Article which requires a 3/5ths majority at an
election by all qualified voters. This taxpayer qualifica-
tion was upheld by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in
Settle v. City of Muskogee, 462 P.2d 642 on December
31, 1969, following the Cipriano case; on March 30, 1971
the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided City of Spencer
v. Rayburn, 483 P.2d 735, holding that the effect of the
Phoenix case was to excise the taxpayer requirement
’ from Section 27. Subsequently all qualified electors who
comply with pertinent registration laws have been per-
mitted to vote at such bond elections without distinction
between taxpayers and others.
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RHODE ISLAND
The Rhode Island Constitution, Amendment Number 29,
Section 2, provided that no one might vote upon any prop-
sition to impose a tax, for the expenditure of money
in a town unless he shall “either (1) be really and truly
possessed in his own right of real estate in such town of
the value of one hundred thirty-four dollars over and above
al} encumbrances ... or (2) shall within the year next
préceding have paid a tax assessed upon his personal
property in said town of the value of at least one hundred
thirty-four dollars.” This provision was anulled and super-
seded by Amendment Number 37 adopted by the people
November 6, 1973.
UTAH
Utah Constitution, Article XIV, Section 3, prohibits the
incurring of any debt by any county, school district or city
“unless the proposition to create such debt,shall have been
submitted to a vote of such qualified electors as shall
have paid a property tax therein in the year preceding
such election. . .” In Cypert v. Washington County School
District, 24 Utah 2d 419, 473 P.2d 887, on July 16, 1970
the Utah Supreme Court held that the effect of the
Phoenix case was to excise the taxpayer requirement from
the constitutional -¢lection requirement. Subsequently all
qualified electors who comply with pertinent registration
laws have been permitted to vote at such bond elections
without distinction between taxpayers and others.
WYOMING
Wyoming Statutes, Sections 22.130 et seq., at the time
of the. Phoenix case provided that non-property owners
receive white ballots and deposit them in a ballot box
designated Box “A” and that property owners and their
spouses get colored ballots and deposit them in ballot Box
“B”, The election was required to carry in each ballot box
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—19—
before the bonds could be issued. Chapter 240, Session
Laws of Wyoming, 1971, revised the laws for bond
elections generally and required one set of ballots for all
qualified electors, printed on white paper, and one ballot
box at each polling place. Subsequently all qualified elec-
tors who comply with pertinent registration laws have been
permitted to vote at such bond elections withgut distine-
tion between taxpayers and others. This change has been
carried forward in a new election code for the State of
Wyoming by Chapter 251, Session Laws of Wyoning,
1973. >
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In all of the states which, at the time of the Phoenix
case, restricted to taxpayers the right to vote in bond
elections, other than Texas, bonds have been voted and
issued in relignce upon local interpretations that Phoenix
prohibited the states from granting to taxpayers alone
a right at an election to reject a bond issue proposed
by the local governing body. A reversal of the decision
of the court below, if this Court declares that such a
right may be granted to taxpayers as a class when coupled
with an election at which all qualified electors may vote,
might mean that such local interpretations were erroneous
and that under state constitutions and laws (prior to
amendment or revision in some states) bonds issued after
having been voted only at elections open to all qualified
electors were issued in violation of those constitutions
and laws which could, consistently with the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, have been obeyed by the use of a two-
ballot election.
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CONCLUSION
Any reversal of the court below-on the merits should
be prospective only as to states other than Texas so
that the rule enunciated by such reversal will apply only
to bond elections called and held after the date of this
Court’s decision.
Respectfully submitted,
JOE R. PURCELL, City Attorney
251 West Washington Street
Phoenix, Arizona 85003
Authorized law officer of the City of Phoenix
111 West Monroe Street
Chicago, Illinois 60603
FRED H. ROSENFELD
GUST, ROSENFELD, DIVELBESS. & HENDERSON
3300 Valley Center
201 North Central Avenue
Phoenix, Arizona 85073
HAROLD B. JUDELL
New Orleans, — 70112
FRANK L. WATSON
FREEMAN, ears WATSON, SLADE,
Jacksonville, Florida 32202
ROBERT M. JOHNSON
DAWSON, NAGEL, SHERMAN & HOWARD
First National Bank Bldg.
621 17th Street
Denver, Colorado 80202
ROSWELL C. DIKEMAN
SYKES, GALLOWAY & DIKEMAN
120 Broadway
New York, New York 10005
SSNS lI ea TE TERNS He
al ag AM
CERTIFICATE
I, the undersigned bond counsel amicus curiae do here-
by certify that the foregoing brief has been served on
counsel for all parties in this matter by depositing a copy
thereof in the United States mail, air mail postage prepaid,
addressed to each of them at his respective address this
10th day of January, 1975.
SUD OS OCSER CRONE SS 000S 00S0NROSS Obes conse sede NNenRSEb tb tebb se 6éece edée nc
Many VW. MumFrorp
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