Appellees Brief — Hill v. Stone

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“SUPREME COURT, hE]

ag DEC 17 1974

NO. 73-1723 " | micuacy ROOAK, J?., CLERK

~ IN THE

Supreme Count ofthe Hitch Sintes

OCTOBER TERM, 1974

JOHN L. HILL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS,

APPELLANT

MICHAEL L. STONE, ET AL,

APPELLEES

ON APPEAL

FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

‘BRIEF FOR THE APPELLEES

DON GLADDEN

MARVIN COLLINS

702 Burk Burnett Bldg.

December 13, 1974 Fort Worth, TX 76102

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AIRE TIAL ae Ms TO

INDEX

Senn

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES........----- vii

NATURE OF THE CASE........-------: 2

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.........----- 2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND :

STATUTORY PROVISIONS......------- 3

STATEMENT OF THE cS Se 4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT....---------- 8

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES......---: 18

I. REGARDLESS OF WHICH CONSTITU-

TIONAL STANDARD IS APPLIED,

THE VOTER REQUIREMENT OF PROP-

ERTY OWNERSHIP AND. RENDITION

IN GENERAL 2URPOSE BOND ELEC-

TIONS IS VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL

PROTECILON CLAUSE........---- ~18

A. The requirement that voters

in general purpose bond

elections own and render

taxable property is not nec-

essary to promote any con-

oe Tsable compelling state

interest...-.--eeeeeeeeee

1. The Texas Supreme Court

has upheld the constitu-

tionality of the voting

classification challen-

ged in this case in the

face of this Court's

Decisions of Kramer v.

Union Free School Dis-

trict and Phoenix v.

are VP”: a 18

Fe SOT OT PNR

. The challenged pro-

visions of Texas law

are not entitled to a

presumption of, con-

etitutiousii¢cy. ....... 20

. The only three con-

ceivable purposes of

~ the Texas voting class-

ification fail to meet

the constitutional

standard of Kramer v.

Union Free School Dis-

trict and Phoenix v.

Kolodziejski.......... 21

a. The interest of the

state in encouraging

its citizens to dis-

close and render for

taxation some prop-

erty, however little,

is not a compe’ ling

State interest..... 22

b. The challenged Texas

voting classification

is not necessary to

promote the state

interest, if any, of

encouraging each cit-

- izen to disclose and

render for taxation

some of his property. 23

c. The interest of the

state in limiting the

franchise to those

who will pay for the

obligations assumed

iii

in the election is

not a compelling

state interest..... 24~

d. The classification

challenged herein is

not necessary to pro-

mote the state's

interest, if any, of

limiting the franchise

to those who will pay

for the obligations

assumed in the

OLORCIOR, 66 cc dk bck 26

e. The interest of the

state in limiting the

franchise to those

who are primarily in-

terested in the out-

come of the election

is not a compelling

state interest..... 27

f. The challenged voting

restrictions are not

necessary to promote

the state's interest,

if any, of limiting

the franchise to those

who are primarily in-

terested in the out-

come of the election. 28

4. The clear mandate of

Kramer v. Union Free

School District and the

three cases subsequently

based upon it is that

these five Texas

POT EEE IS EES NE EE ENS RCO, COOLS CI AR RB tN CNN ons

Ee Nae? RP NU eR a, See ee

yee e

1 at

provisions are uncon-

BELOREEOORL. . Cots ks 2S

B. There is no rational basis

for Texas' requirement

that voters in general

purpose bond elections

be owners and renderers

of taxable property...... 31

1. Texas has no right to

encourage disclosure

and rendition of tax-

able. property by con-

ditioning the right to

vote upon such disclo-

sure and rendition, be-

cause that purpose bears

no relation to voter

qualifications........ 32

2. Texes has no right to -

-limit the franchise to

those who will pay for

the obligations assumed

in the bond election

because this purpose

bears no relation to

voter qualifications.. 34

3. Texas has no right to

limit the franchise in

bond elections to those

who are primarily inter-

ested in the outcome of

the election because

this purpose bears no

relation to voter

quaiificationg........ 36

RIP Seg ZS GT

4. In deciding whether the

Texas voter classifi-

‘cation meets the consti-

tutional standard of Har-

er v. Virginia State -

oard of BYections. the

degree of discrimination

is irrelevant......... 38

II. THE COMPELLING STATE INTEREST

sae

TEST, NOT THE RATIONAL BASIS

TEST, IS THE CONSTITUTIONAL

STANDARD APPLICABLE TO THE

CASE AT BAR... ewiues ioe os ds 40

THE CASE AT BAR IS FACTUALLY

INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE

DECISION OF THIS COURT IN

PHOENIX V. KOLODZIEJSKI..... 46

A. The facts of Phoenix v.

Kolodziejski are closely

analogous to those of the

Te 6° Serer 46

B. In 1970 this Court summarily

affirmed the judgment of a

Three-Judge District Court

in Parish School Board of

the Parish of St. Charles v.

Stewart, citing Phoenix v.

Kolodziejski, on the basis

of facts closely analogous

to those of the case at bar.50

C. The Judge below who disagreed

with this Court's decision in

Phoenix v. Kolodziejski

concurred in the unanimous

judgment below because

he could find no basis

for distinguishing this

case from Phoenix v.

Kolodziejski

eee eee eee eee

CONCLUSION. .

APPENDIX A:

APPENDIX B:

APPENDIX C:

APPENDIX D:

NEW YORK STATUTES

INVOLVED IN KRAMER

V. UNION FREE SCHOOL

DER rh es Via «cae ss fs

LOUISIANA STATUTES

INVOLVED IN CIPRIANO

ARIZONA STATUTES AND

CONSTITUTIONAL PRO=

VISIONS INVOLVED Te

PHOENIX V. KOLODZ- —

DRAMA s os os Gules Foe

LOUISIANA STATUTES

AND CONSTITUTIONAL

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

IN PARISH SCHOOL BOARD

or THE PARISH OF

. CHARLES V

. STEWART.

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES : Page

Associated Enterprises, Inc. v.

Toltec Watershed Improvement

-maecrsce, 4193 U.6. 743 41975) ..:.13,31,

41,42

Cipriano v. Houma, 395 U.S. 701

P1565) cn Cw ee CK re hs oo ae es S,15,.0,

30,31,43

Har er v. Virginia State Board

lections, 383 U.S. 663 .

1986) a re a ek Sk Pe cA oe iG, ik. i2,

A¥,04,32,33, 34, 35,38,39,44,54 -—

Kramer v. Union Free School District,

See wee. Gen Thee. «ass cS 6,13, 16.

18,19,20,21,28,29, 30, 31, 43

Montgomery Independent School -

“District v. Martin, 464 SW2d

638 (Tex. Suge. 300) ks iS 8,19,20,

24,20,39,39, 58

Parish School Board of the Parish

of St. Charles vy. Stewart........ Ls Fee

Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399

cm. Boe Cases... ok ge ek ee 210, ko.

24,15,16,17 ,18,30,31

‘37,40,41,43,46,47,48

a9 ,50,5) 52,533,534

Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin

Water Sygrane District, 410 U.S.

1 OSS rn ee rr Se Te 4 es

40,41,42,43,44

ey SOE SOR”

soe cia bllnei

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES : Page

San Antonio Independent School

District v. Rodriguez, 411

; NOPE nce bs kb eee Oo aD 42

Stewart v. Parish School Board of

St. Charles Parish, 310 F. Supp.

Z att’d mem., 400 U.S.

SEP OE sors sk he he ee 9,28,30,

31,43,50,51,52

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS:

Constitution of Texas

BOX. GCOmet Bee. Fh O36 hii ck vous 3

Constitution of. Texas

Tee. Comet, Act. Vi §5ex.. ccc nks. 3

_ Constitution of Texas

Tez. Const... Art. VIII, $1..:.'s% e 25,34

Texas Election Code Art. 5.03..... 3

Texas Election Code Art. 5.04..... a

Texas Election Code Art. 5.07..... 3

U.S. Constitution Fourteenth

MIs. 6. 5 eae s anes te cee 4,41

OTHER AUTHORITIES:

"The Property Tax in Texas Under State

and Federal Law", 51 Texas L. Rev.

885 (1973) (Professor Yudof).... 52

Fort Worth City Charter, Chapter

Pay ORR Oi i bets ks ead < a. 845582

PER AR I ed NOR LOE LE SNR RCO IAT I 8

SLI RR 8 6 AOD Bt RGAE 1

NO. 73-1723

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1974

eters L. HILL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS,

APPELLANT

MICHAEL L. STONE, ET AL,

APPELLEES

ON APPEAL

FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

BRIEF FOR THE APPELLEES

TO THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES SUPREME

COURT :

PALER Me OPPO

DOM LOL AOE LL LAL MET

2 ‘

NATURE OF THE CASE

The unanimous judgment on March 25,

1974 of the three judge court below hold-

ing unconstitutional and enjoining the

implementation of the herein shad Uinaed

Texas provisions was stayed by this Court

only to the extent of permitting the At-

torney General to continue in force the

dual balloting procedures effectuated by

him in 1969 as a "temporary measure" pend-

ing resolution of the constitutional

issues involved in Phoenix v. Kolodzie-

jekt. 399 U.S. 204. (1970). (pp. 8, II,

uris. State.). 1 ~~

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

,Ultimate Question

IS THE TEXAS REQUIREMENT THAT VOTERS IN

GENERAL PURPOSE BOND ELECTIONS BE OWNERS

‘any citations to the facts stipulated by the

parties in the Pre-Trial Order will be to the

appropriate pages in the Printed “-sepesea (tan),

cited hereafter as "Stip. # » ’

App.". All citations to the ju an and opinion

below will be to the appropriate pages in the

Jurisdictional Statement of the Texas Attorney

General (white), cited hereafter as "p..

AG Juris. State.". All citations to arguments of

Appellants will be to the appropriate pages of the

Texas Attorney General's Jurisdictional Statement

(white) and Brief (white), hereafter cited to

respectively as "p. AG Juris. State." and

: oh rs Mepet lant Brief. a

; wo, ot Mer AAEM pe aia NAAN Bech AML Oe A Rl PAM RA EEE AE ARE A i BOOED

AND RENDERERS OF TAXABLE PROPERTY CONSIS-

TENT WITH THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF

THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT?

Threshold Question

WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE EQUAL PROTEC-

TION STANDARD FOR DETERMINING CONSTITU-

TIONALITY OF THE TEXAS REQUIREMENT THAT

VOTERS IN GENERAL PURPOSE BONI) ELECTIONS

OWN AND RENDER PROPERTY?

If Compelling State Interest Test

.Applicable

WHETHER THE TEXAS REQUIREMENT THAT

VOTERS IN GENERAL PURPOSE BOND ELECTIONS

OWN AND RENDER TAXABLE PROPERTY IS NECES-

SARY TO PROMOTE SOME COMPELLING STATE

INTEREST?

If Rational Basis. Test Applicable

WHETHER THERE IS A RATIONAL BASIS FOR

THE TEXAS REQUIREMENT THAT VOTERS IN

GENERAL PURPOSE BOND ELECTIONS OWN AND

RENDER TAXABLE PROPERTY?

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The state statutory and constitutional

provisions involved are Art. 6, Secs. 3 and

‘on 3a of the Texas Constitution, and Arts. 5.03,

5.04 and 5.07 of the Texas Election Code.

Ww The City of Fort Worth Charter provision

involved is Section 19 of Chapter 25 of the

| . Fort Worth City Charter. These are set

forth in Appellant Attorney General's

gut iedtertenal Statement at pages lc through

a EN NEE EL UE RS ee OOP. SERRE NE APE OD A STR FS SEPT OR A iti BI a 4

The United States Constitutional provi-

sion involved is the Equal Protection Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu-

tion of the United States:

..nor shall any State...deny to any

person within its jurisdiction the

equal protection of the laws. U.S.

Const. Amend. XIV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

There are no disputed facts in this’

’ ease.

On April 11, 1974 the City of Fort Worth

held a bond election. A $6.8 Million

Library Bond issue and a $3.0 Million

Transportation System Bond issue were

submitted to the electorate in a dual box

election. (Stip. #22, 23, pp. 58-69 App.).

The Transportation System bonds passed in

the property owner box and the non-property

owner box. (Stip. #47, pp. 86, 87, App.).

Those bonds have long since been certified

by the Attorney General and sold by the

City O6£ Fort Worth. (Stip. $48,-.p. 67,

App.). The Library Bonds passed in the

non-property owner box, passed in the

aggregate majority of persons voting in

both boxes, but failed in the property

owner box. (Stip. #47, pp. 86, 87, App.).

The Attorney General, whose approval

is a prerequisite to sale of any general

obligation bonds in Texas, has continuously

refused since 1969 to approve any bonds

unless such bonds received a majority vote

of the aggregate of property owners and

non-property owners and a majority vote of

property owners. (Stip. #24, pp. 65-67,

App.). While everyone otherwise qualified

is theoretically entitled to vote, property

owners are given a veto.

The City considered the Library Bond

issue to have failed. (Stip. #29, p. 74

App.).

The decision to sell the bonds is a

legislative decision resting with the

governing body of the appropriate polit-

ical subdivision. In this case, the City

Council of the City of Fort Worth is —

vested with such discretion. (Stip. #10,

pp. 45-47, App.). However, in this case,

there is absolutely no question how the

council would exercise its discretion.

They woutd sell the Library Bonds if

they covld. The following facts make that

clear:

1. Unless the city had intended to

sell such bonds it is absurd to

believe that they would adopt an

ordinance submitting the proposi-

- tion to the voters and spend the

money necessary to conduct a city-

wide election on that proposition.

(See Stip. #9, p. 45, App.; Pl. Ex.

| Pe

2. The City Council has in fact sold

the bonds approved by a majority

of the rendering property owners

2The dual box election procedure devised by

the Attorney General to implement this policy

decision is not authorized by any Texas or Federal

law, statute or otherwise.

EMI Sisko 5 te Ck) haben LS,

in Proposition 1 (Transportation

System Bonds) which was submitted

at the same time as Proposition 2

(Library Bonds). (Stip. #48, p.

87, App.).

3. The City Council has stated in a

motion adopted unanimously on

April 17,-1972, that their legal

discretion would be exercised in

favor of the sale of the bonds if

legal entanglements did not exist.

(Stip. #28, pp. 73, 74, App.).

4. The City Council, the city, attorney,

and the mayor have stipulated that

if the property rendition require-

ments did not exist, they would take

the necessary steps to sell the

Library Bonds as soon as possible.

(Stip. $26, 27, 30, pvp. 70-73, 75,

76, App.) .2

The purposes for which the City of Fort

Worth may issue bonds are coextensive with

the powers of the city council sitting as a

legislative body. Specifically, the City

Charter provides that such bonds may be

issued and sold "for permanentsimprovements

and for any other legitimate -municipal

purpose as may be determined by the City

3There are a number of technical procedural

steps the City would have to take as a prereq-

uisite to issuance and sale of the Library Bonds.

An exhaustive list of these steps appears in

Stipulation #19, pp. 54-56, App. All city offi-

cials involved have stipulated that they would take

all of such necessary steps. (Stip. #26, 27, 30,

pp. 70-73, 75, 76, App.).

Council,..."” (Stip. #10, pp. 45-48, App.).

[Emphasis added]

While the challenged Texas constitutional

and statutory provisions require:th a voter

be an owner and renderer of taxable property,

the Fort Worth City Charter goes further and

requires that the voter actually have paid

the tax. The relevant portion of the Charter

provides:

Provided, that no bonds shall be

issued, nor bonded debt created,

unless authority therefor shall

first be submitted to the qualified

voters who pay taxes on property

situated within the corporate limits

of the City of Fort Worth;

(Stip. #45, p. 46, App.). [Emphasis

added]

Appellees, property owners and non-

property owners who voted in that elec-

tion, brought this suit challenging

Texas provisions of law limiting the right

to vote in general purpose bond elections

to rendering property owners, and seeking

to enjoin the Attorney General and the

City from considering the property owner-

ship requirements of Texas law in deter-

mining whether the bonds passed.

eS ae i ane ee a

SR rteetied Sab SAL. Wy

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I. CHALLENGED CLASSIFICATIONS FAIL UNDER

ANY TEST

A. Compelling State Interest Standard

This Court in Kramer v. Union Free

School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969),

Cipriano v. Houma , 395 U.S. 701 (1969).

5 Phoenix v. ~ Kolodziejski, 399 U.S.

204 (1970) laid down the applicable tests

to be applied in this case:

There must be a compelling state inter-

est for the classification;

and the classification must be necessary

to promote that opens state

interest.

1. Contrary State Court Decision

The Texas Supreme Court in/Montgomery ,

Independent School District v. Martin,

646 eS mae 630 t708. See. i971).

upheld the con$titutionality of the

voting classification challenged in

this case in the face of this Court's

decision in Phoenix, supra. The

Texas Supreme Court avoided any mean-

ingful attempt to apply the standards

set down by this Court in Phoenix.

2. (Omitted from Summary)

3. Compelling State Interest Applied To

Facts Of This Case

a. & b. Encouraging rendition of

(AR RG DT BALD VO DARLIN SOPRA Cts END

taxable property

Assuming for the sake of argument that

the challenged classificatory scheme

does somehow encourage citizens to

disclose and render for taxation a

token amount of property, rendition

of a thirty cent pencil is something

less than compelling. And this is all

it takes to vote. Exclusion of a

voter from the polls in a bond election

is a clumsy and imprecise manner in

which to collect taxes. There are

other recognized, better methods to

encourage rendition of taxable prop-

erty. Thus, these challenged voting

laws are not necessary to encourage

citizens to render property for

taxation.

c. & d. Only those who pay vote

Assuming arguendo that the classifi-

catory scheme challenged here somehow

limits the franchise to those who will

pay for the obligations assumed in

the election, this is not a compelling

state interest. It disenfranchises

multitudes of persons who are interest-

ed in such broad issues as a transpor-

tation system or libraries. The Court

in Stewart v. Parish School sroats of

St. Charles Parish, 310 F. Supp. 1172

(1970), aff'd mem. 400 U.S. “3B (1970)

held that the special interests of

property taxpayers is not a compelling

state interest. Moreover, there are

Many persons otherwise qualified to

vote who have no property rendered

for taxation in the year of the election,

Lid bins identities

WA emo SY HUN

APES ee. a ee

but who will render property and pay

taxes in the future years. That

money will be applied to the retire-

ment of the bonds. Others will effec-

tively pay property taxes in the form

of rent or costs of goods sold.

e. & f. Only persons primarily

interested vote

Limiting the franchise to those who

are primarily interested in the out-

come of the election (if indeed this

could be done) would not be a compel-

ling state interest: for the reason

that the voter not primarily interested

in’ the outcome could nevertheless

cast an intelligent informed ballot.

However, that question is effectively

pretermitted by recognition that no

rational argument can be made that a

requirement of rendition of property

for taxation in any manner limits the

franchise in a library bond election

to the persons primarily interested in

the outcome.

4: (Omitted from Summary)

B. Rational Basis Standard

This Court in Harper v. Virginia

State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663

(1966), struck down the constitutionality

of a poll tax in Virginia. Applying the

rational basis standard, this Court held

that:

wealth like race,

creed, or color, is

not germane to one's

ability to participate

intelligently in the

electoral process.

Harper, supra, at 668.

Encouraging Rendition of Taxable

Property

One of the avowed purposes of the

Texas classificatory scheme - to

encourage disclosure and rendition

of taxable property - has no more

relation to voter qualifications

than does wealth, highway safety, or

any number of other topics in which

the state is otherwise legitimately

concerned.

Only Those Who Pay Vote

Assuming arguendo that the Texas

scheme somehow limits the franchise

to those who will pay for the obliga-

tion assumed in the election, this

does not prevent a voter from intel-

ligently exercising his ballot.

Only Persons Primarily Interested

Vote

If it may be said for the purposes

of argument that the classificatory

scheme in this case somehow limits

the franchise to those who are

primarily interested in the outcome

of the elections this, too, is no

justification since it does not render

a voter incapable of casting an intel-

ligent ballot.

4. Degree of Discrimination Irrelevant

of the 5, Recvont General assert: that

the Texas classificatory scheme does

not stop anyone from voting who

really wishes to vote, since there

is no minimum amount of property.

which a person may render, and he

need not have paid the tax. That

contention was answered sop igianuinanen

in Harper, supra:

We say the same \

whether the citizen

otherwised qualified

to vote has a dollar

and fifty cents in \

his pocket or

nothing at all,

pays the fee or

fails to pay it. .

383 U.S. at 668.

II. APPROPRIATE TEST

The Appellant Attorney General

argues in his Brief that this Court's

decisions in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare

Lake Basin Water Storage District,

410 U.S. 719 (1973) aa Associated

Enterprises, Inc. v. Tol-Tec Watershed

Improvement District, 410 U.S. 743

(L753) are authority for this Court to

uphold the constitutionality of the

Texas classificatory scheme.

It is respectfully submitted that

this Court may apply the rational basis

standard instead of compelling state

interest test to the case at bar only if

it is willing to overrule Kramer, supra,

Cipriano v. Houma, 395 U.S. 7OI (1 ;

Phoenix, supra, and Parish School Board

of the Parish of St. Charles v.

Stewart, supra.

Further, it is respectfully submitted

that neither Salyer nor Associated

Enterprises offer a basie for upholding

the constitutiona}yity of the challenged

Texas provisions. Neither of such cases

involve bond elections. More fund-

amentally, however, both of those

cases held in essence that when land

is virtually the only thing affected

by the outcome of an election, and

the impact of the election on land

alone is clear, then the franchise may be

Lt A OI ee

restricted to real property owners. The

challenged Texas classificatory scheme

in no way limits the franchise to persons

primarily affected by the outcome of the

election at bar. In what manner can it

be said that the restriction of the fran-

chise to rendering property owners

restricts the franchise to persons

primarily interested in the outcome of a

library bond election? There is simply

no manner, rational or irrational in which

property ownership or rendition of property

for taxation is related to use of a_ public

library.

It is interesting to note that even

though the Attorney General has suggested

the propriety of this Court applying

the rational basis standard rather than

the compelling state interest test, he

advances no rational basis on which it

can be said that non-rendering property

owners or non-property owners should be

disenfranchised by the State of Texas in

bond elections involving issues of general

concern to the-community. Perhaps that

failure on the part of the Attorney General

is because there is no such rational basis.

III. PRIOR INDISTINGUISHABLE DECISION OF

THIS COURT

A. Same Facts

In Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399

U.S. 204 (1970) this Court held unconsti-

tutional Arizona statutes and constitutional

provisions which limited the right to vote

in general obligation bond elections to

real property taxpayers. There is no

substantial distinction between that case

and the case at bar. Both cases involve

general obligation bond elections. While

Phoenix, supra, involved restriction of the

franchise to real property taxpayers, the

case at bar involves restriction of the

franchise to rendering property owners

("property" including personal property),

but there is no rational distinction

between Phoenix and the case at bar which

can be made on that basis. Both Phoenix

and the case at bar involve municipal im-

provements of general public interest such

as parks, playgrounds, libraries, trans-

portation systems, etc. In Phoenix,

it was certain that more than half the

debt service requirements on the bonds

would be satisfied from revenues of the ot-

her local taxes paid by non-property

owners. In the case at bar the testimony

was that the general obligation bonds would

be paid off solely from the proceeds of

taxes of persons who own real and personal

property. However, this Court in Phoenix,

spoke directly to that issue stating that

justification for restricting the

franchise to the property owners

seems to be the strongest inthe

case of municipality which, unlike

Phoenix, looks only to property

tax revenues for servicing general

obligation bonds. But even in such

a case the justification would be

insufficient. [emphasis added],

Phoenix, supra, 399 U.S. at page 210.

B. Similar Case Involving Both

Real And Personal Property

Affirmed By This Court

ees

There is direct precedent for this

court summarily affirming the decision,of

the court below in this case. In Parish

School Board of the Parish of St. Charles

v. Stewart, aff'g 310 F. Supp. 117

(EDLa...1970), 400 U.S. 884 (1970), a

three judge district court within the

Fifth Circuit held that Louisiana provisions

limiting the right to vote in general

obligation bond elections to "property

taxpayers" were unconstitutional. The

term "property .taxpayers" included those

who paid tax on personal property. This

Court affirmed in a memorandum opinion

citing Phoenix, supra. ~

C. Disagreeing Judge Below Had

To Concur

One of the district judges below

who concurred in the result reached by the

unanimous court below could find no way —

to distinguish Phoenix, supra. He stated

in his opinion,

I deeply regret that I have been

unable to find a legitimate way

to distinguish the cases above

cited. [Phoenix]. (Concurring

opinion of Judge Brewster, p. 22a

AG Juris. State.).

Kramer, supra, Cipriano, supra, Phoenix,

supra, and Parish School Board of the

arish of St. Charles, supra. really do

not leave even one sign cant question

which this Court needs to answer about

the constitutionality of Texas classifica-

tory scheme. In Phoenix, this Court noted:

*kkNor have we been shown that the

fourteen states now restricting

the franchise have unique problems

that make it necessary to limit

the vote to property owners.

Phoenix, supra, at page 212-213.

Texas is one of those fourteen states.

In the face of that decision the Texas

Supreme Court has squarely held the

voting scheme challenged herein constitu-

tional.

It is respectfully submitted that this

Court must affirm the trial court decision.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

I. REGARDLESS OF WHICH CONSTITUTIONAL |

STANDARD IS APPLIED, THE VOTER REQUIRE-

MENT OF PROPERTY OWNERSHIP AND RENDI-

TION IN GENERAL PURPOSE BOND ELECTIONS

Is VIOLATIVE..OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION

CLAUSE.

A. The requirement that voters in gen-

eral purpose bond elections own and

render taxable property is not nec-

essary to promote any conceivable

compelling state interest.

1. The Texas Supreme Court has up-

held the constitutionality of

the voting classification chall-

enged in this case in the oa

of this Court's Decisions o

Kramer v. Union Free School Dis-

trict and Phoenix v. Kolod@iejski.

In Montgomery Independent School Dis-

trict v. Martin, 464 2d 638 (Tex.

Sup.¥1971) the Texas Supreme Court held

that the Texas laws being attacked in the

present case are not violative of the

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. The opinion of the Court does

not analyze whether the voting classifi-

cation bears any relation to voter quali-

fications4 nor does it analyze whether the

. "But we must remember that the interest of the

State, when it comes to voting is limited to the

power to fix the qualifications. Wealth, like ra-

ce, creed, or color, is not germane to one's

ability to participate intelligently in the

voting classification is necessary [fo

promote a compelling state interest,

which are fhe applicable constitutional

standards.° Two purposes of the voting

classification are set forth in the

opinion:

(1) to limit the franchise to those

who will pay for the obligations

assume in the election,’ and

electoral process." Harper v. Virginia State

Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 at 668 (1966).

5 "Therefore, if a challenged state statute

grants the right to vote to some bona fide resi-

dents of requisite age and citizenship and denies

the franchise to others, the Court must determine

whether the exclusions are necessary to promote

a compelling state interest." Kramer v. Union

Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 at 627 (1969).

6 The traditional “rational basis" standard was

apparently applied by this Court in Harper, Supra,

but was rejected in Kramer v. Union Free School

District, 395 U.S. 621 at 628 (1969).

7 “One who is willing to vote for and impose a

tax on the property of another should be willing

to assume his distributive share of the burden... .

To allow some property owners to vote in that

kind of an election, and at the same time to

permit them to avoid their fair share of the re-

sulting obligation, would confer preferential

rights. This would be a denial of equal protect-

ion to another segment of citizens." Montgomery

Independent School District v. Martin, 464 S.W.2d

638 at 641, 642 (Tex. Sup. 1971).

(2) to° encourage disclosure agd rendi-

tion of taxable property.

2. The challenged provisions of Tex-

&s law are not entitled to a pre-

sumption of constitutionality.

The clear mandate of Kramer v. Union

Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969)

is that these challenged Texas provisions

are not entitled to the general presump-

tion gf constitutionality afforded state

' laws.

8 "In our opinion, the requirement that the vo-

ter in a general obligation bond election must

get his property on the rolls is in the interest

of sound government and affords equal treatment to

all citizens. ... This is the manner in which the

Texas Constitution, as approved by the entire

citizenry of the State, provides inducement for

those who wish to participate in the decision ma-

king process in a School District to assume their

rightful portion of the burden they help to create.

Personal property such as stocks, bonds, cash,

automobiles, and livestock furnishes a great deal

of the State's taxable property. No class of pro-

perty is so susceptible to concealment and escape

from taxation as personal property. ... There may

be other means to reach personal property, but

experience has shown that every means must be

pressed into service if the obligations of govern-

ment are to be spread equally." Montgomery Inde-

pendent School District v. Martins 646 S.W.2d 638

at 641 (Tex. Sup. 1971).

9 Kramer v. Union Free Schgol District, 395 U.S.

621 at 627, 628 (1969).

3. The only three conceivable pur-

poses of the Texas voting class-

ification fail to meet the con-

stitutional standard of Kramer

v. Union Free School District

and Phoenix v. Kolodziejski.

This Court announced a strict standard

for measuring state action in elections

in Kramer v. Union Free School District:

‘

(I)f a challenged state statute grants

the right to vote to some bona fide

residents of requisite age and citi-

zenship and denies the franchise to

others, the Court must determine whe-

ther the exclusions are necessary to

promote*a compelling state interest.

Kramer v. Union Free: School District,

395 U.S. 621 at 627 (

It should be observed that this stand-

ard has two distinct requirements:

(1) there must be a compelling state

interest for the classification;

and

(2) the classification must be neces-

Sary to promote that compelling

state interest.

Thus, in order to decide whether or not

these five .Texas provisions are consistent

with the Equal Protection:Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment, we must answer one

or both of the following questions:

(1) is there a compelling state inter-

est for the classifications made

by these five provisions? ;

(2) even if there is, is the classifi-

cation adopted necessary to pro-

mote that compelling state interest?

a. The interest of the state in

encouraging its citizens to

disclose and render for tax-

ation some property, however

little, is not a compelling

state interest.

It is perfectly clear that the challen-

ged Texas provisions do not require the

voter to assume his pro rata share of the

tax burden in order to vote.

A voter is qualified if he renders

any kind of property of any value,

and he need not have actually paid

the tax. Montgomery Independent

School District v. Martin, 464 0":

2d 638 at 640 (Tex. Sup. 1971).

10 There is however some language in the same

opinion indicating that’ the challenged provisions

do encourage each citizen to assume his fair

~-share of the tax burden.

"To disclose one's share of the total burden

for which he is responsible in a bond elec-

tion requires no more than the law univer-

sally expects. To allow some property

Owners to vote in that kind of an election,

and at the same time permit them to avoid

their fair share of the resulting obligation,

would confer perferential rights." :

464 S.W.2d 641, 642.

The interest of the State in securing

disclosure and rendition for tax purposes

of a thirty-cent pencil is something less

than compelling. The cost of accounting

fcr such an item probably exceeds the tax

that can be collected.

b. The challenged Texas voting

classification is not neces-

sary to promote the state

interest, if any, of encour-

aging each citizen to dis-

close and render for taxation

some of his property.

A law which exacts a monetary penalty

for failure to render property for tax-

ation is an appropriate and recognized

technique for collecting taxes. Employ-

ment of a tax-collector assessor to dis-

cover and render taxable property is’ an-

other recognized way to collect taxes.

Both of these means are tailored to the

end sought to be accomplished. Voting

laws are not designed primarily to collect

taxes, but are designed to give the. citi-

zen a voice in his government. Since

there are other, better ways to encourage

This language cannot be reconciled with the

language of the Court in that case quoted in the

text. |

Moreover the applicable provision of the

Fort Worth City Charter, not considered in

Montgomery, seems to limit the vote to property

owners “who pay taxes." Section 19, Chapter 25,

Fort Worth City Charter. :

ower TT antes

24.

rendition of taxable property, these vot-

ing laws are certainly not necessary to

Promote that goal.

It is difficult to assess how many

persons who otherwise would not render

some property for:taxation are persuaded

to render taxable property by these Texas

laws. The number of such persons is pro-

bably not very great. There are surely

many more persons whose uncertainty over

the property rendition requirements keeps

them from the polls. Since these voting

laws largely fail to encourage rendition

of taxable Property, they are not neces-

Sary to promote that goal.

c. The interest of the state in

limiting the franchise to

those who will pay for the

obligations assumed in the

election is not a compelling

State interest.

The five Texas provisions attacked in

this suit disenfranchise many voters who

are directly affected by the results of

the elections which are held pursuant to

the challenged provisions. The bond elec-

tion held on April 11, 1972, was for the

purpose of submitting two Propositions to

_the electorate:

Proposition 1 ........... $ 3,000,000

(Transportation System Bonde)

Proposition 2 ........... $ 6,860,000

Certainly there is no compelling reason

to adopt a classification which keeps

otherwise qualified voters from voting on

matters such as these. Each of these im-

provements vitally affects all the resi-

dents of Fort Worth. Most bond elections

do affect all residents. Thus, while the

Constitution and Statutes of Texas attempt

to enfranchise only a limited class of

voters in this type of election, it in no

way limits the subject matter of the elec-

tions to matters concerning’ only those

allowed to vote.

While not required by the challenged

Texas constitutional and statutory pro-

visions (state wide), only persons "who

pay taxes'' may vote in a bond election in

the City of Fort Worth (local). Chapter

25, Section 19, Fort Worth City Charter.11

However, Article VIII, §1 of the Texas

Constitution exempts from taxation two

hundred fifty dollars worth of household

and kitchen furniture per family. ;

Thus, some persons who do own and ren-

der property will simply not be wealthy

enough to qualify to vozre. In order to

vote in a bond election in the City of

Fort Worth, one must come from a family

with more than two hundred fifty dollars

of household goods.

It is true that those who must pay the

taxes for the improvements do have a

special interest apart from the general

public, but the Court in Stewart, v.

Parish School Board of St. Charles, 310

11 Set forth in full at pages 45-48 Appendix.

Brees tn tteas Na A

F. Supp. 1172 (1970) aff'd mem., 400 U.W.

884 (1970) held that the special interes¢

of property taxpayers is not a compelling

State interest.

"The special interest property

taxpayers have in bond elections

is not the compelling State

interest that would justify ex-

cluding a large portion of the

electorate that has a substan-

tial stake in public education."

310 F. Supp. at 1181, aff'd mem.,

400 U.S. 884 (1970).

d. The classification challenged

herein is not necessary to

promote the state's interest,

_if any, of limiting the fran-

chise to those who will pay:

for the obligations assumed

in the election.

The Texas provisions disenfranchise

many persons who will have to pay for the

improvements voted on. There are many

persons otherwise qualified to vote who

will not have rendered property for tax-

ation in the year of the election, but

who will render property in future years.

The tax on that property will be applied

to the retirement of the bonds. There

are other people who will effectively pay

property tax in the form of rent, or over-

head added to a seller's cost of goods

sold. There are still others who will be

deterred from voting because although

they haeve rendered some property, they do

not understand that these provisions of

Texas law require only token rendition of

taxable property as a condition to the

right to vote.

The voting laws is no place to require

token compliance. with the legitimate ob-

jective of tax collection, and it is cert-

ainly no place for such token compliance

when, as here, the law limits the right

to vote in an imprecise and easily mis-

understood fashion.

Obviously, there is no practical way

to enfranchise all persons who will ever

be called upon to pay taxes to retire the

bonds voted in the election, but that fact.

does not justify excluding from the fran-

chise many persons who are vitally inter-

ested in the outcome of the election.

Clearly, there is a large amount of

overkill in these provisions. These pro-

visions are not necessary to promote the

State interest of limiting the vote to

those who will, in the long run, pay for

the obligations. Indeed, these provis-

ions do not even reasonably promote that

interest.

e. The interest of the state in

limiting the franchise to

those who are primarily in-

terested in the outcome of

the election is not a compel -

ling state interest.

Even though there is no hint that the

challenged voting classification even be-

gins to limit the franchise to those pri-

marily interested in the outcome of the

election, such a purpose is not a

eA GPNTU IPR IEE

SOR, OE SUN pe at

Breese researc eon

| Sern x

compelling .one.

This is the same state interest sug-

gested in Kramer v. Union Free School Dis- |

trict, supra, and this Court there held

thac the New York statute was not neces-

sary to promote that interest since many

persons vitally interested in the issues

voted on were disenfranchised. 395 U.S.

632, 633.

The Court in Stewart v. Parish School

Board of St. Charles, 310 F. Supp.

C1970), aff'd mem. 400 U.S. 884 (1970),

held that the special interests of pro-

perty taxpayers is not a compelling state .

interest. 310 F. Supp. 1181.

The challenged Texas provisions suffer

precisely the same infirmity, since the

bond elections governed by the five Texas

provisions are of vital concern to all

voters. These bonds can be used to

finance virtually any governmental func-

tion. .

f. The challenged voting restric-

tions are not necessary to

prorote the state's interest,

if any, of limiting the fran-

chise to those who are primar-

ily interested in the outcome

: of the election. :

It is difficult to even make an argu-

ment that the challenged voting classifi-

cation limits the franchise, even impre-

cisely, to persons who are primarily in-

terested in the outcome of the election.

Under the facts of the present case, a

person who has no property rendered for

taxation may have children who would be

benefittedto a great extent by the build-

ing of a new library or the improvement

of existing facilities. And as has al-

ready been pointed out, even though this

voter may have no property rendered for

taxation, if he pays rent on his house |

or any other property which is taxable in

Texas, he is in effect paying the tax

without having any property rendered. To

say that a person is less interested, or

is not primarily interested, in the out-

come of an election such as the one held

in this case simply is not true. The °

further difficulty with such an argument

is that any, attempt to decide by whatever

means who is "primarily interested" in

the outcome of an election for something

of as much general interest as a library

is necessarily highly subjective and

speculative.

It is respectfully suggested that the

challenged voting classification is not

necessary to limit the franchise to per-

sons primarily interested in the outcome

of the election. Indeed, it doesn't even

begin to so limit the franchise.

» 4. The clear mandate of Kramer v.

Union Free School District and

the three cases subsequently

based upon it is that these five

Texas provisions are unconstitu-

tional.

In Kramer v. Union Free School District,

supra, this Court struck down a. provision

of the New York Education law which

Preirrerdse,

required a voter in school board elect-

ions to be either a parent of a child

attending school in the district, or the

owner or lessee of real property, or the

spouse of an owner or lessee. .

In Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395

U.S. 7 1969), a companion case to Kra-

mer v. Union Free School District, this

Court held unconstitutional a Louisiana

statute which limited the right to vote in

utility revenue bond elections to "prop-

erty owners".

In Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S.

204 (1970) this Court held unconstitu-

tional Arizona statutes and constitutional

provisions which limited the right to

vote in general obligation Pond elections

to real property taxpayers.

In Stewart v. Parish School Board of

St. Charles, 310 F. Supp. I172 (1970) ©

aff'd mem., 400 U.S. 884 (1970), a three-

judge district court within the Fifth Cir-

cuit held that Louisiana constitutional

and statutory provisions limiting the

right to vote in general obligation bond

elections to “property taxpayers’ were

Gre gnSt Leueserat: The term "property

ie See Appendix A for a full text of the statute.

13 See Appendix B for a full text of this

Louisiana statute.

+4 See Appendix C for a full text of the

Arizona provisions.

15 See Appendix D for a full text of these

provisions.

taxpayers'' included those who pay tax on

personal property. ‘This Court affirmed

the judgment of the three-judge court in

Sa memorandum opinion, citing Phoenix v.

~*® Kolodziejski, supra.

The Kramer doctrine has been applied

by the Federal Courts in every subsequent

case where the issue of restriction of

the franchise in bond elections fo prop-

erty taxpayers has been raised.! With-

out fail, the Courts have held the chal-

lenged state provisions unconstitutional.

It will be necessary for this Court to

overrule Kramer, Phoenix, Cipriano, and

Stewart, supra, if these Texas provisions

are to be held constitutional.

B. There is no rational basis for Texas’

requirement that voters in general

purpose bond elections be owners and

renderers of taxable property.

The -constitutional standard of Harper

v. Virginia State Board of Elections,

16 Neither Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin

Water Storage District, 410 U.S. 719 (1973) nor

Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed

Improvement District, 410 U.S. 743 (1973) involved

bond elections. More fundamentally, both of such

cases basically held that when land is virtually |

the only thing affected by an election, and the

impact of the election on land atone is clear,

then the franchise may be restricted to rea}

property owners. See II above pp, 40 - 2.

GA.

PY >

}

383 U.S. 663 (1966) is best stated in the

language of its opinion:

But we must remember that the in-

terest of the State, when it comes

to voting is limited to the power

to fix qualifications. Wealth,

like race, creed, or color, is not

germane to one's ability to partic-

ipate intelligently in the electoral

process. Harper v. Virginia State

Board of Elections, supra, 383

U.S. 668 (1966). .

None of te purported purposes of the

Texas voting classification challenged

herein meet the rational basis standard

laid down by this Court in Harper, supra.

Indeed, Judge Woodward, concurring in the

opinion of the unanimous court below,

analyzed the Texas' voter requirements by

applying Harper and found them unreason-

able. (Concurring opinion of Judge Wood-

ward below, p. 18a, AG Juris. State.).

1. Texas has no right to encourage

disclosure and rendition of tax-

able property by conditioning the

right to vote upon such disclo-

sure and rendition, because that

purpose bears no relation to

voter qualifications.

It is undoubted that a state has the

right to encourage disclosure and rendi-

tion of taxable property, just as it has

the right to promote highway safety by

appropriate legislation. But this does

not mean a state is free to withhold the

right of its citizens to vote in order to

~ of a 33

enforce these goals. \

\ a

In Harper v. Virginia State Board of».

Elections, supra, this Court held that a

state does not have the right to impose a

tax on the right to vote because "(v)oter

qualifications have no relation to wealth

nor to paying or not paying this or any

other tax."' 383 U.S. 666. Disclosure

and rendition of taxable property has no

more relation to voter qualifications

than does wealth, highway safety, building

codes, or any number of other topics in

which the state is otherwise legitimately

interested. A state simply is not free to

clutter up the voting laws with require-

ments which have no relation to voter

qualifications.

The Attorney General argues that it is

immaterial to the right to vote in a bond

election in Texas whether one's ownership

of property be great or small. This con-

tention is literally correct, if some-

what npisleading. Ownership of property

alone does not qualify anyone to vote in a

bond election in Texas. Property owner-

ship is a necessary but not a sufficient

condition to voting. The voter must also

have rendered at least a token amount of

that property. And in the City of Fort

Worth, the voter must be a person "who

pays taxes" on property. Under Texas law,

a multi-millionaire can render a ten-cent

pencil for taxation and thereby become

qualified to vote in a bond election.

This property ownership and rendition re-

quirement is said to be so petty, like the

poll tax struck down by this Court in

Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,

supra, that is constitutes no impediment

at all, How could such a petty

rendition requirement be of any tax signi-

ficance to a political sub-division of the

State of Texas?

It may be assumed that there is some

minimum value of property below which a

tax assessor-collector would not render an

item. Whether that value would be ten

dollars, five dollars, or one cent is

purely speculation. But, if there is

such a minimum requirement, then this

would be tantamount to saying that any

citizen who desires to vote must own and

render at least that amount of property.

And in the City of Fort Worth, a person

must own, render, and pay taxes on some

minimum amount of property in excess of

the two-hundred fifty dollars household

goods exemption in order to vote. This

court forcefully and completely foreclosed

the possibility of any such requirement in

Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elect-

tions, supra:

We say the same whether the citizen

otherwise qualified to vote, has a

dollar fifty cents in his pocket or

nothing at all, pays the fee or fails

to pay it.***The degree of the discrim-

ination is irrelevant. Harper, supra,

383 U.S. at 668 (1966).

2. Texas has no right to limit the

franchise to those who will pay

17 Exemption is contained in Art. VIII, 81

Texas Constitution.

for the obligations assumed in

the bond election because this

purpose bears no relation to

voter qualifications.

The fact that a person may or may not

have to pay the taxes which fund an is-

sue on which he is voting may influence

how he wishes to vote. But it has no

bearing on his ability to intelligently

participate in the electoral process.

Therefore, this purpose also fails to meet

’ the constitutional standard of Harper v.

Virginia State Board of Elections, supra.

The Texas Supreme Court in Montgomery

Independent School District v. Martin,

464 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. Supp. 1971), upheld

the challenged voting classification in

this case for the reason that, among

others, "one who is willing to vote for

and impose a tax on the property of anoth-

er should be willing to assume his distri-

butive share of the burden."' Montgomery,

supra, 464 S.W.2d at 638. The Texas Sup-

reme Court is mistaken. These Texas laws

do not encourage a citizen to assume his

distributive share of the tax burden. A

multi-millionaire who renders a ten-cent

pencil for taxation may vote, but the tax

on that item is hardly his distributive

share of the tax burden.

The Attorney General argued in his

Jurisdictional Statement that only pro-

perty owners will ever be called upon to

repay the bonded indebtedness. That al-

legation would be more correctly stated

that only persons who are rendering prop-

erty owners during the years the bonds

are paid off, not at the time of the

election, plus all those who pay indirect

taxes by purchasing items or services

from rendering property owners, will ever

by called upon to repay the bonded indebt-

edness. teat group would contain almost

everyone alive the time of the bond

election whether they were permitted to

vote or not, except for those persons who

have expired awaiting the final resolution

of this litigation.

3. Texas has no right to limit the

franchise in bond elections to

those who are primarily interes-

ted in the outcome of the elec-

tion because this purpose bears

no relation to voter qualifi-

cations.

Assuming arguendo that the challenged»

voting classification does somehow roughly

limit the franchise to those primarily ~

interested in the outcome of an election,

that purpose bears only a speculative

relationship to the ability or potential

of a person to exercise his franchise

intelligently. The Attorney General has

suggested that it is rational for the

Texas Election laws to exclude non-render-

ers in tax bond elections since such per-

sons have no incentive to vote either

cautiously or intelligently. He says that

non-renderers have no reason to vote ag-

ainst any such tax proposal. However, it

would appear that the following persons

would conceivably have ample reasons for

voting against such proposals:

1. Any non-renderer who anticipates

owning property in the future and

becoming a renderer, since tax

bonds take many years to pay off;

2. Persons who have rendered property

for taxation, but who do not desire

to have their right to vote based

upon their rendition or non-rendi-

tion of property for taxation, or

who may be unwilling to state that

they have property rendered for the

purpose of gaining access to the

voting booth; .

3. Citizens who have a direct interest

and concern as to whether or not

the particular item for which the

bond election was being held is

desirable.

In the instant case, 1132 of the 4880

non-renderers voting on the library bonds

voted against that proposition. (Stip. #47,

pp. 86, 87 App). There is no proof on this

record that those 1132 non-renderers had

"no reason" for voting against the propo-

sition. It is reasonable to assume that

such persons were, in fact, quite intel-

ligent and realized that their vote would

increase the tax burden upon themselves

as well as all other citizens of the City

of Fort Worth.

Moreover, this Court noted in Phoenix,

supra, that such "...persons excluded from

the franchise have a great interest in

approving or disapproving municipal inm-

provements..."' Phoenix, supra, 399

U.S. at 210 [Emphasis added]. What

quality does a rendering property owner

‘have which makes him uniquely qualified

to determine whether the City of Fort Worth

shall build a $6.8 million library?

The requirement of property ownership

is confusing to many citizens who in

daily life equate the term "property" with

the term "real property". The Attorney

General's dual box election procedure has

added greatly to the confusion, and the

lengthy explanations appearing in local

newspapers in the City of Fort Worth prior

to each bond election do nothing to clarify

the situation in the minds of most voters.

Many voters, upon realizing that there

must be some complication requiring a two-

column front page story attempting to

explain who may vote, and where, must

simply give up and decide not to vote.

Virtually no voter can have guessed that

the property rendition requirement is

merely a token requirement.

4. In deciding whether the Texas

voter classification meets the

constitutional standard of Har-

er v. Virginia State Board of

Elections, the degree of dis-

crimination is irrelevant.

The Texas Supreme Court has stated that

the challenged voting scheme is no imped-

iment to anyone who really wants to vote 18

18"Tt is the contention of the Attorney General,

and we agree, that voter qualifications of owner-

ship under the Texas constitutional and statutory

provisions stated above, as interpreted by our

decisions, are so universal as to constitute no

impediment to any elector who really desires to

vote in a bond election. A voter is qualified if

This argument was emphatically answered in

Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elect-

ions, supra:

ARTY AE SDAIN ND |

We say the same whether the cit-

izen, otherwise qualified to vote,

has $1.50 in his pocket or nothing

at all, pays the fee or fails to pay

it. 383 U.S. 668. 49

he renders any kind of property of any value, and

he need not have actually paid the tax." Mont-

gomery Independent School District v. Martin.

464 S.W.2d 638 at 640 (Tex. Sup. 1971).

19 "To introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a

measure of a voter's qualifications is to intro-

duce a capricious or irrelevant factor. The

degree of the discrimination is irrelevant."

Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,

supra, 383 U.S. 668 (1966).

eo reece

II. THE COMPELLING STATE INTEREST TEST,

NOT THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST, IS THE

CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD APPLICABLE TO

THE CASE AT BAR.

The Attorney General has suggested

Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water

Storage District, 419 U.S. 719 (1973) as

authority for refusing to apply the con-

' pelling sate interest test in the case at

bar. That case is distinguishable in

several fundamental ways from both the

case at bar and Phoenix, supra. The Water

Storage District involved in Salyer Land

Co., supra, hadasits primary purpose the

acquisition, storage, and distribution of

water for farming. The District had no

other general services which it provided

such as schools, housing, transportation,

utilities, roads, or any other type of

service ordinarily furnished or financed

by a municipality. Therefore, the restric-

tion of the franchise to land owners

within the District had the effect of

limiting the ballot to those persons

primarily affected by the outcome of the

election. In the case at bar, as well

as in Phoenix, by no reach of the imagin-

ation can it be suggested that the proper>

ty ownership requirement restricted the

vote to persons primarily interested in

the outcome of the election. No logic

or experience indicates that only property

owners have a significant interest in such

things as libraries, parks, police and

public safety buildings, playgrounds and

sewer systems.

Moreover, in Salyer, supra, all the

costs of the District's projects were

= Ca

assessed against the land in proportion to

the benefits received. Just the opposite

obtains in the case at bar. The Texas

classification scheme in no way distri-

butes the burden of taxation proportion-

ately between those who receive the most

and the least benefit from the outcome of

the election, or from the operation of

the issue voted on in the election. Thus,

this Court in Salyer held that, by reason

of the Water District's special limited

purposes and its disproportionate effect

upon the activities of land owners as a

group, the statute there involved did pot

violate the Equal Protection Clause

Associated Enterprises Inc. v. Toltec

Watershed Improvement District, 410 U.S.

), decided the same day as

Salyer, supra, is also urged as a basis

for this Court refusing to apply the con-

pelling state interest test. That case is

also clearly distinguishable from Phoenix,

supra, and the case at bar, since, like

Salve. Supra, it involved a special pur-

pose district which had a disproportionate

effect on landowner's as such within the

district. The operation of the watershed

district in that case was conducted

through special projects, assessments be-

ing made on the land for any benefits re-

ceived, and such assessments constituting

20 Also, Salyer, supra, did not involve a bond

election but rather involved the election of

directors to the Board of Governors for the

Water District.

i |

alin |

SRE S

THIS La S

seyet

Bees: SNR

2 lien upon the land itself, until paid.

The persons primarily affected by the out-

come of the election were easily identifi- °

able. These same persons were also liable

for payments in direct proportion to the

benefit they received. This court held

that the state could rationally give land-

owners the exclusive right to vote.

The Appellant has asserted that the

only distinction between the non-land-

owner resident's relationship to the

elections in Salyer and Associated Enter-

rises compared with the relationship of

the non-rendering appellees to the tax

bond election is the difference between

a "special purpose district": and a special

purpose bond election. That assertion of

the Attorney General is demonstrably

false. The classificatory schemes involv-

ed in Salyer and Associated Enterprises

sucossetelte identified and isolated

those persons who were almost exclusively

affected by the operations of the special

purpose district, to-wit: landowners.

If there were to be an analogy between

Salyer and Associated Enterprises and the

case at bar, then the Texas classificatory

scheme would have to somehow limit the

franchise to those persons almost exclu-

sively affected by the outcome of the bond

election. It does not do so. There is

simply no manner, rational or irrational,

in which property ownership or rendition

of property for taxation may be related

to the use of a public library.

San Antonio Independent School District

v: Rodriguez, 411 ve 1 (1973) is also

urged as a basis for this Court to apply

the traditional rational basis test in

the case at bar, since this Court there

decided to "restrain the expansion" of the

fundamental rights analysis in equal pro-

tection cases. If use of the compelling

state interest test in the case at bar

constitutes an "expansion" of the analy-

sis of this Court in Phoenix, supra, why

has the Attorney Generali not suggested to

this Court in what respect an application

of that test herein would constitute an

"expansion"? As pointed outin

Point III A below, there is simply no sub-

stantial distinction between Phoenix,

supra, and the case at bar, and applica-

tion of the compelling state interest

test to the case at bar could not conceiv-

ably be viewed as an "expansion" of the

fundamental rights analysis. However, the

failure of this Court to apply the com-’

_~pelling state interest test in the case

at bar would: overrule this Court's de-

cisions in Phoenix, supra, Kramer, supra,

Cipriano, supra, and Stewart, supra.

If the Attorney General is asking this

Court to overrule those four cases, he

should say so. The Attorney General has

suggested that one of the important facts

to this Court in Salyer, supra, was that

lessees could bargain with their lessors

for the franchise by proxy. Is the

Attorney General suggesting that there is

some provision in Texas law which permits

voting by proxy in general obligation tax

bond elections? If he is, he should cite

the relevant provisions to this Court.

Counsel for appellees have uncovered no

such provisions.

Born FRCP

Appellant contends that Judge Thorn-.

berry, author of the memorandum opinion

below, fails to consider that the general

obligation tax bond election in Texas will

have a direct and disproportionate effect

on property owners. He cites Salyer,

Supra, as the authority for that proposi-

tion. Salyer, supra, simply is not

analagous, since in that case virtually

the only thing affected by the election

was land. In general obligation tax bond

elections, land and property is one of the

least significant things affected. The

most significant thing affected is people.

Additionally, the Attorney General's

analysis makes no allowance whatsoever for

the indirect payment of taxes, nor for

persons who subsequently render property

for taxation.

If the Attorney General desires for

this Court to apply the rational basis

test in deciding the case at bar, why

does he not devote at least two paragraphs

in his brief to discussing the rational

basis test set forth in Harper under the

facts of the instant case? It is respect-

‘fully submitted that his failure to do so

is based upon his realization that even

under the traditional rational basis test,

these challenged Texas provisions would

.completely fail to pass constitutional

muster. These restrictions have no rela-

tionahip whatsoever to the intelligent use

of the ballot. Judge Woodward below

specifically based his concurrence upon

Harper, supra, in which this Court struck

down a poll tax under the rational basis

standard for the reason that such tax bore

no relationship to the intelligent use of

the ballot. Neither does property owner-

ship in general purpose bond elections.

CEI S SW OY i

RE MCN

eee

THE CASE AT BAR IS FACTUALLY. INDIS-

TINGUISHABLE FROM THE DECISION OF

THIS COURT IN PHOENIX V. KOLODZIEJSKI1.

In Phoenix v. Koloziejski, 399 U.S.

204 (1970), this Court held unconstitu-

tional Arizona statutes and constitutional

provisions which limited the right to vote

in general obligation bond elections to

real property taxpayers.

A. The facts of Phoenix:v.

Kolodziejski are closely analogous

to those of the case at bar.“+

The five fundamental points of com-

parison between Phoenix, supra, and the

case at bar demonstrate that there is no

substantial distinction between the two

cases.

1. Type of Election:

Both Phoenix, su ra, and the case

at bar involve bond elections.

2. Type of Property:

In Phoenix, supra, the franchise

was limited to real property taxpay-

ers, while in the case at bar the

franchise is limited to owners of

property which is rendered for taxa-

tion. The term "property" includes

all types of property, real, personal

or* mixed. The distinction between

real property and other types of

21see Appendix C for a full text of the Arizona

provisions there held unconstitutional.

property is important for many pur-

poses, but certainly the lack of

ownership or rendition of personal

property constitutes no preater

reason to deny the franchise to an

otherwise qualified voter than does

lack of ownership of real property.

3. Type of Bond:

Both Phoenix, supra, and the

instant case involve general obliga-

tion bonds.

4. Purpose for Which Bond Money Is

Spent:

In Phoenix, supra, the general

obligation bonds were to be issued

for the purpose of financing various

municipal improvements,\such as city

sewer system, parks, playgrounds,

police and public safety \buildings,

and libraries. In the case at bar it

is undisputed that general obligation

bonds can be used to finance almost

any type of public facility. The two

issues involved in the April 11, 1972

City of Fort Worth bond election were

a $3 million transportation bond

issue and a $6.8 million library bond

issue. Clearly the bond issues in-

volved in both instances affect

virtually all of the citizens of the

respective communities and would be

of general interest to all. Phoenix,-

supra, held that the difference be-

tween the interests of property own-

ers and the interests of non-property

owners on issues such as these is not

great enough to justify excluding the

non-property owners from voting.

That holding is equally applicable

to the case at bar.

5. Debt Service Requirements:

In Phoenix, supra, the stipulated

facts established that it was antici-

pated that more than half the debt

service requirement on the bonds at

issue would be satisfied not from

real property taxes, but from reven-

ues of other local taxes paid by non-

property owners as well as other

local taxes paid by persons who own

real property. In the case at bar

the secretary of the City of Fort

Worth testified by stipulation that

the principal and interest on general

obligation tax-supported bonds issued

by the city would be paid solely from

the proceeds derived from taxes levi-

ed, assessed, and collected from per-

sons who own real, personal or mixed

property which has been duly rendered

for.taxation. (Stip. #42, pp. 80-82,

App.) Thus, there is a distinction

between the two cases, However, this

court spoke directly to just that

distinction in Phoenix, supra, and

made it clear that such a distinction

would not change the result at all.

...the justification for re-

stricting the franchise to

the property owners seems to

be strongest in the case of

a municipality which, unlike

Phoenix, looks only to prop-

erty tax revenues for serv-

icing general obligation

bonds. But even in such a

case the justification would

be insufficient. Property

taxes may be paid initially

by property owners, but a

Significant part of the bur-

den of each year's tax on

rental property will very

likely be born by the ten-

ant rather than the land-

lord since, as the parties

also stipulated in this

case, the landlord will

treat the property tax as

a business expense and yl

normally will be able to

Pass all or a large part

of this cost on to the

tenants in the form of

higher rent. Since most

city residents not owning

their own homes are leasees

of dwelling units, virtually

all residents share the bur-

den of property taxes im-

posed and used to service

general obligation bonds.

Moreover, property taxes on

commercial property, much of

which is owned by corpora-

tions having no vote, will

be treated as a cost of doing

business and will normally be

reflected in the prices of

goods and services purchased

by non-property owners and

property owners alike.

[Emphasis Added] Phoenix v.

Kolodziejski, supra, 399 U.S.

at pages 210, 211.

ENTE ST PIR NT Rae Ra

eee ph

Precisely the same situation ob-

cains in the case of persons owning

-substantial personal or mixed prop-

erty who pass the taxes on to con-

sumers and other persons. The like-

lihood of passing on taxes to con=

sumers im the case of personal prop-

erty is perhaps stronger. In fact

the proposition that property taxes

are passed on through the sales of

personal property and goods and

services is specifically recognized

in the above quotation from this

Court's opinion in Phoenix, supra.

It is respéttfully submitted that

there is simply no substantial distinction .

between Phoenix, supra, and the case at

bar.

B. In 1970 this Court summarily

affirmed the judgment of a Three-

Judge District Court in Parish

chool Board of the Parish O St.

Charles v. Stewart, citing Phoenix

7. Kolodziejski, on the basis of

Facts closely analogous to those.

of the case at bar.

On February 25, 1970, a three-judge

district court within the Fifth Circuit

held that Louisiana provisions restricting

eligibility to vote in bond elections to

property taxpayers violated the Equal Pro-

tection Clause. Stewart v. Parish School

Board of the Parish of St. Charles, 310 F.

Supp. Tl72 (EDLa....1970), aft 'd mem. 400

U.S. 884 (1970). The Louisiana provisions

. 51

there involved~“required that political

subdivisions could issue bonds only if the

bonds were approved by a majority in number

and in amount of property of the taxpayers

who voted in the election. While the re-

quirement of approval by a majority in

amount of property of the Louisiana voting

classification is different from those

involved in Phoenix, supra, and in the case

at bar, the argument for upholding the

classification in Stewart, supra, would be

stronger than the argument for upholding

the classification in Phoenix, supra, or

the case at bar. This is so because in

Stewart, supra, there was some attempt to

make the weight of each voter's vote pro-

portional to his potential tax liability

as the result of casting his vote. On the

other hand in Phoenix, supra, and in the

case at bar, once a voter is on the rolls

in any amount, he is permitted to vote.

The three-judge panel in Stewart, supra,

recognized the term "property™ as Ged ie

the challenged Louisiana provisions includ-

ed personal property, and thus specifically

held that the distinction between personal

and real property in bond election cases

is of no significance. Moreover, the Court

there took judicial notice of the fact that

in Louisiana few persons pay any personal

property taxes, and that those who do

usually pay them based upon the value of

their automobile. It was there noted that

while Louisiana law does provide that all

property in the state is subject to taxa-

tion, that the tax assessors in fact

22 See Appendix D herein for a full text of those

provisions.

SN eee

GE GR RTA ORNL RRL SH Tee SA NO pS iy

Bp UPR SS OR yl OA EB

primarily place business, commercial, and

corporate personal property (merchandise

inventory) on the assessment rolls.

Stewart, supra, 310 F. Supp at page 1173,

note 3.

The same observation has been made with

respect to Texas by tax experts. It has

been recognized that Texas is one of a

declining number of states which provide

that all property is taxable unless

specifically exempted by the state consti-

tution. Yudof, "The Property Tax in Texas

Under State and Federal Law", 51 Texas L.

Rev. 885 at 888 (1973). Professor Yudof

observed in that article that

the net effect is that laws of .

Texas give little indication of the

true size of the tax base. In prac-

tice personal property is rarely in-

cluded - except for automobiles,

which some 400 districts tax.

(Yudof, supra, at page 889)

He further observes that mortgages, savings

accounts, stocks, bonds and the whole pano-

ply of household goods and chattels are

largely untouched by the property tax.

Yudof, supra, at page 889, note 27.

On November 9, 1970, this court summari-

ly affirmed the judgment in Stewart, supra,

citing City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 9

U.S. 20 970). Parish School Board of

the Parish of St. Charles v. Stewart, 400

U.S. 884 (1970). Thus this Court has had a

specific occasion to determine whether the

requirement of ownership of personal prop-

erty would be treated differently than a

requirement of real property ownership, and

has held that there is no distinction.

C. The Judge below who disagreed with

this Court's decision in Phoenix v.

Kolodziejski concurred in the unani -

mous judgment below because he could

ind no basis for distinguishing this

case from Phoenix v. Kolodziejski.

District Judge Brewster below, who con-

curred in the result reached by the three-

judge court, stated in his opinion:

TST EERO Pe aN Te

I relunctantly concur only in

the judgment now being entered

herein because I am unable to see

a substantial distinction between

this case on the one hand and Cit

of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, on the

other. My oath of office binds me

to follow the decisions of the

Supreme Court of the United States

whether I agree with them or not.

My own views regarding the consti-

tutionality of restrictions on

voting here involved are the same

as those expressed in the dissent-

ing opinions in Kramer v. Union &

Free School District, Dunn v. Blunm- é

stein, and the City of Phoenix v.

Kolodziejski, supra. Fi

[Emphasis Added] (Opinion of Judge :

Brewster, pp. 19a, 20a, AG Juris. :

State. )

RAO IMS IG PRET MIE PS OO SR

Judge Brewster's final observation at

the.end of his opinion was as follows:

I deeply regret that I have

been unable to find a legitimate

way to distinguish the cases

above cited. (Concurring Opin-

ion of Judge Brewster, p. 22a, AG

Juris. State.)

Perea ee eet igareomoremaoertary

Gert ce it nnn eminem ene

On June 23, 1970, this Court announced

its decision in Phoenix v. Kolodziejski,

399 U.S. 204 (1970). This Court there held

that a 1969 bond election in which the

franchise was reserved to property owners

was void. Issuance of those bonds was

enjoined. In that opinion, this Court

stated:

*k*kNor have we been shown that the

fourteen states now restricting

the franchise have unique problems

that make it necessary to limit

the vote to property owners.

Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S.

212-213 (1970).

Texas is one of those fourteen states.

In the face of the Phoenix decision, the

Texas Supreme Court has squarely held that

the Texas voting scheme challenged in this

suit is not violative of the Equal Protec- -

tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Montgomery Independent School District v.

Martin, 404 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. Sup. 1971).

Regardless of which constitutional stan-

dard is applied, the Texas voter require-

ment of ownership and rendition of property

for voting in general purpose bond elections

cannot be upheld.

For to repeat, wealth or fee paying

has, in our view, no relation to

voting qualifications; the right to

vote is too precious, too fundamen-

tal to be so burdened and conditioned.

j Harper v. Virginia State Board of

; ections, 43% U.S. 663 at 670 (1966).

CONCLUSION

Therefore, the Texas classificatory

scheme limiting the right to vote in gen-

eral purpose bond elections to rendering

property owners is unconstitutional.

PRAYER

Wherefore, Appellees pray that this

Court affirm the judgment of the three-

judge district court below. —

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

LAW OFFICES OF DON GLADDEN

702 Burk Burnett Bldg.

Fort Worth, Texas 76102

By:

DON GLADDEN

By: <

i a a ti

ee ey eee

PRs geb ane PAE dened ae eS Re GER RE RT

—_

Shee rk

44a)

PROOF OF SERVICE

The undersigned, a member of the Bar of

this Court, hereby certifies that a copy

of the foregoing has this the day

of December, 1974, been served upon each

counsel of record for appellants and

appellees in accordance with Rule 33 of

this Court, by depositing the same in a

United States mail box, with first class

postage prepaid addressed to said counsel

at their post office addresses.

ee ee ee oa, ee

D0 jp AAEM DEC ATs eb beth tes Kk

APPENDIX A: NEW YORK STATUTES INVOLVED IN

KRAMER V. UNION FREE SCHOOL

DISTRICT

1. Section 2012, New York Election Law.

A person shall be entitled to vote at

any school meeting for the election of

school district officers, and upon all ~

other matters which may be brought before

such meeting, who is: 1. A citizen of the

United States; 2. Twenty-one years of age;

3. A resident within the district for a

period of thirty days next preceding the

meeting at which he offers to vote; and

who in addition thereto possesses one of

the following three qualifications:

(a) Owns or is the spouse of an owner,

leases, hires or is in the possession under

a contract of purchase or is the spouse of

one who leases, hires or is in possession

under a contract of purchase of real prop-

erty in such district liable to taxation

for school Songs agg but the occupation of

real property by a person as a lodger or

boarder shall not entitle such person to

vote, or

(b) Is the parent of a child of- school

age, provided such a child shall have

attended the district school in the district

in which the meeting is held for a period

of at least eight weeks during the year pre-

ceding such school meeting, or

residing with him a child of school age who

shall have attended the district school for

a period of at least eight weeks during the

eat

RPO R LES A 2 AES we P6 Eg EO

year preceding such meeting. No person

shall be deemed to be ineligible to vote

at any such meeting, by reason of sex, who

has the other qualifications required by

this section.

APPENDIX B: LOUISIANA STATUTES INVOLVED IN

CIPRIANO V. HOUMA

1. Article 39: 501 LA. STAT. ANN.

Elections. Except as otherwise provided

in special cases, no subdivision may incur

any debt, issue any bonds, levy any special

tax, Or assume any indebtedness unless it

has been authorized by vote of a majority

in number and amount of the property tax-

payers qualified to vote under the consti-

tution and laws of this state who vote at.

an election hereunder. The governing

authority of any subdivision may call 4

special ele¢tion for any of these purposes

at any time; and it shall call an election

for any of these purposes when requested to

do so by the petition in writing of one-

fourth of the property taxpayers eligible

to vote at the election. “

2. See Also Article 33: 4258 LA. STAT. ANN.

Election to authorize the issuance of

bonds; validation. Before the resolution

authorizing the issuance of bonds under

this Subpart is adopted by the governing

body, the question of the issuance of the

bonds shall be submitted and approved at

either a special or general election which

shall be ordered, conducted and canvassed

EL ant he AD 58 WNT Re LURE RSD eS Re AC i

in accordance with either of the following

election procedures, at the discretion of

the governing body;

(1) The question of the issuance of the

bonds may be submitted to and approved by

votes of a majority in number and amount

of the property taxpayers who vote at an

election held hereunder. In the event the

governing body elects to order a property

taxpayers' election, all matters pertaining

thereto, including the qualifications of

voters and the manner of calling and con-

ducing the election and canvassing and

promulgating the results thereof shall be

governed by the provisions of Chapter 4,

Subtitle II, Title 39.

(2) The question of the issuance of the

bonds may be submitted to and approved by

a majority of the qualified electors of the

municipal corporation who vote at an elec-

tion held therein substantially in accordance

with the general election laws of the state

of Louisiana except that the election shall

be ordered, conducted, canvassed and notice

thereof published by the governing body in

accordance with the procedures set forth in

Chaper 4, Subtitle II, Title 39, except

where inconsistent with the provisions of

this section. In the event the governing

body elects to order such an election, all

' qualified resident electors shall be en-

titled to vote in the election and voters

shall ‘not be required to sign a ballot. .

Voting machines shall be used in the holding

of this type of election and assessed valua-

tion shall not be voted in the election.

In the event a property taxpayers' elec-

tion has heretofore been held and promulgated

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approving the issuance of bonds under this

Subpart, as contemplated in Subparagraph

(1) above, the governing body may proceed

with the issuance and sale of such bonds

without complying with the provisions of

this section and without any further elec-

tion approval.

All bonds heretofore issued under the

provisions of this Subpart are hereby

validated, ratified and confirmed and

declared to be valid and binding obliga-

tions of the municipal corporation in

accordance with the terms of their issuance

in spite of any one or more irregularities

which may have occurred in the passage of

this Subpart or question which might be

raised as to the constitutionality of any

procedural provision of this Subpart. All

proceedings heretofore had in connection

with the issuance of such bonds are hereby

ratified, validated and confirmed.

3. See Also Article 39.508 LA. STAT. ANN.

Qualifications of voters. Only property

taxpayers qualified as electors under the

constitution and laws of this state are

entitled to vote in any election held under

the provisions of this Part. The, qualifi-

cations of taxpayers as voters are those of

age, residence, and registration as voters,

without regard to sex. There shall be no

voting by proxy.

With reference to Part IV of this Chapter

if the limits and boundaries of any munici-

pal corporation has been extended and the

assessment roll that is to include the prop-

erty in the extended limits has not already

been made for the municipal corporation,

those who ‘have become property taxpayers

by the extension of the limits and who are

otherwise qualified to vote shall be per-

mitted to vote in the election and the

assessed valuation of their property shall

be ascertained by reference to the last

assessment roll of the parish.

APPENDIX C: ARIZONA STATUTES AND CONSTI-

TUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

IN PHOENIX V. KOLODZIEJSKI

l. Article 7, Section 13 ARIZ. CONST.

Submission of guestions upon bond issues

or special assessments.

Questions upon bond issues or special

assessments shall be submitted to the vote

of real property taxpayers, who shall also

in all respects be qualified electors of

this state, and of the political subdivi-

sions thereof affected by such question.

' 2. Article 9, Section 8 ARIZ. CONST.

Local debt limits; assent of taxpayers.

No county, city, town, school district,

or other municipal corporation shall for

any purpose become indebted in any manner

to an amount exceeding four per centum of

the taxable Property in such county, city,

town, school district, or other municipal

corporation, without the assent of a major-

ity of the Property taxpayers, who must

also in all respects be qualified electors,

therein voting at an election provided by

law to be held for that purpose, the value

of the taxable property therein to be

ascertained by the last assessment for

state and county purposes, previous to

incurring such indebtedness; except, that

in incorporated cities and towns assess-

ments shall be taken from the last assess-

ment for city or town purposes; Provided,

that under no circumstances shall any

county or school district become indebted

to an amount exceeding ten per centum of

such taxable property, as shown by the

last assessment roll thereof; and Provided

further that any incorporated city or town

with such assent mav be allowed to become

indebted to a larger amount, but not ex-

ceeding fifteen per centum additional, for

supplying such city or town with water,

artificial light, or sewers, when the works

for supplying such water, light, or sewers

are or shall be ownec and controlled by the

municipality.

3. Section 9-523 ARIZ. STAT. ANN.

Bond election.

Questions on bond issues under this

article shall be submitted to the qualified

electors of the municipality. No bonds

shall be issued without the assent of a

majority of the qualified electors voting

at an election held for that purpose as

provided in this article.

4. Section 35-452 ARIZ. STAT. ANN.

Election to authorize indebtedness;

qualifications of electors.

A. The governing body or board of a

political subdivision enumerated in Sec-

tion 35-451 may, and upon petition signed

by fifteen per cent of its real property

taxpayers who are qualified electors

thereof shall, order an election by such

taxpayers and electors to determine .

whether such indebtedness shall be

authorized.

B. The order for the election in a

school district shall be made by the board

of supervisors in the county where such

election will be held, either upon petition

or upon request of the board of school

trustees.

C. If a majority of the real property

taxpayers who are qualified electors voting

at the election vote in favor of creating

an indebtedness in an amount exceeding four

per cent of the value of the taxable prop-

erty of the political subdivision, such

political subdivision may become so in-

debted. .

5. Section 35-455 ARIZ. STAT. ANN.

Issuance wid wale of bonds; call for

election.

A. When the political subdivision desig-

nated in this article desires to issue

bonds or other evidences of indebtedness,

the governing body or board thereof may,

with assent of a majority of the real prop-

erty taxpayers’ who are qualified electors

therein voting at the election held as pro-

vided by Section 35-454, issue and sell

bonds in the amount authorized at the

election.

EA PRIA AR Mtn ain Hit eri Sle |

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B. The call for the election shall set

forth the amount of each bond and the

aggregate amount of the bonds, the maximum

rate of interest to be paid thereon, when

the interest is payable, the number of

years such bonds or any series thereof are

to run from, the date of such bonds or

series and the purposes for which the

money derived from the sale of the bends

will be expended.

APPENDIX D: LOUISANA STATUTES AND CONSTI-

TUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

IN PARISH SCHOOL BOARD OF THE

PARISH OF ST. CHARLES V.

STEWART

1. Article 14, Section 14a LA. CONST.

Municipal corporations, parishes and

school, road, subroad, sewerage, drainage,

subdrainage (waterworks and sub-waterworks)

districts, hereinafter referred to as sub-

divisions of the state may incur debt and

issue negotiable bonds, when authorized by

a vote of a majority in number and amount

of the property taxpayers qualified to

vote under the Constitution and laws of

this state, who vote at an election held

for that purpose after notice published or

posted for thirty (30) days in such manner

as the Legislature may prescribe, and the

governing authorities of such subdivisions

shall impose and collect annually, jm ex-

cess of all other taxes, a tax sufficient

to pay the interest annually or semi-

annually and the principal falling due each

year, or such amount as may be required for

sinking fund necessary to retire said bonds

at maturity.

2. Article 39-508 LA. STAT. ANN.

Qualifications of voters.

Only property taxpayers qualified as

electors under the constitution and laws

of this state are entitled to vote in any

election held under the provisions of this

Part. The qualifications of taxpayers as

voters are those of age, residence, and

registration as voters, without regard to

sex. There shall be no voting by proxy.

With reference to Part IV of this Chap-

ter if the limits and boundaries of any

municipal corporation have been extended

and the assessment roll that is to include

the property in the extended limits has

not already been made for the municipal

corporation, those who have become property

taxpayers by the extension of the limits

and who are otherwise qualified to vote

shall be permitted to vote in the election

and the assessed valuation of their prop-

erty shall be ascertained by reference to

the last assessment roll of the parish.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.