Motion — Hill v. Stone

Supreme Court brief1975

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Text

a a ee ee ee

tee RE ere

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES ...............-...0-.

THIS COURT SHOULD SUMMARILY AFFIRM THE

DECISION OF THE THREE-JUDGE COURT BELOW

BECAUSE THIS CASE IS INDISTINGUISHABLE

FROM THE DECISION OF THIS COURT IN

PRUE VY. PAPIAPORERIORL 245 cc cece ke wee

A. The Facts of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski

are Closely Analogous to Those of

RN RN Oe i i ee WN oo ote 8 o

B. The Judge Below Who Disagreed With

This Court's Decision in Phoenix v.

Kolodziejski Concurred in the Unani-

mous Judgment Below Because He Could:

Find No Basis for Distinguishin

This Case From Phoenix v. Kolodzie-

PD EO RO i ee ae ae re

C. In 1970 This Court Summarily Affirmed

the Judgment of a Three-Judge Dis-

trict Court in Parish School Board of

the Parish of St. Charles v. Stewart,

Citing Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, on

the Basis of Facts Closely Analogous

to Those of the Case at Bar .........

(ii)

THIS COURT SHOULD SUMMARILY AFFIRM THE

DECISION OF THE THREE-JUDGE COURT BE-

LOW BECAUSE APPELLANT HAS NOT RAISED A

SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR REVERSAL IN ITS

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ............... 20

. THIS COURT SHOULD SUMMARILY AFFIRM THE

DECISION OF THE THREE-JUDGE COURT BE-

LOW BECAUSE THAT DECISION. IS SO CLEARLY

CORRECT THAT THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY

THAT THIS COURT WOULD BE INDUCED TO RE-

VRRINE bW es als 0h 6 6k hk ene Ek Ow Lee Oe ve 31

A. The Texas Supreme Court has Upheld

the Constitutionality of the Votin

Classification Challenged in This

Case in the Face of This Court's

Decisions of Kramer v. Union Free

School District and Phoenix v.

ee I Or

REE eC T ENG nee boss 31

B. The Challenged Provisions of Texas

Law Are Not Entitled to a Presump-

tion of Constitutionality ........... 33

C. None of the Purported Purposes of

the Texas Voting Classification

Meet the Constitutional Standard

Laid Down by This Court in Harper

v. Virginia State Board of Elec-

SE Be PIE VS PEGE TIES PLE TS are 33

1. Texas has no right to encourage —

disclosure and rendition of tax-

able property by conditioning the

right to vote upon such disclo-

sure and rendition, because that

purpose bears no relation to

voter qualifications ............. 34

RCA GDR Say OY iG AP Se eter ID REN LG ELLEN IER A DONLEY LAE AADE VSS LITLE LEGO MEAD eperwamng tte i

(iii)

2. Texas has no right to limit the

franchise to those who will pay

for the obligations assumed in

the bond election because this

purpose bears no relation to

voter qualifications ...........-.

3. Texas has no right to limit the

franchise in bond elections to

those who are primarily inter-

ested in the outcome of the

election because this putpose

bears no relation to voter

qualifications .......... nea ek 0 ews

4. In deciding whether the Texas

voter classification meets the

constitutional standard of Har-

pez v. Virginia State Board of

ections, the degree of dis-

crimination is irrelevant ........

D. The Only Three Conceivable Purposes

of the eye Voting Classification

Fail to Meet the Constitutional

Standard Laid Down by This Court

in Kramer v. Union Free School

WRGERECe csi oils cacnsvvees ee ed bes

1. The interests of the state in

encouraging its citizens to dis-

close and render for taxation

some property, however little,

is not a compelling state inter-

OGG opewhke bee 2 OH 082828 Oe 8 2 ee

2. The challenged Texas voting

classification is not necessary

to promote the state interest,

if any, of encouraging each

(iv)

citizén to disclose and render

for taxation some of his

EE ci we Ebadi oe ease seh oe 39

3. The interest of the state in

aes the franchise to those

who will pay for the obligations

assumed in the election is not a

compelling state interest ........ 39

4. The classification challenged

herein is not necessary to pro-

mote the state's interest, if

any, of sar the franchise “0

to those who will pay for the

obligations assumed in the

RRO ES OR IEE ree 40

5. The interest of the state in

limiting the franchise to those

who are primarily interested in

the outcome of the election is .

not a compelling state interest .. 41

6. The challenged voting restric-

tions are not necessary to pro-

mote the state's interest, if

any, of limiting the franchise

to those who are primarily in-

terested in the outcome of the

RM AE og book 6c doe su 0 6 ay eee 42

E. The Clear Mandate of Kramer v.

Union Free School District and the

Three Cases Subsequently Based Upon

Tt is That. These Five Texas iT.

sions Are Unconstitutional .......... 43

gro case cee Secs Te cesncss 47

Ce ee ee ee a ee ee ee ee

APPENDIX A:

APPENDIX B:

APPENDIX C:

APPENDIX D:

(v)

NEW YORK STATUTES INVOLVED IN

KRAMER V. UNION FREE SCHOOL

ME Piso see ere beerbeneereces

LOUISIANA STATUTES INVOLVED IN

CIPRIANO V. HOUMA .......... qc sFoee

ARIZONA STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL

PROVISIONS INVOLVED IN PHOENIX V.

KOLODZIEIJSKI ... ccc crcvcvecsvece

LOUISIANA STATUTES AND CONSTITU-

TIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED IN

(vi)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: . Page

Associated Enterprises, Inc.v. Toltec

Watershed Improvement District ,410

Us Ee ROP is Powe oe hea es oes tae

Cipriano v. Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969)....7,9,11,

; —6-24,29543,45

Harper v. Virginia State Board of :

Elections, | ee ER be, Fe 8 Ree dae 7

30,31,33,34,35,36,46

Kramer v. Union Free School District,

Jen U8, a Vy Pee SE Be. Ot ee

; 33,37,42 ,43,44,45

_Montgomery Independent School

District v. Martin, 464 SW2d 638

Cae: We, BOT ESS 6G5s ce ee Fe & Be? Oe

+ 33,36,38,45

Parish School Board of the Parish

RS OR ee 7.22,

19,20,24

Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S.

Pe CUSIP Os ces vnc oe ee yam. ee Re ok eS ae eee

£5, 20,87 , £6. 30 520 eee,

25 .26,27;28 29,31 ,44,45

Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin

Water Storage District, 410 U.S.

hi We ek 7g > Fa ee OE ee ee re. See

28,29,44

oe--—"3

(vii)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: : Page

San Antonio Independent School

District v. Rodriguez, 411

. ES BE 2) Re A ee 8 28

Stewart v. Parish School Board of :

St. Charles Parish, 310 F. Supp.

a mem. , 400 U.S.

884 (1970) 10,17,48,19,20,

29,40,42,44,45

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS:

Constitution of Texas ;

Tex: Const. Art. VI $3a (1955)........-.-s- 20 3

OTHER AUTHORITIES:

"The Property Tax in Texas Under State

and Federal Law", 51 Texas L. Rev.

885 (1973) (Professor Yudof).........-- 18,19

é 5

Breese roger

NO. 73-1723

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1973

JOHN L. HILL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS,

APPELLANT

MICHAEL L. STONE, ET AL,

APPELLEES

ON APPEAL

FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

MOTION TO AFFIRM

_ TO THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:

3 Appellees Michael Stone, et al, move this Court

_to summarily affirm the judgment of the three-

_ judge court below pursuant to Rule 16(1)(c), (d)

of the Rules of this Court. The unusual length of

this Motion to Affirm is attributable to the desire

of counsel to include herein all relevant material

and argument necessary to a resolution of this case

without further hearing, oral argument, or briefing. =

STATEMENT

I. Nature of the Case

The judgment on March 25, 1974 of the three

judge court below holding unconstitutional and

enjoining the implementation of the herein chal-

lenged Texas provisions was stayed by this Court

only to the extent of permitting the Attorney

General to continue enforce the dual balloting

procedures effectuated by him in 1969 as a "tem-

porary measure" pénding resolution of the consti-

tutional issues involved in Phoenix v. Kolodzie-

jski. ‘| U. S. 204 (1970). (pp. 8, 11, AG Juris.

tate.

II. Facts of the Case

There are no disputed facts in this case. On

April 11, 1972 the City of Fort Worth held a bond

election. A $6.8 Million Library Bond issue and a

$3.0 Million Transportation System Bond issue were

submitted to the electorate in dual box election. :

(Stip. #22, 23, pp. 12d-17d, AG Juris. State.) The ©

Transportation System bonds passed in the property

aM NEY ono

es ead

‘ror convenience of reference, all citations to the

judgment and opinions below as well as facts stipulated by

the parties in the Pre-Trial Order will be to the appropriate

pages in the Jurisdictional Statement of the Texas Attorney

General, cited hereafter as "p. » AG Juris. State.".

8 SRNR OER

| orn APTN

owner box and the non-property owner box. (Stip.

#47, p. 29d, AG Juris. State.) Those bonds have

long since been certified by the Attorney General

and sold by the City of Fort Worth. (Stip. #48,

pp. 29d, 30d, AG Juris. State.) The Library Bonds

passed in the non-property owner box, passed in

the aggregate majority of persons voting in both

boxes, but failed in the property owner box.

(Stip. #47, p. 29, AG'Juris. State.)

The Attorney General, whose approval is a pre-

requisite to sale of any general‘obligation bonds

in Texas, has continuously refused since 1969 to

_ approve any bonds unless such bonds received a

_ majority vote of the aggregate of property owners

and non-property owners and a majority vote of

_ property owners. (Stip. #24; p. 17d, AG Juris.

_ State.) While everyone otherwise qualified is

_ theoretically entitled to vote, property owners

_ are given a veto.

The City considered the Library Bond issue to

“have failed. (Stip. #29, p. 22d, AG Juris. State.)

The decision to sell the bonds is a legislative

- decision resting with the governing body of the

‘ appropriate political subdivision. In this case,

'the City Council of the City of Fort Worth is

Se A lobo

Braille

vested with such discretion. (Stip. #10, pp. 5d,

6d, AG Juris. State.) However, in this case, there

is absolutely no question how the council would

' exercise its discretion. They would seli the

Library Bonds if they could. The following facts

make that clear:

1. Unless the city had intended to sell such

bonds it is absurd to believe that they

would adopt an ordinance submitting the

proposition to the voters and spénd the money

necessary to conduct a city-wide election on

that proposition. (See Stip. #9, p. 5d, AG

Juris. State. ; Pl. Ex. B)

ee eee re ee aes

2. The City Council has in fact sold the bonds

approved by a majority of the rendering pro-

perty owners in Proposition 1 (Transportation!

System Bonds) which was submitted at the same?

time as Proposition 2 (Library Bonds). (Stip.

#48, pp 29d, 30d, AG Juris. State.) : j

3. The City Council has stated in a motion a-

dopted unanimously on April 17, 1972, that

their legal discretion would be exercised in ©

favor of the sale of the bonds if legal en- |

tanglements did not exist. (Stip. #28, pp.

21d, 22d, AG Juris, State.)

4. The City Council, the city attorney, and the |

mayor have stipulated that if the property q

rendition requirements did not exist, they

would take the necessary steps to sell the

Library Bonds as soon as possible. (Stip. -

#26, 26, 30, pp. 20d-22d, AG Juris. State.)2

Appellees, property owners and non-property

owners who voted in that election, brought this

suit challenging Texas provisions of law limiting ~

the right to vote in bond elections to rendering

property owners, and seeking to enjoin the Attor-

ney General and the City from considering the pro-

perty ownership requirements of Texas law in de-

termining whether the bonds passed.

eae

2 There are a number of technical procedural steps the

City would have to take as__ prerequisite to issuance and

sale of the Library Bonds. An exhaustive list of these

steps appears in Stipulation #19, pp. 26, 27, P-T. All city

officials involved have stipulated that they would take all

of such necessary steps. (Stip. #26, 27, 30, pp. 34-37, P-T)

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

: S PRIMARY INDISTINGUISHABLE DECISION OF THIS

COURT.

In Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U. S. 204

(1970) this Court held unconstitutional Arizona

statutes and constitutional: provisions which limit-

ed the right to vote in general obligation bond e-

lections to real property taxpayers. There is no

substantial distinction between that case and the

case at bar. Both cases involve general obliga-

tion bond elections. While Phoenix, supra, in-

volved restriction of the franchise to real pro-

perty taxpayers, the case at bar involves restrict-

ion of the franchise to rendering property owners

("property" including personal property), but there

is no rational distinction between Phoenix and the

case at bar.which can be made on that basis. Both

Phoenix and the case at bar involve municipal im-

provements of general public interest such as

parks, playgrounds, libraries, transporation sys-

tems, etc. In Phoenix, it was certain that more

than half the debt service requirements on the

bonds would be satisfied from revenues of the ot-

-her local taxes paid by non-property owners. In .

the case at bar the testimony was the-the general

—

obligation bonds would be paid off solely from the

proceeds of taxes of persons who own real and per-

sonal property. However, this Court in Phoenix,

spoke directly to that issue stating that,

“justification for restricting the fran-

chise to the property owners seems to be

the strongest in the case of municipality

which, unlike Phoenix, looks only to pro-

perty tax revenues for servicing general

obligation bonds. But even in such a case

the justification would be insufficient."

[emphasis added], Phoenix, supra, at page 210

One of the district judges below who concur-

red in the result reached by the unanimous court

below could find no way to distinguish Phoenix,

supra. He stated in his opinion,

"I deeply regret that I have been

unable to find a legitimate way to

distinguish the cases above cited.

[Phoenix]."" (Concurring opinion of

Judge Brewster, p. 22 AG Juris. State.).

There is direct precedent for this court sum- ~

marily affirming the decision of the court below in ©

this case. In Parish School Board of the Parish of ©

St. Charles v. Stewart, aff"g 310 F. Supp. I172

(EDLa...1970), 400 U. S. 884 (1970), a three judge

district court within the Fifth Circuit held that

Louisiana provisions limiting the right to vote in

general obligation bond elections to "property tax-

payers" were unconstitutional. The term "property

taxpayers" included those who paid tax on personal

property. This Court affirmed in a memorandum o-

pinion citing Phoenix, supra.

Ei. APPELLANT ATTORNEY GENERAL OFFERS NO ARGU-

MENT WHATSOEVER IN HIS JURISDICTIONAL

STATEMENT THAT THE TEXAS CLASSIFICATORY

SCHEME CHALLENGED IN THIS CASE MEETS THE

COMPELLING STATE INTEREST TEST ANNOUNCED

BY THIS. COURT IN KRAMER V. UNION FREE

SCHOOL DISTRICT,395 U. S. 621 (1969) and |

PHOENIX V. KOLODZIEJSKI, 399 U. S. 204 (1970)

The argument contained <n that jurisdiction-

, al statement is primarily based upon two conten-

- tions:

yn 45, — . —_— .

a coer concent re Ye

Sarid Coxe

1. That this Court should apply the ration-

al basis equal protection standard to

the case at bar in spite of Phoenix,

supra, ;

et a a at an

Qe es 2

2. That this Court's decisions in Salyer Land

Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage

District, 410 U. S. 719 (1973) and Asso-

ciated Enterprises, Inc. v. Tol-Tec Water-

shed Improvement District, 410 U. S. 743

(1973) are authority for this Court to up-

hold the constitutionality of the Texas

classificatory scheme.

As to the first of such contentins it is res-

pectfully submitted that this Court may apply th:

rational basis standard instead of compelling

state interest test to the case at bar only if it

is willing to overrule Kramer, supra, Cipriano v.

Houma, 395 U. S. 701 (1969), Phoenix,supra, and

Parish School Board of the Parish of St. Charles

v. Stewart, supra. i

As to the second contention it is respectfully

submitted that neither Salyer nor Associated En-

terprises offer a basis for upholding the consti-

_ tutionality of the challenged Texas provisions.

_ Neither of such cases involve bond elections.

_ More fundamentally, however, both of those cases

_ held in essence that when land is virtually the

only thing affected by the outcome of an election,

_ and the impact of the election on land alone is

_ clear, then the franchise may be restricted to

_reai property owners. The challenged Texas class-

_ificatory scheme in no way limits the franchise

to persons primarily affected by the outcome of

the election at bar. In what manner can it be

said that the restriction of the franchise to

rendering property owners restricts the franchise

_to persons primarily interested in the outcome

of a library bond election? There is simply no

Manner, fational or irrational in which property

ownership or rendition of property for taxation

is related to the use of public library.

It is interesting to note that even though

the Attorney General has suggested the propriety

of this Court applying the rational basis standard

rather.than the compelling state interest test, he

does not advance even one rational basis on which

it can be said that non-rendering property owners

or non-property owners should be disenfranchised

by the State of Texas in bond elections involving

issues of general concern to the community. Per-

haps that failure on the part of the Attorney

~General is because there is no such rational basis.=

III. THE DECISION OF THE COURT BELOW IS CLEARLY

CORRECT.

The Texas Supreme Court in Montgomery Inde-

ndent School District v. Martin, LEE sua 638

e q

Tox. Sup. 1971) upheld the constitutionality of ~

the voting classification challenged in this case

in the face of this Court's decision in Phoenix,

supra. The Texas Supreme Court avoided any mean-

ingful attempt to apply the standards set down by

this Court in Phoenix.

~~: : :

By virtue of this Court's decision in Kramer ©

v. Union Free School District, supra, these chal- ;

lenged Texas provisions are not entitled to the E

general presuption of constitutionality afforded

state laws.

er A

This Court in Harper v.Virginia State Board

of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1966), struck down

the constitutionality of a poll tax in Virginia.

Applying the rational basis standard, this Court

held that,

"wealth like race, creed, or color, is

not germane to one's ability to participate

intelligently in the electoral process."

Harper, supra, at 668.

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One of the avowed purposes of the Texas

classificatory scheme - to encourage disclosure

and rendition of taxable property - has no more

relation to voter qualifications than does wealth,

highway safety, or any number of other topics in

which the state is otherwise legitimately concern-

ed. Assuming arguendo that the Texas scheme some-

how limits the franchise to those who will pay for

the obligation assumed in the election, this does

not prevent a voter from intelligently exercising

his ballot. If it may be said for the purposes of

argument that the classificatory scheme in this

_ case somehow limits the franchise to those who are

. primarily interested in the outcome of the elect-

_ ion this, too, is no justification since it does

* not render a voter incapable of casing an intelli-

_ gent ballot. Both the opinion of the Texas Su-

' preme Court ‘and the jurisdictional statement of

_ the Attorney General assert that the Texas classi-

_ ficatory scheme does not stop anyone from voting

_who really wishes to vote, since there in no mini-

/ mum amount of property which a person may render,

_ and he need not have paid the tax. That conten-

tion was answered emphatically in Harper, supra:

"We say the same whether the citizen

otherwised qualified to vote, has a dollar

and fifty cents in his pocket or nothing

at all, pays the fee or fails to pay it."

383 U. S. at 668.

This Court in Kramer v. Union Free School

‘District, supra, Cipriano v. Houma, supra, and

‘Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, supra, laid down the

‘applicable tests to be applied in this case:

l. There must be a compelling state inter-

est for the classification;

2. And the classification must be necessary

to promote that compelling state interest.

Assuming for the sake of argument that the

challenged classificatory scheme does somehow en-

courage citizens to disclose and render for taxa-

tion a token amount of property, rendition of a

thirty cent pencil is something less than compel-

ling. And this is all ie takes to vote. Exclus-

ion of a voter from the polls: in a bond election

is a clumsy and imprecise manner in which to col-

lect taxes. There are other recognized, better

methods to encourage rendition of taxable proper-

ty. Thus, these challenged voting laws are not

necessary to encourage citizens to render property

for taxation.

Assuming arguendo that the classificatory

scheme challenged here somehow limits the fran-

‘ chise to those who will pay for the obligations

assumed in the election, this is not a compelling

state interest. It disenfranchises multitudes of

persons who are interested in such broad

issues as a transportation system or libraries.

The Court in Stewart v. Parish School poare of St.

_Charles Parish, 310 F. Supp.

mem. 400 U. S. 884 (1970) held that the eaetat

interests of property taxpayers is not a compel -

ling state interest. Moreover, there are many.

persons otherwise qualified to vote who have no

property rendered for taxation in the year of the

election, but who will render property and pay

taxes in the future years. That money will be ap-

plied to the retirement of the bonds. Others will

effectively pay property taxes in the form of rent ©

or costs of goods sold.

Limiting the franchise to those who are pri-

marily interested in the outcome of the election

(if indeed this could be done) would not be a com- —

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pelling state interest for the reason that the vot-

er not primarily interested in the outcome could

nevertheless cast an intelligent informed baMot.

However, that question is effectively pretermitted

by recognition that no rational argument can be

made that a requirement of rendition of property

for taxation in any manner limits the franchise in

a library bond election to the persons primarily

interested in the outcome.

Kramer, supra, Cipriano, supra, Phoenix, su-

pra. and Parish School Board of the Parish of St.

arlee, supra, really do not leave even one sign-

cant question which this Court needs to answer

about the constitutionality of Texas classificatory

scheme. In Phoenix, this Couft noted:

"kkkNor have we been shown that the four-

teen states now restricting the franchise

have unique problems that make it necessary

to limit the vote to property owners.”

Phoenix, supra, at page 212-213.

Texas is one of those fourteen states.

In the face of that decision the Texas Supreme

Court has squarely held the voting ,scheme challeng-

ed herein unconstitutional.

Since virtually the cotmplete record in this

case is before the Court and all evidentary mat-

ters are undisputed, this Court should affirm on

the merits without briefing, oral argument, or fur-

ther hearing.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

THIS COURT SHOULD SUMMARILY AFFIRM THE DECI-

SION OF THE THREE JUDGE COURT BELOW BECAUSE

THIS CASE IS INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE DE-

CISION OF THIS COURT IN PHOENIX V. KOLODZIE-

Jonl..

In Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U. S. 204

(1970), this Court held unconstitutional Arizona

statutes

and constitutional provisions which limit-

ed‘the right to vote in general obligation bond

elections to real property taxpayers.

The Facts of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski are

Closely Analapous to Those of the Case

at Bar.

The five fundamental points of comparison

between Phoenix, supra, and the case at bar demon-

strate that there is no substantial distinction

between the two cases.

1. Type of Election:

Both Phoenix, supra, and the case at

bar involve bond elections.

2. Type of Property:

In Phoenix, supra, the franchise was

limited to real property taxpayers, while

in the case at bar the franchise is limit-

ed to owners of prapeet? which is render-

ed for taxation. e term "property"

includes all types of property, real,

personal or mixed. The distinction be-

tween real property and other types of

See Appendix C for a full text of the Arizona pro-

visions there held unconstitutional és : ,

ee eS eae a ee

+ \

PS SCARE SARE ERTS eR Sen Be RET pet ee Teer tee

property is important for many pur-

poses, but certainly the lack of own-

ership or rendition of personal pro-

perty constitutes no greater reason

to deny the franchise to an otherwise

qualified voter than does lack of own-

ership of real property.

ax Type of Bond:

Both Phoenix, supra, and the in-

stant case involve general obligation

bonds. )

4. Purpose for Which Bond Money Is

Spent:

In Phoenix, supra, the general

ebligation bonds were to be issued

for the purpose of financing various

municipal improvements, such as city

sewer system, parks, playgrounds,

police and public safety buildings,

and libraries. In the case at bar

it is un@isputed that general obliga-

tion bonds can be used to finance al-

most any type of public facility.

The two issues involved in the April

11, 1972, City of Fort Worth bond e-

lection were a $3 million transporta-

tion bond issue and a $6.8 million

library bond issue: Clearly the bond

issues involved in both instances af-

fect virtually all of the citizens

of the respective communities and

would be of general interest to all.

Phoenix, supra, held that the differ-

ence between the interests of proper-

ty owners and the interests of non-

property owners on issues such as

these is not great enough to justify

excluding the non-property owners

from voting. That holding is equally

applicable to the case at bar.

5. Debt Service Requirements:

In Phoenix, supra, the stipulat-

ed facts established that it was an-

ticipated that more than half the

debt service requirement on the bonds

at issue would be satisfied not from

real property taxes, but from reven-

ues of other local taxes paid by non-

property owners as well as other lo-

cal taxes paid by persons who own

real property. In the case at bar

the secretary of the City of Fort

Worth testified by stipulation that

the principal and interest on general

obligation tax-supported bonds issued

by the city would be paid solely from

the proceeds derived from taxes levi-

ed, assessed, and collected from per-

sons who own real, personal or mixed

property which has been duly rendered

for taxation. (Stip.# 42, pp. 25d,

26d, AG Juris. State.). Thus, there

is a distinction between the two

cases. However, this court spoke

directly to just that distinction

in Phoenix, supra, and made it clear

that such a distinction would not

change the result at all.

Ts the justification for

restricting the franchise

to the property owners seems

to be strongest in the case

of a municipality which, un-

like Phoenix, looks only to

property tax revenues for

servicing general obligation

bonds. But even in such a

case the justification would

be insufficient. Property taxes

may be paid intially by proper-

ty owners, but a significant

part of the burden of each

_ year's tax on rental property

will very likely be born by

the tenant rather than the

landlord since, as the parties

also stipulated in this case,

the landlord will treat the

property tax as a business

expense and normally will be

able to pass all or a large

part of this cost on to the

tenants in the form of higher

rent. Since most city residents

not owning their own homes

are leasees of dwelling units \

virtually all residents share

the burden of property taxes

imposed and used to service

general obligation bonds. More-

over, property taxes on com-

mercial property, much of which

is owned by corporations hav-

ing no vote, will be treated

as a cost of doing business

and will normally be reflected

in the prices of goods and ser-

vices purchased by non-proper-

ty owners and property owners

alike."" [Emphasis Added]

Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, supra,

at pages 210, 211.

Precisely the same situation obtains

in the case of persons owning substantial

personal or mixed property who pass the

taxes on to consumers and other persons.

The likelihood of passing on taxes to con-

sumers in the case of personal property

is perhaps stronger. In fact the proposi- |

tion that property taxes are passed on

through the sales of personal property

and goods and services is specifically

recognized in the above quotation from

this Court's opinion in Phoenix, supra.

It is respectfully submitted that

there is simply no substantial distinction

between Phoenix, supra, and the case at

bar. s

B.-The Judge Below Who:Disagreed With This

Court's Decision in Phoenix v. Kolodzie-

jski Concurred in the Unanimous Judgment

Below Because He Could Find No Basis

For Distinguishing This Case From Phoenix

v. Kolodziejski.

District Judge Brewster below, who concurred

1 the result reached by the three judge court,

rated in his opinion:

"I relunctantly concur only in the judg-

ment now being entered herein because I am

unable to see a substantial distinction

between this case on the one hand and City

of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, on the other.

My oath of office binds me to follow the de-

cisions of the Supreme Court of the United

States, whether I agree with them or not.

My own views regarding the constitutionality

of restrictions on voting here involved are

the same as those expressed in Kramer v.

Fh PR art ree ure

es aeeerul

PGE teh ce, was einen veer oe

Berson: aE

i) cee

Union Free School District, Dunn v. Blum-

Stein, and the City of Phoenix v. Kolodzie-

Jski, supra,”[Emphasis Added], (Opinion of

Sadze rewster, pp. 19a, 20a, AG Juris.

State.).

Judge Brewster's final observation at the

end of his opinion was as follows;

"I deeply regret that I have been un-

able to find a legitimate way to distin-

guish the cases above cited." (Concurring

Opinion of Judge Brewster,p.22a, AG Juris.

State.).

C. In 1970 This Court Summarily Affirmed

the Judgment of a Three Judge District

Court in Parish School Board of the

Parish of St. Charles v. Stewart, Cit-

ing Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, on the

Basis of Facts Closely Analogous to

Those of the Case at Bar.

On February 25, 1970, a three judge district

court within the Fifth Circuit held that Louisi-

ana provisions restricting eligibility to vote

in bond elections to property taxpayers violated

the Equal Protection Clause. Stewart v. Parish

School Board of the Parish of St. Charles. 310

_ F. Supp. 1172 (EDLa....1970), affrd mem. 400 U.S.

884 (1970). The Louisiana provisions there in-

volved 4 required that political sub-divisions

could issue bonds only if the bonds were approved

_ by a majority in number and in amount of property

_ of the taxpayers who voted in the election. While

the requirement of approval by a majority in

5 amount of property of the Louisiana voting classi-

fication is different from those involved in

- Phoenix.

”

4 See Appendix D herein for full text of those

» provisions.

supra. and in the case at bar, the argument for up-

peidine the cl&ssification in Stewart, supra, would

be stronger than the argument for upholding the classi

fication in Phoenix, supra, or the case at bar.

This is so because in Stewart, supra, there was

some attempt to make the weight of each voter's:

vote proportional to.his potential tax liability

as the result of casting his vote. On the other

hand in Phoenix, supra, and in the case at bar,

once a voter is on the rolls in any amount, he is

permitted to vote.

The three judge panel in Stewart, supra, re-

cognized that the term property” as used in the

challenged Louisiana provisions included personal

‘property, and thus specifically held that the dis-

tinction between personal and real property in

bond election cases is of no signficance. More-

over, the Court there took judicial notice of the

fact that in Louisiana few persons pay any person-

al property taxes, and that those do usually pay

them based upon the value of their automobile.

It.was there noted that while Louisiana law does ©

provide that all property in the state is subject

to taxation, that the tax assessors in fact pri- 4

marily place business, commercial, and corporate q

-_personal property (merchandise inventory) on the 4

assessment rols. Stewart, supra, at page 1173, z

note 3.

The same observation has been made with res-

pect to Texas by tax experts. It has been recognized 4

that Texas is one of a declining number of states

which provide that all property is taxable unless

specifically exempted by the state constitution.

Yudof, "The Property Tax in Texas Under State and

Federal Law", 51 Texas L. Rev. 885 at 888 (1973).

Professor Yudof observed in that article that

Ee oe ary i pe a —

| Soe eg ee ae thee

"the net effect is that laws of Texas

give little indication of the true size

of the tax base. In practice personal

property is rarely included - except

for automobiles, which some 400 districts

tax."' (fudof, supra, at page 889.)

He further observes that mortgages, savings ac-

cownts, stocks, bonds, and the whole panoply of

household goods and chattels are largely un-

touched by the property tax. Yudof, supra, at

page 889, note 27.

On November 9, 1970, this court summarily

affirmed the judgment in Stewart, supra, citing

City of. Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U. S. 204

(1970): Parish School Board of the Parish of St.

Charles vs. Stewart, 400 U. S. 884 (19/70). Thus

this Court has* had a specific occasion to determine

whether requirement of ownership of personal pro-

perty would be treated any differently than a re-

quirement of real property ownership, and has

held that there is no distinction.

*(p.8)

(p.11)

II. THIS COURT SHOULD SUMMARILY AFFIRM THE

DECISION OF THE THREE JUDGE COURT BELOW

BECAUSE APPELLANT HAS NOT RAISED A SUB-

STANTIAL BASIS FOR REVERSAL IN ITS JURIS-

DICTIONAL STATEMENT.

The Attorney General argues taht the issue

involved in this case is important because more

than one-fourth of all the states still base the

right to vote in general bond elections on pro-

perty ownership or taxation. In 1970, this Court 5

specifically recognized the then remaining four-

teen states which had such limitations. Phoenix

v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204:at 213, note II

(1970). The Louisiana constitutional provisions

cited in that. footnote have now been held uncon-

stitutional by this Court in Parish School Board

of the Parish of St. Charles v. Stewart, 400 U.S.

884 (1970), aff’g Stewart v. Parish School Board

of St. Charles, 310 F. Supp. - Sya3s

Article 6, §3(a) of the Texas Constitution was

also cited in that footnote and has been held

unconstitutional by the District Court below.

Thus there are no more than twelve remaining

states which so limit the right to vote ir. bond

elections.

The Attorney General of Texas recognized

the importance of the issue hercin at least as

early as 1969, since in that year the Attorney

General adopted a dual box election procedure as

a "temporary measure" for the purpose of insuring

validity of bonds voted after that date. The

Attorney General suggests that this temporary

measure was adopted on the assumption that a fi-

(p.12)nal determination of Phoenix,supra, would put

*Note - Page numbers in the left-hand margin

herein locate specific contentions in the Attorney

General's Jurisdictional Statement to which the re-

sponse is being made.

Dest peer esce caer erie ANTE a reer ae rE SPOR ARTETA Be

the question to rest. In spite of direct and

positive language in the Phoenix decision to the

contrary, the Attorney General chose to believe

that Phoenix did not put the question to rest.

This Court’s opinion in Phoenix, in reference

to the fourteen states listed in note 11 therein

as restricting the franchise to property owners

in bond elections, stated as follows: .

Nor have we been shown that the fourteen

states now restricting the franchise have

unique problems that make it necessary to

limit the vote to property owners."

Phoenix, supra at 213.

Such language may not have been necessary

to a decision of the Phoenix case, but the death

knell for the challenged Texas provision was

clearly sounded.

(p.12) While the Attorney General correctly states

j that the test applied by the District Court be-

low was whether the challenged voter exclusions

are "necessary to promote a compelling state

interest", Judge Woodward's concurring opinion

below makes it clear that there is another inde-

pendent basis upon which the challenged provisions

should be held unconstitutitonal, to-wit: the

traditional rational basis equal protection test

announced by this Court in Harper v. Virginia

State Board of Elections, 3 .5. 66 . On

the basis of Harper, supra, Judge Woodward's con-

curring opinion provided:

SO eee wea oa 4 ake i

The ownership of property, like race,

creed or color, has no relationship

to one's ability to participate intelli-

gently in the electoral processes, and a

state may only limit the eligibility re-

é quirements of voters to those factors

which would affect a citizen's ability to

intelligently cast his vote." (Concurring

Opinion of Judge Woodward below,p. 18a,

AG Juris. State.).

Patecisvensesowtia

(p.13)

(p. 14)

Whether the compelling state interest test A

or che traditional rational basis test is employed |

therefore makes no difference as to the result :

which should be reached by this Court in the case

at bar. .

The Attorney General suggests that it is im-

material to the right to vote in a bond election

in Texas whether one's ownership of property be

great or small. This contention is literally

correct, if somewhat misleading. Ownership of A

property alone does not qualify anyone to vote

in a bond election in Texas. Property ownership ~

is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to ~—

voting. The voter must also have rendered at ;

least a token amount of that property. Under 4

Texas law, a multi-millionaire can render a ten- :

cent pencil for taxation and thereby become quali-=

fied to vote in a bond election. The Texas 2

Attorney General suggests that this property own- |

das Sho 4s

ee.

ership and rendition requirement is so petty,

like the poll tax struck down by this Court in

Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, supra,

that it constitutes no impediment to anyone who

really desires to vote. This requirement of~

Texas law is no more petty than the requirement

of a poll tax under consideration in Harper v.

Virginia State Board of Elections, supra. if

the requirement 1s so petty as to be no impedi-

ment at all, how could that token ownership and

rendition requirement be of any tax significance

to a political sub-division of the State of

Texas?

It may be assumed that there is some mini-

mum value of property below which a tax assessor- ©

collector would not render an item. Whether that ©

value would be ten dollars, five dollars, or one =

cent is purely speculation. But, if there is

such a minimum requirement, then this would be

tantamount to saying that any citizen who desires —

to vote must own and render at least. that amount

of property. This court forcefully and completely

foreclosed the possibility of any such requirement

in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,

Supra:

"We say the same whether the citizen

otherwise qualified to vote,has a

dollar fifty cents in his pocket or

nothing at all, pays the fee or fails

to pay it.***The degree of the discrimina-

tion is irrelevant." Harper, supra, 383 U.S.

at 668 (1966).

The requirement of property ownership is

confusing to many citizens who in daily life

equate the term "property" with the term "real

property". The Attorney General's dual box elet-

tion procedure has added greatly to the confusion,

and the lengthy explanations appearing in local

newspapers in the City of Fort Worth prior to

f each bond election do nothing to clarify the

situation in the minds of most voters. Many

4 voters, upon realizing that there must be some

A complication requiring a two-column front page

% story attempting to explain who may vote, and

where, must Simply give up and decide not to

vote. Virtually no voter can have guessed that

the propery rendition requirement is merely a

token requirement.

15) The Texas Supreme Court in Montgomery

Independent School District v. Martin, S.W.2d

638 (Tex. Supp. 1971), upheld the challenged

voting classification in this case for the reason

that, among others, "one who is willing to vote

for and impose a tax on the property of another

should be willing to assume his distributive

share of the burden." Montgomery, supra, 464 S.

W.2d at 638. The Texas Supreme ES rt is mis-

taken. These Texas laws do not encourage a

citizen to assume his distributive share of the

-tax burden. A multi-millionaire who renders a

ten-cent pencil for taxation may vote, but the

tax on that item is hardly his distributive share

of the tax burden.

(p.18) The Attorney General alleges that only pro- —

‘perty owners will ever-be called upon to repay e

the bonded indebtedness. That allegation would

be more correctly stated that only persons who

are rendering property owners during the years

the bonds are. paid off, not at the time of the

election, plus all those who pay indirect taxes

by purchasing items or services from rendering

property owners, will, ever be called upon to

repay the bonded indebtedness. That group would ~

contain almost everyone alive at the time of the’ —

bond election whether they were permitted to vote ©

or not, except for those persons who have expired |

awaiting the final resolution of this litigation. ©

ETL AEE SHORE GRA

(p.18) The Attorney General, has suggested that it

is rational for the Texas Election laws to ex-

clude non-renderers in tax bond elections since

such persons have no incentive to vote either

cautiously or intelligently. Thus, the Attorney

General seems to concede that these laws do not

meet the conpelling state interest test announced

by Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S.

621 (1969), Cipriano v. Houma, 395 U.S. 701, (1969)

Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970), and

Parish School,Board of the Parish of St. Charles

v. Stewart, 400 U.S. 884 (1970), aff g 310 F.

Supp. L172 (EDLa....1970).

(p.18) The Attorney General also suggests that non-

renderers have no reason to vote against any such.

tax proposal. However, it would appear that the

following persons would conceivably have ample

Ree RAO AQIS OTT ARLE AN INTRT HA TRIBE ET tee Co

‘Zo.

reasons for voting against such proposals:

1. Any non-renderer who anticipates

owning property in the future and

becoming a renderer, since tax

bonds take many years to pay off;

2. Persons who have rendered property

for taxation, but who do not desire

to have their right to vote based

upon their rendition or n@n-rendi-

tion of property for taxation, or

who may be unwilling to state that

they have property rendered for the

purpose of gaining access to the

voting booth;

3. Citizens who have a direct interest

and concern as-to whether or not the

particular item for which the bond

election was being held is desirable.

In the instant case, 1132, of the 4880 non-

renderers voting on the library bonds voted

against that proposition. (Stip. #47, p. 29d, AG

Juris. State.). There is no proof on this record

that those 1132 non-renderers had "no reason" for

voting against the proposition. It is reasonable

to assume that such persons were, in fact, quite

intelligent and realized that their vote would

increase the tax burden upon themselves as well

as all other citizens of the City of Fort Worth.

Moreover, this Court noted in Phoenix, supra, that

those persons excluded from the franchise

have a great interest in approving or disapproving

municipal improvements...'' Phoenix, supra, 399

U. S. at 210 [Emphasis added].

p. 18) The Attorney General's assertion that the

Texas Election laws create a minimum qualifica-

tion requirement which serves to protect and en-

hance the electoral process is belied by his

. A

failure to point out how the electoral process

is protected or enhanced. What quality does a

renderi property owner have which makes him

uniqug@ly qualified to determine whether the City

of Fort Worth shall build a $6.8 million library?

(pp.20, The Attorney General has suggésted SaJyer

21,22)Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage

District, 419 U.S. 719 (1973) as authority for

refusing to apply the compelling state interest .

test in the case at bar. That case is distin-

guishable in several fundamental ways from both

the case at bar and Phoenix, supra. The Water

Storage District involved in Saicer Land Co.,

Supra, had as its primary purpose the acquisition,

storage, and distribution of water for farming.

The District had no other general services which

it provided such as schools, housing, transporta-

tion, utilities, roads, or any other type of

service ordinarily furnished or financed by a

municipality. Therefore, the restriction of the

franchise to land owners within the District had

the effect of limiting the ballot to those per-

sons primarily affected by the outcome of the

election. In the case at bar, as well as in

Phoenix, by no reach of the imagination can it

be suggested that the property ownership require-

ment restricted the vote to persons primarily

interested in the outcome of the election. No

logic or experience indicates that only property

owners have a significant interest in such things

as libraries, parks, police and public safety

buildings, playgrounds and sewer systems.

Moreover, in Salyer, supra, all the costs

of the District's projects were assessed against

the land in proportion to the benefits received.

Just the opposite obtains in the cade at bar.

The Texas classification scheme in no way dis-

tributes the burden of taxation proportionately

between those who receive the most and the least

benefit from the outcome of the election, or

from the operation of the issue voted on in

the election. In fact, it permits a rendering

property owner to vote without ever paying any

tax whatsoever. Neither failure to pay the tax

nor tex delinquency has any disqualifying effect

under Texas law. Thus, this Court in Salyer held

that, by reason of the Water District's special

limited purposes and itssdisproportionate effect

upon the activities of land owners as a group,

the statute there involved did not violate the

Equal Protection Clause. Also, Salyer, supra,

did not involve a bond election but rather in-

volved the election of directors to the Board of

Governors for is District.

(Du22, The Attorney General suggests Associated

23)Enterprises Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement

District, 410 U.S. 743 (1973), decided the same

day as Salyer, supra, as a basis for this Court

refusing to apply the compelling state interest

test. That case is also clearly distinguishable

from Phoenix, supra, and the case at bar, since,

like Salyer, supra, it. involved a special pur-

pose district which had a disproportionate ef-

feet on landowner's as such within the district.

The operation of the watershed district in that

case was conducted through special projects,

assessments being made on the land for any bene-

fits received, and such assessments constituting

a lien upon the land itself until paid.

The persons primarily affected by the outcome of

the election were clearly and easily identifi-

able. These same persons were also liable for

payments in direct proportion to the benefit

they received. This court held that the state

could rationally give landowners the exclusive

right to vote.

~ (p.23) The Attorney General has asserted that the

only distinction between the non-landowner resi-

.23,

- 28

dent's relationship to the elections in Salyer

and Associated Enterprises compared with the

relationship of the non-rendering appellees to

the tax bond election is the difference between

a "special purpose district’ and a special pur-

pose bond election. That assertion of the

Attorney General is demonstrably false. The

classificatory schemes involved in Salyer and

Associated Enterprises successfully identified

and isolated those persons who were almost ex-

clusively affected by the operations of the

special purpose district, to-wit: landowners.

If there were to be an analogy between Salyer

amd Associated Enterprises and the case at bar,

then the Texas classificatory scheme would have

to somehow limit the franchise to those persons

almost exclusively affected by the outcome of

the bond election. It does not do so. There is

simply no manner, rational or irrational, in

which property ownership or rendition of property —

for taxation may be related to the use of a

public library.

The Attorney General urges this Court's

24)decision in San Antonio Independent School

District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973) as a

basis for urging this Court to apply the tradi-

tional rational basis test in the case at bar,

since this Court there decided to “restrain the

expansion" of the fundamental rights analysis in

equal protection cases. If use of the compell-

ing state interest test in the case at bar con-

stitutes an "expansion" of the analysis of this

Court in Phoenix, supra, why has the Attorney

General not suggested to this Court in what res-

pect an application of that test herein would

constitute an "expansion"? As pointed out

above in Point I. A. above, there is simply no

substantial distinction between Phoenix, supra,

and the case at bar, and application of the

compelling state interest test to the case at

bar could not conceivably be viewed as an

"expansion" of the fundamental ‘rights analysis.

However, the failure of this Court to apply the

compelling state interest test in the case at

bar would overrule this Court's decisions in

Phoenix, supra, Kramer, supra, Cipriano, supra,

and Stewart, supra.

If the Attorney General is urging this Court

to overrule those four cases, he should say so.

(p. 27) The Attorney General has asserted that Judge

Thornberry, author of the memorandum opinion below,

fails to consider that the general obligation tax

bond election in Texas will have a direct and

disproportionate effect on property owners. He

cites Salyer, supra, as the authority for that

proposition. Salyer, supra, simply is not anala-

gous, since in that case virtually the only thing

affected by the election was land. In general

obligation tax bond elections, land and property

is one of the least significant things affected.

The most significant thing affected is people.

Additionally, the Attorney General's analysis

makes no allowance whatsoever for the indirect

payment of taxes.

(p.27) The Attorney General has suggested that one

of the important facts to this Court in Salyer,

supra, was that lessees could bargain with their

lessors for the franchise by proxy. Is the

Attorney General suggesting that there is some

provision in Texas law which permits voting by

proxy in general obligation tax bond elections?

If he is, he should cite the relevant provisions

to this Court. Counsel for appellees have un-

covered no such provisions.

p.29)

If the Attorney General desires for this

Court to apply the rational basis test in de-

ciding the case at bar, why does he not devote

at least two paragraphs in his Jurisdictional

Statement to discussing the rational basis test

set forth in Harper under the facts of the in-

stant case? It zr respectfully submitted that

his failure to do so is based upon his realiza-

tion that even under the traditional rational

basis test, these challenged Texas provisions

would completely fail to pass constitutional

muster. These restrictions have no relation-

ship whatsoever to the intelligent use of the

ballot. Judge Woodward below specifically

based his concurrance upon Harper, supra, in

which this Court struck down a poll tax under

the rational basis standard for the reason that

such tax bore no relationship to the intelligent

use of the ballot. Neither does property owner-

ship.

Ce Ei ese e |

aban

III. THIS COURT SHOULD SUMMARILY AFFIRM THE DECISION

OF THE THREE JUDGE COURT BELOW BECAUSE THAT

DECISION IS SO CLEARLY CORRECT THAT THERE IS NO

POSSIBILITY THAT THIS COURT WOULD BE INDUCED TO

REVERSE.

A. The Texas Supreme Court has Upheld the Con-

stitutionality of the Voting Classification

Challenged in This Case in the Face of This

Court's Decisions of Kramer v. Union Free

School District and Phoenix v. Kolodziejski.

In Montgomery Independent School District v.

Martin, 464 Td 638 Giles: Sup. 1971) the Texas

Supreme Court held that the Texas laws being

attacked in the present case are not violative of

the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-

ment. The opinion of the Court does not analyze

whether the voting classj{fication bears any relation

to voter qualifications,’ nor does it analyze

whether the voting classification is necessary to

promote a compelling state interest, which are the

S"But we must remember that the interest of the State,

when it comes to voting is limited to the power to fix the

qualifications. Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not

germane to one's ability to participate intelligently in the

electoral process." Harper v. Virginia State Board of

Elections, 383 U.S. 663 at 668 (1966).

"Therefore, if a challenged state statute grants the

right to vote to some bona fide residents of requisite age

and citizenship and denies the franchise to others, the

Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary

to promote a compelling state interest." Kramer v. Union

Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 at 627(1969).

applicable constitutional standards. ’ Two purposes

of the voting classification are set forth in the

opinion:

(1) to limit the franchise to those who will

pay for the obligations assume in the

election, and

(2) to encourage disclosure and rendition of

taxable property.

7The tradtional "rational basis" standard is not appli-

cable to this case, Kramer v. Union Free School District,

395 U.S. 621 at 628 (1969).

8"Qne who is willing to vote for and impose a tax on

the property of another should be willing to assume his

distributive share of the burden. ... To allow some property

owners to vote in that kind of an election, and at the same

time to permit them to avoid their fair share of the result-

ing obligation, would confer preferential rights. This would

be a denial of equal protection to another segment of citizens."

Montgomery Independent School District v. Martin, 464 S.W.2d

638 at 641, 642 (Tex. Sup. 1971).

ast

meee

9"In our opinion, the requirement that the voter in a

general obligation bond election must get his property on the

rolls is in the interest of sound government and affords equal

treatment to all citizens. ... This is the manner in which the

Texas Constitution, as approved by the entire citizenry of the

State, provides inducement for those who wish to participate

in the decision making process in a School District to assume

their rightful portion of the burden they help to create.

Personal property such as stocks, bonds, cash, auto-

mobiles, and livestock furnishes a great deal of the State's

taxable property. No class of property is so susceptible to

concealment and escapte from taxation as personal property.

... There may be other means: to reach personal property, but

NYT SRY C9

Bete caresses ernenyereae gin swingers

: The only other conceivable state interest

arguably promoted by the classification is to limit

the franchise to those who are primarily interested

in the outcome of the election.

B. The Challenged Provisions of Texas Law are

not Entitiet to a Presumption of Constitu-

tionality.

The clear mandate of Kramer v. Union Free

School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) is that these

challenged Texas provisions are not entitled to the

general presumption of constitutionality afforded

state laws.1l

C. None of the Purported Purposes of the Texas

Voting Classification Meet the Constitutional

Standard Laid Down by This Court in Harper v.

Virginia State Board of Elections.

The constitutional standard of Harper v. Vir-

ginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)

is best stated in the language of its opinion:

"But we must remember that the interest

of the State, when it comes to voting

is limited to the power to fix qualifi-

cations. Wealth, like race, creed, or

color, is not germane to one's ability

experience has shown that every means must be pressed into

service if the obligations of government are to be spread

equally." Montgomery Independent School District v. Martin,

464 S.W.2d 638 at 641 (Tex. Sup. 1971).

10Vamer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621

at 627, 628 (1969)

to participate intelligently in the

electoral process." Harper v. Vir-

ginia State Board of Elections, supra,

383 U.S. 668 (1966).

1. Texas has no right to encourage disclo-

sure and rendition. of taxable property

by conditioning the right to vote upon

such disclosure and rendition, because

that purpose bears no relation to voter

qualifications.

It is undoubted that a state has the right

to encourage disclosure and rendition of taxable

property, just as it has the right to promote high-

way safety by appropriate legislation. But this

does not mean a state is free to withhold the right

of its citizens to vote in order to enforce these

goals.

In Harper v. Virginia State Board

of Elections, supra, this Court held

that a state does not have the right to impose a

tax on the right to vote because "(v)oter qualifi-

cations have no relation to wealth nor to paying or

not paying this ‘or any other tax." 383 U.S. 666.

Disclosure and rendition of taxable property has no

more relation to voter qualifications than does

wealth, highway safety, building codes, or any

number of other topics in which the state is other-

wise legitimately interested. A state simply is

not free to clutter up the voting laws with require-

ments which have no relation to voter qualifications

2. Texas has no right to limit the franchise

to those who will pay for the obligations

assumed in the bond election because this

purpose bears no relation to voter quali-

fications.

The fact that a person may or may not have

to pay the taxes which fund an issue on which he is

voting may influence how he wishes to vote. But it

has no bearing on his ability to intelligently par-

ticipate in the electoral process. Therefore, this

purpose also fails to meet the constitutional stand-

ard of Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,

supra.

3. Texas has no right to limit the franchise

in bond elections to those who are pri-

marily interested in the outcome of the

election because this purpose bears no

relation to voter qualifications.

Assuming arguendo that the challenged voting

classification does somehow roughly limit the fran-

chise to those primarily interested in the outcome

of an election, that purpose bears only a specula-

tive relationship to the ability or potential of a

person to exercise his franchise intelligently. It

may be generally true that persons primarily inter-

ested in the outcome of an election exercise more

care in the casting of their vote, but this certain-

ly does not mean that persons no primarily inter-

ested are incapable of exercising their franchise

intelligently. For example, a Fort Worth resident

voting in a statewide election on a proposition to

abolish a hospital district in Waco certainly is

"one not primarily interested in the outcome" of

such election. But this in.no way implies that the

voter is ancepabie of casting an informed, intelli-

gent ballot.

The State law which requires a statewide election in

such cases is anamolous. Perhaps the Fort Worth resident

shouldn't have a vote on such a proposition. But that is

because he doesn't reside in or come under the control of

such hospital district, and not because he is incapable of

casting an intelligent ballot.

4. In deciding whether the Texas voter

classification meets the constitutional

standard of Harper v. Virginia State

Board of Elections, the degree of dis-

crimination is irrelevant.

The Texas Supreme Court has stated that the

challenged voting scheme i§ no impediment to anyone

who really wants to vote. This argument was

emphatically answered in Harper v. Virginia State

Board of Elections, supra:

"We say the same whether the citizen,

otherwise qualified to vote, has $1.50

in his pocket or nothing at all, pays

the fge or fails to pay it." 383 U.S.

668.

laure is the contention of the Attorney General, and

we agree, that voter qualifications of ownership under the

Texas constitutional and statutory provisions stated above,

as interpreted by our decisions, are so universal as to

constitute no impediment to any elector who really desires

to vote in a bond election. A voter is qualified if he

renders any kind of property of any value, and he need not

have actually paid the tax." Montgomery Independent School

District v. Martin. 464 S.W.2d 638 at 640 (Tex. Sup. 1971).

13e79 introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a

measure of a voter's qualifications is to introduce a

capricious or irrelevant factor. The degree of the discrim-

ination is irrelevant." Harper v. Virginia State Board of

Elections, supra, 383 U.S. 668 (1966).

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D. The Only Three Conceivable Purposes of the

Texas Voting Classification Fact to Meet

the Constitutional Standard Laid Down b

This Court in Kramer v. Union Free School

District.

This Court announced a strict standard

for measuring state action in elections in Kramer

vy. Union Free School District:

"(L)£f a challenged state statute grants

the right to vote to some bona fide resi-

dents of requisite age and citizenship

and denies the franchise to others, the

Court must determine whether the exclu-

sions are necessary to promote a compell-

ing state interest." Kramer v. Union

Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 at

627 (1969).

It should be observed that this standard has

two distinct requirements:

(1) there must be a compelling state interest

for the classification; and

(2) the classification must be necessary to

promote that compelling state interest.

Thus, in order to decide whether or not these

five Texas provisions are consistent with the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, we

must answer one or both of the following questions:

(1) is there a compelling state interest for

the classifications made by these five

provisions?

(2) even if there is, is the classification

adopted necessary to promote that compell-

ing state interest?

1. The interests of the state in encouraging

its citizens to disclose and render for

taxation some property, however little,

is not a compelling state interest.

It is perfectly clear that the challenged

Texas provisions do not require the voter to assume

his pro rata share of the tax burden in order to

vote. ,

A voter is qualified if he renders

any kind of property of any value,

and he need not have actually paid

the tax, Montgomery Independent

School District’v. Martin, 464 ? W.

at Tex. Sup. 1971).14

\4there ts however some language in the same opinion

indicating that the challenged provisions do encourage each

citizen to assume his fair sahre of the tax burden.

"To disclose one's share of the total burden for

which he is responsible in a bond election re-

quires no more than the law universally expects.

To allow some property owners to vote in that

kind of an election, and at the same time per-

mit them to avoid their fair share of the re-

sulting obligation, would confer perferential

rights." 464 S.W.2d 641, 642.

This language cannot be reconciled with the language

of the Court in that case quoted in the text.

ma ee Se ee a oe

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The interest of the State in securing dis-

closure and rendition for tax purposes of a thirty-

cent pencil is something less than compelling. The

cost of accounting for such an item probably exceeds

the tax that can be collected.

2. The challenged Texas voting classifica-

tion is not necessary to promote the

state interest, if any, of encouraging

each citizen to disclose and render for

taxation some of his property.

A law which exacts a monetary penalty for

failure to render property for taxation is an

appropriate and recognized technique for collecting

taxes. Employment of a tax-collector assessor to

discover and render taxable property is another

recognized way to collect taxes. Both of these

means are tailored to the end sought to be accom-

plished. Voting laws are not designed primarily to

collect taxes, but are designed to give the citizen

a voice in his government. Since there are other,

better ways to encourage rendition of taxable prop-

erty, these voting laws are certainly not necessary

to promote that goal.

It is difficult to assess how many persons

who otherwise would not render some property for

taxation are persuaded to render taxable property

by these Texas laws. The number of such persons is

probably not very great. There are surely many more

persons whose uncertainty over the property rendi-

tion requirements keeps them from the poll Since

these voting laws largely fail to encourage rendi-

tion of taxable property, they are not necessary {to

promote that goal.

3. The interest of the state in limiting

the franchise to those who will pay for

the obligations assumed in the election

is not a compelling state interest.

The five Texas provisions attacked in this

suit disenfranchise many voters who are directly

affected by the results of the elections which are

held pursuant to the challenged provisions. The

bond election held on April 11, 1972, was for the

purpose of submitting two propositions to the

electorate: .

Proposition 1 .............. $ 3,000.000

(Transportation System Bonds)

Proposition 2 .............. $ 6,860,000

(Library Bonds)

Certainly there is no compelling reason to

adopt a classification which keeps otherwise quali-

fied voters from voting on matters such as these.

Each of these improvements vitally affects all the

residents of Fort Worth: Most bond elections do

affect all residents. Thus, while the Constitution

and Statutes of Texas attempt to enfranchise only a

limited class of voters in this type of election,

it in no way limits the subject matter of the elec-

tions to matters concerning only those allowed to

vote.

It is true that those who must pay the taxes

for the improvements do have a special interest

apart from the general public, but the Court in

Stewart v. Parish School Board of St. Charles, 310

F. Supp. 11 a mem. , .W. (3.970)

held that the special interests of property tax-

payers is not a compelling state interest. 310 F.

Supp. at 1181.

4. The classification challenged herein is

not necessary to promote the-state's

interest, if any, of limiting the fran-

chise to those who will pay for the

obligations assumed in the election.

Perirreesiieconcesznrs VLAD MOOG a 9

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PAIR nestip oye

FAIS

The Texas provisions disenfranchise many

persons who will have to pay for the improvements

voted on. There are many persons otherwise quali-

fied to vote who will not have rendered property

for taxation in the year of the election, but who

will render property in future years. The tax on

that property will be applied to the retirement of

the bonds. There are other people who will effec-

tively pay property tax in the form of rent, or

overhead added to a seller's cost of goods sold.

There are still others who will be deterred from

voting because although they have rendered some

property, they do not understand that these pro-

visions of Texas law require only token rendition

of taxable property as a condition to the right to

vote.

The voting laws is no place to require

token compliance with the legitimate objective of

tax collection, and it is certainly no place for

such token compliance when, as here, the law

limits the right to vote in an imprecise and

easily misunderstood fashion.

Clearly, there is a large amount of over-

kill in these provisions. These provisions are

not necessary to promote the state interest of

limiting the vote to those who will, in the long

run, pay for the obligations. Indeed, these pro-

visions do not even reasonably promote that inter-

est.

5. The interest of the state in limiting

the franchise to those who are primarily

interested in the outcome of the elec-

tion is not a compelling state interest.

Even though there is no hint that the

challenged voting classification even begings to

limit the franchise to those primarily interested

LA WPT

in the outcome of the election, such a purpose is

not a compelling one. :

This is the same state interest suggested

in Kramer v. Union Free School District, supra, and

this Court there held that the New York statute was

not necessary to promote that interest since many

persons vitally interested in the issues voted on

were disenfranchised. 395 U.S. 632, 633.

The Court in Stewart v. Parish School Board

of St. Charles, 310 F. Supp. 1172 (1970), aff'd men.

1970), held that the special interests

of property taxpayers is not a compelling state in-

terest. 310 F. Supp. 1181.

The challenged Texas provisions suffer pre-

cisely the same infirmity, since the bond elections

governed by the five Texas provisions are of vital

concern to all voters. These bonds can be used to

finance virtually any governmental eae

6. The challenged voting restrictions are

not necessary to promote the state's

interest, if any, of limiting the fran-

chise to those who are primarily inter-

ested in the outcome of the election.

It is difficult to even make an argument

that the challenged voting classification limits

the franchise, even imprecisely, to persons who are

, primarily interested in the outcome of the election.

Under the facts of the present case, a person who

has no property rendered for taxation may have

children who would be benefited to a great extent

by the building of a new library or the improvement

of existing facilities. And as has already been

pointed out, even though this voter may have no

property rendered for taxation, if he pays rent on

his house or any other property which is taxable

in Texas, he is in effect paying the tax without

having any property rendered. Indeed, by paying

the tax he has done more to fulfill the state's

objective of tax collection than a person meeting

the minimum requirement for voting in a bond elec-

tion. . A renderer need not have paid any tax in

order to vote. To say that a person is less inter-

ested, or is not primarily interested, in the out-

come of an election such as the one held in this

case simply is not true. The further difficulty

with such an argument is that any attempt to decide

by whatever means who is "primarily interested" in

the outcome of an election for something of as much

general interest as a library is necessarily highly

subjective and speculative.

It is respectfully suggested that the

challenged voting classification is not necessary

to limit the franchise to persons primarily inter-

ested in the outcome of the election. Indeed, it

doesn't even begin to so limit the franchise.

E. The Clear Mandate of Kramer v. Union Free

School District and the Three Cases Sub-

sequently Based Upon It is That These Five

Texas Provisions Are Unconstitutional.

In Kramer v. Union Free School District, supra,

this Court struck down a provision of the New York

Education law which required a voter in school

board elections to be either a parent of a child

attending school in the district, or the owner or

lessee of real property, or the spouse of an owner

or lessee.

In Cipriano v. City of Houma,

395 U.S. Bt (1969), a companion

'Ssee Appendix A for a full text of the statute.

aaa

case to Kramer v. Union Free School District, this

Court held unconstitutional a Louisiana statute

which limited the right to vote in a | ed revenue

bond elections to "property owners". 16

In Phoenix v. Kolodziejski. 399 U.S. 204 (1970)

this Court held unconstitutional Arizona statutes

and constitutional provisions which limited the

right to vote in general obligation bond elections

to real property taxpayers.

SLE RC ALES I EM

In Stewart v. Parish School Board of St. .

Charles, 310 F. Supp. 1172. (1970) aff'd mem., 400

U.S. 884 (1970), a three-judge district court with- ~

ing the Fifth Circuit held that Louisiana constitu-

tional and statutory provisions limiting the right

to vote in general obligation bond elections to

“property taxpayers" were unconstitutional.18 The

term "property taxpayers" included those who pay

tax on personal property. This Court affirmed the

judgment of the three-judge court in a memorandut

opinion, citing Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, supra.

The Kramer doctrine has been applied by the

Federal Courts in every subsequent case where the

issue of restriction of the franchise in bond

elections to property taxpayers has been raised. 19

coe Appendix B for a full text of this Louisiana

statute.

see Appendix C for a full text of the Arizona

provisions.

'8ce6 Appendix D for a full text of these provisions.

'SNeither Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water

Storage District, 410 U.S. 719 (1973) nor Associated Enter-

prises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement District, 410

Poy cy Mad, eed

Without fail, the Courts have held the challenged

state provisions unconstitutional. It will be

necessary for this Court to overrule Kramer, Phoenix,

Cipriano, and Stewart, supra, if these Texas provi-

Sions are to be held constitutional.

On June 23, 1970, this Court announced its

decision in Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204

(1970). This Court thete held that a 1969 bond

election in which the franchise was reserved to

property owners was void. Issuance of those bonds

was enjoined. In that opinion, this Court stated:

"kkkNor have we been shown that the four-

teen states now restricting the fran-

chise have unique preblems that make it

necessary to limit the vote to property

owners." Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399

U.S.:2122205 970) «

Texas is one of those fourteen states.

In the face of the Phoenix decision, the

Texas Supreme Court has squarely held that the

Texas voting scheme challenged in this suit is not

violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. Montgomery Independent

School District v. Martin, FOL S.W.2d et: (Tex.

Sup. 19/1).

U.S. 743 (1973) involved bond elections. More fundamentally,

both of such cases basically held that when land is virtually

the only thing affected by an election, and the impact of the

election on land alone is clear, then the franchise may be

restricted to real property owners. See II above pp. 26-28.

Since virtually the complete record in this

case is before the Court and all evidentiary matters

are undisputed, this Court should affirm on the

merits without briefing, oral argument, or further

hearing.

"For to repeat, wealth or fee paying has,

in our view, no relation to voting quali-

fications; the right to vote is too

precious, too fundamental to be so bur-

dened and conditioned." Harper v. Vir-

ginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S.

663 at 6/0 (1966).

AN DSIRE

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CONCLUSION

Therefore, the Texas classificatory scheme

limiting the right to vote in general obligation

bond elections to rendering property owners is

unconstitutional.

PRAYER

Wherefore, Appellees pray as follows:

1. That this Court decide the case

without briefing, oral argument,

or further hearing, and,

2. That this Court affirm the judgment

of the three judge district court

below.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

LAW OFFICES OF DON GLADDEN

702 Burk Burnett Building

Fort Worth, Texas 76102

“DON GLADDEN

MARVIN COLLINS

PROOF OF SERVICE

The undersigned, a member of the Bar of this

Court, hereby certifies that a copy of the fore-

going Motion has this the 26th day of April, 1974,

been served upon each counsel of record for appell-

ees, in accordance with Rule 33 of this Court, by

depositing the same in a United States mail box,

with first class postage prepaid, addressed to.

said counsel at their post office addresses.

DON GLADDEN

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Pesesee eee rss earner ess

BIS OE Bs ie Ba RS PER es RR ARS

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APPENDIX A: NEW YORK STATUTES INVOLVED

IN KRAMER V. UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT

1. Section 2012, New York Election Law.

A person shall be entitled to vote at any school

meeting for the election of school district officers,

and upon all other matters which may be brought

before such meeting, who is: 1. A citizen of the

United States. 2. Twenty-one years of age. 3. A

resident within the district for a period of thirty

days next preceding the meeting at which he offers

to vote; and who in addition thereto possesses one

of the following three qualifications:

(a) Owns or is the spouse of an owner, leases,

hires, or is in the possession under a contract of

purchase or is the spouse of one who leases, hires

or is in possession under a contract of purchase of,

real property in such district liable to taxation

for school purposes, but the occupation of real

property by a person as a lodger or boarder shall

not entitle such person to vote, or

(b) Is the parent of a child of school age, provided

such a child shall have attended the district school

in the district in which the meeting is held for a

* period of at least eight weeks during the year

preceding such school meeting, or

with him a child of school age who shall have attended

the district school for a period of at least eight

weeks during the year preceding such meeting. No

person shall be deemed to be ineligible to vote at

any such meeting, by reason of sex, who has the

other qualifications required by this section.

Wm Sn PO bk Mei TOE Ap RS A we OL ene as “NEAR GAMERS Bin te OO:

APPENDIX B: LOUISIANA STATUTES INVOLVED

IN CIPRIANO V. HOUMA

1. Article 39: 501°LA. STAT. ANN.

Elections. Except as otherwise provided in special

cases, no subdivision may incur any debt, issue any

bonds, levy any special tax, or assume any indebted-

ness unless it has been authorized by vote of a

majority in number and amount of the property tax-

payers qualified to vote under the constitution and

laws of this state who vote at an election hereunder.

The governing authority of any subdivision may call

a ‘special election for any of these purposes at any

time; and it shall call an election for any of these

purposes when requested so to do by the petition in

Ty | of one-fourth of the property taxpayers

eligible to vote at the election.

2. See Also

Article 33: 4258 LA. STAT. ANN.

Election to authorize the issuance of bonds;

validation. Before the resolution authorizing

the issuance of bonds under this Subpart is adopted

by the governing body, the question of the issuance

of the bonds shall be submitted and approved at

either a special or general election which shall

be ordered, conducted and canvassed in accordance

with either of the following election procedures,

at the discretion of the governing body;

(1). The question of the issuance of the bonds

may be submitted to and approved by votes of a

majority in number and amount of the property tax-

payers who vote at an election held hereunder. In

the event the governing body elects to order a

property taxpayers’ election, all matters pertaining

thereto, including the qualifications of voters

and the manner of calling ‘and conducting the election

Serer |

and canvassing and promulgating the results thereof

shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 4,

Subtitle II, Title 39.

(2). The question of the issuance of the bonds may

' be submitted to and approved by a majority of the

“| qualified electors of .the municipal corporation who

| vote at an election held therein substantially in

accordance with the general election laws of the

+ state of Louisiana except that the election shall

be ordered, conducted, canvassed and notice thereof

published by the governing body in accordance with

the procedures set forth in Chapter 4, Subtitle II,

Title 39, except where inconsistent with the provi-

5 sions of this section. In the event the governing

| body elects to order such an election, all qualified

'4 resident electors shall be entitled to vote in the

election and:voters shall not be required to sign a

ballot. Voting machines shall be used in the holding

of this igen oF election and assessed valuation shall

not be voted in the election.

In the event a property taxpayers’ election has

heretofore been held and promulgated approving the

issuance of bonds under this Subpart, as contemplated

in Subparagraph (1) above, the governing body may

proceed with the issuance and sale of such bonds

without complying with the provisions of this section

4 and without any further election approval.

All bonds heretofore issued under the provisions

gof this Subpart are hereby validated, ratified and

confirmed and declared to be valid and binding

jobligations of the municipal corporation in accord-

ance with the terms of their issuance in spite of

@any one.or more irregularities which may have

occurred in the passage of this Subpart or question

Gwhich might be raised as to the constitutionality of

any procedural provision of this Subpart. All

proceedings heretofore had in connection with the

issuance of such bonds are hereby ratified, validated

and confirmed.

3. sed arzo

Article 39.508 LA. STAT. ANN.

Qualifications of voters. Only property taxpayers

qualified as electors under the constitution and

laws of this state are entitled to vote in any elec-

tion held under the provisions of this Part. ~ The

qualifications of taxpayers as voters are those of

age, residence, and registration as voters, without

regard to sex. There shall be no voting by proxy.

With reference to Part IV of this Chapter if the

limits and boundaries of any municipal corporation

has been extended and the assessment roll that is

to include the property in the extended limits has

not already been made for the municipal corporation,

those who have become property taxpayers by the

extension of the limits and who are otherwise

qualified to vote shall be permitte vote in the

election and the assessed valuatio of their property

shall be ascertained by reference to the last

assessment roll of the parish.

APPENDIX C: ARIZONA STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL

PROVISIONS INVOLVED IN PHOENIX V. .KOLODZIEJSKI

1. Article 7, Section 13 ARIZ. CONST.

Submission of questions upon bond issues or special

assessments.

Questions upon bond issues or special assessments

shall be submitted to the vote of real property tax-

payers, who shall also in all respects be qualified

electors of this State, and of the political sub-

divisions thereof affected by such question.

2. Article 9, Section 8 ARIZ. CONST.

Local debt limits; assent of taxpayers. No county,

city, town, school district, or other municipal

corporation shall for any purpose become indebted

in any manner to an amount exceeding four per centum

of the taxable property in such county, city, town,

school district, or other municipal corporation,

without the assent of a majority of the property

taxpayers, who must /also in all respects be qual-

ified electors, therein voting at an election

provided by law to be held for that purpose, the

value of the taxable property therein to be

ascertained by the last assessment for State and

county purposes, previous to incurring such

indebtedness; except, that in incorporated cities

, and towns assessments shall be taken from the last

assessment for city or town pruposes; Provided,

that under no circumstances shall any county or

school district become indebted to an amount

exceeding ten per centum of such taxable property,

as shown by the last assessment roll thereof; and

>) Provided further, that any incorporated city or

town, with such assent, may be allowed to become

indebted to a larger amount, but not exceeding

fifteen per centum additional, for supplying such

city or town with water, artificial light, or sewers,

when the works for supplying such water, light, or

sewers are or shall be owned and controlled by the

municipality.

3. Section 9-523 ARIZ. STAT. ANN.

Bond election. Questions on bond issues under

this article shall be submitted to the qualified

electors of the municipality. No bonds shall be

issued without the assent of a majority of the

qualified electors voting at an election held

for that purpose as provided in this article.

4. Section 35-452 ARIZ. STAT. ANN.

Election to authorize indebtedness; qualifications

of electors.

A. The governing body or board of a political

subdivision enumerated in Section 35-451 may, and

upon petition signed by fifteen per cent of its

real property taxpayers who are qualified.electors

thereof shall, order an election by such taxpayers

and electors to determine whether such indebtedness

shall be authorized.

B. The order for the election in a school district

shall be made by the board of supervisors in the

county where such election will be held, either upon

petition or upon request of the board of school

trustees.

C. If a majority of the real property taxpayers

who are qualified electors voting at the election

vote in tavor of creating an indebtedness in an

amount exceeding four per cent of the value of the

taxable property of the political subdivision,

such political rubdivision may become so indebted.

So RE ball BPP a SES,

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5. Section 35-455 ARIZ. STAT. ANN.

Issuance and sale of bonds; call for election.

A. When the political subdivision designated in

this article desires to issue bonds or other

evidences of indebtedness, the governing body or

board thereof may, with assent of a majority of the

real property taxpayers who are qualified electors

therein voting at the election held as provided by

Section 35-454, issue and sell bonds in the amount

authorized at the election.

B. The call for the election shall set forth the

amount of each bond and the aggregate amount of

the bonds, the maximum rate of interest to be

paid thereon, when the interest is payable, the

number of years such bonds or any series thereof

are to run from the date of such bonds or series

and the purposes for which the money derived from

the sale of the bonds will be expended. .

APPENDIX D: LOUISIANA STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL

PROVISIONS INVOLVED IN PARISH SCHOOL

BOARD OF THE PARISH OF ‘ :

STEWART

1. Article 14, Section 14a LA. CONST.

Municipal corporations, parishes and school,

road, subroad, sewerage, drainage, subdrainage

(waterworks and sub-waterworks) districts, here-

inafter referred to as subdivisions of the State

may incur debt and issue negotiable bonds, when

authorized by a vote of a majority in number and

amount, of the property taxpayers qualified to

vote under the Constitution and laws of this State,

' who vote at an election held for that purpose after

notice published or posted for thirty (30) days in

such manner as the Legislature may prescribe, and

the governing authorities of such subdivisions

shall impose and collect annually, in excess of

all other taxes, a tax sufficient to pay the interest

annually or semi-annually and the principal falling

due each year, or such amount as may be required

for any sinking fund necessary to retire said bonds

at maturity.

2. Article 39-508, LA. STAT. ANN.

‘Qualifications of voters. Only property taxpayers

qualified as electors under the constitution and

laws of this state are entitled to vote in any

election held under the provisions of this Part.

The qualifications of taxpayers as voters are those

of age, residence, and registration as voters,

without regard to sex. There shall be no voting by

proxy.

With reference to Part IV of this Chapter if the

limits and boundaries of any municipal corporation

have been extended and the assessment roll that is

to include the property in the extended limits has

not already been made for the municipal corporation,

those who have become property taxpayers by the

extension of the limits and who are otherwise

_ qualified to vote shall be permitted to vote in the

SBA ED Be tah SB IR Be RE

8 er eee

election and the assessed valuation of their

property shall be ascertained by reference to the

last assessment roll of the parish.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.